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# FRANCISCAN STUDIES

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THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE  
ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY  
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## THE QUESTION OF AN ETERNAL WORLD IN THE TEACHING OF ST. BONAVENTURE

The question of whether or not the world could have been created from eternity was discussed by medieval schoolmen with considerable interest and, to judge from their writings, not without some emotional overtones.<sup>1</sup> Confronted with an apparent conflict between the Aristotelian and Averroistic thesis of an eternal world and the revealed doctrine of the world's temporal creation, the school of thought headed by Aquinas approached the subject on strictly philosophical grounds and adopted an attitude of cautious reservation in the controversy by admitting the theoretical possibility of an eternally created world. In contrast, the school of thought represented by St. Bonaventure defended not only the absolute incompatibility of Christian teaching with the Aristotelian-Averroistic theory but also the impossibility of an eternal world as well as of an eternal creation.

### I. IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM

The controversy has not lost its appeal to the contemporary man, and even today it has more than an academic or historical value. Its solution — if a solution will ever be reached — involves some of the most fundamental issues of natural theology, metaphysics, and cosmology. It involves, first of all, the question of whether it is possible to conceive without contradiction a totally contingent world that would be limited in all respects but one, the extent of its duration. If a positive answer is given to this question, a further issue rises and the possibility must be considered of an infinite multitude of actually existing beings, despite the obvious fact that each individual being

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<sup>1</sup> In the words of D. E. Sharp, the possibility of an eternal creation was "one of the most important questions of the thirteenth century." See her *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 107.

exists separately and has therefore its own distinct and individual nature. The controversy involves the additional problem of whether it is possible to think of creation in the traditional sense of production of a being from nothing (*ex nihilo*) and admit at the same time that there would never have been the case in which nothing, i.e. no creature, was in existence.

There are more far-reaching implications in the question at issue. Chief among them is our understanding of one of the most fundamental and yet mysterious attributes of God, the nature and extent of divine omnipotence. Is God so powerful that he can create a world, although not necessarily the present one, from all eternity, despite the world's radical contingency and successive duration? Or is an eternal creation impossible even to an omnipotent Being simply because the very notion of it involves a contradiction?

These are only some of the problems involved in the issue under consideration. I may add that if a negative side is taken in the controversy, the way is open to a refutation of those systems of philosophy that either identify God with the world or pretend to do away with God altogether and conceive the world as an eternally self-existent and self-sufficient reality. Otherwise stated, once the impossibility of an eternal world is accepted, much of what pantheism, materialism, or any atheistic philosophy stands for will appear to be either groundless or inconsistent.<sup>2</sup>

Coming now to the substance of my article, I will present the position of St. Bonaventure on the impossibility of creation *ab aeterno* as it emerges from its literary and historical context and compare it to the opposite view of St. Thomas. In the course of this presentation, I will feel free to add my own reflections on the matter with a view to clarifying certain points that have been left obscure, or at least did not receive sufficient consideration, by the debating parties.

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<sup>2</sup> It should be obvious to everyone that once the temporal nature of the world, any kind of world, has been established, it is no longer possible to identify it with God, an eternal and immutable Being, as pantheism does. Nor will it be possible to maintain with materialists that matter is the only reality, since it would have to depend on another Being for its existence. It is indeed a truism that no being can give existence to itself, just as no being can come from nothing. For the contradictions involved in an atheistic philosophy see this writer's paper, "The Theistic Proof and Some Contemporary Philosophical Trends," *Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie, Wien, 2-9 September, 1968*. Vol. VI, pp. 173-80.

The article will conclude with my personal evaluation of the whole controversy and a brief analysis of the latest literature on the subject.

## II. BONAVENTURE'S POSITION AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Bonaventure discusses the problem of the eternity of the world in a special question of his *Commentary on the Sentences* of Peter Lombard where he asks, "Whether the world has been produced from eternity or in time."<sup>3</sup> Following the scholastic tripartite method, he lists first the arguments favoring an eternal production, and then refutes them one by one, but not before counteracting them with as many arguments supporting the opposite view, namely, that the world was produced in time and that creation from eternity is not only theologically untrue but also a contradictory, and therefore philosophically untenable, concept.

For a better understanding of Bonaventure's position, I should like to present the historical background of the controversy. We know by revelation that the world was created in time. The question is asked by philosophers whether God could have created the world or any creature from all eternity. Plato taught in the *Timaeus* that this world had a beginning; but he admitted on the other hand the existence of an eternal matter in a chaotic state. Aristotle maintained the eternity of the world, and went as far as to say that the world could not have had a beginning. Yet these two great philosophers did not discuss specifically the question of the absolute beginning of things, since they did not have a proper notion of creation from nothing; rather they discussed the problem of the beginning or not of the actual process of the world.

While the possibility of an eternal creation was not a matter of discussion among the Fathers of the Church, Origen seems to have admitted an eternal creation and Boethius did not find any contradiction in it. The controversy about the eternity of the world was raised in the Middle Ages. On the one side, we have the Jewish Neo-Platonists of the tradition of Proclus and the Arabian commentators of Aristotle, such as Avicenna and Averroes, who admit the eternity of the world; on the other side, we have the Jewish theologians and the Mohammedans who defend not only the fact of creation in time

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. *II Sent.*, d. I, p. I, a. I, q. 2; *Opera omnia* (Ad Claras Aquas, 1885), Vol. II, p. 19.

but also the impossibility of an eternal creation. Moses Maimonides, whose contribution to the understanding of the problem at issue is of primary importance, attempted to show that while the fact of creation is of the domain of faith, a philosopher can demonstrate with absolute certainty neither the necessity nor the repugnance of an eternal origin of the world.<sup>4</sup> This is basically the view that was adopted later by Aquinas, who departed on this matter from the position of his teacher, Albert the Great, while Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, and the Franciscans, Thomas of York,<sup>5</sup> Roger Bacon, and Alexander of Hales affirmed the impossibility of an eternal creation.

It is against this background that Bonaventure took his position in the controversy and rejected both the theory of an eternal world and the notion of a possible eternal creation. "This notion is so much against reason," he states categorically, "that I can hardly imagine how any philosopher with but a little understanding could ever have maintained it." <sup>6</sup> Bonaventure is quite willing to admit that if matter had existed from eternity, as Aristotle and his followers taught, it is not unreasonable nor unintelligible to hold the view of an eternal world. Indeed, such a view is even more consistent with its hypothetical premise, and certainly more logical than Plato's idea of an eternal matter deprived of its form. Quoting a text from Augustine,<sup>7</sup> Bonaventure says that creation can be compared to a footprint in the dust, inasmuch as creatures carry within themselves the vestige of God. If the foot is eternal, and the dust on which it is imprinted existed also from eternity, the footprint will likewise be eternal. Similarly, creatures proceed from God like a shadow, while the Son

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<sup>4</sup> See Moses Maimonides, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, trans. M. Friedländer (2d ed. rev.; New York: Dover Publication, 1956), pp. 171-200, where ample treatment is given to the controversy and most of the arguments used later by Scholastic philosophers on both sides of the issue, including Bonaventure and Aquinas, are discussed and evaluated.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas of York's discussion of the problem deserves special consideration because it contains many principles and arguments used by succeeding Franciscans, including Bonaventure, in support of their thesis. Cf. *Sapientiale*, ed. E. Longpré, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, I (1926), 273-93.

<sup>6</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 22: "Dicendum, quod ponere, mundum aeternum esse sive aeternaliter productum, ponendo res omnes ex nihilo productas, omnino est contra veritatem et rationem...; et adeo contra rationem, ut nullum philosophorum quantumcumque parvi intellectus crediderim hoc posuisse. Hoc enim implicat in se manifestam contradictionem."

<sup>7</sup> *De civitate Dei*, Book X, chap. 31.



proceeds from him as his splendor. As soon as there is light, there is splendor, and, given an opaque body, the shadow appears at one and the same time. Hence, once the existence of an eternal matter is admitted, the notion of an eternal world, far from being contradictory, is more reasonable than the opposite view. But is an eternal matter possible?

To avoid any misunderstanding, it must be made clear that when Bonaventure speaks of the impossibility of an eternal creation, he does not refer to the act by which God decides to create, or what in scholastic terminology is called *active* creation. Such an act, Bonaventure maintains with all other medieval schoolmen, must be eternal just as God himself is eternal because of his absolute simplicity and perfection. The question concerns only *passive* creation, or creation looked at from the point of view of the world as the effect of the eternal decree of God that the world exist.

Likewise, when Bonaventure uses the expression "creation in time," he does not mean that creation took place at a particular moment of time, as though time preceded creation. There was no time when there was no creation, for time, according to the then commonly accepted teaching of Aristotle, is the measure of motion in a changeable being, and before creation there was no such a being. The proper expression for temporal creation is therefore "creation with time," although this expression is not of common usage.<sup>8</sup> Thus the problem under discussion concerns the possibility or not of a creation that would go beyond time and reach out, as it were, into infinity. More specifically, the question is being asked whether it is possible to conceive the world or any contingent being in such a way that the duration of its existence, while actually determined here and now, would have had no beginning and would therefore be infinitely distant from the present moment. It is to this question that Bonaventure addresses himself and these are the arguments he uses to support his thesis.

### III. BONAVENTURE'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN ETERNAL WORLD

1. It is impossible to add to the infinite,<sup>9</sup> for any addition to it would make the infinite greater, and this is against the very nature

<sup>8</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 2, p. 1, dub. 2; Vol. II, pp. 69-70.

<sup>9</sup> See Aristotle, *De caelo*, I, 12, 283 a 9.

of the infinite. Consequently, if the world had no beginning but existed from all eternity, it would admit of no additional duration. This is obviously wrong, for each new day represents an additional unit to the number of days already gone. Anticipating Aquinas' objection that the infinite in question concerns only the past and not the present,<sup>10</sup> which is actually limited and therefore capable of further additions, Bonaventure argues that that is not true, for an eternal world implies an addition to the past as well as to the present. Indeed, for every solar revolution there would have been twelve revolutions of the moon, and since the revolutions of the sun are supposedly infinite, the lunar revolutions would be twelve times as many as those of the sun or twelve times as infinite. This is sheer contradiction.<sup>11</sup>

It may be added that an infinite duration in the past (*a parte ante*) involves an even greater contradiction than a similar duration in the future (*a parte post*). In the former case, we are in effect confronted with an actual infinity, or an infinite series of events that has already been actualized; whereas, in the latter case, there can only be a question of potential infinity or such that it will never be actualized.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, since, of its very nature, a series of successive future events will always be limited, one may infer by analogy that the same ought to be true with regard to a series of successive past events. Thus, just as it is absurd to think of a line that would extend to infinity on one side with no possibility of any further addition to it, so it is difficult, to say the least, to conceive of a line that would reach out to infinity on the opposite side. But that is what an infinite series of successive events amounts to, for each event in the series is like a dot in a line. Briefly, an infinite duration in the past is just as inconceivable as is an infinite line or a line without a beginning.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Contra gentiles*, II, 38, ad *Quod etiam Quarto*.

<sup>11</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, pp. 20-21. This argument had already been proposed by the Islamic theologian Algazel. Cf. Averroes, *Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazelis*, disp. 1, dub. 5, as quoted in M. Gierens, S.J., *Controversia de aeternitate mundi*, "Textus et Documenta," Series phil., fasc. 6 (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1933), p. 45, No. 33. The same argument is also found in the works of other Franciscans, such as Thomas of York (cf. *Sapientiale*, ed. Longpré, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale*, I, 290) and Matthew of Aquasparta (cf. *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. Longpré, *ibid.* p. 297).

<sup>12</sup> This is the observation made by Matthew of Aquasparta. Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. Longpré, *ibid.*, p. 306.

The objection to be raised later by Durandus<sup>13</sup> and Suarez,<sup>14</sup> that this line of reasoning applies only to movable and changeable beings, and not to spiritual substances like the human soul and the angels, is irrelevant. For spiritual substances are at least capable of intellectual acts which are distinct from one another and constitute a series of limited units that is essentially the same as that of the material and changeable beings previously mentioned.

It is interesting to see how the defenders of the possibility of an eternal world react to Bonaventure's argument. In the words of one of their best exponents, a recognized authority on Aquinas' thought, Bonaventure would have fallen victim to a basic misunderstanding by assuming that the past is something *real*, whereas the truth of the matter is that it is only an idea in our minds. This idea may refer to a particular day, month, or year, or any other determined duration, in which case it is always possible to think of an addition to it. But if the idea refers to an infinite past taken as a whole, then the argument is nothing but a begging of the question, since the past cannot be considered as a whole except by determining and limiting it. Thus the argument assumes as true what is to be proved.<sup>15</sup>

Speaking for Bonaventure, I would say that such a criticism is not warranted. First of all, I cannot share the author's view that the past, as referred to definite periods of time such as days, months, or years, is merely an idea in our minds. The measurement of the past in terms of time units, I would agree, is the product of our own thinking, but the basis for that measurement is not and cannot be a mere fiction. There have been *real* events, which took place within *real*, definite periods of time. It is wrong, therefore, to compare the past to the future and make both purely mental constructs. Secondly, with regard to the author's accusation that by conceiving the past as a determined whole Bonaventure and his followers are begging the question, I think one could just as well reverse the charge and say: To hold that the past as a whole cannot be conceived because it transcends all limits and measurements, is precisely to accept as

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Gierens, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-86.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90-100.

<sup>15</sup> See A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., "La preuve de l'existence de Dieu et l'éternité du monde," *Revue thomiste*, 5 (Nov., 1897), 623. See also his book, *L'idée de création et ses retentissements en philosophie* (Paris: Aubier, 1945), pp. 32-33, where he reaffirms his view even more forcefully than in his previous article.

true what the argument is supposed to prove, namely, the infinite nature of the past. But more of this later.

2. It is impossible for an infinity of things to be ordered. In fact, all order involves a beginning, a middle term, and an end. Where there is no beginning, there can be no middle term and no end, and hence no order, at least as far as a whole series of events is concerned. But if the duration of the world, and consequently the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, were infinite, these revolutions would have no starting point,<sup>16</sup> nor would they follow one another, which is plainly false. There must therefore be a first term in the series of heavenly revolutions and hence a beginning of the world.<sup>17</sup>

If it is objected that in Aristotelian,<sup>18</sup> as well as Thomistic,<sup>19</sup> terms an infinite series is only impossible in essentially subordinated causes, Bonaventure disagrees and asks, "Why is not an infinite series of other causes equally impossible?" Aristotle teaches that there has never been a revolution of the stars around the earth without an animal being generated by another animal. Now it is obvious that animals are ordered among themselves by a causal relationship. If then, according to Aristotle, an order among causes is necessary, it does not seem possible to avoid the conclusion that there must have been a first animal and hence a beginning of the world.

To understand Bonaventure's reasoning, one must keep in mind that for him a series of causes in which one depends on another for its existence as a cause, although not for its own causality, is *de facto* a necessary series. In this case, Aquinas' distinction between essentially and accidentally related causes does not hold, for, even though the causes in question do not act simultaneously, they are all needed for the final effect. What is accidental to the series, Bonaventure would say, is the fact that its members act in succession and within the same order of causality, rather than simultaneously and on a different level. Looked at from this point of view, the generation of an animal from another animal or of a man from another man is not merely accidental. Indeed, it is so essential that if any member of the series is missing, no final effect is possible. This goes to show,

<sup>16</sup> Reference is made here to Aristotle's statement, "Infinitorum enim nihil est primum." *Phys.* VIII, 5, 256 a 19.

<sup>17</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII, 5; *Metaph.* I, 2, 994 a 1 ff.

<sup>19</sup> *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7.



Bonaventure would insist, that without a first man there would be no men in existence today.<sup>20</sup>

Aquinas, as is well known, met Bonaventure's objection to an eternal world based on the impossibility of order in an infinite series of successive causes or events by denying the need for a first term in such a series.<sup>21</sup> This answer, if proved valid, would solve one of the most controversial issues that underlie our discussion: whether it is possible to conceive an infinite series of events and avoid at the same time the contradiction, admitted by both Aquinas and Bonaventure, that would result from the acceptance of the idea of an infinite number. This point will be discussed in connection with Bonaventure's third argument, which in many ways resembles the present one.

3. It is impossible to traverse the infinite.<sup>22</sup> But if the world had no beginning, an infinite number of celestial revolutions must have taken place and made it impossible to reach our present day.<sup>23</sup> Here again Bonaventure foresees Aquinas' objection<sup>24</sup> that this is a wrong issue, because in an eternal world no infinite distance is being traversed, since there is no first revolution to begin with. To this Bonaventure replies: either one revolution, or let us say one day, has preceded the present day infinitely, or none. If none, then all anterior days are at a limited distance from the present one, which means that they all had a beginning. If, on the contrary, one day stands at an infinite distance from the present one, then what about the day that immediately followed it? Would that day be infinitely removed from the present day or not? If it is not infinitely removed, then neither is the preceding day, for the distance between them is limited. If, on the other hand, it is infinitely removed, the same question must be asked about the third, the fourth, and all succeeding days indefinitely. This amounts to saying that the present day is at no further distance from any one day in the past than it is from

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<sup>20</sup> The idea that in the process of generation the causes are essentially related to one another is already found in Thomas of York (cf. *Sapientiale*, in Longpré, *art. cit.*, p. 291) and was later developed by Matthew of Aquasparta (cf. *Quaest. disp.*, *ibid.*, p. 299).

<sup>21</sup> *Cont. gent.*, II, 38, *Quod etiam Tertio*; *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 6.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, 22; 82 b 38; *Metaph.* X, 10; 1066 a 35.

<sup>23</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>24</sup> *Sum theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2 ad 6.

another. All days are then simultaneous and no sequence of days is possible, which is obviously not the case.<sup>25</sup>

This argument, like the preceding ones, aims to show the absurd consequences that follow from the acceptance of an infinite series of past events. The argument is not to be taken lightly, for it involves one of the most critical issues in the present controversy and may well serve as a testing ground for Bonaventure's thesis. To better understand his reasoning and the discrepancy between his view and that of Aquinas, a brief presentation of the latter's position is in order.

In his attempt to show the possibility of an eternal creation, or at least the lack of its evident contradiction, Thomas consistently maintains that it is possible to conceive of an infinite series of accidentally subordinated causes as long as the causes involved act only in succession. This he calls a potentially infinite series or multitude to distinguish it from an actually infinite multitude, whether this is taken absolutely, e.g., the act of the will, the movement of the hand, and a hammer, or accidentally, as for example, an infinite multitude of hammers, one independent of the other.<sup>26</sup> To avoid the apparent contradiction of what might be construed as the acceptance of an infinite number, Thomas adopts Aristotle's distinction between number and multitude and claims that number adds to multitude the idea of measurement: "Number is multitude measured by one."<sup>27</sup> This distinction enables him to acknowledge the validity of the Aristotelian principle that the infinite admits of no addition, cannot be ordained, cannot be traversed, and the like, and still maintain his own view of the possibility of an eternal world.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>26</sup> *Sum. theol.* I, q. 7, a. 4; q. 46, a. 2, ad 7.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 7, a. 4. See also *In III Phys.*, lect. 8, where Thomas explains that while number is a species of discrete quantity, multitude is like a transcendental: "est enim numerus multitudo mensurata per unum, ut dicitur in decimo Metaphysicae; et propter hoc numerus ponitur species quantitatis discretæ, non autem multitudo, sed est de transcendentibus."

<sup>28</sup> For a discussion of the notion of an infinite series of causes and related problems see Hildebrand Fleischmann, O.S.B., "De processu in infinitum in causis efficientibus," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses*, 3 (1926), 5-28; Paolo Carosi, "La serie infinita di cause efficienti subordinate," *Divus Thomas*, 46 (1943), 29-77; 159-75; P. M. Périer, "A propos du nombre infini," *Revue pratique d'apologétique*, 27 (1919), 739-57. For an extensive and sympathetic treatment of Aquinas' doctrine of creation see James F. Anderson, *The Cause of Being* (St. Louis: Herder, 1952).

Bonaventure objects to Aquinas on this score, even though there is no evidence that Thomas was the direct target of his attack, and tries to refute his position by a series of arguments *ad absurdum*. The third argument is a case in point.

It would be impossible, it has been noted,<sup>29</sup> to disprove directly the theory of an infinite series of past events, for, being unthinkable, the theory does not lend itself to direct refutation. Yet it is not difficult to point out the absurd consequences to which the theory leads. This is precisely what Bonaventure attempts to do.

Aquinas' position seems to imply that an infinite series of causes is possible as long as the members of the series are not acting or existing simultaneously or actually required for a particular effect. Thus it is not impossible to conceive of an infinite series of hammers, as long as they are used successively for a particular work, just as it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, the successive or actual existence of the causes in question becomes the criterion of the possibility or not of an infinite series. If this is the case, why then, one may ask, make a distinction between multitude and number — a distinction, incidentally, that is far from convincing — which is completely irrelevant to the problem at issue? Whether or not the causes are actually in existence, we are confronted in both cases with a series of distinct, determined, and therefore measurable, units that has already been actualized and can in no way be called merely potential. The fact that some of the causes, e.g., hammers or men, are not in existence now is purely accidental to the effect of the series.<sup>31</sup> This is so true that the possibility of their being kept in existence by God from all eternity, provided an infinite series of such causes is conceivable, should be obvious to everyone. This point will become clearer when Bonaventure's fifth argument is discussed.

4. The fourth argument is based once more on an Aristotelian principle, namely, that it is impossible for a finite power to understand the infinite.<sup>32</sup> That, however, Bonaventure says, would be the case if the world had no beginning. For if we admit with Aristotle

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Hidden God*, trans. Theodore Crowley (St. Louis: Herder, 1966), p. 175.

<sup>30</sup> *Sum theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7.

<sup>31</sup> For a discussion of this point cf. Fleischmann, *art. cit.*, pp. 62–63.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *Metaph.* II, 4, 999 a 27.

that no celestial revolution is possible that is not being caused, or at least known, by a finite spiritual substance, and grant further that a pure intelligence does not forget what it knows, then we are bound to say that a finite power knows the infinite. It would be an actual, comprehensive knowledge of an infinite number of revolutions, since, in Aristotle's conception of the world, such revolutions would have been going on from all eternity. Nor can it be said, adds Bonaventure, that the knowledge of the revolutions in question can be obtained by a single idea on account of their similarity, for that knowledge extends also to the effects of the revolutions which are diverse and infinite. The conclusion is therefore inescapable: a finite intelligence would have an actual and comprehensive knowledge of the infinite.<sup>33</sup>

Needless to say, this argument is but another attempt on the part of Bonaventure to show the absurd consequences that follow from the notion of an eternal world. The assumption of Aristotle's unscientific theory of heaven on which the argument rests does not in any way weaken the value of the argument itself. In fact, it is at least conceivable that in an eternally existing world a created intelligence — whether human or divine is irrelevant — would be there to know the infinite number of actual or possible changes and events that would have taken place in it. Thus the only question to be solved is whether or not an infinite series of past events that have been actualized in succession can be present to a finite intelligence as a simultaneous and distinct whole on account of its intuitive grasp and unfailing memory. Bonaventure answers this question in the negative and his answer, it seems to me, is in complete agreement with his previous position.

5. The fifth argument is not only the epilogue and logical conclusion of the preceding ones, but it constitutes also the most serious objection to the theory of an eternal world. Thomas himself felt very strongly the weight of this objection and, as we shall see presently, he was never able to answer it to his complete satisfaction. Here is how Bonaventure frames the argument. It is impossible that an infinity of beings exist at one and the same time.<sup>34</sup> But if the world is eternal and, as Aristotle says, everything that exists is somehow

<sup>33</sup> *II Sent.*, d. I, p. I, a. I, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle, *Phys.* III, 5; *Metaph.* X, 10, 1066 b 11.



related to man,<sup>35</sup> the world would never have been without man. Since, however, a man has only a temporal existence, there would then have been by now an infinite number of men. We know, on the other hand, that for each man there is a rational soul, and that the soul as a spiritual substance is immortal. Consequently, just as there would have been an infinite number of men, so there would have been an infinite number of souls, which, because of their incorruptible nature, would all be actually existing today. This is against the principle stated above of the impossibility of an actual infinity of beings. The theory of an eternal world must therefore be wrong.<sup>36</sup>

This conclusion cannot be evaded, continues Bonaventure, by the theory of a cyclic existence of the souls, whereby one soul could pass through an infinite number of bodies, for, according to Aristotle, each soul is the proper act of a determined matter.<sup>37</sup> Nor can it be evaded by saying that a single soul or intellect is sufficient for the entire human race, since this is even a greater error than the preceding one. The conclusion is therefore unassailable.<sup>38</sup>

As previously stated, Thomas took this argument very seriously, and in both the *Summa contra gentiles*<sup>39</sup> and the treatise *De aeternitate mundi*<sup>40</sup> he acknowledges the particular difficulty it presents to his own thesis. This should not surprise anyone who is acquainted with his persistent denial of the possibility of an infinite number of actually existing beings. What may be a surprise is the way in which he tries to evade the issue by saying that God could have created a

<sup>35</sup> Aristotle, *Phys.* II, 2, 194 a 34.

<sup>36</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>37</sup> Aristotle, *De anima* II, 2, 414 a 25.

<sup>38</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, pp. 21-22.

<sup>39</sup> Book II, chap. 38, ad *Quod autem*.

<sup>40</sup> The complete title of the treatise is *De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes*. This will be quoted from the collection of St. Thomas' *Opuscula philosophica* edited by Raymundus M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1954). Here is how Thomas expresses himself in connection with the objection at issue: "Adducunt etiam pro se rationes quas etiam Philosophi tetigerunt et eas solverunt; inter quas illa est difficilior quae est de infinitate animarum: quia si mundus semper fuit, necesse est modo infinitas animas esse." *Ibid.*, p. 108, No. 310. See also for the same objection *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 8. For an English translation of all Aquinas' and Bonaventure's texts on the question of the eternity of the world see St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure, *On the Eternity of the World*, trans. from the Latin with an Introduction by Cyril Vollert, Lottie H. Kendzierski, and Paul M. Byrne (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964).

world without man, in which case the problem of an infinite number of souls would not even have arisen. Furthermore, in a statement that seems to reverse his previous position, he adds that "it has not yet been demonstrated that God could not make [a world] in which there would be an infinity of actually existing beings."<sup>41</sup>

In the words of one of his commentators,<sup>42</sup> this is Thomas' easy way out of the impasse in which he found himself. But did he really answer Bonaventure's objection? It does not seem so. First of all, the difficulty involved in the possibility of an infinite number of men, and therefore of an actual infinity of souls, cannot be dismissed simply by saying that God could have created a world without man. To be sure, God did not have to create man or any other being, in which case there would be no question to ask. But the fact is that God did create a world and did create man to live in it. The question is therefore whether in the hypothesis of an eternal world, which Aquinas accepts as a possibility, a man could have been created along with it, that is, from all eternity, and be endowed with a soul that could go on in existence forever. This is the point at issue, and this, I believe, is a perfectly legitimate question to ask.

Furthermore, the issue cannot be evaded even by the supposition that the infinity in question might concern only spiritual substances, like angels and the human souls, as Aquinas seems to suggest. The reason is obvious. An actual infinity of angels or souls is just as inconceivable as is an infinite number of individual men or bodies, for each member of the series is equally limited, determined, and therefore measurable. Besides, if the Thomistic theory is held that the separated soul is individuated by its transcendental relationship to the matter of the body, then it is hardly understandable how a distinction could be made between spiritual and material substance as far as the series or multitude is concerned. There would have to be just as many bodies as there are souls, and this again goes to disprove Aquinas' thesis that only a potential infinite multitude is possible but not an actual one, whether absolute or accidental.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *De aeternitate mundi*, ed. cit., p. 108, No. 310. See also *Cont. gent.*, II, chap. 38, ad *Quod autem*, where the same idea is suggested indirectly.

<sup>42</sup> Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook, C.S.B. (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 150.

<sup>43</sup> *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 4. See also *ibid.*, q. 46, a. 2, ad 8, where Aquinas confirms the view expressed in q. 7, a. 4. For some of the difficulties involved in Aquinas' thesis see H. Pinard, "Création," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, III, 2, cols. 2178-2179.

Clearly, then, Thomas did not find it easy to cope with Bonaventure's argument based on the impossibility of an infinite number of souls. His questioning whether God could not possibly create a world with an infinity of actually existing beings, which by some is considered as Thomas' last word on the matter, is also an indication that toward the end of his life he might have had doubts about the validity of his previous distinction between actual and successive infinity.<sup>44</sup> The problematic here involved is how to admit either of these two kinds of infinity and yet avoid the contradiction that would result from the existence of an infinite number of beings. Thomas' recourse to Aristotle's distinction between number and multitude is no doubt an ingenious device, but, as previously indicated, it is not absolutely convincing.<sup>45</sup> For one thing, it failed to convince Bonaventure, who appears certain of the impossibility of an actual infinite multitude of beings. It is in fact on such an impossibility that he grounds his fifth argument.<sup>46</sup>

If an opinion can be expressed on this matter, I must say that I find it difficult to accept the idea of a multitude of distinct, individualized, and therefore determined beings, that would not be able to be measured in terms of numerical units. If an infinite material body cannot exist because its constitutive elements are all limited and well determined and the resulting compound cannot be of a different nature than the elements themselves — an idea with which Aquinas seems to agree, even if he does so for different reasons<sup>47</sup> — then I fail to see how an infinite multitude of equally limited and distinct beings (whether material or spiritual is irrelevant) could possibly exist in concrete reality.

6. Whereas the five arguments thus far considered aim to show the impossibility of an eternal creation from the effect of God's crea-

<sup>44</sup> For Thomas' possible change of attitude toward the problem at issue see Iosephus Hontheim, S.J., *Institutiones theodicaeae* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1893), p. 713, n. 1.

<sup>45</sup> For a defense of Aquinas' view see Périer, *art. cit.*, pp. 739-57.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Pius M. a Mondreganes, O.M.Cap., "De impossibilitate aeternae mundi creationis ad mentem S. Bonaventurae," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 5 (1935), 560. This article, which runs from p. 529 to p. 570, is a very good presentation of Bonaventure's thought on the eternity of the world and its philosophical background.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 3: "It is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite."

tive act, the sixth and last of Bonaventure's arguments is based on the nature of creation itself. This argument deserves special consideration because, in Bonaventure's view, it is probably the strongest and most compelling one, and also because it is the one that has been most misunderstood. It runs as follows.

It is impossible for something that has being after non-being to exist from all eternity, for that implies a contradiction. But the world has being after non-being. Hence the world cannot be eternal. That the world has being after non-being is proved by the fact that it is produced by God totally, i.e., in its entire substance, and this can only be in terms of a production from nothing. It is not produced from nothing materially, as though there had been some kind of pre-existent matter, but only originally, inasmuch as the production of the world marks the beginning of its existence. This is a true production *ex nihilo*, since neither matter nor form was pre-existing. Moreover, matter could not come from any source outside of God, and God possesses no matter within himself. Thus to say that the world is eternal, or that it has been produced from eternity, and to hold at the same time that it has been produced from nothing, is entirely against truth and reason.<sup>48</sup>

The principal idea contained in this argument is that creation is not only the production of a thing in its totality, i.e., from no pre-existent principle or element, but that it also involves a transition, as it were, from non-being to being, and consequently, the emergence into existence of a new reality, the beginning of a new existence outside God. The two concepts of "total production" and "production *ex nihilo*" are linked together by Bonaventure in such a way that one cannot be separated from the other and both demand an initial emergence of being from an original nothing. This amounts to saying that if the being in question existed from all eternity, it could never have been produced from nothing, since there would never have been an original nothingness to begin with.

It would be wrong to interpret Bonaventure's expression of "being after non-being" (*esse post non-esse*) as meaning a sequence in time, as though creation would have taken place at a particular moment of time. No one was more aware than Bonaventure of Augustine's explanation that time began *with* creation: a doctrine that he

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<sup>48</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 22.



made his own.<sup>49</sup> Thus when he says that being comes after non-being, he means simply that the world must have had a beginning, as the following text clearly indicates: "When [the world] is said to be made (*fieri*), it means that it has a beginning (*principium*). When it is said to be *eternal*, it means that it has no beginning."<sup>50</sup> Hence, to ask whether the world could have been created from eternity, is tantamount to asking whether the world could have had a beginning without having a beginning, which is a plain contradiction.<sup>51</sup>

Bonaventure therefore agrees with Aquinas in saying that creation does not involve a sequence in time or duration,<sup>52</sup> but he parts company with him when he draws the conclusion that creation involves only a sequence in nature between nothing and being.<sup>53</sup> There is, of course, a sequence in nature in the sense explained by Aquinas, namely, that a creature, left to itself, is nothing, and whatever of reality it has, comes to it from another being.<sup>54</sup> But this sequence does not explain the actual emergence of being from nothing,

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 2, p. 1, dub. 2; Vol. II, pp. 69-70: "Dicendum, quod differt dicere, secundum Augustinum, aliquid fieri *ex tempore*, et *in tempore*, et *cum tempore*. *Ex* enim importat ordinem, *in* importat continentiam, *cum* importat simultatem; et ideo nihil est factum *in tempore*, nec *ex tempore*, nisi quod exciditur a tempore. Quia igitur tempus et ea, quae in primordio temporis creata sunt, a tempore non excluduntur, ideo dicit, ea esse creata *cum tempore*, non *in tempore*, nec *ex tempore*."

<sup>50</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 44, a. 1, q. 4; Vol. I, p. 788.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* See also *Comment. in Ecclesiasten*, chap. 3, q. 1; Vol. VI, p. 28, where Bonaventure says that time in creatures means "the measure of their exit from non-being to being (*mensuram exitus de non-esse ad esse*).

<sup>52</sup> Sertillanges, like many others, is therefore wrong when he presents Bonaventure's notion of creation *ex nihilo* as implying the idea of duration prior to the actual existence of the world. He is also wrong, as will be seen later, when he states that Bonaventure considers the *nihilum* prior to creation as a positive point of departure. See *L'idée de création*, *op. cit.*, p. 26. Van Steenberghen is not very helpful either when he states that "St. Bonaventure confused creation *ex nihilo* with creation *post nihilum*" and gives the impression that the preposition *post* refers to a sequence in time. Cf. *Hidden God*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

<sup>53</sup> *De aeternitate mundi*, p. 107, No. 304. "Sed ordo multiplex est: scilicet durationis et naturae. Si igitur ex communi et universali non sequitur proprium et particulare, non erit necessarium ut propter hoc quod creaturam esse post nihil dicitur, prius duratione fuerit nihil, et postea fuerit aliquid: sed sufficit, si prius natura sit nihil quam ens."

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*: "Esse autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio; sibi autem relictas in se considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter inest sibi nihil quam esse."

or, if I may so speak, the newness of being. As a matter of fact, if a mere sequence in nature in the sense explained above exists between being and non-being, the whole idea of creation as production from nothing seems to be ruled out. This apparently is what worries Bonaventure, who conceives creation as an event, and even a change or *mutatio*. However, he takes care to explain, the term change does not refer here to an actual transition to being or *esse* from *nihilum* as a real *terminus a quo*. This would be a contradiction, for *nihilum* is the negation of every reality whatsoever. The term is taken in the rather broad sense of emergence of a new reality, the beginning of a new *esse*.<sup>55</sup>

To better explain his thought, Bonaventure contrasts creation *ex nihilo* to the process occurring in the Holy Trinity whereby the Son is generated by the Father. In both cases there is a production, and in both cases the production is due to an equally infinite power. But, whereas in the generation of the Son by the Father there is an identity of substance that excludes any change or transition from nothing to being, as well as any beginning of *esse*, in creation there is a production *ex nihilo* by which the *esse* comes after the *non-esse*, in the sense previously explained. This is what is meant by the expression *feri ex nihilo*: to be made from nothing, to begin to exist. Briefly, production as such is indifferent to time and eternity; production *ex nihilo* involves necessarily the notion of time and change, the beginning of something that did not exist before.<sup>56</sup> Once the concept of production *ex nihilo* is explained in these terms, the question of the possibility of an eternal creation does not even arise.

These are, then, the arguments used by Bonaventure to prove the impossibility of an eternal creation. Having stated his own position, he takes up the objections raised by the defenders of the Aristotelian-Averroistic theory of an eternal world mentioned at the beginning of the question and answers them one by one. Since these

<sup>55</sup> The following text is very enlightening: "Si ergo quaeratur, quae sit habitudo, quae importatur in comparatione ad *non-esse*; dicendum, quod illa habitudo dicitur *mutatio*. – Et si quaeras, quid sit illa mutatio; dico, quod non est aliud quam ipsa res. – Et hoc patet, quia est mutatio *ad esse*, et mutatio *ab esse*, et mutatio *in esse*. Mutatio *ad esse* nihil ponit nisi a parte termini; ...et ideo *mutari* primo modo nihil aliud est, quam nunc *primo esse*." *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 34.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 1; Vol. II, p. 33.

objections have no direct bearing on the subject of our discussion, I will omit them and continue my paper with a brief evaluation of Bonaventure's position as compared to that of Aquinas.

#### IV. BONAVENTURE AND AQUINAS

From the foregoing exposition, it would appear that Bonaventure finds it difficult to accept the idea of an eternal creation because of his understanding of the nature of the world and of his notion of creation itself. Like Aquinas and all other medieval schoolmen, he sees no problem on the part of God, as far as an eternal creation is concerned. An eternally omnipotent Being can do just as well from eternity what Christian revelation tells us he did in time, provided the idea of an eternal creation involves no contradiction. Here is where Bonaventure parts company with Aquinas. While both schoolmen agree in their understanding of creation as a production of a being from absolute nothing, Aquinas maintains that creation is essentially a relation of total dependence of the creature on its Creator, while Bonaventure holds that, in addition to the creature's dependence on God, creation marks also the beginning of the creature's existence. Furthermore, Bonaventure lays greater emphasis than Aquinas does on the positive aspect of creation as a production from nothing. Indeed, in the latter's view, creation is conceived in terms of a simple predicamental relation or, to use his own word, "an accident" that follows logically upon the thing created;<sup>57</sup> whereas for Bonaventure, "to be created (*creari*) is by nature, although not by duration, prior to the *esse* [of the creature]." <sup>58</sup> In this latter conception, the expressions *inceptio essendi* (the beginning of being) and *novitas essendi* (the newness of being), used by Aquinas to explain

<sup>57</sup> *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, *Ad Tertium*, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, Vol. II (8th ed. rev.; Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1949), p. 43: "Dicendum quod illa relatio accidens est, et secundum esse suum considerata, prout inhaeret subiecto, posterius est quam res creata." Many Scholastic philosophers, following the lead of John Duns Scotus and John of St. Thomas, have accepted the view that creation involves a transcendental relation rather than merely a predicamental relation.

<sup>58</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 35: "Et ideo concedendum, quod creatio non est aliud secundum rem a creatura, nec medium inter ipsam et Deum secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem; unde est prius natura *creari* quam *esse*, non *duratione*."

the creature's relation to God by creation,<sup>59</sup> acquire a more positive meaning. Creation becomes an event, the "exit" of *esse* from *non-esse*,<sup>60</sup> the beginning of a new reality. Hence Bonaventure's persistent refusal to accept the idea of an eternal creation that would do away with the very notion of creation in the sense that has just been explained.

Although Bonaventure does not make Thomas' concept of creation the direct target of his criticism, I feel a need to implement his teaching with a personal observation. To conceive creation as a relation of total dependence of the creature on its Creator is undoubtedly correct, for a creature has no reality of its own, and whatever of reality it has, must come to it from God. But is such dependence really what makes a creature to be a creature? or is not dependence something that follows logically upon creation? After all, in order to depend, one must first exist. Again, how does the notion of dependence convey the idea of production from nothing, which is what creation is all about? I would submit, therefore, that the relation of dependence can perhaps be better explained in terms of an effect or logical sequence of creation, while creation itself as the actual production of a being from nothing takes precedence over that relation. Creation, in other words, is the production of a being as a being. From this fact it follows that the being so produced is totally dependent on its Creator. This explanation, it seems to me, makes more sense than the one given by a previously mentioned Thomist commentator who, after saying that creation is "nothing but a unilateral relation of dependence," draws the following conclusion: "For a creature to be in relation to God, it must first exist. If creation is this relation, creation comes then after the creature in the order of being. This is truly the world upside down!"<sup>61</sup> I would perfectly agree with this last statement, if the author's notion of creation were correct. But, may I ask, is this really what creation amounts to? Can we really say that creation comes after the creature in the order

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<sup>59</sup> *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, in *Quaest. disput.*, II, p. 43; "in ipsa creatione... importatur... solummodo inceptio essendi, et relatio ad creatorem a quo esse habet; et sic creatio nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum novitate essendi."

<sup>60</sup> *I<sup>l</sup> Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2; Vol. II, p. 34: "Creari enim non significat *esse* principaliter, sed exire de *non-esse* in *esse*, et hoc ab aliquo."

<sup>61</sup> Sertillanges, *L'idée de création*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.



of being? In the light of my preceding observations, the answer to these questions can only be in the negative.

In addition to the difficulty arising from the notion of creation, Bonaventure's other main source of objection to Aquinas' theory of a possible eternal world is the nature of the world itself. The Seraphic Doctor cannot visualize a world, or any created being for that matter, that could possibly exist from all eternity and still retain its nature of contingent, changeable, and therefore limited being. We have seen his arguments to this effect and there is no need to repeat them. I would like, nevertheless, to add here a final observation, which aims to show that Bonaventure's view of the impossibility of an eternally created being is not perhaps as far-fetched as it may first appear to be.

By its nature, a contingent being — whether temporal or eternal does not matter — depends on its Creator for the entire length of its existence. Thus it is conceivable that God could annihilate it at any given moment of its existence by simply withdrawing his conservative act from it. If that is the case, how can we then account for such a possibility and still retain the idea of an eternal contingent being? Destruction or annihilation, let us keep in mind, is not a process; it is an instantaneous act, just as creation is. The only difference between the two is that creation demands a positive act on the part of God, whereas annihilation is effected through a negative act. Should we say, then, that there is an eternal instant in which the being can be destroyed? That is obviously a contradiction. Thus the only other possible answer, it seems to me, is either that an eternal contingent being is not eternally destructible, which seems to conflict with the very nature of a contingent being, or that it is eternally destructible but can never be actually destroyed, in which case the infinite power of God is questioned. Whatever the answer, this is a problem that is at least worth considering.

## V. RECENT LITERATURE ON THE SUBJECT

I would like now to compare the position adopted in this paper with that of a renowned contemporary philosopher and medievalist, Fernand Van Steenberghen, who in a recent article <sup>62</sup> has reaffirmed

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen, "Saint Bonaventure contre l'éternité du monde," in *S. Bonaventura, 1274-1974*, Vol. III (Grottaferrata [Rome]: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973), 259-78.

and developed some of the ideas expressed in his earlier works.<sup>63</sup> Van Steenberghen introduces his study with a review of the latest writings on the subject, such as those by Pius a Mondreganes,<sup>64</sup> Etienne Gilson,<sup>65</sup> Georges H. Tavard,<sup>66</sup> Joseph Ratzinger,<sup>67</sup> and Vincenzo C. Bigi.<sup>68</sup> In the author's view, the article by Pius a Mondreganes is, despite some minor defects, a most valuable source of information not only for Bonaventure's doctrine, which is fully endorsed, but also for the thought of the Church Fathers and Scholastic philosophers, both ancient and modern. Gilson's treatment of the theory of creation, Van Steenberghen continues, is confined to an objective presentation of Bonaventure's thought with no attempt to critically evaluate it. So is the presentation of Ratzinger, who discusses the problem of the origin of the world within the framework of Bonaventure's theology of history. The study of Tavard, says Van Steenberghen, is of an entirely different nature. Basing himself on a passage from Bonaventure's treatise *De Trinitate*, Tavard takes a stand against all preceding historians and claims that according to Bonaventure the world has had a beginning only "because God willed it." This amounts to saying that, if God had willed otherwise, he could have created a world from all eternity. To the objection that to Bonaventure an eternally created world seems to imply a contradiction, Tavard answers that the contradiction for the Seraphic Doctor lies only in an eternal world *created ex nihilo*, not in a world that would have been created from eternity but not *ex nihilo*. Accordingly, the arguments advanced by Bonaventure against the possibility of an eternal world do not represent his own thought.

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<sup>63</sup> See, for example, *Hidden God*, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-75; *Ontology*, trans. Martin J. Flynn (New York: Wagner, 1952), pp. 240-44; *La philosophie au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1966), pp. 225-26, 245, 291, 328, 345-46, 404-410, 428, 458-64, 472, 511, 542; "La controverse sur l'éternité du monde au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres* (de l'Académie Royale de Belgique), 1972 (5<sup>e</sup> serie, 68), 243-63.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. n. 46 above.

<sup>65</sup> *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (2d ed. rev.; Paris: Vrin, 1943), pp. 154-59.

<sup>66</sup> "On a Misreading of St. Bonaventure's Doctrine of Creation," *Downside Review*, 69 (1951), 276-88.

<sup>67</sup> *Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura* (Munich: Schnell and Steiner, 1959), pp. 140-47.

<sup>68</sup> "La dottrina della temporalità e del tempo in San Bonaventura," *Antoniano*, 39 (1964), 437-88; 40 (1965), 96-151.

Van Steenberghen sharply criticizes Tavard's position, stating that it is "totally indefensible." It is based, he says, on a faulty interpretation of Bonaventure's text and contradicts the constant teaching of the Franciscan Master.<sup>69</sup>

The treatment of Bonaventure's notion of creation and time by Father Bigi is in direct opposition to Tavard's view. Calling it "a solid and profound study," Van Steenberghen commends Bigi for a penetrating analysis of Bonaventure's concept of the temporality of the world and for clearly indicating the fundamental difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure in their approaches to the problem of creation and eternity.<sup>70</sup>

To complete Van Steenberghen's survey of studies on the subject under discussion, mention must be made of an article that appeared in the same volume as Van Steenberghen's study and follows it immediately. Its author, Father Antonius Coccia, discusses the doctrine of the eternity of the world on the basis of Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences* and *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, with occasional references to other works by the Seraphic Doctor.<sup>71</sup> Coccia shows his sympathy for Bonaventure's position and points out, among other things, the modern aspect of Bonaventure's theory in that it seems to have the support of contemporary science.

Having stated the recent background of the controversy about the eternity of the world, Van Steenberghen approaches the subject himself and makes a brief analysis of the question from the *Sentences*, where Bonaventure's theory is presented. As a result of his analysis, he discovers that the reasons advanced by the Seraphic Doctor for the rejection of an eternal world can be reduced to two basic arguments. The first is based on the notion of *creatio ex nihilo* and corresponds to the sixth *ratio* brought forth by Bonaventure against the opposing theory and developed further in the actual solution of the problem at issue. The second argument is based on the notion of the infinite and the Aristotelian principles derived from it. It corresponds to the five *rationes in oppositum* which, in Bonaventure's arrangement, precede the argument from the notion of creation. Van

<sup>69</sup> See *art. cit.*, pp. 262-65 for Van Steenberghen's criticism of Tavard's position.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 265.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Antonius Coccia, O.F.M.Conv. "De aeternitate mundi apud S. Bonaventuram et recentiores," in *S. Bonaventura, 1274-1974, op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 279-306.

Steenberghen rejects the first argument and endorses the second. For convenience sake, I shall mention first his points of agreement with Bonaventure's view and then I will discuss his objections to the argument based on *creatio ex nihilo*.

Van Steenberghen rightly observes that all Bonaventure's *rationes* against the theory of an eternal world rest on a datum that is granted by his opponents, namely, that an eternal world in the past implies an infinite series of events already accomplished. For if the series were finite, there would be a first term and hence a beginning of the world. After mentioning the five arguments from Bonaventure's text, Van Steenberghen observes further that although these arguments do not have exactly the same value today as in Bonaventure's time when Aristotle's physical theory of the world was commonly accepted, still their basic reasoning is sound; it shows very clearly the absurd consequences that would follow if the notion of an eternal world were accepted. In Van Steenberghen's view, the underlying theme of Bonaventure's arguments is that "in the quantitative order, the infinite is the ideal limit toward which an *indefinite* series of additional units *tends* but which it will never reach. Otherwise stated, in the real order it is impossible to have an infinite in act."<sup>72</sup>

Van Steenberghen is so convinced of the truth of his thesis grounded in the nature of discrete quantity, that he cannot see how a philosopher, or any person of judgment, could refuse to accept it. And yet, he remarks, there are those who persist in maintaining the possibility of an eternal world in a desperate fight whose history would be both interesting and amusing. In their attempt to defend an indefensible thesis, they display such "intellectual acrobatics," that one wonders how strong a role their imagination plays. Père Sertillanges' hypothesis of an infinite number is a case in point.<sup>73</sup> I may add that the hypothesis in question is a logical consequence of the theory of an eternal world, unless Thomas' distinction between number and multitude is accepted. But this, as previously noted, amounts to saying that an infinite series of past events, each one limited and well determined, would be numberless and indetermined. The contradiction involved in this position is not difficult to see.

<sup>72</sup> Van Steenberghen, *art. cit.*, in *S. Bonaventura, 1274-1974*, p. 273.

<sup>73</sup> *L'idée de création, op. cit.*, p. 35. For Van Steenberghen's discussion of Bonaventure's argument based on the notion of the infinite cf. *art. cit.*, in *S. Bonaventura, 1274-1974*, pp. 271-76.



While Van Steenberghen accepts Bonaventure's argument against an eternal world based on the notion of the infinite, he criticizes the argument from creation *ex nihilo* and declares it worthless. The reason for its rejection is basically the same as that given by St. Thomas. The notion of creation *ex nihilo* does not imply a temporal priority of *nihilum* over being but only a sequence in nature, on the grounds that a created being, if left to itself, would be nothing, since all its reality comes to it from its cause. Thus the expression *factum ex nihilo* means simply *factum non ex aliquo*, i.e., made from no pre-existing subject. Hence creation *ex nihilo* does not necessarily involve a beginning of existence, as Bonaventure claims. Hence also Bonaventure's interpretation of *ex nihilo* as meaning *post nihilum* is incorrect, since no time is possible prior to creation.<sup>74</sup>

## VI. APPRAISAL OF VAN STEENBERGHEN'S VIEW

A discussion of Van Steenberghen's position here outlined would entail a repetition of much that I have already said in this paper in connection with Bonaventure's sixth argument from the *Sentences* and in my final comment on the controversy at issue. I will, therefore, confine myself to Van Steenberghen's criticism of Bonaventure's argument.

In the first place, it must be made clear that whenever Bonaventure uses the expression *post nihilum* in reference to creation, he does not imply in any way a sequence in time between nothing and being, but only a sequence in origin and, more specifically, the beginning of existence from no pre-existing being, the *nunc primo esse*.<sup>75</sup> This point is not made clear by Van Steenberghen. He seems in fact to insinuate that Bonaventure's notion of creation *ex nihilo* involves a temporal succession, as though an imaginary time existed before creation and apart from the world.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>74</sup> See Van Steenberghen, *art. cit.*, pp. 268-71, for his criticism of Bonaventure on Thomistic grounds.

<sup>75</sup> See references under notes 48, 49, 50 and 55 above.

<sup>76</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 270: "Aussi lorsque Bonaventure déclare, en réponse à Avicenne, que l'acte créateur est un acte de volonté et que, dès lors, Dieu peut vouloir éternellement que le monde commence d'exister à tel moment du temps, il imagine un temps indépendant de l'existence du monde, ce qui revient à introduire la durée temporelle dans l'éternité divine." See also his comment on p. 269: "Commentons: cette interprétation du mot *ex* revient à dire que *ex nihilo* signifie tout bonnement *post nihilum*."

Secondly, to say that the formula *ex nihilo* has strictly speaking a negative meaning, in the sense that creation presupposes no pre-existing subject, is of course very true, and Bonaventure would agree with it. But what about creation itself or the actual emergence into existence of a being from nothing as the result of the creative act of God? Is this also a merely negative notion? I submit that once creation is conceived as a production of being *ex nihilo*, it is far from clear that an instantaneous action is not involved whereby the being in question begins to exist. Just as through annihilation, which is possible at each moment of a created being's existence, a being ceases instantaneously to exist, so by creation a being does actually begin to exist. This is what Bonaventure had in mind when, toward the end of his life, he wrote: "Wise men agree that something cannot be made from nothing and thus be from eternity. For just as when something falls into nothing it necessarily ceases to exist, so when something is made from nothing, it begins to exist." <sup>77</sup>

One more question must be raised in connection with Van Steenberghen's concluding remarks. While acknowledging that Bonaventure has established the impossibility of an eternal world by furnishing the elements of a decisive proof *ab absurdo* against the hypothesis of an eternal past, Van Steenberghen affirms that Bonaventure was able to do so only by showing the contradiction of an infinite in act, not by his doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*.<sup>78</sup> As a matter of fact, Van Steenberghen holds, his way of understanding creation *ex nihilo* would have somewhat compromised the solidity of his position.<sup>79</sup>

If this is the case, then the argument for the impossibility of an eternal creation which was foremost in Bonaventure's mind, would not only be useless but also damaging to his thesis. The only way to prove the temporal nature of the world is to be found, according to Van Steenberghen, in the essential dynamism of the substances of which the world is composed: a dynamism that is manifested in a continuous process of evolution that must have had a beginning and can be measured by time.<sup>80</sup>

I do not intend to contest Van Steenberghen's view, which is certainly worth considering. However, I must point out that his

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *In Hexaëmeron*, collatio IV, n. 13; Vol. V, 351.

<sup>78</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 276.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 278.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.

position narrows down the concept of temporal creation to the present world or any other world similar to it. In the hypothesis, which is at least conceivable, that a different kind of world, let us say a static world, were created by God and kept in that state for the entire length of its existence, the theory of an eternal creation could be accepted. Such a view is not only against the mind of Bonaventure, who taught that no being whatsoever could possibly be created from eternity, but seems to make an accidental property the basis for a being's temporal existence. Motion and change are in effect no absolute requirement for a contingent being, whose only essential characteristics seem to be its continuous dependence on the cause of its existence and its successive duration. Nevertheless, I agree with Van Steenberghen's other conclusion that, given the dynamic nature of a world like the present one, it is easier to work out an argument for a beginning of its evolutionary process and of its temporal creation.<sup>81</sup>

In conclusion, the question of whether or not the world could have been created from eternity remains one of the most difficult and perplexing issues in the entire field of philosophy. Strong arguments exist on both sides of the question, which should make one very cautious before committing himself to either the position of Aquinas or to that of Bonaventure. The fact that the problem under consideration involves an element of mystery that is proper to all God's acts and operations, such as the act of creation, should make one even more cautious in accepting either of the proposed solutions as a definitive one. If this article has thrown some light on Bonaventure's contribution to the solution of this complex but fascinating issue, it will have achieved its purpose.

*The Catholic University  
of America,  
Washington, D.C.*

BERNARDINO M. BONANSEA, O.F.M.

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 277. For an explanation of how science favors the theory of a temporal origin of the world and, at least indirectly, the doctrine of creation in time, see this writer's study, "A Prime Instance Where Science Needs Religion," in *Science and Religion*, ed. John Clover Monsma (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), pp. 93-102.

## MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA'S *DE PRODUCTIONE RERUM* AND ITS RELATION TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND ST. BONAVENTURE<sup>1</sup>

Although more than fifteen years have passed since G. Gál presented his excellent edition of Matthew of Aquasparta's disputed questions *De Productione Rerum*, no individual study of these questions has been made.<sup>2</sup> This is unfortunate because these questions constitute an important contribution both to the construction of an intellectual portrait of Matthew and to an understanding of his attitude and position as regards the philosophical movement toward the end of the thirteenth century.

In these notes our interest is to consider the doctrine of these questions in their historical context. More precisely, we are interested in Matthew's attitude toward Aristotle and St. Thomas. In our first reading of the text we were surprised by the echos of St. Thomas which we heard throughout. We had expected Matthew, as a Franciscan writing and teaching in the last part of the thirteenth century, to be rather anti-Thomist. As a student of John Pecham, and as the reputed admirer of the Bonaventurian synthesis, Matthew, it seemed to us, should present himself as an adversary of the suspect synthesis of Thomas Aquinas; or at least we expected Matthew to neglect the writings of St. Thomas.<sup>3</sup> As is known, in the last third of the thirteenth century there arose a reaction to the gaining Aristotelianism which manifested itself in the heterodox doctrines of a Siger

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<sup>1</sup> This article is based on the author's doctoral dissertation, "A Study of the Doctrine and Sources of Matthew of Aquasparta's *Quaestiones De Productione Rerum*," presented at the University of Louvain, Belgium, in October, 1972.

<sup>2</sup> Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Productione Rerum et De Providentia*, ed. G. Gál, O.F.M., *Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi*, No. 17 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1956). We refer to these questions in the notes with the abbreviation *De Prod.*

<sup>3</sup> Our view of the thirteenth century is that of Fernand Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle, Philosophes Médiévaux*, No. 9 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, and Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1966).



of Brabant and in the vigorous synthesis of St. Thomas. This reaction became organized into a movement known as neo-Augustinism. Matthew, reputed to be one of the remarkable figures of this movement, would be expected to share Pecham's stated opposition to Thomas Aquinas. But our study has not confirmed our expectations.

It is clear from an examination of the disputed questions *De Productione Rerum* that Matthew's opposition to Thomas, clear and unmistakable in questions of epistemology, does not amount to a total rejection of the thought and writings of the Angelic Doctor.<sup>3a</sup> It is our purpose to indicate the dependence, often literal, of Matthew on Thomas. Attempting to determine the character of the material which Matthew has borrowed from Thomas, we see that it is Aristotelian. This leads us to the conclusion that neither anti-Thomism nor anti-Aristotelianism are total and complete in the writings of Matthew. We must, on the contrary, affirm that the fervor of the renewal and return to St. Augustine does not mean a refusal of the Aristotelianism which impregnated the thought of the thirteenth century. Moreover we can say for these disputed questions that the devotion to St. Augustine is more nominal and complementary than philosophical. That is to say that it is not St. Augustine who furnished Matthew with the categories of thought for these questions. Matthew, for example, refuses the possibility of the eternity of our world or of any possible creature. He does this in conformity with St. Augustine who affirmed the same. But not one of St. Augustine's arguments for the non-eternity of the world is repeated by Matthew. The fact is that Matthew wants all of his theses to be in conformity with the teaching of St. Augustine; but, for the most part, the same can be said of St. Thomas. Furthermore, Matthew's fidelity to St. Augustine is not absolute, as is clear in the question about the communicability of the power of creation to a creature.

We do not present this study as the contradiction of what Matthew's major historians have written or of what historians of the thirteenth century have portrayed. But a consideration of the questions *De Productione Rerum* introduces the necessity of modifying

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<sup>3a</sup> It is important to note that historians' study of Matthew has been centered mostly on his epistemology, especially the doctrines developed in his disputed questions *De Cognitione*. Cf. H. M. Beha, "Matthew of Aquasparta's Theory of Cognition," *Franciscan Studies*, 1960, vol. 20, pp. 161-204; and 1961, vol. 21, pp. 1-79, and 383-465.

at least certain accents. The first comprehensive treatment of the life, works, and thought of Matthew is the article of E. Longpré in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*.<sup>4</sup> Longpré situates Matthew in a continuous current called Augustinism which begins with Alexander of Hales and Thomas of York and includes most of the Franciscan authors of the thirteenth century. Characteristic of this philosophic current is its profound Augustinian inspiration: These authors decided to maintain essentially the metaphysics of St. Augustine and St. Anselm, plus the insights of the school of Saint-Victor. Without denying the openness of this school to the writings of Aristotle, Longpré insists on the profound separation between the Franciscan school of Augustinian inspiration and the Aristotelian current. Matthew is the learned student of the Bonaventurian synthesis and of the writings of St. Augustine. Longpré insists that the work of Matthew constitutes the incontestable proof of the authentic and traditional Augustinism of the ideas advanced by Alexander of Hales and his successors. Matthew's writings are the best evidence of the conflict which existed from the beginning of the Franciscan school between Augustinism and Aristotelianism. As for St. Thomas, Longpré attributes to Matthew "*une critique intégrale*" of the Angelic Doctor. Matthew's writings are evidence that the Augustinian current did not cede to the surrounding Aristotelianism; rather Matthew's work is proof that at the end of the thirteenth century, and only then, the current called Augustinism reached its greatest perfection.

Without discussing the correctness of affirming an Augustinism which goes back to Alexander of Hales and develops itself in a continuous line throughout the thirteenth century, we object to the opposition, repeated and insisted upon, between Bonaventurianism, understood as the exposition of the metaphysics of St. Augustine especially, and Aristotelianism and Thomism. We believe that the questions *De Productione Rerum* are evidence that Matthew cannot be understood purely and simply as an opponent of Aristotle and/or St. Thomas, nor as a philosopher working for the most part with the categories of St. Augustine and St. Anselm. It seems that the distinction to be made is between different forms of Aristotelianism. To insist, as does Longpré, on the influence of Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure as most fundamental and essential in the writings of Matthew is, we believe, to falsify the perspective of the thirteenth

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<sup>4</sup> "*Matthieu d'Aquasparta*," vol. 10, col. 375-389.

century intellectual drama, and to neglect unduly the influence of Aristotle, and thus the possible influence of St. Thomas.

Writing shortly after Longpré, V. Doucet presents more or less the same view and interpretation of Matthew.<sup>5</sup> Doucet recognizes that Matthew did not create a new or original synthesis, but rather took up the doctrine of St. Augustine as it existed in a systematic form in the Franciscan school, especially in the writings of St. Bonaventure. Doucet credits Matthew with an exposition of Augustinism and its defense against Thomistic Aristotelianism. Matthew modestly and pacifically opposed St. Thomas for no other reason than that he considered the preference of Aristotle to Augustine to be seriously wrong (*nefas*). The whole meaning of the conflict between Augustinism and Aristotelianism was to save the authority of St. Augustine. Thus Matthew's first and major source is St. Augustine, and Doucet sees Matthew's work as the justification of the synthesis elaborated earlier by St. Bonaventure.

Placing strong emphasis on the influence of St. Augustine, Doucet, we believe, fails to distinguish the domains of theology and philosophy. Furthermore, Doucet gives too much credit to Matthew's affirmation of his desire to be faithful to St. Augustine. In any case, fidelity to Augustine does not necessarily mean the rejection of Aristotle. Matthew understood this, even if his historians have not clearly grasped it. Doucet fails to recognize Matthew's debt to Aristotle, and thus implicitly minimizes the importance of Aristotelianism in Matthew's construction. It is against this that we object and bring evidence. The naked opposition of Franciscanism or Augustinism to Aristotelianism just does not find support in the texts.

In his recent doctoral dissertation P. Weber states that the major interest of the work of Matthew is his effort to make a synthesis between the Augustinian orientation of St. Bonaventure and the thought of Aristotle.<sup>6</sup> Admitting with Longpré and Doucet the high importance of Augustine for Matthew, Weber also recognizes explicitly the Aristotelianism of Matthew and the influence of the Arabian authors. Discussing Matthew's sources, Weber correctly notes that Matthew has borrowed directly from the *Summa Alex-*

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the introduction to his edition of Matthew of Aquasparta's *Quaestiones Disputatae De Gratia*, *Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi*, No. 11 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1935), pp. CLV-CLX.

<sup>6</sup> *La morale fondamentale d'après Matthieu d'Aquasparta*, 2 vol., University of Louvain, Belgium, 1967. Cf. vol. I, pp. 88-94.

*andri*, Bonaventure, and Thomas. This view is largely our own. But as regards Matthew's use of the texts of St. Thomas, Weber says that Matthew borrows nothing more than the *status quaestionis* of the Angelic Doctor. "For the solutions, on the other hand, [Thomas's] contribution is most often negative. Influenced by polemics and perhaps by scholastic chauvinism from which nobody was exempt, Aquasparta avoids, as much as possible, to exploit the work of the Angelic Doctor."<sup>7</sup> This is the point which needs correction in the light of our study. It is simply not true that Matthew had the intention of avoiding Thomas as much as possible. Had it been his intention, Matthew could have written the questions *De Productione Rerum* without St. Thomas; but the fact is that Matthew deliberately chose to use extensively the *De Potentia* of St. Thomas, as well as, to a lesser extent, the other works of the Angelic Doctor.

From the review of three historians of Matthew it is clear that an interpretation of an author involves necessarily an interpretation of the era in which he lived and wrote. We will reserve our conclusions on this matter until after we have reviewed the text of the questions *De Productione Rerum*. The following notes on the individual questions included in Matthew's text are intended to make clear that Matthew, assiduous in his fidelity to St. Bonaventure and remarkable in his fervor toward St. Augustine, has a large unacknowledged debt to St. Thomas for the construction and development of these questions. Most important, the Aristotelianism of St. Thomas does not compromise an Augustinian and Bonaventurian project, but rather fits easily into Matthew's work.

#### EXSISTENTIA DEI

The questions included in the *De Productione Rerum* are all centered on certain problems of creation: the mode and power of creation, the relation between the Creator and the created, the time of creation, the existence and unicity of the Creator, and the immutability of the Creator in creating. Each question of the series proposes a rational clarification of one of these points, and the starting point of Matthew's presentation is the question of the existence of God. Creation is a mode of production, and every mode of production

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.



presupposes a principle of production. Matthew begins, therefore, by establishing the existence of God, the first being, principle and cause of all other beings. Whereas all the other questions treated in the *De Productione Rerum* receive therein the fullest development which Matthew apparently ever gave to them, the question concerning the existence of God is rather summary and can be understood well only through reference to the exposition contained in our author's commentary on the *Sentences*. With these texts we will see that Matthew is, at least textually, the very faithful disciple of St. Bonaventure. This is important because it has recently been said that Matthew refused the Bonaventurian way to God.<sup>8</sup> At the same time we will see that Matthew's fidelity to the Seraphic Doctor shows some hesitation.

In the *De Productione Rerum* Matthew begins with the famous argument found in St. Anselm's *Proslogion*. Substituting the expression "*ens primum et summum, entium universorum principium*" for Anselm's *quo maius* formula, Matthew argues that the mind immediately conceives such a being and assents that such a being exists. The mind is forced to recognize that such a being exists, and this certainty of God's existence through a simple reflection on the notion of God as the highest being, is what St. John Damascene meant when he said that the knowledge of God's existence is naturally inserted in us.<sup>9</sup>

The second argument is also based on the notion of the first and highest being. The idea of every being other than the first being excludes or makes abstraction of the real and actual existence of the being. I can, for example, have the idea "horse" or "man" without knowing whether there is an actually existing horse or man. But in the case of the first and highest being, existence belongs to its idea. In the highest being there is identity of quiddity and existence, such that there is also identity of meaning in the questions *an est* and *quid est*. We can, therefore, make the following reasoning: Just as it necessarily follows that if the best is the best, the best exists, because the best denotes the most complete and actual being; so also it follows that if the first and highest being is the first and

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Anton C. Pegis, "The Bonaventurian Way to God," *Mediaeval Studies*, 39 (1967), p. 242. That Matthew's presentation is a repetition, mostly literal, of St. Bonaventure's texts is easily verified; cf. *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 153); and *De Mystério Trinitatis*, a. 1, q. 1 (*Opera*, V, p. 45).

<sup>9</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 1, Resp. (Gál, p. 11).



highest being, the first and highest being exists, because the first and highest being is the most complete and actual being.<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, Matthew argues for the existence of God from the sensible world. Involved here are considerations of the origin of beings, their duration, distinction, imperfection, mutability, government, and order. These are so many ways of looking at the sensible world, and each way leads to the affirmation of God as cause and principle of all beings. Matthew borrows these familiar arguments from St. John Damascene, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and Richard of St. Victor; and for Matthew, each moves effortlessly to the affirmation of the existence of God.

An interpretation of these arguments, an attempt to see how they work together toward their common conclusion, is somewhat difficult. A review of the parallel texts in Matthew's commentary on the *Sentences* is enlightening without being completely unambiguous. As regards the *Proslogion* argument of St. Anselm, Matthew seems to have been uncertain of its value and how it works to prove the existence of God. Having presented the argument accurately Matthew adds this striking phrase: "Sed quia ista veritas prima est, a priori probari non potest. Propterea, sicut possumus, a posteriori conandum est hoc aliququaliter demonstrare."<sup>11</sup> Matthew's hesitation remains without explanation. Could it be that Matthew was hedging in face of the criticism of the Anselmian argument made by St. Thomas? Whatever the reason, Matthew did not abandon the *Proslogion* argument, nor did he give it central importance in a demonstration of the existence of God. The true and basic position of Matthew is that a proof of God's existence must be based on the sensible world. It is the sensible world that is the "*medium probans*," and everything in it leads rather easily to the affirmation of the absolute, God.<sup>12</sup>

But if, technically speaking, a "proof" is had only through the sensible world, that does not mean that there is no other reasonable way to the certitude and indubitability of the existence of God. For Matthew, repeating Bonaventure, the mind can come to know with certitude and indubitably that God exists when it examines itself or looks at the world around it or looks above itself — "sive

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* (Gál, pp. 11-12).

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Gál's edition, p. 11, n. 27.

<sup>12</sup> *In Sent.*, I, d. 2, qq. 1-3 (ed. A. Daniels, "*Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise in dreizehnten Jahrhundert*," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, No. 9 (1909), p. 60.

ingrediatur animus se, sive egrediatur extra se, sive elevatur supra se, si rationabiliter decurrit, certitudinaliter et indubitanter Deum esse cognoscit.”<sup>13</sup> Man discovers God when he turns within himself. The interior way to God is the most characteristic approach to God in the disciples of St. Bonaventure. The rational mind is an image of God. An examination of the activities of the memory, intellect, and will leads to the discovery of God. When he goes outside himself man has the evidence of the sensible world; when he enters within himself he has the evidence of the rational soul which is made in the image of God. When man looks above himself, what evidence does he have? Here we recall Matthew’s second argument in the *De Productione Rerum*. Existence is included in the idea of the first being, so that just as the best necessarily exists because it denotes the most perfect and real being, the first being also necessarily exists because the first being is the most perfect and actual being. What is the meaning of such an argument? If God is God, God exists. If the existence predicated of God is God himself, then it is certain that God exists. Such an argument seems to imply a vision of the divine essence which would make the proposition affirming God’s existence self-evident. But this is not Matthew’s position, and the consideration of an objection in the text makes clear what our author is trying to say.<sup>14</sup> It is objected that no one knows the principle that every whole is greater than its part unless he knows what a whole is. No one, therefore, knows that God exists unless he knows what God is. Matthew answers and concedes that no one knows principles unless he knows their constitutive terms. No one knows that the whole is greater than the part unless he knows what a whole is and what a part is. But the knowledge of some terms is hidden, while the knowledge of other terms is clear and manifest. Moreover, our knowledge of the signification of terms can vary from full, to fuller, to most full. Let us apply this to God. God is known comprehensively only by himself. He is known clearly by the saints. He is known as in a mirror darkly by us. We know that God is “primum et summum principium omnium mundanorum; et hoc potest esse omnibus manifestum: quia cum quilibet sciat se non semper fuisse, scit se habere principium, et sic de omnibus aliis; et quia haec notitia omnibus se offert, et hac cognoscita scitur Deum esse, verum est indubitabile quantum est

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* (Daniels, p. 63).

de se.”<sup>15</sup> What does this mean? The existence of God is evident in itself. As such it has the indubitability of a proposition in which the subject and predicate are identical. Yes, the existence of God is *of itself* evident; it is comprehended by God. The truth of God’s existence is clearly seen by the saints. But it is seen by us “*ex parte et in aenigmate*.” The truth of God’s existence is manifest to all. The existence of God as cause of all that is, is indubitable. The existence of God as the reason of our knowing with certitude is indubitable. But we must reason our way to this indubitable truth. The existence of God is indubitable because there is no lack of evidence. Man need only reason correctly with the abundant evidence and he will discover the indubitable truth *Deum esse*. It is granted that if man suffers a defect of reason, it is possible to doubt that God exists. But if the intellect thinks of God as it should, it cannot doubt that he exists.<sup>16</sup>

Matthew’s way to God is very much the Bonaventurian way to God. The only possible influence of St. Thomas, as we have already noted, is at the point of Matthew’s hesitation regarding the *Proslogion* argument of St. Anselm. It is our first possible indication that Matthew was not closed to the discussions of the Aquinate. In the following questions it becomes abundantly clear that Matthew was quite receptive to Thomas’s learning.

### PERFECTIO DEI

In the second question Matthew asks about the relationship between the first being (*primum ens*) and all other beings (*entia*). He asks whether all being (*entitas*) is in God really, truly, and essentially. Matthew is not asking whether all being (*ens*) or beings (*entia*) are in God. The question is to know whether and how every perfection of being is in God. The term “*entitas*” is best translated “perfection” or “perfection of being.”<sup>17</sup> Thus the question is to know whether every and all perfection which we find in the world and in the beings of the world is also found in God. If the question

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* (Daniels, p. 60).

<sup>17</sup> Matthew uses interchangeably “*entitas*,” “*perfectio*,” and “*perfectio entitatis*,” and throughout this second question we find the triplet “*perfectio, entitas, nobilitas*.” St. Thomas, too, connects the notions “*entitas*” and “*perfectio*”; cf., for example, *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 6, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 52).

is clear, so too is the answer. To every perfection in the creature there corresponds something (*aliquid*) in the essence of the first being. But the perfections which are common to both the creature and the Creator exist in a more perfect way in the Creator than they do in the creature. The doctrine which Matthew develops here is not new or different from the teaching of his contemporaries. Nonetheless, the rubric or title under which Matthew discusses this question is seemingly unique. His master, St. Bonaventure, who teaches the same doctrine, asked, not whether all being (*entitas*) is in God, but whether all things (*res*) are in God and whether God is in all things.<sup>18</sup> St. Thomas posed the question in the same way, in terms of things in God.<sup>19</sup>

Every perfection of being is really and truly (*per veram et realem existentiam*) in God. This is the point which Matthew wants to establish, but first he explains that there are two other ways according to which every perfection of being can be said to be "in" God: causally and equivalently. God is the efficient, formal exemplary, and final cause of all being. Thus we can say that causally every perfection of being and all being is found in God. Let us note that Matthew is saying that *causally*, not only every perfection of being, but also all being (*omne ens*) is in God. When he comes to answer the principal question about the real and true existence of every perfection of being in God, Matthew will say that every perfection of being is in God, but not that all being is in God. Every perfection of being and all being can also be said to be in God equivalently. That which is less precious can be said to be in that which is more precious. Silver, for example, is in gold because the value of silver is contained in the value of gold. Gold is as precious and more precious than silver. In the same way we can say that all beings are in the first being because God is not only worth as much as all other beings, but he is infinitely more precious.

The statement that every perfection of being exists really and truly in God must be correctly understood. It is incorrect to understand that every created perfection exists in the uncreated being essentially. We cannot say that the creature is in the Creator really, truly, and essentially, for this amounts to saying that God is the

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 36: *Quomodo res sunt in Deo*; a. 1, q. 1: *Utrum res fuerint in Deo ab aeterno* (*Opera*, I, p. 620).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 3: *Utrum res quae cognoscuntur in Deo sint in eo* (Parma ed. *Opera*, III, VI, p. 290).



creature or that the creature is God. Correctly understood, the affirmation that every perfection of being is in God is true in this sense that there is no perfection found in a creature which does not exist in God in a more perfect and noble way. The perfection which is in the creature is proper to the creature and exists in the creature and not in God. But to the perfection existing in the creature there corresponds in the essence of God something like the perfection in the creature. For example, to the goodness in the creature corresponds goodness in the Creator. There is not only a similitude or reason of goodness in God; rather goodness exists really and truly in God.<sup>20</sup>

In support of his thesis Matthew proposes three considerations: one concerning the causality and perfection of God, another concerning the notion of being, and a consideration of creatures. First, God as efficient, formal, exemplary, and final cause of all being possesses the perfection found in the creature. For if God did not exist, he would not produce beings; if he were not living, he would not produce living beings; if he were not intelligent, he would not produce intelligent beings; and if he were not good and beautiful, he would not produce good and beautiful beings.<sup>21</sup> Second, there is nothing outside being, which is to say that being embraces and includes all perfection of being (*omnem rationem perfectionis et entitatis*). The first being is absolute being, in no way contracted or particular, but rather *esse per se subsistens*. Nothing, no perfection, is excluded or outside the first being. Third, every being other than the first being exists *per participationem*. Whatever a particular being is, it is *secundum quid*; and all that a creature is *per participationem* and *secundum quid*, the first being is simply and essentially. Moreover, all other beings are beings insofar as they imitate and approach the first being, so that the diverse grades of beings are according to the grades of imitation of, and participation in, the first being. Thus if I want to say what man is, I will say that "homo est quoddam ens participans sive imitans ens primum secundum talem gradum essendi."<sup>22</sup> Thus it is necessary that all perfection of being be in God.

As already mentioned, the doctrine which Matthew presents is not new, although the rubric he uses does not seem to have been borrowed from another author. It seems nonetheless possible to

<sup>20</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 2, Resp. (Gál, p. 38).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* (Gál, p. 39).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* (Gál, p. 41).



understand Matthew's development as an effort to clarify with the help of considerations familiar to St. Thomas a doctrine proposed by St. Bonaventure. At one point the Seraphic Doctor asks how things are in God. More specifically, he asks whether all things are in God from all eternity. He answers that "*res sunt in Deo ab aeterno secundum similitudinis praesentiam atque secundum causativam potentiam, sed non secundum realem existentiam.*"<sup>23</sup> All things can be said to be in God as formal exemplary and efficient cause, but really things are in the world. Considering only the formulas, we note right away that whereas Matthew is explaining how God possesses all the perfection of being "*secundum veram et realem existentiam,*" St. Bonaventure is showing that things are not in God "*secundum realem existentiam.*" Are their teachings contradictory? Clearly not. For when St. Bonaventure says that things are in God as knower or cause, he does not mean that in a human way. God is pure and perfect actuality, and creatures are the signs of God. They are the word uttered by God.<sup>24</sup> The creature receives all its perfection from God, and there is no perfection absent from God. God is infinite and immense, present to all things according to their degree of perfection. The infinite power of God possesses the totality of effects that can be produced. Nonetheless, Matthew's accent is absent from Bonaventure's text. Matthew wants to insist that things, i.e. the perfection of all things, exist in God, not only insofar as he is cause, but really, as the perfection of the divine essence, *secundum realem existentiam*. Furthermore, Bonaventure, asking in another place whether imperfect things are in God, answers that that which is imperfect is in God, not by that by which it is imperfect, but rather by that which underlies (*subest*) the imperfection.<sup>25</sup> Since all things bespeak some perfection and thus a certain truth, they are necessarily in God, the first truth. All things exist in God exemplarily. Bonaventure carries out his discussion in the context of exemplarism and ideas. That which is imperfect does not have a corresponding idea in God by reason of its imperfection, but by reason of the underlying perfection. Matter, for example, is something imperfect; but since matter is something and denotes an essence, it has an idea in God. We see that Bonaventure does not place his affirmation outside the context of the divine ideas.

<sup>23</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 1, q. 2, Concl. (*Opera*, I, p. 620).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *In Hexaem.*, I, 13 (*Opera*, V, p. 331).

<sup>25</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 3, q. 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 629).

Has Matthew developed his own question in order to clarify something which Bonaventure fails to develop explicitly? Admittedly the question can have no definitive answer. Nonetheless, the fact that Bonaventure has seemingly always discussed the theme of the reality of creatures' perfections in God in terms of the doctrine of the *Verbum* and the divine ideas could have left obscure or unclear the very teaching which Matthew has given us. Matthew has been careful to note that when we affirm the existence of all perfection in God really and truly we must understand this *sane*. He is anxious that his formula not be understood as the contradiction of the Bonaventurian doctrine which he only wants to clarify.

Turning to St. Thomas we want to make only one pertinent remark. The doctrine which Matthew has presented finds a sharper echo in the writings of St. Thomas than in those of St. Bonaventure. The basic teaching that God really possesses every perfection of being which creatures possess, is founded, first, on the doctrine of causality; second, on a consideration of God as absolute being; and third, on the doctrine of participation. All three of these points are often and clearly taught by St. Thomas, and he explicitly relates them to the affirmation that every perfection of a creature is possessed by God.<sup>26</sup> Although we must be hesitant to recognize a literary dependence of Matthew on Thomas in this question, we can say soundly that in a uniquely formulated question Matthew has clarified Bonaventurian teaching with considerations used by St. Thomas to establish the same thesis.

### UNUS DEUS

To establish the unicity of God Matthew brings together arguments and considerations of both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. Matthew presents the question as a refutation of the doctrine of contemporary neo-Manichaeans or Cathari. Whereas most of the questions of the *De Productione Rerum* are organized around errors in the ancient philosophers, this question aims at refuting a philosophical error in contemporary theology. Matthew argues that there cannot be two first principles, a *summum bonum* and a *summum malum*.

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<sup>26</sup> Cf., for example, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, c. 29 (Parma ed. *Opera*, III, V, p. 24).

The unicity of God, lost to the pagans and certain philosophers and theologians, can be rationally established through three considerations. The first is concerned with the implications of the proofs of God's existence; the second comes to the unicity of God from a consideration of the sensible world; and the third is a consideration of the reality of evil. Matthew's text reflects the parallel texts of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and it is the latter who provided a greater part. Thomas, like Matthew, situates the question in the context of the Manichaean error, although, unlike Matthew, he gives no indication that the problem is contemporary. St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, treats separately the question of God's unicity and the question of the Manichaean doctrine.<sup>27</sup> Matthew has incorporated practically the whole of St. Thomas' text into his own. There is only a certain abridgement of the Angelic Doctor's text. At the same time Matthew has somewhat changed the order and arrangement of Thomas' text. Like Matthew, Thomas says that there is a triple error to be considered. But whereas Matthew distributes the three errors among the pagans, philosophers, and theologians, Thomas affirms that the threefold error is rooted entirely in the incorrect understanding which the ancient philosophers had of the principle that opposites are the cause of opposites. That is to say that Thomas does not have Matthew's paragraph about the error of the pagans, and that rather than consider the Manichaean doctrine as a separate error, Thomas sees it as a consequence of the principal error among the ancient philosophers. Despite these differences in construction, it is evident, especially from a review of the objections which accompany the question in both authors, that the question is centrally concerned with the Manichaean doctrine. In any case, the whole of Thomas' text from the *De Potentia* — the statement of the triple error and its refutation — is dispersed or scattered throughout the *Respondeo* of Matthew's text.

Following Thomas almost word for word, Matthew argues, first, that all opposites in the world are found to share either in the same species, genus, "*vel saltem in ratione essendi.*" Therefore, there must be one first principle which is the cause of being in all. Likewise, opposite agents must be reduced, not only to the heavens as the one cause of their movements, but to the one unmoved mover.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 2, a. unicus, q. 1 (*Opera*, I, p. 50); and *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (*Opera*, II, p. 26).

Second, evil cannot be a principle. Something is a principle of activity only insofar as it is in act; but evil denotes imperfection and "*potentiam privatam debito actu.*" Third, the order of the universe finds its explanation only in a reduction to one ordering principle. Several different principles could account for order only "*per accidens et casu.*" But the order of the universe is not accidental since it is perpetual and undeviating.

To assure ourselves of the literary dependence of Matthew on Thomas, let us place in parallel columns the texts of both authors.<sup>28</sup>

*Thomas*

Antiqui philosophi... deveniunt in hoc ut rerum duo prima principia constituerent: et hoc propter triplicem defectum qui eis aderat in contrariorum consideratione.

Primus erat, quia contraria considerabant, secundum hoc tantum quod diversa sunt ex natura speciei non autem secundum quod est aliquid unum in eis ex natura generis, licet contraria in eodem genere sint: unde non attribuebant eis causam secundum id in quo conveniunt, sed secundum hoc in quo differunt: et propter hoc in duo prima contraria, sicut in duas primas causas, omnia contraria reduxerunt... Sed inter eos Empedocles prima contraria etiam primas causas agentes posuit, scilicet amicitiam et litem: et hic, primo posuit bonum et malum principia.

Secundus defectus fuit, quia utrumque contrariorum aequa-

*Matthew*

Alius error fuit quorundam Philosophorum... Iste autem error ortum habuit ex falso intellectu cuiusdam propositionis notae et famosae apud antiquos, scilicet quod "contrariorum contrariae sunt causae," et ex falsa consideratione contrariorum...

Alius error fuit quorundam Philosophorum, qui posuerunt plures causas agentes, scilicet litem et amicitiam, bonum et malum, sicut Empedocles et Pythagoras... Quia enim consideraverunt contraria prout contraria sunt et diversa secundum naturam speciei, non prout conveniunt secundum naturam generis, — quoniam contraria sunt in eodem genere —, ideo omnia contraria reduxerunt in prima contraria tanquam ad causas agentes. Haec sunt autem lis et amicitia, malum et bonum, quae sunt generaliora et universaliora contraria.

Ulterius, utrumque contrariorum aequaliter iudicaverunt, et

■ *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 6, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 51); and *De Prod.*, q. 3, Resp. (Gál, pp. 61-73).



*Thomas*

liter iudicabant... Et exinde provenit quod tam bonum quam malum, quae videbantur esse generaliora contraria, ponebant quasi quasdam naturas diversas. Et inde fuit quod Pythagoras posuit duo genera rerum, scilicet bonum et malum; et in genere boni posuit omnia perfecta, ut lucem, masculum, quietem et huiusmodi; et in genere mali posuit omnia imperfecta, ut tenebras, feminam et huiusmodi.

Tertius defectus fuit, quia iudicaverunt de rebus secundum quod in se considerantur tantum, vel secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam rem particularem, non autem in comparatione ad totum ordinem universi. Et inde est quod si invenerunt aliquam rem esse alteri nocivam, vel esse in se imperfectam respectu aliarum imperfectarum, iudicaverunt eam simpliciter malam secundum naturam suam, et non ducere originem a causa boni...

Et ex hac radice provenit quod Manichaei corruptibilia... et visibilia... non posuerunt esse a Deo, sed a contrario principio. Hic autem error est omnino impossibilis; sed oportet omnia reducere in unum primum principium, quod est bonum, quod quidem tribus rationibus ostenditur...

Omnia autem contraria et diversa, quae sunt in mundo, inveniuntur communicare in aliquo uno, vel in natura speciei, vel in natura generis, vel saltem

*Matthew*

putaverunt contraria esse quasdam naturas diversas. Et inde fuit quod Pythagoras posuit duo tantum genera, scilicet bonum et malum, et in genere boni posuit omnia perfecta, utpote lucem, masculum, quietem et huiusmodi; in genere mali omnia imperfecta, ut tenebras, motum, feminam et huiusmodi...

Ex imperfecta rerum consideratione. Quoniam consideraverunt res inferiores absoluta consideratione, vel in comparatione unius rei particularis ad aliam rem particularem, non in comparatione nec in ordine universi totius; et quia viderunt aliquas res in se imperfectas respectu perfectiorum, viderunt aliquas res alteri noxias, iudicaverunt eas simpliciter malas... nec aliquo modo a bono principio ducere originem...

Tertius fuit, et est usque in hodiernum diem, error Manichaeorum, qui posuerunt duo principia, unum malorum, aliud bonorum, unum visibilium, aliud invisibilium.

Omnia enim entia habent convenientiam aut in natura speciei aut in natura generis aut saltem in ratione essendi... Quaecunque autem habent aliquid

*Thomas*

in ratione essendi ; unde oportet quod omnium istorum sit unum principium, quod est in omnibus causa essendi...; et sic patet quod supra quaslibet diversas causas oportet ponere aliquam causam unam, sicut etiam apud Naturales supra ista contraria agentia in natura ponitur unum agens primum scilicet caelum, quod est causa diversorum motuum in istis inferioribus. Sed quia in ipso caelo invenitur situs diversitas in quam sicut in causam reducitur inferiorum corporum contrarietas, ulterius oportet reducere in primum motorem, qui nec per se nec per accidens moveatur.

Secunda ratio est, quia omne agens agit secundum quod actu est, et per consequens secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum. Secundum autem quod malum est, non est actu, cum unumquodque dicatur malum ex hoc quod potentia est privata proprio et debito actu... Nihil ergo agit in quantum malum est, sed unumquodque agens agit in quantum bonum est. Secundum vero quod actu est unumquodque, bonum est: quia secundum hoc habet perfectionem et entitatem, in qua ratio boni consistit... Et huic rationi concordant verba Dionysii qui dicit, quod malum non agit nisi virtute boni, et quod malum est praeter intentionem et generationem.

Tertia ratio est, quia si diversa entia essent omnino a contrariis principiis in unum prin-

*Matthew*

commune, necesse est quod unum sit ab alio aut utrumque ab aliquo alio principio communi... Et inde est quod isti naturales omnia ista contraria agentia reduxerunt in causam unam... caelum... quod est causa diversorum motuum in istis inferioribus. Et quia in ipso caelo est aliqua diversitas, et ipsum, licet sit movens, est tamen motum, ideo necesse est ulterius reducere in unum primum motorem omnino immobilem et per se et per accidens.

Malum non potest esse principium... Nihil enim agit nisi in quantum est actu; malum autem, hoc ipso quod malum, importat imperfectionem et dicit potentiam privatam debito actu... Ulterius, unumquodque, secundum quod est in actu, est bonum, quia secundum hoc habet entitatem: ergo impossibile est ponere malum esse principium. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius... quod malum non agit nisi in virtute boni, et quod malum est praeter generationem.

Omnia enim entia, quantumcunque diversa et contraria, habent quandam colligantiam et

*Thomas*

*Matthew*

cipium non reductis, non pos-  
sent in unum ordinem concur-  
rere nisi per accidens. Ex mul-  
tis enim non fit coordinatio nisi  
per aliquem ordinantem, nisi  
forte multa casualiter in idem  
concurrant. Videmus autem cor-  
ruptibilia et corporalia, perfecta  
et imperfecta in unum ordinem  
concurrere. Nec potest dici, quod  
haec casualiter eveniant, nam  
non contingeret ita semper vel  
in maiori parte, sed solum in  
paucioribus. Oportet ergo omnia  
ista diversa in aliquod unum  
primum principium reducere a  
quo in unum ordinantur...

concurrunt in eundem ordinem.  
Quod patet: nam caelestia mo-  
vent terrestria, superiora infe-  
riora, spiritualia movent corpo-  
ralia... Igitur omnia omnino en-  
tia oportet reduci ad unum prin-  
cipium ordinans. A diversis enim  
principiis multa non possunt ad  
unum ordinari nisi per accidens  
et casu; ordo autem universi ca-  
sualis esse non potest, cum iste  
ordo sit perpetuus et intrans-  
gressibilis. Ergo necesse est  
unum solum esse primum prin-  
cipium a quo sunt et per quod  
ordinantur omnia.

As for St. Bonaventure's part in the construction of this ques-  
tion, it is small and negligible. Matthew, like Bonaventure, argues  
for the unicity of God from his attributes. According to Bonaventure,  
if we admit that God is simple, omnipotent, and highest, we cannot  
but conclude to his unicity.<sup>29</sup> Taking the same approach, Matthew  
argues in terms of the simplicity, perfection, primacy, and infinity.  
Both men insist on fidelity to the Anselmian formula according to  
which God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, which is  
to say that he is the one highest existing being, cause of all other  
beings.

We can conclude that whereas Matthew has borrowed directly  
and textually from Thomas, his dependence on Bonaventure is not  
literal. Matthew certainly had before his eyes the text of St. Thomas.  
The teaching of St. Bonaventure was familiar to him through his  
education. He belonged to the tradition of St. Bonaventure, which  
he knew well and accepted. Thus Matthew incorporated the teaching  
of the two masters. Moreover he added a number of considerations  
which are found in neither Thomas nor Bonaventure. They are  
common and familiar points which Matthew has gathered here to  
reinforce his exposition. This is a characteristic of Matthew, viz. the  
abundance of material which he includes in the discussion of each

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 2, a. unicus, q. 1 (*Opera*, I, p. 50).

question. The text is evidence for Matthew's reputation as being a good and thorough professor. In any case, we see that, for Matthew, the unicity of God is established principally through the argument from causality. The multiple must always be reduced to its unique cause of being, and that is God. All that is, insofar as it is, has the perfection of being. The Manichaeian reification of evil is untenable. Evil does not point to some existence, but rather to some absence of perfection. That which is absent, that which is not, need not and cannot be explained in terms of an efficient cause.

### CREATIO EX NIHILO

Following Averroes, Matthew recalls the various solutions which the Greek and Arabian philosophers gave to the question of the origin of the world. He reduces these to five, and the five have in common that none amounts to a total production of things and the world from nothing. But where the skill of the philosophers has failed, the revelation contained in Scripture comes as a help. Matthew shares the sentiment of St. Bonaventure: aided by revealed knowledge of the truth we can then see how reason confirms the divine teaching.<sup>30</sup> The creation of the world from nothing is a doctrine whose truth is accessible to reason. Thus Matthew, in the company of both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, is in opposition to St. Albert the Great and Moses Maimonides, both of whom maintained that the creation of the world can be known only by faith.<sup>30a</sup> That the world was produced from nothing can be demonstrated in many ways. Matthew presents three series of arguments based on considerations of: 1) the producing principle, God; 2) the condition of the produced world; and 3) the notion of production. These arguments serve to make clear what is already present in the proofs of God's existence, and a number of the arguments are only a repetition of those used to demonstrate the existence of God. It is only in the series of objections

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<sup>30</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 4, Resp. (Gál, p. 94). Matthew is repeating St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, Resp. (*Opera*, II, p. 16).

<sup>30a</sup> "For the texts of Albert the Great and Moses Maimonides, see A. Rohner, *Das Schöpfungsproblem bei Moses Maimonides, Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin*," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 1913, vol. II, n. 5.



and answers accompanying this question that Matthew gives us a development and explanation of the unique mode of production that creation is. Matthew, like St. Thomas, understands the arguments for God's existence as sufficient to prove creation, whereas St. Bonaventure says that after proving the existence of the producing principle, we must ask whether the producing principle, God, produced the world entirely, in both its material and formal principles. For Matthew and Thomas, to prove that all beings are from God and that they are *per participationem* is to prove both God and that mode of production which creation is.<sup>31</sup>

The series of arguments based on the notion of production seem to be proper to Matthew, and we must admit that they are weak and valueless. The series of arguments based on the reality of the world are more or less a repetition of the arguments from the contingency, imperfection, and finality of the world which were used to establish the existence of the first being as cause of all other beings. The arguments based on the producing principle reflect again the text of St. Thomas. Central here and in the following questions is the notion of God as pure act. God is pure act, and he is in no way in potency. In him there is identity of agent and action, and his action is his substance. Furthermore, since God's action is not an accident but is identical with his substance, his action need not be founded in some subject, nor does his action presuppose a subject in which it would be founded. Created agents, on the other hand, because they are composed of actuality and possibility, and because they are not identical with their action, i.e. because their action is accidental to them, must found their action in some subject. God, therefore, is able to produce from nothing, but all other agents necessarily produce from some subject. Giving a second form to this argument, Matthew, repeating Aristotle, says that every being acts according to its degree of actuality. God is pure act and acts, therefore, by his total self. His action works fully toward the production of the effect — "*quia totum est actus, toto se agit; ideo in totum agit, totum producit.*" Created agents, on the other hand, because they are composed of actuality and possibility, do not act by their whole selves and do not produce the whole of their effect.<sup>32</sup>

This argument, in both of its forms, is found in St. Thomas but

<sup>31</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2 (Parma ed. *Opera*, III, VI, p. 386)

<sup>32</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 4, Resp. (Gál, p. 95).

never in St. Bonaventure.<sup>33</sup> Matthew has borrowed the argument from the *De Potentia* text of St. Thomas, although he has not literally reproduced the text of St. Thomas. The reason for this is simple and clear. The argument, in its second part, as already mentioned, is based on the Aristotelian notion that every being acts according to its degree of actuality. Both Matthew and Thomas accept that God as pure act works fully toward the effect of his action and is able to produce from nothing. But Thomas, in his text, contrasts the action of God to the action of other agents that are composed of matter and form. Since Matthew refuses the doctrine of matter and form as elaborated by Thomas, he does not repeat the text he has before him. He contents himself with a more general contrast between the action of God and the action of created agents.

Having established that God is able to produce from nothing, i.e. that he is able to create, Matthew goes on to explain in his answers to the long series of objections what it means to say that the Creator created the creature and that that is creation. With these four related terms there are a number of questions to be answered. What does it mean to say that God is Creator? What does it mean to say that he creates? Is the creature the result of the act of creating? What does the term "creation" designate: the act of creating or the created? Is creating something? If so, what is its metaphysical status? If Matthew had several sources to establish the fact of creation, i.e. the fact that God is able to produce from nothing, it is nonetheless true that he relies, with minor exceptions, exclusively on St. Thomas to establish the meaning of creation. In his answers to the objections Matthew incorporates the teaching of St. Thomas contained in the first three articles of the third question of the *De Potentia*.

All the preceding arguments notwithstanding, how can God produce something from nothing? It is the common teaching of the philosophers that from nothing comes nothing, *de nihilo nihil*. Matthew answers that it is true that natural agents produce something from something else, and not something from nothing. The reason for this is that natural agents act through motion. But the supernatural agent does not act through motion; his action, therefore,

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 1, Sed Contra 2 (Marietti, II, p. 39). St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, quod sic 3 (*Opera*, II, p. 14), gives a similar argument based on the principle "*agens secundum formam potest producere formam.*"

does not presuppose any matter. Creation is an action, a production; but it is different from an ordinary act of production in that it involves no motion, and consequently presupposes no matter. Here are the parallel texts of St. Thomas and Matthew:<sup>34</sup>

*Thomas*

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex nihilo nihil fieri, Philosophus dicit esse communem animi conceptionem vel opinionem naturalium, quia agens naturale, quod ab eis consideratur, non agit nisi per motum; unde oportet esse aliquod subiectum motus vel mutationis, quod in agente supernaturali non oportet, ut dictum est.

*Matthew*

Tertio modo potest responderi quod est vox naturalium, loquentium de naturali productione et quae est ab agente naturali; quod quidem agit per motum, et ideo necessario praesupponit materiam. Et ideo non habet locum de prima productione et quae est ab agente supernaturali et quod per motum non agit, ideo materiam nec supponit nec requirit.

But how is it that God does not act through motion? Action through motion, says Matthew, is characteristic of an agent in which there is distinction between the agent itself and its action. But God is an agent in whom there is identity of agent and action. God's action is not other than his essence; he is his action. Here are the texts of St. Thomas and Matthew:<sup>35</sup>

*Thomas*

Praeterea, Avicenna dicit quod agens cui accidit agere, requirit materiam in quam agat. Sed Deo non accidit agere, immo sua actio est sua substantia. Ergo non requirit materiam in quam agat.

*Matthew*

Item, Avicenna : agens cui accidit agere, indiget materia; agens autem cui non accidit agere, materia non indiget. Sed agenti primo agere non accidit, immo est sua actio; ergo non indiget materia.

Why is creation called a production if it is so different from ordinary production? It is true that both modes of production have

<sup>34</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1 (Marietti, II, p. 39); and *De Prod.*, q. 4, ad 1 (Gál, p. 101).

<sup>35</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 1, Sed Contra 2 (Marietti, II, p. 39); and *De Prod.*, q. 4, Contra e (Gál, p. 92).

an active subject, but we have seen their strong difference: identity and non-Identity of agent and action. Ordinary production presupposes matter, involves an evolution and is an action through motion. Creative production is from nothing, does not include the distinction *fieri* and *factum esse*, and does not take place through motion. Do they at least have in common that both are in some way a change or a mutation? This a point on which Matthew and Thomas disagree. Matthew sides with St. Bonaventure and affirms that creation is a mutation because the *ratio mutationis* is that something has newly come into existence. St. Thomas, on the other hand, holds that mutation has a common subject or something which was before and is now differently.<sup>36</sup> Behind this at first seemingly inconsequential disagreement are the different positions on the question of the eternity of the world. In Matthew's understanding, to affirm that creation is a mutation is to admit that the world is not eternal, that creation is the introduction of something new into existence.

Is creation as a production a substance or an accident? Let us admit that it can't be a substance. But if creation is an accident, we must have a subject in which it inheres. There seem to be three possibilities: God, a creature, or some matter which precedes the creature and from which the creature is made. Creation as an accident can't be in God, because there are no accidents in God. Nor can creation as an accident be in some produced creature, because, according to Aristotle, the subject precedes the produced accident in definition and time. Therefore there is no production from nothing because some matter, the subject of creation, existed before creation. In answer to this objection Matthew introduces the distinction between active creation and passive creation. Active creation designates the Creator, but with a relation to the creature newly made. But this relation is not really in the Creator, but in the creature. Passive creation designates the effect of the active creation. Is passive creation a substance or an accident? First, Matthew says that passive creation is not in some genus properly, but that the creation of a substance is in the genus of substance and the creation of an accident is in the genus of accident. Second, our author says that passive creation is an accident. It is the relation of the creature, and relation is an accident. Then he explains in what sense the passive creation as a relation is prior to the created, and in what sense it is posterior to

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 2, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 41).



the created. The teaching of Matthew is identical to that of St. Thomas. Here are the parallel texts of the two authors:<sup>37</sup>

*Thomas*

Et ideo dicendum est, quod creatio potest sumi active et passive. Si sumitur active, sic designat Dei actionem quae est eius essentia, cum relatione ad creaturam; quae non est realis relatio, sed secundum rationem tantum. Si autem passive accipitur... est in genere relationis... Illa relatio accidens est, et secundum esse suum considerata, prout inhaeret subiecto, posterius est quam res creata; sicut accidens subiecto, intellectu et natura, posterius est... Si vero consideratur secundum suam rationem, prout ex actione agentis innascitur praedicta relatio, sic est quodam modo prior subiecto, sicut ipsa divina actio, quae est eius causa prima.

*Matthew*

Dicendum quod est creatio actio et creatio passio. Creatio actio est divina substantia, connotans tamen respectum ad creaturam de novo factam; qui tamen respectus realiter non est in Deo, sed in creatura. De creatione autem passione non potest responderi uno modo... Potest tamen et alio modo dici quod creatio accidens est, ut relatio creaturae relatio autem est accidens. Sed ista relatio considerata secundum se, prout inhaeret subiecto, est creatura posterior; si vero consideretur secundum suam rationem prout ex actione agentis innascitur, sic est quodam modo prior subiecto, sicut et actio divina quae est eius causa prima.

The preceding is reinforced when Matthew takes up the objection that if every creature is created and if creation itself is a creature, there will necessarily be an infinite regress; but since this is not possible, we must deny the reality of creation. Matthew answers that creation is not a being situated midway (*medium*) between the Creator and the creature, as if it were a being different from both Creator and creature. He repeats that active creation is the Creator with a relation to the creature; but this relation is not in the Creator; it is rather in the creature. Passive creation is the creature itself with a relation to its Creator; but this relation is not something which differs *secundum rem* from the creature. Furthermore, says Matthew, a relation is not dependent on another relation. Finally, he explains that the term creature can be taken in two ways. First, a creature is everything that is not God, and in this sense we can say that

<sup>37</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, Resp. and ad 3 (Marietti, II, p. 43); and *De Prod.*, q. 4, ad 13 (Gál, p. 106).

creation is a creature. Second, a creature can mean anything and everything that is subsistent and created by God. In this sense, creation is not a creature; it is not a *creatum aliquod*. Creation is not something which *is*; it is rather something which *inheres*, just as we say that accidents are not beings (*entia*), but of being (*entis*). Let us note again the dependence of Matthew on Thomas for this last point.<sup>38</sup>

### Thomas

Creatio active accepta significat divinam actionem cum quadam relatione cointellecta, et sic est increatum; accepta vero passive, sicut dictum est, realiter relatio quaedam est significata per modum mutationis ratione novitatis vel inceptionis importatae. Haec autem relatio, creatura quaedam est, accepto communiter nomine creaturae pro omni eo quod est a Deo. Nec oportet procedere in infinitum, quia creationis relatio non refertur ad Deum alia relatione reali sed ipsa. Nulla enim relatio refertur alia relatione... Si vero nomen creaturae accipiamus magis stricte pro eo tantum quod subsistit (quod proprie fit et creatur, sicut proprie habet esse), tunc relatio praedicta non est quoddam creatum, sed concreatum, sicut est ens proprie loquendo, sed inhaerens. Et simile est de omnibus accidentibus.

### Matthew

Creatio non est aliquod medium inter Creatorem et creaturam differens ab utroque; sed creatio actio est ipse Creator cum relatione ad creaturam, quae relatio realiter non est in ipso, sed in creatura, creatio vero passio est ipsa creatura cum relatione ad Creatorem, quae quidem relatio non ponit aliquid secundum rem differens a creatura. — Quod obicit “omnis creatura creatur,” dico quod non oportet abire in infinitum, sed statur in primis: non enim relatio alia relatione refertur; — Vel dico quod nomen creaturae duobus modis accipi potest, scilicet pro omni eo quod est a Deo nec est ipse, et sic creatio creatura est; alio modo pro eo quod per se est sive subsistit et a Deo creatur, et sic creatio non est creatura vel creatum aliquod, sed magis concreatum. Nec est ens proprie, sed magis inhaerens sicut de quibuslibet accidentibus dici potest quod non sunt entia sed entis.

Matthew began by proving that God can create from nothing and that he does in fact create from nothing. As pure act God is

<sup>38</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2 (Marietti, II, p. 43); and *De Prod.*, q. 4, ad 14 (Gál, p. 107).

able to be totally efficacious toward the effect of his action. The world as contingent, imperfect, and ordered points to its creation or production from nothing. This production of the world from nothing is called creation. The phrase *de nihilo* expresses a negative truth: God did not produce the world from something other than himself, from some independent subsisting matter.<sup>39</sup> Then, in the answers to the objections, we saw with Matthew how little resemblance there is between ordinary production and the production called creation. Creation can be called a production only because creation — passive creation, the world — is a caused effect: "*Productio est, quia ab alio est.*" The elements of an ordinary production — active subject, matter, evolution, and result — have no direct counterparts in the production called creation. In one case there is an active subject distinct from its action; in the other case there is identity of agent and action. In one case there is matter; in the other case there is none. In one case there is an evolution, a becoming; in the other case "*Creari idem est ac creatum esse.*" In the one case there is an effect which, once produced, subsists independently of the active subject; in the other case the effect is a participation of the active subject and could not be totally independent. In one case the active subject and its effect are two; in the other case God and the world are not quite two, nor are they one. Thus, in the end, Matthew is led to affirm that creation is a certain relation, a unilateral relation binding the creature to the Creator. Creation as a causal relation of dependence is ontologically posterior to the creature. There is no rapport between the creature and the Creator before the creature exists. Creation is this rapport and is possible only when the creature exists.

We have seen to what extent Matthew is dependent on the texts of St. Thomas. It is the texts of Thomas which have helped Matthew to understand how little and how poorly creation is defined as a "*productio de nihilo.*" It is interesting to note that Thomas himself never seems to have used this expression. He does use the verb forms of *producere*, but we do not find the substantive expression "*productio de nihilo*" in his texts. Perhaps Thomas recognized the difficulties of this expression due to our imagination which tries to see creation in relation to ordinary production. In any case, Matthew

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<sup>39</sup> That which is produced exists already "*in causa vel in ratione exemplari.*" Cf. *De Prod.*, q. 4, ad 7 (Gál, p. 103).

owes much to St. Thomas. In face of Matthew's abundant use of the texts of St. Thomas we can well ask why our author has not made use of the texts of his master Bonaventure. Is the teaching of St. Bonaventure defective on this point? Is there any internal reason for Matthew's preference for St. Thomas? It does not seem so. Bonaventure's theses are those of Thomas, and their developments are largely the same.<sup>40</sup> As we have seen, Matthew does turn to Bonaventure and away from Thomas on the point of creation as a mutation. Matthew and Bonaventure affirm that creation is a mutation; Thomas denies it. The disagreement here is rooted in the question of the eternity of the world. We can only conclude that Matthew knew the texts of both Bonaventure and Thomas, and no anti-Thomist animosity kept Matthew from borrowing largely from the Angelic Doctor. Matthew has given us in the space of a single question the teaching which Bonaventure and Thomas cover through several articles.

#### MULTITUDO RERUM

The fifth question of the series asks whether God can produce immediately more than one effect, whether God's creative action is necessarily limited and determined — intrinsically and/or extrinsically — to one particular creature. Matthew teaches that God is the free Creator of all that exists and that he is not determined to produce only one effect. At issue here are the neo-Platonic theories of emanation which contradict the biblical teaching of God's total authorship of nature and of all creatures. That a multitude of effects cannot be from one first agent is among the philosophical and theological errors condemned at Paris in 1277.<sup>41</sup>

It is the doctrine of Avicenna that is mentioned explicitly by Matthew. Avicenna calls the primary cause the First or the Necessary, which name signifies that the First has no cause. All other beings are possible; they need a cause in order to exist. The possible beings flow from the First according to a necessary order. Creation is not a matter of free will for the First. Any "decision" to create would

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<sup>40</sup> St. Bonaventure summarizes his teaching in *Breviloquium*, p. II, c. 1 (*Opera*, V, p. 219).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. H. Denifle, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I, p. 546, nn. 44 and 54.



introduce into the First a change incompatible with its essential necessity. The Avicennian conception of the production of creatures is based on the absolute simplicity of the First. It is the perfect simplicity of its essence which prevents the First from producing more than one immediate effect. The being that flows from the First is a pure separate Intelligence, and all other beings down to the common matter and forms of the sublunary world flow from the first Intelligence in an order which has its own necessity. This is the universe of Avicenna. The two essential points to be noted are first, that the production by the First is necessary; and second, that the immediate production by the First is limited to one effect because of its simplicity.

Interesting to an examination of Matthew's text is the way in which he uses the parallel texts of both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. Matthew recognizes that the basic error and contention of Avicenna is that God is limited to one effect because of its unity or simplicity — "ab uno, in quantum unum, non est nisi unum."<sup>42</sup> In this respect Matthew's presentation is parallel to St. Bonaventure's.<sup>43</sup> But, unlike Bonaventure, Matthew does not refute directly Avicenna's affirmation. Rather Matthew turns to St. Thomas and argues in terms of causality and causal limitation. If God is limited in his producing activity to one effect this can only be explained in terms of determination by one of the four causes: formal, material, final, or efficient. The formal cause of the object produced, since it is posterior to the producing or efficient cause, cannot account for the determination or limitation of the producing principle. Second, there is no material cause involved in God's producing activity since he produces from nothing. Third, the final cause can be considered under two aspects: the end of the operation and the end of the intention (*finis operationis* and *finis intentionis*). The end of the operation is the form and perfection of the object produced; it is the same as the formal cause. The end of the intention is the communication or representation of the divine goodness. The divine goodness is infinite, so that no creature participates perfectly in it, nor represents it perfectly. Thus there is nothing from the point of view of the end which necessarily limits or determines God's activity. Fourth, a rational being acts and produces through power, wisdom,

<sup>42</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 5, Resp. (Gál, p. 118).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 (*Opera*, II, p. 28).

and will. The power, wisdom, and will of God are infinite, so that God is no way limited as efficient cause. Furthermore, acting "*per rationem sive ideam et voluntatem*," God is a free agent; and no free agent, much less the divine agent, is limited to one effect. The whole of this argument, except for the consideration of efficient causality, has been taken from St. Thomas. Here are the texts of the two authors:<sup>44</sup>

*Thomas*

Quod multa non posse procedere ab uno principio immediate et proprie videtur esse ex determinatione causae ad effectum.

Debitum igitur essendi tale causarum non potest esse ex forma inquantum est forma, quia sic concomitatur causatum; sed vel ex virtute causae efficientis, vel ex materia, vel ex fine.

Non potest autem dici in Deo quod effectus ejus habeat debitum essendi ex materia. Nam cum ipse sit totius esse auctor, nihil quolibet modo esse habens praesupponitur ejus actioni, ut sic ex dispositione materiae necesse sit dicere talem vel talem ejus esse effectum.

Sed in quantum etiam (forma) est finis, praecedit in intentione agentis. Et quamvis forma sit finis operationis... non tamen omnis finis est forma. Est enim aliquis finis intentionis praeter finem operationis... Similiter nec ex fine intentionis. Hic enim finis est divina bonitas cui nihil accrescit ex effectuum productione. Nec iterum per effectus

*Matthew*

Quod enim ab uno non possit nisi unum procedere hoc non potest esse nisi ex determinatione alicuius causae.

Hoc autem non potest provenire ex parte causae formalis, in quantum est forma, quia forma concomitatur rem ipsam non per se, sed virtute alicuius causae.

Nec ista determinatio potest esse ex parte causae materialis, quia Primum, cum sua sit actio et totius esse causa, materiam non praesupponit, ideo nec ex dispositione vel indispositione materiae necesse est talem vel talem effectum sequi.

Nec ista determinatio potest esse ex parte causae finalis: nec finis operationis, qui est forma et perfectio rei... Nec finis intentionis; haec enim est vel communicatio vel repraesentatio divinae bonitatis, quoniam nihil ex defectu creaturarum sibi vel deperit vel accrescit. Divina autem bonitas est infinita, ita quod nulla creatura ipsam per-

<sup>44</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 16, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 87); and *De Prod.*, q. 5, Resp. (Gál, pp. 121-123).

Thomas

Matthew

potest totaliter repraesentari vel eis totaliter communicari... ut totaliter divinam bonitatem participet.

fecte participat nec eam perfecte repraesentat.

Similiter nec ex potentia effectiva. Nam cum ejus activa potentia sit infinita, non terminatur ad unum nisi ad id quod esset aequale sibi, quod nulli effectui competere potest. Unde, si inferiorem sibi effectum producere sit necesse, potentia sua quantum in se est, non terminatur ad hunc vel illum distantiae gradum, ut sic debitum sit ex ipsa virtute activa talem vel talem effectum produci.

Similiter nec ex parte causae efficientis, quoniam cum agat vel producat per potentiam, sapientiam et voluntatem, quae in quolibet agente per rationem concurrunt... quia primum infinitum est, unumquodque eorum in Deo infinitum est.

As mentioned above, the argument from causality does not answer directly the Avicennian affirmation that the simplicity of the First is incompatible with the immediate production of a multitude of effects. Matthew, following Bonaventure, presents the problem as a problem of understanding the simplicity of God; then, following Thomas, he argues in terms of causality against a limitation of God's power. (Thomas, we should note, does not discuss the notion of simplicity in his text.) In his discussion of the Avicennian position Bonaventure recognizes a double error.<sup>45</sup> First he rejects the *falsum fundamentum* of the Arabian doctrine, according to which there was a pre-existing matter.<sup>46</sup> Then he attacks the *falsam rationem* of the position. The conclusion to be drawn from the admission of God's simplicity is not that he is limited to one immediate effect, but that he is able to produce all his creatures immediately: "Quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius, et quanto potentius, tanto in plura potest." This is what Matthew says in an answer to an objection concerning the oneness of God: "Quod obicit 'agens sive efficiens est unum,' dico quod etsi agens sit unum, quia non unum arctatione sed potius

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 (*Opera*, II, p. 28).

<sup>46</sup> It seems that in fact Avicenna did not maintain the doctrine of pre-existing matter. Cf. L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Paris: Vrin, 1951), pp. 41-44.

simplicitate et actualitate, hoc ipso est multiplex in virtute et efficacia: quanto enim unumquodque simplicius, tanto virtuosius." <sup>47</sup>

In conclusion we can note that Matthew has borrowed more from Thomas than Bonaventure. Second, Matthew has failed to coordinate fully his description of the problem with his answer to it. He seems to answer Bonaventure's problem with Thomas's solution. Whereas for the question concerning the creation of the world from nothing we could find no explanation of Matthew's preference for the texts of the Angelic Doctor, we can for the present question see that Matthew has preferred an argument from causality to an argument based on the attributes of God. The relation between the simplicity and power of an agent is in danger of seeming like a word game unless there is a solid grasp of a basic ontology. The argument from causality is much more direct and quickly and solidly conclusive. Matthew, renowned and illustrious professor, saw this.

#### POTENTIA CREANDI INCOMMUNICABILIS

The sixth question of the series asks whether the power of creation properly understood can be given to, or possessed by, a creature. Whereas the preceding questions concerning creation and the immediate production of a multitude of effects were intended as a refutation of certain Greek and Arabian doctrines, the present question has a Christian theological background. Certain theologians maintained that the sacramental powers of the priest were a power of creation. Matthew, along with all of his contemporaries, rejects this view of the priestly powers.<sup>48</sup> In our presentation we shall continue to note the strong influence of St. Thomas. St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, is almost nowhere to be found in this discussion; and this probably for the simple reason that he never devoted a question or article to this problem.<sup>49</sup>

Matthew begins by explaining three possible meanings that could be given to the expression "the communication of the creative power." The first and strictest meaning of the expression "to create"

<sup>47</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 5, ad 10 (Gál, p. 131).

<sup>48</sup> Matthew rejects this view although he is not certain that St. Augustine did not hold Lombard's position. Cf. *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, p. 148).

<sup>49</sup> But see St. Bonaventure's remarks in *III Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, q. 3, Concl. (*Opera*, III, p. 324).



is to produce something from nothing, "nullo praesupposito principio, nec materiali nec agente sive efficiente." To say, in this sense, that the power of creating is possessed by a creature means that the creature produces something from nothing by its own power, just as God creates. Certain heretical theologians admitted this doctrine. The angels, they say, were created by God; and the angels created the world, "*sine conscientia Dei patris.*"<sup>50</sup> But, says Matthew, the error of these theologians was never committed by any philosopher. No philosopher ever said that a creature was entirely independent and able to create fully by itself. No philosopher ever said that a creature was pure act or God. The philosophers always affirmed that secondary agents must be reduced to the prime mover. Although St. Thomas does not mention the heretical theologians, Matthew's answer to their position is taken from St. Thomas. Here are the two authors' texts:<sup>51</sup>

*Thomas*

Si igitur sic stricte creatio accipitur, constat quod creatio non potest nisi primo agenti convenire, nam causa secunda non agit nisi ex influentia causa primae; et sic omnis actio causae secundae est ex praesuppositione causae agentis.

Nam ordo effectuum est secundum ordinem causarum. Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum; et ideo oportet quod dare esse in quantum huiusmodi sit effectus primae causae solius secundum propriam virtutem; et quaecumque alia causa hoc habet in quantum est in ea virtus et operatio primae causae, et non per propriam virtutem.

*Matthew*

Immo posuerunt omnes motores et agentia secunda reduci ad primum movens et agens, et in virtute illius agere et movere... quia omnes virtutes pendent a virtute unius primi, qui immediate agit in effectibus omnium agentium posteriorum.

Rursus, ordo effectuum est secundum ordinem causarum. Primus autem effectus est esse, quod omnibus effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum nullum alium praesupponit effectum. Et ideo oportet quod esse sit effectus tantum primae causae, aut si aliqua causa dat esse, hoc est in quantum est in ea virtus et operatio primae causae, et non per propriam virtutem...

<sup>50</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, pp. 143-144).

<sup>51</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 46); and *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, p. 144).

A second possible meaning of the expression "to create" is to produce something from nothing, "*tamen praesupposito principio agente primario.*" The created agent or creating creature would produce something from nothing without any special influence of the Creator, "*sed solum supposita universali manutentia, qua gubernat et regit universam creaturam et quam nulli agenti subtrahit.*"<sup>52</sup> Matthew does not accept this, nor does he admit that a creature can create in a third sense espoused by theologians who claim that the priest, with his sacramental powers, creates grace in the soul of the faithful. Peter Lombard maintained that Christ could have given this power of creation to the ministers of the sacraments, especially of the sacrament of baptism. Matthew rejects this view, although he is not sure that St. Augustine did not share Lombard's opinion.<sup>53</sup>

Matthew presents six arguments to show that God is not able to communicate to a creature the power of creating. Discussing this same problem, St. Thomas gives five arguments against the possibility of a creating creature. Matthew repeats four of Thomas' arguments; and it is interesting to note that to two of the four arguments Matthew gives names or titles borrowed from St. Bonaventure. The eternity, perfection, immensity, simplicity, actuality, and unity which characterize necessarily the creative power are found only in God and never in a creature or secondary agent. Matthew's consideration of the eternity and perfection necessary to the Creator and absent in every creature are more statements than arguments. Let us look at the arguments which have parallels in the text of St. Thomas.

Every change or movement is from one opposite to another opposite. It is necessary that the agent power be proportioned to the distance which separates the two opposites. The heat of an object, for example, must be more intense according as the object to be heated is more cold. Likewise, since the distance between being and non-being is infinite because they are opposites *extra genus*, the agent necessary for this production must be of infinite power. Furthermore, being and non-being have nothing in common (*nullo modo conveniunt*); and where two opposites have nothing in common, there is no proportion between them. The disproportion can be overcome only by the immense and infinite power which is God the

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<sup>52</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, p. 144).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*

Creator. This argument is taken from St. Thomas, but the key or title word in Matthew's text is "*immensum*". It is known that the divine immensity is a Bonaventurian theme.<sup>54</sup> Here are the parallel texts of Matthew and Thomas:<sup>55</sup>

Thomas

Nam creatio infinitam requirit virtutem in potentia a qua egreditur: quod ex quinque rationibus apparet. Prima ratio est ex hoc quod potentia facientis proportionatur distantiae quae est inter id quod fit et oppositum ex quo fit. Quanto enim frigus est vehementius, et sic a calore magis distans, tanto maiore virtute caloris opus est ut ex frigido fiat calidum. Non esse autem simpliciter in infinitum ab esse distat, quod ex hoc patet, quia a quolibet ente determinato plus distat non esse quam quodlibet ens, quantumcumque ab alio ente distans invenitur; et ideo ex omnino non ente aliquid facere non potest esse nisi potentiae infinitae.

Matthew

Tertia ratio est, quia posse creare dicit posse immensum; omnis enim motus, omnis transmutatio est ab opposito in oppositum; potentiam autem agentem oportet proportionari distantiae quae est inter id quod fit et oppositum ex quo fit. Quod patet, quoniam tanto oportet esse calorem maioris virtutis quanto frigus, ex quo fit, fuerit intensius. Cum autem inter ens et non ens simpliciter sit distantia infinita, cum sint opposita extra genus, ideo ex non ente simpliciter non potest aliquid facere vel producere nisi agens extra genus et potentiae infinitae.

Giving again a Bonaventurian title to an argument, Matthew says that the creative power is the most simple power (*posse simplicissimum*) which the Creator alone possesses. The divine simplicity is a constant and familiar theme in the writings of St. Bonaventure.<sup>56</sup> But the argument which Matthew presents is taken again from St. Thomas. Here are the parallel texts:<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Cf., for example, *III Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, q. 3, Concl. (*Opera*, III, p. 324).

<sup>55</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 43); and *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, p. 149).

<sup>56</sup> Cf., for example, *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (*Opera*, I, pp. 638-639).

<sup>57</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 43); and *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, p. 149).

*Thomas*

Tertia ratio est, quia cum accidens oporteat esse in subiecto, subiectum autem actionis sit recipiens actionem; illud solum faciendo aliquid recipientem materiam non requirit, cuius actio non est accidens, sed ipsa substantia sua, quod solius Dei est; et ideo solius eius est creare.

*Matthew*

Quinta ratio est, quoniam posse creare dicit posse simplicissimum et illius agentis in quo non differt agens et actio nec actio est accidens agenti. Cum enim creatio sit actio quaedam quae non potest esse in creabili, quia illud non est, nec in materia, cum non sit ex materia; actionis autem subiectum est recipiens actionem ipsam, et omne accidens oportet esse in aliquo subiecto: ergo creatio est actio quae non est accidens agenti, sed est ipsa agentis substantia in quo non differt substantia, virtus et actio.

In his last consideration Matthew argues that the actuality of the agent must be all the greater as the thing to be produced is more defective. Thus to effect a passage from nothingness, which is the greatest defect, to something, the agent must be of the greatest actuality. Furthermore, as we have seen already several times, every agent acts according to its degree of act. The agent which is total or pure act is able to be efficacious toward the whole of its effect. But it is only God who is pure and total act; therefore the creature cannot produce from nothing. Here are the parallel texts of Thomas and Matthew:<sup>58</sup>

*Thomas*

Secunda ratio est, quia hoc modo factum agitur quo faciens agit. Agens autem agit secundum quod actu est; unde id solum se toto agit quod totum actu est, quod non est nisi actus infiniti qui est actus primus; unde et rem agere secundum totam eius substantiam solius infinitae virtutis est.

*Matthew*

...Ulterius omne agens agit secundum quod est in actu, et hoc modo factum agitur quo agens est in actu. Illud autem agens se toto agit quod totum est actu; igitur illud agens totum agit, totum producit, quod totum est in actu et agit se toto. Hoc autem non est nisi agens actualitatis purae et infinitae. Nullum autem agens creatum potest esse huiusmodi.

<sup>58</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4, Resp. (Marietti, II, p. 46); and *De Prod.*, q. 6, Resp. (Gál, p. 150).



In conclusion we note again Matthew's dependence on St. Thomas. We have noted the interesting fact that twice Matthew has given Bonaventurian names to arguments borrowed directly from St. Thomas. The question was to know whether a creature could receive from God or possess the power of creating or producing something from nothing. Matthew's answer is that creation in the strict sense is an impossibility for any creature because every creature exists in dependence on its Creator, and, therefore, can never be or act "*nullo praesupposito*." Nor can a creature create, even if we admit the assistance of God, because a creature cannot possess the power necessary to create. Although our language might lead us to believe that God could communicate the *potentiam creandi*, the fact is that this power is nothing other than the being of God.

#### DURATIO MUNDI

The last two questions of the series deal with the question of the duration of the world. In his full and lengthy discussion Matthew defends without ambiguity the position of St. Bonaventure against St. Thomas. First Matthew demonstrates that God *can* produce a new effect without a change of himself. Thus the world is not necessarily eternal. Then he shows that *our* world is not eternal. Finally he will maintain that no eternal creature is possible: "Deus hoc potenter non potuit."<sup>59</sup> The question dealing with God's ability to produce a new effect without undergoing any change in himself is a rubric proper to Matthew. Neither Bonaventure nor Thomas devote a question or article to this problem. It is the doctrine of Averroes that Matthew refutes. Averroes maintained the eternity of the world because a non-eternal world would involve a change of will (*mutatio voluntatis*) on the part of God. Matthew counters the assertion of Averroes by establishing, first, the immutability of God: He is immutable because he is simple, eternal, and immense. Second, Matthew shows the compatibility between God's immutability and his production of new effects. In line with the preceding questions Matthew emphasizes that as pure act God is immutable. Every being in potency to, or capable of, change or movement is mutable. God is pure act and not at all in potency: He is immutable. That the

<sup>59</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 9, Resp. (Gál, p. 213).

immutable God can produce new effects Matthew establishes through considerations of the mode of the divine operation, the identity of operation and agent in God, the simultaneity or unity of eternity, and the nature of the relation between God and his effects. Borrowing the theological language of St. Augustine, Matthew works his way to the conclusion that God's will is not changed by the coming to be of the eternally willed effect. God has his "*verbum aeternum de re temporali*." <sup>60</sup> Thus Matthew agrees with Averroes that God acts through his will, but it is his eternal will. Intrinsically God does not change. His action is his essence. Although Matthew gives us in this question a series of quotations from St. Augustine, it is the Aristotelian notion of pure act which gives strength to the conviction of God's immutability and of his power to produce new effects without causing a change of himself.

Having demonstrated that our world is not necessarily eternal, Matthew goes on, in the last question of the series, to show that our world is not eternal and that it is impossible for a creature to be eternal. Matthew's basic conviction and argument, which he inherited from St. Bonaventure, is that creation *ex nihilo* is necessarily creation *post nihilum*. It is interesting to note that Matthew has developed some of the arguments of St. Bonaventure but he has not deemed any correction or modification of them necessary. Matthew considers and refuses the discussions presented by St. Thomas in his commentary on the *Sentences* and in the *De Potentia*. Furthermore, rather than repeat the five arguments against the eternity of our world proposed by St. Bonaventure, Matthew limits himself to the three arguments of Bonaventure which Thomas refuted in the *Summa*. <sup>61</sup> For Matthew, the impossibility of an infinite number of souls, revolutions, and generations is the demonstration of the non-eternity of our world. Last, we can note that Matthew remains silent concerning the theological motives which inspired the position of St. Bonaventure. <sup>62</sup> His entire discussion is limited to a detailed analysis of the arguments and notions involved. This does not mean, of course, that Matthew did not see any dangers for faith in the affirmation of the possibility

<sup>60</sup> *De Prod.*, q. 8, Resp. (Gál, p. 190).

<sup>61</sup> *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 46, a. 2 (Parma ed. *Opera*, I, I, p. 192).

<sup>62</sup> Cf., for example, *De Decem Praeceptis*, II, n. 25 (*Opera*, V, p. 514); *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, col. 8, n. 17 (*Opera*, V, p. 498); and *In Hexaem.*, col. 6, nn. 4 and 5 (*Opera*, VI, pp. 360-361).

of an eternal creation. It would seem rather that he has preferred to remain at a philosophical level.

### CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of our study we recognized Matthew as a neo-Augustinian. This term is proposed by F. Van Steenberghen to designate those Franciscans who, in reaction against the radical Aristotelianism of a Siger of Brabant and the Aristotelian novelties of a Thomas Aquinas, decided to see themselves as the heirs and promoters of the thought and spirit of St. Augustine.<sup>63</sup> In the name of an already established theological synthesis these Franciscans refuse the new philosophical views of Thomas Aquinas. This theological synthesis, as F. Van Steenberghen points out, is not a pure *reprise* of St. Augustine; but rather owes much to Jewish and Arabian authors. Thus the appellation "neo-Augustinism." Matthew of Aquasparta was evidently intent on promoting the authority and prestige of St. Augustine. He recognized St. Augustine to be the guide, not only of the theologians, but of all thinkers.<sup>64</sup> In cases of doubt, Matthew suggests, the authority of Augustine should be heeded for safety's sake at least.<sup>65</sup> And the endangering of an element of the established theology was reason enough to reject the Aristotelian novelties of Thomas Aquinas.<sup>66</sup> Nonetheless, for all his Augustinian fervor, we never see Matthew condemn Aristotle; and in the *De Productione Rerum* we see his large use of St. Thomas' *De Potentia* which relies very heavily on the Aristotelian notion of pure act to resolve the different questions concerning the creation and the Creator. In view of all this, we suggest the following conclusions.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, pp. 464-471.

<sup>64</sup> "(The position of St. Thomas) *videtur nihilominus evertere et subvertere omnia fundamenta beati Augustini, cuius auctoritates nullo modo possunt exponi. Quod videtur inconveniens, cum ipse sit doctor praecipuus, et quem doctores catholici et maxime theologi debent sequi.*" *Quaestiones Disputatae De Fide et De Cognitione, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi*, No. 1 (2nd ed.; Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1957), p. 232.

<sup>65</sup> "*Non est tutum professoribus theologiae positionem hanc contrariam dictis doctionibus egregii Augustini tenere.*" *Quaestione Disputatae De Anima XIII*, ed. A.-J. Gondras (Paris: Vrin, 1961), p. 107.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 64, where Matthew defends against St. Thomas the doctrine of the plurality of forms in the name of an established Christology.

First, Matthew never rejected any of the theses of St. Bonaventure. In the writings of his master Matthew found those positions which he recognized to be of Augustinian inspiration and true. Second, Matthew's interest was the promotion of the authority of St. Augustine, not the condemnation of Aristotle. This is not a matter of words. F. Van Steenberghen says that the Franciscans rallied to St. Augustine "pour mieux combattre le prestige d'Aristote et de Thomas d'Aquin."<sup>67</sup> We suggest that this expression is too polemical and does not convey best the situation, at least not the attitude of Matthew of Aquasparta. Wheresoever new ideas of Aristotelian inspiration endangered the established theology, Matthew refuted them. At the same time he recognized that Aristotle was able to give help in establishing many theses of a philosophical nature without jeopardizing the theological synthesis. This is precisely the case in the *De Productione Rerum*. The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas, which is admittedly not pure Aristotelianism, is recognized as able to establish well the the relationship between the being of God and the being of creation, the unicity of God, the meaning of creation, the immediate production of a multitude, and the impossibility of communicating the power of creation. Thus Matthew is not totally closed to the recent developments of Aristotelianism. He is not anxious to combat or ignore as much as possible Aristotle and St. Thomas. The *De Productione Rerum* is solid evidence of this.

We can conclude by recalling the positions of the three historians of Matthew that need correction in light of our study. Most obvious is the imprecision of Weber's affirmation that a certain "*chauvinisme d'école*" kept Matthew from borrowing more than spare introductory remarks from the writings of St. Thomas. Longpré's contention that Matthew's construction is owed essentially to the metaphysics of St. Augustine and St. Anselm is incompatible with the basically Aristotelian inspiration of the questions *De Productione Rerum*. The large presence of St. Augustine, as we have already mentioned, is more complementary than foundational in these questions. Matthew did "cede" to the surrounding Aristotelianism of the end of the thirteenth century. Maintaining the key positions of St. Bonaventure, he gave place, nonetheless, to Aristotle wherever possible. Lastly, Doucet's affirmation that Matthew everywhere considered the preference of Aristotle to St. Augustine to be wrong is contradicted by

<sup>67</sup> *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, p. 465.



the text we have studied. The language and categories of Aristotle replace those of St. Augustine in all of these questions, save that concerning the existence of God. And even in the question of God's existence we have seen Matthew's hesitation regarding the *Proslogion* argument of St. Anselm and his reliance on proofs based on the sensible world. It seems true, as Doucet affirms, that Matthew was engaged in the defense and perfection of the Bonaventurian synthesis; but this project did not keep Matthew from achieving a unity in these questions by substituting the Aristotelian formulations of St. Thomas for those of St. Bonaventure.

*Servite Priory*  
*Anaheim, California*

JOHN D. DOWD, O.S.M.

## THE MEANING OF *CONVENIENTIA* IN THE METAPHYSICS OF ST. BONAVENTURE

In a text that might well be taken as a description of the history of Christian theology, A. N. Whitehead wrote that Christianity is a "religion seeking a metaphysics."<sup>1</sup> It is precisely this fact which, in the opinion of Whitehead, has made it possible for Christianity to develop so richly in its history; for Christianity is, in effect, an experience of history seeking its own proper metaphysical implications throughout its ongoing encounter with human cultural history. The center of the Christian historical experience is the person of Jesus Christ in whom the Christian community sees "a revelation of the nature of God and of His agency in the world."<sup>2</sup> Since Christian tradition sees in Christ not only *a* revelation, but *the* decisive revelation, His person becomes the fundamental clue as to the nature of reality.

If metaphysics involves the search for universal structures of reality, the decisive question becomes that of the sort of experience which one sees as paradigmatic. In the case of Bonaventure, we find a theologian who has made a clear decision concerning that experience which provides the basic clues for metaphysical inquiry. Most clearly expressed in his later works, it is a decision that seems to be operative from the beginning of his literary career.<sup>3</sup> Christ is the center of reality, and it is from that center that man should begin his inquiry concerning the nature of reality.<sup>4</sup> Beginning at the center, the in-

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<sup>1</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (Cleveland, 1969), p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (Toronto, 1961), p. 166.

<sup>3</sup> J. Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, tr. Z. Hayes (Chicago, 1971), pp. 109, 128 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Hex.* 1, 1 (V, 329) says we are to begin "from the center, which is Christ; for if this center is overlooked, no result is obtained." *Hex.* 1, 10 (V, 330) puts it as follows: "Note that a beginning should be made from the center, that is from Christ... Hence it is necessary to start from Him if a man wants to reach Christian wisdom." *Hex.* 1, 11-39 (V, 331 ff.) states in but a few pages in concentrated form Bonaventure's understanding of Christ as the center of all dimensions of

quirer can come to know how all things come forth into being and how they are to be brought to consummation. "Such is the metaphysical center that leads us back, and this is the whole of our metaphysics; namely, it is concerned with emanation, exemplarity, and consummation; that is, to be illumined by means of spiritual light and be led back to the Highest Being. And in this you will be a true metaphysician."<sup>5</sup> One could not hope for a more explicit statement of Christocentric concern on the part of any theologian; metaphysics is to be derived from the mystery of Christ.

With such a starting point in mind, we can gain some understanding of Bonaventure's voluntaristic concept of reality; for Christ is the embodiment of divine love, a love that is utterly free in relation to every creature. If that which is embodied in Christ is the ultimate mystery of all reality, then reality at root is voluntaristically structured; for the principle of all reality appeared in Christ as a loving will.

The present article is an attempt to study only one aspect of the implications of Bonaventure's vision; namely, the meaning of the argument of *convenientia* in the early Christology of the Seraphic Doctor. Our study is limited, for the most part, to a consideration of the first distinction of the third book of the *Sentence Commentary*,<sup>6</sup>

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reality and knowledge. All references to the Latin texts of Bonaventure are to the Quaracchi edition. With each citation, the volume number will be given in Roman numerals, and the page number in Arabic numbers, e.g. (X, 21).

<sup>5</sup> *Hex.* I, 17 (V, 332).

<sup>6</sup> The first distinction of Lombard's third book of *Sentences* treats three questions: 1) why the Son assumed flesh, and not the Father or Spirit; 2) Whether the Father or the Spirit could have become incarnate; 3) Whether the Son, who assumed the flesh, did something that neither the Father nor the Spirit did. In the most radical sense, an incarnation of the Father or of the Spirit is possible. But since redemption is a work of divine wisdom, it is carried out in a congruous order. In terms of congruity, it would seem that it is more congruous that a mission into history be related to those persons who are *ab alio* in the Trinity, and in the order of their emanations. He who is *a nullo* should not be sent, though an incarnation of the Father is radically possible. He who is first by reason of origin is sent first; this is the mission *in carnem* of the Son. After this follows the mission of the Spirit, who is from the Father and the Son. The work of the incarnation is the work of the entire Trinity, since the substance and operation of the Trinity is one and undivided; but it is directed to the union of the Son alone with the flesh. Thus, the name "Son" applies not to two persons, but to one and the same person who is both Son of God and Son of Man. There is, then, a harmony between the emanations of persons in God and the historical mission of the Son

since it is here that Bonaventure elaborates the conditions for an incarnation and the arguments of *convenientia* most fully and systematically. The text of Bonaventure is divided into two major articles; the first treats the possibility of an incarnation; and the second treats the congruence of the incarnation of the Son.

To speak of an incarnation presupposes something about the nature of the two terms of the union — God and man — by reason of which an incarnation might be said to be possible at all. If we proceed — as Bonaventure does — from the datum of faith which tells us that the Word did indeed become flesh, that fact necessarily implies the possibility of the fact; and the possibility leads us to ask about the conditions for such a possibility. While it is true that human reason by itself might never come to ask about such a possibility, once one takes the datum of faith as his starting point and inquires into the conditions for the possibility of such a union, it may well be that some fundamental metaphysical conclusions will emerge that differ from those of the metaphysician who carries out his task with no reference to the Christological mystery and its metaphysical implications.

## A CONCEPT OF THE INCARNATION

Prior to our actual inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of an incarnation, it is necessary to provide at least a working definition of the term. In Bonaventure, one of the most common examples used to clarify the meaning of the incarnation is drawn from the experience of human knowledge and its expression in words. The human person, who is at first a potential subject of knowledge, becomes a knower in actuality through its encounter with the world around it; it comes to a knowledge of itself and of other things. The process of moving from the state of a potential knower to that of an actual knower may be illustrated by the process of generation through which a parent begets a child. The soul begets a reality that is not simply identical with the soul as such; and that reality Bonaventure calls a concept or a word. The knowing subject begets an inner word which is nothing other than its knowledge of itself or of

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and the Spirit. As we will see in the course of this article, Bonaventure's treatment agrees in all essential points with this position of Lombard, though the Seraphic Doctor elaborates his position with great care.



another.<sup>7</sup> The term "inner word," therefore, signifies a being in as far as it is aware of itself and/or another. But the inner word, and therefore the knower himself, remains enclosed within itself unless in some way the inner word finds expression in an external word.<sup>8</sup> When that happens, interiority expresses itself externally; and to the extent that this takes place, a communication between two subjects becomes possible. The words of human language, therefore, are different from the inner word of knowledge, yet their real meaning lies in the fact that they communicate the inner word which is their content. In a sense, the words of language systems are the otherness of the inner word; they are what the inner word becomes when it moves into the public realm for the sake of communication. Now, it is clear that a person's knowledge cannot be disengaged from the person's subjectivity so as to be transported outside himself. Yet if that knowledge is not really the content of the words of human language, no communication between subjects is really possible.

If we take this as an analogy for dealing with the incarnation, when we speak of the Word of God, we are referring to the pure self-awareness of God whereby He knows Himself totally and actually in His own being and in the many ways in which He can communicate being.<sup>9</sup> The Word is the Father's total and perfect self-expression as supreme loving Being and source of all that is or can be. Following the analogy, we discover that all of creation is an external word in which the inner causal Word comes to expression in multiple ways. But within the world of created beings, it is the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth which becomes the fullest and most perfect external Word that gives expression to the inner, eternal Word as its proper content. Pursuing the analogy yet another step, we see that incarnation cannot mean that the Word of God's self-awareness leaves God and descends into time for a brief visit among men.<sup>10</sup> On the contrary, incarnation is primarily a mystery of re-

<sup>7</sup> I *Sent.* d. 27, p. 2, a. un., q. 3 (I, 487).

<sup>8</sup> *Sermo II in nat. Dom.* (IX, 107); also, Zachary Hayes, *What Manner of Man? Sermons on Christ by St. Bonaventure: A Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (Chicago, 1974), p. 76, n. 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Hex.* 3, 4 (V, 343) Summum autem spiritum impossibile est se non intelligere et cum intellectum aequetur intelligenti, intelligit quidquid est et quidquid potest: ergo ratio intelligendi aequatur intellectui, quae similitudo ejus est. Haec autem similitudo Verbum est.

<sup>10</sup> *Sermo II in nat. Dom.* (IX, 107); also, Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 80, n. 16.

lation.<sup>11</sup> It is the unique case of God's creative action which places the created human nature of Jesus in being and in a unique relation to the divine. So intense is this relation that the history of Jesus of Nazareth is properly what the inner Word of God "becomes" when it is most fully spoken into that which is ontologically other than itself, i.e. the human nature of Jesus. The inner Word remains what it is in itself; yet it moves into history in a form that is other than itself. The divine is present in a reality that is not divine; the human nature exercises a function relative to the divine which is analogous to the function of the vocal word relative to human knowledge.

In more abstract terms, incarnation means that a divine person who is, from eternity, an hypostasis relative to the divine nature assumes an hypostatizing function and indeed becomes the hypostasis of a human nature in time. Three conditions may be established for the possibility of such a relationship.<sup>12</sup> 1) The two terms of the relation must be capable of such a unique and intense union. The divine must be capable of entering into such a union without detriment to the divinity, for if the divine did not remain what it is in itself, it would not be the divine that is present in the non-divine. On the other hand, human nature must be capable of being drawn into such a union without becoming either more or less than human. 2) There must be a unity of person; for if this were not the case, then the history of Jesus would not be the history of the Word but a history only extrinsically related to the Word. It would not be truly the presence of the Word that we encounter in Jesus, but a reality particularly close to the Word yet still penultimate in character. 3) Granted the possibility from the side of God and from the side of man, it is yet required that there be a power adequate to effect the union. It is above all with the first two of these conditions that we are concerned. How may such a thing as an incarnation be conceived so as to do no violence to the perfection and immutability of God? What kind of relationship can there be between the infinite God and the finite creature, for how is such a union possible if there be no proportion between the terms of the union?

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<sup>11</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1 (III, 10); ad 3 (III, 10-11); *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 (III, 13); ad 4 (III, 13); ad 6 (III, 13).

<sup>12</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 4, sic. 3 (III, 16).

## CONDITIONS FOR AN INCARNATION

## a) ON THE PART OF GOD

Is such a thing as an incarnation congruous with the nature of God and His mode of operation? <sup>13</sup> If we begin with the fact of the incarnation, it is clear that such a thing must be possible. But how can we conceive of it without doing violence to our concepts of the divine nature? Basic to Bonaventure's theology in general is the principle: Everything that is not derogatory to God's excellence is to be considered a possibility for the divine power.<sup>14</sup> The question then becomes whether an incarnation as described above would imply anything derogatory to the divine nature. Bonaventure's answer is cast primarily within the generally accepted Scholastic theory of the relation between the created world and God,<sup>15</sup> according to which the creative act of God implies no change in God but only in the creature. Creation implies relation, but that relation is *realis* only on the part of the creature. God is in the creature *per essentiam, praesentiam, et potentiam*,<sup>16</sup> yet depends on the creature in no way; while the creature is totally dependent on God as conserving and sustaining cause.<sup>17</sup> As we have seen above, the incarnation is a unique case of

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<sup>13</sup> A certain methodological ambiguity may be discerned in the attempt to answer this question. It is clear that for Bonaventure, the person of Christ becomes the basic clue as to the nature of God. At the same time, the term "God" already has some content which Bonaventure draws largely from the philosophical-theological tradition; particularly relative to such notions as perfection, relation, and change. If one were entirely consistent in working from the Christological starting point, would it not be true that such notions would receive their primary content from the mystery of Christ? At least prior concepts of God might have to undergo transformation on these points. To a degree, this does take place in Bonaventure's thought, as can be seen clearly in the fifth and sixth chapters of the *Itinerarium* (V, 308 ff.). But in the treatment of the present question, the reader gains the impression that certain common teachings of the Scholastic tradition play a greater role than need be the case.

<sup>14</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (III, 9 ff.); *ibid.* contra 1 & 2 (III, 9); *Brevil.* 1, 2 (V, 211) where Bonaventure urges us to think of God "altissime et piissime." The Seraphic Doctor is unwilling to allow human concepts to place limits on what is possible to God. The only conceivable limit would be that involved in an obvious contradiction. The point here would be to determine whether there is a contradiction involved in the very notion of an incarnation.

<sup>15</sup> Zachary Hayes, *The General Doctrine of Creation in the Thirteenth Century* (Schöningh, 1964) pp. 97-105.

<sup>16</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, conf. 3 (III, 10).

<sup>17</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (III, 10).

God's creative action. If it be conceived within the larger context of creation-theology, it would appear that the divine creative power renders this human nature a real, concrete, individual being in union with the Word.<sup>18</sup> If God's creative action in general implies neither need nor dependence on the part of God, neither does that same creative action imply need or dependence when it is directed specifically to the work of the incarnation.

The hypostatic union is primarily a mystery of relation.<sup>19</sup> In a more general sense, the Scholastic doctrine of relation as elaborated by Bonaventure sees the possibility that a relation may be established by a change in only one of the terms while the other term remains fundamentally unchanged in itself. Such a case can be seen in the example of a crystal that is brought into a lighted room. When it is moved from darkness into the light, the crystal is illumined and penetrated with light. While the crystal is said to be changed, the beam of light that illumines it remains unchanged in itself.<sup>20</sup> If we remove any grossly materialistic elements from this example, it may be taken as an analogy for the relation between the human nature of Christ and the Word who assumed that nature. The Word remains unchanged in terms of its divinity, and it is not removed locally from the Trinity; rather the human nature is called into being precisely as the human nature hypostatized by the Word. The only change involved here lies on the side of the created nature; first the metaphysical change in the passage from non-being to being, and then all subsequent change in the historical development of that created nature.

Up to this point, Bonaventure has spoken only of the divine nature as such and not specifically of one of the divine hypostases as distinct from the others. Western theology, at least from the time of Augustine, had taught that all the divine operations *ad extra* proceed from God as from one principle. Lombard, in the first distinction of the third book of the *Sentences* <sup>21</sup> had indicated that while, in fact,

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*; III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1 (III, 10); I *Sent.* d. 30, q. 3 (I, 524 ff.).

<sup>19</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1 (III, 10). As the terms "to generate" and "to be generated" do not signify action and passion in God but only *relation*, so the term "to be united" used in reference to the incarnation does not signify passivity on the part of God, but only *relation*.

<sup>20</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3 (III, 10-11).

<sup>21</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, c. 2 in: *Libri IV Sententiarum*, tom. II, ed. 2<sup>a</sup> (Quaracchi, 1916) p. 552.



the Son alone became incarnate, yet in principle it is possible that both the Father and the Spirit could become incarnate. The further objection has been raised that since the works of the Trinity are one and indivisible, all three persons must have become incarnate. With an appeal to Augustine,<sup>22</sup> Lombard responded by distinguishing between the operation of the Trinity, which indeed is one and undivided, and the effect to which that operation is directed, which — in this case — is the union of the Word alone with the flesh. Bonaventure treats the question from two perspectives. 1) Whether one of the divine persons could become incarnate without the other two? 2) Whether in some way all three persons could become incarnate?

Granting the traditional principle that the operation of God is one and undivided, Bonaventure argues that Scripture speaks of the incarnation of the Word alone. That is the fact from which the theologian must proceed, and that fact implies the possibility that one hypostasis could become incarnate without the other two.<sup>23</sup> But arguing from the fact to the possibility, we are led to ask about the conditions for the possibility. Here again we are confronted with Bonaventure's doctrine of relation. The incarnation involves not only the divine operation, but also a relation.<sup>24</sup> While the operation is common to all three persons, the effect of the operation involves a relation of the human nature to only one of the divine hypostases who alone is hypostasis of this nature. Incarnation, finally, is a union in person; and person is radically incommunicable. Since it is precisely by reason of relation that the divine hypostases are distinguished in the Godhead, there is no cogent reason against the possibility of a relation between a human nature and one divine person *determinate et distincte*.<sup>25</sup> God is the creative cause of all finite reality, and this is common to all three persons since there is but one divine nature and one divine operation. However, in speaking of the incarnation, we are dealing with a situation in which the divine is not simply the creative cause of the creature but is precisely a hypostasis in reference to the finite. Since the divine nature is not simply equivalent

<sup>22</sup> *De trin.* I, 5, 8; IV, 21, 30 (PL 42, 824, 909).

<sup>23</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (III, 12-13).

<sup>24</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 (III, 13); ad 4 (III, 13); resp. (III, 12-13).

<sup>25</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (III, 12). All opposing arguments, whether they are based on the Trinitarian principle, the relation between creation and re-creation, or the theology of grace, fail to take into account the reality of the relation involved in the incarnation. III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, quod non 1-4 (III, 12).

to a divine hypostasis, and since it is precisely as hypostases that the persons are distinct from each other, is it not conceivable that one hypostasis — as distinct from the others — should have an hypostatizing function relative to the finite? There would seem to be no contradiction involved; and if there is no contradiction, then it would appear at least as a possibility. It is the reality of the relation involved in the incarnation and its unique character that distinguishes the incarnation from all the other works of creation and re-creation, and provides the basis for saying that there is at least one predication that can be made of the Son alone; for the Son alone becomes flesh.<sup>26</sup>

The argument thus far proceeds from the fact of the incarnation of the Son, but that is in reality only the mode in which the incarnation actually took place. It may still be asked whether that is the only possible mode of an incarnation. Man should not place limits on what is possible for God. Hence, it is conceivable that God could have become incarnate in another way. The only mode of incarnation we know of is one which involves a unity of person. However, it is conceivable without contradiction that the three divine persons could enter into a community with one created nature in a way analogous to their communication in the one divine nature. In such a case, conceived here as a hypothetical possibility, incarnation would involve not a unity of person but a unity of one created nature.<sup>27</sup>

In assessing Bonaventure's argument thus far, we find that his thought moves from the fact of the incarnation to the possibility of the fact and to the inquiry into the conditions for the possibility on the part of God. While arguing to the possibility of the incarnation in its actual historical mode, Bonaventure sees also the possibility of other modes of incarnation. Neither the incarnation as such nor an incarnation in its actual historical mode is judged to be necessary; we can simply say that such a thing is possible, and need be seen as involving nothing derogatory to the divine nature. Thus Bonaventure arrives at a conclusion which may seem startling for such a consistently Christo-centric thinker. Any one of the three divine

<sup>26</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, contra 4 (III, 12).

<sup>27</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4 (III, 15-16). This hypothetical possibility is to be distinguished from another mode of conceiving an incarnation whereby all three persons would assume one and the same created nature into a unity of person. The latter appears to Bonaventure as contradictory and hence not even a hypothetical possibility. III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 3 (III, 14 ff.).

persons, says the Seraphic Doctor, could have become incarnate <sup>28</sup> since the conditions for the possibility of an incarnation are true of all three persons. But faith says that the Word became flesh; not the Father nor the Spirit. No argument can show that all three must become incarnate, nor that it would have been more fitting that either the Father or the Spirit should have entered into such a union. The theologian is left with the task of looking at the actual mode of the incarnation in the actual course of history and to search out the congruity of that reality; for he operates on the conviction that God operates in an orderly way so that there must be order and congruity in the works of God.

#### b) ON THE PART OF MAN

Before looking at the arguments concerning the actual mode of the incarnation of the Word, we must turn our attention at least briefly to the other term of the union, namely, man. What must man be like if an incarnation in a human nature is to be possible? How is such a union as that of the incarnation possible if there is no proportion between the terms of the union? <sup>29</sup> Is that which we conceive as possible in terms of the divine nature simply an impossibility in terms of man? In attempting to answer this question, we find ourselves at the heart of Bonaventure's doctrine of man at which Christological, Trinitarian, and anthropological issues come together in a unity. Methodologically, we must again refer to our point of departure: the fact of the incarnation of the divine Word in human flesh. If that has happened, then it must be possible. But then the theological definition of man must be drawn from that fact. Christology becomes the point of departure for understanding the deepest truth about man and his relation to the divine. If a human nature has in fact received the self-communication of the divine in the hypostatic union, then there must be a potency in human nature for such a self-communication. Indeed, as Bonaventure argues, such a potency is the highest and most noble potency in man and in the entire universe. From the hypostatic union, we arrive at the theological definition of man as a potency capable of being actuated by personal union with the divine. All created reality has God as its creative cause; man, however, by virtue of his spiritual nature, has God not

<sup>28</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 4 (III, 16 ff.).

<sup>29</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 4 (III, 8-9).

only as his creative cause but as the personal goal of all his intellectual and appetitive strivings. While there is a fundamental substantial difference between God and man, yet there is a *convenientia ordinis*<sup>30</sup> between the rational creature and God which Bonaventure sees as the basis for the possibility of an incarnation on the part of man; for the human nature of Jesus shared in the common human potency to receive the mystery of a divine self-communication.<sup>31</sup> The possibility of an incarnation, from the side of man, lies in his rational-spiritual nature which involves an immediate ordering to God as his personal goal and end. Such an ordering between two realities makes the possibility of a union more likely than in the case of two similar beings which are not thus ordered to each other. Two beings may be alike in nature and yet not capable of uniting with each other. For example, the soul is more readily united to the body which is of a different nature than to another soul which is of the

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<sup>30</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (III, 11); I *Sent.* d. 1, a. 3, q. 1 & 2 (I, 38 ff.); I *Sent.* d. 3, p. II per totam (I, 82); II *Sent.* d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 392 ff.) for the meaning of *convenientia ordinis*. The soul is related to God in the sense that God alone "perfecte finit et delectat ipsam animam propter se et super omnia." (I, 38). In response to the objection that there is no proportion between God and the soul, Bonaventure distinguishes "*convenientia per unius naturae participationem*" which involves a "*communitas univocationis*," and "*convenientia per comparationem communem*" which involves a "*communitas analogiae sive proportionis*." Of the three types of analogy, the type involved here is the sort of relation which exists between the model and the copy (= *similitudo*). The soul is the "*similitudo Dei*." On the part of the soul, this involves an "*inclinationem, et indigentiam, in alio quietationem et sufficientiam, quia unum factum est propter alterum, unde ordinatur ad alterum*." Only the rational creature is immediately ordered to God, for only the rational creature can know truth, enjoy the good, and render praise in a fitting way. Man as a rational creature reflects the distinction and order intrinsic to the divine nature in the origin, order, and distinction of the faculties intrinsic to the human nature. As an image of God, man is immediately ordered to union with the divine.

<sup>31</sup> *Sermo II in nat. Dom.* (IX, 107); also, Hayes, *What Manner of Man*, p. 76, n. 2; p. 94, n. 50. Also, III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, contra 3-5 (III, 9) reveals the same concept of man. The soul of man is "possible" in relation to God; its possibility of conformity with God is greater than its possibility of being related to the body. But if God can unite the soul with the body, even more can He effect the union of a human nature with Himself. Any being that is very close to another and lovable in the highest degree is capable of the highest union with the other. God is most intimate to the soul and lovable above all things. Thus, Bonaventure concludes that God as Uncreated Spirit can be united in a most perfect manner with a rational created nature.



same nature. The reason is that the soul is intrinsically ordered to the body while it is not ordered to other souls in this way. It is not true that opposites cannot be united, nor does it follow that the ontological difference between God and man would nullify the possibility of a hypostatic union.<sup>32</sup>

If there should be any argument against the possibility of an incarnation, it must be based either on the fact that it is impossible from the side of God or that it is impossible on the part of man. Bonaventure's argument intends to show that if such a divine communication should take place — as faith confesses it — it implies neither the diminution of divine perfection nor the dissolution of created reality. On the contrary, it is the most noble and most perfect work of God in which the most exalted potency of the created order is reduced fully to act.<sup>33</sup> Bonaventure's concept of incarnation is derived from the actual reality of the incarnation of the Son through a thought process that brackets the particular factors involved in that historical mode of incarnation and isolates the fundamental conditions for any kind of personal union between the divine and the human. Since those conditions are true of any of the three divine persons, the conclusion seems inevitable that any of the three persons could be the subject of an incarnation.

## WHY AN INCARNATION OF THE WORD?

### a) CONVENIENTIA

Having clarified the fundamental conditions for the possibility of an incarnation, Bonaventure's argumentation moves to a consideration of the actual form which the incarnation has taken in history. In view of what has been said thus far, it is clear that, in the mind of Bonaventure, we cannot argue to any metaphysical necessity relative to an incarnation in any form, nor relative to an incarnation of the Word specifically. His treatment is worked out in terms of four questions of *convenientia*.<sup>34</sup> The thought pattern reflected in the

<sup>32</sup> Bonaventure's concept of man receives a distinctly Christological character when he elaborates it in terms of the analogy of the Image. Cfr. Hayes, *What Manner of Man*, p. 80, n. 14. The main burden of this, however, pertains properly to the congruity of the Word and is treated later in this article.

<sup>33</sup> *Sent. d. I, a. I, q. I, contra 5* (III, 9).

<sup>34</sup> III *Sent. d. I, a. 2, q. I* (III, 19 ff.) The entire second article deals with

notion of *convenientia* moves between the sovereign freedom of God on the one hand and the facts of history on the other. Since God is always free in relation to the world, and since nothing outside of God can move Him to act, whatever we find in history is characterized by a profound contingency. But since God, who is free, acts in an orderly way, whatever proceeds from His causal action must bear the marks of order. God is to be thought of *altissime et piissime*;<sup>35</sup> as highest spiritual being, He is a mystery of orderly love. Whatever He does proceeds from His nature as love and hence from His will. But whatever He wills, He decrees in an orderly way.<sup>36</sup> Thus, in approaching the actual world in its history, man is confronted with order. However, since God who orders the world is free in His operation, the actual shape of the world and its history should not lead us to rashly assume relations of metaphysical necessity too easily. One cannot assume that other world-orders are impossible; nor that this present world-order could have been brought to completion in no other way than by an incarnation of the Word. That which God does may be designated as *melius*, as *magis congruum*,<sup>37</sup> and indeed, even as *maxime congruum*,<sup>38</sup> but this is not to be turned into a necessity, since God is free and is necessitated by nothing outside Himself. It is possible, however, for man to search out the deeper meaning of God's works and to try to see their relation to one another, for God has created a world and not just a plurality of unrelated beings. The world and its history — including sin, grace, and

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the congruity of the incarnation of the Word. The four questions are: 1) Whether in the incarnation of the Word proper congruence is observed on the part of God. 2) What is the *ratio praecipua* of the incarnation of the Word in its actual historical form. 3) For which of the three divine persons is an incarnation in this historical form *magis idonea*. 4) Whether the actual historical time of the incarnation is fitting.

<sup>35</sup> *Brevil.* I, 2 (V, 211). "...fides, cum sit principium cultus Dei et fundamentum ejus quae secundum pietatem est doctrinae, dictat, de Deo esse sentientium altissime et piissime."

<sup>36</sup> J. Ratzinger, "Gratia praesupponit naturam: Erwägungen über Sinn und Grenze eines Scholastischen Axioms," in: *Einsicht und Glaube*, ed. J. Ratzinger, and H. Fries (Freiburg: Herder, 1962) pp. 135-149. See in particular pp. 139-144 which treat Bonaventure's use of the word "nature." That which we call a *cursus naturalis* is basically a *cursus voluntarius* since in its deepest sense, the whole of nature is an emanation from will; it is structured voluntaristically.

<sup>37</sup> III *Sent.* d. 2, a. 1, q. 1 fund. 1 (III, 37). "Si ergo Deus semper facit quod melius est et magis congruum..."

<sup>38</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, sic 5 (III, 19).

incarnation — is conceived by God as a unity ; and man is capable of discerning the harmony, coherence, and congruity of the actual course of events. Thus, as Bonaventure argues, the theologian, with his eyes turned to the actual course of history, can conclude to no absolute necessity of an incarnation, nor of an incarnation of the Son. Yet, with the conviction that God acts in an orderly way, it is possible for the theologian to discern the inner harmony and congruity of what in fact has been decreed by God. To speak of *convenientia*, therefore, is to say more than mere non-contradiction, yet it is to say less than absolute necessity. That we are dealing with more than non-contradiction is evidenced in the way Bonaventure conceives of the inner relation between the orders of creation, recreation, and consummation. That it is less than necessity is clearly the import of the entire argument.

#### b) INCARNATION IN POVERTY

When we turn our gaze from the conditions for the possibility of an incarnation to look at the actual reality of the historical incarnation, we find that it is not an incarnation in glory and majesty but one in poverty and humility. Does this historical form of the incarnation do violence to the divine majesty? Here the question treated above in terms of the conditions of any incarnation is raised precisely in relation to the concrete mode in which the incarnation actually took place.<sup>39</sup> Does not the poverty and humility of Jesus do violence to the power, wisdom, and goodness of God? Perhaps if one's concept of divine power were drawn from other sources, there would be a conflict. But, in the mind of Bonaventure, it is precisely the historical mode of the incarnation that reveals to us the peculiar quality of divine power and the manner of God's agency in the world. This appears in Bonaventure's thought in the form of a dialectic. God is and remains God; He cannot divest Himself of His divinity, nor does He do this even in the incarnation. But He can be and is in fact humbled in that which is other than His divinity but related to Himself in the hypostatic union. The weakness and humiliation of Jesus becomes the means whereby the peculiar Christian understanding of God's power and majesty become known. It is in the humble Jesus that the true glory of the divinity is revealed, as it is in the weakness of His humanity that the true quality of divine

<sup>39</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (III, 19 ff.).

strength is manifested.<sup>40</sup> It is, in fact, the self-emptying of the divine Word in an incarnation characterized by smallness, weakness, and humility that reveals the peculiar quality of God's love.<sup>41</sup>

### c) WORD, CREATION, RE-CREATION, CONSUMMATION

The congruity of the incarnation of the Word is developed extensively in response to the question: For which of the three persons was the incarnation in this mode *magis idonea*?<sup>42</sup> Bonaventure presents his position with elaborate care, and his arguments reveal precious Christological insights in which the inner structure of the orders of creation, re-creation, and consummation appears. The six arguments fall into two groups; three that view the incarnation of the Word in relation to the order of creation and three that approach it in terms of the work of redemption. All six arguments may be evaluated as ramifications of one fundamental argument, that of the Bonaventurian reduction.

#### (I) *Principle of reduction*

The underlying principle is expressed explicitly somewhat late in Bonaventure's presentation in these words: "Posterius habet reduci per illud, quod est prius in eodem genere."<sup>43</sup> This general

<sup>40</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, sic 1 (III, 19); ad 1 (III, 20). Cfr. also E. Cousins, "The Coincidence of Opposites in the Christology of St. Bonaventure," in: *Fr. St.* 28 (1968) VI, pp. 27-46.

<sup>41</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2 (III, 21). Cfr. also H. Schalück, *Armut und Heil: Eine Untersuchung über den Armutsge danken in der Theologie Bonaventuras* (Paderborn, 1971); H. Schalück, "Theologische Implikationen des Armutsge dankens bei Bonaventura" in: *Franz. St.* 54 (1972), 2/3, pp. 184-191 for an extensive study of this type of dialectic in Bonaventure. The plan of God intends to bridge the chasm between the fullness of being and nothingness; death and life. This is brought about in that strength that becomes weakness when the powerful God becomes the poor man. The extremes of this dialectic are present in Christ, the Mediator. Thus the simple principle of Christian life emerges: "Oportet Christum videre primo in humilitate, qui ipsum vult videre in sua sublimitate." In *Epiph. Sermo I* (IX, 149).

<sup>42</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (III, 28 ff.). In another context, these arguments are treated by: A. Gerken, *Theologie des Wortes: Das Verhältnis von Schöpfung und Inkarnation bei Bonaventura* (Düsseldorf, 1962), pp. 27-45.

<sup>43</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 28 ff.). In *Brevil.* 2, 9 (V, 226) we read: "Lex divinitatis haec est, ut infima per media reducuntur ad summa." Cfr. also *Brevil.* 4, 5 (V, 245); *Itin.* 4, 3 (V, 306); *De red.* n. 23 (V, 325); *Hex.* 3 (V, 342 ff.).



principle, drawn from Aristotle,<sup>44</sup> is given a specifically Christian content by the Seraphic Doctor. God specifically as triune is the necessary prior reality for all that is in the world.<sup>45</sup> In particular, for Bonaventure, the first emanation — that of the Word — is prior to all other emanations. It is in the eternal generation of the Word that we find the exemplary *ratio* of all emanations because it is in the emanation of the Word that God disposes all things.<sup>46</sup> The generation of the Word is, therefore, the necessary prior condition for whatever comes from God in the order of creation. Creation is co-spoken in the Word that is the Father's self-utterance, and co-loved in the Spirit of love breathed mutually by the Father and the Son. On the side of created reality, this means that the relation of creatures to God bears an analogy to the inner-trinitarian relation of the Son to the Father. The Son is the primal relation of full equality to and perfect likeness to the Father; He is the ontological basis of all other relation. All creaturely relations are but limited reflections of the Son's relation to the Father.

(2) *Relation of creation to the Word*

The arguments of Bonaventure relate both to the incarnation of the Word as such and to the incarnation as a redemptive reality, and the principle of reduction is operative at both levels. Most basically, the argument means that in the incarnation the Son assumes the creaturely relations into union with His own personal reality thus bringing the model and the copy into the closest possible unity in one being. The first series of arguments revolves around three distinct designations for the second divine person and serves to point out the particular congruity of an incarnation precisely of that person. The second person is called Image, Word, and Son.<sup>47</sup> Each of these designations points out particular aspects of the relation between the order of creation and the incarnation. Of fundamental importance in Bonaventure's view is the notion of "image" in which we clearly see the inner ordering of human nature to the mystery of the second divine person. The second person is the Image of the Father;

<sup>44</sup> Arist. *II Metaph.* text 4.

<sup>45</sup> Hayes, *The General Doctrine of Creation...*, pp. 86 ff. on the Scholastic tradition concerning the trinitarian emanations as the necessary condition for the act of creation.

<sup>46</sup> *III Sent.* d. 11, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4 (III, 245); *Hex.* 1, 27 (V, 334).

<sup>47</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 29 ff.).

the full and perfect reflection of all the Father is in one who is other than the Father. The second person is the immanent Image of the Father. But there is an image of God in the world of creation, and that is man. Man is an image of God not in the general sense of being "like" God, but in the specific sense of being "like" the Son. Thus, man as a creature is created as an image of the Image. If, then, there is to be an incarnation of one divine hypostasis in a human nature, would it not seem more fitting that it be a union precisely of the Image and the image so that the Image may shine forth most clearly in the image?<sup>48</sup> But the same second person is known as Word, a title which designates not only his relation to the Father but his relation to creation and man as well.<sup>49</sup> As Word, the second person is the *ratio exprimendi et manifestandi*, and as we have already seen, His generation is the exemplary *ratio* of all other generation. The term "Word" expresses not only His relation to the Father, but also to the created world which is, to a certain degree, an objectification of the inner creative Word; and above all to man, who is ontologically shaped to be an apt instrument for mediating the divine Word in history. There is an inner ordering between the outer word (= the flesh) and the inner Word (= the divine person) whereby the history of Jesus may be said to be the historicization of the eternal Word in which all is created.<sup>50</sup> Viewed from this perspective, the incarnation means that the human nature — which is potentially an external word — receives its truest content in the communication of the Word so that it becomes truly the historical exegesis of God in history.<sup>51</sup> Finally, the second person is called "Son," a term which designates His relation to the Father. The Son is one who is "from" another; this is what is expressed by the analogy of generation. If we turn to the actual mode of the incarnation which took place through a human mother in such a way that a divine person became the son of man, would it not seem more fitting that such a predication should be made of one who is Son from eternity? There is, in

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Comm. in Joann.* I, 6, q. 1 (VI, 247) sketches the outline of an entire Christological program in one paragraph that describes why "Word" is the most fitting designation for the second divine person. Cfr. also *I Sent. d.* 27, p. II, a. un., q. 3 (I, 487) where Bonaventure argues for his preference for the designation "Word." *Brevil.* I, 3 (V, 212) indicates the meaning of all three names.

<sup>50</sup> Hayes, *What Manner of Man*, p. 76, n. 4.

<sup>51</sup> *III Sent. d.* 1, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 29).

the actual form of the incarnation, an inner correspondence between the eternal emanations and relations and the realities of salvation history focused in the person of Jesus. The incarnation is not the embodiment of God in a general sense, but very specifically, the embodiment of one who is Son. It is precisely in one who is truly Son of Man that we may discover who is Son of God and thus come to know the Father and the Spirit in the specifically Christian sense.

### (3) *Relation of redemption to Word*

The second series of arguments develops the principle of reduction even further into the area of sin, grace, and glory. Here the question is whether there is something in the nature of the fall itself which might lead us to say that an incarnation of the Son is more fitting for the work of redemption. As we indicated above, in Bonaventure's trinitarian theology, the Son is truly equal with and fully like the Father. When we turn to the reality of sin with this in mind, it appears that sin is directed specifically against the Son since it arises from the desire to be like God in a way that is true only of the Son. Since sin is directly against the Son, it appears fitting that the work of repairing the damage of sin should be assumed by the Son.<sup>52</sup> This becomes even more clear if we view the form that the incarnation actually took, for it is an incarnation in poverty, weakness, and obedience; an incarnation in the form of one who could and did truly pray to the Father. The obedience and prayer of Christ is the historical embodiment of His eternal relation to the Father.<sup>53</sup> The correspondence between trinitarian reality and the history of salvation emerges again. In terms of His place in the Trinity, the Son is one who receives all He is from the Father and bends back on the Father totally in a gesture of filial love. Is it not fitting that the mystery of His eternal sonship be embodied in one whose entire historical existence is an attempt to carry out in human terms whatever may be demanded by the Father? Jesus reveals God's love not in general

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* This is further amplified in *Hex.* 1, 27 (V, 334) in the form of a dialectic. The Word who is equal to the Father in nature, power, and immortality is united with man in terms of three opposite qualities: a suffering nature, weakness, and mortality. This happens in order that the three imperfections which derive from sin may be overcome by the three divine perfections. Thus man can pass from suffering to life; from poverty to richness; and from mortality to immortality.

<sup>53</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 29).

terms, but specifically in the form of filial love which points back to the paternal love and to the Spirit.

The fruit of redemption is expressed very pointedly in the words "that we might be sons of God."<sup>54</sup> Here the principle of reduction is carried expressly into the area of grace and consummation. Grace means not merely a sharing in the divine nature, but specifically a being shaped into the mystery of the Son and thus into His relation to the Father and the Spirit. Ultimately the process of reduction is the shaping of created reality most fully into the mystery of Sonship; it is a transforming union of the creature with God in which the human "becomes like" God by becoming like the Son. The conformity of man to God (= reduction) is brought about through that subsistent conformity that is the Word. Since the ontological *prius* of creation, grace, and glory is the Son, what could be more fitting than that the task of reduction be carried out in history by the Son.<sup>55</sup>

#### d) THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST

How does the Seraphic Doctor understand the question of the predestination of Christ? It is significant that he does not ask the hypothetical question: Would the Word have become incarnate had Adam not sinned?<sup>56</sup> This is a question of a hypothetical order of

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* (III, 30).

<sup>55</sup> The arguments against this position fail to give full seriousness to the correspondence between the order of history and the trinitarian emanations. For this reason Bonaventure rejects all arguments which attempt to show a greater congruity for an incarnation of the Father or of the Spirit. Cfr. *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (III, 28). It is from the Christological mystery that we come to the Christian trinitarian concept. Within that context, we come to know the Father as one who is totally *a nullo*, and the Spirit as one who is *a patre et filio*. If the history of grace is in fact our clue as to the nature of God, would it not follow that it would be incongruous for the Father to be sent, for an historical mission would appear as a false expression of who the Father is. It is more congruous that the first historical mission, which is *in carnem*, should correspond to the first emanation and thus be a mission of the Son. Likewise, it appears more congruous that the second mission correspond to the second eternal emanation, i.e. that of the Spirit who is *a patre et a filio*. Yet, even here Bonaventure will not speak of a necessity.

<sup>56</sup> This form of the question became very common in Scholastic circles. Cfr. J. M. Bissen, "De motivo incarnationis," in: *Antonianum* 7 (1932), pp. 314-336; J. Bonnefoy, "La question hypothétique: Utrum si Adam non peccasset... au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," in: *Revista Española de teología* 14 (1954) pp. 327-368; R. Haubst,



history which appears to be of little or no concern to Bonaventure. He does indeed ask what the *ratio praecipua* of the incarnation might be,<sup>57</sup> and his answer is one that tries carefully to avoid anything outside God necessitating the divine in any way.<sup>58</sup> He treats the position which views the incarnation as the highest work of creation in which the created order receives its crown. As Bonaventure presents this theory, it seems to place a certain necessity<sup>59</sup> on the part of God. Those holding this position distinguish between the incarnation *in se* and the incarnation in its actual mode as it involves the mortal, passible flesh of Jesus. As the highest and crowning work of creation, the incarnation cannot proceed from God merely because of sin; rather it must proceed from Him *principaliter*,<sup>60</sup> for it certainly seems *inconveniens* to say that the most noble work of creation should be brought about "non principali intentione, sed quasi quadam occasione."<sup>61</sup>

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"Das hoch- und spätmittelalterliche 'Cur Deus homo?' " in: *M. Th. Z.* 6 (1955), pp. 302-313; J. Kaup, "Cur Deus homo?," in: *Frz. St.* 21 (1934), pp. 232-242; D. Unger, "Franciscan Christology — Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ," in: *Fr. St.* 23 (N.S. 2) (1942), p. 428 ff.

<sup>57</sup> Bonaventure speaks of *ratio* without defining the term explicitly. Following Bonnefoy on this point, Gerken distinguishes *ratio* and *motivum*. The latter seems to imply a causality from outside of God which must be excluded. The question of the *ratio*, on the other hand, is that of the *Sinngrund* of the divine work in itself. (Gerken, *Theol. des Wortes*, p. 193 ff.)

<sup>58</sup> The first position presented by Bonaventure sees the *ratio praecipua* of the incarnation to lie in the perfection of the universe in the orders of nature, grace, and glory, but understands this perfection in such a way that if God decides to create this present world at all, He is unavoidably necessitated to the incarnation. The second position sees the work of redemption as the *ratio praecipua* in such a way that, had there been no sin, there would have been no incarnation. Bonaventure allows the possibility of both positions; but if pushed to choose between them, he would hold the second as more in conformity with piety. *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (III, 23 ff.). Yet when the question is raised in that way, there is a hypothetical tone about both positions. Bonaventure's own view prefers not to ask hypothetical questions but to limit itself to the actual course of history. In the real historical order, the incarnation is both the crown of creation and the work of redemption. Bonaventure's problem, as we will see, is that of the relation between these two dimensions.

<sup>59</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (III, 25) where Bonaventure uses the term "quandam necessitatem incarnationis." Gerken (*Theol. des Wortes*, p. 195, n. 12) suggests that it may be that Bonaventure has exaggerated the *convenientia* of the opposition thus turning it into a necessity for the purpose of rejecting it.

<sup>60</sup> *III Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, contra 5 (III, 22-23).

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

Bonaventure himself frequently speaks of the incarnation as the consummation of the created order,<sup>62</sup> yet he is unwilling to allow that the creature could necessitate God. Rather than ask the hypothetical question as to what might have happened in a different historical order, he prefers to look to the actual shape of the incarnation in the only historical order of which we have any knowledge. In that order it appears more in accord with piety<sup>63</sup> that the *ratio praecipua* is the work of redemption. Yet the incarnation is not to be seen as a sort of after-thought on the part of God. From eternity, God knew the course that history would take, including the fall of man.<sup>64</sup> From the very beginning, therefore, God has acted in view of His intention of restoring what He knew would in fact become a fallen creation. Therefore, from the beginning, the creature is structured with a view to redemption. God predestined Christ not only *principaliter*, but, indeed, *principalius*.<sup>65</sup> It is not sin that is the cause of the incarnation, but simply the excessive love and mercy of God.<sup>66</sup> God does not predestine Christ because man has sinned. As the most noble of God's works, the incarnation is willed for its own sake and not for the sake of any lesser good.

In the theology of Bonaventure, the incarnation appears always as an absolutely free gift of God. While it is the supreme work of God that brings creation to its highest perfection, it is simultaneously the work of redemption. In the present order, the incarnation of the Word in which the consummation of the created order is accomplished is willed inseparably together with its redemptive function for fallen man. Bonaventure distinguishes between the *ratio finaliter movens* and the *ratio inducens*.<sup>67</sup> The former is the pure love and mercy of God; the latter is sin. The incarnation is willed for its own sake out of pure love and not simply because of sin. Yet, as seems clear from the above arguments, the redemptive function is not simply added to

<sup>62</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, resp., ratio 1 (III, 20); *Sermo II in nat. Dom.* (IX, 109-110); also, Hayes, *What Manner of Man*, p. 91 ff., n. 45-51.

<sup>63</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (III, 24).

<sup>64</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2 (III, 26). Man is in fact created as one who is capable of being redeemed. Had he not fallen, there would have been no need of redemption, hence no need for that potentiality to be reduced to act. The potency of man would not be called *frustra* in such a case, since this could be said only when a potency is not reduced to act where time and place demand it.

<sup>65</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5 (III, 26-27).

<sup>66</sup> *Loc. cit.*, ad 6 (III, 27).

<sup>67</sup> III *Sent.* d. 32, a. un., q. 5, ad 3 (III, 706).

the incarnation, for the actual incarnation is thoroughly shaped by its redemptive function. While the incarnation bears its own inner *ratio*, the soteriological dimension appears as the *ratio inducens*,<sup>68</sup> a term which points to the actuality of a fallen history and holds open the possibility that an incarnation, willed for its own sake as the highest revelation of the *benignitas Dei*, can in fact enter into history as a redemptive act. So it is that while the incarnation is in fact a redemptive mystery, it fulfills other functions in the world as well; above all, it is the perfection of the universe.<sup>69</sup> Such a view may be justifiably interpreted as a doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ within the present order in this sense that there is no lesser good that moves God to decree it; it is willed for its own sake. But if the term "absolute predestination" were taken to mean that

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> The text of III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5 (III, 27) certainly reads like a doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ in the present order. Kaup (*op. cit.*, p. 237) says that Bonaventure rejected the absolute decree of the incarnation, which appeared more reasonable, in favor of the opposite view, which conformed more to the requirements of piety. A closer reading of Bonaventure, however, shows that what he rejected is not the doctrine of the absolute predestination as such, but any understanding of the divine decree which would involve a necessity *ab extra*. Also Bissen's evaluation (*op. cit.*, p. 325) would have to be more carefully qualified. He writes: "Christus ergo secundum S. Bonaventuram non est a principio et effective centrum et caput operis Dei ad extra, sed solummodo per modum meriti et ab instanti redemptionis" (p. 325). We find it difficult to accept this in view of Bonaventure's own explicit statement: "Humanum vero genus respectu incarnationis et nativitatis Christi non fuit ratio finaliter movens, sed quodam modo inducens. Non enim Christus ad nos finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum." III *Sent.* d. 32, q. 5, ad 3 (III, 706). Gerken (*Theol. des Wortes*, p. 203) comments on the text of III *Sent.* d. 11, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4 (III, 245): "Christi generatio (= aeterna) fuit ratio exemplaris omnis emanationis, quia in Verbo, quod Deus genuit, omnia disposuit. Ergo pari ratione ejus praedestinatio fuit ratio exemplaris omnis praedestinationis." Since there can be no predestination of the divine Word in itself, the text must refer to the God-man. The *pari ratione* sets up a correspondence between the generation of the Word and its relation to creation on the one hand, and the incarnation and the predestination of mankind on the other hand. If the *pari ratione* be interpreted on the basis of I *Sent.* d. 7, dub. 2 (I, 144), it would mean that just as God could not have created the world had He not first generated the Son, so He could not have predestined mankind to grace and glory had He not predestined the God-man. Gerken interprets this to imply a doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ. It is questionable whether we can place that much weight on the *pari ratione*, but certainly if this text is placed in the larger context of Bonaventure's position, the interpretation would seem to be justified.

God could create in no other way, such a doctrine would be alien to the thought of the Seraphic Doctor.

e) THE TIME OF THE INCARNATION

There is one further question of *convenientia*; namely, that of the actual time of the incarnation. Assuming that God in fact decrees the incarnation, at what time in history would it most fittingly take place? Paul had written: "In the fullness of time, therefore, God sent His Son; born of a woman, born under the Law, that He might redeem those who were under the Law so that we might receive the adoption of the sons of God" (*Gal.* 4,4). What the phrase "the fullness of time" might have meant to St. Paul is not the issue here. There was, however, a patristic tradition to which Bonaventure and other Scholastics were heir, according to which the coming of Christ took place at the end of time;<sup>70</sup> more precisely, as the inauguration of the final age of human history. Arguments concerning the appropriate time for the incarnation had placed it either at the beginning or at the end of history. If, as *Genesis* 2,2 writes, God completed His work on the sixth day, and if the incarnation is the highest work of creation, should it not have taken place during the first six days? <sup>71</sup> On the other hand, there is a time for everything (*Eccl.* 3,1); and no time is as fitting for the richest gift of grace as the time of maturity. As man is disposed to wisdom in advanced age rather than in youth, so it seems more congruous that divine wisdom should become incarnate in the fullness of time rather than in the beginning.<sup>72</sup> Bonaventure reflects the tradition concerning the six ages of history.<sup>73</sup> In this view, as it is reflected in Bonaventure, the six days of creation have been transformed into a broader structure of history. As the works of creation are completed on the sixth day, so the work of redemption is brought about in the sixth and final age of history. Yet in the text of the *Sentence Commentary* Bonaventure gives this view a qualification the significance of which becomes apparent only in his later writings. Instead of placing redemption simply *in fine*

<sup>70</sup> Ratzinger, *The Theology of History*, p. 109.

<sup>71</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 4 (III, 31).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 4, dub. (III, 33): "Sexta vero ratio est, quia tempus incarnationis est tempus sextae aetatis, in qua quidem est plenitudo et perfectio, ut sicut mundus in sexta die est consummatus, sic in sexta aetate sit reparatus..."



*temporis*, he says that it came about *quasi in fine saeculorum*.<sup>74</sup> The significance of the *quasi* begins to emerge if we read the *Breviloquium* on the same question, for there the coming of Christ begins to look more like the center than like the end of time.<sup>75</sup> The "fullness of time" does not point to a temporal end, but to the fact that the prophecies of all ages have been fulfilled. Christ appears midway, some of His elect preceding Him and others following. The "fullness of time" is beginning to merge with the "center of time," and Bonaventure's predilection for the concept of the center begins to assert itself in terms of the theology of history.<sup>76</sup> Though the full significance of this becomes apparent only later in Bonaventure's career, the careful qualification of the tradition already in the *Sentence Commentary* may be taken as a sign that we are dealing with an authentically Bonaventurian concern.<sup>77</sup> Christ is the center of all reality in which all the polarities of existence come together. He is the ontological center and the center of history as well.

## CONCLUSION

The title of this article explicitly relates the concept of *convenientia* to metaphysics while the treatment of Bonaventure seems to be what most contemporary philosophers would call theology. In what sense are we dealing with a metaphysical concept? The answer to that question will be determined by what one understands metaphysics to be. We could conceive various answers to that question; many answers tend to base themselves on the fundamental distinction

<sup>74</sup> III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 4, resp. (III, 32).

<sup>75</sup> *Brevil.* 4, 4 (V, 245); 6, 4 (V, 269).

<sup>76</sup> Ratzinger, *The Theology of History*, p. 109 ff. for a more detailed account. It would go beyond the scope of the present article to pursue this line of development further. Suffice it to say that in the later Bonaventure, the concept of the center assumes a dominant role. The idea that Christ is the center of reality is worked out both in the metaphysical order and in the order of history. The Word is the center of the Trinity; the incarnate Word is the center of all reality; the incarnation takes place at the center of time. The argument of reduction then reaches its most compact form. Reduced to its simplest form, Bonaventure's view may be expressed in his own words as follows: "Lex divinitatis haec est, ut infima per media reducuntur ad summa." *Brevil.* 2, 9 (V, 226). The most elaborate working out of this position is found in *Hex.* 1, 10-39 (V, 330-335).

<sup>77</sup> Ratzinger, *The Theology of History*, p. 109 ff.; 145 ff.

between natural knowledge and revelation so that metaphysics becomes a systematic doctrine of the universal structures of reality elaborated through pure, unaided natural reason. In such a view, the notion of *convenientia* as elaborated by Bonaventure would more readily be assigned to the realm of the purely theological rather than to the world of metaphysical discourse.

It is possible, however, to conceive of metaphysics from a different perspective. If one were to analyze the history of metaphysical thought and ask what sort of thought process is involved in it, would it not be possible to answer that metaphysical thinking is a process whereby one moves from a limited experience to infer judgments of a universal sort in the hope of having discovered universal structures of being.<sup>78</sup> Put in another way, a metaphysical vision emerges from the tendency to see a limited experience as paradigmatic of reality as a whole; a particular human experience in the world is taken as the basic clue as to how things are in general. If metaphysics be seen from this perspective, then any thought-process that does this may be considered to be metaphysical; and metaphysical visions will differ most fundamentally in terms of the sort of experience they take as paradigmatic.

As we have seen above, it is clear that Bonaventure understands his doctrine of emanation, exemplarity, and reduction to be a metaphysical doctrine. He has made a decision about which experience is to serve as the paradigm for metaphysical understanding, and in this decision he differs from other metaphysicians. But one could well argue that the decision of the Seraphic Doctor may well be one of the implications of the universal claim of the Christian Gospel. The process of working out the implications of that starting-point is not essentially different from that of other metaphysicians.

If the starting-point is significantly different, then one might well expect conclusions that differ. The classical Greek doctrine of being and the category of substance had long been appropriated by Christian theologians, but not without considerable difficulty. Is it not because of these categories that it proved impossible for both Aristotle and Plato to conceive of a first principle of reality that was also the creator of the world? If we take our basic clue for interpreting reality from the way in which individual beings stand in themselves, and

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<sup>78</sup> It is our conviction that a strong case can be made for this view though it would go beyond the scope of this article to do so here.

interpret change in terms of the immanent power of finite beings to seek their own perfection by moving from potency to act; and if we then call that immanent drive to self-perfection by the name of "love," it would become clear why the first principle of reality — by way of extrapolation — should appear as a self-enclosed, perfect monadic unity that could not create the world out of love, for to love anything outside itself would involve imperfection in the perfect. But things do exist as individual beings in the world, and Bonaventure does not totally reject the classical doctrine of being. What is embodied in Bonaventure's Christological starting-point is not an isolated, individual existent, but rather a being who, while individual, is through and through relational. Moving from that point, the Seraphic Doctor can proceed in two ways: to the doctrine of the Trinity, which is the metaphysics of divine self-relatedness and of the creative love from which all other reality flows; and to the relational definition of created reality as such and of man in particular, which emerges in the symbolic understanding of the universe and the doctrine of man as an image of God. The doctrine of being inherited from the greatest minds of antiquity must be held open to the implications of the reality embodied in Christ. From this perspective, the great dialectical treatments of the *Itinerarium* and the *De Mystério Trinitatis* reveal their deeper metaphysical significance. All the basic qualities of being elaborated in Greek metaphysics must be held open to the qualities of reality implied in the Christological mystery. God is Being; but Being is Love; God is substance, but substance is relational; God is one, but the highest unity is the unity of plurality in love. If the classical doctrine of being is allowed to rest in itself, it becomes a false interpretation of the deepest truth about reality; and when it is held open to the mystery of Christ, its basic concepts have to be refashioned.

In the classical doctrine of being, the final word about reality is intellect; for Bonaventure, the final word is will. For what is embodied in Christ is a mystery of love, and Christ Himself tells us that the proper name of God is "Good." Indeed, God is Spirit; and as Highest Spirit, He is pure self-awareness. But He is aware of Himself as what He is by necessity of nature, and that is pure love. God's self-awareness is an awareness of His own immanent fecundity as love, and of all the ways in which His love can be communicated to the non-divine. Since God is what He is in Himself by reason of necessity, the immanent emanations are the necessary modalities of

love. But since love cannot be coerced from without, every created being and the whole of the cosmos emerges from the free decision of the divine will. Thus, taking Christ as the basic clue for metaphysical understanding, Bonaventure arrives at a voluntaristic world-view.

Within such a view, the notion of *convenientia* is not merely a theological concept but truly an implication of the basic metaphysical vision. As we have seen in Bonaventure's arguments, it is a concept that enters into the interpretation of all levels of reality. If the final word about reality is will, nothing in the world or its history can be designated as fully necessary, neither as to its mere existence nor as to its actual mode of existence. Yet, since the primal will is also an orderly will, that which emerges from it appears with factual relations of harmony and coherence. The implications of the voluntarism of Bonaventure as they are expressed in the concept of *convenientia* may be summarized in the following points:

- 1) No created world is necessary.
- 2) This actual world is not necessary, and other world-orders are possible.
- 3) Within this actual created world, such a thing as an incarnation — conceived as the crown of the created order — is not necessary; for the world could have been brought to completion in another way.
- 4) An incarnation of only one divine person is not necessary in the event that there should be an incarnation at all.
- 5) On the other hand, an incarnation of all three — while possible in a mode of incarnation other than the actual incarnation — is not necessary.
- 6) The incarnation of the Word is not necessary; neither as to its fact nor as to its mode.

While necessity is excluded in each case, at the same time Bonaventure's conviction concerning the orderliness of God's works leads him to a position of economic trinitarianism which seeks to delineate as carefully as possible the inner relation between the outer form of historical reality and the deepest content of that history, which is the true self-communication of God — as He is in Himself; Father, Son, and Spirit — to the world of His creation.



## SAINT BONAVENTURE AND THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

The sacraments were instituted from the beginning to cure the sickness of sin, St. Bonaventure says, and they will endure until the end of time.<sup>1</sup>

As the perfect cure for sin, the sacraments cast out its sickness, restore man to perfect health, and conserve the spiritual health that they restore. Though last in number, the sacrament of matrimony was the first to be introduced, for it was instituted before original sin. Matrimony now tempers and excuses concupiscence, preserves the virtue of temperance by restoring the nobility of marriage, and conserves the natural being of man by renewing the multitude of men in the being of nature. Matrimony was introduced before the other sacraments because the being of nature is the foundation of all things. Although it is a great sacrament, nevertheless, connected with concupiscence, matrimony is the least in sanctification, and so it has the last place among the spiritual remedies for sin.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, in Bonaventure's view, the sacrament of matrimony with the sacrament of penance are common to the old law and the new law, or the Old Testament and the Gospel. Coming in some way from

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<sup>1</sup> "Sacramenta ab initio ad curationem hominis instituta sunt et semper cum morbo hominis cucurrerunt et usque in finem saeculi perdurabunt..." — *Brevil.*, p. 6, c. 2 (V, 266; V, 126). St. Bonaventure describes here the variation of the sacraments under the natural law, the written law of the Old Testament, and the law of grace in the Gospel. — References to the writings of St. Bonaventure use, with some modifications, the more standard abbreviations. The first numbers in the parentheses refer to the volume and pagination of his *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882-1902); the second refer to his *Opera theologica selecta* (Quaracchi, 1934-64). References to the books of Scripture are an adaptation of the now, fairly common, ways of indicating them. All references to Aristotle and to the Fathers use the standard abbreviations: Aristotle's writings are noted with their numbers in the Bekker edition, *Aristotelis Opera* (Berlin, 1831-70); the writings of the Fathers are noted as they appear in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* (PG), or *Patrologia Latina* (PL).

<sup>2</sup> *Brevil.*, p. 6, c. 3 (V, 267-68; V, 128-29).

a dictate of nature, which never varies, matrimony and penance existed from the beginning. Though the incarnate Word is the fount of sacramental grace, nonetheless, because matrimonial generation and penitential remorse were necessary, grace was given through matrimony and penance, which the divine Word had already instituted and made known to man by a dictate of nature. When Christ instituted the sacraments of the Church, He did not make void these two sacraments of the old law and the law of nature. Rather, approving and confirming them, He consummated them by His preaching of penance and His attendance at weddings.<sup>3</sup>

Bonaventure defines marriage as "the legitimate union of man and woman, maintaining an individual custom of life." Man and woman were united this way both before and after original sin. Matrimony was first instituted as a duty (*in officio*) and signified the union of God and the human soul. After original sin, the sacrament was made also a remedy for the disease of lust, or concupiscence, and now signifies the union both of Christ and the Church and of the two natures in the one person of Christ. In His wisdom, the divine Word made man in such a way that mankind would be propagated in a manner befitting its threefold ability to avoid sin, to fall into sin, and to rise up or be restored from sin. Thus, before original sin, man was conjoined by his soul to God through a unitive love which was most chaste, singular and individual. The marital union of man and woman was then both individual and singular, which signified the conjunction of God and the soul. After original sin, a remedy for the consequent disease of lust came from the conjunction of the divine and human natures in the personal, singular and individual unity of Christ. The singular and individual union in Christian marriage, therefore, signifies the conjunction or union of God and man, or of Christ and the Church. Hence, matrimony was a sacrament both before and after original sin, though its use and signification differ in those two states of mankind. Because matrimony was a sacrament prior to sin, the lust of concupiscence is to be excused by the use of marriage rather than given the power to corrupt it. A marital union comes into being, moreover, through a free and interior consent, expressed in an exterior sign, of the two persons willing to marry. In this respect, matrimony is the union of a man and a woman as its

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<sup>3</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, Resp. "Et quod... non evacuavit." (IV, 591; IV, 581); *Brevil.*, p. 6, c. 4 (V, 268; V, 129-31).

agent or influencing principle and its supporting or receiving principle. Thus, establishing a bond of love, the marital union of a man and a woman proceeds from a true consent of their will. Marriage is begun by a promise of consent concerning the future, and it is ratified or confirmed by a consent in the present to complete the union of the two in one flesh. Now the carnal union consummating and completing Christian marriage signifies the union of Christ and the Church. Consequently, the perfection of Christian marriage has the goods of fidelity, children, and the sacrament. The good of fidelity looks to the *debitum*, i.e. the mutual obligation regarding the marital act. The good of the sacrament has to do with the insoluble bond of love ratifying the union. The good of children is a consequent or common effect of the other two: on consummating their marriage, a man and a woman by their wholly equal power hand over to each other their bodies for the procreation of children.<sup>4</sup>

The above description of matrimony, beginning with its place among the sacraments, contains all the essential features of Bonaventure's doctrine on marriage, notably Christian marriage. Accounting for the different states of man, the doctrine extends to the institution and signification of the sacrament, or its being and nature, the necessary conditions required of the persons willing to marry, particularly free consent, and the goods to be derived from the proper use of marriage. Our presentation of Bonaventure's doctrine will follow the general lines of these three features, commencing with the being and nature of the sacrament.<sup>5</sup>

#### INSTITUTION AND SIGNIFICATION

Bonaventure teaches that all the sacraments, excepting matrimony, were instituted mainly as a remedy for sin. Matrimony was instituted originally as a duty, under natural law, in the state of

<sup>4</sup> *Brevil.*, p. 6, c. 13 (V, 279-80; V, 151-53). Bonaventure also treats here the impediments to matrimony and its legal conditions, aspects that we shall consider only in passing.

<sup>5</sup> The three features constitute respectively the formal cause of matrimony: IV *Sent.*, d. 26, div. text. (IV, 661; IV, 649); its material and efficient causes: d. 27, div. text. (IV, 675; IV, 674-75), d. 34, div. text. (IV, 766; IV, 751-52); and its final cause: d. 31, div. text. (IV, 716; IV, 701-02). See also: IV *Sent.*, d. 27, dub. 1 (IV, 684; IV, 671-72).

innocence. Reinstituted after original sin, matrimony then became a remedy and progressed under the old law until the Gospel, when the institution of the sacrament was completed.<sup>6</sup> As a Christian sacrament, matrimony is a cure for the lust of concupiscence, an aid to the virtue of temperance, and a duty within the Church regarding the multiplication of children for the worship of God. Christian marriage is also an immutable sacrament, for it is the sign of the insoluble union of the two natures in Christ.<sup>7</sup>

Going first to Scripture (Mt 9:4), Bonaventure affirms that matrimony was instituted before original sin. Then, arguing from reason, he maintains that the use of matrimony is for the procreation of children, which was in harmony with the state of innocence. Matrimony, furthermore, is found among all peoples, and this shows that it is a dictate of nature. Since dictates of that sort were made known to man from the beginning, matrimony must have been instituted in the state of innocence.<sup>8</sup> Explaining his view, Bonaventure says that institution looks to use, and matrimony is used both as a duty and as a remedy, but the other sacraments are used only as a remedy. Prior to original sin, matrimony was a duty with respect to man's intellect and to his generative power. Matrimony gave an intellectual delight from seeing in the exterior union of man and woman the sign of the interior union, already understood, of God and the human soul. There had to be a union of man and woman, because no man alone could conserve the species. After original sin, matrimony was reinstituted as a remedy for man's ignorance of the sacrament as a sign and for the disease of concupiscence, which it restrains.<sup>9</sup>

Going again chiefly to Scripture (Mt 19:6; Gn 1:28), Bonaventure holds that matrimony was instituted by God. If the sacraments came from man, they would be subject to his will and, therefore, to change and variation. But all the sacraments are unchangeable, thus manifesting their divine origin. Since matrimony is a very great sacrament (Eph 5:32), it especially was instituted by God, not by man.<sup>10</sup> Some of the sacraments are purely of faith, e.g., baptism and confirmation, which God instituted by a mandate. Other sacraments

<sup>6</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, Resp. (IV, 49; IV, 43); cf. arg. 1, ad 1 (a, ad a).

<sup>7</sup> Loc. cit., q. 3, in Resp. (IV, 53; IV, 46-47); d. 36, a. 2, q. 1, Resp. (IV, 796; IV, 783).

<sup>8</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, fa 1-4 (IV, 661-62; fa a-d, IV, 650).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Resp. (IV, 662; IV, 651).

<sup>10</sup> Loc. cit., q. 2, fa 1-4 (IV, 663; fa a-d, IV, 651-52).



are partly of faith and partly of a dictate of natural law, such as penance and matrimony, which God instituted by an interior illumination of man. God did not, therefore, command Adam to take Eve as his wife. Rather, illumined by God, Adam understood that Eve was given to him as his wife, and that his posterity, through their free consent, would be united to wives in the same way. This is why Adam said of Eve: "This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh... Wherefore, a man shall leave father and mother and shall cling to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh" (Gn 2:23-24). Adam said this not by himself, Bonaventure observes, but by an illumination from God when He instituted the sacrament of matrimony.<sup>11</sup>

The first institution of matrimony, nevertheless, had the mandate or precept: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth" (Gn 1:28). This could have been obeyed only by the union of man and woman in matrimony, which was ordered to the conservation of the species.<sup>12</sup> The precept was affirmative and in accordance with natural law, which dictates some things absolutely, e.g., that God be loved, and other things according to time, for instance, that all goods be held in common. It was in the latter mode that the precept was given on the use of matrimony: as long as men and women were few, natural law dictated that children be multiplied for the worship of God; but the precept ceased with the cessation of that state of mankind, so that the reinstitution of matrimony under the law of grace had an indulgence and not a precept.<sup>13</sup> What Bonaventure means here is that, under the new law of the Gospel, every man and woman is not obliged to marry, as they were under the old or written law and the law of nature. An affirmative precept obliges only according to time and place, whereas a negative precept obliges always and everywhere. A moral precept, furthermore, is dictated as necessary by natural law, which also dictates certain things as expedient, or in a general way, e.g., that sacrifices be made to God; these are determined ultimately with the help of faith and of divine inspiration. The precept on the use of matrimony was affirmative, not negative: though it is a moral precept, it was dictated by natural law only in a general way until the proper time of its obligation was determined

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, Resp. (IV, 664; IV, 652).

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*, q. 3, fa 1-3 (IV, 664; fa a-c, IV, 653).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Resp. (IV, 665; IV, 654-55).

by the revelation of the divine will. Although God set the time and revealed His will after original sin, the precept bound everyone in the time of innocence, or of natural law. At that time, when marriage was a duty and not a remedy, there was no proneness to lust, and all children would have been generated for the worship of God. It was no more perfect, therefore, not to marry than to marry. This was true also in the time of the written law, which had the merit of obedience in carrying out the precept. In the present time of the law of grace, there are many who are sufficient to fulfil the precept, while others keep the counsel of virginity. Because of the difficulty and toil in being entirely continent, Bonaventure says, virginity is a great and noble virtue. He also says, however, following Augustine, that the chastity of virginity or celibacy in the new law is not superior to the chastity of matrimony in the old law.<sup>14</sup>

Bonaventure maintains, nonetheless, that virginal chastity is better and more perfect than conjugal chastity.<sup>15</sup> Taking continence as a habitus, he says that virginal chastity is a greater virtue than conjugal chastity, because virginal continence goes beyond the demands of human nature. Thus, regarding the beauty of integrity, virginity has greater merit than matrimony, for the one has a holy incorruption and the other a dishonourable corruption. Taking continence as a state, he compares the two forms of chastity according to the same time, and according to different times. In the first instance, he holds that conjugal chastity was preferred entirely during the old law, when virginity was forbidden; but virginity is now preferable to matrimony, because the new law, not demanding fecundity of the womb, requires holiness, incorruption, and purity of mind. In the second instance, he sees no preference with respect to state or merit, provided charity is equal, between the conjugal chastity of the old law and the virginal chastity of the new law.<sup>16</sup>

Under natural law, matrimony was an exterior sign of the interior union of God and the soul. Under the law of grace, matrimony is a sign depending partly on an instinct of nature, or a dictate of natural law, and partly on Christian faith. On the side of natural

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<sup>14</sup> I *Sent.*, d. 48, a. 2, q. 1, Resp. (I, 855-56; I, 679); IV *Sent.*, d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, con. 1, ad 1 (IV, 48, 49; IV, 42, 43); II *Sent.*, d. 20, dub. 3 (II, 487-88; II, 503-04); IV *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, con. 2, ad 2 (IV, 665; IV, 653, 654). St. Augustine, *De bono coniug.*, 21, 26 (PL 40, 391).

<sup>15</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 33, a. 2, q. 2, fa 1-4 (IV, 754; fa a-d, IV, 739-40).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., Resp. (IV, 755; IV, 740); cf. *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 177-78).

law, matrimony is an instinctive union of a man and a woman; on the side of faith, this exterior union is a sign of the interior union of God and the soul. Thus, as a thing (*res tantum*), matrimony is by nature the union of a man and a woman; as a sign (*signum tantum*), it has naturally an exterior signification of the interior union in the minds of the man and the woman. As both a thing and a sign (*res et signum*), matrimony is a carnal union signifying by nature an interior consent of minds and, according to faith and institution, the union of God and the soul, or of Christ and the Church. Hence, Christian marriage is a sign by nature and by institution: the man signifies God, or Christ, and the woman signifies the soul, or the Church; but the principal union signified is the union of Christ and the Church through charity and in a conformity of nature. Those two factors are signified in Christian marriage respectively by the consent of minds and the carnal union of the man and the woman. According to first institution, however, the sacrament signified the union of God and the soul. Even if man had not sinned, matrimony would have signified this union, though not as clearly as now, or the union of God and the Church.<sup>17</sup>

As a sacrament, matrimony is a sign effecting what it signifies. Now, as we have seen, its first sign looks to the union of minds in the man and the woman, and its second to their carnal union. In Christian marriage, the first sign unites them to each other as members of the Church, and the second unites them to Christ. It is in this way, Bonaventure says, that Christ is united to the Church in Christian marriage. As the man and the woman become more united in matrimony, so they become more united to Christ, thus bringing about the union of their souls with God.<sup>18</sup>

In Bonaventure's judgment, then, the sacrament of matrimony had a natural sign up to the incarnation of Christ. Although the conservation of the individual was lost after original sin, the conservation of the species was maintained through matrimony. Consequently, in Christian marriage, the carnal act of union became the sign of the union of Christ and the Church. Thus, by divine institution, one man and one woman are united in matrimony, just as Christ and the Church are united as a unique groom and bride.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, Resp., ad 2-3 (IV, 666-67; IV, 655-56).

<sup>18</sup> Loc. cit., q. 2, con. 1, ad 1 (IV, 668; IV, 656, 657).

<sup>19</sup> Loc. cit., a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (IV, 662; IV, 651). The indissolubility of matrimony, as we shall see, is one of the consequences that Bonaventure draws from the nature of the sacrament as a sign.

Relying on Scripture (Gn 2:28), Bonaventure sees Adam needing the help of Eve only for the act of generation, because sexual union is required to generate a child. They would have had sexual union, as Augustine shows, even if they had not sinned; this is evident to Bonaventure himself from the distinction of the sexes, which was intended then, as now, for generating children.<sup>20</sup> He affirms his position, first, on the authority of Scripture, about Adam: "Let us make him a help like unto himself" (Gn 1:28); to Adam and Eve: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth" (Gn 1:28). He affirms it, secondly, according to the judgment of right reason: the generative power looks to the completion of human nature, and the use of the power to the complement and perfection of the celestial city. Since human nature was more perfect before than after original sin, therefore, if there were no sin, the celestial city would not have been deprived of its due number of citizens, provided that children could and would have been generated. But there would have been sexual union, because neither the man nor the woman alone could have generated a child. Consequently, they would have helped each other in procreating children for the multiplication of mankind.<sup>21</sup>

Bonaventure clearly takes an exalted view of the generative power, and of sexual union in marriage. The use of the generative power is, under the natural law, to perfect the celestial city. The whole reason of the power is not, as Aristotle seems to say (*De anima*, 2.4; 415a22-415b8), to conserve or to perpetuate the species. The principal reason is to multiply the number of the elect; this is the reason according to Christian faith, which Aristotle did not have. God intended the multiplication of the elect to be successive both to manifest His glory and to unite men more closely by a greater mutual love. God intended it also for the beauty and perfection of the universe: the passage of irrational things ought to follow the order and need of rational things, for whose sake they are made. Sexual union in marriage, moreover, would not have been a carnal work in the state of innocence, but a natural work in harmony with the human spirit and divine grace.<sup>22</sup>

Because matrimony was first instituted as a duty to procreate

<sup>20</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 20, un. 1, fa 1-3 (II, 477; fa a-c, II, 490-91); St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, 14, 23, 1 (PL 41, 430).

■ Ibid., Resp. (II, 478; II, 491); cf. fm 4 (d).

■ Ibid., sc. 3-4, ad 3-4 (II, 478; II, 491, 492).



children, Bonaventure takes the position that sexual union would have come about in the state of innocence only for the sake of a child.<sup>23</sup> His position depends on the harmonious order and the perfection of the generative power. This power had an order of perfect subjection to reason, which directed the use of the power to its proper end. Right and ordinate reason dictates that a thing is to be used only for its proper end: since the generative power is for the procreation of children, right reason dictates that it is to be used only for that end. The perfection of the generative power was such, moreover, that there were no impediments to its potency in the man or in the woman, respecting her time and condition. Consequently, always ordinate, their sexual union would have come about only to procreate a child.<sup>24</sup> By the time and condition of the woman, Bonaventure means her period of menstruation and her state of pregnancy. Under those circumstances, Adam would not have sought carnal union with Eve, because such a union would have been useless and a disorder. There was no disorder in the state of innocence, when matrimony was not a remedy for avoiding fornication.<sup>25</sup> In the state of fallen nature, a man sins at least venially in seeking carnal union with his wife beyond the necessity of procreating a child. Adam would also have sinned and fallen from innocence by seeking carnal union with Eve beyond the same necessity. But he would have respected this necessity, so that the act of carnal union would never be deprived of its due intention, nor the latter of its due end. The privation of a right intention is not without fault, Bonaventure adds, and the privation of an intended utility is not without penalty. Neither of these privations, however, was in the state of instituted nature.<sup>26</sup>

Sexual union is of the integrity of matrimony regarding its efficacy and its signification. Bonaventure teaches this on the basis of Scripture (Gn 2:24; Mt 19:5), supported by human reason. Sexual union is necessary in marriage to realize its signification of the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. The marital remedy for concupiscence is not had by continence, but solely by the carnal union of matrimony.<sup>27</sup> It is the plenary being, not the necessary being, of matrimony that determines its integrity. The

■ Loc. cit., q. 5, fa 1, 3-4 (II, 483; fa a, c-d, II, 497).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., Resp. (II, 484; II, 498).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., sc. 3, ad 3 (II, 483, 484; II, 498, 499).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., fm 2 (II, 483; fm b, II, 497).

<sup>27</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, fa 1, 3-4 (IV, 669; fa a, c-d, IV, 658).

necessary being concerns, first, the sign of the union of Christ and the Church through charity, secondly, the duty of mutual support and assistance, and thirdly, the remedy for concupiscence by keeping the man faithful to one woman. These three aspects involve a union of minds: pertaining to a ratified marriage, they constitute the sufficient integrity or perfection of the sacrament. The plenary being has to do with the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature, with the procreation of children, and with the disorder of lust by curing it when the man knows the woman with a love for procreating children, or with marital affection. These features entail a union of bodies: belonging to a consummated marriage, they constitute the plenary integrity or perfection of the sacrament.<sup>28</sup>

In Bonaventure's judgment, the sexual union of man and woman in the state of innocence would not have given as intense or as great a delight as it does now. There would have been a moderate and measured delight before original sin because of the rectitude of human nature and the rule of human reason. After original sin, reason lost the bond and restraint of original justice by which it ruled the generative power. Thus, the reins now relaxed, the power seeks the delight of sexual union with an impetuosity and immoderation making the intensity of the delight to be so great that it is sought beyond its due mode and order. This errancy and disorder is not the result of a greater intensity of the power itself, but of the defect of reason's control.<sup>29</sup>

According to Bonaventure, then, sexual union would have been in harmony with the perfection of human nature, prior to original sin. The power and act of generation are a common perfection of nature; but the proper perfection of rational nature requires the spirit to preside over the flesh and reason to control sensuality. Hence, after original sin, the perfection of man demands the suppression of the disorder of sensuality and of its rebellion against reason.<sup>30</sup> This disorder and rebellion, which are a weakness of the flesh, mark what Bonaventure calls, as we have seen, the dishonourable corruption of matrimony. That condition is not a fault, but the penalty of concupiscence resulting from original sin. Matrimony has no dishonour

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., Resp. (IV, 670; IV, 659). The twofold being, as we shall see, has important consequences for the nature and goods of matrimony.

<sup>29</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 20, un. 3, Resp. (II, 481; II, 495); cf. sc. 1-4 (a-d). Bonaventure is influenced here by Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, 14, 23-25 (PL 41, 430-34).

<sup>30</sup> *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 10 (V, 179).

regarding either its signification or the procreation of children ; nor is there any disgrace or disorder in the marital act of sexual union. Matrimony so orders this act that it is free of the disorder which would be there without the sacrament. The defect of nobility in marriage is found only in the penal condition of concupiscence. Differing from the other sacraments, which free from sin actually committed, matrimony prevents sin by remedying the disorder of concupiscence. Consequently, the perfection of the marital act consists in its entire restriction, or restraint, so that the accompanying lust of concupiscence is completely conquered.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, in Bonaventure's view, the marital act is not an evil, but a good and perfection of human nature. If there were no sin, the act would be free of lust. The inheritance of original sin, moreover, is not a consequence of the nature of the marital act, but of its penal condition. It is the lust of concupiscence, not the act of generation, which is evil. Because the evil is ordered to the good of procreating a child, the marital act is not corrupted by concupiscence, but is excused from it by the remedial power of the sacrament. There is no shame in the marital act itself. Rather, there is rejoicing in the procreation of a child according to the law of matrimony, which checks concupiscence and gives to the marital act its limit, mode and due end.<sup>32</sup> Though the remedial use of matrimony frees the act from sin that would otherwise be there, the grace of the sacrament is not necessarily given when the act is performed to avoid the lust of concupiscence, even though the act itself can be a source of merit. The proper and due use of the act does not satisfy the lust of concupiscence, but overcomes and prevents it. To seek the marital act for the delight of concupiscence, Bonaventure says, is to seek it beyond the nature of matrimony, which is not then a remedy, but a means of fomenting concupiscence.<sup>33</sup>

Since the proper use of the marital act is sinless and meritorious (1 Cor 7:5-6), Bonaventure maintains that it is a venial sin to use the act to avoid fornication, i.e. apart from the necessity or sole love of procreating children. Such a use can be sinless, if it fulfills the *debitum*, which is an obligation both of pure justice and of the fidelity

<sup>31</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 20, dub. 1-2 (II, 487; II, 502-03); IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, ad 7 (IV, 723; IV, 709); *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 9 (V, 175).

<sup>32</sup> *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 7-9 (V, 170). Bonaventure relies here on Augustine, *Con. Jul.*, 4, 9, 54 (PL 44, 764); 3, 7, 16 (PL 44, 710); 4, 8, 49 (PL 44, 762-63).

<sup>33</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4-5 (IV, 670; IV, 659-60).

and goods of marriage. If the act is used simply to avoid fornication, the use is then always a sin, because it is motivated by concupiscence, which does not respect either the procreation of children or the satisfaction of the *debitum*. Consequently, there is no merit in using the marital act for that purpose.<sup>34</sup>

On taking this stand, Bonaventure rejects the position that it is always a mortal sin to use the marital act solely, or with a final intention, to enjoy its delight, and that it is a venial sin to enjoy the delight as a condition of the proper use of the act. The position rests on the premise that, to avoid all sin, the act's delight should not please but displease reason. The delight is so great that, while it lasts, the use of reason and the spirit of prayer are taken away, and so the delight cannot be directed to God. For that reason, no one can use the marital act well by willing the delight, but by not willing it. This is not so with other sense delights, which can be directed to God. Hence, to seek the delight of the act is a mortal sin, to accept it when offered is a venial sin, but to tolerate it pertains to perfection. Bonaventure judges this position to be exceedingly hard. Although a husband plays and even delights with his wife, and this is a venial sin, even so, they act from marital affection. Though they commit venial sin, it is not necessary to direct every delight to God. Neither is it always a mortal sin to delight in a creature, unless it is so placed as an end that it is set against God, thus positing it as an ultimate end. Adopting another position, Bonaventure holds that a man sins mortally by seeking his wife for the sake of final delectation, or if he is moved to the delight with so great an impetus that he treats her meretriciously: he is then placing an ultimate end in the delight, for he takes delectation truly and properly in the creature, which he loves vehemently and beyond measure. If, however, a husband wills to delight in his wife because she is his wife, and would in no way know her if she were not his wife, then complete disorder is not in the marital act. Venial sin is there, because the good of matrimony excuses the disorder, lest it be a mortal sin.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 724-25; IV, 709-10); d. 26, dub. 3 (IV, 671; IV, 660); d. 31, dub. 6 (IV, 728; IV, 714).

<sup>35</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, Resp. (IV, 726; IV, 711). The gravity of a sin stemming from lust is measured according to its ability to absorb the power of natural judgment: d. 38, dub. 7, in Resp. (IV, 826; IV, 815). Though it is worse to deflower a virgin than to fornicate with a married woman, the latter is the graver sin because of the greater harm done to the State, of the injury done to



Though grace is not always given in matrimony, it excuses sexual union from all sin, or makes a sin to be venial which would otherwise be mortal. These effects, Bonaventure says, were caused by the sacrament immediately after original sin. With regard to the Christian sacrament, however, he says that it not only provides a remedy for sin, but also grants a gift of grace to those consenting to be united from charity in order to procreate children for divine worship. The nuptial blessing of the Church and the expression of consent to maintain an individual custom of life elevate the man and the woman above the disorder and corruption of concupiscence, and give them the grace for a singular, and inseparable, union ordered to the good of children. Thus, from the grace of the sacrament, a remedy comes to be for the triple disorder of concupiscence, and there arises the threefold good of matrimony. The first disorder of concupiscence is an inclination to lust for many women. Curing the disorder, grace moves the man to be united solely with his wife, thus bringing about the singular union effecting the good of fidelity. The second disorder is an inclination toward the delight and not the utility of carnal union. Grace cures this disorder by urging the man to know his wife only for the sake of procreation, which produces the good of children. The third disorder is a disdain for the woman after the satisfaction of concupiscence. That disorder is cured by grace in motivating the man to will always to remain with his wife, and so grace causes the inseparable union from which arises the good of the sacrament.<sup>36</sup>

The remedy of matrimony is not confined to Christian marriage. On this question, Bonaventure teaches that non-Christians have the true sacrament. He holds this by way of Scripture (1 Cor 7:12), and of reason, which shows that marriage is a dictate of natural law,

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the husband, and of the infamy that it causes: d. 41, dub. 4, Resp. (IV, 864; IV, 855). For a delineation of the various sins, and of their gravity, contrary to matrimony and to chastity see: *Decem praec.*, col. 6, nn. 12-13, 16 (V, 527-28).

<sup>36</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 2, Resp. "Et ideo..." (IV, 668; IV, 657); cf. fa 1-4 (a-d). Matrimony becomes a means of grace when consent is conjoined to the nuptial blessing, which makes known the sign of the sacrament. Thus, remedying the ignorance of the sign, this blessing sanctifies matrimony and makes it to be chiefly a spiritual rather than a carnal union, for matrimony has connected with it many temporal things, such as rearing and nourishing children. Though grace may be imparted by reason of the nuptial blessing, which looks to the complete being of the sacrament, matrimony gives only the help of grace to avoid sin, but the other sacraments give grace to take away sin. *Ibid.*, ad 4 (IV, 669; IV, 658); d. 30, un. 3, ad 3 (IV, 711; IV, 698).

a law common to all peoples. Since non-Christians give their express consent to maintain an individual custom of life, their marital union has the true nature of the sacrament.<sup>37</sup> But their marriage lacks the perfect nature of the sacrament. Though it has the duty of procreating children, they are not generated for divine worship. Marital affection excuses the act from sin, but the sacrament does not give the grace remitting concupiscence by reason of the nuptial blessing. The union of God and the soul, or of the two natures in Christ, is not actually signified, but is there only as a habitual disposition. The good of the sacrament is defective, because the bond of non-Christian marriage lacks perfect ratification. Explaining the last point, Bonaventure says that the state of non-Christian marriage is such that the bond can be made more secure by a union with Christ through the sacrament of baptism, from which no one is to be deterred. Although the reception of baptism by one of the partners can weaken the bond, it cannot be loosed as long as both partners remain in their original state, which is governed by natural law.<sup>38</sup>

Matrimony among non-Christians is a true remedy for sin, because they maintain conjugal continence or chastity in the marital act, particularly when it is used with marital affection. They are excused from sin, then, according as the sacrament is a remedy under natural law. No one sins, except for an evil will, in fulfilling an obligation, and matrimony bears the mutual obligation of carnal union, or the *debitum*.<sup>39</sup> Conforming to the nature of non-Christian marriage, however, the sacramental remedy is not perfect. The reason for this, Bonaventure states, is that the matrimonial goods are there imperfectly by the absence of baptism and of faith. The bond of matrimony is imperfect because of the first defect, and it is impossible to please God (Heb 11:6) because of the second. It is possible without faith to avoid sin in any act, if it is not evil; but it is not possible without faith to merit an eternal reward. Though non-Christians avoid the penalty of concupiscence by not doing evil, their conjugal chastity has no reward, because it does not have the true

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<sup>37</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, fa 1-4 (IV, 833; fa a-d, IV, 821).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., Resp., ad 3-4 (IV, 834; IV, 822). The being of non-Christian marriage is not as perfect as the being of Christian marriage: loc. cit., q. 4, ad 4 (IV, 837; IV, 826). On the state of marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian see: ibid., q. 1 (IV, 832-33; IV, 820-21); on the state of a non-Christian marriage after baptism see: q. 4 (IV, 836-37; IV, 825-26).

<sup>39</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, con. 1-4 (IV, 835; con. a-d, IV, 823).

and proper effect of a virtue. This effect is to turn away from evil, thus avoiding punishment, and to do what is good, thereby acquiring eternal glory. Their defect of faith, moreover, and the lack of the nuptial blessing prevent them from receiving the grace remitting concupiscence. They escape sin, nonetheless, because of the sacrament, unless lustful love intervenes. Such a love, Bonaventure adds, also vitiates the conjugal act among Christians.<sup>40</sup>

Of all the remedies of matrimony, conjugal chastity is the positive one that is common to Christian and non-Christian marriage. Bonaventure often refers to conjugal chastity as conjugal continence; but the two are not identical. Continence can be complete abstinence from the carnal act of union; Augustine calls this celibate chastity. Continence can also be restraint from immoderation or intemperance in the act; Bonaventure calls this nuptial chastity. Though celibate chastity is nobler than nuptial chastity, the habitus of the one, but not its act, can be had at the same time with the other in a person who is most temperate.<sup>41</sup> Complete abstinence from the marital act is not allowed in a consummated marriage, unless both partners are willing to remain entirely continent. If the husband takes a vow of continence, for example, he cannot seek the act, but is bound to accede to his wife whenever she requests it.<sup>42</sup>

Bonaventure has nuptial chastity alone in mind when he refers to conjugal continence properly as conjugal chastity.<sup>43</sup> This chastity is consistent with evangelic law and natural law. Showing that it is approved by evangelic law, Bonaventure cites no less than eight texts from the New Testament. He cites, for instance: "Have you not read that he who made men from the beginning, made them male and female... Those whom God has joined together no man can separate" (Mt 19:4, 6). On the authority of these texts, Bonaventure argues that the union of a man and a woman in an individual custom of life is of divine institution and has the approval of Christ. Since the

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., Resp., ad 1-3 (IV, 835-36; IV, 823-24).

<sup>41</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 33, dub. 3 (IV, 762-63; IV, 749); St. Augustine, *De bono coniug.*, 22, 27 (PL 40, 391-92).

<sup>42</sup> Loc. cit., a. 2, q. 1 (IV, 732-33; IV, 715-16). Matrimony gives grace to remedy concupiscence, but a vow so disposes the soul that grace is given for a more perfect remedy; they do better who vow continence rather than marry, but not everyone can do this (Mt 19:11), and so both matrimony and continence, or celibacy, are necessary: d. 26, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 668-69; IV, 657).

<sup>43</sup> *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 15 (V, 171).

act of conjugal chastity flows from that union, the virtue and its act are in harmony with divine law. Citing another text: "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loves the Church" (Eph 5:25), Bonaventure reasons that, because Christ is united to the Church with a most chaste love, a husband is united to a wife with a chaste love, which harmonizes with the law of God.<sup>44</sup> Bonaventure presents next six arguments demonstrating that conjugal chastity is a dictate of natural law, so that the virtue conforms to this law and to divine law. He demonstrates it, for example, on the ground that the conjugal act is a natural and common good ordered to the multiplication of mankind. He also demonstrates it from the principles that fidelity is a noble good, and that the generation of children is a useful and profitable good. As a natural virtue moderating the conjugal act, therefore, conjugal chastity is in accord with human reason and with the law of God.<sup>45</sup>

The harmony of conjugal chastity with the law of God existed from the beginning and, still existing, will continue until the number of the elect is completed. Before original sin, conjugal chastity was consistent with the natural law because of the nature of man, which was formed as male and female (Gn 1:27), because of the precept to increase and multiply (Gn 1:28), which required the legitimate use of conjugal chastity, and because of the revelation to Adam that husband and wife would be two in one flesh (Gn 2:23-24). Thus, under natural law, the marital union of man and woman is natural, moral, and sacramental. After original sin, conjugal chastity was consistent with the written law by reason of God's promise to Abraham (Gn 17:4, 6), of His miracle in Sara (Gn 21:1-2), and of His statutes containing the laws and conditions of matrimony (Lv 18:2, 5-6). Under the law of grace, conjugal chastity is consistent with the angel's message from God to Zachary, who preserved nuptial chastity by devout prayer and a holy life (Lk 1:13, 6), the definition of Christ (Mt 19:6) and His presence at Cana (Jn 2:1-11), and the apostolic instruction, for Peter and Paul commend matrimony, its laws and fidelity, and the mutual love of husband and wife.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., fa 1, 5 (V, 166). The other arguments based on Scripture (fa 2-4, 6-7), depend respectively on Jn 2:2-11, 1 Pt 3:7, 1 Tim 2:15, 1 Cor 7:3-4, 28.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., fa 10-13 (V, 166-67). The other two arguments (fa 8-9), founded on the conjugal act, draw the same conclusions by way of the nature of matrimony as a great sacrament (Eph 5:32) and the precept to increase and multiply (Gn 1:28).

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., Resp. "...et viri." (V, 168). The reference to Peter and Paul indicates fa 2-7; see above: n. 44, and include Eph 5:25.



In the state of instituted nature, Bonaventure continues, matrimony was a sacrament and a duty. In the state of fallen nature, matrimony remains a duty because of human nature, but is also a remedy because of original sin. Consequently, the use of conjugal chastity has to be understood from its threefold nature as a duty, a remedy, and a sacrament. This understanding is obtained by a consideration of the sacrament, and a consideration of the disease of concupiscence. Considering the sacrament, Bonaventure sees the use of conjugal chastity as a duty to procreate children for the worship of God to be an act of pure virtue. He also sees the use of conjugal chastity as a remedy to avoid incontinence to be an act of the virtue accompanying the weakness of the flesh. Considering the disease, he regards the satiation of concupiscence, whether in fulfilling the duty or in seeking the remedy of matrimony, as a venial sin and not as an act of the virtue; but the act is not entirely inconsistent with conjugal chastity, because matrimony excuses the fault, lest it be a mortal sin. He regards the act of totally satiating concupiscence, or the meretricious use of matrimony, as repugnant to conjugal chastity and a perversion of the law of matrimony. These several aspects of conjugal chastity, Bonaventure shows, agree with the teaching of Augustine.<sup>47</sup>

### LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LOVE

The second essential feature of matrimony comprises the necessary conditions required to contract it and to maintain the conjugal life. We have seen Bonaventure saying that matrimony comes into being by a free and interior consent shown exteriorly in words of agreement. Matrimony is, therefore, the union of a man and a woman who are related as its agent or influencing principle and its supporting or receiving principle. Thus, making a bond of love, their union results from a true and mutual consent of will.<sup>48</sup>

There are, then, three points to be examined here. The first is liberty of mind, or freedom of consent, which is the foundation of matrimony. The second is the marital relation of husband and wife,

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., Resp. "Sed hoc... concedendae sunt." (V, 168-69); con. 6, ad 6 (V, 167, 169-70). St. Augustine, *De bono coniug.*, 10, 11 (PL 40, 381-82).

<sup>48</sup> For the three points see above: n. 11, n. 28, nn. 36-37.

particularly with respect to the procreation of children. The third is the love or marital affection contributing to the harmony and the good of conjugal life.

We have already seen Bonaventure establishing some things about freedom of consent. First, God revealed to Adam that men would leave their parents and, through free consent, would be united to wives (Gn 2:23-24). Secondly, by words of promise and consent, matrimony manifests exteriorly an interior union of minds; by the carnal union of husband and wife, matrimony manifests their spiritual union or interior consent. A ratified marriage requires this consent, which is completed in a consummated marriage. Thirdly, an express consent by non-Christians to maintain an individual custom of life confers the true nature of the sacrament on their marital union. The sanctification by the nuptial blessing of a similar consent by Christians elevates them above the disorder of concupiscence, and gives them the grace for a singular and inseparable union ordered to the good of children.<sup>49</sup>

These are, in fact, the three important aspects of liberty with regard to marriage. We shall, therefore, consider them as they relate liberty respectively to the divine institution of matrimony, to its nature and its signification, and to the lust or disease of concupiscence.

Insisting on the divine institution of matrimony, Bonaventure rejects the view that it is a purely human agreement. Although the mutual obligation of matrimony has a human origin, the indissolubility of that obligation has a divine origin. Since matrimony has the nature of a sacrament and a sign chiefly because of its indissolubility, the sacrament has its origin from God and not from man. Thus, the first cause of the bond of matrimony is God, and its proximate cause is the human agreement expressed in the mutual consent of the man and the woman. Hence, the total cause lies in their consent together with the divine institution: the original cause of the bond is the divine institution and the human consent; but the divine institution alone is the conserving cause, or the cause of the bond's indissolubility.<sup>50</sup> The divine institution, however, does not impede the natural freedom required to contract matrimony. The precept of God to increase and multiply (Gn 1:28) takes into account

<sup>49</sup> See above: n. 4, n. 11, n. 17, nn. 36-38.

<sup>50</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4 (IV, 664; IV, 653); d. 27, a. 2, q. 1, Resp. (IV, 679; IV, 666); d. 27, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3 (IV, 682; IV, 669-70).

the movement of charity, a movement which most of all is free and spontaneous. When God precepted the contract of matrimony, He left it to the pure liberty of those contracting it to marry whom they will.<sup>51</sup>

Because of the nature and signification of matrimony, no one can be compelled to marry. This is acknowledged, Bonaventure comments, by canon law and civil law, which do not recognize marriages contracted by parents on behalf, but without the consent, of their children.<sup>52</sup> The full liberty required to contract matrimony is grounded in its natural signification of an interior consent, and in the gravity of the obligation involved in the contract. For those reasons, an obligatory precept by parents cannot bind their children, who are free to marry or not to marry according to their own will. Bonaventure adds, nonetheless, that they may be bound to obey because of charity, or a reasonable cause, e.g., to end a family feud, or to prevent marriage with an evil person, or because of a voluntary promise of their parents, whose good name would otherwise suffer. Although children must obey their parents in all things (Col 3:20), this applies normally to parental honour and family affairs. With respect to other things, obedience is recommended but is not obligatory; for instance, if parents take an oath to give their children in marriage, the latter are not bound to obey, unless they consent freely, or in good faith. As a human contract, then, matrimony is caused by the full and free consent of the persons willing to marry.<sup>53</sup> Such a consent is required not only by the laws and indissolubility of matrimony, but also by its sign.<sup>54</sup> To have a matrimonial union, not an adulterous one, the contracting persons must give and express their consent absolutely and not conditionally. A defect of exterior consent nullifies a marriage before the Church; but a defect of interior consent voids it before God. An absolute consent is required because of the divine institution, which looks to the signification in matrimony of the invisible union of God and the soul. This is why Christ constituted the union of matrimony as something perpetual, a condition also dictated by natural law. A conditional consent, therefore, is contrary to the substance of matrimony.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4 (IV, 665; IV, 654).

<sup>52</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 29, un. 3, con. 1-4 (IV, 702; con. a-d, IV, 690-91).

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, Resp., ad 2, 4-5 (IV, 702-03; IV, 691-92); d. 29, dub. ■ (IV, 704; IV, 692).

<sup>54</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 28, un. 2, con. 1-4 (IV, 690; con. a-d, IV, 677).

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, Resp. (IV, 690; IV, 677). On the relation between the law of

A consent made from lust does not necessarily nullify a marriage. If a chaste consent were necessary, then charity would also be necessary, which is not a condition demanded by any other sacrament.<sup>56</sup> Consent to marry out of lust can be made with the intention of positing it as the end and object of the marriage. That consent seeks to extort carnal union, not to contract matrimony, and so the consent does not cause a true marriage. A marriage is valid when there is consent to contract matrimony, even though the consent is given with the intention of satisfying the lust of concupiscence and not of maintaining chastity. The substance and cause of the consent are good: they come from God; its circumstance is evil, but this is not the cause of the marriage. The cause is the consent as a work of reason ordering it to a good end and flowing from the will inasmuch as it is good by its order to such an end.<sup>57</sup> A violent or lustful extortion of carnal union, furthermore, consummates a ratified marriage. To be free, marriage must follow consent, which is the foundation of matrimony. A depraved mode of union consummates a marriage, therefore, because the union is marital. Though the union is not free, the consent on which it is based is free: consent by its nature entails freedom.<sup>58</sup> Thus, a marriage is valid when it is contracted with the sole intention to unite in conjugal society. It is also valid, but a mortal sin, when the intention and consent are directed to carnal union for the sake of generating children, but with the evil purpose of satisfying the lust of concupiscence. A marriage is both invalid and a mortal sin when it is contracted with the sole intention and consent to seek carnal union in order to satiate the lust of concupiscence.<sup>59</sup>

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nature and the law of grace, note: "...dicendum quod lex naturae partim conveniebat cum lege gratiae, partim cum lege scripta: quantum ad libertatem cum lege gratiae conveniebat, quantum vero ad imperfectionem et obscuritatem cum lege scripta." — *III Sent.*, d. 40, un. 1, ad 3 (*III*, 886; *III*, 898).

<sup>56</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 30, un. 3, con. 2-3 (*IV*, 710-11; con. b-c, *IV*, 698). If matrimony were valid only for those having charity, the sacrament would scarcely be knowingly valid, for no one knows with certitude whether or not he has charity: *I Sent.*, d. 17, p. 1, un. 3 (*I*, 298-300; *I*, 242-43).

<sup>57</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 30, un. 3, Resp., ad 1-2 (*IV*, 711; *IV*, 698-99). Though matrimony signifies the union of Christ and the Church in a chaste love, the sacrament is not a sign because of charity or of chastity, but because of the indivisibility of the union: arg. 4, ad 4 (*IV*, 710, 711; *IV*, 697, 698).

<sup>58</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3 (*IV*, 733; *IV*, 717).

<sup>59</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 38, dub. 1, Resp. "...contrahere consueverunt." (*IV*, 825; *IV*, 813).



The next topic is the marital relation of husband and wife. Regarding this topic, Bonaventure considers matrimony to be, as we have seen, under natural law an instinctive union of a man and a woman. In addition, relying on Scripture (Gn 1:28; 2:18, 28), he considers Adam to need the help of Eve only for the act of generation, which neither could accomplish alone, and so they helped each other for the multiplication of mankind.<sup>60</sup> The generation of a child has to take place, according to the order and power of nature, by the sexual union of a man and woman. Thus, in generating children, they are so related that the efficient or active principle is more in the man and the material principle more in the woman. There must, then, be a union of the two in a seminal mixture having the power and proper principle to propagate a human body. This mixture is the seed containing both the effective and the material principle of human generation.<sup>61</sup> Because the woman is, as it were, the matter of union in matrimony, Bonaventure says, the sacrament is named from the mother (*mater*). When there is a relation between two extremes, it ought to be named, if it is rightly named, from the one where there is the greater dependence. But the woman has a greater need to be united to the man than he has to be united to the woman, so that matrimony ought more to be named after the woman than after the man. This view of Bonaventure is tied closely to the teaching of Scripture (Gn 2:18) that Adam was created first, and was alone, until Eve was created as his helpmate, i.e. by the bond of matrimony.<sup>62</sup>

Looking to the fruit of matrimony, Bonaventure holds that the sacrament is named from its good of children. This good is understood more through the mother than the father, because the woman was made for procreating children, and thus she was made as the man's helpmate: the labour of procreation falls more upon her than upon the man. She has the mother's duty to nourish the children, for it is the woman who has to conceive them, to carry them in the womb, to nourish them, and to offer them compassion. As the possession of

<sup>60</sup> See above: n. 17, n. 20.

<sup>61</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 20, un. 2, Resp. "...seminum generassent." (II, 479-80; II, 493); cf. fa 2-4 (b-d).

<sup>62</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, fa 1-4 (IV, 677; fa a-d, IV, 663-64). Bonaventure follows Augustine here in teaching: "Matrimony is named from this, that a woman ought not to marry except to become a mother." — *Con. Faus.*, 19, 26 (PL 42, 365).

children is called *patrimony* after the father (*pater*), so their acquisition by the mother (*mater*) gives rise to the name *matrimony*. Thus, in Bonaventure's view, matrimony is best named from its final cause, or the principal intention for which it was instituted: the fruit of the womb.<sup>63</sup>

Bonaventure's position on the marital relation of husband and wife does not include the view, as his texts show, that the man is the wholly active principle and the woman is the purely passive principle in the act of generation. Their relationship is such that the *more effective* principle is in the man and the *more material* principle is in the woman. This is a consequence of his philosophical understanding of a material principle as never purely passive, because it is active in some way, e.g., the act by which matter causes a form to exist, and of a formal principle as never wholly active, because it is passive to some extent, for instance, a form's receptivity with respect to being.<sup>64</sup> The greater effectivity on the part of the man and the greater materiality on the part of the woman refer to the physical or biological aspect of the generative act, namely, the rôle of impregnation and fecundation by the man and the comparable rôle of reception by the woman.<sup>65</sup> In keeping with this view, Bonaventure does not accept the position, based on Aristotle, that the woman is the material principle and the man is the effective or operative principle, so that the seed of the man is related to the seed of the woman as an artisan is related to the matter of his artifact, thus allotting to the woman the rôle only of providing the matter and an exterior support. This position is unacceptable to Bonaventure, who maintains that the mother has not only a passive, but also an active, rôle in generating a child, a fact evident to him in the closer likeness at times of the child to the mother than to the father. Aristotle's doctrine on the generation of animals, then, is to be understood of human generation only by way of appropriation.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., Resp. "Aut secundum fructum...", ad 1-4 (IV, 677-78; IV, 664-65). For the relation of children to their father and mother under civil law or the *ius imperiale* see: IV *Sent.*, d. 36, a. 1, q. 3, Resp. (IV, 794-95; IV, 781-82); on the relation in a marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian see: d. 39, dub. 4, Resp. (IV, 843-44; IV, 833).

<sup>64</sup> See: II *Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, qq. 1-2 (II, 89-98; II, 79-88). Cf. d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2 (II, 33-35; II, 25-28); d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (II, 108-10; II, 98-100); d. 17, a. 1, q. 2 (II, 413-18; II, 424-27).

<sup>65</sup> See above: n. 61.

<sup>66</sup> "...sicut dicit Philosophus, mater in generatione prolis se habet sicut

Bonaventure himself, as we have seen, holds the position that a man and a woman hand over their bodies to each other, by their entirely equal power, for the procreation of children. He retains his position by many affirmations of the equality of husband and wife with respect to the act of generation (*torum*). This equality is a dictate of right reason, or natural law, which requires a husband and wife to become one flesh by the conjugal act. It is dictated by natural law, then, that a married man cannot share the act with another woman. The right use of the act always necessitates a true equality of the man and the woman within the union of matrimony.<sup>67</sup>

It would seem, however, that a husband and wife cannot be equal, because their union signifies the union of Christ and the Church, or of God and the soul, neither union involving an equality. This position follows Scripture: "Women ought to be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord..." (Eph 5:22-28). Considering the position, Bonaventure says that three things are to be taken into account in matrimony: distinction of sex, a conformed union, and a mutual obligation. By the first and second, matrimony signifies God and the Church: the woman needs the man as the soul needs God and the Church needs Christ; the inseparable union and the conformity of the man and the woman signify particularly the indivisible union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. The mutual obligation of matrimony has no signification. God is entirely free and is not obligated to anything whatsoever. There ought to be an obligation between husband and wife, nonetheless, because their union would otherwise not be inseparable. Since they are conformed in their union, they are also conformed in an obligation, and so they are equal, or have parity, because they have obliged each other by reason of their conformity. The teaching of Scripture is to be understood, therefore, of the su-

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principium materiale et semen viri sicut effectivum et operativum. Unde comparatur semen viri ad semen mulieris sicut artifex ad materiam, mulier vero non facit nisi materiam ministrare et exterius fovere... Sed haec positio nimis parum dicit. Primum, quia mater in generatione non solum habet potentiam passivam, sed activam; unde quandoque proles magis assimilatur matri quam patri. Unde quod dicunt physici intelligendum est per appropriationem." — III *Sent.*, d. 4, a. 3, q. 1, in Resp. (III, 111; III, 105-06); Aristotle, *De gener. anim.*, I, 2 (716a2-17), I, 20-21 (729a4-729b20).

<sup>67</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, con. 3 (IV, 734-35; con. c, IV, 719); d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, con. 3 (IV, 747; con. c, IV, 732); ad 1 (IV, 748; IV, 733). Bonaventure is referring, in the last two texts, to the infidelity of concubinage, an aberration contrary to the goods of matrimony; see below: n. 90.

periority of the man with regard to things pertaining especially to him, such as the rule of the home, and other similar things.<sup>68</sup>

The superiority of the man to which Bonaventure refers does not entail a natural inferiority of the woman. It has to do, rather, with the different rôles of the father and the mother in family society.<sup>69</sup> Bonaventure is well aware of the full text of Scripture on the distinction of sex: "God created man to his own image [and likeness]; to the image of God he created them. Male and female he created them. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth" (Gn 1:27-28).<sup>70</sup> The distinction of sex is here closely associated with the image of God in human nature. Considering this question, Bonaventure teaches that the man and the woman were created equal with respect to the divine image, which is rooted in the human soul, where there is no distinction of sex. Man and woman are of the same species, which is not varied according to sex; but the image of God follows the species, not the individual, and so the divine image is equally in the man and in the woman. The image of God, furthermore, is reformed by grace and its theological virtues. But grace and its virtues can be in a woman just as excellently as in a man: with equal reason, therefore, is the natural image of God in which mankind was created.<sup>71</sup> Now, with regard to being, the divine image consists chiefly in the soul and its powers of memory, intelligence and will. The image consists most of all in those powers as they are turned toward God, in which respect there is no distinction of male and female. Consequently, a man and a woman do not differ in regard to the being and to the fulfilment of the image of God. They differ accidentally in regard to its well-being, or clearer expression, which is a property of the divine image looking to the order and relation of the soul to the body. Since sexual distinction is in the body, there is a greater representation of God in the man because of his presidency or principality: "The man is the head of the woman... the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man... the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man" (1 Cor 11:3, 8-9).<sup>72</sup>

<sup>68</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 32, dub. 1 (IV, 742; IV, 727-28); cf. d. 36, dub. 4 (IV, 800; IV, 787). Note also: "...ex concursu patris familias et matris familias ad disponendum regimen domus resultat una potestas, ita quod altera non sufficeret..." — II *Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, un. 3, in Resp. (II, 599; II, 617).

<sup>69</sup> See above: n. 63; cf. II *Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 (II, 563-64; II, 581-82).

<sup>70</sup> *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 1, Resp. "Legi naturae... pudicitiae coniugalis." (V, 168).

<sup>71</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, con. 1-4 (II, 403; con. a-d, IV, 414-15).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, Resp. (II, 403; II, 415).



The superiority of the man over the woman, then, is grounded in an accidental, not an essential, quality of the image of God in the human soul. This quality has to do with the distinction of sex, which is found in the body, so that the headship of the man in matrimony concerns things relating to the bodily or mundane affairs of conjugal life. The spiritual side of matrimony is founded on the equality of the man and the woman as images of God. When Bonaventure speaks of the man representing God and of the woman representing the soul, he is not referring to the distinction of sex, but to the spiritual aspect of human nature. Thus, he is speaking of the spiritual union of matrimony as it signifies the union of God and the soul. When he speaks of the man representing Christ and of the woman representing the Church, he is then referring to the distinction of sex, and thus he speaks of the sexual union in matrimony as it signifies the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. Hence, his doctrine on the necessary being and the plenary being of matrimony relates to his doctrine on the essential being and the well-being of the image of God in human nature. The necessary being of matrimony relates to the essential being of the divine image; the plenary being of matrimony relates to the well-being or accidental property of the image. Since the fulfilment and perfection of the image rests on its essential being, which is equal in the man and the woman, and since the fundamental signification of matrimony is its manifestation of the union of God and the soul, therefore, as images of God, a husband and wife are equal as individuals with regard both to the substantial being of matrimony and to their spiritual or personal relations, especially their relations to God. Thus, the equality of husband and wife is grounded in their proper dignity as human persons, for the image of God is not found perfectly in the human soul or in human nature, but in the human person.<sup>73</sup>

The natural dignity of husband and wife as human persons is the primary foundation of their mutual love. From what we know even now of Bonaventure's thought on love and marriage, there is a quite evident relation of marital love to the twofold being of matrimony. The singular and individual union of matrimony signifies the similar mode of union: first, of God and the soul by a most chaste love, which is also singular and individual; secondly, of the two natures in Christ and, through charity and in a conformity of nature,

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<sup>73</sup> Loc. cit., a. 1, q. 1 (II, 394-96; II, 404-07).

of Christ and the Church. Looking to the necessary being, the union of Christ and the Church through charity is connected with the mutual support and assistance of matrimony, and so its necessary being relates to the spiritual love of husband and wife. Looking to the plenary being, the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature is connected with the natural love of procreating children, or with marital affection, and thus this being relates to the carnal love of husband and wife. It is in regard to the latter love that Bonaventure speaks of matrimony as a remedy for concupiscence. The sacrament sanctifies the use of carnal union with the sole love of procreating children, which give joy to their parents. Such a use of the union always frees the marital act from sin, and gives to Christians the grace of the sacrament. Marital affection also excuses from serious sin the use of the act to obtain its delight, or even to avoid fornication; but a disordered or lustful love vitiates the conjugal act in a Christian or in a non-Christian marriage. A true marital affection, for Christians and non-Christians, not only frees the conjugal act from sin, but also preserves the virtue of conjugal chastity. Consequently, harmonizing with divine law, Christian marriage unites husband and wife in a chaste love signifying the most chaste love uniting Christ and the Church.<sup>74</sup>

It is evident, then, that the marital affection or carnal love of a husband and wife is founded on their personal or spiritual love, which has to do particularly with their mutual support and assistance. Bonaventure has a brief description of these two loves, which he calls conjugal love and social love, in a text showing that *love* is a proper name of the Holy Spirit: a husband and wife love each other with a social love for their common life; they love each other ultimately with a conjugal love for procreating a child.<sup>75</sup>

Elsewhere, dealing with uxoricide, Bonaventure sees social love as more easily broken than natural love. We cling more closely to natural things, as a child clings to its mother, and so matricide is more cruel and perverse than uxoricide. Although the union of husband and wife is greater according to the signification of matrimony, the union of mother and child is greater according to fact.

<sup>74</sup> See above: n. 4, n. 28, n. 32, nn. 35-40, n. 44.

<sup>75</sup> "Huius autem exemplum potest poni in amore creato, quo sponsus et sponsa se diligunt. Nam diligunt se amore sociali ad convivendum; diligunt se ulterius amore coniugali ad prolem procreandam..." — *I Sent.*, d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, in Resp. (I, 201; I, 162).

The flesh of a mother and child is one in substance and nature; the flesh of a husband and wife is one only in their carnal union. A husband is drawn more to his wife for a time; but he is drawn more to his mother absolutely. Conjugal love can be more intense than natural love; but it is easier for a husband and wife to be stirred up to hate each other than for a mother and child. Thus, it is not the social love of matrimony, but its conjugal love, that leaves behind maternal love.<sup>76</sup>

The relation of parent and child impedes their carnal union. This is an impediment of natural law, of divine law, and of canon law. The union is contrary to natural law, first, because of the reverence and honour due to a father and mother, secondly, because of the succession of generation, which should be progressive, not retrogressive, so that a child ought not to be united with its principle to generate. It is a dictate of human nature, therefore, that maternal love differ from conjugal love. Divine law forbids the union (Gn 2:24) and the union of brother and sister (Lv 18:5), because the two unions are dishonourable and ignominious. Canon law prohibits them, and other unions of consanguinity, in order to widen the borders of love. Because we are prone to loving our nearest of kin, and because matrimony gives rise to a newness of kin while fomenting mutual love, the Church decrees that love be extended beyond the limits of affection for parents and close relatives, thus caring for the spread of charity and the honour or nobility of marriage. In Bonaventure's view, then, the natural affection within a family is quite distinct from the marital affection of a husband and wife. Indeed, according to nature, the two affections are so distinct that marital affection, but not natural or familial affection, inclines a man and a woman toward carnal or conjugal union. This union, therefore, has a certain natural love, namely, of procreating children.<sup>77</sup>

Conjugal love, consequently, should be both singular and individual. Bonaventure sees in these qualities of marital love the foundation of the singular and individual nature of matrimonial union. He holds, accordingly, that bigamy opposes the law of nature and

<sup>76</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2, q. 2, con. 3 (IV, 808; con. c, IV, 796); ad 2-3 (IV, 809; IV, 796-97). Maternal love is the highest natural love, social love is the highest acquired love, and charity is the highest love flowing from grace: *Sermo, De Assum.* 6 "Quinta stella... caritatis perfectio." (IX, 704).

<sup>77</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 40, un. 2 (IV, 849-51; IV, 838-40); d. 42, a. 1, q. 1, Resp. (IV, 869; IV, 858). See above: n. 22.

all the laws of matrimony.<sup>78</sup> This is true, first, according as the law of nature is set down in Scripture (Gn 2:24; Mt 19:5). It is true, secondly, according as that law is what right reason dictates: you ought not to do to another what you would not will to have done to yourself (cf Tb 4:16). Since no man wills that his wife have another man, neither ought any man will to take another wife, because a husband and a wife are equal with respect to the conjugal act. Finally, it is true according as the law of nature is implanted in the animals. Though not every animal observes a unique union, this is found among some animals, and it is implanted in human nature, as experience shows. Conjugal love is so singular that, from experience, it is known not to be shared by anyone outside the union of matrimony. Every husband is naturally zealous that his wife love him alone, and every wife is similarly zealous that her husband love her alone. If original sin had not intervened, conjugal love would never have been common, even if everything else were common. In a Christian marriage, charity does make all things common, but never conjugal love, for this is a private love. Matrimony, moreover, is the sacrament or sign of the love between the soul and God: He is zealous that the soul love no one else with so great a love, and the soul does not will that it be deserted by God for someone else. Thus, we see the wisdom of God manifesting itself to us in us, and showing us in creatures subject to us how we ought to act: "Ask the beasts, and they teach you" (Job 12:7). But we do not heed the divine wisdom, Bonaventure says, because our minds are darkened by sin. In short, between a husband and a wife, there is a mutual love and, therefore, both a mutual zeal and a singular union.<sup>79</sup>

Because matrimony requires a mutual love, God has decreed that no one can be, nor ought to be, obliged to marry except voluntarily. Here lies a wonderful thing, Bonaventure exclaims, that a man find in some woman a love so pleasing that he would never find in any other, a fact also known from experience.<sup>80</sup> The free consent required to marry, then, is also founded on mutual love. Such consent

<sup>78</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 3, fa 1-4 (IV, 749; fa a-d, IV, 734).

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., Resp., ad 3 (IV, 749-50; IV, 734-35).

<sup>80</sup> ["...in] matrimonio, ubi est servitus corporis et debet esse mutus amor, decrevit Deus ut nullus possit nec debeat nisi propria voluntate obligari. — Est enim ibi quoddam mirabile, quia homo invenit in muliere aliquam complacentiam quam nunquam posset in alia invenire, ut dicunt experti." — IV *Sent.*, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2 (IV, 797; IV, 784).



can be had even when beauty is the motive, as it was when Jacob consented to marry Rachel (Gn 29:17). If it is the principal motive, however, the cause of the marriage lacks some honour. Beauty ought not to be the prime intention, but the procreation of children, or something similar, e.g., a remedy for concupiscence. Even the procreation of children is ordered to the service of God. If beauty is only an inducing cause, there may not be sin, at least grave sin, because beauty draws the human spirit naturally toward love. When such love is simply pleasing, it is not very intense, and so is not culpable. Thus, it is highly improbable that Jacob sinned in marrying Rachel because of her beauty. People are induced to marry, Bonaventure notes, for many reasons that are not sinful, at least as long as they are not the only end, e.g., beauty, riches, property, wisdom and virtue. Of these reasons, virtue and wisdom, or moral probity, are to be preferred.<sup>81</sup>

No one in this world is to be loved as an end, but as a way to the end. The final end of marriage is not conjugal love or its act: they are unstable, transitory, and perishable goods.<sup>82</sup>

#### GOODS OF MATRIMONY

The third essential feature of matrimony is its finality, or its goods. Bonaventure begins his consideration of this aspect of marriage by showing that the sacrament itself is in the genus of the noble good, i.e. spiritual good. His view rests on the position that virtue is a noble good: since the conjugal act is an act of chastity, and the preservation of fidelity is an act of justice, matrimony falls into the genus of the noble good.<sup>83</sup>

Strictly speaking, however, Bonaventure limits the noble good of matrimony to fidelity, which is an essentially moral good ensuring the singularity of carnal union. The multiplication of children is a profitable good conserving the species and perfecting its number. The indivisible union of matrimony is a delightful good which is so great that a husband and wife, leaving their parents, are two in

<sup>81</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 30, un. 3, con. 1 (IV, 710; con. a, IV, 698); d. 30, dub. 6 (IV, 713; IV, 701); d. 34, a. 1, q. 2, Resp. "Ex parte finis... remedium honestatis." (IV, 769; IV, 755).

<sup>82</sup> *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 5 (V, 169).

<sup>83</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, fa 1-4 (IV, 717; fa a-d, IV, 702).

one flesh (Gn 2:24). This is why husbands are commanded to "Love their wives as their own bodies" (Eph 5:28). Thus, the three goods of matrimony correspond to the three goods open to human choice, as Aristotle shows (*Ethic.*, 2.3; III3a15-III3b1). Because of original sin, Bonaventure continues, the matrimonial goods are defiled to some extent. The good of fidelity is dishonoured by the improbity of lust and prurience mixed with the conjugal act. The good of procreating children for divine worship is harmed because it now impedes intensity of prayer and perfect worship of God. The good of the sacrament, or of indivisible union, is mixed with sorrow and anguish, for a husband is anxious about the things of this world and how he may please his wife, and so he is divided by a tribulation of the flesh. Hence, the goods of matrimony are imperfect, which is why it is better not to marry, though marriage itself is a good thing (1 Cor 7:32-38). The imperfections of marital goods are penal effects of original sin; but they are cured and excused from fault by the medicinal power of the sacrament.<sup>84</sup>

Bonaventure shows next that there are only three goods of matrimony. The number is sufficient from its efficient or instituting cause. The good of fidelity is dictated by right reason regarding the singularity of union. The good of children is dictated by nature for the conservation of the species. The good of the sacrament is dictated by grace to signify the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The formal or constituent cause, looking to the being of matrimony, necessitates the good of the sacrament because of its institution, the good of fidelity from its due use, and the good of children through the fruit of its utility. The final cause or end of matrimony, however, requires the three goods either as such or as opposed to the evil of concupiscence. As such, they are to be chosen because they are the proper goods of matrimony. As opposed to evil, the good of fidelity safeguards the singularity of union against fluctuation, the good of children protects the utility of marriage against disorder, and the good of the sacrament preserves its inseparable union against disdain or contempt. Uniting all three considerations, Bonaventure says that the matrimonial goods signify the threefold property of the union of Christ and the Church, namely, its singularity, its fruit (i.e. members of the Church), and its inseparability. These three

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., Resp., ad 2-4 (IV, 717-18; IV, 702-03); cf. dub. 5 (IV, 728; IV, 713-14). See above: n. 45.

goods, then, are the sole goods of matrimony, and they are common to it both before and after original sin.<sup>85</sup>

They belong necessarily to matrimony, moreover, but in different ways. The good of the sacrament pertains necessarily to matrimony because of its mutual obligation concerning the *debitum*, of its divine institution, and of its signification of the union of Christ and the Church. The other two goods are connected to the being and the well-being, or perfection, of matrimony. Since a marriage must be contracted by a mutual consent, and the contract can be in the absence of these two goods, but not in opposition to them, the goods of fidelity and of children touch the being of matrimony. If consent is given, for example, on the condition that the woman will engage in prostitution, or will procure an abortion, then the contract is invalid and adulterous, because the consent is opposed directly to the constitution of matrimony. The absence or lack of the two goods does not void a marriage contracted by a valid consent. Fidelity comes from the right use of the conjugal act, which can be abused by infidelity. Likewise, children are the fruit of the womb, which can be sterile naturally or artificially. The use of the conjugal act, then, and the fruit of the womb have to do also with the well-being of matrimony. The sacrament can be without these two goods, as it is with married people who consent to abstain from their marital rights. Matrimony can be even in opposition to fidelity and to children, for instance, when infidelity and the procurement of sterility or of an abortion happen after a valid marriage has been contracted. The sacrament was instituted not only for procreating children, but also as a sign and, after sin, as a remedy. If there were no sin, the good of children would never be lacking, because there would not then be the penalty of sterility. Because of sin, however, this particular good is not always there, but the other goods can be there at all times, and so the sacrament is there, even without children.<sup>86</sup>

Thus, the good of the sacrament looks to the necessity of the interior union of minds, and to the indissoluble bond of a ratified marriage, which signifies the union of Christ and the Church through charity. This good is related to the social and spiritual love of husband and wife, thus dealing with their mutual support and assistance.

<sup>85</sup> Loc. cit., q. 2, Resp., ad 1-3 (IV, 719; IV, 704).

<sup>86</sup> Loc. cit., q. 3, Resp., ad 3 (IV, 720-21; IV, 750-60). Bonaventure is influenced here by Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.*, 9, 7, 12 (PL 34, 397).

The good of children looks to the exterior union of bodies, and to the fruit of a consummated marriage, which signifies the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. This marital good is related to the carnal and conjugal love of husband and wife, thus having to do with their duty of procreating children for divine worship. Taking a middle position, the good of fidelity is concerned with both the interior union of minds and the exterior union of bodies. Fidelity is found in a ratified and in a consummated marriage, and so it looks to the singular and individual union of Christ and the Church through charity and in a conformity of nature. The good of fidelity invokes the remedy for concupiscence, in a ratified marriage, to keep husband and wife together in their marital society and, in a consummated marriage, to cure the lust inclining them to unite carnally beyond the due bounds of marital affection. Hence, related to the social and carnal love of marriage, or its spiritual and conjugal love, this good has to do with the mutual obligations of husband and wife, particularly their mutual obligations in regard to the *debitum*. The good of fidelity, then, working through grace, ensures that they use the conjugal act not only within the singular and individual union of matrimony, but also in a chaste love which is singular and individual, for their union is the sign of the singular and individual union, in a most chaste love, of God and the human soul.<sup>87</sup>

Bonaventure, appealing to Augustine, has the good of fidelity arising from an unconditional consent to marry one person. The individual nature of matrimonial union, moreover, shows that the good of fidelity is of the substance of matrimony.<sup>88</sup> Consequently, a matrimonial contract is invalid if the consent is conditional with the intention of dissolving the marriage in favour of another at a future time. The contract is invalid because of the defect of fidelity and of the sacrament, which must be perpetual. The conditional consent, therefore, is contrary to the good of fidelity.<sup>89</sup> To have this good in a valid marriage, a husband must not unite carnally with any other woman, or a wife with any other man: a husband and wife must remain faithful by uniting solely with each other. Because the negative aspect of fidelity is something that ought to be natural to matri-

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<sup>87</sup> See above: n. 74, n. 78.

<sup>88</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 5-6 (IV, 720; fa e-f, IV, 705); St. Augustine, *De bono coniug.*, 5, 5 (PL 40, 376-77).

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., con. 2, ad 2 (IV, 720, 721; IV, 705, 706).



mony, there can never be any release from it as long as the marriage endures. Since the positive aspect depends on the negative, the loss of the latter releases the innocent person from the obligation of the *debitum*, because the guilty person is no longer entitled to seek the marital act.<sup>90</sup>

The due use of the marital act is ordered to the good of children, or the fruit of the womb, for which end the institution of the sacrament was principally intended.<sup>91</sup> The procreation of children, particularly for divine worship, is the duty of matrimony. A husband and wife, receiving grace to overcome the corruption of concupiscence, are sinless when they use the marital act for the good of children, which are a cause for joy. The act is not free from sin, if it is used simply to avoid fornication, or without the sole love of procreating children. Thus, founded on the grace of a singular and inseparable union, the duty of matrimony is fulfilled with a certain natural love accompanying the conjugal act.<sup>92</sup>

Bonaventure insists that the use of the generative act in matrimony for the good or procreation of children can be entirely without sin. His position is based on the authority of Augustine and on hu-

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<sup>90</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2-3 (IV, 735; IV, 719-20). The chaste use of the conjugal act in fulfilling the *debitum*, which is an obligation of pure justice, not only pertains to the good of fidelity, but is also a source of merit; see above: n. 34. The remaining texts of Bonaventure on the good of fidelity are concerned chiefly with the sins of infidelity, the resulting problems relating to the *debitum*, and the separation of husband and wife, as follows: (a) matrimonial fornication, i.e. adultery, deprives the guilty person of the right to seek the *debitum*: IV *Sent.*, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 734-35; IV, 719-20); this sin is also a legitimate cause for divorce, namely, the termination of cohabitation, but not the dissolution of the marriage: d. 35, un. 1-6 (IV, 780-88; IV, 767-75); cf. d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 6 (IV, 720; fm f, IV, 705): d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, con. 1 (IV, 734; con. a, IV, 719); (b) under the old law, divorce by repudiating a wife was permitted, because it was not punished or forbidden, but was illicit and sinful if it dissolved the marriage: d. 33, a. 3, qq. 1-3 (IV, 758-62; IV, 744-48); cf. d. 35, un. 1, ad 5 (IV, 782; IV, 768); (c) concubinage and bigamy (which is a violation of conjugal love) are contrary to natural law, the dictate of right reason, the old law, and the law of the Gospel; though God allowed concubinage by a dispensation under the old law, this dispensation was revoked by Christ: d. 33, a. 1, qq. 1-3 (IV, 747-52; IV, 731-38); see above: nn. 78-79, and I *Sent.*, d. 47, un. 4 (I, 845; I, 671-73); (d) the crime of uxoricide is contrary to every law, including civil law, is a most grave sin, and impedes a subsequent marriage: IV *Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2, qq. 1-3 (IV, 807-10; IV, 794-98); see above: n. 76.

<sup>91</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 4 (IV, 720; fm d, IV, 705); see above: n. 60.

<sup>92</sup> See above: nn. 33-36, n. 77.

man reason, supported by Scripture. According to Augustine (*De bono coniug.*, 6.6; PL 40.377), the marital use of the generative act to procreate children has no sin. According to human reason, matrimony is a good and sacred thing: it was instituted by God (Gn 1:28), who reinstituted it after original sin (Gn 8:17); it was approved and confirmed by Christ (Mt 19:4; Jn 2:2). Since a sacred thing can be used in a holy and sinless way, and everything commanded by God can be done without sin, the matrimonial use of the generative act to procreate children can be a holy and sinless thing. No natural potency, such as the generative potency, is essentially evil. It can be used well, or for its proper purpose, as the generative potency can be used to procreate children.<sup>93</sup>

Bonaventure thinks it to be an error to say that the generative act is sinful only through excess. This understanding of the act fails to see how the disease of concupiscence has infected the generative power. Every act in which the itching of lust is so great that it absorbs reason, and makes a person to be wholly carnal is an act disordered in itself and causing a perversion of the soul's reign over the body and of the order of justice, so to speak, among the powers of the soul and also between them and the soul itself. Such a disorder is found in the conjugal act, Bonaventure says, appealing to experience and to a number of theological authorities.<sup>94</sup> With regard to experience, the disorder is seen in the natural and evident shame attached to the movement of the genital members and their act, even when it is well ordered. Thus, because the act cannot be exercised without so great a disorder, it is obvious to Bonaventure that the act in itself (because of original sin) is disordered by concupiscence. He also thinks it to be an error, however, to say that the generative act is always sinful and in no way to be excused, so that it corrupts the good of matrimony. This view fails to see that the sacrament is a remedy and a cure settling the disease of concupiscence. The disease does not make the generative act essentially evil, as the act of idolatry is essentially evil: because it is a disorder of the mind in relation to God, idolatry is an evil and disease that cannot be cured; concupiscence is a disorder only of one creature in relation to another, and so this disease can be cured. God provided the cure by instituting

<sup>93</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, fa 1-4 (IV, 721-22; fa a-d, IV, 706-07).

<sup>94</sup> St. Augustine, *Sermo* 162, n. 2 (PL 38, 886-87); Origen, *In Numeros*, 6, 3 (PG 12, 610); Lombard, *In Ep. 1 ad Cor.* (18-20), 4, 31 (PL 191, 1584).

matrimony, which would be the sign of the union of Christ and the Church. Thus, as a remedy for concupiscence, matrimony has the medicine to cure the disease and to excuse the generative act from sin. It is more in accord with Christian faith, therefore, to hold that the act is diseased, but is also excused from sin by the remedy of the sacrament, especially when the act is used to procreate children. Although some theologians hold that matrimony excuses the act only from mortal sin, Bonaventure sides with Augustine, who says that God will give a perfect remedy when the act is used for the good of children, and so the act can be free from all fault. The intention of procreation, however, must persist throughout the act, an exceedingly difficult condition to fulfil.<sup>95</sup>

Bonaventure gives three intentions for seeking the good of children. The first seeks this good according to its true mode: to bring up children for the worship of God. The second seeks it indifferently: to have heirs and successors, or to secure a posterity. The third seeks it in a deformed or evil way: to take pride and glory in the beauty of many children. Since the true good and utility of marriage is to be judged from the intention of procreating and rearing children for divine worship, a marriage with the other two intentions has some good, but not the true good or utility for which the sacrament was instituted.<sup>96</sup> All good things whatsoever that we have are gifts and presents from God. We are anxious to have such things: we desire them, labour to possess them, and pray to God that we may acquire

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<sup>95</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, Resp. (IV, 722-23; IV, 707-08); St. Augustine, *De bono coniug.*, 6, 6 (PL 40, 377-78). The conjugal act is made essentially evil and is always sinful when its immoderate delight, disorder, lust, and shame are contrary to the act of reason. If the order of reason is preserved, however, those modes of the conjugal act arise from sensuality, and so they are due to the penalty of concupiscence resulting from original sin. As a remedy, the sacrament of matrimony puts order into reason, so that the conjugal act is willed moderately, ordinately, and uprightly, thus removing all shame inasmuch as children are willed and desired in a chaste manner. Without the intervention of the remedy of matrimony, therefore, there is always disorder both in the appetite of sensuality and in the act of reason, and so there is always sin in the generative act. It is not true to say, nevertheless, that the act of generation is a cause of sin, because the act is essentially the cause only of children. Their generation results in sin, not in the parents, but in the children, who are born in original sin. Movements of the flesh preceding the conjugal act are not always sinful: they are sinless when they come from an ordered thinking about carnal union with a view to generating children. *Ibid.*, ad 1-6 (IV, 723; IV, 709).

<sup>96</sup> Loc. cit., dub. 1, Resp. (IV, 727; IV, 712).

them. They can be sought either through human love or because of evangelic perfection. It is through human love, Bonaventure says, that the present of succession and the gift of children are sought and desired. It is better, however, to choose spiritual than carnal gifts, for such is the intention of the Gospel, which promises perfection in this life and glory in the next.<sup>97</sup>

When a child is generated with the sole intention of having a posterity, the intention lacks its due form, which is to procreate the child for the worship of God. Nor does the intention have perfectly the good of the child, though it is legitimate, since it is generated matrimonially. The intention also has no merit, but neither does it have demerit, for it is not a deformed intention. There is, therefore, a fourfold difference among children, both Christian and non-Christian. Some are natural and legitimate, because they are born in wedlock; these children ought to inherit the family property. Other children are legitimate but not natural, e.g., adopted children, who can also be heirs to the family property. Certain children are natural but not legitimate, for instance, those born of concubines, whereas others are neither legitimate nor natural, i.e. who are born out of wedlock by incest, or by adultery.<sup>98</sup> Now, according to every law, particularly natural law, it is blameworthy and a reproach to children who are born of concubines. Right reason dictates that a son ought to succeed his father, and so it is a penalty for a son not to have the paternal inheritance. It is the practice of all societies, moreover, that children born of concubines not succeed to such an inheritance. Right reason, likewise, dictates that this is a just penalty for the disorder, not in the children, but in the act of generating them. It is also a dictate of right reason that both parents ought to rear their children, who ought in their turn, and by an equal obligation, to support their parents when they grow old. For these reasons, a man and a woman should unite in matrimony to procreate their children, which is the purpose of the generative power. Consequently, they should unite also to rear their children, who are then bound to serve and to honour their parents until they die. To possess perfectly the good of children, therefore, their progenitors should be united in the act of generation not only equally and inseparably, but also solely as husband and wife.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>97</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 33, dub. 6 (IV, 750-51).

<sup>98</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4 (IV, 836; IV, 824-25).

<sup>99</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, con. 1-2, 4 (IV, 747; con. a-b, IV, 732).



Finally, it is contrary to the noble good of matrimony to have more than one wife for the sake of procreating children. Although nature dictates that children are to be multiplied, even so, this is to be done duly, ordinately, and without injuring anyone else. It is better, then, according to Bonaventure, for a man not to generate children than to harm his wife by marrying another. In short, the dictate of nature to acquire the useful good of matrimony is not to be followed in such a way as to prejudice its noble good of fidelity, which is a right and an obligation of justice.<sup>100</sup>

The delightful good of matrimony, or the good of the sacrament, also necessitates the right and obligation of justice. This good consists in the indivisible or inseparable union of husband and wife, i.e. in the indissolubility of their mutual obligation and of their matrimonial bond. Having a divine origin, the indissolubility of the mutual obligation is the principal reason why matrimony is a sacrament and a sign. God is the first cause of the bond and the human agreement is its proximate or second cause. The indissolubility of the bond, then, though it requires the full and free consent of the partners to a marriage, is conserved by the divine institution of the sacrament. The obligation of justice, moreover, flows from the conformity of husband and wife in their matrimonial union, and establishes an equality between them with respect to the act of generation. Although this obligation has no signification, nevertheless, the obligation is necessary for the inseparability of their union, which has signification. The inseparable union of husband and wife in a conformity of nature is the sign of the indivisible union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. Consequently, the inseparability of the union between husband and wife is necessary for the good of the sacrament.<sup>101</sup>

Bonaventure speaks of the sacramental bond as the principal and the inseparable good of matrimony. The two other goods are related to it as the one principal end of matrimony. The union of husband and wife is the sacrament of matrimony. The inseparability

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<sup>100</sup> Loc. cit., q. 2, ad 4 (IV, 750; IV, 735). There are some other defects in the good of children that Bonaventure examines, but more or less in passing, for instance, the evils of abortion and of deliberate sterilization: (a) d. 31, dub. 4 (IV, 727; IV, 713); d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, con. 2 (IV, 734; con. b, IV, 719); (b) d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 3 (IV, 720; fm c, IV, 705); see above: n. 86.

<sup>101</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 1-2 (IV, 720; fa a-b; IV, 705); see above: n. 50, nn. 52-55, n. 68.

of that union is the good of matrimony. Inseparability of union, therefore, is called the good of the sacrament, or the sacrament itself. The reason for this is that the good of inseparability, but not of fidelity or of children, is consubstantial to matrimony and is an indissoluble consequence of the sacrament. Although matrimony is a sign of the union of God and the soul, a union that can be loosed through sin, nonetheless, matrimony is a sacrament chiefly because it is the sign of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, a union that cannot be loosed in any way. Hence, the sin of adultery, which is contrary to the goods of fidelity and of children, does not loosen the union of matrimony, which ties a husband and wife by an indissoluble bond.<sup>102</sup> They are united indissolubly by the bond not only because of their promise, but also and principally because their union signifies the insoluble bond of the two natures in Christ. For the latter reason, in the judgment of Bonaventure, no authority can loosen the bond of matrimony. Christian marriage is immutable, therefore, because it is the sign of the insoluble union of the divine and human natures in Christ.<sup>103</sup>

Bonaventure distinguishes the indissolubility of a consummated marriage from the indissolubility of a ratified marriage. He gives three reasons why a consummated marriage is indissoluble. God intended the union of a husband and wife to be inseparable, so that they are two in one flesh (Mt. 19:6). The nature of matrimony requires them to maintain an individual custom of life. Matrimony is the sign of the inseparable union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature.<sup>104</sup> The indissolubility of a consummated marriage is not perpetual, however, for it lasts only as long as the mortal life of the husband or of the wife. With the death of the one or of the other, the bond of their marriage is dissolved. The bond is not indissoluble of itself, therefore, but from the signification of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. The original cause of the bond's indissolubility, nevertheless, is the divine institution of matrimony.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, grounded in the divine institution, the indissolubility of a consummated marriage follows the nature of the carnal act of union

<sup>102</sup> Loc. cit., q. 2, ad 4-6 (IV, 719-20; IV, 704); d. 35, un. 4, ad 1, 3-4 (IV, 785-86; IV, 772).

<sup>103</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5 (IV, 822; IV, 810); see above: n. 7.

<sup>104</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 27, a. 3, q. 1, fa 1-4 (IV, 681; fa a-d, IV, 669).

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., Resp., ad 1-2 (IV, 682; IV, 669).

as the sign of the union of Christ and the Church. The union of a husband and wife is uniquely and indivisibly one, as the union of Christ and the Church, who are a unique groom and bride, is indivisibly one. It is the nuptial blessing, moreover, with the expression of consent to maintain an individual custom of life, that elevates a husband and wife above the disorder of concupiscence. It is the grace of the sacrament, however, that causes their singular and inseparable union, which is ordered to the good of children.<sup>106</sup>

The foundation of the indissolubility of Christian marriage is the sacrament of baptism, which imprints an indelible character on the soul. As the sacrament of faith, baptism is the foundation of the other sacraments, and it is a stable sacrament, for it is not subject to change.<sup>107</sup> Although a non-Christian marriage is indissoluble by nature as long as both persons remain unbaptized, the good of the sacrament is defective because the bond lacks perfect ratification, which it can have through baptism.<sup>108</sup>

The indissolubility of a ratified marriage, unlike a consummated one, involves only the union of minds between a husband and wife. As a result, this indissolubility concerns the signification of the union of God and the soul rather than the union of the two natures in Christ. A marriage is ratified because it has a certain indissolubility inasmuch as the bond lasts while the mutual consent of minds remains. Such a marriage can be dissolved with the spiritual death of the husband or of the wife, e.g., when one of them takes a solemn vow of chastity, or enters a religious Order. This dissolution is not made by human authority, but by God who instituted the matrimonial bond, and to whom a solemn vow of continence is made.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>106</sup> See above: n. 19, n. 36.

<sup>107</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, Resp., ad 2 (IV, 841; IV, 830).

<sup>108</sup> *Loc. cit.*, q. 1, fm 2 (IV, 838; fm c, IV, 827); q. 3, ad 1 (IV, 484; IV, 830). See above: n. 38, n. 40. A marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian is contrary to the good of fidelity because of the danger of infidelity, to the good of children because the non-Christian parent can prevent them from being dedicated to God, and to the good of the sacrament because the marriage ought to be, but is not, founded on baptism, fully ratified and insoluble: *loc. cit.*, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6 (IV, 833; IV, 821). The indissolubility of matrimony under the old law was not perfect, because no sacrament was as perfect then as it is now under the new law of grace: d. 33, a. 3, q. 2, con. 2 (IV, 760; con. b, 746); cf. a. 1, q. 3 (IV, 751-52; IV, 735-37). The crime of uxoricide is contrary not only to the fidelity of matrimony, but also to its indissolubility: d. 37, a. 2, qq. 1-3 (IV, 807-10; IV, 794-98).

<sup>109</sup> *IV Sent.*, d. 27, a. 3, q. 2, (IV, 683-84; IV, 670-71); cf. q. 1, ad 4 (IV,

Bonaventure upholds the right of persons to marry not only a second time after the death of a husband or of a wife, but also as many times as remarriage is for a good end, such as to generate children, to avoid the sin of fornication, and to sustain the necessities of life. Remarriages are true sacraments, but they lack the complete nature of the sacrament. In regard to the unity of the first marriage, the division of the flesh takes away the fulness of the signification of the unity of the two natures in Christ. Although such marriages are honourable because they have the three goods of matrimony, even so, they are imperfect with respect to the nobility of fidelity, for they manifest a probable defect in conjugal chastity, and with respect to the signification of the sacrament, since they are defective signs of the unity of Christ and the Church.<sup>110</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Although St. Bonaventure lived and died in the 13th century, he developed an original and, to us, an interesting doctrine on the sacrament of matrimony. The originality of his doctrine is best seen in three marks that stand out in notable ways. Those marks are the nature of matrimony as a sacrament and a sign, the principal intention of procreating children for divine worship, and the due equality of husband and wife.

Under natural law and by divine institution, the visible union of man and woman in matrimony, even before original sin, signified the invisible union of God and the human soul. The latter union is manifested naturally and fundamentally by way of the spiritual union of minds in the man and the woman who consent freely to marry. The necessity of that spiritual union is the principal reason

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682; IV, 670). Bonaventure holds that a ratified marriage ought to be consummated because of the free and mutual consent initiating the contract; he sets down the canonical conditions (of his own day) for the dissolution of such a marriage, which must be consummated if those conditions are not met: d. 32, a. 1, q. 2 (IV, 732-33; IV, 716-18).

<sup>110</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 42, a. 3, qq. 1-3 (IV, 876-80; IV, 866-70). The alternative to remarriage, i.e. the chastity of widowhood, is more honourable not only because Christ counsels it, through St. Paul (1 Cor 7:40), but also because it harmonizes better with natural law: a spiritual good is to be preferred to a carnal good. See: *Perf. ev.*, q. 3, a. 2, Resp., ad 5-6 (V, 173-74).



for the indissolubility, which has a divine origin, making matrimony chiefly and by nature a sacrament and a sign. After original sin, the natural signification of matrimony was obscured until it was elevated to a higher order by the incarnation of Christ. Hence, under Christian faith, matrimony also signifies the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, and the union of Christ and the Church.

The immutability of Christian marriage stems from its signification of the insolubility of the union of the two natures in Christ. Thus, the natural indissolubility of matrimony, or the principal reason why it is a sacrament and a sign, is transformed by grace and Christian faith. This fundamental signification of Christian marriage is grounded in the indivisibility of the flesh of husband and wife: their carnal union signifies the indivisible union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The carnal union of matrimony, moreover, is a natural sign of an interior union or consent of minds. That sign is transformed in Christian marriage into a sign of the union of Christ and the Church both through charity and in a conformity of nature. Founded on the indispensable consent of minds, the sign of the union through charity is of the necessary being of the sacrament, and so it unites husband and wife as members of the Church. Looking particularly to the bond of a ratified marriage, the spiritual union of Christian marriage in a chaste love signifies the union of Christ and the Church in a most chaste love. Consequently, the carnal union of the marriage is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. Founded specifically on the distinction of sex, this sign is of the plenary being of the sacrament and, directed to the multiplication of members of the Church, is the means of uniting a husband and wife to Christ. Looking especially to the bond of a consummated marriage, the inseparability and conformity in the carnal union of Christian marriage signifies the indivisibility of the union of Christ and the Church in a conformity of nature. The signification of this union and of the union in charity are made one in the singular and individual union of the sacrament according as the union of minds is completed by the union of bodies. Hence, the more a husband and wife are united to each other, so much the more are they united to Christ, and so the man and the woman realize in Christian marriage the fundamental sign of matrimony: the union of God and the human soul.

The principal intention of procreating children is not directed simply to perpetuating mankind, or to propagating them for their

own sake. It is, rather, directed to procreating them for the worship of God and the attaining of eternal glory. This view is completely in line with St. Bonaventure's understanding of the nature and purpose of matrimony under natural law and Christian faith. Before original sin, matrimony by its nature was a sacrament and a sign. As a sacrament, it had the duty of procreating children for the worship of God. As a sign, it pointed to the union of God and the human soul. Since this was a union in love and in prayer, therefore, under natural law, the union of husband and wife was, and still is, intended chiefly to generate other men and women who, worshipping God, would also be united to God in love and in prayer. After original sin, matrimony became a remedy for concupiscence. This disease brought dishonour on matrimony by introducing lust into the generative act, thus obscuring the intention of procreating children for divine worship and, contrary to the primary condition of the sacrament, making the act of procreation an impediment to prayer and the worship of God. The primary intention and condition of matrimony, however, with all that they entailed in the original state of mankind, are now restored in Christian marriage. Hence, under Christian faith, matrimony is not ordered directly to the multiplication of children, but to procreating them within the community of the Church for the worship of God, and so to unite them to God in love and in prayer until they attain eternal glory.

St. Bonaventure's understanding of the corruption of the generative act by lust, and the great difficulty of avoiding sin in matrimony, even in Christian marriage, must be seen within his total perspective of the sacrament as a means of union with God in love, prayer, and worship. Although we do not today take the view that the remedy of matrimony, especially under Christian faith, is perfect only when the conjugal act is used to procreate children, or to fulfil the *debitum*, nevertheless, in all justice to St. Bonaventure, his view of the remedy as lessening the gravity of sin, which is incurred in every other use of the conjugal act, has to be understood and appreciated according to his own principles and within his whole outlook on matrimony as both a natural and a Christian sacrament. He does, after all, take the very firm position that the remedy of matrimony can make entirely sinless the use of the conjugal act to procreate children, to satisfy the *debitum*, and even to manifest marital affection within the bounds of conjugal chastity. Though we would today consider the conjugal act in itself to be less sinful,

and so to be more readily perfected by the remedy of the sacrament, especially the Christian sacrament, even so, St. Bonaventure's understanding of the effects and corruption of concupiscence does not conflict with the evidence in our own times of infidelity, sexual aberrations, and dissolutions of marriages.

The third outstanding mark of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on matrimony is also close to our own times. Following Scripture, he places the man over the woman in regard to things having to do particularly with the rule of the family. This is not a natural or an essential superiority of the man over the woman. It is, rather, a priority of order and of time. With regard to order, the priority is based on the physiological rôles of the man and the woman in the generation, conception, and rearing of children. With regard to time, the priority is founded on the Scriptural account of Eve's creation after Adam and as his helper in procreating children. In all other respects, including the origin of the power to govern the household, a husband and wife are entirely equal, especially concerning the marital right and obligation of carnal union. Thus, for a man of the 13th century, St. Bonaventure is very close to our day when the equality of women, particularly in marriage, is being recognized, acknowledged, and accepted. For St. Bonaventure himself, the marital equality of husband and wife is grounded in their proper dignity as human persons, but especially in their personal dignity as images of God. The carnal, sexual, and conjugal love of married life takes its origin and direction from the spiritual, personal, and social love of husband and wife. This perspective of matrimony, whether Christian or non-Christian, flows from St. Bonaventure's understanding of the foundation of marriage as consisting in the necessary freedom of consent to establish an individual custom of life. In short, taking an exalted view of the personal nature of the man and of the woman, he insists that the very nature of the sacrament demands that a husband and wife be equal in their matrimonial union, which is fundamentally the sign of the union of God and the soul of the human person.

*Pontifical Institute  
of Mediaeval Studies  
Toronto, Ontario*

JOHN FRANCIS QUINN, C.S.B.

OFFICIUM PASSIONIS DOMINI :  
AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT  
OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

MANUSCRIPT

Our *Officium Passionis Domini* is contained in a manuscript *Ms. qMed.* 131 of the Boston Public Library. Manuscript on soft, yellow vellum, written and illuminated in the region of Marches, Italy, in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, c. 1320–1330.<sup>1</sup>

The text is in Latin: it contains 101 ff. (10 × 8 cm). It has 15 full-page miniatures; one full-page and 17 smaller historiated initials with borders, rebacked. A Calendar occupies ff. 1–12<sup>v</sup>, the *Officium Passionis Domini* ff. 13–51<sup>v</sup> with one f. lacking between ff. 46<sup>v</sup>–47<sup>r</sup>. The *Officium defunctorum* in ff. 52–101<sup>v</sup>, lacking probably 4 ff. before 52.

The script, in gothic (see Plates 1 and 2), gives the impression of squareness, the letters being in general as wide as they are tall. It uses juncture, e.g. the *pe* of *peccatis* (f. 45<sup>v</sup>), the *ho* of *hostis* (f. 46<sup>r</sup>), the *de* of *decor* (f. 25<sup>v</sup>), the *pe* of *pendens* (f. 39<sup>v</sup>). Whenever two or more minims come together the first is shorter than the second and third. Final *s* is uniformly double-looped, e.g. *foras* (f. 48<sup>v</sup>), *humeris* (f. 31<sup>v</sup>), *meus* (f. 43<sup>v</sup>). Every final *m* resembles a 3, the tail extending often below the line, e.g. *locutum* (f. 48<sup>v</sup>); it is more generally, however, the *p* and the *g* that extend below the line, e.g. *gratias* (f. 23<sup>v</sup>), *egrediebant* (f. 48<sup>v</sup>), *patriam* (f. 51<sup>v</sup>), *eripe* (f. 32<sup>r</sup>).

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<sup>1</sup> The manuscript was purchased in 1954 from W. H. Schab from the Josiah H. Benton Fund. I was able to edit and publish the manuscript by courtesy of the Trustees of the Boston Public Library. I wish to express my gratitude to them and to John Alden, Keeper of the Library's Rare Books for his kindness. I take also this opportunity to thank Robert F. Melville, Associate Dean of the Humanities at SUNY Binghamton for providing me assistance in getting to Boston and to the University's Faculty Awards Committee for their grant towards the reproduction of the miniatures.



The loop of the *a* normally joins the vertical member below the top, e.g. *alapis* (f. 25<sup>v</sup>), *alacriter* (f. 26<sup>r</sup>). The script offers quite a number of Italian characteristics such as abbreviations and spellings. The script, moreover, invites comparison with a similar example in a manuscript of the Vatican Library, *Biblioteca Apostolica*, *Rossi Lat. IX 421*.<sup>2</sup> As it was written in March 1308, it offers both chronological and calligraphic suggestions as to the date of composition of our *Officium Passionis Domini*.

Internal evidence allows us to provide at least a definite *terminus ad quem* for our manuscript. In its calendar section, on the date of April 28 (f. 8<sup>r</sup>), is recorded the anniversary of the death of *sancti Vitalis* (who suffered martyrdom probably under Nero in 171 A.D.). Immediately after it and on the same line appears this entry: *anno domini mccc xxx viii, eodem die obiit Afrobitius sancti Petri martiris ordinis predicatorum*. Since the entry is in a different hand and ink than the entire original, the addition must have been made a few years after the completion of the manuscript, possibly by the person for whom it was composed, or perhaps by a new owner. By taking, on calligraphic comparison, the date 1308–1310 as a safe *terminus a quo* and the year 1338 as a definite *terminus ad quem*, the composition of the manuscript may be restricted to the years 1320–1330.

The Afrobitius of the *sancti Petri martiris ordinis predicatorum* whose death is recorded as having occurred on the 28 of April 1338 must have been a Dominican; this can be surmised both by the fact that he is said to have belonged to the *ordo predicatorum* — the Dominicans are indeed known as the Preaching Friars — and by the reference *sancti Petri martiris* for, St. Peter Martyr, together with St. Dominic, St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Catherine of Siena, is one of the Dominicans' four principal saints.

The Calendar agrees with the religious usage as found in other fourteenth-century manuscripts from the Marche, the majority of the saints — St. Anthony, St. Scholastica, St. Benedict, St. Bartholomew, St. Vitalis, St. Francis — being those venerated in the dioceses of the region. Since Afrobitius' death is recorded in 1338 in connection with St. Peter Martyr of the Order of Preachers, it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that Afrobitius may have been a Dominican connected with the church of St. Peter Martyr of Ascoli

<sup>2</sup> S. Harrison Thomson, *Latin Bookhands of the Later Middle Ages 1100–1500* (Cambridge, 1969), Plate 69.

Piceno, Marches, a vast Romano-Gothic construction which was erected in the year 1332, at approximately the time when our manuscript was composed.\* Afrobitius may have been one of the church's original *canonici* or *archipresbiteri*. The unusual occurrence of the mention of the death of a Dominican in an obviously general Franciscan manuscript should not surprise since, particularly in the Marches, one finds a most unusual and coeval dissemination of Dominican and Franciscan houses; and one of the curious phenomena of fourteenth-century Marches is the unusually abundant number of churches dedicated to St. Francis and St. Dominic, such as those of St. Francis and St. Dominic in Urbino, St. Francis in Ascoli Piceno, St. Francis and St. Dominic in Cagli and in Ancona.

#### MS. TRADITION

Our *Officium Passionis Domini* is variously known as *Officium de cruce*, *Cursus de passione Domini*, *Hore de passione Domini*. Of the 38 codices of this Office five bear the name of St. Bonaventure, the rest being anonymous. Tradition indicates that the *Officium Passionis Domini* was composed by St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) at the request of Louis IX, king of France from 1226 to 1270. About this Office the Chronicle of the 24 Generals says: "Hic Generalis (Bonaventura) ad instantiam Domini et sancti Ludovici, regis Franciae officium devotissimum de cruce composuit."<sup>3</sup> One of the oldest manuscripts of the Office, *Codex Parisiensis 16309* of the fourteenth century, states on fol. 322r: "Incipit Officium sanctae crucis completum a fratre Bonaventura ad preces domini Ludovici."<sup>4</sup> We have, moreover, the testimony of Petrus Perusinus, Franciscus Samson and Marianus Florentinus to the effect that St. Bonaventure composed this Office. Its best manuscript is to be found in the *Brev. ms. Franciscanum saec. XIV* in *Codex Vaticanum 10.000*, edited in the *Opera Omnia*, T. VIII, pp. 152-158. The *Opera Omnia*, on pp. lxi-lxiii of the same volume, enumerates and identifies all of the extant manuscripts and collates seven of them with the text of the Vatican

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\* The church was named after Pietro da Verona who, on the very same site had established, in the year 1250, Ascoli's first Dominican foundation.

<sup>3</sup> *S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia* (Ad Claras Aquas, 1898), T. VIII, p. lxi.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

edition. The editors, on p. lxi, observe that "dolendum tamen est, quod codices inter se valde dissentiunt, ponentes differentes antiphonas et orationes; unde certe determinare non potuimus, quae lectio fuerit primitiva. Hae differentiae lectionum inde explicari possunt, quod multi sibi licere putaverint librum devotionis pro libitu accommodare proprio gustui." Indeed, one of the consistent manifestations of the Middle Ages is not only the amount of disparity found among the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth century Psalters, Breviaries, *Officia*, and Books of Hours, but in addition, the considerable duplication among them. In view of this, in the transcription of our *Officium Passionis Domini*, I have recorded some of its most prominent variants.

#### PHILOLOGICAL REMARKS

Considering its relatively late date of composition, c. 1320–1330, the *Officium Passionis Domini* is characterized, linguistically, by a general uniformity of phonological and morphological forms, and a considerable degree of standardization.

Although the vocalic evolution emerging from the loss of quantitative distinctions indicates a phonological development not unlike and even parallel to contemporary Italian and Romance texts, the *Officium* offers instances of morphological forms which exhibit a tendency to conservation rather than to change.

While the geographical provenance of the *Officium*, the mountainous region of the Marche, seems to account for the regular preservation of certain morphological forms, the manuscript offers nevertheless distinct examples of conventional Italian morphological evolution.

*Phonology.* *Hec* (f. 13<sup>r</sup>) is a quite normal spelling in late Latin, reflecting monophthongization of *ae* /ai/ to /e/. A perusal of vocalic developments in the text attests to a straightforward evolution to normal forms. Such Latin forms as *haec*, *animae*, *quae*, *aeternae*, *sanctae*, *praetium*, *poenas*, *foedari*, *coetibus*, tonic, protonic or postonic, are rendered as *hec*, *anime*, *que*, *eterne*, *sancte*, *pretium*, *penas*, *fedari*, *cetibus*. *Arundinem* (f. 15<sup>v</sup>) shows the loss of orthographic *h*, which is normal at this time, reflecting early loss in speech.

The adherence to the reproduction of normal vocalic evolution is broken, at times, by an unexplained appearance of conservatism. Next to expressions like *pro omnibus que retribuit mihi*, one finds also, for instance, *quae fidelis dare uelis*.

*Morphology.* The alternation in the text of *officium* – *offitium* probably evidences the assibilation of *t+yod*, i.e. *t+semivowel i*, to a /ts/ or /tʃ/ sound. *Annis* (f. 25<sup>v</sup>) for *annos* (after *quadráginta*) is an accusative of time replaced by ablative. This is a very frequent phenomenon in Late Latin with practical identity of both. *Loquetur ad eos* (f. 16<sup>v</sup>), is an analytic construction, very frequent in Vulgate; also *dixit me*, for *mihi* (f. 17<sup>r</sup>). *Nichilo* (f. 33<sup>r</sup>) for *nihilo*, is frequent in medieval Latin documents just as the form *michi* for *mihi*.

The standardization of phonological forms leads, in the manuscript, to the standardization of morphological ones. Phonetic Vulgar Latin mergers resulting from the obliteration of certain cases, and the fusion of others are well represented in the manuscript. The scribe establishes, for instance, no visible graphical difference between the nominative *terre* < *terrae* and the genitive of an expression such as *fines terre* < *fines terrae*.

It is, however, within the confines of normal morphological and syntactical forms that one finds most instances of erroneous spellings, vulgarisms or Italianisms, and outright syntactical blunders. Some notable examples of orthographical laxity are the following: f. 19<sup>v</sup>, *et milites plententes coronam de spinis* for *plectentes*; f. 28<sup>v</sup>, *in tabernaca tua* for *in tabernacula tua*; f. 25<sup>v</sup>, *Ihesu Christe angelorum decor gaudi et libertas* for *gaudium*; f. 16<sup>r</sup>, *te crucifixum colimus et toto corde possimus* for *poscimus*.

Examples of syntactical errors are the following: f. 18<sup>r</sup>, *dedi dilectam animam meam in manibus inimicorum* for *in manus*; f. 20<sup>r</sup>, *percutiebant capito ejus* for *caput ejus*; f. 23<sup>v</sup>, *cuius diximus* for *cui diximus*.

A pronounced tendency of the scribe is to neglect normal Vulgar Latin morphological forms for specific Italian developments. A few examples will suffice: f. 30<sup>r</sup>, *tollerasti*, It. *tollerasti*, from Latin *tolerasti*; f. 15<sup>v</sup>, *obprobria*, It. *obbrobrii*, from the Latin *opprobria*; on the other hand, the manuscript does not exhibit a conspicuously early Italian morphological development, the assimilation of the consonantal group – *ct* – into /tt/, e.g., *noctem* > *notte*, *pectus* > *petto*, *dictum* > *detto*. The scribe writes *actentius* f. 27<sup>v</sup>, *dimictis* f. 50<sup>v</sup>, *conuenuctu* f. 32<sup>r</sup>, but these are interesting hypercorrections, probably indicating that the – *ct* – consonant cluster had become – *tt* – in speech. We are in Italy!

The morphological departures we have made reference to are peculiar to our anonymous scribe, nor do they constitute an out-



standing exception. They are rather one more testimony of that process of linguistic metamorphosis which characterizes the Latin of the Italian peninsula from the tenth to the fourteenth century. The inconsistency in forms is probably due to the scribe's attempt to reach a certain measure of compromise between Latin traditionalism and Italian linguistic developments.

As the most popular devotional book of the later Middle Ages, the Book of Hours was primarily composed for the layman; although our Book contains the Office of the Passion, a most sacred theme, the scribe did not seem to have applied himself to the redaction of this private devotional tract as carefully as he might have to one destined for an aristocratic or wealthy family.

#### LITURGICAL CONTENT

The Church's two great liturgical actions are: the *Sacrificium*, celebrating the mystery of the Mass and reserved to the Clergy and the *Officium* (Divine Office), that is, the public prayer of the Church which since the earliest times of the Christian era was cultivated by the people.<sup>5</sup> The liturgical texts whose object was the essence of the liturgical action are fixed and immutable, redacted in an official formula which is identical for the whole Church since it expresses its doctrine. The liturgical texts that do not cut into the substance of the action of the cult have been left to the free composition of the single churches and sometimes of the faithful.

Whereas the Mass is fundamentally a single sacrificial rite, the Divine Office is a cycle of daily devotions. As early as the Apostolic period, the Divine Office (Canonical Office, *Cursus*, or *Horae*) evolved into a cycle of eight separate services or Hours for each day. The combining, in the Middle Ages, of these Hours and the Mass gave rise to a complete day of nine services disposed thus: Matins (*Matutinum*, 2:30 a.m.), Lauds (*Laudes*, 5 a.m.), Prime (*Prima*, 6 a.m.), Terce (*Tertia*, 9 a.m.), MASS (Missa), Sext (*Sexta*, 12 p.m.), None (*Nona*, 3 p.m.), Vespers (*Vesperae*, 4:30 p.m.), Compline (*Completorium*, 6 p.m.).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> C. Callewaert, "Rôle du peuple chrétien dans la célébration de l'office divin," *Sacris Erudiri* (Abbatia S. Petri, 1940), *passim*, pp. 196-99; A. M. Roguet, O.P., *The Liturgy of the Hours* (London, 1971), p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Dom Pierre Salmon, *L'Office divin* (Paris, 1959), pp. 12-18; also John

Patterned after the offices of the Canonical Hours, there developed in the Middle Ages, Books of Hours or *Horae* used for private devotions. Our *Officium Passionis Domini* is in the tradition of these Books of Hours.

### BOOK OF HOURS

In his monumental study on the origins and development of the Book of Hours, the distinguished medievalist Leroquais asks the question: « Qu'est-ce qu'un livre d'Heures? » He provides a succinct answer: "C'est un recueil d'office et de prières à l'usage des fidèles, un bréviaire à l'usage des laïques."<sup>7</sup> As the most popular devotional book of the later Middle Ages, the Book of Hours was the type of religious illuminated manuscript most frequently produced during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.<sup>8</sup> As a concise compendium of devotional texts to be used by the laity in private devotion the Book of Hours derives its name from the primary and central part of the book, the *Officium parvum Beatae Mariae Virginis*, the Little Office of the Blessed Virgin.<sup>9</sup> It was called an 'Hours' because it was at the *Horae Canonicae* — Matins, Lauds, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, and Compline — that the *Officium parvum Beatae Mariae Virginis* was read, although, unlike the Divine Office proper, the *Officium* contained one nocturn instead of three, and three lessons instead of the regular nine. This Hours of the Virgin is of medieval origin. Although it is first mentioned in the tenth century in connection with bishop Ulric of Augsburg, its earliest written texts are of the eleventh century,<sup>10</sup> when Peter Damian promoted its observance.

From the Carolingian period to the twelfth century the prayer book of the laity had been the Psalter. A document which is usually

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Plummer, *Liturgical Manuscripts for the Mass and the Divine Office* (New York, 1964), p. 32.

<sup>7</sup> Abbé V. Leroquais, *Les Livres d'Heures*, T. I (Paris, 1927), p. vi.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Perdrizet, *Le Calendrier Parisien à la fin du moyen âge* (Paris, 1933), pp. 12-13; also Leroquais, p. xii; G. Domel, *Die Entstehung des Gebetbuches und seine Ausstattung in Schrift, Bild und Schmuck bis zum Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Köln, 1921), p. 47.

<sup>9</sup> Leroquais, p. xvii; also Plummer, p. 46.

<sup>10</sup> Josef Stadlhuber, "Das Laienstundengebet vom Leiden Christi in Seinem Mittelalterlichen Fortleben," *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, 81-82 (1950), pp. 187-88; P. Batiffol, *Histoire du Bréviaire Romain* (Paris, 1911), p. 222; E. Bishop, *Liturgica Historica* (Oxford, 1918), p. 225.

attributed to Alcuin composes, for instance, *Officia per ferias* for the laity.<sup>11</sup> It was only in the late twelfth century, when the *Officium parvum Beatae Mariae Virginis* became part of the Psalter, that the Book of Hours acquired its basic characteristic components: the liturgical Calendar, the Little Office, the Penitential Psalms, the Litany, the Memorials to the saints, and the Office of the Dead. Later, with the dropping of the Psalter, the Psalter-Hours book transformed itself in the traditional Book of Hours we have come to know. Moreover, the Book was enriched by the addition of many supplementary texts, such as offices and prayers to the Deity and to individual saints, which varied according to the use of each diocese or the desires of the customer.

The Book of Hours soon became extremely popular as a simple and personal instrument of private devotion. "Since the Divine Office itself is very complicated in structure and its observance requires the concentration of the clergy, the devout layman found a substitute in the simpler, almost unvarying observances composing the Book of Hours."<sup>12</sup> Indeed, by the middle of the fourteenth century every middle class family needed a breviary or a Book of Hours; at times, on the fly leaves at the beginning and at the end of it, significant events in the family history were recorded: marriages, births, baptisms, deaths. The Book of Hours was more or less luxurious, bound perhaps in a rich binding, and illustrated with elaborate miniatures, sometimes by great artists, according to the money available. The miniatures occur at the opening of each 'Hour,' — Matins, Lauds, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, Compline — or of the various parts of the book (Office of the Cross, of the Holy Spirit, of the Dead etc.)

Although the *Officium parvum Beatae Mariae Virginis* remained throughout the one essential text of the Book of Hours, soon it became enriched by the addition of the Hours of the Cross. To be sure, the events of Christ's Passion occupied already a place in the

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<sup>11</sup> P.L., CI, 509-612. In col. 509, we read: "Sed quia vos rogastis, ut scriberemus vobis breviarium commatico sermone, qualiter homo qui adhuc in activa vita consistit, per dinumeratas horas has Deo supplicare debeat et licet vos, qui Christiano ordine vivitis... non ignoratis qualiter Domino supplicetur: sed quia rogastis dicemus breviter quod sentimus."

<sup>12</sup> John Plummer, *The Hours of Catherine of Cleves* (New York n. d.), p. 9; H. Leclercq, "Livres d'Heures" in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, T. IX (Paris, 1930), pp. 1836-38.

Little Office of the Virgin since the Passion according to John came to be very early part of it. Before long, however, the custom arose to formalize the commemoration of the Passion by the redaction and inclusion in the Little Office of the Virgin, of the Hours of the Cross. At the beginning it was a short Office without psalms, lessons or responses, such as the *parvus ordo de cruce* (lat. 1425) mentioned by Leroquais.<sup>13</sup> Soon it becomes a regular Office variously titled *ordo magnus de cruce*, *officium sanctissime passionis D.N.I.C.*, *magnum officium crucifixi*, or *officium parvum S. Crucis*; and it is beginning with the end of the thirteenth century and the early years of the fourteenth that one finds the Office of the Passion in the Book of Hours, to the extent that, for all the textual dominance of devotions to Mary, the idea of the Passion of Christ plays, devotionally and iconographically, the dominant role.<sup>14</sup> The last stage in the development of these *officia passionis* was their linking with the Hours themselves, achieving at times a paraliturgical status. Such is the case of our fourteenth-century *Officium Passionis Domini*.

Although the linking of the hours with the various phases of Christ's Passion had been a private devotional practice since the early years of the Christian era,<sup>15</sup> it was only at some later date that an episode of the Passion was allegorically allotted to each hour. This association of the Office with the Passion was already made by Rabanus Maurus in his *De clericorum institutione*.<sup>16</sup> From then on the idea reappears constantly. The distribution of the various parts of the Passion into the canonical hours which was so easy for the early Middle Ages soon led to the mention of this practice in the accounts of the Passion.<sup>17</sup> A widely disseminated and much copied Latin meditation became the pseudo-Beda *De meditatione passionis Christi per septem diei horas libellus*;<sup>18</sup> the same division is followed in the Passion section of the *Meditationes Vitae Christi* of the pseudo-Bonaventure, — though its main structure is that of the days of the

<sup>13</sup> Leroquais, *op. cit.*, p. xxvi.

<sup>14</sup> Stadlhuber, pp. 296–305.

<sup>15</sup> Joseph A. Jungmann, S.J., *The Early Liturgy* (Notre Dame Ind., 1959), pp. 98–104; Rosemary Woolf, *The English Religious Lyric in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1968), p. 235.

<sup>16</sup> *P.L.*, CVII, 327–29.

<sup>17</sup> Stadlhuber, p. 310; also L. M. F. Daniëls, "Van den Seven Ghetijden der Passion onses Heren," in *Ons Geestelijk Erf*, 16 (Antwerpen, 1942), pp. 186–235.

<sup>18</sup> *P.L.*, XCIV, 561–68.



week — and also in the Passion section of Ludolf the Carthusian's *Vita Iesu Christi*. A Passion arranged according to the canonical hours of the day is Anselm's *Dialogus beatae Mariae et Anselmi de Passione Domini*<sup>19</sup> and so is Bernard's *Liber de Passione Christi et doloribus et planctibus Matris ejus*.<sup>20</sup>

It was, specifically, a new *Zeitgeist*, a more intense medieval interest in Christ's Passion that brought about the creation of the various *Officia passionis Domini*, their insertion in the Book of Hours, and their eventual linking with the Hours themselves. A really momentous event in the development of medieval Christocentric piety was the appearance of new mystical forces around the turn of the millenium with their emphasis on the personal and emotional implications of the Passion. One looks less at Christ in his completed work and more at Christ incarnate, at his earthly life and suffering. The *person* of Jesus steps ever more into the foreground, it becomes so to speak more tangible, sensual.<sup>21</sup> This reveals itself particularly clearly in the visual arts<sup>22</sup> and the poetry of the languages.<sup>23</sup> The contemplation of Christ, the suffering human, becomes the Christ image of the Middle Ages;<sup>24</sup> even before the eleventh century the contemplation of the sufferings of the Lord assumes a large role in the Benedictine monasteries<sup>25</sup> and out of this attitude arises a whole number of prayers, hymns, invocations and meditations for the veneration of Christ's Passion.<sup>26</sup>

To be sure, although serious attempts at rendering accounts of

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, CLIX, 271-290.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, CLXXXII, 1133-1142.

<sup>21</sup> J. A. Jungmann, S.J., "Die Stellung Christi im Liturgischen Gebet," *Liturgiegeschichte Forschungen*, 7-8 (Münster, 1925); F. Heiler, *Das Gebet* (München, 1923), p. 242.

<sup>22</sup> L. Gougaud, *Dévotions et pratiques ascétique du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1925), pp. 74-78.

<sup>23</sup> H. Hatzfeld, "Liturgie und Volksfrömmigkeit in den südromanischen Dichtersprachen des Mittelalters," *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft*, 13 (1933), 65-74 and ff.

<sup>24</sup> E. Dumoutet, *Le Christ selon la Chair et la Vie liturgique au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1932).

<sup>25</sup> U. Berlière, *L'ascèse bénédictine des origines à la fin du xii<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1927).

<sup>26</sup> Extremely popular are such works as Rabanus Maurus's *De passione Domini*, P.L., CXII, 1425-1430, and Candidus Bruun's *De Passione Domini*, P.L., CVI, 57-104; on the subject see also Gougaud, *op. cit.*, "Les antécédents de la Dévotion au Sacré-Coeur," pp. 74-78.

Christ's Passion appeared in the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries, they lacked sensitive human accents. Iconography and liturgy are primarily interested in celebrating the *Verbum*, the triumphant Divinity, the crucified Victor, the source of life and salvation; in literature, such works as Ambrose's *De Passione Domini*, Sedulius' *A solis ortus cardine* and Fortunatus' *Vexilla regis prodeunt* celebrate ontologically the atemporal and eternal meaning of the Passion, they celebrate Christ *in sancta cruce* rather than *in parasceve*, their theme was not the Passion, but the stupendous triumph: *Pange lingua gloriosi proelium certaminis*.

The truly lasting and effective new forces in the formulation of a Christocentric piety are, as I have had occasion to indicate,<sup>27</sup> the mystical concentration on Christ's human sufferings as articulated by St. Anselm and St. Bernard. It was St. Anselm (1033-1109) who supplied the theological and theoretical justification for Christ's sufferings through a new interpretation of the necessity of the Redemption. In the *Cur Deus Homo*, a Christological treatise reminiscent of those of the second to fifth centuries, St. Anselm emphasizes the true significance of the humanity of Christ by stressing that the redemptive act took place on a human level.

The devotion to Christ's Passion fostered by the delicate sensibility of St. Anselm finds its greatest expression in the concentrated pathos devoted to it by St. Bernard (1091-1153). An unremitting love for Jesus crucified was the focal point of St. Bernard's life and the guide for his interior feelings and emotions: "haec mea sublimior interim philosophia, scire Jesum, et hunc crucifixum."<sup>28</sup> St. Bernard's treatment of Christ's suffering found a new strain of spirituality for, as Pourrat points out, his writings "dès le XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, orientèrent les coeurs vers les mystères de la vie terrestre, en particulier vers ceux de sa naissance et de sa passion."<sup>29</sup> The Christocentric

<sup>27</sup> Sandro Sticca, *The Latin Passion Play: Its Origins and Development* (Albany, 1970), pp. 42-43.

<sup>28</sup> P.L., CLXXXIII, St. Bernard, *Sermones in Cantica*, Sermo XLIII, 4, col. 995. St. Bernard seems to be echoing St. Paul's "Non enim iudicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Iesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum." (*Ad Corinthios*, I:2-3).

<sup>29</sup> P. Pourrat, *La spiritualité chrétienne* 2 vols. (Paris, 1947-51), II, 481; Felix Vernet, *La spiritualité médiévale* (Paris, 1929), p. 18; Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 243, writes that "à partir surtout de la seconde moitié du siècle, [XII<sup>e</sup>] la spiritualité devient plus individualiste, plus sensible et plus 'dévoté,' plus portée à la méditation du Christ souffrant et crucifié qu'à celle de sa résurrection ou de sa Passion."

mysticism of St. Anselm and St. Bernard soon acquired a religious universality by being incorporated into the common body of Christian opinion, and medieval spirituality came to know Christ with a more delicate intimacy and dwelt primarily on his Passion.

The two most important works in understanding the Christocentric piety of the Middle Ages are in fact St. Anselm's *Dialogus Mariae et Anselmi de Passione Domini* and St. Bernard's *Liber de Passione Domini*.<sup>30</sup> Although they were originally intended for contemplatives, manuscript tradition attests to their popularity and to their rapid diffusion and dissemination. By the middle of the thirteenth century, copies of the *Dialogus* could be found in practically every monastic library in Europe. An even greater popularity was enjoyed by the *Liber de Passione* in nearly every Western European country; in England alone, the *Liber* survives in at least twenty-three manuscripts.<sup>31</sup> Examples of this popularity are provided by the persuasive influence they exercised on English medieval religious lyric, on drama and on the iconography of the Passion.<sup>32</sup>

Of significant importance in the understanding of Christocentric piety in the Middle Ages is the contribution made to it by the Franciscan mystics, especially St. Francis (1181-1226) and St. Bonaventure (1221-1274). In particular, the Franciscans influenced the people and created a path for their conception of the suffering Redeemer.<sup>33</sup> The spirituality of St. Francis is distinctly affective, and fundamentally devotional and popular,<sup>34</sup> exhibiting a most human and intimate approach to the divine mysteries, the Passion in particular. Love for Christ crucified stirred St. Francis's soul, and it was a love which, governed by compassion, incited him to a participation in His sufferings. Participation in Christ's Passion was a cherished

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On the history of the devotion to the humanity of Christ see P. C. Richstätter, S.J., *Christusfrömmigkeit in ihrer historischen Entfaltung. Ein quellenmassiger Beitrag zur Geschichte des Gebetes und des mystischen Innenleben der Kirche* (Cologne, 1949).

<sup>30</sup> For the *Dialogus* and the *Liber* see my references above.

<sup>31</sup> Woolf, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

<sup>32</sup> For the lyric consult Woolf, especially Chaps. ii and vii; for the *Drama*, Sticca in Chapt. ii; for the iconography see F. P. Pickering, *Literature and Art in the Middle Ages* (Florida, 1970), Chap. v.

<sup>33</sup> K. A. Kneller, *Geschichte der Kreuzwegandacht* (Freiburg, 1908), pp. 47 ff.

<sup>34</sup> Alfonso Pompei, "L'influenza religioso-sociale di San Francesco e della sua primitiva fraternità nel secolo XIII," *Miscellanea Francescana*, 66 (1966), p. 200.

ideal for St. Francis<sup>35</sup> and indeed the sufferings of the Redeemer upon the Cross are for every Franciscan "the centre of all man's hope of salvation, his only consolation, his sorrow and his delight."<sup>36</sup>

Extremely important in transmitting the influence of St. Anselm, St. Bernard and St. Francis are such mystics as St. Bonaventure whose writings constitute the culmination of a homiletic trend towards pietism and human realism. The *Meditationes Vitae Christi*, in particular, long attributed to St. Bonaventure but now ascribed to the Franciscan friar Joannes de Caulibus, had a profound influence on the drama and plastic arts of the later Middle Ages.<sup>37</sup> By enlarging the bare outlines of canonical narrative, by inventing and investing new scenes of the Passion with concrete detail, the *Meditationes* pass over dogma in order to represent a personal and poignant human experience for the pious to contemplate.

These theological, mystical and devotional forces necessarily had literary, liturgical as well as iconographical consequences. One of the literary consequences was, as it has recently been shown, the dramatization, in the twelfth century, of Christ's Passion.<sup>38</sup> In liturgy the consequences were just as pronounced and remarkable. The prayers in the liturgy of the old Church prove unequivocally that the redemption was the center of the daily devotions. In the development of the Middle Ages, it soon becomes apparent that through the influence of mystical Christocentric writings, the direction in the daily devotions of the laity is narrowed from the Redemption in its entirety to the person of the suffering Redeemer.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the thought of the Passion of Christ is enlarged from the daily de-

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<sup>35</sup> A most extended and learned analysis of St. Francis's Passion piety is found in P. Oktavian von Rieden, "Das Leiden Christi im Leben des Hl. Franziskus von Assisi. Eine Quellenvergleichende Untersuchung im Lichte der zeitgenössischen Passionfrömmigkeit," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 30 (1960), 5-30; 129-145; 241-263; 353-397.

<sup>36</sup> J. F. Raby, *A History of Christian Poetry* (Oxford, 1927), p. 423; Amedée P. De Zedelgem, "Aperçu historique sur la dévotion au chemin de la Croix," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 18-19 (1948-49), 45-142.

<sup>37</sup> I will limit myself to a few references on the subject: Emile Mâle, *L'Art religieux de la fin du moyen âge* (Paris, 1946); P. Livario Oliger, O.F.M., "Le *Meditationes Vitae Christi*," *Studi Francescani*, 8 (1922) 18-47; Lawrence G. Craddock, O.F.M., "Franciscan Influence on Early English Drama," *Franciscan Studies*, 10 (1950), 383-417.

<sup>38</sup> Sticca, *op. cit.*, Chap. ii.

<sup>39</sup> Stadlhuber, p. 288.



votions to the entire *Cursus*. Particularly as regards the Books of Hours one witnesses a narrowing of the conceptual content and an expansion of the concern for the Passion of Christ throughout all hours of the day <sup>40</sup> with the person of Christ as a suffering human standing in the center in place of the Redemption.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the mystical and devotional forces that have been described were the seedbed towards the emergence of a theology and Christology of suffering (*Leidenstheologie*) that profoundly influenced the development of representational art in the Middle Ages, and contributed to the origin of late medieval realism. As the distinguished art historian F. P. Pickering had occasion to remark: "It is a fact of textual and iconographical history that what the many visionaries of the later Middle Ages saw, coincides for the greater part with what Anselm in his *Dialogus* and Bonaventura in the *Meditations* had already related." <sup>42</sup>

Chronologically, one of the first results of this *Leidenstheologie* was a new trend in the iconography of Christ on the Cross.<sup>43</sup> From the fifth century to the beginning of the eleventh the prevalent type of the Crucified, in Europe, is the *Christus triumphans*, the Pantocrator. This type shows Christ alive on the Cross, with his eyes open, the body erect and without signs of pain to indicate the triumphant and divine qualities of Christ. From the eleventh century on a second type becomes increasingly common: expressing suffering and human nature, Christ is now represented dead on the Cross, eyes closed, head lowered, the body slightly bent in a rhythmic curve, and blood and water issuing from his wounded side.<sup>44</sup> Art too appears to be exploiting and conveying the deep emotion that meditations on Christ's sacrifice has aroused at that time both in literature and liturgy. It is not surprising, therefore, in view of their contemporary Passion attitudes, that the redactor or redactors of our Book of Hours

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>41</sup> Hatzfeld, pp. 75-99.

<sup>42</sup> Pickering, pp. 279-80.

<sup>43</sup> Gabriel Millet, *L'iconographie de l'évangile* (Paris, 1916), p. 398; Paul Thoby, *Le crucifix des origines au concile de Trente* (Nantes, 1959), p. 79.

<sup>44</sup> M. Didron, *Iconographie chrétienne* (Paris, 1843), p. 235; J. R. Martin, "The Dead Christ on the Cross in Byzantine Art," in *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of Albert Mathias Friend, Jr.* (Princeton, 1955), p. 189; Victor Leroquais, *Les sacramentaires et les missels manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1924), I, p. xxxv.

should have decided to incorporate in it that most devout of St. Bonaventure's Christocentric tracts, the *Officium Passionis Domini*, and later, should have wished to express visually in the illumination of the text with Passion scenes, what the pseudo-Bonaventure had so piously and vividly described in the Passion section of the *Meditationes Vitae Christi*. And it is precisely the iconography of Christ's Passion illustrated in 16 miniatures that constitutes one of the most striking and distinct features of our *Officium Passionis Domini*.

### THE MINIATURES

As the distribution of the miniatures in the text is directly related to the disposition of the Hours, the liturgical content of our *Officium Passionis Domini* is of interest from a religious and artistic viewpoint. More specifically, the determining and distinguishing features of this Office are as follows:

*Matins:* ff. 13<sup>r</sup>–22<sup>v</sup>.

<i>Inuitatorium.</i>	Christum captum
<i>Psalmus.</i>	Uenite exultemus domino
<i>Ymnus.</i>	In passione Domini
<i>Antiphona.</i>	Insurrexerunt in me
<i>Psalmus.</i>	Quare fremuerunt gentes
<i>Lectio I.</i>	Apprehendit Pilatus Ihesum
<i>Lectio II.</i>	Susceperunt autem milites
<i>Lectio III.</i>	Postea sacens Ihesu

*Lauds:* ff. 22<sup>v</sup>–26<sup>r</sup>.

<i>Antiphona.</i>	Contumelias
<i>Psalmus.</i>	Usque quod dominus obliuisceris
<i>Capitulum.</i>	Spiritus oris nostri
<i>Ymnus.</i>	Christum ducem
<i>Antiphona.</i>	Proprio filio suo non pepercit
<i>Psalmus.</i>	Benedictus dominus deus

*Prime:* ff. 27<sup>v</sup>–30<sup>v</sup>.

<i>Ymnus.</i>	Tu qui velatus facie
<i>Antiphona.</i>	Faciem meam
<i>Psalmus.</i>	Iudica me deus
<i>Capitulum.</i>	Recogitate eum

<i>Terce:</i>	ff. 31 <sup>v</sup> –34 <sup>r</sup> .	
	<i>Ymnus.</i>	Hora qui ductus tertia
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Dominus, tanquam ouis ductus est
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	Exaudi deus orationem meam
	<i>Capitulum.</i>	Christus passus est pro nobis
<i>Sext:</i>	ff. 35 <sup>v</sup> –38 <sup>r</sup> .	
	<i>Ymnus.</i>	Crucem pro nobis subiit
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Posuerunt supra capito
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	Credidi propter quod locutus sum
	<i>Capitulum.</i>	Tradebant autem
<i>None:</i>	ff. 38 <sup>v</sup> –42 <sup>r</sup> .	
	<i>Ymnus.</i>	Beata Christi passio
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Cum accepisset Ihesus
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	Uoce mea ad dominum
	<i>Capitulum.</i>	Decebat enim propter
<i>Vespers:</i>	ff. 43 <sup>v</sup> –47 <sup>r</sup> .	
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Dignus es domine
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	Exaltabo te, Domine
	<i>Capitulum.</i>	Uidemus Ihesu propter passionem
	<i>Ymnus.</i>	Qui pressura
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Recessit pastor bonus
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	Magnificat anima mea dominum
<i>Compline:</i>	ff. 47 <sup>v</sup> –51 <sup>v</sup> .	
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Plangent eum
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	Beatus qui intellegit
	<i>Ymnus.</i>	Qui iacuisti mortuus
	<i>Capitulum.</i>	Christo in carne passo
	<i>Antiphona.</i>	Saluator mundi
	<i>Psalmus.</i>	[Canticum Simeonis] Nunc dimittis

The *Antiphons* for Matins and Lauds are taken from the Office of *Tenebrae* for Good Friday (*Feria vi in Parasceve*). The name of *Tenebrae* has been given to the Matins and Lauds of the last three days of Holy Week. *Tenebrae* is essentially a gradual extinguishing of lights, (fifteen candles, fourteen yellow and one white), during the celebration of the night service between midnight and dawn. "In the ninth century this service was simply called nocturns, but today

it is called matins, and the ninth-century matins has been renamed lauds."<sup>45</sup> The other *Antiphons* of the Office are taken variously from the evening office of Holy Week. Manuscript tradition attests to the wide popularity of St. Bonaventure's *Officium Passionis Domini*, its text being used not only for inclusion in various Books of Hours and liturgical motets,<sup>46</sup> but also, as we shall see, as a source material for iconographical Passion cycles.

The traditional cycle of illustrated miniatures of the Office of the Passion in the Books of Hours was generally the following:

<i>Matutinum:</i>	Judas' Betrayal
<i>Laudes:</i>	Jesus before Pilate
<i>Prima:</i>	The Flagellation
<i>Tertia:</i>	Bearing of the Cross
<i>Sexta:</i>	Christ on the Cross
<i>Nona:</i>	Descent from the Cross
<i>Vesperas:</i>	Entombment
<i>Completorium:</i>	Resurrection

The variety of Passion events depicted by the miniaturist of our *Officium* demanded a different disposition and a slight departure from traditional Passion cycles, providing, with the exception of the Matins' Invitatory, two miniatures for each Hour. The sequence runs thus:

<i>Inuitatorium:</i>	f. 13 <sup>v</sup> . Christ's Agony in the Garden [Pl. 6]
<i>Ad matutinum:</i>	f. 18 <sup>v</sup> . Judas' Betrayal [Pl. 7]
» »	f. 19 <sup>r</sup> . Jesus taken away by the soldiers [Pl. 8]
<i>Ad laudes:</i>	f. 24 <sup>v</sup> . Jesus before Annas [Pl. 9]
» »	f. 25 <sup>r</sup> . Jesus, hands tied, taken to Caiaphas [Pl. 10]
<i>Ad primam:</i>	f. 26 <sup>v</sup> . Jesus before Caiaphas [Pl. 11]
» »	f. 27 <sup>r</sup> . Buffeting and Mocking of Jesus [Pl. 12]
<i>Ad tertiam:</i>	f. 30 <sup>v</sup> . Jesus before Pilate [Pl. 13]
» »	f. 31 <sup>r</sup> . Flagellation of Jesus [Pl. 14]

<sup>45</sup> O. B. Hardison, Jr., "The Lenten Agon," in his *Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 117-18; see also Gueranger, *Liturgical Year*, VI, 301-316; for medieval descriptions of the *Tenebrae* see Amalarius, *Liber officialis*, P.L., CV, 1202 b-d.

<sup>46</sup> Jacqueline A. Mattfeld, "Some Relationships between Texts and *Cantus Firmi* in the Liturgical Motets of Josquin des Pres," *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 14 (1961), pp. 175-76.



<i>Ad sextam:</i>	f. 34 <sup>v</sup> . Jesus, blindfolded, before Herod [Pl. 15]
»      »	f. 35 <sup>r</sup> . Jesus bearing the Cross [Pl. 16]
<i>Ad nonam:</i>	f. 38 <sup>v</sup> . The Denudation (stripping) of Jesus [Pl. 17]
»      »	f. 39 <sup>r</sup> . Jesus on the Cross [Pl. 18]
<i>Ad vesp̄eras:</i>	f. 42 <sup>v</sup> . Longinus strikes Jesus' side [Pl. 19]
»      »	f. 43 <sup>r</sup> . Deposition from the Cross [Pl. 20]
<i>Ad completorium:</i>	f. 47 <sup>v</sup> . Mary's Lamentation [Pl. 21]

Although Compline appears to be the only Hour in our Office to have been allotted one miniature instead of two, one soon realizes that this does not constitute either a significant departure or a glaring oversight on the miniaturist's part. It can be rather easily explained by the fact that Mary's Lamentation is a combination of two miniatures in one. It has been shown for instance, that the Byzantine Lamentation (*Threnos*) developed directly from the Entombment scene<sup>47</sup> and that the Byzantine Entombment forms are the principal sources of medieval Italian Entombment and Lamentations.<sup>48</sup> Since at this time, as our discussion will show later on, the Entombment and Lamentation motifs had merged into a single iconographic type, our miniaturist too, chose to combine two essentially different scenes into one. Thus Compline too, like all the other Hours, may be said to contain two miniatures.

Considering the relationship that has existed in every century between the power of the time and that of the man, it would be instructive to indicate at this point that the region of Marches — the place of origin of our *Officium Passionis Domini* — through the years, has reflected, on the artistic level, the marginal and restricted conditions that its geographical position gave to it. Since the year 752, when the region was donated by Pippin to the Church, the Marches experienced one political domination after the other. Although it acquired a measure of political identity during the time of the Signorie, in the Renaissance — with the Malatesta governing Fano and Pesaro; the Montefeltro, Urbino; the Della Rovere, Urbino and Cagli; the Varano, Camerino; the Chiavelli, Fabriano — the Marches was soon ravaged by the invasions of Francesco Sforza,

<sup>47</sup> K. Weitzmann, "The Origin of the Threnos," in *De Artibus Opuscula XL: Essays in Honor of Erwin Panofsky*, ed., M. Meiss (New York, 1961), I, 476-90.

<sup>48</sup> Don Denny, "Notes on the Avignon Pietà," *Speculum*, 44 (1969), p. 218.

Cesare Borgia, and Lorenzino de' Medici. Finally, when the long reign of Francesco Maria II (1574-1631) ended without heirs, the region was absorbed by the Church, which governed it through its cardinals.

Culturally, too, the Marches finds itself, through the centuries, in a position of receptivity, always open to various artistic stimuli from different centers from Italy and abroad. Particularly in the Gothic period, its culture reflects the general diffusion of the Giotto revolution amply documented and illustrated in its churches. Even Allegretto Nuzi (1315-1373), the Marches' earliest famous native painter, translates in festive decorations what he had learned under his Florentine master Bernardo Daddi. On the whole the Marches felt, in this period, the influence of the Byzantine school of the Venetians Guglielmo, Paolo and Lorenzo, the Sienese of Andrea di Bartolo and Luca di Tomme, and the popular current of Andrea of Bologna. It is only in the Late-Gothic period, end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries, that one witnesses the possibility or even the dawn of an original artistic discourse in the works of local artists such as Carlo da Camerino, Arcangelo di Cola, and the brothers Salimbeni from St. Saverino.

In an article describing some recent acquisitions by the Boston Public Library, Zoltán Haraszti devotes a few lines to our *Officium* indicating that it constitutes a rare example of the artistic production of the Marches which did not produce 'great' art. He then continues by stating that

Byzantine characteristics had lingered on especially in the more remote towns, the churches of which possess many little-known frescoes. It is with these frescoes — crudely realistic, yet not without sweetness — that the miniatures of the Library's volume have a kinship.<sup>49</sup>

Haraszti's brief aesthetic judgment correctly identifies some of the traditional Byzantine features of the miniatures; a fuller assessment of their artistic value can only be gained, however, by means of a detailed analysis of their style and iconography.

One of the first impressions created by the miniatures is that they are indeed crudely realistic, the style being relatively unpolished: crude and vigorous rather than refined and courtly. But although these miniatures are not of especial artistic interest as to quality in

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<sup>49</sup> Zoltan Haraszti, "Notable Purchases," *Boston Public Library Quarterly*, 6-7 (1954-55), p. 75.

the traditional aesthetic sense, they do possess stylistic and iconographic features which, although provincial and 'crude', may be of interest to art historians. The figure-to-field relationship is, for instance, unusual as to the size of the figures. The characters fill the frames completely, and indeed, they break the frames in several instances. Thus, spears, torches, clubs, lances, etc., break the frame in about 9 of the miniatures, the arms of the men who flagellate Christ extend outside of the picture space (f. 31<sup>r</sup>) and so do the whipping column and flogging ropes; the arms of the Cross Christ bears break the frame (f. 35<sup>r</sup>) and so does Longinus' lance (f. 42<sup>v</sup>) in the Crucifixion and Joseph's ladder (f. 42<sup>r</sup>) in the Deposition etc. These accents tend to give the scenes a heightened sense of 'immediacy'; by breaking the frame, the artist suggests (figuratively speaking) that the events enter into the realm of the viewer. There is a concerted effort to elaborate the narrative force of the pictorial cycle. In this our miniaturist clearly shows himself a man of the times; he is part of that late medieval piety, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with its concern rhetorically and pictorially for stark realism. As Gertrude Schiller so cogently puts it in her monumental work on the *Iconography of Christian Art*:

Biblical events are no longer interpreted; they are brought home to the spectator in a personal, visual confrontation. This relationship, in which the believer, in his meditations, follows Christ's way to the Cross, is reflected in pictorial realism. The passages devoted to the Passion in the *Meditationes vitae Christi*, a work written by a Franciscan, which was quickly taken up and widely read, describes the events realistically and exhorts the reader spiritually to absorb what he sees... The artistic realism of this period is best explained as a reflection of that brand of piety which was concerned to present biblical events as occurring in the sphere of every day. Realistic presentation was, moreover, sometimes so heightened that it took on an expressionistic character.<sup>50</sup>

Significantly enough it is precisely the *Meditationes Vitae Christi* of the pseudo-Bonaventure that the Officium's miniaturist seems to have had in mind as he illustrated the Passion pictorial narrative. Iconographically, particularly noteworthy and somewhat unusual is the miniaturist's concern with scenes of the 'leading' of Christ (*ductio*). The manuscript shows this after the Arrest (f. 19<sup>r</sup>) and after the presentation before Annas (f. 25<sup>r</sup>), where Christ is led to Caiaphas. These

<sup>50</sup> Gertrude Schiller, *Iconography of Christian Art*, 2 vols., Janet Seligman, trans. (New York, 1972), II, 11-12.

scenes of leading are not 'canonical liturgical' events, and are not commonly depicted. Their inclusion may reflect an interest in narrative continuity, and also contemporary concern with the fact that Christ's suffering was enhanced by His continual leading back and forth. Christ's peregrinations to Annas, Caiaphas, Pilate and Herod, together with their attendant suffering and tribulations had been vividly and visually described in the *Meditationes Vitae Christi*:

Ducitur, et reducitur; spuitur, et reprobatur; volvitur, et circumflectitur huc atque illuc tamquam stultus, et stultissime imbecillis... modo ad Annam, modo ad Caiapham, modo ad Pilatum, modo ad Herodem, et iterum ad Pilatum, et ibidem modo intus, modo foris ducitur et attrahitur. Deus meus! quid est hoc? Nonne tibi videtur hoc durissimum, amarissimum, et continuum, et magnum bellum?<sup>51</sup>

That the miniaturist followed the Passion text of the *Meditationes* will become more apparent later in the description of the single miniatures. But there are other reasons why the pseudo-Bonaventure's Passion account should have been the pattern for our miniaturist. Since Bonaventure's rhythmic *Officium Passionis Domini* constitutes the basic text of our entire Office it is not surprising that the illustrator should have turned for inspiration, in the illustration of his text, to another work attributed to St. Bonaventure. Secondly, it is the *opinio communis* of the art historians, to be found in every handbook, that the pseudo-Bonaventure's *Meditationes* influenced the iconography of virtually any incident in the Passion story.<sup>52</sup> But perhaps even more important are the historical considerations. It is now believed that the *Meditationes* was written in the first years of the fourteenth century by a Franciscan, Joannes de Caulibus, living in the town of St. Gemignano in Tuscany.<sup>53</sup> This is an extremely important fact for it not only places, chronologically, the composition of the *Meditationes* at about the same time our *Officium* was redacted but also points out the close geographical proximity of the two since the Marches borders with Tuscany. And it is not without historical

<sup>51</sup> A. C. Peltier, ed., *S. Bonaventurae Meditationes Vitae Christi in Opera Omnia* (Parisiis, 1868), XII, 599-600.

<sup>52</sup> Pickering, *op. cit.*, p. 240; also Etienne Gilson, "Saint Bonaventure et l'Iconographie de la Passion," *Revue d'Histoire Franciscaine*, I (1924), 405-424; Emile Mâle, *L'art religieux de la fin du moyen âge en France* (Paris, 1922), pp. 27 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Oligier, *loc. cit.*, *Studi Francescani*, 7 (1921), 173-181.



significance either that a fourteenth-century Italian manuscript of the famous *Meditationes Vitae Christi*, copiously illustrated, exhibits artistic characteristics attributed by the volume's editors to the region of Siena or Pisa,<sup>54</sup> cities in Tuscany. Already from the years 1330 we have an Italian Passion in *ottava rima* which draws abundantly from the *Meditationes*.<sup>55</sup> It is not unlikely that like the illustrator of the Italian manuscript and the composer of the Passion poem, our miniaturist too, was one of the first artists to have drawn inspiration, immediately after its appearance, from one of the most popular and realistic accounts of the Passion ever written.

Outside of immediate textual influences our *Officium* possesses other distinct iconographical features. The depiction of the Crowning with Thorns (f. 27<sup>r</sup>) with Christ at one side (left) is relatively unusual; Christ is usually in the center amidst His tormentors. The scene of Pilate ordering the flagellation (f. 30<sup>v</sup>) is also relatively rare; the miniaturist is following here very close the Passion account of the *Meditationes* for there it is clearly stated that Pilate "iussit autem eum durissime flagellari."<sup>56</sup> Once again there seem to be some preoccupation with narrative continuity and fulness, as also in the scene of Herod's sentencing (f. 34<sup>v</sup>) which precedes the Bearing of the Cross. One of the most singular and unusual features of our *Officium* Passion cycle is offered by the representation of Christ blindfolded in His sentence (f. 34<sup>v</sup>), bearing of the cross (f. 35<sup>r</sup>), and even as His robe is removed (f. 38<sup>v</sup>). None of this is justified in the usual stream of the narrative and it is hard to imagine how one would carry the cross in this state. Our miniaturist, however, was not too perturbed by these inconsistencies since he had found the idea of Christ's blindfolding prominently discussed in the *Meditationes*. But it is the idea of *ducitur*, which occurs extremely often in the *Meditationes* Passion narrative and which is even present in the description of Christ on His way to Calvary, "...tunc venerabile lignum crucis longum, et grossum, et multum grave ponunt super humeros ejus... et tunc *ducitur* et *acceleratur*..."<sup>57</sup> that so impressed itself on the mind of our miniaturist, that he felt sure that Christ was led to Calvary blindfolded. So closely and unquestioningly did he follow the narrative.

<sup>54</sup> Isa Ragusa and Rosalie B. Green, eds. and trans. *Meditations on the Life of Christ* (Princeton, 1961), p. xxix.

<sup>55</sup> Oliger, p. 170.

<sup>56</sup> Peltier, p. 603.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 605.

One last example of pictorial realism is the Deposition (f. 43<sup>r</sup>) which is affective and effective in its representation of Christ's body bent backwards over Joseph of Arimathea's shoulder. This rather forcibly expresses Christ's death in physical terms. The above are some of the general characteristics of the *Officium's* pictorial Passion cycle. It is time now to examine each miniature individually.

CHRIST'S AGONY IN THE GARDEN. The Holy Office is normally begun with an Invitatory. This consists in the verse *Domine, labia mea aperies: Et os meum annuntiabit laudem tuam*. This invitatory daily invites the faithful to sing the praises of the Lord. Fittingly enough, our illustrator, attaches the first miniature (f. 13<sup>r</sup>), Christ in the Garden, to the invitatory prayer for, just as the Invitatory should begin the whole sequence of daily prayer, so too the scene showing Christ in prayer is a worthy beginning in the commemoration of His Passion events. At the same time, both the Invitatory prayer and the miniature constitute a spiritual and visual invitation, to the reader, to pray and later to suffer and sacrifice with Christ in His passion. The miniaturist may have had in mind the passage in the *Meditationes Vitae Christi* where, its author too, attaches the Christ in the Garden scene to the *ante matutinum* period and clearly exhorts the reader to pray and to consider chronologically from the beginning of the Passion at this moment, each scene, up to the end, as if he were present:

Reassume ergo meditationes istas a principio passionis, et prosequere per ordinem usque in finem... Tu vero... exerciteris in amplioribus, ut et tibi Dominus ipse dabit. Attende ergo ad singula, ac si praesens esses.<sup>58</sup>

Just as the Invitatory prayer, our first miniature too, stands outside of the mainstream of the Passion narrative cycle, fulfilling its role, structurally, of initiatory meditation.

The Gospel accounts (Matthew 26:36-46, Mark 14:32-42, Luke 22:39-46) relate that after the Last Supper Christ went with His disciples to the garden of Gethsemane on the Mount of Olives. As Christ left the disciples and set about to pray, Matthew records that He 'fell on His face' "procidit in faciem suam." Luke, on the other hand, relates that Christ knelt down. These two passages are impor-

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 600.

tant for, from them, derived pictorial formulae of Christ's Agony in the Garden. Although representations of this scene appear as early as the fourth century, it is only in the sixth century that the Agony in the Garden acquires full iconographic status as evidenced, for instance, by its representations in the mosaic cycles of S. Apollinare Nuovo in Ravenna and in the *Codex Purpureus Rossanensis*. On the whole, the representation of Christ in the Garden is a rare event both in manuscript illumination and pictorial cycles from the eighth to the twelfth centuries even though it appears from time to time in wall paintings and in sculpture. The scene becomes popular with the advent of the thirteenth century and by the fourteenth a specific iconographic type acquires prominence: depicting Christ in Agony, kneeling and with the upper part of His body fairly erect. Distinct examples of this type are provided by the representations of Christ in Agony found, for instance, in Duccio's painting (c. 1308-11) from Siena's Cathedral high altar and in the Passion altar from Hoggeismar (c. 1320). As in these paintings, our miniaturist too, depicts Christ kneeling, His body erect, His hands united and raised in prayer and supplication, against a background of rocks and flowers. While the isolated position of Christ heightens the effect of loneliness, He betrays no sign of real suffering. The delineation of this scene will become more realistic and sorrowful, however, by the fourteenth century.

**JUDAS' BETRAYAL.** The Betrayal is one of the first of the scenes of the Passion to have been visually represented. It appears as early as the fourth century and is practically never missing from Medieval Cycles.<sup>59</sup> In describing Judas' betrayal the illustrator combines three scenes, namely: The Kiss of Judas, Jesus' Arrest, and The Encounter between Peter and Malchus. Compositionally, the nimbed Christ and Judas occupy the center of the miniature (f. 18<sup>v</sup>), while helmeted soldiers, dressed more or less alike and carrying lances, torches, maces and halberds, form a compact group around the two protagonists. Jesus and Judas are isolated in the center so that the confrontation acquires particular dramaticism. Additional realism is added to the scene by the fact that Judas, coming from the right, is the only figure in movement. To the left, Peter, wielding an extremely large sword, cuts off the ear of the helmeted Malchus, who has sunk to his knees.

<sup>59</sup> Schiller, *op. cit.*, II, 52.

Although pictorial cycles of the Arrest varied in form and technique with Judas coming, for instance, either from left or right, our miniaturist seems to follow Italian examples. Structurally our miniature offers striking similarities, for example, to a twelfth-century Betrayal scene from the church of S. Angelo in Formis and to the fourteenth-century (c. 1305) Giotto fresco of the Betrayal in Padua. Incidentally both scenes reflect Byzantine forms. Judas' motion as he embraces Christ is a virtual, although clumsy replica of Giotto's masterpiece. This kind of influence should not be surprising for it is a known fact that, in the fourteenth century, illumination maintained a continuous relationship with large-scale painting. It is particularly in the next miniature (f. 19<sup>r</sup>) depicting Jesus being taken away by the soldiers to be brought before the high priests, that one fully realizes the miniaturist's concern with the idea of the *ductio*. Christ is indeed being led with a rope tied about His neck, a soldier holding the end of it. There is an aura of resignation on Christ's face as He is led away while followed by the same crowd of soldiers. The artist seems to have completely captured the spirit of the passage in the *Meditationes* which invites the reader to consider "quo modo [Christus] se patitur capi, ligari, percuti, et furibunde *duci*." <sup>60</sup>

JESUS BEFORE ANNAS. After His capture, it is to the home of Annas, one of the high priests, that Jesus is first taken. The miniature (f. 24<sup>v</sup>) presents Annas to the left on a raised throne, to the right Jesus, His hands tied by a rope the end of which is held by one of the soldiers present in the scene. The other soldier strikes Jesus' face with his right hand. The scene, particularly as regards the last incident appears to have been suggested by John's Gospel account (18:22) which mentions that an officer, infuriated by Christ's answer to the high priest, struck Him: "Haec cum dixisset, unus assistens ministrorum dedit alapam Iesu, dicens: Sic respondes pontifici?" In the miniature Jesus is completely isolated from the various expressions and gestures that surround Him. This increases His sense of loneliness. In the next miniature, which completes the Lauds cycle, once more the miniaturist exhibits his concern for narrative continuity by showing Christ again (f. 25<sup>r</sup>) being led by soldiers by means of a rope tied to His hands. The idea of the *ductio* is further reinforced by the singular fact that here as in the leading depicted on f. 19<sup>r</sup>,

<sup>60</sup> Peltier, p. 602.



Christ is the only one shown in motion with an exaggerated stepping forth of His right foot.

JESUS BEFORE CAIAPHAS. The trial before the Sanhedrin has a place among the scenes of the Passion in early art. Iconographically, the Sanhedrin was variously represented by three priests, by Annas and Caiaphas, or by Caiaphas alone. To dramatize the ordeal of the trial and to give emphasis to the *ductio* motif the miniaturist has decided to show Christ separately before Annas and then before Caiaphas. Our miniature (f. 26<sup>v</sup>) contains the dramatization of the following motifs: 1) the testimony of the false witnesses as is apparent in one of the figures pointing to Christ, and 2) Caiaphas' questioning of Christ, which is implied in the third scene where Caiaphas rends his clothes. Visual analogues for Caiaphas' rending his garment exist in pictorial representations from the sixth to the twelfth centuries. The scene appears, for instance in the St. Augustine Gospels (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, 286, f. 125), the so-called Gospel book of Otto III (Munich, Staatsbibl. Clm. 4453, Cim. 58, f. 247), and in the Laurenziana Gospel from Florence (f. 56). In all these Caiaphas always sits on the right of the image. Curiously enough our miniaturist has chosen to depict him on the left. Again as in the trial before Annas, Christ stands alone, all eyes converging on Him. Caiaphas' rending of his garment, a symbolic act signifying, since antiquity, impassioned grief, coming as it does, after Christ proclaims Himself to be the Son of God, expresses indignation. According to traditional Jewish custom, the rending of one's clothes was a required action when offences were committed against the Divinity, "*consuetudinis judaicae est, cum aliquid blasphemiae et quasi contra Deum audierint, scindere vestimenta sua.*" (Bede's *Paraenetica*, Sect. I. *Homiliae*, col. 401 in *P.L.*, XCIV). Immediately after this scene and completing the Prime cycle we are presented with the Buffeting and Mocking of Christ. The inspiration for this miniature was clearly suggested by the description of it provided in the *Meditationes*:

...alius eum purpura in contumeliam vestit, et alius spinis eum coronat; alius arundinem in manu ejus ponit; alius furibunde accipit, ut spinosum caput percutiat; alius nugatorie genuflectit, alius deridet genuflexionem, et plura ei intulerunt opprobria.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 599.

All of these details are present in the miniature (f. 27<sup>r</sup>). Although Matthew (27:27-30) and Mark (15:16-20) mention most of the events above, they are described in connection with Jesus' Mocking after His trial before Pilate. Our miniaturist chose to describe the events in connection with Caiaphas. The miniature is interesting for it is the only one in which Jesus wears a different garment to reflect His being mockingly arrayed in *purpura*. Proceeding from left to right the miniature's pictorial details follow the description provided in the *Meditationes*. All of the actions: Christ seated — an element first introduced by Giotto — and clad in purple, the Crown of thorns on His head, the reed in His hand, the man striking His head with a reed, the man mockingly genuflected before Him, the man striking Him with his fist etc., create a continuous chronological narrative as well as a continuous decorative rhythm which is also implied by the fact that the very man who in the previous miniature before Caiaphas had accused Jesus, is now seen striking His head with a reed. This miniature is particularly harmonious for the assurance of the design in the style of the costumes and in the rhythm of the line.

JESUS BEFORE PILATE. In the Trial before Pilate (f. 30<sup>v</sup>) our miniaturist follows the narrative of Matthew, who together with Mark and John records Jesus' appearing before Pilate only once, while Luke states that Jesus was subjected to two trials before the Roman governor, one occurring before, and the other after, Jesus' trial in the house of Herod. The centralized position of the miniature and the structural architecture which encloses it at the top suggest a monumental prototype about which I will have more to say later. Curiously enough Christ is not present in the miniature; Pilate is shown on the left seated on a throne in the act of ordering the flagellation. The miniaturist must have decided not to represent Christ at this point since he wished to give emphasis to the next miniature (f. 31<sup>r</sup>) where Christ, standing alone in His sufferings, appeals to human sentiment and personal devotion. Indeed the composition of the earlier miniature with Pilate leads visually to the flagellation. Departing from the rigid frontality of traditional Byzantine types, the miniaturist creates an eloquent movement as Pilate, in his command, leans to his left towards the point where the flagellation is to take place. As I have pointed out earlier, the scene of Pilate's ordering the flagellation is relatively rare and its appearance here is again consonant

with the illustrator's desire for narrative continuity. In their desire to represent continuous action medieval illustrators had to face the problem of the limitations inherent in the artistic medium. Otto Pächt cogently states the problem of continuous narrative thus:

How is a picture or relief whose elements are essentially immobile, and whose world is basically stilled and silent, graphically to convey, and not only vaguely to hint at, a story that unfolds in time? A story encompasses a sequence of events, but it is more than mere succession. It is the change and the transition from one episode to the next, in short the passing of time, which we must be made to feel if the story is to become alive in our own mind.<sup>62</sup>

What the miniaturist of our *Officium* has tried to do is to introduce into his illustrations the element of moving, continuous action, which had normally been considered the province of the writer.

The isolation of the miniature representing Christ being flagellated was done with the intention of making it a central experience, a most effective testimony, an overwhelming actuality of His sufferings for the spectator to contemplate and identify with. By isolating Christ the scene becomes more spiritually efficacious and didactic; it is as if the image has become animated. Again this is part of that late medieval pietistic realism. One witnesses in the late Middle Ages, "in religious painting and sculpture... an attempt to link the living, or the recently dead, with the timeless Christian facts, and to point up the spiritual values of contemplating them."<sup>63</sup> In the wake of a tradition that began in the twelfth century, Christ, in our miniature, is clothed only in a loin-cloth or *perizoma*; he stands in front of the column with His hands tied behind. To His left and right respectively, stand two men, one older than the other, in the act of flagellating Him. Although from the thirteenth century onwards, in the Flagellation scene, Christ's body was covered with bleeding wounds, the Christ of our miniature does not bear any marks on His. Structurally the picture offers a significant resemblance to an early fourteenth-century painting from Umbria (*Flagellazione*. Maestro del dittico Poldi-Pezzoli, Milano),<sup>64</sup> especially in the representation of

<sup>62</sup> Otto Pächt, *The Rise of Pictorial Narrative in Twelfth-Century England* (Oxford, 1962), p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> J. W. Robinson, "The Late Medieval Cult of Jesus and the Mystery Plays," *PMLA*, 70 (1965), p. 512.

<sup>64</sup> Miklos Boskovits, "Ipotesi su un pittore umbro del Trecento," *Arte antica e moderna*, 29 (1965), pl. 41 a.

the column and in the contrast of the two men dressed respectively in dark and light clothes. Even more striking configurationally is our miniature's similarity with Cimabue's flagellation (c. 1300) in the Perugia painted processional cross. It too presents Christ standing before the column with no sign of violence. There is no doubt that the importance the Flagellation achieved in Italy must be understood in connection with Passion mysticism within the context of late medieval piety there. More particularly "the popularity of the Flagellation in Italy is connected with the ascetic life of Franciscan friars. They glorified the endurance of suffering and ill-treatment and chastized themselves in order to identify themselves with Christ of the Flagellation."<sup>65</sup> One has to think only of the Franciscan influence on the Italian flagellant movement to gain an idea of their concern with enduring suffering.

JESUS BEFORE HEROD. Of the four evangelists Luke alone recounts that Pilate, hoping by this means to be rid of the prisoner, sent Christ to the tetrarch Herod. As in the scenes describing Jesus before Annas and Caiaphas, a member of the crowd, dressed in the fashion of the period, accuses Jesus standing before Herod (f. 34<sup>v</sup>). Jesus, blindfolded, is to the right with a group of soldiers behind Him. The illustration does not present much movement but rather exhibits a feeling of static intensity particularly in the fixed glances of the crowd, directed at Herod in expectation of his judgment. The next miniature (f. 35<sup>r</sup>), as part of the Sext cycle, depicts the Bearing of the Cross. Christ is shown blindfolded, carrying a long wooden Cross on His right shoulder, His hands tied by a rope the end of which is held by the foremost soldier in a position of authority — as indicated by the fact that he is the only one with a beard — who leads Christ to Calvary. In this scene the idea of 'leading' is most manifest. The details were again suggested by a passage in the *Meditationes*: "...et tunc venerabile lignum crucis longum, et grossum, et multum grave ponunt super humeros ejus... Et tunc *ducitur, et acceleratur... Ductus autem fuit foras... ut latronem ligatum, ad Calvariae locum duxerunt.*"<sup>66</sup> This emphasis, in the textual pattern he was following, on the *ducitur*, on the fact that Christ was led and guided, justifies the miniaturist's naive and even paradoxical rendering of Christ

<sup>65</sup> Schiller, p. 67.

<sup>66</sup> Peltier, p. 605.



bearing the Cross blindfolded. Although the 'leading' of Christ has iconographical antecedents, as for instance on an eleventh-century wall painting in Göreme, Turkey, and on a relief on the gold antependium in Aachen (c. 1020), Christ is not carrying the Cross, however. Early Christian iconography rarely shows Christ carrying the Cross alone, although He may be shown bearing it together with Simon as in the Passion cycle in the Gospels of St. Augustine (c. 600). It is only with the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries that Christ is shown carrying the Cross Himself. But whether He carries the Cross, as in a fresco by Giotto in Padua (c. 1305), or simply goes to Calvary with His hands tied and with Simon carrying the Cross, as in the painting by Duccio (c. 1308-11) for the high altar of the cathedral at Siena, contemporary iconography did not provide our miniaturist with visual examples of Christ bearing the Cross, His hands tied, being led blindfolded to Calvary. As I have indicated, that source he found in the *Meditationes*.

THE DENUDATION OF CHRIST. Matthew alone records that the soldiers stripped Christ before mocking Him. Liturgically, the stripping of Christ was familiar in the Middle Ages from the reading from the twenty-first psalm during Holy Week, and especially from the liturgical practice of baring the altar (*denudatio altarium*), which is the symbol of Christ naked and deserted by His disciples. The stripping of Christ became popular only in the late Middle Ages in the wake of meditations on the Passion, particularly those of the *Meditationes Vitae Christi* and of St. Bridget of Sweden.<sup>67</sup> Folio 38<sup>v</sup> in our manuscript presents us with the scene of the stripping of Christ's garment. Jesus is depicted standing and blindfolded, His garments being pulled over His arms by one of the soldiers that surround Him. The detail may have been supplied by the passage in the *Meditationes*: "Videas ergo oculis mentis... alios ordinare quidquid facere debeant, et alios ipsum spoliare. Spoliatur etiam, et nudus est nunc... coram tota multitudine."<sup>68</sup> As in this passage the effect sought by the miniaturist is that of showing precisely Christ's suffering in His naked humiliation before the crowd. Christ's deepest suffering is interior. Indeed, in the nobility and rigor of its style, this scene is a fitting reflection of the severity of its spiritual and doctrinal content.

<sup>67</sup> Schiller, p. 85.

<sup>68</sup> Peltier, p. 605.

Compositionally, the miniature's stripping offers singular similarities to contemporary representations of the same scene in a panel painting in Perugia, Umbria, dating from the end of the thirteenth century, and to a fourteenth-century Byzantine painting in Bologna,<sup>69</sup> especially in the representation of Christ naked but for a *perizoma* and His garments about to be pulled over His arms. Like these pictures, our miniature too does not show any signs of violence on Christ's body. Christ's suffering is accentuated, nevertheless, by the exquisite rendering of His white nakedness contrasted with the intensely dark background of the crowd. The scene is stylized to indicate the inner significance of the moment. Although crude in the general formulaizing of his style, the illustrator succeeds in increasing the appeal of his Passion cycle with brilliantly individualistic articulations of the Passion narrative. The next miniature contained in the None cycle is the representation of Jesus on the Cross (f. 39r). The iconography of The Crucifixion is one of the richest, exhibiting through the centuries, many changes and reflecting the spirit of the times. The earliest surviving examples of the Crucifixion date from the fifth century. Early images, especially the Byzantine, emphasize the *Christus victor*, who by His sacrifice, demonstrates that He has defeated Death. Around the seventh or early eighth century a Byzantine crucifixion type developed which was to become extremely popular. It is the three-figure image comprising Christ on the Cross, Mary on the right and John on the left. This type can be found, for instance, in the frescoes of the church of S. Angelo in Formis (c. 1100) and it is also the type depicted in our miniature although in the latter Christ is shown dead on the Cross. Like it our miniature too, shows the Byzantine restraint in expressing suffering. But our miniature also reflects later developments, particularly those that brought about a change from the Romanesque *Christus triumphator* on the Cross to the *Christus patiens* of the Gothic. From the twelfth century on Mary and John are generally included in the Crucifixion scenes and by the mid-thirteenth century, with the representation of Christ dead on the Cross and His body held fast to it by three nails, the transformation of the Crucifixion type is almost complete. Our miniaturist too shows Christ nailed with three nails, a *perizoma* about His waist, head lowered, His body slightly bent in a rhythmic curve. Structurally it offers similarities with contemporary Crucifixions such

<sup>69</sup> Schiller, II, plates 301 and 302.

as Duccio's painting from the high altar of Siena's cathedral (c. 1308–11), Simone Martini's painting at Antwerp (c. 1340), and a painting from the Cologne Master from the central panel of a winged altarpiece (c. 1330). These all reflect the profound consciousness of Christ's suffering which mystical and devotional writing by such people as Anselm, Bernard, Francis, and Bonaventure had aroused at this time. By revealing the full intensity of His suffering the artists are able to heighten the beholder's perception of Christ's sorrow.

Of invaluable significance in determining iconographic antecedents and the locality of origin of our manuscript, is the extraordinary similarity that our Crucifixion bears to an early fourteenth-century Crucifixion fresco from the church of S. Vittore in the very city of Ascoli Piceno. It was through the pursuit of hypothetical inferences that I came to this startling discovery. Having established a connection between my text and the church of St. Peter Martyr in Ascoli Piceno, I began to entertain the idea that its churches might provide suggestions concerning the *Officium's* pictorial cycle. To this end I began correspondence with one of the leading young students of central Italy's medieval art, Piergiorgio D'Angelo, of the university of Pescara. My hypotheses were soon confirmed by the astonishing similarity to the *Officium's* miniatures of some frescoes from Ascoli Piceno's church of S. Vittore. This discovery, after some 643 years, of a relationship between wall painting and miniature illumination, constitutes a vivid example of the results of scholarly perseverance and luck.

In both Crucifixions, S. Vittore's and ours, the basic layout of the composition is the same but one is particularly struck by the identical rendering of the humanized and expressive gestures of the Virgin and John. As in the fresco image, in our miniature too, the Virgin raises her hands towards the Crucified in a movement expressing pain and grief; John's emotional gesture too, with his hands crossed over his bosom, is virtually identical in both Crucifixions, suggesting either a common source or the awareness, on the artist's part, of specific iconographic trends. I shall discuss in depth the significance and value of this discovery in the description of the last miniature dealing with the Virgin's Lamentation. The kneeling female figure at the left in the Crucifixion in our miniature is probably the *donatrix*, i.e. the person for whom the manuscript was made. This would be quite normal for a para-liturgical text of this kind, particularly in an illuminated copy.

LONGINUS STRIKES JESUS' SIDE. Folio 42<sup>v</sup> of our *Officium* presents a representation of the classical example of Gothic Crucifixion with its concern with portraying the earthly and human elements in Christ's corporeity. Christ is shown on the Cross with His head tilted sideways, wearing a Crown of Thorns, His eyes closed, His mouth slightly open to project part of the tongue, His body curved to the right, the *perizoma* drawn into a knot on the opposite side, His body held to the Cross by three nails. The very low center of gravity of Christ on the Cross communicates the somber quality of the scene and arouses the compassion of the beholder. Even more affective is the portrayal of human feelings of the people present and reflecting on the agony of the Crucifixion. The Virgin, in her traditional image of the *Stabat mater dolorosa*, stands, nevertheless, in a dignified manner. As she grieves her face is turned towards the beholder as if to invite him to contemplate her dead Son. Particularly interesting too is the fact that as Longinus strikes Christ's side and blood gushes forth onto his lance, Longinus' eyes are turned towards the spectator. The Longinus incident must be given a close examination since it throws light on the source used by the miniaturist. In the canonical Gospels, although both a soldier who pierced Jesus' side and the Centurion appear, they are not identified as the same person. Matthew and Mark relate the conversion in a closely similar fashion. Matthew writes: "Centurio autem, et qui cum eo erant, custodientes Jesum, viso terrae motu et his quae fiebant, timuerunt valde, dicentes: Vere Filius Dei erat iste."<sup>70</sup> John, however, does not report the incident of the Centurion, but presents the only account of the soldier who pierced Christ's side: "Sed unus militum lancea latus eius aperuit et continuo exivit sanguis, et aqua."<sup>71</sup> As our miniaturist chose to represent Longinus dressed as a soldier, shield in the left hand, and lance in the right, we are able to identify the source he used. In the early — fifth or sixth century — apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus "for the first time appears the name of Longinus and here we find it applied to both soldier and centurion."<sup>72</sup> In medieval tradition the Centurion who believed in Jesus is confused with the soldier who pierced His side.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Matthew, 27:54-55.

<sup>71</sup> John, 19:34-35.

<sup>72</sup> Rose Jeffries Peebles, *The Legend of Longinus in Ecclesiastical Tradition* (Baltimore, 1911), pp. 7-8.

<sup>73</sup> Peebles, p. 20; Carl Kröner, *Die Longinus-Legende, ihre Entstehung und Ausbreitung in der französischen Litteratur* (Münster, 1899), p. 16.



Although the miniaturist tries to give expression in this scene to the sense of heightened anguish described by the mystics, he still abides by traditional Byzantine restraint in the depiction of Christ's body relatively free from blood stains and physical abuse. Byzantine restraint is especially observable in the depiction of the Virgin particularly in view of the images of the grieving mother so prevalent in contemporary painting. As scholars have shown, the Byzantine heritage remained fertile in Italy throughout the Gothic era, especially in stylistic patterns and coloristic brilliance.<sup>74</sup> Such is the case with our miniatures; initially it seems that all in them — the iconography, the technique, the background — are Byzantine, but one soon realizes that in the full movement and emotional force of their scenes one can perceive reminiscences and elements of the great contemporary artists who were painting frescoes on the walls of Italy's most beautiful churches — from Cavallini to Giotto, from Duccio to Cimabue — and in specific instances of the fresco Passion cycles from the small churches of the Marches region.

Completing the Vespers cycle is the next miniature (f. 43<sup>r</sup>) depicting the Deposition from the Cross. The Gospel accounts (Matthew 27:57–66, Mark 15:42–7, Luke 23:50–5, John 19:38–43) record that Joseph of Arimathaea asked Pilate for Christ's body, removed it from the Cross, wrapped it in a cloth, and laid it in his own new tomb. Soon a pictorial tradition depicting Joseph of Arimthaea before Pilate arose as evidenced by the scenes illustrated in the great Byzantine Gospel manuscripts of the tenth and eleventh centuries. From this time too date the earliest iconographical representations of Joseph's removal of Christ's body from the Cross. Although, as scholars have pointed out, the Deposition images derive from the images of the Crucifixion, already by the tenth century a Byzantine type of the Deposition had developed showing Mary and John at their traditional places by the Cross, with Mary pressing the dead Christ's hand against her cheek, while Joseph, standing on a stool, supports Christ's body over his shoulder.<sup>75</sup> Another Byzantine type whose tradition dates as of the eleventh century shows Joseph standing on a *suppedaneum* or a ladder with his arms around the body of

<sup>74</sup> Mario Salmi, *Italian Miniatures* (New York, 1954), pp. 19, 37; Pietro Toesca, *Monumenti e Studi per la Storia della Miniatura Italiana* (Milano, 1930), p. 41; Sabrina Mitchell, *Medieval Manuscript Painting* (New York, 1965), pp. 38–9.

<sup>75</sup> Millet, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

the dead Christ. In our miniature Joseph of Arimathaea, standing on a ladder, is holding Christ's body bent backwards over his shoulder, and, to the right and kneeling at the foot of the Cross, Nicodemus is about to remove with a pair of tongs the nail from Christ's feet; to the left, also kneeling, the Virgin is tenderly grasping Christ's arm already freed from the nail. The motif of the Virgin tenderly grasping the arm of Christ, which first occurs in Byzantine images of the tenth century, must be understood as part of a humanizing trend in Byzantine art of that time;<sup>76</sup> this motif will become popular from the eleventh century on, and it will recur continually in Italian art of the thirteenth and fourteenth century.<sup>77</sup> Although iconographical antecedents of the image were available, the visual arrangement of our miniature appears to be closely dependent on the passage of the *Meditationes* where the scene is so described as to make our miniature a virtual visual replica of it. I take up the description at the point illustrated by the miniaturist:

Descendit Nicodemus, et ivit ad clavum pedis. Joseph vero sustentabat corpus Domini; felix quippe ipse Joseph, qui corpus Domini meruit sic amplexari. Tunc pendentem manum dexteram Domina suscepit reverenter, et ponit ad vultum suum, intuetur, et osculatur cum lacrymis validis et suspiriis doloris.<sup>78</sup>

It is quite clear from this description that the author of the *Meditationes* is giving emphasis to the most prominent action of the Deposition, namely, to Joseph's tender and reverent gesture as he puts his arms around Christ. That this is so is clearly evident by the author's aside where he observes that Joseph must truly have been happy to have been found worthy to take the Lord's body in his arms. It is also clear from an analysis of our miniature that the visual and emotional perspective is centered on the depiction of this scene. Christ's dead body and Joseph occupy the center of the picture, the body of Christ actually extending in its compositional dimensions to both left and right; this is done both to completely fill the picture frame with the basic event and also to allow Nicodemus on the one side and the Virgin on the other to touch Christ's body. Joseph is depicted climbing down from the ladder about a couple of steps from

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<sup>76</sup> Weitzmann, p. 483.

<sup>77</sup> Schiller, p. 165.

<sup>78</sup> Peltier, p. 609.

touching the ground; at this point and at this point alone would the kneeling Virgin have been able to touch Christ's hanging right arm. The Author of the *Meditationes* captures the moment at the exact time when he writes: "Tunc pendentem manum dexteram Domina suscepit reverenter." One of the striking features of this Deposition especially in locating and establishing style and derivation, is the disposition of Christ's body bent backwards over Joseph's shoulder. As the body leans to the left it describes an almost perfect arc. It is not only a generally occurring Italian motif but in its exaggerated curved representation of Christ's body reflects iconographic norms as practiced in the region of Umbria and Tuscany, close to the Marches, from which the latter drew so much, artistically, over the years.

Our Deposition, in its attempt at three-dimensional evocation and especially in its grouping of figures, presents, for instance, significant parallels with a late thirteenth-century Deposition by Enrico di Tedice (Pisa, *Museo Nazionale*). Our miniature, however, shows more distinct pictorial and aesthetic similarities with a fourteenth-century Deposition from Pisa's Museo Civico (see Pl. 3) and especially with a Deposition from a diptych (c. 1275-1300) in Perugia's Pinacoteca (see Pl. 4). Our Deposition shares with the latter the intensity and profundity of the expressions in rendering the flowing and supple movement of Christ's body as it creates a semi-circle in Joseph's arms. Both Depositions show a tendency towards the intensification of stresses within the picture, toward the creation of a continuous deep perspective and of a harmonious rhythm throughout. Although the Perugia Deposition exhibits greater technical subtleties especially in the field of depth through the spatial dynamism created by the space-displacing arrangement of the figures, the compositional architecture remains the same in both pictures. Even though our miniaturist fails to achieve accurate perspective because his figures are constricted on the stage, he attains nevertheless, in his lyric simplicity, the same intensification of the emotional and spiritual drama portrayed. The dichotomy between the Perugia Deposition's technical mastery and our miniaturist's pictorial rigidity is purely academic, a matter of schooling; the design, however, the composition, and the architecture are the same, and clearly show how much our illustrator owes to his predecessors. This is not surprising for, in terms of what we have been saying about art in the Marches, it simply indicates its artist's infinite capacity for the absorption and emulation of geographically contiguous pietistic imagery.

MARY'S LAMENTATION. Our last miniature (f. 47<sup>r</sup>), attached to Compline, represents the Lamentation of Mary over Jesus' body. Compositionally this Entombment-Lamentation follows Italo-Byzantine precedent in details of Christ's wrapped body (mummy style), and of Mary's bending over her Son's head and embracing of the corpse. We have already remarked on the fact that the Byzantine Lamentation (*Threnos*) developed directly from the Entombment scene and that the Byzantine Entombment forms are the basic sources of medieval Italian Entombments and Lamentations. In our miniature the center of the stage is held by the *Mater Dolorosa* reclining over her Son's dead body. The other figures, Joseph of Arimathaea, Nicodemus, Mary Magdalene, and others, stand behind the tomb but they all blend in the harmony of a single theme and mood: that of compassion. In his enhancing of the scene of the grieving mother, the miniaturist departed somewhat from Byzantine pictorial norms. In the earliest Byzantine images the Lamentation combined with the Bearing of the Body and took place before the entrance to the rock tomb. In this scene less prominence is given to the motifs of tenderness and more to the liturgical and hieratic character of the action. Our miniaturist, however, by giving emphasis to Mary's sorrow is following Western iconographic norms for "the *Threnos* which Byzantine art had created as an image of great pathos always remained a liturgical icon in the East, while the West turned it into one of the most humanized images of personal devotion, the *Pietà*." <sup>79</sup> Schiller feels that this readiness to separate an independent image of the Lamentation from the Bearing of the Body may derive from funeral customs in East and West, fulfilling one of the spiritual needs of mourners; <sup>80</sup> as we shall indicate later on it also reflects pietistic attitudes concerning Mary's *Compassio*. At any rate, by the end of the eleventh century, the Lamentation had become an independent iconographic image. Particularly in Italy, by the fourteenth century, the anointing stone upon which the mourners had momentarily expressed the *Threnos* becomes a sarcophagus and the Lamentation merges with the Entombment. Fra Guglielmo's marble relief Entombment (c. 1270) in the pulpit of Pistoia and Ugolino da Siena's Entombment in the altar for S. Croce, Florence (c. 1320-30), constitute vivid examples, respectively, of early and established forms of the sarcophagus type of Entombment-Lamentation.

<sup>79</sup> Weitzmann, p. 490; also Denny, p. 220.

<sup>80</sup> Schiller, II, p. 174.



The Lamentation and Pietà are of course apocryphal motifs. "The determining element in the origin of these motifs is the grief of the Virgin, a theme entirely foreign to canonical accounts of the Passion."<sup>81</sup> Indeed the vision of an austere and ascetic Virgin seems to have been prevalent in the early years of the Christian era. Her steadfastness at the Crucifixion is commented upon in an Ambrosian *Missale*, for instance, in the preface to the feast of Mary's seven sorrows.<sup>82</sup> On the basis of John's account, "Stabant autem iuxta crucem Iesu mater eius, et soror matris eius, Maria Cleophae, et Maria Magdalene," St. Ambrose wrote: "Stabat Sancta Maria iuxta crucem filii et spectabat virgo sui unigeniti passionem; stantem illam lego, flentem non lego."<sup>83</sup> Writing on the subject, in an article entitled "Studien zu den Marienklagen und Germanische Totenklage," Professor Lipphardt remarks that "dem ganzen frühen Mittelalter galt Maria unter dem Kreuz als das Vorbild für alle, die einen lieben toten zu betrauern hatten. Wie sie durch Chistus gestärkt worden war, so sollten sich alle christen nach ihrem Beispiele verhalten und in der Trauer standhaft bleiben."<sup>84</sup> The Church Fathers, in particular, suggested that Mary was aware of the mystery of the Redemption, and consequently endured her Son's death for the salvation of mankind. It is for this reason that in the West, during the first ten centuries, there are no extended Latin meditations upon the sorrows of the Virgin. Most religious commentaries stress the faith of the Virgin rather than her grief. Mary's steadfastness is repeatedly cited by later authors too. Arnould of Bonnevalle writes in the twelfth century that Mary's interior dispositions and perfect obedience to the Father enabled her to share in her own way in Christ's offering of Himself:

Dividunt coram Patre inter se mater et Filius pietatis officia, et miris allegationibus muniunt redemptionis humanae negotium, et conducunt inter se reconciliationis nostrae inviolabile testamentum.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Denny, p. 219.

<sup>82</sup> P. Gabriel M. Roschini, "De modo quo B. Virgo animi dolorem sustinuit," in his *Mariologia* (Rome, 1948), II, p. 210.

<sup>83</sup> *De Obitu Valentiniani*, Cap. XXXIX, P.L., XVI, col. 1431; also in *Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam*, P.L., XV, cols. 1930-31.

<sup>84</sup> Walther Lipphardt, "Studien zu den Marienklagen und Germanische Totenklagen," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, LVIII (1934), p. 395.

<sup>85</sup> P.L., CLXXXIX, cols. 1726-27.

Albert the Great (d. 1280), for instance, defines Mary's dignity as that of *co-adjutrix* in the work of Redemption since she alone persevered on Calvary.<sup>86</sup> Indeed many theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth century refer to the Biblical *Stabat Mater* as an illustration of their mariological teachings. According to St. Bernardine of Siena Mary was intimately associated in the work of Redemption, and St. Lawrence of Brindisi points out her role in our objective Redemption: "Spiritus Mariae una cum spiritu Christi, sacerdotali munere juxta aram crucis fungebatur, Christique officium offerebat pro salute mundi aeterno Deo."<sup>87</sup> In the wake of this tradition, our miniaturist too, in the Crucifixion scene (f. 42<sup>v</sup>), depicts Mary standing erect under the Cross in priestly dignity, her arms crossed over her bosom in humble assent.

A different tradition, however, particularly in the Eastern Church, emphasized Mary's maternal instinct and tears. Indeed, the oldest lamentation of the Virgin as a liturgical motif is contained in the apocryphal Greek *Gesta Pilati B*, dated no later than the fifth century.<sup>88</sup> Here it is related how the Virgin fell unconscious on the way to Golgotha and wept in despair at the Cross. Soon, in the West too, Mary's anguish is duly articulated by various commentators. Beginning especially in the eleventh century one witnesses the emergence of meditations on the sorrows of Mary, which reach their climax in the twelfth, and by virtue of their pathetic commentary on the sacrifice on the Cross show the natural ties that exist between the

<sup>86</sup> *Quaestiones super Evangelium*, Qu. 43 and 149, 2 (*Opera Omnia*, XXXVII, Paris, 1898), pp. 81 and 214.

<sup>87</sup> Quoted in David Baier, O.F.M., "Mary at the Foot of the Cross," *Franciscan Studies*, 23 (1942), p. 7; on the subject of Mary's association in the work of Redemption see J. Bittremieux, "Adnotationes circa Doctrinam B. Mariae Virginis Coredemptricis," *Ephemerides Theologiae Lovanienses*, 16 (1939), 745-778, and Al Janssens' review article "De Cooperatione Immediata Matris Redemptoris ad Redemptionem Objectivam," *ibid.*, pp. 829-833.

<sup>88</sup> A. Mingana, "The Lament of the Virgin and the Martyrdom of Pilate," *Woodbrooke Studies* 2 (Manchester, 1928), 411-530; also E. Cothenet, "Marie dans les Apocryphes," *Maria*, VI (Paris, 1961), 111-12. One of the earliest examples of the *Staurotheotokia*, in the Eastern Church, is the one composed by Romanos in the fifth century. See Joannes Baptista Pitra, *Analecta Sacra*, I (Paris, 1876), pp. 101-07. Jacob of Sarug (c. 451-521), the well-known sixth-century Syrian poet, in a poem entitled "De Transitu," offers an already fairly developed conception of Mary as the *Mater Dolorosa*; and Simeon Metaphrastes, living in the tenth century, wrote a *Lament of the Blessed Virgin* which anticipates the medieval *Placatus Mariae*.

*Passio* and the *Compassio*. Although Patristic writings had generally commented on Mary's instrumentality in the Passion by indicating that she had cooperated proximately, directly, and immediately in the achievement of the redemption, eleventh and twelfth-century commentaries emphasized her sorrows and human agony, seeing in the Virgin the figure of the *Mater dolorosa* experiencing in her heart Christ's suffering.

It seems quite anachronistic, therefore, on the part of scholars such as Mâle to state that "de même que l'on dit *Christi Passio* on commence à dire dès le XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, *Mariae Compassio*."<sup>89</sup> This is hardly true. To be sure, pathetic expressions on Mary's sorrows are more frequent in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but the theme of the *Compassio* began in the eleventh century,<sup>90</sup> flourished in the twelfth,<sup>91</sup> and found its most intense lyric effusion in the thirteenth with the stream of Franciscan piety: St. Bonaventure, Pecham, and Jacopone da Todi. Peter Damian (988-1072), commenting on the prophecy of Simeon, appears to be the first to have introduced the term *Compassio* in the sense which will be predominant in later centuries:

Et tuam ipsius animam pertransivit gladius. Ac si diceret: dum Filius tuus senserit passionem in corpore, te etiam transfiget *gladius compassionis* in mente.<sup>92</sup>

But it is with St. Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh and St. Bernard in the twelfth that comes into being the triumphant period of meditation on the suffering and compassion of the Virgin at the foot of the Cross. St. Anselm by virtue of his famous *Dialogus Mariae et Anselmi de Passione Domini* and more particularly through *Oratio XX*,<sup>93</sup> St. Bernard by the *Liber de Passione Christi et Doloribus et Planctibus Matris Eius*, introduced Christianity to a new current of piety emphasizing Mary's maternal sorrow and compassion. A piety which rendered intelligible and human the relationship

<sup>89</sup> Emile Mâle, *L'Art religieux de la fin du moyen âge* (Paris, 1946), p. 122.

<sup>90</sup> Angelus Luis, "Evolutio historica doctrinae de Compassione B. Mariae Virginis," *Marianum*, 5 (1943), 274-76; Lutz Machensen, "Mittelalterliche Tragödien: Gedanken über Wesen und Grenzen des Mittelalters," *Festschrift für Wolfgang Stammler* (Berlin, 1953), p. 99.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276; Wilmart, *op. cit.*, pp. 505-09.

<sup>92</sup> *In Nativitatem B.M.*, I, in *P.L.*, CXLIV, col. 748A.

<sup>93</sup> *P.L.*, CLVIII, cols. 902-05.

between Mother and Son, became later of inestimable importance in the redaction of vernacular Passion plays, and readily assumed prominence in contemporary monastic writings. This concern with Mary's compassion led to the composition of Offices of the Compassion, the earliest of which, erroneously attributed to St. Bonaventure, dates from the thirteenth century. On the whole, though, it is the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that are the age of Compassion. During this period

Offices, prayers, and lengthy meditations on the subject of Mary's *compassio* are composed; the great popular preachers devote entire sermons to it; eventually a special feast is dedicated to the Sorrows of Mary. Religious art, too, takes up the theme. The Pietà, the image of the compassionate Virgin, becomes a devotional image second in importance only to the Man of Sorrows.<sup>94</sup>

In view of the Marian pietistic attitudes we have been referring to, it is not surprising that our miniaturist too, should have decided to express them pictorially just as other contemporary artists were doing. Realizing that the vision of the grieving figure of the *Virgo moerens* was able to generate a more intense participation of the reader or beholder in the Entombment scene, our miniaturist heightened its pathos by giving prominence to Mary's role in it. In this, of course, he was not original, for he was simply translating in terms of human experience not only what he found in homily, meditation, and sermon, but also in the salient feature of Gothic and late Gothic piety, namely, the preoccupation with the sufferings of Christ and His Mother. Thomas a Kempis was indeed resuming the spirit of an age when he exhorted: "Compatere Christo et Matri suae, anima fidelis, si cupis gaudere... cum eis in caelis."<sup>95</sup>

One of the most striking and uniquely important features of our Entombment-Lamentation miniature, both from a historical and iconographical viewpoint, is the astonishing similarity that it bears

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<sup>94</sup> Otto G. Von Simson, "Compassio and Co-Redemptio in Roger Van Der Weyden's *Descent from the Cross*," *Art Bulletin*, 35 (1953), pp. 13-14; on the dissemination of the *compassio* motif see also H. Delehaye, "La Vierge aux sept glaives," *Analecta Bollandiana*, 12 (1893), 332-352 and P. Keppler, "Zur Passionspredigt des Mittelalters," *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 3 (1882), 285-315; 4 (1883), 161-188.

<sup>95</sup> In his hymn "Compassio animae devotae super contritione et dolore beatae Mariae Virginis," in Drewes's *Analecta Hymnica*, 48 (Leipzig, 1905), p. 510, No. 489.



to an Entombment-Lamentation fresco from the church of S. Vittore in the very same city of Ascoli Piceno. I have been able to establish historically, at the beginning of the discussion, the locality of origin of our manuscript by identifying both the church of St. Peter Martyr and the saint himself with events that took place in the city of Ascoli Piceno. I now have — as indicated in the analysis of the Crucifixion scene — artistic evidence which further points to that city as the place of provenance of our *Officium Passionis Domini*. The S. Vittore Entombment-Lamentation fresco (see Pl. 5) dates from the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century. In both Entombment scenes the similarities are substantiated not only in the structural arrangement of the holy figures standing behind the Virgin reclining over her Son's body, but in a variety of postures and motifs. There are five attending holy persons in our miniature just as there are five figures in the S. Vittore Entombment-Lamentation. In both scenes the focal point is established through the asymmetrical placing of Christ to the far right; the Virgin's tender embracing of Christ with her left arm clear across His chest and her cheek gently placed next to His are virtually identical gestures and movements; and so is the horizontal delineation of the Virgin's figure as it rests close to Christ. Of marked interest is the extraordinary similarity in both scenes of the gestures of Mary Magdalene. Schiller has pointed out that Mary Magdalene is usually conspicuous in Italian Lamentations of the late thirteenth century for her expressions of emotion. In both our Entombment-Lamentation scenes her gestures are compositionally identical as she pulls on her left tress with her left hand while with her right, she gently touches her right cheek in a characteristic gesture of lament. In the two scenes it is precisely Mary Magdalene's gesture, in its awareness of suffering and grief, that stands out in the iconographical arrangement. The important role played in these pictures by Mary Magdalene is not too surprising since she was one of the most popular saints of the Middle Ages. The prominence given to her particularly in Crucifixion and Entombment scenes must be seen within the larger context of the intensity of the Magdalene cult in the West, which, beginning in the eleventh, found its greatest manifestation in the twelfth and then again in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Scholarship has already established the extent of the Magdalene cult, in the Middle Ages, in liturgy, drama and art.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Victor Saxer, *Le culte de Marie Madeleine en Occident des origines à*

The Church of S. Vittore, a typical example of Romanesque architecture, was completed during the early years of the thirteenth century. Toward the end of that century and the beginning of the fourteenth its walls were adorned with many frescoes, which were rediscovered in 1890 after having remained hidden for more than two centuries beneath a layer of plaster and lime. The frescoes were first restored in 1928 and more recently in 1969, at which time, the most outstanding and valuable were removed and placed in the Diocesan Museum of Art of the city of Ascoli Piceno. The presence of frescoes in the little church of S. Vittore is not a startling phenomenon since pre-Renaissance painting at Ascoli — which clearly derives from Byzantine and Italian types (Tuscan, Umbrian, Abruzzean and local) — abundantly expressed itself in the art of frescoes which decorate the internal and often even the external walls of almost all the city's churches. The oldest and most interesting cycle of frescoes is precisely the one contained in the church of S. Vittore, and most surely the product of the small local group of artists that flourished at Ascoli Piceno in the fourteenth century.<sup>97</sup> This artistic activity which can be seen reflected in the frescoes of its churches — especially S. Vittore, SS. Vincenzo and Anastasio, S. Maria Intervineas, S. Tommaso, S. Giacomo, S. Maria delle donne, S. Pietro in Castello, S. Croce, S. Ilario, S. Andrea, S. Angelo Magno — must surely have found expression in the art of manuscript illumination especially in view of the fact that Franciscan and Dominican liturgical books were widely diffused in the region of Marche in the thirteenth and fourteenth century.<sup>98</sup> In our specific instance, the miniaturist was struck by the artistic merit, the markedly individual character, the somber piety of the S. Vittore Entombment-Lamentation and apparently decided to draw on it in order to dramatize and render more realistic the events portrayed in his own Entombment-Lamentation.

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*la fin du moyen âge*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1959); Joseph Szövérfy, " 'Peccatrix Quondam Femina': A Survey of the Mary Magdalene Hymns," *Traditio*, 19 (1963), 79-146; Clifford Davidson, "The Digby *Mary Magdalene* and the Magdalene Cult of the Middle Ages," *Annuaire Mediaevale*, 13 (1972), 70-87; Omer Jodogne, "Marie-Madeleine pécheresse dans les Passions médiévales," *Scrinium Lovaniense. Mélanges historiques Etienne Van Cauwenberg* (Louvain, 1961), 272-84.

<sup>97</sup> Raimond Van Marle, *Italian Schools of Painting* (The Hague, 1925), V, p. 186; also Cesare Mariotti, *Ascoli Piceno* (Bergamo, 1928), p. 50.

<sup>98</sup> Serafino Prete, "La *Passio S. Emigdii*. II" *Studia Picena*, 39 (1972), p. 16.



It would appear from our analysis of the *Officium Passionis Domini* that it reflects, theologically and pictorially, the impact of contemporary forces and concepts which were capturing the imagination of the time. Artistically, particularly in the retention of traditional pictorial norms, the *Officium Passionis Domini* is the classical example of the works of the provinces where traditional stylized canons, characterized by the dominance of theological content, try to coexist with the newly emerging iconographic forces. As such, our *Officium* represents, on the artistic level, a crystallization of diverse pictorial modes, from the Byzantine to the Gothic, and stands as an illustration of the passage from Byzantine symbolism to fourteenth-century Italian emotional art. Byzantine treatment of Passion scenes is always an attempt to transcend the real. To achieve or to express the infinite and the theological, Byzantine art evolved rigid pictorial cycles, highly selective, following the compositional laws of hieratic iconography and reaching expressiveness through the very lack of dramatic mobility. The iconographical types are themselves symbols and therefore unchangeable. Romanesque art, too, although exhibiting great human power never descended to sentimentalism or popular appeal. With the advent of the Gothic style, the faith, animated by mystical writings, becomes ecstatic rather than contemplative, wishing to embrace the divine and to express it in concrete terms. The change, as I have had occasion to point out, is particularly visible in the drama, which cast aside the lyricism and stylized forms of the liturgical drama in order to express the facts and values of Christian belief in more realistic terms: in cyclic plays, in pageantry, by enlarging the narrative, by expanding the role of secular characters, by the addition of apocryphal scenes.<sup>99</sup> The influence of Gothic art is especially evident in manuscript illumination of the early fourteenth century with the treatment of Passion incidents only slightly articulated before. In the fourteenth century, freed from ecclesiastical control and supervision, artists were more likely to be laymen than monks; in their responsibility to the growing middle class, they concentrated on physical detail, reflecting popular taste, and the mystical forces of Francis and Bonaventure, operating behind it. In the fourteenth century, the Passion,

<sup>99</sup> Sticca, *Latin Passion*, Chaps. v and vi.

in particular is treated as a narrative of extreme human experiences rather than, as formerly, as symbolic of theological truth and doctrine. It is a trend that is exploited by writer and artist, but most especially by the dramatist.

As to the various influences traceable in our miniatures, it must be remembered that by the middle of the fourteenth century artistic vitality was passing, in Italy, from the great urban centers to the provinces.<sup>100</sup> Here the artists were less likely to be influenced by traditional iconographic patterns and could concentrate more on the depiction of a robust reality. As the clientele which was becoming increasingly more numerous, because of the demand for Books of Hours, came more often than not from the middle class and was not too demanding, the artistic quality of the miniatures tended to decline. Particularly as regards our miniatures, in their crude simplicity, they reflect many influences, especially those that scholars have already remarked on for the entire region of Marches in the fourteenth century, namely, the Sienese<sup>101</sup> and the Pisan. Sienese characteristics are occasionally apparent in our miniatures in the elegance of some figures, the sweetness of their expressions and in the fine quality of technique. However, in their violent chiaroscuro contrasts, particularly at the margins, our miniatures show the influence of the illumination school of Pisa. In two specific instances, as we have indicated, they exhibit the distinct qualities of the local school of painting which specialized in frescoes. Iconographically, as a complete Passion cycle, our miniatures testify to that pietistic fascination, that realistic style of presentation, that stirring dramatization of the Passion scenes with its emphasis on human experience that is peculiar to the plastic arts in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Theologically, as we have seen, our *Officium Passionis Domini* reveals the effects of that comprehensive dissemination of homiletic literature of the Passion, in particular the Franciscan, and specifically that of the pseudo-Bonaventure's *Meditationes Vitae Christi* to which the miniaturist often referred for the pictorial shaping of the salient events in Christ's Passion. Considering the lasting influence that the *Meditationes* were to have on the art of the late Middle

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<sup>100</sup> P. D'Ancona and E. Aeschlimann, *The Art of Illumination* (London, 1969), p. 26.

<sup>101</sup> Mary Pittaluga, *L'arte italiana* (Firenze, 1938), I, p. 355.



Ages,<sup>102</sup> our miniaturist has the distinction of being one of the first artists to have taken inspiration from the most complete account of the Passion ever written. Both in its liturgical content and in its visual presentation, our *Officium* demonstrates to the fullest the central concern of Franciscan piety, Christ's Passion. This concern, which starts with S. Francis, finds later full manifestation, in Italy, in the works of S. Bonaventure, Jacopone da Todi, Ubertino da Casale, S. John of Capistrano and B. Battista Varani. The devotional spirit and edifying intent of our *Officium Passionis Domini* can indeed be best expressed in the words of its original composer, S. Bonaventure: "Via non est nisi per ardentissimum amorem crucifixi."<sup>103</sup>

## OFFICIUM PASSIONIS DOMINI

### *Incipit Offitium Passionis Domini*

Domine, labia mea aperies. Et os meum annuntiabit laudem tuam. Deus, in adiutorium meum intende. Domine, ad adiuuandum me festina. Gloria patri et filio et spiritui sancto. et cetera. *Ad matutinum. Inuitatorium.* Christum captum atque irrisum, flagellatum, crucifixum. Uenite adoremus.

*Psalmus* [94] (f. 13<sup>r</sup>)

Uenite exultemus domino, iubilemus deo salutari nostro. Preocupemus faciem ejus in confessione et in psalmis iubilemus ejus. *Christum captum.* Quoniam deus magnus dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos. Quoniam non repellat deus plebem suam, quia in manu ejus sunt omnes fines terre et altitudines montium ipse conspicit. *Uenite adoremus.* Quoniam ipsius (ff. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>r</sup>) est mare et ipse fecit illud, et aridam fundauerunt manus ejus. Uenite adoremus et procidamus ante dominum, ploremus coram domino qui fecit nos, quia ipse est dominus deus noster, nos autem populus ejus et oues pascue ejus. *Christum captum.* Hodie si uocem audieritis, nolite obdurare corda uestra, sicut in exacerbatione secundum diem temptationis in deserto ubi temptauerunt me patres uestri, probauerunt et uiderunt opera mea. *Uenite adoremus.* Quadraginta annis proximus fui generationi huic et dixi, semper hii errant corde. Ipsi

<sup>102</sup> Emile Mâle, "Le Renouveau de l'art par les Mystères," *Gazette des Beaux Arts*, 31 (1904), pp. 98, 230; M. L. van Puyvelde, "Nouvelles recherches sur l'influence de *Meditationes Vitae Christi* sur l'art de la fin du moyen âge," *Actes du Congrès d'histoire d'art, Société de l'histoire de l'art française*, II, pt. 2, (1921), 260-274.

<sup>103</sup> *Itinerarium mentis in Deum, Opera Omnia*, V, 295.

uero non cognouerunt uias meas quibus iuraui in ira mea, si introi-  
bunt in requiem meam. *Christum captum*. Gloria patri et filio et spi-  
ritui sancto, sicut erat in principio et nunc et semper, et in secula  
seculorum. *Amen*. Uenite adoremus Christum captum et fustibus  
flagellatum arundine uerberatum (ff. 14<sup>v</sup>-15<sup>r</sup>)  
Uenite adoremus. *Ymnus*

## i

In passione domini  
qua datur salus homini  
sit nostrum refrigerium  
et cordis desiderium.

## ii

Portemus in memoria  
et penas et obprobria  
Christi, coronam spineam  
crucem, clauos et lanceam.

## iii

Et plagas sacratissimas  
omni laude disgnissimas  
acetum, fel, arundinem  
mortis amaritudinem.

## iv

Hec omnia nos satient  
et dulciter inebrient  
nos repleant uirtutibus  
et gloriosis fructibus.

## v

Te crucifixum colimus  
et toto corde possumus (sic)  
ut nos sanctorum cetibus  
coniungas in celestibus.

## vi

Laus, honor Christe uendito  
et sine causa prodito  
passo mortem pro populo  
in aspero patibulo. *Responsio: Amen*.

*Antiphona*. (Ad nocturnum] Insurrexerunt in me.<sup>1</sup>

*Psalmus*. [2] Quare fremuerunt gentes et populi (ff. 15<sup>v</sup>-16<sup>r</sup>)  
meditati sunt inania. Astiterunt reges terre et principes conuenerunt  
in unum, aduersus dominum et aduersus Christum ejus. Dirumpamus  
uincula eorum, et projiciamus a nobis iugum ipsorum. Qui habitat  
in celis, irridebit eos et Dominus subsannabit eos. Tunc loquetur ad  
eos in ira sua, et in furore suo conturbabit eos. Ego autem constitutus  
sum rex ab eo super Syon montem sanctum ejus, predicans precep-  
tum domini. Dominus dixit ad me, filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui  
te. Postula a me, et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam et tanquam uas  
figuli confringens. eos. Et nunc, reges, eos intel- (ff. 16<sup>v</sup>-17<sup>r</sup>)  
ligite, erudimini omnes qui iudicatis terram. Seruite domino in amore  
et exultate ei cum tremore. Apprehendite disciplinam nequando ira-  
scatur dominus et pereatis de uia iusta. Cum exaserit in breui ira  
ejus, beati omnes qui confidunt in eo. *Antiphona*. Insurrexerunt in  
me uiri absque misericordia et non pepercerunt anime mee.<sup>2</sup> *Versus*.

<sup>1</sup> The Antiphon for *Matins*, *Feria VI. in Parasceve*: Insurrexerunt in me testes iniqui, et mentita est iniquitas sibi. *Versus*: Diviserunt sibi vestimenta mea. *Responsio*: Et super vestem meam miserunt sortem.

<sup>2</sup> Antiphon for *Matins*, second Nocturn, *Feria VI. in Parasceve*: "Insur-

Reliqui domum meam, dimisi hereditatem meam. *Responsum*. Dedi dilectam animam meam in manibus inimicorum meorum.<sup>3</sup> Pater noster. *Versus*. Et ne nos. *Responsio*. Sed libera. *Absolutio*. Gloriosa passio crucifixi perducatur nos deus ad gaudia paradisi.<sup>4</sup> *Responsio*. Amen. *Benedictio*. Iube domine opere benedicere. *Versus*. Propter suam sanctam passionem det nobis deus suam benedictionem. Amen. (ff. 17<sup>v</sup>-18<sup>r</sup>)

[*Lectio prima*] Apprehendit Pilatus Ihesum, et flagellavit, et milites plerique [sic] coronam de spinis, in posuerunt capiti ejus, et ueste purpurea circumdederunt eum, et ueniebant ad eum et dicebant: Ave rex iudeorum, et dabant ei alapas<sup>5</sup> et expuebant in eum, acceperunt arundinem et percutiebant caput ejus.<sup>6</sup> Tu autem deus miserere nobis. *Responsio*. Deo gratias. *Responsum*. Seniores populi consilium fecerunt ut Ihesum dolo tenerent et ceciderent. Cum gladiis et fustibus exierunt tanquam ad latronem.<sup>7</sup> *Versus*. Collegerunt pontifices et pharisei consilium ut dolo Ihesum tenerent et occiderent cum gladiis. Iube domine opere benedicere (ff. 19<sup>v</sup>-20<sup>r</sup>) *Benedictio*. Per uirtutem sancte crucis perducatur nos deus ad gaudia uere lucis. *Amen*.

[*Lectio secunda*] Susceperunt autem milites Ihesum et eduxerunt baiulans sibi crucem, exierunt in eum locum qui dicitur Caluarie, ibi eum crucifixerunt et cum eo alios duos latrones hinc et hinc, medium autem Ihesum.<sup>8</sup> Tu autem deus miserere nobis. *Responsio*. Deo gratias. *Responsum*. Tanquam ad latronem existis cum gladiis et fustibus comprehendere me, cotidie apud uos eram in templo docens et non me tenuistis,<sup>9</sup> et ecce flagellatum, ducitis ad crucifigendum.<sup>10</sup> *Versus*. Cumque iniecissent manum in Ihesum et tenuissent eum dixit ad eos: Cotidie. Iube domine opere benedicere. *Benedictio*. Sanguinis Christi aspersio sit nobis salus et (ff. 20<sup>v</sup>-21<sup>r</sup>) protectio. *Responsio*. *Amen*.

*Lectio tertia*. Postea sacens Ihesu quod omnia consummata sunt dixit, sitio. Illi spongiam plenam aceto atque sopo circumponentes optulerunt ori ejus. Cum autem gustasset Ihesu acetum dixit: consummatum est.<sup>11</sup> Tu autem miserere nobis. *Responsio*. Deo gratias. *Re-*

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rlexerunt in me viri absque misericordia, et non pepercerunt animae meae. Quia non est inventus qui me agnosceret, et faceret bene."

<sup>3</sup> Responsory for *Matins*, *Feria VI. in Parasceve*.

<sup>4</sup> A variation of this *Absolutio* reads: "Passio Domini nostri Iesu Christi perducatur nos ad gaudia paradisi."

<sup>5</sup> John, 19:2-4.

<sup>6</sup> Matthew, 27:30-31.

<sup>7</sup> Responsory for *Matins*, *Feria V. in Coena Domini*.

<sup>8</sup> John, 19:16-18.

<sup>9</sup> Matthew, 26:55-56; Mark, 14:48-50; Luke, 22:52-53.

<sup>10</sup> Responsory for *Matins*, *Feria VI. in Parasceve*.

<sup>11</sup> John, 19:28-30.

*sponsum*. Sicut ouis ad occisionem ductus est et cum male tractaretur, non aperuit os suum. Traditus est ad mortem, ut unificaret populum suum.<sup>12</sup> *Versus*. Tradunt in mortem animam, et inter sceleratos deputatus est. Traditur. Gloria patri et filio et spiritui sancto. Tra.

*Ad Laudes. Antiphona. Contumelias.*<sup>13</sup>

*Psalmus* [12] Usque quod dominus obliuisceris (ff. 21<sup>v</sup>-22<sup>r</sup>)  
me in finem? quousque auertis faciem tuam a me. Quamdiu ponam consilium in anima mea, dolorem in corde meo per diem. Usquequo exaltabitur inimicus meus super me? respice et exaudi me Domine deus meus. Illumina oculos meos ne unquam abdormiam in morte, nequando dicat inimicus meus : preualui aduersus eum. Qui trubulant me exultabunt si motus fuero, ego autem in tua misericordia sperabo. Exultabit cor meum in salutari tuo, cantabo Domino quia bona tribuit mihi, et psallam nomini tuo altissime.

*Antiphona*. Contumelias et terrorem passus sum ab eis et aduersus mecum est tanquam bellator fortis.

*Capitulum*. Spiritus oris nostri, Christus captus est (ff. 22<sup>v</sup>-23<sup>r</sup>)  
in peccatis nostris, cuius [sic] diximus : in umbra tua uiuimus in gentibus.<sup>14</sup> *Responsio*. Deo gratias.

*Ymnus*.

i

Christum ducem  
qui per crucem  
redemit nos ab hostibus  
laudet cetus  
noster letus  
exultet celum laudibus.

ii

Pena fortis  
tue mortis  
et sanguinis effusio  
corda terant  
ut te querant  
Iesu nostra redemptio.

iii

Per felices  
cicatrices  
sputa, flagella, uerbera  
nobis grata  
sint collata  
eterna Christi munera.

iv

Nostrum tangat  
cor, ut plangat  
tuorum sanguinis uulnerum  
in quo toti  
sumus loti  
conditor alme syderum.

v

Passionis  
tue donis  
Saluator nos inebria

<sup>12</sup> Responsory for *Matins, Sabbato Sancto*.

<sup>13</sup> Antiphon for *Lauds, Feria IV. Majoris Hebdomadae*: "Contumelias et terrores passus sum ab eis: et Dominus mecum est tamquam bellator fortis."


<sup>14</sup> Thren. 4, 20.



ILLUSTRATIONS ACCOMPANYING

*Officium Passionis Domini :*

An Unpublished Manuscript  
of the Fourteenth Century



25  
 iniquitatiz nr̄az necus  
 diſrumpere. ut ipſe hu  
 militatis omimode. uili  
 tatem aliter amplex  
 centes. ſublimitatis tue  
 felici mereamur collegio  
 iocundari. Qui unus et  
 regnis cum deo patre. i  
 unitate ſpiritus ſancti  
 deus. p̄ omnia ſecula ſeculorū.  
 Amen. ¶ Ito primum.

PLATE I — Boston Public Library Ms. 131.





PLATE II — Boston Public Library Ms. 131.



PLATE III

Deposition from  
Pisa's Museo Civico.



PLATE IV

Deposition from  
Perugia's Pinacoteca.





PLATE V — Entombment—Lamentation from S. Vittore.



dñō. mibilem dō. salutari  
 mō. Preccatē faciem  
 ei mōstificē. i p salmo  
 mibilem ei. xps apom.  
 Qm dō magnus dñs a  
 rec magnus sup oīa deo.  
 Qm n repellet dñs ple  
 bem sui. qz i mōm etno  
 sūt omēs fides fce a gis  
 audines mōm nō spic.  
 Venite adrem. Qm ipmō

PLATE VI — Christ's Agony in the Garden.






PLATE VII — Judas' Betrayal.



PLATE VIII — Jesus taken away by the soldiers.




PLATE IX — Jesus before Annas.




PLATE X — Jesus, hands tied, taken to Caiphas.



PLATE XI — Jesus before Caiphas.




PLATE XII  
Buffeting and Mocking of Jesus



PLATE XIII — Jesus before Pilate.



PLATE XIV — Flagellation of Jesus





ATE XV — Jesus, blindfolded,  
before Herod.



PLATE XVI — Jesus bearing  
the Cross.



ATE XVII — The Denudation  
(stripping) of Jesus.




PLATE XVIII — Jesus on the  
Cross.




PLATE XIX — Longinus strikes Jesus' side.



PLATE XX — Deposition from the Cross.





PLATE XXI — Mary's Lamentation.



quae fidelis  
dare uelis  
beata nobis gaudia. Laus, honor.

*Versus.* Dedit percutientibus se maxillam.<sup>15</sup> *Responsio.* Fuit saturatus obprobriis.

*Ad benedictus. Antiphona.* Proprio filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.<sup>16</sup>

*Psalmus.* [Lc. 1: 68-79] Benedictus dominus deus. (ff. 23<sup>v</sup>-24<sup>r</sup>)

*Oratio.* Domine Ihesu Christe angelorum decor gaudi et libertas qui pro meam redemptionem iniquorum fedari sputis, cedi alapis, constringi uinculis uoluisti, per tui nominis gloriam salutaris, iniquitatum nostrarum nexus disrumpere, ut propter te humilitatis omnimode, uilitatem alacriter amplectentes, sublimitatis tue felici mereamur collegio iocundari. Qui uiuis et regnas cum deo patre in unitate spiritus sancti deus, per omnia secula seculorum. *Responsio.* Amen.

*Ad Primam.* (ff. 25<sup>v</sup>-26<sup>r</sup>)

*Ymnus.*

i

ii

Tu qui uelatus facie  
fuisti sol iustitie  
flexis illusus genibus  
cesus quoque uerberibus.

Te petimus actentius  
ut sis nobis propitius  
et per tuam clementiam  
perducas nos ad gloriam.  
Laus, honor, ut supra.

*Antiphona.* Faciem meam.<sup>17</sup>

*Psalmus.* [42] Iudica me deus et discerne causam meam de gente non sancta ab homine iniquo et doloso eripe me. Quia tu es deus meus et fortitudo mea quare me repulisti atque tristis incedo dum affligit me inimicus. Emitte lucem tuam et ueritatem tuam (ff. 27<sup>v</sup>-28<sup>r</sup>)

ipsam me deduxerunt et adduxerunt in montem sanctum tuum in tabernacula (sic) tua. Introibo ad altare dei, ad deum qui letificat iuuentutem meam. Confitebor tibi in cythara, deus, deus, meus, quare tristis es, anima mea, et quare conturbas me? Spera in Domino, quia confitebor illi salutare uultus mei et deus meus.

*Antiphona.* Faciem meam non auerti ab increpantibus et conspuentibus in me.<sup>18</sup> *Capitulum.* Recogitate eum qui talem a peccatoribus aduersus semetipsum substituit contritionem ut non fatigemini animis uestris deficientes.<sup>19</sup> *Responsio.* Deo gratias. *Versus.* Cum malediceretur non

(ff. 28<sup>v</sup>-29<sup>r</sup>)  
maledicebat. *Responsio.* Cum pateretur non conminabatur.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Thren. 3, 30.

<sup>16</sup> Antiphon for *Lauds, Feria VI. in Parasceve.*

<sup>17</sup> Antiphon for *Prime, Feria II. Majoris Hebdomadae:* Faciem meam non auerti ab increpantibus et conspuentibus in me.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. Isa. i, 6, 7.

<sup>19</sup> *Ad Hebraeos*, 12:3-4.

<sup>20</sup> Petri Epistola I, 2:23: "Qui cum malediceretur, non maledicebat: cum pateretur, non conminabatur."

*Oratio.* Domine Ihesu Christe princeps omnium regum terre, qui pro nobis contumeliose ad instar latronis impio iudici es presentatus et seuientium contra te crudelissimas uoces tanquam agnus mansuetissimus patientissime tollerasti, da nobis pro tui nominis gloria, ut cum astiterimus tuo terrifico tribunali non damnemur eterno supplicio sed tuis in celestibus mereamur fidelibus sociari. Qui uiuis et regnas.  
*Ad Tertiam.* (ff. 29<sup>v</sup>-30<sup>r</sup>)

*Ymnus.*

i

Hora qui ductus tertia  
 fuisti ad supplicia  
 Christe, ferendo humeris  
 crucem pro nobis miseris

ii

Fac nos sic te diligere  
 sanctamque uitam ducere  
 ut ualeamus requie  
 frui celestis patrie.  
 Laus, honor, Christe.

*Antiphona.* Dominus, tanquam ouis ductus est.<sup>21</sup>

*Psalmus.* [63] Exaudi deus orationem meam cum tribulor, a timore inimici eripe animam meam. Protexisti me a conuinctu malignantium et a multitudine operantium iniquitatem. Quia exacuerunt ut gladium linguas suas, intenderunt arcum rem amaram ut (ff. 31<sup>v</sup>-32<sup>r</sup>) sagiptent in occultis immaculatum. Subito sagiptabunt et non timebunt, firmauerunt sibi uerbum malum, disputauerunt ut absconderent laqueos, dixerunt quis uidebit eos. Scrutati sunt iniquitatem, defecerunt scrutantes scrutinium. Accedet homo ad cor altum et exaltabitur deus. Sagipte paruulorum facte sunt plage eorum et pro nichilo habuerunt contra eos lingue ipsorum. Conturbati sunt omnes qui uidebant eos, et timuit omnis homo; annuntiauerunt opera dei, et facta ejus intellexerunt. Letabitur iustus in domino et sperabit (ff. 32<sup>v</sup>-33<sup>r</sup>)

in eo et laudabuntur eum recti corde.

*Antiphona.* Deus tanquam ouis ductus est ad uictimam et non aperuit os suum.<sup>22</sup>

*Capitulum.* Christus passus est pro nobis, nobis relinquens exemplum ut sequamini uestigia ejus, qui peccatum non fecit nec inuentus est dolus in ore ejus.<sup>23</sup> *Responsio.* Deo gratias. *Responsum.* Preposite sibi gaudio. Sustinuit crucem. *Versus.* Omni confusione et temptatione subjectum gloria populi. *Versus.* Oblatus est quia ipse uoluit. *Responsio.* Et non aperuit os suum.

*Oratio.* Domine Ihesu Christe qui hora diei tertia ad crucis poenam per mundi salute ductum es, te supplices obsecramus, ut per uirtutem tue beatissime passionis omnia peccata nostra deleas et ad tue beatitudinis gloriam misericorditer nos perducas. Qui uiuis.

*Ad Sextam.*

(ff. 33<sup>v</sup>-34<sup>r</sup>)

<sup>21</sup> The Antiphon for *Lauds, Feria V. in Coena Domini*: "Dominus tanquam ovis ad uictimam ductus est, et non aperuit os suum."

<sup>22</sup> See above, n. 21.

<sup>23</sup> *Petri Epistola* I, 2:21-23.

*Ymnus.*

i

Crucem pro nobis subiit  
et stans in illa sitiit.  
Iesus prefixus uulnere  
in uolis plantis latere.

ii

Honor et benedictio  
sit crucifixo filio  
qui suo nos supplicio  
redemit ab exilio.  
Laus, honor Christo uendito.

*Antiphona.* Posuerunt.<sup>24</sup>

*Psalmus.* Credidi propter quod locutus sum, ego autem humiliatus sum nimis. Ego dixi in excessu mortis mee, omnis homo mendax. Quid retribuam domino pro omnibus que retribuit mihi. Calicem salutaris accipiam et nomen domini inuocabo. Pretiosa in conspectu domini mors sanctorum ejus. O domine ego seruus tuus, et ego seruus tuus et filius ancille tue. Dirrupisti (ff. 35<sup>v</sup>-36<sup>r</sup>)  
uincula mea, tibi sacrificabo hostiam laudis. Uota mea domino reddam in atriis domus domini, in conspectu omnis populi ejus, in medio tui Ierusalem.

*Antiphona.* Posuerunt supra capito eius causam cruce inscriptam: Ihesu nazarenum, rex Iudeorum.<sup>25</sup>

*Capitulum.* Tradebant autem iudicanti se iniuste qui peccata nostra ipse pertulit in corpore suo super lignum, ut peccatis mortui iustitie uiuamus.<sup>26</sup> *Responsio.* Deo gratias. *Responsum:* Oblatus est quia. quia ipse uoluit. *Versus.* Et non aperuit os suum. Quia. Gloria patri et filio et spiritui sancto. oblati. *Versus.* Tradidit in mortem animam suam.<sup>27</sup> *Responsio.* Et cum sceleratis deputatus est. *Versus.* Domine exaudi orationem meam. *Responsio.* Et clamor meus. (ff. 36<sup>v</sup>-37<sup>r</sup>)

*Oratio.* Domine Ihesu Christe qui hora diei sexta ad exprimendum ad reuertentibus tue benignitatis affectum brachia in patibulo expandisti et in sanctissimo corpore tu pro nostri sanandis uulneribus quinque uulnera perfudisti, da nobis pro tui nominis gloria in sanguine tuo et amore profiscere et feruere, ut tuis mereamur amplexibus eternaliter inherere. Qui uiuis et regnas cum deo patre in unitate spiritus sancti deus per omnia secula seculorum. *Responsio.* Amen. *Ad Nonam.* (ff. 37<sup>v</sup>-38<sup>r</sup>)

*Ymnus.*

i

Beata Christi passio  
sit nostra liberatio  
ut per hanc nobis gaudia  
parata sint celestia.

ii

Gloria Christo domino  
qui pendens in patibulo  
clamans emisit spiritum  
mundumque saluans perditum.  
Laus, honor Christo uendito.

<sup>24</sup> Antiphon for *Lauds*, *Feria VI. in Parasceve*: "Posuerunt super caput ejus causam ipsius scriptam: Jesus Nazarenus, Rex Judeorum."

<sup>25</sup> See above, n. 24.

<sup>26</sup> *Petri Epistola I*, 2:23-24.

<sup>27</sup> From the Responsory for *Matins*, *Sabbato Sancto*.

*Antiphona.* Cum accepisset.<sup>28</sup>

*Psalmus.* [141] Uoce mea ad dominum clamaui, uoce mea ad dominum deprecatus sum. Effundam in conspectu eius orationem meam et tribulationem meam ante ipsum pronuntiem. Indeficiente in me spiritum meum et tu agnouisti semitas meas. In uia hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt superbi laqueos mihi. Considerabam a dextris et uidebam et non erat qui cognosceret me. Periiit fuga a me et (ff. 39<sup>v</sup>-40<sup>r</sup>) non est qui requirat animam meam. Clamaui ad te domine, dixi tu es spes mea, portio mea in terra uiuentium. Intende in deprecationem meam quia humiliatus sum nimis. Libera me a persequentibus me, quia confortati sunt super me. Educ de custodia animam meam, ad confitendum nomini tuo, me expectant iusti, donec retribuas mihi.

*Antiphona.* Cum accepisset Ihesus acetum dixit: consummatum est et inclinato capite emisit spiritum.<sup>29</sup>

*Capitulum.* Decebat enim propter quem omnia, in quem omnia, qui multos filios adduxerat in gloriam, auctorem salutis eorum per compassionem consumari.<sup>30</sup> *Responsio.* Deo gratias. *Responsum.* Tradidit in mortem animam suam.<sup>31</sup> *Versus.* Et cum sceleratis de (ff. 40<sup>v</sup>-41<sup>r</sup>) putatus est animam suam. Gladio tradidit. *Versus.* Uere langores nostros ipse tulit. *Responsio.* Et dolores nostros ipse portauit.

*Oratio.* Domine Ihesu Christe qui hora diei nona expansis in cruce manibus et inclinato capite deo patri spiritum tradidisti et in dulcissimi lateris tui apertione, redemptionis nostre pretium tuum sanguine perfudisti, concede nobis indignis famulis tuis, ut in hora mortis nostre animas nostras ad te qui uere paradisos es, facias misericorditer peruenire. Qui uiuis. *Versus.* Deus exaudi. *Responsio.* Et cla. *Versus.* Beato dicemus domino. *Responsio.* Deo gratias.

*Ad Uesperas.*

(ff. 41<sup>v</sup>-42<sup>r</sup>)

*Antiphona.* Dignus es domine.<sup>32</sup>

*Psalmus.* [29] Exaltabo te, Domine, quoniam suscepisti me, nec delectasti inimicos meos super me. Domine, deus meus, clamaui at te et sanasti me, domine abstraxisti ab inferno animam meam, saluasti me a descendentibus in lacum. Psallite domino sancti ejus et confitemini memorie sanctitatis ejus. Quoniam ira in indignatione ejus, et uita in uoluntate ipsius. Ad uesperum demorabitur fletus et ad matutinum letitia. Ego autem dixi in mea abundantia, et non mouebor in eternum. Domine in sancta uoluntate tua prestitisti decori meo (ff. 43<sup>v</sup>-44<sup>r</sup>) uirtutem, auertisti faciem tuam a me et tristis sum atque turbatus. Ad te domine clamabo et ad dominum meum deprecabor, que utilitas

<sup>28</sup> Antiphon for *Vespers*, *Feria VI. in Parasceve*.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ad Hebraeos*, 2:10.

<sup>31</sup> From Responsory for *Matins*, *Sabbato Sancto*.

<sup>32</sup> Antiphon taken from a passage in *Apocalypsis Ioannis*, 5:9-10, "Dignus es Domine accipere librum, et aperire signacula ejus: quoniam occisus es, et redemisti nos Deo in sanguine tuo ex omni tribu, et lingua, et populo, et natione: et fecisti nos Deo nostro regnum, et sacerdotes: et regnabimus super terram."



in sanguine meo dum descendo in corruptionem? Numquid confitebitur tibi pulvis, aut annuntiabit ueritatem tuam? Audiuit dominus et misertus est mei, dominus factus est adiutor meus. Conuertisti planctum meum in gaudium mihi, conscidisti saccum meum et planxi me letitiam, ut cantem tibi gloria mea et non conpungar. Domine, deus meus in eternum confitebor tibi.

*Antiphona.* Dignus es domine, accipere librum et soluere signacula et quoniam occisus es et redemisti nos in sanguine tuo.<sup>33</sup>

*Capitulum.* Uidemus Ihesum propter passionem (ff. 44<sup>v</sup>-45<sup>r</sup>) mortis ejus, gloria et honore coronatum ut gratia dei pro omnibus gustaret mortem.<sup>34</sup> *Responsio.* Deo gratias.

*Ymnus.*

i

Qui pressura  
mortis dura  
soluisti nexus criminum  
nos ad pacem  
duc ueracem  
Iesu, corona uirginum.

ii

In flagellis  
potum fellis  
bibisti amarissime  
pro peccatis  
perpetratis  
eterne rex altissime.

iii

Nostre genti  
recolenti  
tue mortis supplicium  
da uirtutem  
et salutem  
Christe, redemptor omnium.

iv

In amara  
crucis ara  
fudisti riuos sanguinis  
Iesu digne  
rex benigne  
Consors paterni luminis.

v

Sanguis Christi,  
qui fuisti  
perhemptor hostis  
inuidi  
fac sitire  
nos uenire  
ad cenam agni prouidi.

(ff. 45<sup>v</sup>-46<sup>r</sup>)

vi

Laus honor Christo uendito  
et sine causa tradito  
et passo mortem pro populo  
in aspero patibulo.

*Responsio. Amen.*

*Versus.* Disciplina pacis nostrae super eum. *Responsio.* Cuius liuore sanati sumus.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See page 196, n. 32.

<sup>34</sup> *Ad Hebraeos*, 2:9-10.

<sup>35</sup> *Isa.*, 53, 5.

*Antiphona.* Recessit.<sup>36</sup>

*Psalmus.* Magnificat anima mea dominum.

*Antiphona.* Recessit pastor bonus, fons aque (ff. 46<sup>v</sup>-47<sup>r</sup>)  
uiue, quia animam suam posuit pro ouibus suis et pro suo grege  
mori dignatus est.

*Oratio.* Domine Iesu Christe, qui hora uestpertina pro humana salute iam morte peremptus de cruce deponi et in tue Matris manibus, ut pie creditur, recipi uoluisti, concede propitius, ut depositis peccatorum nostrorum sarcinis, ante conspectum diuine maiestatis tue presentari ualeamus. Qui uiuis et regnas cum deo patre in unitate spiritus sancti deus per omnia secula seculorum. *Responsio.* Amen.

[Ad Completorium]<sup>37</sup>

*Versus.* Conuerte nos deus salutaris noster. *Responsio.* Et auerte iram tuam a nobis. *Versus.* Deus in adiutorium meum intende.

*Responsio.* Domine ad adiuuandum.

*Antiphona.* Plangent eum.<sup>38</sup>

*Psalmus.* [40] Beatus qui intelligit super egenum et pauperem, in die mala liberabit eum dominus. Dominus conseruet eum et uiuificet eum, et beatum faciat eum et emundet in terra animam ejus et non tradat eam in manibus inimici ejus. Dominus opem ferat illi super lectum doloris ejus, uniuersum stratum ejus uersasti in infirmitate ejus. Ego dixi Domine miserere mei, sana animam meam, quia peccaui tibi. Inimici mei dixerunt mala mihi, quando morietur et perebit nomen ejus. Et ingre-

(ff. 47<sup>v</sup>-48<sup>r</sup>)  
diebantur ut uiderent, uana locutum est cor eorum et congregauerit iniquitatem sibi. Et egrediebantur foras et loquebantur simul in unum sussurabant. Omnes inimici mei aduersum me cogitabant mala mihi, uerbum iniquum mandauerunt aduersum me. Numquid qui dormit non adiciet ut resurgat et etenim homo pacis mee in quo sperabat, qui edebat panes meos ampliauit aduersum me supplantationem. Tu autem dominus miserere et resuscita me, et retribuam illis. In hoc cognoui quoniam uoluisti me, quia non gaudebit inimicus meus super me. Propter innocentiam autem meam suscepisti me et confirmasti me in

(ff. 48<sup>v</sup>-49<sup>r</sup>)  
in conspectu tuo in eternum. Benedictus dominus deus Israel, a seculo et usque in seculum, fiat, fiat.

*Antiphona.* Plangent eum quasi unigenitum, quia innocens deus occisus est.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Cf. John, 10:15.

<sup>37</sup> A folio is lacking, in the present manuscript, between ff. 46-47. Comparison with the Vatican *officium* has allowed us to reproduce the passage contained in the missing folio.

<sup>38</sup> Antiphon for *Lauds, Sabbato Sancto*: "Plangent eum quasi unigenitum, quia innocens Dominus occisus est." Cf. *Zach*, 12, 10.

<sup>39</sup> See above, n. 38.

## Ymnus.

i

Qui iacuisti mortuus  
in petra, rex innocuus  
fac nos in te quiescere  
semperque laudes reddere.

ii

Succurre nobis, Domine  
quos redemisti sanguine  
et deduc nos ad celestia  
eterne pacis gaudia.  
Laus, honor.

*Capitulum.* Christo in carne passo et uos eadem cogitatione armamini.<sup>40</sup>

*Responsio.* Deo gratias. *Responsum.* Oportuit in sanctam crucem pati.

*Responsio.* Et ita intrare in gloriam suam Christus deo patri oportuit.

*Uersus.* Oportuit pati propter delicta nostra. *Responsio.* Resurrexit  
propter iustificationem (ff. 49<sup>v</sup>-50<sup>r</sup>)

nostram. *Postea Antiphona.* Saluator mundi.<sup>41</sup>

*Psalmus.* [Canticum Simeonis] Nunc dimictis seruum tuum domine,  
secundum uerbum tuum in pace. Quia uiderunt oculi mei salutare  
tuum. Quod parasti ante faciem omnium populorum. Lumen ad  
reuelationem gentium et gloriam plebis tue Israel.

*Antiphona.* Saluator mundi salua nos qui per crucem et sanguinem  
redemisti nos, auxiliare nobis te deprecamur domine deus noster.<sup>42</sup>

*Oratio.* Domine Ihesu Christe, qui hora completorium sepultus es, et  
a mulieribus planctus, fac nos quos gementes atque lamentantes  
tuam deuotissime plangentes (ff. 50<sup>v</sup>-51<sup>r</sup>)

passionem atque nos memoriam recolentes, te exilio ad patriam, te  
labore ad requiem, te merore ad beatissime uisitationis tue consola-  
tionem peruenire concede. Qui uiuis et regnas cum deo patre in uni-  
tate spiritus sancti deus. Per omnia secula seculorum. *Responsio.*  
Amen.

*Finit Offitium Passionis Domini. Deo Gratias. Amen* (f. 51<sup>v</sup>)

The State University of New York  
at Binghamton

SANDRO STICCA

<sup>40</sup> *Petri Epistola I, 4.*

<sup>41</sup> Antiphon for *Feria VI. in Parasceve.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

## WALTER BURLEY'S *QUAESTIONES IN LIBRUM PERIHERMENEIAS*

Walter Burley commented Aristotle's *Perihermeneias* four times. The commentaries vary in style and stretch over the whole of his teaching career. He wrote a summary-type commentary which simply outlines Aristotle's work for beginning students.<sup>1</sup> He produced two expositions of the Stagyrte's treatise which follow the text closely, expounding chapter by chapter the Philosopher's work.<sup>2</sup> Finally, he penned a fourth "commentary," edited here, which is his early *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*. The latter is a work written in 1301, focusing on certain issues which, in the context of the *Perihermeneias*, Burley considers of importance. This disputed-question type commentary is not tied down to a literal exposition, but enjoys the freedom to discuss the issues Burley chooses. One of the questions, for example, centers on the controversy regarding the distinction between essence and existence in creatures. In this question Walter attacks the positions of Albert the Great and Avicenna, St. Thomas and Giles of Rome, as well as that of Henry of Ghent (all named explicitly), before siding with Godfrey of Fontaines ("Haec est positio Magistri Godefridi quam credo esse veram" <sup>3</sup>). This work is more properly a discussion of contemporary issues derived from the *Perihermeneias* than a strict commentary on Aristotle's text.

Burley's *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* is found in two Cambridge manuscripts: Gonville and Caius 645/668, ff. 60ra-76rb, and Gonville and Caius 512/543, ff. 13ra-23vb.<sup>4</sup> The first of these

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<sup>1</sup> Found incomplete in Cambridge, ms. *St. John's College* 100, f. 54rb-vb.

<sup>2</sup> The earlier of the two we have edited under the title "Walter Burley's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias*" in *Franciscan Studies*, 33 (1973), 42-134. The second one, written in 1337, is the one given in the printed edition of Burley's *Super Artem Veterem* (Venice, 1497).

<sup>3</sup> Below in the text, n. 4.43.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. C. H. Lohr ("Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries" in *Traditio*, 24 [1968], 171-187) who provides a list of Burley manuscripts. For the *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* he gives one certain ms. (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius



manuscripts states that Burley is the author. At the top of f. 60r we read "Quaestiones datae a Magistro Waltero de Burley super librum perihermeneias, anno domini m<sup>o</sup>ccc<sup>o</sup>p<sup>o</sup>." At the end of the same text we have the explicit: "Expliciunt quaestiones Gualteri Burley" (f. 76rb). The second manuscript ends simply with the words "Expliciunt quaestiones," but across the top of ff. 13r, 13v, 14r, 14v, and after the first question are the words (in the same hand): "Burley," "Dominus Walterus Burley," or "Walterus Burle." Internal similarities between a very large portion of question 1 and the early part of the surely authentic *Middle Commentary on the Perihermeneias* also establish Burley as the author.<sup>5</sup>

Although the five questions are independent in their focus (except for questions 4 and 5 which are related through the same lemma), still they form one work and refer to one another. Burley, without doubt, is the author of all five questions.

The two manuscripts are described by the author of the Gonville-Caius catalogue.<sup>6</sup> We will use the letter *C* to designate *ms. Gonville-Caius 645/668* and the letter *G* to indicate *ms. Gonville-Caius 512/543*. Both texts are so close to one another that *G* appears to be copied from *C*. I have used *C* as the main text and noted the significant variants of *G*, except where *G* was justifiably correcting *C*. I have preferred *C* as the basic text throughout also because *G* has the external weakness that many of its corners are faded, thus making large sections unreadable.

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645/668, ff. 60-76) and one doubtful one (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 512/543, ff. 13-23). Following this lead we examined both manuscripts and can confirm that both manuscripts do carry the same text.

<sup>5</sup> Compare the *Quaestiones*, nn. 1.5ss. and the *Middle Commentary*, nn. 1.12ss.

<sup>6</sup> M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College* (Cambridge, 1908) II, 665-666; 381-384.

⟨GUALTERI BURLAEI

QUAESTIONES IN LIBRUM PERIHERMENEIAS

QUAESTIO PRIMA⟩

(I.0I) *Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen*<sup>1</sup> etc. Quaeritur utrum vox primo significet rem vel passionem.

⟨Quod vox non primo significat rem⟩

(I.I) Quod vox non significat rem primo probo, nam haec vox 'omnis' non significat aliquam rem, quia si significat aliquam rem aut illa res est apta nata inesse pluribus aut non. Si sic, igitur hoc signum 'omnis' esset terminus communis et haberet supposita et vere praedicaretur de supposito; et per consequens tales essent verae: "*A* est omnis" et "*B* est omnis." Sint *A* et *B* supposita talis rei. Si res significata per ly omnis non sit nata inesse pluribus, tunc 'omnis' esset terminus singularis, et per consequens haberet aliquod commune quod de eo praedicaretur. Sit illud *A*. Haec igitur esset vera: "*A* est omnis." Et similiter ly<sup>2</sup> omnis non esset nomen appellativum; quod falsum est. Istud argumentum probat quod hoc signum 'omnis' nihil significat, nec rem nec passionem.

(I.II) Praeterea, si hoc signum 'omnis' significet rem, tamen non significet rem transcendentem, igitur significat aliquid inferius ad ens, et per consequens haec esset nugatio "Omnis res est res," quia superius sequitur inferius a parte eiusdem extremi. Et si dicatur quod hoc signum 'omnis' significat modum rei sed non rem; contra: Tunc haec esset nugatio "Omnis modus rei est," quia illud quod significatur per istum terminum 'modus rei' est superius ad rem significatam per hoc signum 'omnis.' Et si dicatur quod quia hoc signum 'omnis' significat rem vel modum rei per modum modi ideo non est nugatio; contra: Ad minus haec esset nugatio "Omnis modus rei est omnis modus rei," accepta hac prout singularis est, quia hoc signum 'omnis' ut facit propositionem singularem accipitur per modum rei. Si dicatur aliter quod hoc signum 'omnis' non habet significatum de se sed solum ex adiuncto; contra: Istud est idem argumentum quod prius, quia sic esset hic nugatio "Omne contrahens significatum ex adiuncto est aliquid," quia terminus distinctus est superius ad terminum distinguens. Praeterea, si hoc signum 'omnis' non haberet significatum nisi ex adiuncto, hoc signum 'omnis' significaret aliud in ista "Omnis homo currit" quam in ista "Omnis asinus currit," quia diversum significatum traheret ex diverso adiuncto.

<sup>1</sup> Aristot., *Periherm.*, c. 1 (16a 1).

<sup>2</sup> ly om. C

(I.I2) Ad principale: Iste terminus 'homo' non significat aliquam rem extra animam, quia quaelibet res extra animam est una numero. Sed iste terminus 'homo' non significat unam rem<sup>3</sup> numero, quia nec significat Sortem nec Platonem.

(I.I2I) Si dicatur quod iste terminus 'homo' significat rem extra animam, nec est quaelibet res extra animam una res numero; contra: Si iste terminus 'homo' significet rem extra animam, aut ista res habet esse in suppositis aut non. Si non, tunc commune esset in esse separatum a suppositis. Si habeat esse in suppositis, tunc in Sorte est res significata per hominem, et praeter hoc tota natura Sortis. Sortes igitur est aggregatum ex natura hominis et natura Sortis. Tunc arguo: Omne aggregatum ex duabus naturis est aliud ab altera istarum naturarum; sed per te Sortes est unum aggregatum ex natura hominis et ex Sorte; igitur Sortes est aliud a natura hominis et etiam a Sorte, igitur Sortes esset aliud a Sorte. Si dicatur quod Sortes non aggregatur ex natura hominis et ex natura Sortis; contra: In Sorte est natura specifica hominis et aliquid plus. Quaero de residuo: Aut residuum a natura specifica sit completa natura Sortis vel non. Si sic, habetur propositum, scilicet quod Sortes componatur ex natura Sortis et ex natura speciei, et sic Sortes esset sua pars. Si detur quod in residuo non est completa natura Sortis; contra: In residuo a natura specifica includitur hoc corpus et haec anima, quia neutrum includitur in natura speciei. Tunc arguo: Omne compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima est Sortes; residuum a natura speciei est compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima; igitur residuum a natura speciei est Sortes, et per consequens in residuo a natura speciei habetur complete tota natura Sortis.

(I.I3) Praeterea, arguo aliter quod 'homo' non significat rem extra anima, quia ista res aut est de se universalis aut est de se singularis. Si sit de se universalis, igitur sibi repugnat natura singularis, et per consequens non inest Sorti. Si sit de se singularis, igitur sibi repugnat inesse pluribus, et sic non competit Sorti et Platoni. Dicitur huic secundum sententiam Avicennae, V suae *Metaphysicae*,<sup>4</sup> quod iste terminus 'homo' significat unam rem quae de se nec est universalis nec singularis, quia si de se esset universalis, non posset inesse singulari, et si de se esset singularis non posset inesse pluribus. Et ideo dixit Avicenna quod humanitas est humanitas tantum de se, et de se nec est unum nec multa; contra: Tunc haec est vera: "Homo est aliquid quod non est de se universale vel singulare." Aut igitur de se est aliquid quod nec de se est universale nec singulare aut non. Si de se sit aliquid quod de se nec est universale nec singulare, igitur illud quod significatur per

<sup>3</sup> unam rem/unum C

<sup>4</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, V, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 86va).

hominem non inest Sorti quia homini de se competit aliquid quod repugnat Sorti, cum haec sit vera: "Sortes de se est universale vel singulare." Si detur quod homo non est de se aliquid quod nec de se est universale nec singulare, tunc haec est vera, scilicet homo est aliquid quod non de se est aliquid quod nec de se est universale nec singulare. Sit igitur totum istud praedicatum *A*. Quaero: Aut Sortes de se est *A* aut non. Si sic, igitur homo non inest Sorti, quia *A* repugnat Sorti, et tunc homo de se est aliquid quod repugnat Sorti. Si detur quod homo non de se est *A*, tunc haec est vera: Homo est aliquid quod non de se est *A*. Aut igitur de se aut non. Si de se, tunc homo non inest Sorti. Si non de se, erit processus in infinitum. Et hoc argumentum est bonum si argumentum *A v i c e n n a e* valeat.

(I.I4) Praeterea, ista res quae significatur per hominem non est una numero<sup>5</sup> sed competit pluribus *p e r t e* ut Sorti et Platoni, igitur eadem res inesset Sorti et Platoni. Et *t u d i c e s* et bene quod eadem res secundum speciem bene potest inesse diversis numero; *c o n t r a*: Si eadem res secundum speciem inesset Sorti et Platoni haec esset vera: "Sortes est idem Platoni specie"; ex qua sequitur "Igitur Sortes est Plato specie", quia ista convertuntur: "Plato est idem Platoni." Et ista esset vera: "Homo est idem asino secundum genus," ex quo sequitur "Igitur homo est idem asino secundum aliquid," et ultra "Igitur homo est asinus secundum aliquid."

(I.I5) Praeterea, si 'homo' significaret aliquam rem, aut igitur iste terminus 'homines' significat eandem rem aut aliam. Si aliam, hoc nomen 'homo' esset nomen heteroclitum, quia significat aliud in numero singulari et aliud in plurali. Si significant eandem rem, igitur iste terminus 'homo' et iste terminus 'homines' haberent eandem supposita, et per consequens haec esset vera: "Homo est homines," quia aliquod suppositum praedicati inest alicui supposito subiecti.

(I.I5I) Si *d i c a t u r*<sup>6</sup> quod isti termini significant eandem rem sed tamen non habent eandem supposita; *c o n t r a*: Probo quod isti termini habent aliquod idem suppositum, nam isti termini possunt distribui pro eodem supposito. Probo sic:<sup>7</sup> Sic dicto "Omnis homo currit," verum est quod in ista fit distributio pro istis hominibus, demonstratis Sorte et Platone. Nunc sequitur: Fit distributio pro istis hominibus, igitur fit distributio pro hoc supposito, demonstratis eisdem hominibus, quia isti homines et hoc suppositum convertuntur. Et in ista "Omnes homines currunt" fit distributio pro eodem supposito,<sup>8</sup> igitur isti termini 'homo' et 'homines' habent aliquod idem suppositum.

<sup>5</sup> numero/per te *add.* C

<sup>6</sup> Si dicatur/dicitur hic G

<sup>7</sup> Probo sic *om.* C

<sup>8</sup> eodem supposito/eisdem suppositis G



(1.16) Praeterea, si iste terminus 'homines' significet aliquam rem, eadem ratione iste terminus 'isti homines,' aliter esset vox non-significativa. Sed iste terminus 'isti homines' non significat aliquam rem nisi de genere substantiae, quia nolo demonstrare nisi rem de genere substantiae. Sed non significat rem generis tantum nec rem alicuius speciei tantum, igitur significat aliquod individuum de genere substantiae. Sed quodlibet tale est unum numero, igitur haec esset vera "Isti homines sunt unum numero."

(1.17) Praeterea, volo determinare 'homo' ad standum<sup>9</sup> pro significato et istum terminum 'homines' similiter. Ista tunc esset vera: "Homo<sup>10</sup> *A* est homines *B*," quia hic est unio pro significatis, et significatum praedicati inest significato subiecti.

(1.18) Praeterea, si 'homo' significet aliquam rem, igitur sic dicto "Tantum homo est risibilis," alicui denotaretur praedicatum inesse praecise. Aut igitur Sorti denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise aut ei quod non est Sortes. Si Sorti, igitur Plato excluditur, et per consequens sequitur "Tantum homo est risibilis, igitur Plato non est risibilis." Si ei quod non est Sortes denotetur praedicatum inesse precise, igitur a Sorte denotatur praedicatum removeri, et per consequens sequitur "Tantum homo est risibilis, igitur Sortes non est risibilis."

(1.19) Praeterea, adhuc ostenditur quod iste terminus 'homo' et iste terminus 'homines' habeant aliquod idem suppositum, et hoc sic: Nam demonstratis quatuor hominibus, isti quatuor sunt quatuor supposita huius termini 'homo,' et duo supposita huius termini 'homines.' Tunc arguo sic: Omnia quae sunt ista quatuor sunt aliqua quorum quodlibet est homo; sed ista duo supposita, demonstratis eisdem quatuor, sunt ista quatuor; igitur ista duo supposita sunt aliqua quorum quodlibet est homo; igitur quodlibet istorum duorum suppositorum est homo, et per consequens quodlibet istorum duorum suppositorum est suppositum hominis, et ita idem est suppositum huius termini 'homo' et huius termini 'homines.' Nec valet dicere quod discursus praefactus non valet propter diversitatem relationis, quia relativum in maiore et in conclusione refert idem ut istum terminum 'aliqua'; et supponit pro eodem ut pro istis quatuor hominibus, igitur discursus est bonus.

(1.110) Ad principale: Iste terminus 'Sortes' non significat aliquam rem, quia si sic, aut igitur significat simplex aut compositum. Non simplex, quia cum significet rem de genere substantiae aut significaret materiam vel formam, quod falsum est. Si significet compositum, igitur semper significabit compositum, igitur Sorte corrupto haec esset vera: "Sortes est compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima," ex qua sequitur: "Igitur hoc corpus et haec anima componunt Sor-

<sup>9</sup> ad standum *om.* C

<sup>10</sup> Homo/homines G

tem"; et ultra: "Igitur corpus et anima componunt Sortem." Sed omne compositum ex corpore et anima vivit, igitur Sorte corrupto haec esset vera: "Sortes vivit"; et similiter Sorte corrupto esset haec vera: "Sortes est homo," quod est contra *aliquos*,<sup>11</sup> nam Sorte corrupto sunt istae verae: "Omne compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva est homo"; "Sortes est compositus ex corpore et anima intellectiva," igitur etc. Praeterea, Sorte corrupto anima intellectiva Sortis est, et suum corpus similiter. Si igitur tunc Sortes sit compositus ex hoc corpore et hac anima, aliquod non-ens ex entibus esset compositum.

(I.III) Hic dicitur quod hoc nomen 'Sortes' significat unum compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima, sed nec hoc corpus nec haec anima est essentialiter infra significatum Sortis; sed Sortes significat unum quod non est compositum cui accidit esse compositum, et ipso corrupto nec est simplex nec compositum; *contra*: Nomina sunt ad placitum. Volo igitur instituere Sortem ad significandum compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima, ita quod utrumque sit essentialiter infra significatum Sortis sicut significat iste terminus 'compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima.' Isto posito, adhuc iste terminus 'Sortes' non significat nisi rem de genere substantiae. Cum igitur 'Sortes' non sit nomen speciei nec nomen generis, sequitur quod sit nomen individui de genere substantiae. Et tunc Sorte corrupto erit haec vera: "Sortes vivit," sicut probatum est. Praeterea, Sorte corrupto, Sortes distinguitur a Caesare. Aut igitur se ipso distinguitur a Caesare aut per aliud. Si per se ipsum, Sortes et Caesar in nullo convenirent nec plus conveniret Sortes cum Caesare quam cum asino mortuo, quod falsum est;<sup>12</sup> igitur Sortes distinguitur a Caesare per aliud. Illud est pars significati Sortis; igitur Sorte corrupto adhuc est verum quod Sortes est unum compositum et non est compositum nisi ex hoc corpore et hac anima.

(I.II2) Praeterea, Sorte corrupto, iste terminus 'Sortes' significat aliquid. Aut igitur significat simplex aut compositum. Non simplex, quia nec materiam nec formam; igitur compositum, et non nisi compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima.

(I.II3) Ad principale: Si iste terminus 'homo' significet rem extra animam, ista foret falsa: "Homo est species," quia praedicatum huius solum significat rem in anima. Sed res extra animam non inest rei in anima. Et si dicatur quod res significata per istum terminum 'species' habet esse extra animam; *contra*: Igitur haec esset falsa: "Scientia est species," quia scientia non est nisi in anima et res extra animam non inest rei in anima.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. opinio S. Thomae et Aegidii cum refutatione eius, *infra*, nn. 4.26 et 4.28.

<sup>12</sup> quod... est *om.* G

(I.II4) Ad principale: Iste terminus 'animal rationale' non significat aliquam rem extra animam, quia si sic: Aut ista res est substantia aut accidens. Non accidens, igitur substantia. Aut igitur eadem substantia quae et homo aut alia. Si alia, cum ista non sit ordinata ad hominem esset disparata ab homine, et sic foret haec falsa: "Homo est animal rationale." Si eadem, igitur istae propositiones significant idem: "Omnis homo est risibilis" et "Omne animal rationale est risibile." Sed hoc est falsum, quia una est notior alia, nam una est principium in demonstratione et alia conclusio. Si dicatur quod res significatae per istas propositiones sunt aequivocae sed tamen istae propositiones non; contra: Si una sit notior alia aut haec est ratione vocis aut ratione rei. Non ratione vocis, tum quia aliquis potest scire quid significatur per istum terminum 'homo' etsi non sciat quid significatur per istum terminum 'animal rationale'; tum quia etsi nullus homo sciret aliquod idioma adhuc posset homo facere demonstrationes, et essent principia demonstrationis notiora conclusione. Igitur quod una praemissarum sit notior conclusione non est ratione vocis sed ratione rei significatae.

(I.II5) Ad principale: Nomen non imponitur nisi ei quod intelligitur. Sed res extra non intelligitur, quoniam ex intellectu et intelligibili verius fit unum quam ex materia et forma, per Philosophum, III *De anima*.<sup>13</sup> Sed ex intellectu et re extra animam non fit unum. Igitur res extra animam non intelligitur, et per consequens sibi non imponitur nomen.

(I.II6) Ad principale: Per Priscianum: <sup>14</sup> "Nihil aliud est esse partem orationis quam mentis conceptum significare"; igitur quaelibet pars orationis significat conceptum mentis. Praeterea, per Philosophum *hic*: <sup>15</sup> "Voces sunt notae passionum animae"; igitur vox significat passionem primo.

〈Quod vox primo significat rem〉

(I.2) Ad oppositum: Per Boethium: <sup>16</sup> Impositor rebus quas vidit nomina imposuit.

(I.2I) Praeterea, si vox significaret passionem primo, quaelibet propositio esset impossibilis in qua non praedicatur idem de se. Ista enim esset impossibilis: "Homo est animal," quia denotatur quod passio hominis est passio animalis. Et si dicatur quod etsi vox significet passionem primo, unio tamen est pro rebus; contra: Terminum idem supponit quod significat, igitur quod terminus primo

<sup>13</sup> Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 4, t. 2 (429a 13-15).

<sup>14</sup> Priscianus, *Instit. gramm.*, II, cap. 3, n. 14 (ed. Krehl, I, 65).

<sup>15</sup> Aristot., *Periherm.*, c. 1 (16a 3-4).

<sup>16</sup> Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione*, red. 2, lib. I, cap. 'De signis' (PL 64, 409BC; ed. Meiser, 33).

significat primo supponit; igitur per istam "Homo est animal" denotatur quod passio hominis sit passio animalis. Praeterea, si esset unio pro his quae ex consequenti importantur, haec esset vera: "Rationale per se est animal," quia 'rationale' ex consequenti importat hominem.

〈Opinio tenens vocem primo significare passionem〉<sup>17</sup>

(1.3) Ad quaestionem dicitur uno modo quod vox primo significat passionem, nam ista se habent secundum ordinem: Res extra, passio in anima, vox, et littera. Res enim extra potest multiplicare speciem suam ad sensum, et tunc virtute intellectus agentis possunt species multiplicari usque ad intellectum patientem, et tunc mediante ista specie habet homo cognitionem de re. Sed quia homo est animal communicativum non sufficit sibi cognoscere res quarum species habet, sed indiget exprimere alii quod apud ipsum est et concipere quod apud<sup>18</sup> alios est. Et ideo in mente sunt voces tamquam instrumenta per quae conceptiones unius hominis possunt innotescere alii homini. Sed quia voces non manent, sed soni sunt cum sunt in fieri, nec se extendunt ad quamcumque distantiam, ideo indiget homo quibus instrumentis quae sunt signa vocis non manentis quantum ad praesentes et vocis similiter absentis, ut id quod per vocem non potest alteri innotescere propter distantiam sibi innotescat per signum vocis. Cum igitur quaeritur quid vox primo significet, dicitur quod vox immediate significat passionem rei, et passio rei immediate significat rem, et scriptura immediate significat vocem. Et quia quidquid est signum signi est signum signati, ideo vox mediate significat rem et in propositionibus est unio pro rebus et non pro passionibus, sicut in scriptura non est unio pro litteris scriptis sed in omni oratione est unio pro eo quod ultimo significatur, ut pro eo quod sic est significatum quod non significans.

〈Contra istam positionem〉

(1.4) Contra istam positionem: Si vox immediate significet passionem haec esset vera: "Homo est passio hominis." Probatio: Nam

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Lambertus Altissiodorus, *Logica* (ed. F. Alessio, 1971), 205–206: "Vox est illud quod profertur cum intellectu rei; tunc unitur significatio vocis, et efficitur vox significativa, et licet sit naturalis et intellectus rei et vox similiter, quia a naturalibus principiis formatur tamen quia a voluntate fit unio intellectus rei cum voce, et in hoc consistit vocis impositio, ideo vox dicitur significare ad voluntatem instituentis. Sic ergo vox primo et per se et immediate est signum intellectus rei; ulterius vero mediate est signum rei. Sicut enim dicitur quod quidquid est causa cause est causa causati sic potest dici suo modo quod quidquid est signum signi est signum significati, et sic rei est significatum. Vox que est signum signi, scilicet intellectus, erit signum significati, scilicet rei, sed immediate est signum intellectus, mediate autem signum rei."

<sup>18</sup> apud om. C



isti termini 'homo' et 'passio hominis' significant idem primo. Nulli <sup>19</sup> est dubium quin iste terminus 'passio hominis' significat passionem hominis. Et si isti termini significant idem primo, igitur significant idem ex consequenti, quoniam quidquid est signum signi est signum signati. Igitur ista nullo modo foret falsa "Homo est passio hominis," nec pro significatis primariis nec pro significatis ex consequenti.

(I.41) Praeterea, nomina sunt ad placitum; igitur nomen potest imponi cuilibet cognito et hoc in voluntate imponentis. Cum igitur res extra sit cognita potest nomen immediate significare rem extra.

(I.42) Similiter, hoc confirmatur, quia si vox necessario significaret passionem animae, ut ipsi dicunt, si vellem aliquam vocem imponere ad significandum oporteret me illam imponere ad significandum passionem sive vellem sive non; quod est absurdum dicere.

(I.43) Et similiter, res extra per prius cognoscitur quam cognoscatur passio animae, quia si prius cognosceretur passio animae quam res extra quaelibet res extra cognosceretur per discursum. Res igitur extra prius cognoscitur quam sua passio. In illo priori possibile est imponere nomen rei, et tunc non imponitur passioni, quia nomen non imponitur nisi noto, per *Commentatorem*, VII *Metaphysicae*.<sup>20</sup>

(I.44) Praeterea, possibile est quod aliquod nomen sit aequivocum ad rem et ad suam passionem. Cum igitur aequivocum significet omnia sua significata aeque primo, illud nomen non per prius significabit passionem rei quam ipsam rem.

(I.45) Praeterea, si quaelibet vox significaret primo talem passionem, quaelibet vox primo significaret rem de genere relationis, quia propria similitudo rei refertur ad rem cuius est similitudo.

(I.46) Praeterea, illud significatur per vocem quod per vocem primo apprehenditur. Sed, prolata voce, apprehenditur res et non passio, igitur vox primo significat rem.

(I.47) Praeterea, rei intendit imponens nomen imponere, igitur vox significat rem.

(I.48) Praeterea, per auctoritates: *Philosophus*, III *De anima*,<sup>21</sup> dicit quod lapis non est in anima sed species eius. Si tamen hoc nomen 'lapis' significaret speciem lapidis, ista foret falsa: "Lapis non est in anima."

<sup>19</sup> Nulli/Alicui non G

<sup>20</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VII, com. 54 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 95 va).

<sup>21</sup> Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 8, t. 38 (431b 29-432a 1).

(1.49) Praeterea, Philosophus, I *Elenchorum*,<sup>22</sup> dicit quod pro rebus utimur nominibus notis, et quia sunt infinitae et nomina finita oportet unum nomen significare plures res; ex quo videtur quod vox significat primo rem.

〈Quid nomine passionis significatur〉

(1.5) Circa dissolutionem istius quaestionis oportet primo videre quid nomine passionis significatur. Ad quod dicunt aliqui<sup>23</sup> quod passio non est species recepta in intellectu nec etiam actus intelligendi ipsius intellectus, sed est terminus actus. Sed est aliquid fabricatum ab intellectu veluti quoddam idolum in quo intellectus speculatur rem extra.

(1.51) Et quod tale idolum debeat poni in intellectu probatur tripliciter: Primo sic: Omnis actus et omnis comparatio habet aliquem terminum, ut dicitur V *Physicorum*,<sup>24</sup> igitur et actus intellectus, aliter non esset finitus et distinctus. Sed cum actus intellectus sit manens in intellectu necessario terminabitur ad aliquid intra et illud terminativum actus est tale idolum repraesentans rem extra.

(1.52) Secundo sic: Nulla potentia operatur nisi habeat obiectum sibi praesens aliquo modo, aliter operaretur circa nihil. Sed intellectus intelligit res absentes per essentiam; igitur habet aliquod obiectum sibi praesens in quo repraesentatur sibi res absens, et illud obiectum est tale idolum repraesentans rem absentem.

(1.53) Tertio sic: Sicut operatio transiens extra se habet ad obiectum extra sic operatio manens intra se habet ad obiectum intra. Sed operatio transiens extra non potest esse nisi sit obiectum extra, igitur operatio manens in agente ut in intellectu non potest esse nisi sit obiectum intra manens in ipso intellectu. Huiusmodi obiectum est tale idolum, quod dicitur passio animae. Exemplum huius ponitur, nam sicut quantumcumque species coloris esset in oculo meo non possem videre nisi esset color oppositus visui meo, sic quantumcumque species sit in intellectu non potest habere actum intellectionis nisi aliquod obiectum ponatur intra intellectum.

(1.6) Contra istam viam: Si tale idolum ponatur in intellectu ad hoc quod habeatur actus intelligendi, cum tale idolum non maneat semper sed solum ad praesentiam actus quo intellectus informatur, tunc quantumcumque aliquis haberet perfectam scientiam non posset

<sup>22</sup> Aristot., *Soph. elench.* I, c. 1 (165a 6–10).

<sup>23</sup> Robertus Grossatesta (?), *Summa philosophiae* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter, 9, Münster, 1912) 264, 297–298, loquitur de idolo ut id quod intelligitur, sed argumenta hic data non apud eum inveniuntur.

<sup>24</sup> Aristot., *Physica*, V, c. 1 (224b 35–225a 1).

intelligere aliquid perfecte nisi prius fabricaret obiectum intra per quod intelligeret, et hoc videtur inconueniens.

(1.61) Praeterea, a nullo philosopho invenitur quod per actionem manentem in agente sit aliquid productum in agente realiter differens ab illa actione, sed per actionem transeuntem ad extra est aliquid operatum praeter actionem et non per actionem manentem in agente. Unde Philosophus, IX *Metaphysicae*,<sup>25</sup> dicit: "Quorum non est aliquid aliud opus praeter actionem in istis, quod ista actio, ut visio in vidente et speculatio in speculante, et vita in anima." Item, Commentator, IX *Metaphysicae*, commento 18,<sup>25a</sup> dicit sic: "Quaedam res sunt quarum fines sunt agere tantum et quaedam res quarum fines est aliquid actum."

(1.62) Similiter, Commentator, supra textum Philosophi praeallegatum,<sup>26</sup> dicit quod "omnia quae non sunt acta, sed finis eorum est agere, actiones eorum existunt in eis, ut videre in vidente, et intelligere in intellectu."

(1.63) Hic habetur tam a Philosopho quam a Commentatore quod ubi actio est manens in agente non est aliquid operatum praeter ipsam actionem.

(1.64) Praeterea, Commentator, II *Coeli et Mundi*, comm. 17:<sup>27</sup> "Omne quod facit aliquam actionem propter aliquid, facit illam actionem propter aliam rem; et hoc erit cum finis fuerit passio et non actio. Fines enim aliquando sunt actiones tantum," ut operationes tantum, "et sunt aliquando actiones in passivis," ut actiones transeuntes extra.

(1.65) Ex istis potest concludi quod in intellectu non oportet ponere aliquem terminum intrinsecum differentem ab actu intelligendi et ita passio non debet poni aliquid idolum formatum in intellectu per actum intelligendi.

### 〈Responsio Gualteri Burlaei〉

(1.7) Ideo dicendum sicut dicit Ammonius hic<sup>28</sup> supra illud Philosophi "Voces sunt notae earum passionum quae sunt in anima," quod passio quantum ad propositum tripliciter po-

<sup>25</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, IX, c. 8, t. 16 (1050a 35–1050b 1).

<sup>25a</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, IX, com. 16 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 114ra).

<sup>26</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, IX, com. 16 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 115rb).

<sup>27</sup> Averroes *In Aristot. De coelo*, II, com. 17 (ed. Iuntina, V, Venetiis, 1550, f. 50rb).

<sup>28</sup> Ammonius, *Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d'Aristote* (ed. G. Verbeke, 32–39).

test sumi: Nam passio uno modo est motus appetitus sensitivi. Alio modo passio dicitur ipsa apprehensio facta in intellectu a re extra. Et neutro istorum modorum intellexit *Philosophus* passionem cum dixit quod "voces sunt notae passionum animae." Tertio modo sumitur passio pro ipsa re ut nata est movere intellectum, et sic sumendo passionem voces significant passiones, quia nihil aliud est significare passionem isto modo quam significare rem ut est proportionata intellectui. Et isto modo quaelibet vox significat passionem. Cuius ratio est: Nomen non imponitur nisi cognito ab intellectu; sed nihil est cognosci ab intellectu nisi secundum quod est proportionatum intellectui; et ideo nomen non imponitur alicui nisi secundum quod illud est proportionatum intellectui. Non tamen significat vox quaelibet primo aliquid existens in intellectu, nam sicut est in actu intelligendi sic est in actu significandi. Sed in actu intelligendi est considerare tria, scilicet rem intellectam et ipsum intellectum intelligentem, et speciem mediante qua res intelligitur, sic quod illa species non est illud quod primo intelligitur sed res primo intelligitur mediante specie. Sic in actu significandi est reperire tria: vocem significantem, rem significatam et speciem rei mediante qua res significatur. Et sicut species non est illud quod primo intelligitur sic species non est illud quod primo significatur sed res mediante specie.

(1.71) Unde pro quaestione breviter dicendum quod aliqua vox significat rem extra animam immediate, et aliqua passionem immediate, et aliqua utrumque immediate ut si sit aequivocum ad rem et ad passionem rei. Unde vox potest significare quidlibet quod placet imponenti; si enim oporteret imponentem imponere nomen passioni nomen non significaret ad placitum.

(1.8) Ad primam rationem:<sup>29</sup> Quod hoc signum 'omnis' significat aliquam rem et illa res est apta convenire pluribus, aliter non esset hoc nomen nomen appellativum. Sed res significata per hoc signum significatur per modum disponentis aliud et non secundum quod est res in se. Unde hoc signum 'omnis' non est terminus communis nec est omne nomen appellativum terminus communis. Nec valet "Hoc nomen significat rem quae nata est convenire pluribus; igitur est terminus communis," sed plus requiritur quod significaret per modum rei et non per modum modi. Significare rem per modum rei est significare rem absolute secundum quod est res in se, et significare rem per modum modi est significare rem secundum quod disponit aliud. Et isto modo significat hoc signum 'omnis.' Unde hoc signum 'omnis' nec est terminus singularis nec terminus communis.

(1.81) Et quando dicitur<sup>30</sup> quod si hoc signum 'omnis' significaret rem hic esset nugatio "Omnis res est," dico quod non sequitur quia hoc signum 'omnis' significat rem per modum modi et

<sup>29</sup> Supra, n. 1.1.

<sup>30</sup> Supra, n. 1.11.



hoc nomen 'res' per modum rei, et hoc excusat nugationem. Et similiter in ista 'Omnis modus rei est omnis modus rei'; secundum quod haec est singularis ly omnis significat rem per modum modi, et ideo non est nugatio etsi modus rei bis importetur a parte eiusdem extremi.

(1.82) Ad aliud principale:<sup>31</sup> quod hoc hominem 'homo' significat rem extra animam sed illa res non est una numero sed una secundum speciem, nec est omnis res extra animam una res numero.

(1.82I) Ad primum in contrariam<sup>32</sup> dicendum quod res significata per 'homo' est pars quidditativa et totum universale Sortis. Et quando quaeritur de residuo a natura speciei, dico quod natura speciei non separatur secundum esse ab illo residuo et in illo residuo est completa natura Sortis, et non est concedendum quod Sortes componatur ex natura speciei et toto residuo a natura speciei nisi concederetur quod Sortes componatur ex se ipso et alio. Et si dicitur "Natura speciei per te est una pars Sortis, igitur ex natura speciei et residuo componitur Sortes tamquam ex partibus, et per consequens illud residuum est pars Sortis; dicendum: Concedo quod natura speciei est una pars Sortis sed ex hoc non sequitur quod totum residuum sit alia pars, et hoc quia natura speciei et illud residuum sunt in esse coniuncta et non separantur nisi secundum considerationem intellectus.

(1.83) Ad aliud:<sup>33</sup> quod haec est vera: "Homo de se nec est universalis nec singularis" sive "Homo nec de se est universale nec singulare," et haec est vera secundum quod subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem. Nec verificatur ista secundum eandem suppositionem specialem secundum quam ista "Homo est species"; sed ista "Homo nec de se" etc. verificatur secundum quod 'homo' supponit pro significato absolute, sed in ista "Homo est species" supponit iste terminus 'homo' secundum quod abstrahitur a suppositis; sed in alia supponit iste terminus 'homo' pro significato absolute, non habendo aliquem respectum ad supposita nec ad intensionem. Et quando dicitur ulterius quod "tunc est haec vera 'Homo est aliquid quod nec de se est universale nec singulare,'" et cum quaeritur 'aut de se est aliquid etc. aut non de se', dicendum quod non de se. Unde semper dandae sunt negativae, et concedo processum in infinitum in talibus, sicut patet in simili: "Sortes est aliquid quod est homo" et "Sortes est aliquid quod est aliquid quod est homo," et adhuc "Sortes est aliquid quod est aliquid quod est aliquid quod est homo." Unde sic procedo in infinitum; non accidet aliqua non-intelligibilitas. Similiter, haec consequentia est bona "Homo currit, igitur hominem currere est verum," et consequens est una oratio indicativa,

<sup>31</sup> Supra, n. 1.12.

<sup>32</sup> Supra, n. 1.121.

<sup>33</sup> Supra, n. 1.13.

igitur infert verum enunciatum de suo dicto sic: "Si hominem currere est verum hominem currere esse verum est verum." Adhuc consequens est oratio indicativa et infert verum enunciatum de suo dicto; et sic in infinitum. Unde in consequentiis et in propositionibus non est inconveniens procedere in infinitum.

(1.84) Ad aliud:<sup>33a</sup> Quod res significata per hominem est una res specie, et tamen haec est falsa de virtute sermonis "Sortes est idem Platoni specie sive secundum speciem," quia tunc Sortes esset Plato specie. Ista tamen forte est vera "Sortes et Plato sunt idem specie" et debet iste ablativus 'specie' teneri adverbialiter secundum quod haec est vera et est idem dicere ac si diceretur "Sortes et Plato sunt idem specificè." Unde in talibus "Ista sunt eadem numero" et "Ista sunt eadem specie" vel "genere," ista ablativa tenentur adverbialiter. Communiter tamen admittuntur tales: "Sortes est idem Platoni specie" sub hoc sensu: Sortes convenit cum Platone in specie.

(1.85) Ad aliud:<sup>34</sup> quod iste terminus 'homo' et iste terminus 'homines' significant eandem rem et non differunt nisi in modo significandi. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod isti termini habeant eadem supposita. Unde sciendum quod res habet supposita et terminus similiter. Supposita rei significatae sunt res et non voces, et supposita vocis significantis sunt voces et non res significatae. Et secundum hoc est concedendum quod nullus homo est suppositum alicuius termini sed omnis homo est suppositum rei significatae per aliquem terminum. Unde supposita huius termini 'homo' sunt tales voces 'iste homo,' 'ille homo' et supposita huius termini 'homines' sunt tales termini 'isti homines,' 'illi homines.' Et sic patet quod isti termini 'homo,' 'homines' non habent eadem supposita; res tamen significatae per istos terminos habent eadem supposita. Tu dices: "Igitur pro aliquo eodem fuerit distributio in istis "Omnis homo currit," "Omnes homines currunt," et hoc pro aliquo eodem supposito rei; dicendum quod si velimus dicere quod pro suppositis rei fiat distributio conclusio est concedenda. Nec tamen propter hoc erit haec vera "Homo est homines," quia supposita terminorum non sunt idem. Vel aliter et melius: Quod etsi in numero singulari fiat distributio pro suppositis rei significatae per terminum, tamen in numero plurali non, sed in numero plurali fit distributio pro aggregatis ex suppositis rei significatae per terminum. Unde in ista "Omnes homines currunt" non fit distributio pro aliquo supposito rei significatae per terminum, tamen in numero plurali non, sed in numero plurali fit distributio pro aggregatis ex suppositis rei significatae per terminum. Unde in ista "Omnes homines currunt" non fit distributio pro aliquo supposito rei significatae per subiectum, quia non fit distributio pro aliquo homine sed fit distributio pro aggre-

<sup>33a</sup> Supra, n. 1.14.

<sup>34</sup> Supra, n. 1.15.

gato ex Sorte et Platone ut pro eo quod significatur per istum terminum 'isti homines.'

(1.851) Ad primum in contrariam:<sup>35</sup> Quod in ista "Omnis homo currit" fit distributio pro istis hominibus, demonstratis Sorte et Platone, secundum quod ly 'istis' tenetur divisive, et sic est haec falsa "Isti homines sunt hoc suppositum." Sed haec est vera "Isti homines sunt hoc suppositum" secundum quod subiectum supponit materialiter.

(1.86) Ad aliud:<sup>36</sup> Quod iste terminus 'isti homines' non significat aliquam unam rem sed significat plura. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod sit vox non-significativa, nam illa vox est non-significativa quae nec significat unum nec plura. Sic dico de hoc copulato 'Sortes et Plato' quod hoc copulatum non significat aliquid sed significat plura. Et tu dices: Si hoc copulatum significaret plura et non significat unum per prius quam aliud, igitur esset aequivocum, quia significaret plura aequae primo et non significat nisi Sortem et Platonem, igitur haec aliquo sensu esset vera "Sortes est Sortes et Plato." Ad istud dicendum quod hoc copulatum 'Sortes et Plato' significat plura; nec ex hoc sequitur quod sit aequivocum, nam aliquid significare plura est dupliciter: Vel sic quod significat utrumque istorum, et illud quod sic significat plura est aequivocum. Alio modo aliquid significat plura non quia significat unum et etiam aliud, sed quia suum significatum est plura, et sic hoc copulatum 'Sortes et Plato' significat plura, quia non significat nisi Sortem et Platonem, et ista sunt plura.

(1.87) Ad aliud:<sup>37</sup> Quod etsi iste terminus 'homines' determinetur ad standum pro significato et iste terminus 'homo' similiter, adhuc est haec falsa "Homines *A* sunt<sup>38</sup> homines *B*," etsi enim absolute idem insit sibi tamen eadem res sub uno modo significandi non inest sibi ipsa sub alio modo significandi, sicut patet. Haec enim est falsa "Homines est homo," et tamen subiectum et praedicatum significant idem. Per hoc patet quod haec est falsa "Species est homines sive homines sunt species"; etsi enim res significata per praedicatum absolute loquendo insit rei significatae per subiectum tamen res significata per praedicatum non inest rei significatae per subiectum sub isto modo significandi.

(1.88) Ad aliud:<sup>39</sup> Quod in ista "Tantum homo currit" alicui denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise, quia homini stanti pro supposito denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise et ei quod non est Sortes

<sup>35</sup> Supra, n. 1.151.

<sup>36</sup> Supra, n. 1.16.

<sup>37</sup> Supra, n. 1.17.

<sup>38</sup> sunt/est C

<sup>39</sup> Supra, n. 1.18.

denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise, et cum ista exclusiva non denotet nisi unum, concedendum est quod ei quod non est Sortes inest praedicatum praecise. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod Sorti non insit praedicatum, quia per exclusivam non excluditur quidlibet quod non est idem cui denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise, sed quidlibet excluditur de quo non vere dicitur illud cui denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise. Vel aliter: Quod per istam "Tantum homo est risibilis" non alicui denotatur praedicatum inesse praecise, sed haec est vera: Praedicatum denotetur inesse alicui praecise et hic ly alicui non stat disiunctive.

(I.89) Ad aliud:<sup>40</sup> Quod demonstratis quatuor hominibus haec est falsa: "Isti quatuor sunt duo supposita huius termini 'homines,'" quia isti quatuor homines non sunt supposita alicuius termini, et ideo haec maior est vera: "Omnia quae sunt ista quatuor sunt aliqua quorum quodlibet est homo." Sed tunc est haec falsa: "Ista duo supposita, demonstratis duobus suppositis huius termini 'homines,' sunt ista quatuor."

(I.810-II) Ad aliud principale:<sup>41</sup> Quod iste terminus 'Sortes' significat aliquam rem extra animam et significat idem quod iste terminus 'compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima,' nam certum est quod iste terminus 'compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima'<sup>42</sup> non significat nisi rem de genere substantiae et significat idem quod aliquod suppositum de genere substantiae. Et ideo haec est necessaria "Sortes est compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima." Nec ex hac sequitur "Igitur hoc corpus et haec anima componunt Sortem," sicut non sequitur "Compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima est compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima,"<sup>43</sup> ergo hoc corpus et haec anima componunt compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima," quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens. *C o n t r a*: sequitur "Sortes est compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima, igitur Sortes est compositum ex istis, demonstratis hoc corpore et hac anima," et ulterius "Igitur ista componunt Sortem" et ultra "Igitur hoc corpus et haec anima componunt Sortem," igitur "a primo" etc.; *d i c e n d u m* quod non sequitur "Sortes est compositum ex istis, igitur ista componunt Sortem," sicut non sequitur "Compositum ex istis est compositum ex istis, igitur ista componunt compositum ex istis," et maius inconveniens quod ex ista enunciatione sequitur etiam quod Sortes componitur ex istis quae non componunt Sortem, et istam concedo. *T u d i c e s*: Igitur Sorte corrupto, haec esset vera: "Sortes est compositus ex entibus, et ita non-ens componeretur ex entibus"; *d i c o* quod non sequitur "Sortes componitur ex istis et

<sup>40</sup> Supra, n. I.19.

<sup>41</sup> Supra, nn. I.110 et I.111.

<sup>42</sup> ex... anima/etc. G

<sup>43</sup> ex... anima/etc. G



ista sunt entia, ergo Sortes componitur ex entibus," sicut patet si loco Sortis ponatur iste terminus 'compositum ex istis.' Unde Sorte corrupto, haec est falsa "Sortes est compositum."

(1.812) Et tu dices:<sup>43a</sup> Sorte corrupto iste terminus 'Sortes' significat aliquid; aut ergo significat simplex aut compositum. Non simplex, ergo compositum; ergo Sorte corrupto, est haec vera: Sortes est quoddam compositum; dicendum quod Sorte corrupto, Sortes significat aliquid, sed nec significat simplex, nec etiam compositum, quia simplex et compositum solum significat illud quod est.

(1.813) Ad aliud principale:<sup>44</sup> Quod haec est vera: "Homo est species," quia res significata per istum terminum 'species' salvatur in quolibet supposito cuiuslibet speciei, ideo res significata per istum terminum 'species' habet esse in anima et etiam extra animam, quia aliquod suppositum eius est in anima et aliquod extra animam, et commune salvatur in quolibet supposito. Per hoc patet ad rationem in contrariam.

(1.814) Ad aliud principale:<sup>45</sup> Quod iste terminus 'animal rationale' significat idem quod 'homo.' Unde ex parte rei significatae per definitionem et nomen definiti nulla est diversitas. Sciendum tamen est quod eadem res uno modo considerata est notior se ipsa alio modo considerata. Res enim significata per istum terminum 'homo' potest considerari dupliciter: aut absolute et sic significatur hoc nomine 'homo,' vel in quantum componitur ex talibus principiis, scilicet ex tali genere et ex tali differentia. Et ista res secundo modo considerata est notior se ipsa primo modo considerata, et sic dico quod ista "Omne animal rationale est risibile" est notior quam ista "Omnia homo est risibilis." Et tamen eadem res significatur per utramque sed alio et alio modo, et sic idem sub una ratione est notior se ipso sub alia ratione.

(1.815) Ad aliud principale:<sup>46</sup> Quod res extra intelligitur; et cum dicitur quod ex intellectu et intelligibili etc., haec est sic intelligendum quod ex specie quae est ratio intelligendi et intellectu verius fit unum quam ex materia et forma, quia ex eis fit unum simplicius quam fit ex materia et forma. Et similiter ex intellectu et specie in intellectu fit unum sine alia transmutatione reali, sed ex materia et forma non.

(1.816) Ad ultimum:<sup>47</sup> Quod per conceptum Priscianus intelligit rem ut concipitur, et idem intelligit Philosophus per passionem cum dicit "Voces sunt notae passionum."

<sup>43a</sup> Supra, n. 1.112.

<sup>44</sup> Supra, n. 1.113.

<sup>45</sup> Supra, n. 1.114.

<sup>46</sup> Supra, n. 1.115.

<sup>47</sup> Supra, n. 1.116.

## 〈QUAESTIO SECUNDA〉

(2.01) *Si tantum pater est non tantum pater est.*<sup>1</sup> Quaeritur an haec consequentia valeat: "Tantum pater est, igitur non tantum pater est."

〈Quod haec consequentia non valet〉

(2.1) Quod non videtur, quia si valeret hoc esset quia incluso aliquo excluderetur<sup>2</sup> quodlibet aliud ab incluso. Sed hoc est falsum, nam haec exclusiva est vera: Tantum exclusum per exclusivam propositam excluditur per exclusivam propositam, et sit ita quod nulla alia exclusiva proponatur. Quaero: Aut Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam aut non. Si sic, igitur ab eo removetur vere praedicatum, igitur haec est vera: Sortes non excluditur per exclusivam propositam; igitur si Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam Sortes non excluditur per exclusivam propositam. Subiectum igitur exclusivae propositae vere removetur a Sorte et omne tale excluditur per exclusivam propositam, igitur Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam, igitur si Sortes non excluditur per exclusivam propositam Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam.<sup>3</sup>

(2.10) Praeterea, si consequentia valeat hoc esset per tale medium "Pater est, igitur filius est" et ultra "Igitur non tantum pater est." Sed haec consequentia non valet "Pater est, igitur filius est," quia si sic, sequeretur "Iste pater est, igitur suus filius est." Sed haec consequentia non valet, quoniam haec est vera "Iste pater fuit antequam suus filius fuit," et per consequens ista "Iste pater est" fuit vera antequam ista fuit vera "Suus filius est," et per consequens non sequitur "Iste pater est, igitur suus filius est."

(2.11) Praeterea, quod haec consequentia non valeat "Pater est, igitur filius est," quia tunc iste pater refertur ad istum filium, et sequeretur eodem modo "Iste pater est, igitur iste filius est," quae consequentia non valet. Demonstrato patre habente plures filios, si corrumpatur unus filius, haec est vera "Iste pater est" et haec falsa "Iste filius est"; et quod sit idem Pater qui refertur ad omnes istos filios patet, quia aliter isti filii non haberent eundem patrem.

(2.12) Praeterea, si aliquis generet antequam iste qui est in utero vivit, haec est vera "Iste pater est" et tamen haec falsa "Suus filius est." Quod autem haec sit vera "Iste pater est" patet, nam de non-patre non potest fieri pater absque hoc quod generet. Ponatur igitur quod iste nunquam postea generet; iste postea erit pater quando filius vivet, igitur fuit pater antequam filius vixit, aliter de non-patre fieret pater absque generatione.

<sup>1</sup> Sophisma *add. (interl.)* G

<sup>2</sup> excluderetur/excluditur G

<sup>3</sup> per... propositam/etc. G

(2.13) Praeterea, habens filium et non-filium est pater, aliter falsum diceret filius "Iste est meus pater"; igitur non sequitur "Iste pater est, igitur suus filius est." Praeterea, nec sequitur e converso "Filius est, igitur suus pater est," quia posito quod pater moriatur antequam filius vivet, postea filio vivente haec est vera "Iste filius est," aliter falsum diceret mater dicendo "Iste est meus filius"; igitur non sequitur "Iste filius est, igitur suus pater est."

(2.14) Praeterea, si filius refertur ad patrem eadem ratione filii in numero plurali referentur ad aliquid, quia nihil est respectum in numero singulari et absolutum in numero plurali. Aut igitur ly filii referuntur ad patrem vel ad patres. Si ad patres, tunc sequeretur "Filii sunt, igitur patres sunt"; quod non est verum, quia posito quod non esset nisi unus pater et haberet plures filios, tunc est antecedens verum et consequens falsum. Nec referuntur 'filii' ad patrem, quia tunc sequeretur "Isti sunt filii, igitur sunt patris filii"; quod non est verum, demonstratis filiis diversorum patrum. Et similiter sequeretur "Pater est, igitur filii sunt," ubi antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente.

(2.15) Praeterea, haec est falsa "Pater et Filius referuntur." Probatio: Quia si sic, aut referuntur per relationem aut per relationes. Si per relationem, aut igitur per paternitatem aut per filiationem. Si pater et filius referuntur per paternitatem, igitur filius refertur ad patrem per paternitatem et tunc paternitas esset subiective in filio. Et si detur aliud membrum, quod pater et filius referuntur per filiationem, igitur pater refertur ad filium per filiationem et per consequens filiatio esset subiective in patre. Si autem detur quod pater et filius referuntur relationibus, igitur pater refertur ad filium relationibus; sed hoc est falsum.

(2.16) Praeterea, quod non sequatur "Filius est, igitur pater est," quia aliquid sequitur ad consequens quod non ad antecedens, nam sequitur "Pater est, igitur paternitas est" et ultra "Igitur actio generandi patris est." Sed non sequitur "Filius est, igitur actio generandi patris est," quia tunc sequatur "Filius est, igitur pater generat." Probatio huius consequentiae: "Paternitas est, igitur actio generandi patris est," nam paternitas fundatur super actionem patris; nunc autem ita est quod relatio non potest manere destructo fundamento relationis; igitur patet similitudo fundata super albedinem non manet destructa albedine, igitur nec paternitas manet destructa actione patris.

〈Quod consequentia data valet〉

(2.2) Ad oppositum: Sequitur "Tantum pater est, igitur omne ens est pater" et ulterius "Igitur coelum est pater" et ultra "Igitur coelum est" et ulterius "Igitur non tantum pater est." Dicitur ad probationem quod consequentia est bona propter rationem ad

oppositum et similiter quia sequitur "Tantum pater est, igitur pater est" et ulterius "Igitur filius est" et ultra "Igitur non tantum Pater est." *C o n t r a* istam positionem: Quod non sequatur "Filius est, igitur non tantum pater est." Probatur, quia ex opposito consequentis non sequitur oppositum antecedentis, nam si sic, haec esset quia incluso aliquo excluderetur omne aliud ab incluso. Sed hoc non oportet, quoniam ista stant simul: "Tantum habens supposita est habens supposita" et "Aliquid quod non habet supposita est habens supposita," quoniam utraque istarum est vera. De exclusiva non est dubium; et alia est vera similiter, quoniam sequitur "Homo non habens supposita est habens supposita, igitur aliquid non habens supposita est habens supposita." Antecedens est verum, igitur consequens. Veritas antecedentis patet, quia 'homo' et 'homo non habens supposita' convertuntur quantum ad supposita: Sicut enim haec est vera "Omnis homo est homo" sic et ista "Omnis homo est homo non habens supposita." Cum igitur 'homo' habet supposita sequitur quod 'homo non habens supposita' habet supposita.

(2.21) Praeterea, cum ista exclusiva "Tantum Sortes est aliquid a quo differt aliud a Sorte" stat haec "Plato est aliquid a quo differt aliud a Sorte," quia utraque istarum est vera. De exclusiva non videtur dubium; et haec similiter est vera "Plato est aliquid a quo differt aliud a Sorte," quia sequitur "Plato est aliquid a quo differt Cicero, igitur Plato est aliquid a quo differt aliud a Sorte." Et si d i c a t u r quod non sequitur "A Platone differt Cicero, igitur a Platone differt aliud a Sorte," quia 'differt' confundit; *C o n t r a*: Si 'differt' hic confunderet, haec esset falsa: "A Sorte differt aliquid," quia ex hac sequeretur quod a Sorte differt Sortes, et haec esset vera "A Sorte differt quidlibet," quod non apparet verum.

(2.22) Praeterea, ista stant simul "Tantum Sortes vel Plato est animal visum ab istis," demonstratis Sorte et Platone, et "Cicero est animal visum ab istis," quia posito principali utraque istarum est vera. Posito enim quod Sortes videat Platonem et se ipsum, et quod Plato videat Sortem et se ipsum, et quod nullum animal visum a Sorte sit visum a Platone nisi solum Sortes, et quod nullum animal visum a Platone sit visum a Sorte nisi solum Plato, et quod Sortes videat multa animalia quae Plato non videt de quorum numero sit Cicero, tunc est exclusiva vera et alia propositio similiter, et per consequens cum exclusiva stat attributio praedicati alii ab incluso. Si d i c a t u r quod isto casu posito ista est falsa "Cicero est animal visum ab istis"; *c o n t r a*: Cicero est de numero animalium visorum ab istis, demonstratis omnibus animalibus quae videntur a Sorte et etiam a Platone, sive videantur ab utroque sive ab uno tantum. Modo sequitur: "Cicero est de numero animalium visorum ab istis; igitur Cicero est animal visum ab istis." D i c i t u r quod haec consequentia non valet "Cicero est de numero animalium visorum ab istis, igitur Cicero est animal visum ab istis," sicut non se-



quitur "Sortes est de numero non-hominum, igitur Sortes est non-homo," quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, quia demonstratis Sorte cum duobus asinis, haec est vera "Sortes est de numero istorum," ex qua sequitur "Igitur Sortes est de numero non-hominum"; haec igitur est vera; *contra*: Posito quod non sit aliquod animal visum a Sorte nec etiam a Platone quod sit ita album sicut Cicero, ista tunc est vera: "Cicero est albissimum animalium visorum ab istis," quia Cicero est albissimus istorum, demonstratis omnibus animalibus visis ab istis. Nunc sequitur "Cicero est albissimum animalium visorum ab istis, igitur Cicero est animal visum ab istis," quia superlativus gradus requirit quod terminus ad quem vere praedicetur de termino a quo; aliter haec esset possibilis "Sortes est albissimus asinorum."

(2.23) Praeterea, ad principalem conclusionem arguo sic: Haec est vera "Tantum verum infertur ex vero," et haec similiter "Impossibile infertur ex vero"; igitur etc. Probatio assumpti: Nam haec est vera: Contradicta repugnant vero, igitur verum infert opposita contradictorum; sed omnia opposita contradictorum sunt opposita inter se; igitur verum infert opposita inter se. Probatio antecedentis: Nam contradicta inferunt oppositum veri, sicut patet in syllogismo ex oppositis; igitur contradicta repugnant vero. *Tu dices* quod contradicta non inferunt oppositum veri sed una copulativa facta ex contradictis vel etiam aliquod antecedens syllogisticum; *contra*: Demonstratis istis 'Sortes currit,' 'Sortes non currit,' singularia huiusmodi—utrumque istorum est verum—inferunt oppositum veri, quia inferunt hanc universalem et per consequens utramque singularem huius universalis, et una singularis huiusmodi est oppositum veri; igitur singularia huiusmodi inferunt oppositum veri. Sed singularia huiusmodi sunt contradicta vel aequipollent contradictis; igitur contradicta inferunt oppositum veri.

(2.24) Praeterea, aliter probatur quod cum exclusiva stat quod praedicatum insit alii ab inclusio, quoniam haec est vera: "Tantum contingentia contingit esse vera" et haec similiter: "Deum esse et te sedere contingit esse vera," et tamen "Deum esse et te sedere non sunt contingentia." Probo quod stant simul, quia utraque istarum est vera. Exclusiva est vera, quia universalis de terminis transpositis est vera, quoniam omnes propositiones quas contingit esse veras possunt esse verae et non esse verae; et omnes tales propositiones sunt contingentes per definitionem <sup>4</sup> contingentis, ut patet. Et haec similiter est vera: "Deum esse et te sedere contingit esse vera," quia Deum esse et te sedere possunt esse vera et possunt non esse vera. *Dicitur* quod haec est falsa "Tantum contingentia contingit esse vera," et universalis de terminis transpositis similiter. Nec sequitur "Istae propositiones possunt esse verae et possunt non esse verae,

<sup>4</sup> definitionem/divisionem G

igitur istae propositiones sunt contingentes." Et ideo haec est falsa: "Omnes propositiones quas contingit esse veras sunt contingentes"; *contra*: Probo quod haec sit vera, et hoc sic: In ista "Omnis propositio quam contingit esse veram" est propositio "Tantum pro propositionibus contingentibus fit distributio," quia non fit distributio nisi pro illis de quibus dicitur subiectum. Tunc arguo: "Tantum pro propositionibus contingentibus fit distributio in hac; et pro omnibus propositionibus quas contingit esse veras fit distributio in hac; igitur omnes propositiones quas contingit esse veras sunt contingentes."

(2.25) Ad principale: Demonstratis Sorte et Platone, haec est vera "Tantum Sortes et homo sunt isti homines," et haec similiter "Plato et homo sunt isti homines"; igitur cum exclusiva stat quod praedicatum insit alii ab inclusio. Veritas exclusivae patet, quoniam haec est vera: "Omnia quae sunt isti homines sunt Sortes et homo," nam sequitur ex hac vera: "Omnia quae sunt isti homines sunt Sortes et Plato." Et alia est vera similiter, quia sequitur "Sortes et Plato sunt isti homines, igitur Sortes et homo sunt isti homines." *Dicitur* quod ista stant simul; nec per istam "Plato et homo sunt isti homines" attribuitur praedicatum alii ab inclusio; *contra*: Sequitur "Plato et homo sunt isti homines, igitur aliquid quod non est Sortes et homo sunt isti homines," igitur istae starent simul "Tantum Sortes et homo sunt isti homines" et "Aliquid quod non est Sortes et homo sunt isti homines" et sic cum exclusiva stat quod praedicatum insit <sup>5</sup> alii ab inclusio.

(2.26) Praeterea, ista stant simul: "Tantum Sortes est aliquid et Sortes" et "Sortes et Plato sunt aliquid et Sortes"; vel accipiat ista "Ens Sortis et Plato est aliquid et Sortes," quia utraque istarum est vera. *Dicitur* quod haec est falsa "Ens Sortis et Plato est aliquid et Sortes"; *contra*: "Ens Sortis et Plato est Plato et Sortes, igitur ens Sortis et Plato est aliquid et Sortes." Antecedens verum, igitur consequens. Consequentia patet dupliciter: Primo, quia ex opposito consequentis infertur <sup>6</sup> oppositum antecedentis, nam arguendo ex opposito consequentis arguitur a negatione superioris ad negationem inferioris, cum iste terminus 'aliquid' sit per se superius ad 'Sortem.' Et similiter sequitur "Ens Sortis et Plato est Sortes et Plato, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt ens Sortis et Plato"; et ultra "Igitur aliquid et Plato sunt ens Sortis et Plato," et ulterius "Igitur ens Sortis et Plato est aliquid et Plato."

(2.27) Praeterea, ista stant simul: "Tantum Sortes est idem sibi" et "Plato est idem sibi," quia utraque istarum est vera. *Dicitur* quod exclusiva est falsa; *contra*: Sic dicto "Tantum Sortes est idem sibi," quaero utrum ly sibi solum stat pro Sorte vel etiam sit

<sup>5</sup> quod... insit/attributio praedicati G

<sup>6</sup> infertur/sequitur G

indifferens ad Sortem et Platonem. Si solum stet pro Sorte, igitur idem est dicere: "Tantum Sortes est idem sibi" et dicere "Tantum Sortes est idem Sorti"; sed haec secunda est vera, igitur et alia. Si ly sibi sit unum commune indifferens ad Sortem et Platonem, igitur esset terminus communis et posset distribui pro suppositis et praedicatur de suppositis, quod patet esse falsum.

(2.28) Praeterea, demonstratis omnibus propositionibus quae nunc primo sunt verae, haec est vera: "Tantum aliquod istorum nunc primo est verum"; et haec similiter: "Aliud ab altero istorum nunc primo est verum." Quod exclusiva sit vera patet, quia utraque exponens est vera, et alia est vera similiter, quoniam haec exclusiva nunc primo est vera. Quaero tunc: Aut in hac exclusiva demonstratur haec eadem exclusiva vel non? Si sic, pars demonstraret totum cuius est. Si non, igitur haec exclusiva est aliud ab altero istorum, eisdem demonstratis. Et haec exclusiva non primo est vera; igitur aliud ab altero istorum nunc primo est verum.

(2.29) Praeterea, ista stant simul: "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus," demonstratis Sorte et Platone, et "A Sorte videtur asinus," et tamen idem praedicatum est in istis, et tamen praedicatum attribuitur vere alii ab inclusio. Et exclusiva est vera, posito quod Sortes et Plato videant asinum<sup>7</sup> et nulli alii, tunc est exclusiva vera, quia utraque exponens est vera. Dicitur quod isto posito, haec est falsa "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus"; et negativa exponens est falsa, quia haec est negativa exponens "A nullo alio ab istis videtur asinus"; contra: Isto posito, quod exclusiva sic habeat exponi, ex vero sequeretur falsum. Posito enim quod quilibet homo videat unum animal et quod nullum animal videat nisi homo, haec tunc est falsa "Tantum ab istis videntur animalia," demonstratis Sorte et Platone, et tamen utraque exponens est vera. Haec enim est vera "Ab istis videntur animalia"; et haec similiter "A nullo alio ab istis videntur animalia," et per te exclusiva sic debet exponi. Tu dices quod quando praedicatum est in numero singulari et subiectum accipitur pluraliter, tunc debet exclusiva exponi modo praedicto, sed si praedicatum sumatur in numero plurali, non oportet; contra: Idem est inclusum in istis "Tantum ab istis videntur animalia" et "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus," igitur eadem excluduntur per utramque et per consequens<sup>8</sup> in negativa exponente utriusque.

(2.210) Praeterea, sit *A* haec propositio "Omne<sup>9</sup> ens currit." Haec exclusiva est vera "Tantum pro inferiori ad ens fit distributio in *A*," et haec similiter "Pro eo quod non est inferius ad ens fit distributio in *A*." Quod exclusiva sit vera patet, quia haec est vera "Quodlibet pro quo fit distributio in *A* est inferius ad ens"; et alia est vera

<sup>7</sup> asinum/Platonem G

<sup>8</sup> consequens/idem erit subiectum *add.* G

<sup>9</sup> Omne/quodlibet G

similiter: Haec enim est vera "Pro eo quod non est inferius ad ens fit distributio in *A*," nam sequitur "Pro quolibet fit distributio in *A* aliquid est idem quod non est inferius ad ens, igitur pro aliquo quod non est inferius ad ens fit distributio in *A*." Dicitur quod haec est falsa "Tantum pro inferiori ad ens fit distributio in *A*" et universalis de terminis transpositis similiter; contra: Probo quod ista universalis sit vera, nam nihil est sumere sub termino nisi inferius ad terminum; sed quodlibet pro quo fit distributio in *A* contingit sumere sub subiecto ipsius *A*; igitur quodlibet pro quo fit distributio in *A* est inferius ad ens.

(2.211) Praeterea, haec est vera "Quidlibet est inferius ad ens; sed quidlibet pro quo fit distributio in *A* est aliquid; igitur" etc. Probatio maioris: Si ista sit falsa "Quidlibet est inferius ad ens," cum non sit falsa in toto possit verificari per exceptionem. Sit igitur illud pro quo est falsa *B*. Haec tunc est vera "Quidlibet praeter *B* est inferius ad ens." Cum igitur exceptio sit extra captio partis a toto oportet quod id quod hic excipitur sit inferius ad ens. Igitur haec est vera "*B* est inferius ad ens," et per consequens ista exceptiva est falsa "Quidlibet praeter *B* est inferius ad ens," quia ista ponit quod *B* non est inferius ad ens.

(2.212) Praeterea, ista stant simul: "Tantum verum cuius contradictum est falsum est propositio" et "Aliquid quod non est verum cuius contradictum est falsum est propositio," quia utraque istarum est vera. De secunda non est dubium, quia sequitur ex hac vera "Aliquod falsum est propositio." Et prima est vera, scilicet exclusiva, quia utraque exponens est vera. Dicitur quod exclusiva est falsa et sua negativa exponens similiter; contra: Oppositum negativae exponentis est falsum, quia sequitur "Aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum est propositio, igitur aliquod verum cuius contradictum est falsum est propositio." Vel sic et melius: Sequitur "Aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum est propositio, igitur aliqua propositio est aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum." Sed haec est falsa, quia nec propositio vera est aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum, nec propositio falsa. Non propositio vera, quia propositio vera est verum cuius contradictum est falsum, igitur non est aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum. Nec propositio falsa, quia sequitur "Aliqua propositio falsa est aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum, igitur aliqua propositio falsa est aliquid cuius contradictum est falsum." Sed haec est falsa. Et haec consequentia patet, quia 'aliud a vero' est inferius ad hoc commune 'aliquid.' Hic igitur arguitur ab inferiori ad superius a parte praedicati, subiecto manente eodem. Et similiter sequitur "Propositio falsa est aliud a vero cuius contradictum est falsum, igitur propositio falsa est aliud a vero, et illius contradictum est falsum." Et ulterius "Igitur propositio falsa est aliquid, et illius contradictum est falsum."

(2.213) Praeterea, in istis est idem praedicatum "Tantum a



Sorte datur denarius" et "Platoni datur denarius"; et per consequens per exclusivam non excluditur quodlibet aliud ab incluso.

(2.214) Praeterea, ista stant simul: "Tantum propositio est propositio vera" et "Repugnans propositioni est propositio vera."

(2.22) Ad probationem <sup>10</sup> dicendum quod consequentia est bona; quod patet per rationem ad oppositum et aliter sic: "Si tantum pater est, pater est," et ultra "Igitur pars patris est," et ulterius "Igitur non tantum pater est." Unde de consequentia principali non videtur esse dubium.

(2.23) Sed dubium est de istis consequentiis quae fiunt communiter: "Pater est, igitur filius est," et similiter "Filius est, igitur non tantum pater est."

(2.24) Quia dicunt aliqui <sup>11</sup> ad primam consequentiam quod non sequitur "Pater est, igitur Filius est," quia relativa respectu exsistere non se interimunt nec etiam ponunt sed respectu esse essentiae et dependentiae. Quod videtur sic: Prius et posterius tempore sunt relativa, et tamen non sequitur "Prius tempore est, igitur posterius tempore est." Sic enim sequeretur: Festum Sancti Thomae est, igitur festum nativitatis Domini est. Et addunt alii <sup>12</sup> ulterius quod relativa sunt simul non quantum <sup>13</sup> ad exsistere sed quantum ad denominationem subiectorum, ita quod quandocumque est verum dicere "Hoc est prius" est haec vera "Hoc est posterius," demonstrato posteriori.

(2.25) Sed hoc stare non potest. Posito enim quod Pater et Filius sint relativa, probo hanc consequentiam "Pater est, igitur filius est," nam sequitur "Pater est, igitur pater filii est," et ultra "Igitur aliquis est filius cuius est pater." Modo sequitur "Si aliquis est filius, ille est," cum iste terminus 'filius' sit terminus concretus actualis et solum dicatur de praesentibus sicut iste terminus 'albus.' Modo sequitur "Si aliquis est filius et ille est, filius est," igitur *a primo* "Si pater est, filius est." Vel sub alia forma: "Si iste pater est, est pater alicuius." Sit ille *A* cuius est pater. Tunc iste est pater ipsius *A*, et non est pater nisi filii, igitur *A* est filius. Ex qua sequitur "Igitur *A* est." Modo sequitur "*A* est, et *A* est filius, igitur filius est"; igitur "Si iste pater est, filius est," et sic est arguendum de quolibet alio patre.

(2.26) Praeterea, Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*, cap. 'De relatione' <sup>14</sup> ubi ponit istam proprietatem 'relativa sunt simul

<sup>10</sup> probationem/quod G

<sup>11</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non inveni.

<sup>12</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non inveni.

<sup>13</sup> non quantum/numquam C

<sup>14</sup> Aristot., *Praedicamenta*, cap. De 'ad aliquid' (7b 15-8a 12).

natura,' dicit quod scientia et scibile non sunt vere relativa, nec sensus et sensibile. Quod probat sic: Destructa scientia non propter hoc destruitur scibile, quia etsi nulla scientia esset adhuc essent multa scibilia, et destructo sensu non propter hoc destruitur sensibile, quoniam destructo animali, et si nullum animal est destruitur sensus, quia tunc nullus sensus est; sed etsi nullum animal esset adhuc multa sensibilia essent, ut calidum, frigidum. Ex hoc concludit quod scibile non refertur ad scientiam, nec sensibile ad sensum. Igitur ad hoc quod aliqua sint vere relativa requiritur quod posito uno respectu exsistere ponatur aliud, et e converso. Et ideo dicendum quod haec consequentia est bona "Pater est, igitur filius est"; et generaliter relativa quae per se sunt in genere relationis vel quorum relationes sunt per se in genere relationis talia posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt. Nec valet instantia de priori et posteriori, quia prius et posterius non sunt in genere relationis sed circueunt omnes genus, quoniam in omni genere reperitur prius et posterius.

(2.27) Ad secundam consequentiam<sup>15</sup> dicunt aliqui<sup>16</sup> quod non sequitur "Filius est, igitur non tantum pater est," sicut patet. Non sequitur ex opposito, quia idem potest esse pater et filius, et ideo incluso patre non excluditur filius. Sed contra: Sequitur<sup>17</sup> "Filius est, igitur aliquis filius qui non est pater est," et ultra "Igitur non tantum pater est." Prima consequentia patet, quia antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente nisi ponantur multi filii simul, quod est inconueniens. Probo, nam si aliquis filius est, quaero: Aut est pater, aut non. Si non, habetur propositum, scilicet quod filius qui non est pater est. Si sit pater, igitur est pater filii. Quaero de suo filio: Aut est pater, aut non. Si non sit pater, habetur propositum quod aliquis filius qui non est pater est. Si iste filius sit pater, igitur est pater filii. Quaero de suo filio: Aut est pater, aut non. Si non, habetur propositum. Si sit pater, erit processus in infinitum. Dico igitur quod quaelibet istarum consequentiarum est bona: "Si tantum pater est, pater est," et "Si pater est, filius est," et "Si filius est, non tantum pater est."

(2.31) Ad primum argumentum<sup>18</sup> dicendum quod cum ista "Tantum exclusum in exclusiva proposita excluditur in exclusiva proposita"<sup>19</sup> non stat quod praedicatum insit alii ab incluso. Et cum quaeritur utrum Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam vel non, dicendum quod Sortes non excluditur per exclusivam propositam. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod subiectum exclusivae propositae vere removetur a Sorte, sed tamen iste terminus 'exclusum per'<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Supra, n. 2.23.

<sup>16</sup> Hic supra, nn. 2.1-2.16.

<sup>17</sup> contra: Sequitur/consequentia G

<sup>18</sup> Supra, n. 2.1.

<sup>19</sup> in... proposita om. G

<sup>20</sup> exclusum per/excludens per exclusum per G

exclusivam propositam' vere removetur a Sorte. Et ex hac non sequitur quod subiectum exclusivae propositae vere removetur a Sorte. *Contra*: Praedicatum exclusivae propositae vere removetur a Sorte. Si haec sit vera "Sortes non excluditur per exclusivam propositam," et omne a quo vere removetur praedicatum exclusivae propositae excluditur per exclusivam propositam, igitur Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam. Igitur si non excluditur per exclusivam propositam excluditur per exclusivam propositam. Vel aliter: Si haec sit vera "Sortes non excluditur per <sup>21</sup> exclusivam propositam," tunc subiectum exclusivae propositae vere removetur a Sorte, et omne tale excluditur per exclusivam propositam; igitur Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam; igitur si Sortes non excluditur per exclusivam propositam Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam. Ad istud oportet dicere quod subiectum exclusivae propositae vere removetur a Sorte sed ex hoc non sequitur quod Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam. Unde concedendum est quod Sortes excluditur per hanc exclusivam, sed non est concedendum quod Sortes excluditur per exclusivam propositam.

(2.310) Ad aliud:<sup>22</sup> Quod haec consequentia est bona "Pater est, igitur filius est," posito quod pater et filius sint relativa. Et dicendum quod haec est vera "Pater fuit antequam suus filius fuit," sed tamen ista "Pater est" non fuit vera antequam ista fuit vera "Suus filius est." Et si dicatur: "Si iste pater fuit antequam suus filius fuit, igitur iste pater habuit paternitatem antequam suus filius fuit; sed quodcumque iste pater habuit paternitatem fuit haec vera 'Iste pater est,' igitur haec fuit vera 'Iste pater est antequam suus filius fuit,' et per consequens ista 'Iste pater est' fuit vera antequam haec fuit vera 'Suus filius est'"; Dicendum quod haec est falsa "Quodcumque iste pater fuit, iste pater habuit paternitatem," quia demonstrato aliquo qui fuit heri et nunc primo est pater, haec est vera "Iste pater fuit heri" et haec falsa "Iste pater heri habuit paternitatem."

(2.311) Ad aliud:<sup>23</sup> Quod iste pater refertur ad istum filium tamquam ad per se terminum sed refertur ad hoc commune 'filius istius patris,' nam semper sequitur "Iste pater est, igitur filius istius patris est," et e converso. *Contra*: Iste filius refertur, igitur ad aliquem terminum et non nisi ad istum patrem, igitur iste filius et iste pater sunt relativa, et per consequens iste pater refertur ad istum filium; Dicendum quod iste pater non refertur ad istum filium sed ad filium istius patris ita quod terminus istius relationis sit unum commune. Et similiter iste filius non refertur ad istum patrem sed ad hoc commune 'pater istius filii.' Bene enim sequitur

<sup>21</sup> per/excluditur per *add.* G

<sup>22</sup> Supra, n. 2.10.

<sup>23</sup> Supra, n. 2.11.

"Iste filius est, igitur pater istius filii est" et e converso. Si tamen iste filius referretur ad istum patrem inter istum filium et suum correlativum non esset relatio mutua, sed iste pater est terminus cuius relationis, scilicet illius quae est huius communis 'filius istius patris ad hunc patrem.' Et similiter iste filius est per se terminus relationis quae est huius communis 'pater istius filii ad hunc filium.' Unde demonstrato hoc patre habente plures filios iste pater non refertur ad aliquem istorum filiorum sed ad hoc commune 'filius istius patris' nec aliquis istorum filiorum refertur ad istum patrem relatione reali quae est in utroque extremorum sed quilibet istorum filiorum refertur ad hoc commune 'pater istius filii,' illo filio demonstrato.

(2.312) Ad aliud:<sup>24</sup> Quod si aliquis generet non est verum dicere "Iste est pater" antequam illud quod est in utero vivat. Et cum dicitur quod "tunc de non-patre fieret pater sine aliqua generatione," dicendum quod de non-patre non potest fieri pater sine generatione, tamen de non-patre potest fieri pater sine nova generatione istius patris. Nec sequitur "Iste non est pater, et erit pater, igitur generabit," sed sequitur 'igitur generabit vel generavit.' Verbi gratia: Si Sortes vulneraverit Platonem, antequam Plato sit mortuus non est verum dicere quod Sortes est homicida. Posito tunc quod Sortes postquam vulneraverit Platonem nihil mali faciat, et quod Plato illo vulnere moriatur, Sortes qui non est homicida fit homicida sine aliqua nova actione.

(2.313) Ad aliud:<sup>25</sup> Dicendum quod Pater et filius non sunt vere relativa nisi 'pater' sumatur indifferenter pro masculo et femella, et 'filius' sumatur indifferenter pro filio et filia. Sic enim 'pater' et 'filius' sunt per se relativa, et aliter non. Secundum tamen quod nos communiter utimur 'pater' sumitur pro determinato sexu, et 'filius' similiter; et sic non sunt per se relativa. Exemplum in simili secundum quod communiter utimur: Hoc nomen 'equus' non se extendit nisi ad masculos, et tamen hoc nomen 'equus' est nomen speciei, et sic oportet quod se extendat ad masculum et femellam, tamen masculus et femella non differunt specie per *Philosophum*, *X Metaphysicae*,<sup>26</sup> et ideo oportet quod hoc nomen 'equus' secundum quod est nomen speciei et secundum quod se extendit solum ad masculos sit aequivocum; et sic hoc nomen 'pater' secundum quod est nomen per se relativum et secundum quod se extendit solum ad masculos est aequivocum. Unde si tu velis quod 'pater' et 'filius' sunt relativa per se, oportet te intelligere per patrem indifferenter masculum et femellam et per filium similiter. Et si hoc non velis, oportet te dicere quod ista non sunt relativa sed imponas nomen ad significandum aliquid commune patri et matri et sit *A*. Et imponatur aliquod no-

<sup>24</sup> Supra, n. 2.12.

<sup>25</sup> Supra, n. 2.13.

<sup>26</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, X, c. 9 (1058a 29-34).



men ad significandum commune filio et filiae et sit *B*. Et tunc *A* et *B* sunt per se relativa et aliter non. Tu dices: Si 'pater' posset sumi pro masculo et femella, ista foret vera "Pater est mater," quod nullus concederet; Dicendum quod si 'pater' et 'filius' sint relativa haec est distinguenda "Pater est mater," et uno sensu vera, sumptis patre et matre secundum quod sunt relativa. Si tamen velis dicere quod haec nullo modo sit vera "Pater est mater," oportet convenienter dicere quod 'pater' et 'filius' non sunt relativa; sint *A* et *B* idem quod prius. Vel est dicendum quod res significata per hoc disiunctum 'pater vel mater' refertur ad rem significatam per hoc disiunctum 'filius vel filia,' et hoc est idem quod prius.

(2.314) Ad aliud:<sup>27</sup> Quod posito quod 'pater' et 'filius' sint relativa adhuc iste terminus 'filii' in numero plurali non refertur ad aliquid. Unde non obstante quod res significata per istum terminum 'filius' referatur, tamen res significata per istum terminum non refertur sub quocumque modo significandi; unde non refertur in numero plurali.

(2.315) Ad aliud:<sup>28</sup> Quod haec est vera "Pater et filius referuntur," et tamen nec est concedendum quod pater et filius referuntur relatione nec etiam relationibus; sed concedendum est quod unus refertur una relatione et alius alia.

(2.316) Ad aliud:<sup>29</sup> Quod haec consequentia non valet "Paternitas est, igitur actio Patris est." Et cum dicitur quod paternitas fundatur super actionem patris et relatio non manet, destructo fundamento, dicendum quod paternitas et huiusmodi fundantur supra actionem sicut supra fundamentum sui primi esse, non autem fundantur supra actionem sicut supra fundamentum suae permanentiae. Et huius ratio est quia relatio est forma permanens. Forma autem permanens induci potest per aliquid non permanens, sicut patet de formis inductis per motum vel per mutationem sive sint formae substantiales sive accidentales.<sup>30</sup> Unde illi motus vel mutationes sunt fundamenta talium formarum quantum ad principium sui esse sed quia de se sunt formae permanentes, ideo non indigent illis fundamentis ultra. Sed tu dices similitudo et aequalitas sunt res permanentes et tamen non possunt esse, destructis fundamentis, igitur nec eodem modo paternitas et filiatio; dicendum quod non est simile, quoniam fundamenta similitudinis et aequalitatis se habent ad istas relationes in ratione causae formalis; modo nihil potest manere sine suo principio formali. Iste enim est similis illi formaliter similitudine sicut principio formali remoto. Et ideo similitudo non manet, destructa albedine. Sed paternitas non se habet ad actionem

<sup>27</sup> Supra, n. 2.14.

<sup>28</sup> Supra, n. 2.15.

<sup>29</sup> Supra, n. 2.16.

<sup>30</sup> accidentales/absolutae *add.* G

sicut ad formale principium sed sicut ad efficiens; per actionem enim producitur filius a patre. Paternitas tamen habet aliquod fundamentum in permanendo et illud est ipsa natura quae est principium generandi active, et filiatio habet similiter fundamentum permanentiae et illud est natura quae est principium generandi passive, et istae naturae manent dum pater et filius manent.

(2.4) Ad primum argumentum contra positionem:<sup>31</sup> Quod haec est vera "Tantum habens supposita habet supposita"; et haec similiter "Homo non habens supposita est habens supposita" est aliquo sensu vera, ut secundum quod iste terminus 'homo' habet suppositionem simplicem et alia pars extremi similiter, scilicet 'non habens supposita.' Secundum tamen quod prima pars extremi supponit simpliciter et secunda personaliter, vel etiam secundum quod aliqua pars extremi sive prima sive secunda supponit personaliter sic est falsa, et infert hanc "Aliquid non habens supposita habet supposita."

(2.401) Tu dices: Sumptis partibus subiecti secundum suppositionem simplicem adhuc iste terminus 'homo' est inferius ad hoc transcendens 'aliquid,' igitur omni modo sequitur "Homo non habens supposita habet supposita, igitur aliquid non habens supposita habet supposita."

(2.402) Praeterea, ostenditur quod ista sit vera "Homo non habens supposita habet supposita," sumpto subiecto pro suppositis, quoniam per istam propositionem denotatur praedicatum inesse subiecto et non denotatur quod praedicatum insit huic supposito nec etiam illi, igitur denotatur quod praedicatum insit uni communi quod commune habet supposita et omni tali inest praedicatum, scilicet habere supposita, igitur haec propositio est vera.<sup>32</sup>

(2.403) Praeterea, si haec esset vera "Homo non habens supposita habet supposita," sumpto subiecto secundum suppositionem simplicem, tunc homo non habens supposita est aliquid habens supposita, et non est nisi homo, igitur homo non habens supposita est homo habens supposita.

(2.4011) Ad primum istorum:<sup>33</sup> Quod etsi 'homo' qualitercumque sumatur sit inferius ad hoc commune 'aliquid,' tamen non sequitur "Homo non habens supposita habet supposita, igitur aliquid non habens" etc., sumpto consequente ut particularis est, scilicet secundum quod ly aliquid est enunciativa; tamen secundum quod ly aliquid est transcendens sic bene sequitur et est consequens verum, sumpta altera parte extremi uniformiter in antecedente et in consequente.

<sup>31</sup> Supra, n. 2.2.

<sup>32</sup> haec... vera/praedicata C

<sup>33</sup> Supra, n. 2.401.

(2.402I) Ad aliud:<sup>34</sup> Quod ista est falsa "Homo non habens supposita" etc., sumpto subiecto pro suppositis, et tamen praedicatum inest subiecto. Sed ad veritatem propositionis non requiritur nec sufficit quod praedicatum insit et quod supponit sive significato subiecti sed requiritur quod praedicatum insit alicui pro quo subiectum supponit. Unde concedo quod nulli supposito subiecti denotatur praedicatum inesse sed praedicatum denotatur primo inesse subiecto pro suppositis et quia praedicatum non inest subiecto pro suppositis, non obstante quod praedicatum insit subiecto, ideo propositio est falsa.

(2.403I) Ad tertium:<sup>35</sup> Quod haec est vera "Homo non habens supposita est homo habens supposita," sumpta utraque parte subiecti pro intentione et prima parte praedicati pro intentione et secunda parte praedicati pro suppositis, et hoc concludit argumentum.

(2.4I) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>36</sup> Quod haec est falsa "Tantum Sortes<sup>37</sup> est aliquid<sup>38</sup> a quo differt aliud a Sorte," quia haec est vera "Plato est aliquid a quo differt aliud a Sorte." C o n t r a : Sequitur "Plato est aliquid a quo differt aliud a Sorte, igitur a Platone differt aliud a Sorte," et ulterius "Igitur Plato non est idem alii a Sorte," et ultra "Igitur Plato non est aliud a Sorte." Prima consequentia probatur quia 'differt' et 'non idem' sunt eadem, igitur si a Platone differt aliud a Sorte Plato non est idem alii a Sorte; D i c e n d u m quod non sequitur "A Platone differt aliud a Sorte, igitur Plato<sup>39</sup> non est idem alii a Sorte," quia in consequente iste terminus 'aliud a Sorte' stat confuse et distributive et in antecedente stat idem terminus particulariter. Et cum dicitur quod "'differre' et 'non esse idem' sunt eadem," d i c e n d u m quod hoc est verum respectu termini eodem modo supponentis, et ideo bene sequitur "A Platone differt aliud a Sorte, igitur Platoni aliud a Sorte non est idem,"<sup>40</sup> et haec est vera. Et si t u d i c a s : 'Differt' confundit, igitur sic dicto 'A Platone differt aliud a Sorte' stat iste terminus 'aliud a Sorte' confuse et distributive; d i c e n d u m quod 'differt' confundit suum per se terminum si sit confundibile, et subsequatur nunc in ista "A Platone differt aliud a Sorte" ly aliud a Sorte non est per se terminus huius relationis, et ideo non confunditur.

(2.42) Ad aliud:<sup>41</sup> Quod ista non stant simul: "Tantum Sortes vel Plato est animal visum ab istis" et "Cicero est animal visum ab istis." Ad probationem quod posito casu praedicto haec est falsa

<sup>34</sup> Supra, n. 2.402.

<sup>35</sup> Supra, n. 2.403.

<sup>36</sup> Supra, n. 2.21.

<sup>37</sup> Sortes/homo G

<sup>38</sup> aliquid/illud G

<sup>39</sup> Plato/praedicatum aliud a Sorte G

<sup>40</sup> alii a Sorte... idem om. (hom.) sed cum signo (mg.) G

<sup>41</sup> Supra, n. 2.22.

"Cicero est animal visum ab istis": Nec sequitur "Cicero est de numero animalium visorum ab istis; igitur Cicero est animal visum ab istis," sicut patet in simili: Non sequitur "Sortes est de numero non-hominum, igitur Sortes est non-homo." Ad argumentum in contrariam: Quod posito quod nullum animal visum sit ita album sicut Cicero, ista est vera "Cicero est albissimum animalium visorum ab istis." Nec propter hoc sequitur quod Cicero sit animal visum ab istis. Nec est verum quod dicitur quod semper superlativus gradus requirit quod terminus ad quem vere praedicetur de termino a quo, sicut patet: Non sequitur "Sortes est albissimus non-hominum, igitur Sortes est non-homo." Si tamen terminus ad quem sit nomen alicuius speciei vel alicuius per se in genere, tunc oportet quod terminus ad quem praedicetur de termino a quo, et ideo bene sequitur "Sortes est albissimus asinorum, igitur Sortes est asinus."

(2.43) Ad aliud:<sup>42</sup> Quod haec est vera "Tantum verum infertur ex vero," et ista similiter est vera "Contradicta repugnant vero." Nec ex hac sequitur quod verum infert opposita contradictorum." Unde non sequitur "Verum repugnat istis, igitur verum infert opposita istorum"; bene tamen sequitur "Verum repugnat huic, igitur infert oppositum huius." *C o n t r a*: Demonstratis duobus contradictis vel convertibilibus cum duobus contradictis, ista sunt unum antecedens respectu falsi, igitur ex opposito istius falsi quod est verum infertur oppositum huius antecedentis. Sed hoc antecedens et ista idem sunt; igitur ex opposito huius falsi quod est verum inferuntur opposita istorum. Ad istud *d i c e n d u m* <sup>43</sup> quod dubium est an debeat concedi quod praemissae sunt unum antecedens respectu conclusionis vel etiam an debeat concedi quod singulares sunt unum antecedens ad universalem. Si enim ista concedantur, cum omne antecedens sit unum numero, oportet concedere quod praemissae quae sunt diversae propositiones sunt unum numero et etiam quod singulares universalis quae sunt diversae propositiones essent unum numero. Ideo verius videtur esse dicendum quod praemissae in syllogismo non sunt unum antecedens ad conclusionem sed sunt partes materiales constituentes unum antecedens. Et tamen est concedendum quod praemissae antecedunt ad conclusionem et singulares ad universalem, et ideo praemissae sunt antecedentia ad conclusionem et singulares ad universalem. Et cum hoc stat quod nulla praemissa antecedit ad conclusionem nec etiam singularis ad universalem. Et tamen in syllogismo est antecedens quod constituitur ex praemissis et in inductione est aliquod antecedens quod constituitur ex singularibus universalis. Unde vel oportet istud concedere vel dicere quod aliqua consequentia est bona in qua tamen nihil est antecedens. Et *t u d i c e s* quod si tale antecedens constituatur ex praemissis vel etiam ex singularibus universalis ex opposito consequentis ubi tale

<sup>42</sup> aliud/principale *add.* G; supra, n. 2.23.

<sup>43</sup> dicendum *om.* C



est antecedens debet inferri oppositum antecedentis; *Dicendum* quod hoc non oportet ubi antecedens non habet oppositum, sed in talibus sufficit ad hoc quod consequentia sit bona quod ex opposito consequentis cum una parte antecedentis inferatur oppositum alterius partis.

(2.44) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>44</sup> Quod haec est falsa "Tantum contingentia contingit esse vera," et haec universalis similiter "Omnes propositiones quas contingit esse veras sunt contingentes." Ad illud in contrarium: Quod in ista "Omnis propositio quam contingit esse veram est propositio" non fit distributio pro omnibus propositionibus quas contingit esse veras, quia tunc fieret distributio pro istis "Deus est," "Tu sedes," quoniam istas contingit esse veras. Ad unum acceptum in argumento *dicendum* quod non valet "Istae propositiones possunt esse verae et possunt non esse verae,"<sup>45</sup> igitur istae propositiones sunt contingentes." Et si enim sequatur "Hoc potest esse verum et potest non esse verum, igitur est contingens," tamen non sequitur "Ista possunt esse vera et possunt non esse vera, igitur sunt contingentia," quia terminus non distribuitur eodem modo in numero singulari et in numero plurali, sicut patet: Caecus sic distribuitur: caecum est illud quod non videt et est aptum natum videre, et tamen in numero plurali non distribuitur sic, quia tunc demonstratis uno caeco et alio vidente esset haec vera "Ista sunt caeca," quoniam haec est vera "Ista non vident et ista sunt apta nata videre."

(2.45) Ad aliud:<sup>46</sup> Quod haec est vera "Tantum Sortes et homo sunt isti homines," demonstratis Sorte et Platone, et haec similiter est vera "Plato et homo sunt isti homines." Et cum arguitur sic "Si Plato et homo sunt isti homines, igitur aliquid quod non est Sortes et homo sunt isti homines," *dicendum* quod illud quod accipitur loco consequentis est distinguendum ex eo quod negatio potest cadere supra hoc totum 'Sortes et homo,' et sic consequentia non valet, nec sic arguitur ab inferiori ad superius; vel potest negatio<sup>47</sup> cadere solum super 'Sortem,' et sic est consequentia bona; et sic non repugnant ista: "Tantum Sortes et homo sunt isti homines" et "Id quod non est Sortes et homo sunt isti homines." Unde in negativa exponente huius exclusivae "Tantum Sortes et homo" etc. debet negatio cadere super hoc totum 'Sortes et homo.'

(2.46) Ad aliud:<sup>48</sup> Quod haec est falsa "Tantum Sortes est aliquid et Sortes," quoniam haec est vera "Ens Sortis et Plato est aliquid et Sortes," sicut praeargutum<sup>49</sup> est.

<sup>44</sup> Supra, n. 2.24.

<sup>45</sup> non... verae/esse falsae C

<sup>46</sup> Supra, n. 2.25.

<sup>47</sup> negatio *om.* G

<sup>48</sup> Supra, n. 2.26.

<sup>49</sup> praeargutum/prius argutum G

(2.47) Ad aliud:<sup>50</sup> Quod haec est distinguenda "Tantum Sortes est idem sibi" ex eo quod ly sibi potest restringere subiectum vel partem praedicati, et sive sic sive sic, semper est falsa. Et cum quaeritur utrum ly sibi importet intentum communem Sorti et alii vel indeterminate stet pro Sorte, d i c e n d u m quod importat intentum communem Sorti et alii; sed non importat intentum communem communitate qua terminus dicitur esse communis ad sua supposita sed importat intentum communem communitate applicationis, nec habet ly sibi aliqua supposita nec aliquod pronomen.

(2.48) Ad aliud:<sup>51</sup> Quod impossibile est partem demonstrare totum cuius est, nec est possibile demonstrare omnes propositiones quae nunc primo sunt verae, quoniam tales sunt infinitae, quia si aliqua propositio nunc primo sit vera quaelibet propositio sibi convertibilis nunc primo est vera. Sed infinitae propositiones convertuntur cum qualibet propositione, et ideo si aliqua propositio nunc primo sit vera infinitae propositiones nunc primo sunt verae, et ideo non possunt omnes propositiones quae nunc primo sunt verae aliquo modo demonstrari.

(2.49) Ad aliud:<sup>52</sup> Potest dici quod ista non stant simul: "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus" et "A Sorte videtur asinus"; et secundum hoc esset dicendum quod negativa exponens huius "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus" dicitur esse ista "Nec ab alio ab istis nec ab aliis ab istis videtur asinus." Et per hoc patet ad argumentum in contrarium, quoniam posito quod quilibet homo videat se tantum, haec est falsa "Tantum ab istis videntur animalia" propter negativam exponentem. Vel aliter et forte melius: Quod ista stant simul "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus" et "A Sorte videtur asinus," et d i c e n d u m tunc quod cum exclusiva stat quod idem praedicatum insit alii ab inclusio, sed cum exclusiva non stat quod praedicatum insit alii ab inclusio sub eadem habitudine sub qua praedicatum attribuitur inclusio, sicut patet. Ista bene stant simul "Tantum a Sorte datur denarius" et "Platoni datur denarius" quia haec est sub alia et alia habitudine. Sic ex parte ista ista stant simul "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus" et "Ab alio ab istis videtur asinus"; sed ista non stant simul "Tantum ab istis videtur asinus" et "Ab aliis ab istis videtur asinus," et ideo negativa exponens huius exclusivae debet esse ista "A nullis aliis ab istis videtur asinus."

(2.410) Ad aliud principale:<sup>53</sup> Concedo quod haec sit vera: "Tantum pro inferiori ad ens fit distributio in A," et haec est falsa "Pro quolibet fit distributio in A; sit A idem quod prius." C o n t r a : Si haec sit falsa "Pro quolibet fit distributio in A" et non est falsa

<sup>50</sup> Supra, n. 2.27.

<sup>51</sup> Supra, n. 2.28.

<sup>52</sup> Supra, n. 2.29.

<sup>53</sup> Supra, n. 2.210.

in toto, igitur potest verificari per exceptionem; et illud quod excipitur est inferius ad ens, et pro eo fit distributio in *A*, et per consequens pro illo non est haec falsa "Pro quolibet fit distributio in *A*"; dicendum quod haec est falsa "Pro quolibet fit distributio in *A*" et hoc pro significato huius termini 'ens,' quoniam pro significato entis non fit distributio, nec propter hoc oportet quod ista verificetur per exceptionem. Unde non omnis propositio quae non est in toto falsa potest verificari per exceptionem, sed haec regula est intelligenda quando universalis est falsa pro aliquo contento sub termino distributo. Nunc autem ubi distribuitur transcendens contingit quod universalis est falsa et tamen non pro aliquo contento sub subiecto.

(2.411) Tu dices,<sup>54</sup> probando quod haec universalis sit vera "Quidlibet est illud pro quo fit distributio in *A*"; sic praedicatum inest cuilibet contento sub subiecto, igitur quaelibet singularis est vera, et per consequens universalis; Dicendum quod ubi distribuitur transcendens non sequitur praedicatum inest cuilibet contento sub subiecto, igitur quaelibet singularis est vera, quia in aliqua singularis talis universalis debet demonstrari aliquid quod non est inferius ad subiectum.

(2.412) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>55</sup> Quod haec est falsa: "Tantum verum cuius contradictum est falsum est propositio" propter negativam exponentem, et intelligendum est quod in negativa exponente huius exclusivae debet relativum idem referre quod referrebat in exclusiva, et alietas seu negatio debet cadere super totum inclusum. Per hoc ad argumentum in contrarium: Quod haec est vera "Aliqua propositio falsa est aliud quam verum cuius contradictum est falsum" secundum quod alietas cadit super hoc totum 'verum cuius contradictum est falsum,' nec sequitur: "Aliqua propositio falsa est aliud quam verum cuius contradictum est falsum, igitur aliqua propositio falsa est aliquid cuius contradictum est falsum,"<sup>56</sup> quia relativum diversum refert in antecedente et in consequente. Nec arguitur hic ab inferiori ad superius, non obstante quod 'aliud quam verum' sit inferius ad 'aliquid,' quoniam iste terminus 'aliud quam verum' non est pars antecedentis, quia ly aliud non solum cadit super ly verum sed super hoc totum 'verum cuius contradictum est falsum.'

(2.413) Ad aliud:<sup>57</sup> Quod ista stant simul: "Tantum a Sorte datur denarius" et "Platoni datur denarius," et cum exclusiva stat quod praedicatum insit alii ab inclusio sub alia habitudine quam sub illa sub qua sumitur inclusum.

<sup>54</sup> Supra, n. 2.211.

<sup>55</sup> Supra, n. 2.212.

<sup>56</sup> falsum/verum C

<sup>57</sup> Supra, n. 2.213.

(2.414) Ad ultimum:<sup>58</sup> Quod ista stant simul: "Tantum propositio est vera" et "Repugnans propositioni est verum"; nec per istam "Repugnans propositioni est verum" attribuitur praedicatum repugnanti incluso. Tu dices: Haec est vera "Propositio et repugnans propositioni repugnant," igitur in ista "Repugnans propositioni est verum" attribuitur praedicatum repugnanti incluso; dicendum quod haec est vera "Propositio et repugnans propositioni repugnant" sumptis istis terminis 'propositio repugnans propositioni' pro suppositis. Sed sumptis istis terminis pro intentione, sic est haec falsa "Propositio et repugnans propositioni repugnant," quoniam haec est vera "Propositio et repugnans propositioni convertuntur vel se habent secundum superius et inferius," tamen haec sit vera "Omnis propositio repugnat propositioni."

(2.5) Ad principale arguitur per rationes communes. Non videtur quod sequatur "Tantum pater est, igitur non tantum pater est," quia in omni consequentia bona oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti, igitur huic "Tantum pater est" repugnat oppositum huius "Non tantum pater est," quod est istud "Tantum pater est," igitur idem repugnat sibi. Et si dicatur quod includentibus opposita non oportet quod oppositum contingentis repugnet antecedenti; contra: Si hoc esset verum probatio Aristotelis per quam probat conversionem propositionum de inesse non valeret generaliter. Non enim posset haec consequentia probari "Sortes scit Sortem esse lapidem, igitur sciens Sortem esse lapidem est Sortes," quia cum antecedens includat opposita non oportet oppositum consequentis repugnare antecedenti.

(2.51) Et si dicatur: Aliter concedo quod idem repugnat sibi includentibus opposita; contra: Sit *A* ista "Tantum pater est"; haec est vera "*A* est *A*," cum praedicetur idem de se, et tamen in ista praedicaretur repugnans de repugnanti, posito quod *A* repugnaret ipsi *A*, et sequeretur "*A* est *A*, igitur *A* non est *A*." Suscipiendo quod idem repugnet sibi et quod generaliter oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti esset dicendum quod repugnantia est duplex: Quaedam inter complexa et quaedam inter incomplexa. Loquendo de repugnantia quae est inter complexa sic potest affirmativa esse vera in qua praedicatur repugnans de repugnanti, et sic est haec vera "*A* est *A*"; nec ex hoc sequitur quod "*A* non sit *A*." Loquendo tamen de repugnantia quae est inter incomplexa sic numquam est affirmativa vera in qua praedicatur repugnans de repugnanti.

(2.52) Aliter dicitur, sicut prius, quod non oportet includentibus opposita quod oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti sed semper in omni consequentia oportet quod oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedente. Et per hoc patet ad rationem in contrarium: Non enim probat Philosophus suas conversiones quia opposi-

<sup>58</sup> Supra, n. 2.214.



tum consequentis repugnat antecedenti, sed quia oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedenti. Unde breviter haec regula non est generalis "Quidquid repugnat consequenti" etc., sed haec est generalis "Quidquid stat cum antecedente stat cum consequente,"<sup>59</sup> quia si aliquid stat cum antecedente potest esse verum cum antecedente quantum est ex forma, et omne quod potest esse verum cum antecedente quantum est ex forma potest esse verum cum consequente quantum est ex forma, et omne tale stat cum consequente.

(2.53) Aliter arguitur probando consequentiam principale non valere, et hoc sic: Omnis consequentia tenet ratione alicuius identitatis inter antecedens et consequens. Sed inter contradicta nulla est identitas, quia contradicta totaliter distinguuntur et per consequens unum contradictorum numquam potest inferre reliquum, et sic consequentia principalis non valet; *Dicendum* quod inter contradicta est aliqua identitas, quoniam in contradictis sunt idem termini, et consequentia principalis tenet ratione incomplexorum. Vel aliter: Quod non oportet consequentiam tenere ratione identitatis quae est inter antecedens et consequens, quia consequentia bona tenet ratione medii veri, quod medium non est intrinsecum alteri contradictorum.

(2.54) Aliter arguitur: Si consequentia sit bona intelligens antecedens intelligit consequens, igitur si unum contradictorum inferret reliquum intelligens unum contradictorum intelligeret contradicta; *Dicendum* quod haec est falsa "Intelligens antecedens intelligit consequens," nam haec est vera "Nullus intelligens antecedens intelligit consequens" accipiendo 'intelligere' proprie pro 'actu considerare,' cum impossibile sit intelligere multa simul.

(2.55) Aliter arguitur, probando quod non sequitur "Tantum pater est, igitur pater est," quia aliquid antecedit ad antecedens quod non ad consequens. Sequitur enim "Nullus non-pater est, igitur tantum pater est," sed non sequitur "Nullus non-pater est, igitur pater est." Prima consequentia probatur sic: Si nullus non-pater est, nullum ens est non-pater," et ulterius "Igitur nullum ens non est pater," et ulterius "Igitur omne ens est pater, igitur tantum pater est."

(2.56) Praeterea, in antecedente stat iste terminus 'pater' secundum quid et in consequente simpliciter; igitur est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter in illa consequentia. Probatio assumpti, nam in antecedente dimittitur aliquid a patre sine quo intellectus patris haberi non potest; igitur pater ponitur secundum quid. Probatio antecedentis, nam in antecedente destruitur intellectus filii et sine filio non potest haberi intellectus patris. Et praeter hoc haec dictio 'tantum' dicit 'non cum alio' et 'pater' dicit 'cum alio,' igitur in ista "Tantum pater est" est oppositio a parte eiusdem extremi, igitur alterum oppositorum stat diminute, sed dictio exclusiva non stat diminute, igitur iste terminus 'pater' stat diminute.

<sup>59</sup> stat... consequente/etc. G

(2.57) Praeterea, dictio exclusiva importat relationem, igitur in consequentia illa est figura dictionis. Et hoc argumentum probat quod hic sit figura dictionis "Tantum homo currit, igitur homo currit," quia in antecedente accipitur aliquid pertinens ad genus relationis, et in consequente accipitur pertinens ad genus substantiae, igitur commutatur 'ad aliquid' in 'quid.'

(2.581) Ad primum <sup>60</sup> istorum: Quod haec consequentia non valet "Nullum ens est non-pater, igitur omne ens est pater," quia ex negativa de praedicato infinito non sequitur affirmativa de praedicato finito. *C o n t r a*: Singularia antecedentis inferunt singularia consequentis; Sequitur enim "Hoc ens non est non-pater, igitur hoc ens est pater," quia oppositum non stat, quoniam si ista starent simul "Hoc ens non est non-pater" et "Hoc ens non est pater" eorum opposita starent simul, et tunc ista starent simul "Hoc ens est pater" et "Hoc ens <sup>61</sup> est non-pater"; *D i c e n d u m* quod singularia consequentis non inferuntur ex singularibus antecedentis sed oppositum stat. Et dicendum quod non sequitur "Ista stant simul, igitur eorum opposita stant simul," sicut patet. Ista enim stant simul "Aliquod animal currit," "Nullus homo currit"; sed ista non stant simul "Nullum animal currit" et "Aliquis homo currit."

(2.582) Ad aliud:<sup>62</sup> Quod in ista "Tantum pater est" stat iste terminus 'pater' et secundum quid et etiam simpliciter, quia haec propositio includit opposita. Stat enim iste terminus 'pater' simpliciter respectu praedicati et stat secundum quid respectu exclusionis, et hoc probant argumenta.

(2.583) Ad aliud:<sup>63</sup> Quod non est figura dictionis in consequentia facta, nec est semper fallacia figurae dictionis quando arguitur a ratione unius praedicamenti ad rationem alterius. Bene enim sequitur "Album est, igitur substantia est" ubi tamen arguitur 'a quali' ad 'quid.'

### ⟨QUAESTIO TERTIA⟩

(3.0) *Circa enunciationem.*<sup>1</sup> Quaeritur utrum enuntiatio componatur ex vocibus vel ex rebus vel ex conceptibus.

### ⟨Quod non ex vocibus⟩

(3.01) Quod non ex vocibus videtur, quia accipio enunciationem quae est subiectum huius libri. Si ista esset composita ex vocibus:

<sup>60</sup> Supra, n. 2.55.

<sup>61</sup> ens/non *add.* G

<sup>62</sup> Supra, n. 2.56.

<sup>63</sup> Supra, n. 2.57.

<sup>1</sup> *Circa enunciationem om.* G

Aut igitur ex vocibus significantibus rem in anima vel ex vocibus significantibus rem extra animam. Si primo modo, subiectum huius libri non esset commune ad hanc enunciationem "Homo est animal." Si secundo modo, subiectum huius non esset commune ad hanc enunciationem "Genus est universale."

(3.02) Praeterea, si enuntiatio componatur ex vocibus, sit igitur *A* idem quod haec enuntiatio prolata "Omnis homo currit" et *B* idem quod ista "Sortes est homo," et *C* idem quod ista "Sortes currit." Si tunc iste syllogismus "Omnis homo currit, Sortes est homo, igitur" etc. componatur ex vocibus, hic esset bonus syllogismus "*A*, *B*, igitur *C*," et proferens istas voces faceret syllogismum.

(3.03) Praeterea, si oratio<sup>2</sup> componeretur ex vocibus, eadem propositio simul esset vera et falsa, ut ista "Canis currit," quoniam eadem vox est in uno sensu et in alio, et in uno sensu est vera et in alio falsa, igitur simul est vera et falsa. Hoc confirmatur: Veritas non est in enunciatione nisi sicut in signo; sed haec "Canis currit" simul significat verum et falsum, igitur simul est vera et falsa.

(3.04) Praeterea, si enuntiatio componatur ex vocibus prolatis, in quolibet bono syllogismo essent sex termini, quia alia vox numero profertur in maiore, et alia in minore, et alia in conclusione.

(3.05) Praeterea, numquam<sup>3</sup> praedicaretur idem de se, quia si dicam "Homo est homo" haec vox 'homo' primo prolata et secundo prolata est alia et alia vox numero.

(3.06) Praeterea, in conversione essent quatuor termini, cum aliae voces secundum numerum proferantur in convertente et in conversa.

(3.07) Praeterea, ad omnem propositionem esset respondendum dubie, nam prolata ista "Homo est animal" dubium est, respondisti, utrum 'homo' significet tantum unum, quia forte apud alios vel in alio idiomate significat lapidem. Cum igitur dubium sit utrum haec sit multiplex vel non, ad istam est respondendum dubie et ad quamlibet consimilem.

(3.08) Praeterea, si propositio componatur ex vocibus prolatis, unum contradictum esset verum quando reliquum non esset verum, quia unum contradictorum potest proferri quando reliquum non profertur. Et similiter una propositio haberet mille contradicta, quia si mille proferant istam "Nullus homo est animal" quilibet istorum profert contradictum huius "Aliquis homo est animal," et illi proferunt mille propositiones, igitur mille propositiones contradicunt uni.

(3.09) Praeterea, nulla propositio foret necessaria, quia si nulla propositio proferatur nulla propositio est vera, quoniam si nulla

<sup>2</sup> oratio/enunciatio G

<sup>3</sup> numquam/nunc non G

propositio proferatur, nulla propositio est, cum esse propositionis sit solum in proferri, et si nulla propositio est nulla propositio est vera.

(3.010) Praeterea, quaelibet vox prolata potest aliud significare quam modo significat, manente priori significato; igitur quaelibet propositio prolata potest esse multiplex, et ulterius "Igitur quaelibet propositio prolata potest non esse vera"; et per consequens nulla propositio est necessaria.

(3.011) Praeterea, propositio non componatur nisi ex vocibus quae imponebantur ad significandum. Sed si proferam istam "Homo est animal" istae voces quas modo profero numquam imponebantur ad significandum, quia non ante hoc instans cum ante hoc instans non habuerunt esse; nec in hoc instanti, quia sic quilibet proferens imposeret voces ad significandum de novo; igitur ex istis vocibus nunc prolatis non componitur haec enuntiatio.

(3.012) Praeterea, voces prolatae non componerent enunciationem nisi quia significant verum vel falsum. Sed secundum hoc aliqua enuntiatio componeretur ex nutibus monachorum, et similiter enuntiatio posset componi ex sonis qui non sunt voces ut ex sonis citharae, quia tales soni possunt imponi ad significandum verum vel falsum.

(3.013) Praeterea, in nulla propositione praedicaretur superius de inferiori, quia vox non est per se superior ad vocem, quoniam si vox esset per se superior ad vocem haec vox 'substantia' esset genus generalissimum, et res significata per hanc vocem est genus generalissimum, igitur essent viginti genera generalissima, ut decem res et decem voces. Et similiter, omnis vox prolata est sensibilis qualitas, quia obiectum auditus et omne tale est in tertia specie qualitatis, igitur in tertia specie qualitatis essent decem praedicamenta.

(3.014) Praeterea, in ista "Homo est non-homo" praedicaretur superius de inferiori, quia iste terminus 'non-homo' est superior ad omnem vocem prolatam, quoniam quaelibet vox sit non-homo.

(3.015) Praeterea, si componatur ex vocibus haec esset possibilis: "Homo est asinus," nam posito ponibili haec foret concedenda, ut patet. Ponatur ista "Homo et asinus significant idem" et proponitur ista "Homo est asinus." Haec debet concedi, quia est sequens, cum impossibile sit ista significare idem nisi haec sit vera "Homo est asinus" cum unio in ista "Homo est asinus" sit pro significatis terminorum.

(3.016) Praeterea, propositio volaret in aëre et subiectum esset sursum et praedicatum deorsum, et ita propositio esset mobilis de loco ad locum. Cum igitur logica sit de propositione et eius partibus, logica esset de rebus mobilibus, et ita logica esset physica et esset scientia realis.



(3.017) Praeterea, in propositione affirmativa unitur praedicatum subiecto; sed vox prolata non unitur voci prolatae, quia quando una vox prolata est alia non est, quando enim subiectum est praedicatum non est.

〈Quod non ex conceptibus〉

(3.10) Quod<sup>4</sup> non componatur ex conceptibus videtur, quia conceptus significant naturaliter; sed partes propositionis significant ad placitum, sicut et ipsa propositio; igitur etc. Quod conceptus significant naturaliter patet per *Philosophum hic*.<sup>5</sup> Et praeter hoc, conceptus significant idem apud omnes et quod sic significat naturaliter significat.

(3.11) Praeterea, possibile est quod nullus conceptus sit in anima, quia possibile est quod nullus homo aliquid concipiat. Si igitur oratio componatur ex conceptibus possibile esset nullam orationem habere esse, et ita esset possibile quod nulla propositio foret vera.

(3.12) Praeterea, propositio componitur ex illis in quibus habet esse congruitas;<sup>6</sup> sed congruitas non habet esse in conceptibus, quia conceptus non habent modos significandi, igitur etc.

(3.13) Praeterea, "nihil aliud est esse partem orationis quam mentis conceptum significare" per *Priscianum*;<sup>7</sup> sed conceptus non significat conceptum, quia si unus conceptus significaret alium foret processus in infinitum.

〈Quod non ex rebus〉

(3.20) Praeterea, quod enuntiatio non componatur ex rebus extra animam, quia enuntiatio non componitur nisi ex subiecto et praedicato; sed res extra animam non subiicitur nec etiam praedicatur; igitur etc.

(3.21) Praeterea, quaelibet res extra animam est substantia vel accidens; sed propositio non componitur ex substantiis nec ex accidentibus, quia si sic propositio non esset<sup>8</sup> solum ens rationis, nec esset excludenda a consideratione metaphysici, et tamen *Philosophus*, VI *Metaphysicae*,<sup>9</sup> excludit propositionem a sua consideratione.

(3.22) Praeterea, una propositio posset esse pars alterius propositionis, quia intellectus potest intelligere unam propositionem

<sup>4</sup> Quod/Propter quod G

<sup>5</sup> Aristot., *Periherm.*, c. 1 (16a 7-8).

<sup>6</sup> in... congruitas om. G

<sup>7</sup> Priscianus, *Instit. gramm.*, II, c. 3, n. 14 (ed. Krehl, I, 65).

<sup>8</sup> non esset om. C

<sup>9</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 4, t. 8 (1027b 29-31).

esse eandem alteri, et ista tota propositio potest esse pars alterius propositionis, et sic in infinitum, dato quod propositio componatur ex rebus.

〈Ad oppositum: Quod ex vocibus〉

(3.3) Ad oppositum: Quod componatur ex vocibus apparet, quia propositio componitur ex nomine et verbo; sed nomen et verbum sunt voces prolatae, per Boethium *hic*,<sup>10</sup> et similiter vox prolata, ut ista vox 'homo' est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore etc.;<sup>11</sup> igitur vox prolata est nomen, et ulterius "Igitur vox prolata est pars propositionis."

〈Ad oppositum: Quod ex conceptibus〉

(3.31) Quod componatur ex conceptibus apparet, nam etsi nullus loqueretur posset homo syllogizare et discurrere a notis ad cognitionem ignotorum. Iste syllogismus componitur ex propositionibus sed non ex propositionibus compositis ex vocibus prolatis; illae igitur propositiones sunt compositae ex conceptibus.

〈Ad oppositum: Quod ex rebus extra〉

(3.32) Quod componatur ex rebus videtur, quia in propositione aliqua praedicatur superius de inferiori; sed ordo non est nisi inter res.

〈Prima Responsio〉

(3.4) Ad quaestionem dicitur uno modo quod propositio non componitur ex vocibus prolatis nec ex rebus, 〈nec ex conceptibus〉, sed ex vocibus imaginabilibus. Quod non componatur ex vocibus prolatis probatur, quia sic propositio posset volare; nec componatur ex rebus extra animam, quia sic componeretur ex substantiis vel ex accidentibus et non esset ens rationis; nec componatur ex conceptibus, quia tales conceptus possunt non esse et sic esset possibile quod nulla propositio foret vera; igitur relinquitur quartum, quod componatur ex vocibus imaginabilibus quae voces semper haberent esse.

〈Contra primam responsionem〉

(3.41) Contra: Ista positio nihil vitat, quia quaero de illis vocibus imaginabilibus: Aut significant ad placitum aut naturaliter. Non significant naturaliter, quia sic propositio esset quoddam naturale; nec componeretur ex nomine et verbo; igitur significant ad placitum. Et si hoc, nulla propositio ab aeterno fuit vera, quia quaero an istae

<sup>10</sup> Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione*, red. 1, lib. I, cap. 'De oratione' (PL 64, 315D-316B; ed. Meiser, 76).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Aristot., *Periherm.*, c. 2 (16a 19).

voces poterunt non significasse quod significaverunt, aut non. Si non, tunc non significant ad placitum. Si sic: aut igitur antequam imponebantur ad significandum, aut quando imponebantur ad significandum, aut postquam imponebantur ad significandum. Si detur primum, tunc non significabant ab aeterno et per consequens nulla propositio semper fuit vera. Nec quando imponebantur ad significandum, quia tunc de necessitate significabant illa quibus imponebantur. Nec postquam imponebantur ad significandum, quia postquam vox est imposita ad significandum est haec necessaria "Ista vox significavit illud," quia affirmativa vera de praeterito est necessaria, igitur vel oportet dicere quod illae voces imaginabiles non significant ad placitum vel etiam quod nulla propositio semper fuit vera.

(3.42) Praeterea, si illae voces significant ad placitum, igitur imponebantur ad significandum; sed impositor fuit prius quam imposuit voces ad significandum; igitur illae voces non semper significabant; et sic nulla propositio semper fuit vera.

(3.43) Praeterea, quaelibet vox significans ad placitum potest aliud significare quam modo significat. Posito enim quod quilibet homo ignoraret significata vocum imaginabilium posset illas voces de novo imponere et quaelibet propositio posset esse multiplex et ita quaelibet propositio posset non esse vera, et sic ista positio non potest salvare quod aliqua propositio sit necessaria.

(3.44) Praeterea, ista positio incidit in illud quod intendit vitare, scilicet quod propositio componatur ex vocibus prolatis, quoniam eadem vox numero est vox imaginata et vox prolata, quia eadem vox quae actualiter profertur prius fuit imaginata in mente proferentis sicut eadem domus numero quae fit in re extra prius fuit concepta in mente artificis. Ponere igitur propositionem componi ex vocibus imaginatis et non ex vocibus prolatis est ponere impossibilia.

(3.45) Praeterea, isti positioni non est credendum, quia ponit quod nullus potest dicere verum et sic dicentes istam opinionem non dicit verum.

(3.46) Praeterea, ista vox prolata "Homo est animal" est vox significans verum vel falsum, igitur est propositio; et partes huius orationis, ut ista vox 'homo,' est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore etc., igitur est nomen quod est pars enunciationis. Dicitur huic quod non omnis vox quae significat ad placitum sine tempore etc. est nomen sed solum illa vox quae immediate significat rem; huiusmodi non est vox prolata sed vox imaginata; C o n t r a : Istud nihil valet, nam ex quo vox prolata significat ad placitum potest imponi ad significandum rem immediate, aliter non significaret talis vox ad placitum. Si enim dicatur quod vox prolata necessario significat vocem imaginatam immediate, sic non significat vocem imaginatam ad placitum; sed oporteret vocem prolatam significare vocem imaginatam sive imponens velit sive non, quod videtur absurdum.

(3.47) Praeterea, ista positio ponit quod propositio non habet esse subiectivum in anima, nec extra animam, quia ponitur quod propositio nec est substantia nec accidens. Contra istud est *Aviceenna*, libello suo *De intentione scientiarum*,<sup>12</sup> ubi dicit quod "omne quod est vel est substantia vel accidens vel creator substantiae et accidentis." Unde ponere aliquam quae nec est substantia nec accidens est ponere impossibile, sicut *ibidem* probat *Aviceenna* sic: "Omne quod est vel est ens per se vel non est ens per se. Si sit ens per se, sic quod non indiget subiecto in quo exsistat, sic est sibi sufficiens quantum ad esse; omne tale est substantia. Si non est ens per se, sic est accidens." Et ideo concludit quod omne causatum vel est substantia vel accidens. Similiter, si ponatur aliquod causatum exsistere quod nec est substantia nec accidens, illud minus habet de entitate quam accidens, quia tale, si ponatur, erit ens diminutum. Nunc quantocumque aliquid minus habet de entitate tanto perfectius subiectum requirit in quo exsistat, sicut patet, quia qualitas est imperfectius ens quam quantitas, ideo requirit substantiam quantam in qua exsistat tamquam in subiecto. Sed quantitas non requirit nisi substantiam pro subiecto. Si igitur propositio sit ens imperfectius quam accidens perfectius subiectum requirit quam aliquod accidens, et ita erit in aliquo, ut in subiecto. Istud confirmatur sic: Magnae perfectionis quod aliquid possit exsistere sine subiecto. Si igitur propositio exsistat et non in subiecto, propositio est perfectius ens quam aliquod accidens, et per consequens non debet excludi a consideratione metaphysici.

(3.48) Praeterea, ista positio destruit omnes fallacias in dictione, quia nulla vox imaginabilis est multiplex, et sic nulla pars orationis est multiplex.

(3.49) Praeterea, arguo per auctoritates: *Boethius*<sup>13</sup> dicit *hic* quod nomen et verbum quae sunt partes enunciationis sunt voces prolatae.

(3.410) Praeterea, de hoc quod dicitur quod propositio non habet esse in anima: *Aviceenna* vult oppositum, I *Metaphysicae* suae capitulo 5,<sup>14</sup> ubi dicit quod enunciationes non sunt nisi ex intentionibus quae habent esse in anima.

(3.411) Item, *Commentator*, VI *Metaphysicae* commento ultimo,<sup>15</sup> dicit quod ens verum non habet causam nisi animam. Et in principio eiusdem commenti dicit: "Entia vera sunt facta ab intellectu, quando divisit entia ab invicem vel composuit ea ad invi-

<sup>12</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non inveni.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. hic supra, nota 10.

<sup>14</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non inveni.

<sup>15</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot., Metaph.*, VI, com. 8 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 72ra).



cem"; ex quo patet quod propositio efficitur ab intellectu. Sed illud quod efficitur ab intellectu manet in intellectu, cum actio intellectus non sit transiens, igitur propositio subiective est in intellectu.

(3.412) Praeterea, illa quae accidunt propositioni sunt in intellectu subiective, igitur et propositio. Probatio antecedentis: *Avicenna*, primo capitulo suae *Logicae*,<sup>16</sup> dicit quod "in eis quae sunt extra nec est complexum nec incomplexum, nec propositio, nec argumentatio, nec suppositio nec praedicatio"; sed omnia ista sunt in intellectu.

(3.413) Praeterea, quod oratio<sup>17</sup> componatur ex vocibus prolatis videtur per *Avicennam*, VI *Naturalium* parte quinta, capitulo primo,<sup>18</sup> qui dicit quod natura fecit quod "anima componeret ex sonis aliquid per quod unus homo potest docere alium"; et illud est propositio. Et *parvum ante* dicit quod tales ex quibus componitur propositio non permanent; sed voces imaginatae permanent et partes propositionis non; igitur propositio non componitur ex vocibus imaginatis.

〈Secunda responsio〉

(3.510) Aliter dicitur quod enunciatio componitur ex vocibus prolatis sed nec ex his vocibus nec ex illis sed solum ex huiusmodi vocibus, et ita salvatur quod duo homines possunt dicere eandem enunciationem.

〈Contra secundam responsionem〉

(3.511) Contra: Ista positio destruit se ipsam, quia si enunciatio componitur ex vocibus prolatis et nec ex his vocibus nec ex istis, demonstratis vocibus prolatis, cum omnis vox prolata sit vox prolata a me vel ab alio, et enunciatio nec componitur ex his vocibus prolatis a me nec ex illis vocibus prolatis ab alio, sequitur quod ex nullis vocibus prolatis componitur enunciatio; cuius oppositum ponit.

(3.512) Praeterea, posito quod tantum unus homo loquatur et non dicat nisi istam "Homo est animal," quaero an dicat aliquam propositionem vel non. Si nullam propositionem dicat, sequitur quod nulla propositio posset proferri, et per consequens propositio non habet esse in prolatione. Si dicat aliquam propositionem et non dicit nisi istas voces prolatas, sequitur quod illa propositio componitur ex istis vocibus prolatis.

(3.513) Praeterea, secundum istam viam eadem propositio potest proferri cras quae profertur nunc; sed ista propositio quae pro-

<sup>16</sup> Avicenna, *Logica*, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 3r).

<sup>17</sup> oratio/propositio

<sup>18</sup> Avicenna, VI *Naturalium*, p. V, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 22rb).

fertur nunc iam non habebit esse et cras habebit esse, igitur idem numero rediret postquam corruptum est; hoc est impossibile.

〈Tertia responsio〉

(3.520) Ideo aliter dicitur quod propositio componitur ex vocibus prolatis sed non ex solis vocibus prolatis; immo enunciatio componitur ex voce prolata tamquam ex materiali et ex respectu ad significatum tamquam ex formali. Et sic ponitur quod ista propositio "Homo est animal" prolata nunc et prolata alias, vel simul prolata a diversis, est eadem numero formaliter et diversa numero materialiter quia respectus ad significatum est idem.

〈Contra tertiam responsionem〉

(3.521) Contra: Secundum istam positionem aliquid postquam esset corruptum rediret idem numero, nam hac oratione prolata, postea, nullo loquente, haec propositio non habet esse et cras per te potest eadem proferri et habere esse, igitur etc. Et si dicatur quod idem numero manens idem formaliter potest redire postquam est corruptum; c o n t r a : Corrupta propositione prolata corrumpitur et respectus ad significatum et idem respectus numero potest redire, igitur aliquid manens idem cum idiomate potest redire postquam est corruptum.

(3.522) Praeterea, de hoc quod dicitur: Quod idem respectus manet in diversis vocibus; illud est falsum, quia idem respectus non est nisi inter eosdam terminos, quia secundum *Avicennam*, VI *Naturalium* parte quinta, capitulo 3:<sup>19</sup> "Unumquodque quod ad multa refertur hoc est per diversas relationes"; igitur alius est respectus huius vocis ad suum significatum et illius vocis ad suum significatum.

(3.523) Praeterea, idem formale non est sic in diversis materialibus et si possit successive, igitur non est idem respectus huius vocis ad suum significatum et illius ad suum significatum.

(3.524) Similiter, ista positio ponit quod idem numero simul et secundum se totum est hic et Romae, quia idem respectus numero est in voce prolata hic et in voce prolata Romae.

(3.525) Praeterea, ista positio non salvat necessitatem alicuius propositionis, quia posito quod nullus homo loqueretur nulla propositio foret vera.

<sup>19</sup> Avicenna, VI *Naturalium*, p. V, c. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 24va).

〈Quarta responsio〉

(3.53) Aliter ponitur quod oratio componitur ex vocibus prolatis, et conceditur quod in quolibet bono syllogismo sunt sex termini diversi secundum numerum sed tantum tres idem secundum speciem. Unde dicitur quod in prima figura illud idem numero quod subiicitur in maiore non praedicatur in minore sed idem secundum speciem, et hoc sufficit ad bonitatem syllogismi.

〈Contra quartam responsionem〉

(3.53<sup>1</sup>) Contra: Secundum istud aliquis terminus communis habens multa supposita non posset idem numero praedicari de aliquo istorum, et aliquis terminus distribueretur pro suppositis qui non posset idem numero praedicari de aliquo supposito, quia alius terminus numero est hic subiectum "Omnis homo currit" quam hic praedicatum "Sortes est homo."

(3.53<sup>2</sup>) Praeterea, in syllogismis ex obliquis non esset tres termini tantum nec secundum numerum nec secundum speciem, quia quaelibet littera variat terminum secundum speciem; alius igitur terminus specie subiicitur in ista "Cuiuslibet hominis est asinus" quam praedicatur in ista "Sortes est homo."

〈Quinta responsio〉

(3.54) Aliter dicitur quod enunciatio est triplex: Enunciatio enuncians tantum, enunciatio enunciata tantum, enunciatio enuncians et enunciata. Enunciatio primo modo dicta componitur ex vocibus prolatis vel scriptis. Enunciatio secundo modo dicta componitur ex rebus significatis per terminos. Enunciatio tertio modo dicta componitur ex conceptibus in anima qui conceptus significantur per voces prolatas et significant ipsas res, et ideo talis enunciatio dicitur enuncians et etiam enunciata.

〈Contra quintam responsionem〉

(3.54<sup>1</sup>) Contra istud arguitur: Si enunciatio componeretur ex rebus extra animam haec esset vera "Subiectum bibit praedicatum," quia per istam positionem<sup>20</sup> verae res extra animam praedicantur et subiiciuntur, tunc iste homo est subiectum in aliqua propositione et vinum quod bibit est praedicatum, igitur etc. Hic dicitur quod tales nullo modo debent concedi, sed si reducantur in syllogismum erit fallacia accidentis; c o n t r a : Per istam positionem quidlibet quod potest intelligi potest esse praedicatum et subiectum in propositione, igitur haec est vera "Bibens praedicatum potest esse

<sup>20</sup> positionem/enunciationem G

subiectum," igitur sua conversa est vera "Subiectum potest bibere praedicatum." Similiter, haec est vera "Currrens in bello monte est subiectum," quia sequitur, secundum istos, hoc potest intelligi, igitur est subiectum propositionis. Sequitur igitur "Currrens in bello monte potest intelligi, igitur currrens in bello monte est subiectum propositionis," et ulterius "Igitur subiectum propositionis currit in bello monte." Hic non potest assignari fallacia accidentis nisi assignetur fallacia accidentis in una propositione.

(3.542) Praeterea, de hoc quod dicitur: Quod propositio componitur ex conceptibus in anima; hoc apparet falsum, quia sic per actum intelligendi esset aliquid causatum in anima differens ab illa actione quod satis improbatum est prima quaestione.<sup>21</sup>

### 〈Ad quaestionem〉

(3.55) Ad quaestionem dicendum quod enunciatio est triplex: Quaedam in voce, et illa est oratio prolata, et quaedam in scripto et quaedam in mente. Hoc est quod dicit Boethius *hic*.<sup>22</sup> Quod omnes peripatetici dicunt tres esse orationes, scilicet in mente, in scripto et in prolatione.<sup>23</sup> Oratio prolata sive enunciatio prolata componitur ex vocibus prolatis. Enunciatio scripta componitur ex litteris scriptis. Et enunciatio in mente componitur ex illis quae<sup>24</sup> intellectus intelligit esse eadem sive sint voces sive res extra. Oratio in scripto non est multum ad propositum. Sed circa enunciationem in prolatione sciendum est quod aliqua enunciatio est prolata, quia aliqua vox prolata significat verum et falsum, et aliqua vox prolata est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore etc., et aliqua cum tempore etc. Ideo aliqua vox prolata est nomen et aliqua<sup>25</sup> verbum; sed nomen et verbum sunt partes enunciationis; igitur partes enunciationis habent esse in prolatione, et per consequens ipsa enunciatio habet esse in prolatione. Nec valet quod aliqui<sup>26</sup> dicunt: Quod vox prolata non significat rem immediate, ideo nec nomen nec verbum est vox prolata secundum quod sunt partes orationis. Istud non valet, quia ex quo vox prolata significat ad placitum possibile est quod vox prolata immediate significet rem extra, et ita patet quod enunciatio et suae partes habent esse in prolatione. Ulterius est sciendum quod enunciatio secundum esse suum in voce non componitur praecise ex sonis prolatis sed ex sonis prolatis cum respectu ad determinatum significatum.

<sup>21</sup> Supra, q. 1, nn. 1.6–1.65.

<sup>22</sup> Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione*, red. 2, lib. I, cap. 'De signis' (PL 64, 407B; ed. Meiser, 29).

<sup>23</sup> prolotione/oratione C

<sup>24</sup> quae/cum C

<sup>25</sup> aliqua/aliquod C

<sup>26</sup> Supra, q. 1, n. 1.3.



(3.551) Unde sciendum quod vox est aequivocum: Uno modo est genus, et alio modo est materia. Vox ut est genus importat aggregatum ex voce quae est materia et respectu ad significatum; sed vox ut est materia non importat aliquem respectum ad significatum. Et vox secundum quod est materia est quoddam naturale, et secundum quod est genus est quoddam artificiale. Et quia enuntiatio est res artificialis et res naturalis non vere praedicatur de re artificiali nisi denominative, — non enim vere dicitur quod arca est lignum sed quod arca est lignea — ideo vox quae ponitur in definitione nominis est vox quae est genus et non est vox quae est materia, quia vox secundum quod est genus importat respectum ad significatum et sic est quoddam <sup>27</sup> artificiale, et vox quae est materia non vere praedicatur de nomine. Unde Boethius <sup>28</sup> loquens de voce quae est materia, dicit quod sicut nummus non est aes tantum sic nomen non est vox tantum sed vox significativa.

(3.552) Ulterius est sciendum quod de enunciatione secundum esse in prolatione non habet logicus principaliter determinare. Unde dicit Avicenna prima parte suae *Logicae*, capitulo tertio:<sup>29</sup> “Ad considerationem dictionum ducit nos necessitas. Logicus enim ex hoc quod logicus non habet primo occupari circa verba nisi quantum ad loquendum et agendum. Si enim possibile esset logicam discurrere solo intellectu, ita ut non considerarent aliqua eius nisi soli intellectus, tunc sufficeret. Si etiam doctor artis posset revelare id quod est in animo eius alio modo semper supersederet a verbis.” Et sic patet quod de voce prolata non habet logicus principaliter determinare. Sed quia enuntiatio prolata est instrumentum logici, et cum logicus sit artifex scientificus, non decet ipsum quod sit ignarus sui instrumenti, et hac necessitate ductus secundario et ex consequenti determinat de enunciatione prolata.

(3.553) Circa enunciationem in mente sciendum quod ista componitur ex rebus quas intellectus asserit esse eadem et diversa. Si enim intellectus asserat voces esse easdem, talis enuntiatio componitur ex vocibus. Et si asserat res extra animam esse easdem, talis enuntiatio componitur ex rebus extra animam. Unde cum voces prolatae significant passiones animae, ut communiter dicitur, et passiones animae significant res extra, oportet concedere quod tandem sit deveniendum ad aliquid quod sic est significatum quod non significans. Cum igitur ista enuntiatio prolata “Homo est animal” significat aliquid — sit illud *A*. Aut *A* significat aliquid aut nihil. Si nihil, tunc *A* est propositio in mente. Si aliquid, sit illud *B*, et quaerendum est de *B* eodem modo sicut prius. Si *B* nihil significet

<sup>27</sup> quoddam/quid C

<sup>28</sup> Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione*, red. 2, lib. I, cap. ‘De signis’ (PL 64, 408C; ed. Meiser, 32).

<sup>29</sup> Avicenna, *Logica*, c. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 3r).

sed sic significatur quod non significat, *B* est propositio in mente. Si *B* significet aliquid erit processus in infinitum. Unde breviter: Illud quod significetur per propositionem prolatam sive significetur mediate sive immediate, dummodo sit tale quod non significat aliquid aliud ulterius illud, voco propositionem in mente.

(3.554) Ulterius est intelligendum quod propositio in mente non componitur ex rebus compositione reali sicut domus componitur ex lignis et lapidibus, sed solum est ibi compositio intellectualis quae fit ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit aliqua esse eadem et diversa. Unde *Commentator*, IV *Metaphysicae*, commento ultimo:<sup>30</sup> "Entia vera, cuiusmodi sunt propositiones, facta sunt ab intellectu quando divisit ea ab invicem aut composuit ea ad invicem." Ex quo patet quod in propositione secundum esse in mente non est nisi intellectualis compositio.

#### <Instantiae contra opinionem auctoris>

(3.61) *Tu dicis*: Ista positio non salvat necessitatem aliquius propositionis, quia nullus intellectus semper componit aliqua ad invicem nec etiam aliquis intellectus semper composuit aliqua ad invicem, igitur nulla propositio secundum esse in mente semper fuit vera nec etiam erit aliqua semper vera, quia possibile est quod nullus intellectus componat nec dividat.

(3.611) Praeterea, enunciatio non componitur nisi ex subiecto et praedicato, igitur si enunciatio componeretur ex rebus extra animam, res extra animam esset subiectum in propositione et sic ista domus esset unum subiectum.

(3.612) Praeterea, si proposito habeat esse subiectivum in anima, igitur est verum accidens informans animam; nihil tale est ens rationis, igitur propositio non est ens rationis, quod est contra *Philosophum*, VI *Metaphysicae*.<sup>31</sup>

(3.613) Et similiter, ubi totum est ibi suae partes sunt; igitur si propositio sit in anima et suae partes sint res extra, res extra animam sunt in anima, et ita lapis secundum esse reale esset in anima.

#### <Responsiones ad instantias>

(3.62) Ad primum:<sup>32</sup> Dicendum quod propositiones aliquae semper erunt verae et semper erant verae, verumtamen nulla propositio semper habuit esse. Unde ad hoc quod propositio sit vera non requiritur quod propositio sit actualiter sed sufficit quod illa sint eadem

<sup>30</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VI, com. 8 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 72ra).

<sup>31</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 4, t. 8 (1027b 29-31).

<sup>32</sup> Supra, n. 3.61.

quae denotantur esse eadem vel quod illa sint diversa quae denotantur esse diversa, et hoc loquendo de propositione tam secundum esse in mente quam secundum esse in prolotione. Unde prolata ista "Homo est homo," et ista desinente esse, adhuc ista est vera, quia oratio prolata dicitur vera ex hoc quod est significativum veri, id est ex hoc quod est aptum natum significare verum. Et ista quae fuit prolata est apta nata significare verum sive sit sive non. Unde breviter: Haec consequentia non valet "Haec propositio est vera, igitur haec propositio est," sicut non sequitur "Haec propositio est haec propositio, igitur haec propositio est." Et sic potest salvari quod primum principium semper fuit verum; nec ex hoc sequitur quod primum principium semper habuit esse.

(3.621) Ad aliud:<sup>33</sup> Quod propositio secundum esse in mente non semper componitur ex subiecto et praedicato, quia res extra non praedicatur nec subiicitur; sed propositio secundum esse in mente componitur ex significatis subiecti et praedicati. Vel aliter: Posito quod haec concedatur "Omnis propositio componitur ex subiecto et praedicato," sic dicto haec propositio, demonstrata propositione in mente, componitur ex subiecto et praedicato. Hic isti termini 'subiectum,' 'praedicatum' possunt supponere pro significatis subiecti et praedicati. Unde isti termini 'subiectum' et 'praedicatum' sunt aequivoci ad rem significatam per subiectum et praedicatum et hoc penes secundum modum aequivocationis. Et ideo bene est concedendum quod haec propositio componitur ex subiecto et praedicato, et tamen non est concedendum quod res extra sit subiectum vel praedicatum, nec quod ista domus est subiectum in propositione, quia in ista non potest iste terminus 'subiectum' supponere pro significato subiecto sed solum pro eo quod formaliter est subiectum.

(3.622) Ad aliud:<sup>34</sup> Quod si concedatur quod propositio habet esse, oportet concedere quod sit substantia vel accidens vel etiam prima causa. Aliud enim esset concedendum quod illud quod est minus ens quam accidens posset per se exsistere, et sic concedo quod propositio est accidens secundum quod accidens distinguitur contra substantiam et habet esse subiectivum in anima, verumtamen non est accidens reale sed solum accidens secundum rationem, quia efficitur per intellectum. Unde Philosophus, VI *Metaphysicae*,<sup>35</sup> dicit quod verum et falsum sunt in anima et bonum et malum sunt in re extra; quod non esset nisi verum et falsum haberent esse subiectivum in anima, quia certum est quod bonum et malum habent esse obiectivum in anima. Si tunc verum et falsum non haberent esse subiectivum in anima non magis essent verum et falsum in anima quam bonum et malum.

<sup>33</sup> Supra, n. 3.611.

<sup>34</sup> Supra, n. 3.612.

<sup>35</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 4, t. 8 (1027b 25-27).

(3.623) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>36</sup> Quod enunciatio habet esse subiectivum in anima et tamen suae partes non; unde compositum compositione intellectuali habet esse alicubi ubi suae partes non habent esse. Si dicatur: Secundum istam responsionem aliqua propositio esset homo, quia haec propositio "Corpus est <sup>37</sup> anima" est quoddam compositum ex corpore et anima, et omne tale est homo; dicendum quod omne compositum ex corpore et anima ex compositione reali est homo, sed compositum ex corpore et anima compositione intellectuali non est homo.

<Aliae instantiae contra positionem auctoris>

(3.63) Contra primam partem huius positionis arguitur ostendendo quod nomen prolatum sit vox sola ita quod non sit compositum ex voce et respectu ad significatum, quia si sic, nullum nomen esset aequivocum, quia aggregatum ex voce et respectu ad determinatum significatum non est aequivocum.

(3.631) Praeterea, vox sola imponebatur ad significandum; tunc haec vox 'homo' quam tu dicis esse materiale in nomine est vox significativa ad placitum, igitur est nomen; sed illud materiale non importat respectum vel ad minus non est aggregatum ex se ipso et respectu ad significatum.

(3.632) Praeterea, si oratio haberet esse in prolatione, vox prolata esset distribuibilis et non nisi pro voce, igitur in ista prolata "Omnis homo currit" fieret distributio pro vocibus, et ita pro non-hominibus.

(3.633) Praeterea, contra aliam partem positionis: Si oratio haberet esse in mente vel componeretur ex rebus, cum partes orationis habeant modos significandi illae res extra animam haberent modos significandi. Et istud confirmatur, quia omnis oratio vera est congrua et congruitas non est sine modo significandi.

<Responsiones ad istas instantias>

(3.64) Ad primum <sup>38</sup> istorum: Dicendum quod hoc nomen 'nomen' est aequivocum: Ad nomen secundum quod distinguitur contra verbum ut ponitur octava pars orationis; alio modo nomen dicitur idem quod vocabulum, et sic quaelibet pars orationis dicitur nomen et quaelibet vox significativa. Accipiendo nomen primo modo concedo quod nullum nomen est aequivocum, quia illo modo accipiendo nomen sic importat aggregatum ex voce et respectu ad determinatum significatum; unde haec vox 'canis' est tria nomina, illo modo

<sup>36</sup> Supra, n. 3.613.

<sup>37</sup> est/ et C

<sup>38</sup> Supra, n. 3.63.



accipiendo nomen. Sed accipiendo nomen secundo modo, sic concedo aliquod nomen esse aequivocum; sed sic non definitur nomen a Philosopho hic.<sup>39</sup> Et quod istud sit verum declaro sic: Si aliquod nomen esset aequivocum, primo modo accipiendo nomen, tunc nomen non importaret nisi solam vocem; igitur cum haec vox 'amor,' ut est nomen et ut est verbum, sit una vox numero, idem numero esset nomen et verbum, et tunc accidentia verbi essent accidentia nominis et sic nomen significaret cum tempore et verbum esset nominativi casus. Et similiter in ista "Equus currit" supponeret nomen adiectivum et sic esset haec incongrua. Tu dices: Secundum istud nulla pars orationis esset multiplex, quia nec nomen nec verbum et sic de aliis. Similiter, si quaereretur quae pars est hic multiplex 'canis,' esset respondendum quod est nomen; quod non esset nisi aliquod nomen esset multiplex. Ad primum: Quod pars orationis est duplex ad propositum, scilicet pars formalis et pars materialis. Partes formales voco nomina et verba quae hic definiuntur a Philosopho. Partes materiales sunt materialia in nomine et verbo quae praesupponuntur in positione, ex quibus et respectibus ad significata constituuntur nomina et verba. Et tunc dico quod nulla pars formalis orationis est multiplex; sed pars materialis orationis bene potest esse multiplex. Ad secundum: Quod si quaereretur quae pars est 'canis' esset respondendum distinguendo, quoniam in uno sensu est unum nomen et in alio sensu est aliud nomen.

(3.641) Ad aliud:<sup>40</sup> Quod aliquid imponi ad significandum est dupliciter: Vel tamquam materiale praesuppositum imponi vel tamquam compositum ex illo materiali et respectu ad significandum. Quod primo modo imponitur ad significandum non est nomen sed illud quod imponitur secundo modo. Et cum dicitur quod illud materiale est vox significativa ad placitum etc.: dicendum quod haec est falsa, accipiendo vocem secundum quod cadit in definitione nominis, quia vox secundum quod cadit in definitione nominis sic est genus, et ideo haec est falsa sicut ista "Arca est lignum."

(3.642) Ad aliud:<sup>41</sup> Concedo quod vox prolata habeat supposita et quod in ista prolata "Omnis homo currit" fit distributio pro vocibus ut pro nominibus suppositorum hominis, et sic concedo quod vox est superior ad vocem, pro re tamen; unde ordo est inter voces propter ordinem inter res. Nec tamen debet concedi quod haec vox est illa vox, quia cum dico "Haec vox est illa vox" loquor de ista voce pro se ipsa et non pro re significata. Sed voces pro se ipsis non sunt ordinatae; vox tamen pro re vere praedicatur de alia voce, et ideo haec est vera "Sortes est homo." Contra: Per istam responsionem in ista propositione prolata "Omnis sol est" fieret distributio pro vi-

<sup>39</sup> Aristot., *Periherm.*, c. 2 (16a 19).

<sup>40</sup> Supra, n. 3.631.

<sup>41</sup> Supra, n. 3.632.

ginti suppositis, posito quod iste sol habeat viginti nomina, et posito quod nullus homo habeat nomen, non obstante quod centum homines essent, in ista "Omnis homo currit" non fieret distributio pro aliquo supposito; dicendum quod loquendo de ista "Omnis sol est" secundum esse in prolatione concedo conclusionem sed loquendo de ista secundum esse in mente sic solum fit distributio pro uno supposito. Eodem modo dico de ista "Omnis homo currit."

(3.643) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>42</sup> Dicendum quod oratio secundum esse in mente est congrua sed alia congruitate quam oratio prolata. Unde modi significandi grammaticales sumuntur a modis intelligendi. Sicut igitur grammaticus habet considerare congruitatem in modis significandi sic logicus habet considerare congruitatem in modis intelligendi. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod partes orationis in mente habeant aliquos modos significandi, ut casum vel modum. Tu quares: Si enuntiatio sic habeat esse in mente talis enuntiatio est alicuius quantitatis, ita quod aliqua est universalis; igitur pars illius enunciationis distinguitur et ita vera res extra animam distinguitur; dicendum est: Concedo quod propositio universalis habet esse in mente quia etsi nulla vox esset prolata adhuc posset homo syllogizare et syllogismus non fit sine propositione universali, et ideo aliqua est universalis quae non est prolata. Et concedo quod vera res extra animam distinguitur, quia distinguere non est aliud quam in supposita dividi ita quod salvetur in diversis suppositis; sed nulla universalis quae habet esse extra animam habet esse in diversis suppositis ita quod salvatur in quolibet.

(3.701) Ad primum principale:<sup>43</sup> Quod enuntiatio quae est hic subiectum componitur ex partibus, ut ex subiecto in communi et praedicato in communi et nec ex hoc subiecto nec ex illo, sicut homo in communi componitur ex carnibus et ex ossibus et nec ex his carnibus nec ex his ossibus, sicut vult Philosophus, VII *Metaphysicae*.<sup>44</sup> Et dico quod partes enunciationis quae est hic subiectum nec sunt termini substantiales nec termini accidentales sed sunt termini communes ad terminos substantiales et ad terminos accidentales,<sup>45</sup> et sicut enuntiatio in communi componitur ex talibus partibus communibus sic syllogismus similiter qui est subiectum in libro *Priorum* componitur ex enunciatione in communi quae est subiectum hic.

(3.702) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>46</sup> Quod nullo modo est hic syllogismus "A, B, igitur C," non obstante quod A significet idem quod ista "Omnis homo currit," quia ad bonitatem syllogismi in prolatione non sufficit quod sit habitudo inter res significatas per voces sed re-

<sup>42</sup> Supra, n. 3.633.

<sup>43</sup> Supra, n. 3.01.

<sup>44</sup> Potius Aristot., *Metaph.*, I, c. 9 (993a 17-21).

<sup>45</sup> terminos substantiales... accidentales/utrosque G

<sup>46</sup> Supra, n. 3.02.

quiritur quod voces significantes istas res sint voces complexae. Et si dicatur: Quod sequitur ex aliquibus sequitur ex eorum convertibilibus, sed *A* et *B* convertuntur cum praemissis boni syllogismi, igitur *A* et *B* inferunt eandem conclusionem quam et istae praemissae; dicendum quod haec est distinguenda "*A* et *B* convertuntur cum praemissis boni syllogismi," ex eo quod *A* et *B* possunt habere suppositionem personalem vel simplicem vel etiam materiale. Si *A* et *B* habeant suppositionem personalem, sic concedo istam et istam similiter "*A* et *B* inferunt conclusionem syllogistice"; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod talis consequentia valeat: "*A* et *B*, igitur *C*." Sicut patet in simili: Nullus negat quin maior et minor inferunt conclusionem syllogistice, et tamen hic non est aliqua consequentia: "Maior, minor, igitur conclusio." Nec debet ista consequentia sic exerceri si *A* et *B* habeant suppositionem simplicem vel materiale. Sic est haec falsa: *A* et *B* convertuntur cum praemissis, quia denotatur quod ista incomplexa convertuntur cum aliquibus praemissis.

(3.703) Ad aliud argumentum:<sup>47</sup> Quod non sequitur quod eadem oratio sit vera et falsa. Et cum dicitur quod ista "Omnis canis currit" est uno sensu vera, dicendum quod hoc est falsum, quia nullum multiplex est aliquo sensu verum sed multiplex habet aliquem sensum verum. Et quantumcumque tu signes multiplex in uno sensu, manente multiplicitate, non est concedendum quod illud multiplex aliquo sensu sit verum, sed est concedendum quod aliquis sensus illius multiplicis est verum. Unde, sicut dictum est prius, ista oratio "Omnis canis currit" in diversis sensibus est alia et alia oratio. Et cum dicitur quod ista significat verum et falsum, dicendum quod nulla oratio significat verum et falsum, loquendo de praeciso significato orationis, sed ista vox quae est materialis in enunciatione significat verum et falsum. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod ista vox sit vera et falsa. Et cum dicitur "Veritas et falsitas non sunt in oratione nisi sicut in signo" etc., dicendum quod veritas et falsitas non sunt in oratione quae est enunciatio nisi sicut in signo, et ideo sequitur haec enunciatio significat falsum, igitur est falsa; tamen veritas et falsitas sunt in materiali enunciationis sicut in signo et tamen illud materiale nec est verum nec falsum.

(3.704) Ad aliud principale:<sup>48</sup> Dicendum quod in syllogismo prolato sunt sex termini secundum numerum numerositate subiectiva, quia illi termini, ut scilicet voces prolatae, sunt in diversis subiectis; sed tamen in syllogismo prolato sunt tantum tres termini secundum numerum numerositate obiectiva, et sunt termini idem numero numerositate obiectiva quando termini sunt consimiles et repraesentant eandem rem, et sic ista vox 'homo' prolata hic et prolata Romae est

<sup>47</sup> Supra, n. 3.03.

<sup>48</sup> Supra, n. 3.04.

eadem numero numerositate obiectiva. Et ad bonitatem syllogismi in prolotione sufficit quod sunt tantum tres termini secundum numerum numerositate obiectiva. Et quod sic oporteat distinguere de termino apparet, quia aliter esset concedendum quod aliqua vox significat ad placitum quae numquam imponebatur ad significandum, quoniam certum est quod ista vox eadem numero numerositate subiectiva quam modo profero numquam imponebatur ad significandum. Et ideo si debeat dici quod ista vox eadem numero quam modo profero imponebatur ad significandum oportet dicere quod ista eadem numero numerositate obiectiva et non numerositate subiectiva imponebatur ad significandum. Et ista distinctione habita patet ad argumenta quae sequuntur.

(3.705) Ad primum:<sup>49</sup> Quod in ista prolata "Homo est homo" praedicatur idem numero de se numerositate obiectiva, quia subiectum et praedicatum sunt voces consimiles et repraesentant eandem rem, sed non sunt eadem numero numerositate subiectiva.

(3.706) Ad aliud:<sup>50</sup> Quod in conversione sunt quatuor termini diversi secundum numerum, loquendo de numerositate subiectiva; sed sunt tantum duo termini secundum numerum numerositate obiectiva, et talis unitas terminorum requiritur ad conversionem.

(3.707) Ad aliud:<sup>51</sup> Quod non sequitur quod ad omnem propositionem sit respondendum dubie. Unde non sequitur "Tu dubitas an haec oratio sit multiplex, vel etiam tu concedis hanc orationem quae est multiplex, igitur male respondes." Sed si concedas orationem multiplicem vel quam dubitas an sit multiplex in omni usu tuo, tunc sequitur quod tu male respondes. Si enim concedas orationem qua homines hic utuntur tamquam multiplici, tunc tu male <respondes>; aliter ad nullam orationem posses respondere nisi scires omnia idiomata et usum omnium hominum.

(3.708) Ad aliud:<sup>52</sup> Quod si unum contradictorum sit verum, sequitur quod reliquum sit falsum. Sed sciendum quod aliqua contradicunt evidenter et aliqua contradicunt et non-evidenter. Propositio prolata contradicit evidenter propositioni prolatae, et propositio prolata contradicit propositioni in mente sed non-evidenter. Et si unum contradictorum est verum, vel suum contradictum evidens vel suum contradictum non-evidens est falsum; sed non sequitur unum contradictorum in prolotione est verum, igitur suum contradictum in prolotione est falsum; sed sufficit quod suum contradictum in mente sit falsum. Unde si nomina imponantur ad significandum unum contradictorum in prolotione antequam nomina imponantur ad signifi-

<sup>49</sup> Supra, n. 3.05.

<sup>50</sup> Supra, n. 3.06.

<sup>51</sup> Supra, n. 3.07.

<sup>52</sup> Supra, n. 3.08.



candum reliquum, tunc unum contradictorum in prolotione est verum antequam suum contradictum in prolotione est falsum. Ad aliud: Concedendum quod infinitae propositiones diversae secundum numerum numerositate subiectiva contradicunt uni, sed diversae propositiones secundum numerum numerositate obiectiva non contradicunt uni. Unde haec propositio "Tantum unum uni contradicit" est intelligenda de unitate obiectiva et non de unitate subiectiva.

(3.709) Ad aliud:<sup>53</sup> Quod aliqua propositio prolata est necessaria, ut ista "Homo est animal," et non valet "Haec propositio non est prolata, igitur non est vera," quia dictum est prius<sup>54</sup> quod propositio est vera quando non est, quia propositio est significativa veri quando non est. Et si dicatur: Volo quod isti termini cadant a suis significatis et significant alia ut aliqua disparata, tunc non est propositio vera; potest dici, secundum Boethium,<sup>55</sup> quod postquam vox est imposita ad significandum significat naturaliter, et ideo non potest cadere a suo significato: etsi enim imponatur de novo alii tamen significatum quod prius habuit non admittit. Vel aliter: Quod propositio prolata ideo est necessaria, quia est signum necessarii, et sic aliqua propositio est necessaria quae tamen non de necessitate est vera; sed si aliqua propositio in mente sit necessaria illa de necessitate est vera.

(3.710) Ad aliud:<sup>56</sup> Patet per praedicta, quia oratio non prolata componitur ex vocibus quae imponebantur ad significandum, nam eadem numero numerositate obiectiva quae nunc proferuntur imponebantur prius ad significandum.

(3.711) Ad aliud:<sup>57</sup> Quod enunciatio non componitur ex nutibus monachorum nec ex sonis citharae, quia enunciatio non componitur nisi ex vocibus significantibus ad placitum, loquendo de enunciatione in prolotione. Similiter Avicenna, *VI Naturalium* parte quinta, capitulo primo,<sup>58</sup> dicit quod voces prolatae plura ostendunt et magis evidenter quam nutus, et ideo enunciatio magis componitur ex vocibus prolatis quam ex nutibus.

(3.712) Ad aliud:<sup>59</sup> Quod in aliqua propositione prolata praedicatur superius de inferiori, et vox prolata est superior ad vocem prolatam, sicut dictum est. Et cum dicitur quod tunc essent viginti praedicamenta, dicens quod hoc non sequitur, quia vox prolata

<sup>53</sup> Supra, n. 3.09.

<sup>54</sup> Supra, n. 3.62.

<sup>55</sup> Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione*, red. 2, lib. I, cap. 'De signis' (PL 64, 411D-412B; ed. Meiser, 39).

<sup>56</sup> Supra, n. 3.010.

<sup>57</sup> Supra, n. 3.011.

<sup>58</sup> Avicenna, *VI Naturalium*, p. V, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 22rb).

<sup>59</sup> Supra, n. 3.012.

non est praedicamentum sed signum praedicamenti; unde ordo inter voces prolatas non est ordo praedicamentalis. Et ideo dicit Boethius, in *Praedicamentis*,<sup>60</sup> quod Philosophus determinat de decem vocibus decem genera rerum significantibus; per hoc innuens quod voces non sunt genera sed signa generum.

(3.713) Ad aliud:<sup>61</sup> Potest concedi quod in ista oratione prolata "Homo est non-homo" praedicatur superius de inferiori, nec ex hoc sequitur quod haec sit vera, quia veritas non est in enunciatione prolata ratione vocum sed ratione rerum significatarum. Vel aliter: Quod non praedicatur superius de inferiori quia vox non est superior ad vocem nisi propter ordinem inter res significatas et res significata per 'non-hominem' non est superior ad rem significatam per 'hominem,' tamen res significata per 'non-hominem' bene est superior ad hanc vocem 'homo,' sed quia non est superior ad rem significatam per hanc vocem, ideo non praedicatur hic superius de inferiori. Unde haec est falsa "Quaelibet vox est inferior ad rem significatam per 'non-hominem,'" sed haec bene est vera "Quaelibet vox est inferior ad rem significatam per 'non-hominem.'"

(3.714) Ad aliud:<sup>62</sup> Quod haec propositio "Homo est asinus" non est possibilis, quia si isti termini 'homo', 'asinus' imponantur ad significandum aliud quam modo significant, non erit haec oratio eadem enuntiatio quae prius, quia in istis vocibus fundabitur alius respectus ad aliud significatum, et ideo enuntiatio non manet eadem. Per hoc ad argumentum quod posita ista "Homo et asinus significant idem" haec est neganda "Homo est asinus"; si tamen rei veritas foret quod homo et asinus significarent idem, haec esset concedenda "Homo est asinus" sed non esset eadem enuntiatio quae prius; et aliter est respondendum aliquo existente posito quam esset respondendum si illud de necessitate foret verum.

(3.715) Ad aliud:<sup>63</sup> Quod non sequitur quod aliquid posset volare inter subiectum et praedicatum, quia quando subiectum est praedicatum non est, et inter id quod est et id quod non est non potest aliquid volare. Nec sequitur quod praedicatum sit sursum et subiectum deorsum, quia quando subiectum est praedicatum non est.

(3.716) Ad aliud:<sup>64</sup> Quod in propositione affirmativa unitur praedicatum subiecto, et tamen quando subiectum est praedicatum non est. Sed praedicatum unitur subiecto in toto tempore continente esse subiecti et esse praedicati; sed praedicatum non unitur subiecto in instante illius temporis nec in aliqua parte illius temporis sed solum-

<sup>60</sup> Boethius, *In librum Praedicamentorum*, I (PL 64, 161C).

<sup>61</sup> Supra, n. 3.013.

<sup>62</sup> Supra, n. 3.014.

<sup>63</sup> Supra, n. 3.015.

<sup>64</sup> Supra, n. 3.016.

modo in toto illo tempore. Aliter arguitur ostendendo quod enuntiatio non componitur ex vocibus, quia si sic, haec consequentia non valeret: "Antecedens est verum, igitur consequens," quia voces possunt imponi antecedenti antequam imponantur consequenti et antecedens habet esse antequam consequens habet esse; aliter antecedens potest proferri quando consequens non profertur. Et similiter non valeret "Praemissae sunt verae, igitur conclusio." Dicendum quod haec consequentia non valet "Antecedens in prolotione est verum, igitur conclusio in prolotione est verum," sed tamen sequitur "Antecedens in prolotione est verum, igitur suum consequens in mente est verum"; et eodem modo dicendum est de praemissis respectu conclusionis.

〈Ad rationes probantes quod enuntiatio  
non componitur ex conceptibus〉

(3.8) Rationes quae probant quod enuntiatio non componitur ex conceptibus concludunt verum, quia sicut prius probatum est, in intellectu non sunt aliqui tales conceptus formati per actum intelligendi, qui conceptus sunt similitudines rerum. Posito tamen quod enuntiatio componatur ex conceptibus posset dici ad argumenta:

(3.810) Ad primum:<sup>65</sup> Concedo quod conceptus significant naturaliter. Et cum dicitur quod partes orationis significant ad placitum, hoc est intelligendum de partibus orationis prolatae.

(3.811) Ad aliud:<sup>66</sup> Quod etsi nullus conceptus sit in anima, tamen enuntiatio composita ex conceptibus est vera. Dictum enim est prius <sup>67</sup> quod non sequitur "Haec propositio est vera, igitur haec propositio est."

(3.812) Ad aliud:<sup>68</sup> Quando Priscianus dicit quod "nihil aliud est esse partem orationis quam significare mentis conceptum," ipse intelligit de partibus orationis prolatae.

(3.813) Ad aliud:<sup>69</sup> Quod congruitas habet fieri in conceptibus, et tamen conceptus non habent modos significandi sed modos intelligendi, ratione quorum in oratione composita ex conceptibus est congruitas.

<sup>65</sup> Supra, n. 3.10.

<sup>66</sup> Supra, n. 3.11.

<sup>67</sup> Supra, n. 3.62.

<sup>68</sup> Supra, n. 3.12.

<sup>69</sup> Supra, n. 3.13.

〈Ad rationes probantes quod enuntiatio non componitur ex rebus〉

(3.820) Ad aliud quod probatur enunciationem non componi ex rebus:<sup>70</sup> Cum dicitur quod enuntiatio non componitur nisi ex subiecto et praedicato etc.; dicunt aliqui<sup>71</sup> quod praedicatum potest esse nomen vel participium. Si sit participium, sic conceditur; et etiam conceditur quod vera res extra animam est praedicatum et subiectum, quia vox praedicat suum significatum. Contra istud: Nihil valet, quia posito quod nulla vox esset prolata nec etiam quod aliquis conceptus foret, tunc nulla res esset praedicata nec subiecta, quia nihil esset praedicans nec subiiciens. Et sic isto casu posito esset concedendum quod enuntiatio non componitur ex subiecto et praedicato. Et similiter secundum istud esset concedendum quod subiectum currit, secundum quod ly subiectum sumitur participialiter. Ideo dicendum est quod enuntiatio secundum esse in mente non componitur ex subiecto et praedicato nisi permutatur quod in ista "Enuntiatio componitur ex subiecto et praedicato" subiectum et praedicatum possint supponere pro rebus significatis per voces, et hoc forte est verum. Unde ista "Enuntiatio componitur ex subiecto et praedicato" est distinguenda penes secundum modum aequivocationis ex eo quod isti termini 'subiectum,' 'praedicatum' possunt supponere pro rebus significatis per tales voces 'homo,' 'animal' vel pro talibus vocibus quae formaliter sunt subiectum et praedicatum. Primo modo est haec vera "Enuntiatio in mente componitur ex subiecto et praedicato"; secundo modo est falsa. Ista tamen nullo modo est concedenda "Vera res extra animam est subiectum vel praedicatum," ut lapis vel lignum.

(3.821) Ad aliud:<sup>72</sup> Concedendum est quod enuntiatio in mente componitur ex substantiis vel ex accidentibus, et hoc compositione intellectuali. Nec tamen ex hoc sequitur quod enuntiatio non est excludenda a consideratione metaphysici sic quod de ea non determinat principaliter, et hoc quia enuntiatio non componitur ex substantia et accidente nisi compositione intellectuali.

(3.822) Ad aliud:<sup>73</sup> Concedo quod una propositio est pars alterius, et sic in infinitum; nec est inconveniens procedere in infinitum in talibus.

#### 〈QUAESTIO QUARTA〉

(4.01) *Omnis phoenix est.*<sup>1</sup> Circa istud quaerantur duo: Primo an esse exsistere sit de essentia rei causatae.

<sup>70</sup> Supra, n. 3.20.

<sup>71</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non inveni.

<sup>72</sup> Supra, n. 3.21.

<sup>73</sup> Supra, n. 3.22.

<sup>1</sup> Omnis... est *om.* G



〈Quod esse et essentia non sunt idem〉

(4.01) Videtur quod non: Per rationem Algazelis, I suae *Metaphysicae*, cap. 6:<sup>2</sup> Quaestio quid est et quaestio an est differunt: quaestio quid est quaerit de essentia et quaestio an est quaerit de esse. Si autem esse et essentia essent idem, quaestio quid est et quaestio an est non differunt.

(4.02) Et hoc confirmat ipse<sup>3</sup> sic: Rationabiliter quaerit quid fecit nigredinem esse, sed non quaeritur rationabiliter quid fecit nigredinem esse nigredinem; et similiter: Bene quaeritur an nigredo sit sed non bene quaeritur an nigredo sit nigredo. Si tamen esse et essentia essent idem,<sup>4</sup> una quaestio esset rationabilis sicut et alia.

(4.03) Istam rationem confirmo sic: A generante vel producente rem in esse non habet res quod sit idem quod est, ut a generante non habet Sortes quod sit Sortes nec humanitas quod sit humanitas; sed a generante habet res quod sit in actu; igitur essentia rei et esse in actu differunt.

(4.04) Praeterea, actio agentis terminatur ad aliquid absolutum, quia ad respectivum non terminatur actio; sed ad essentiam rei quantum ad id quod est non terminatur actio agentis, sed per actionem agentis efficitur res quod habet esse in actu; igitur esse in actu est aliquid absolutum differens ab essentia.

(4.05) Praeterea, in omni transmutatione subiectum differt ab utroque terminorum; per hoc enim probat Philosophus, I *Physicorum*,<sup>5</sup> quod materia est alia a forma. Sed essentia aliquando est sub esse et aliquando est sub non-esse et transmutatur a non-esse in esse; igitur essentia non est eadem cum esse nec etiam cum non-esse.

(4.06) Praeterea, essentia de se nec est necesse esse nec impossibile esse, quia si de se esset necesse esse non posset non esse, et si de se esset impossibile esse non posset esse; igitur essentia de se est possibile esse et non-esse. Sed nihil exsistit per hoc quod de se est possibile esse et non-esse, et essentia exsistit per esse; igitur esse non est idem quod essentia.

(4.07) Praeterea, si esse esset idem cum essentia, essentia de se esset determinata ad esse, et omne quod de se est determinatum

<sup>2</sup> Algazel, *Metaph.*, tr. I, cap. 'De accidentibus' (ed. J. T. Muckle, 1933) 25, lin. 17-20.

<sup>3</sup> Algazel, *Metaph.*, tr. I, cap. 'De accidentibus' (ed. J. T. Muckle, 1933) 25, lin. 20-23.

<sup>4</sup> idem/quaestio add. G

<sup>5</sup> Aristot., *Physica*, I, c. 7, tt. 59-60 (190a 9-21).

ad esse est ex se necesse esse; igitur quaelibet essentia esset ex se necesse esse; quod falsum est. Et haec est ratio Avicennae.<sup>6</sup>

(4.08) Praeterea, essentia de se est possibile esse; sed si aliquid de se sit possibile esse, efficiens non potest facere illud esse in actu nisi se ipsum illi imprimat vel aliquid aliud. Se ipsum non potest imprimere, quia essentia non imprimitur in essentiam; igitur efficiens imprimit aliquid aliud. Et illud erit aliquid absolutum, quia actio non terminatur nisi ad aliquid absolutum. Et efficiens non imprimit nisi esse; igitur esse est aliquid absolutum aliud ab essentia.

(4.09) Praeterea, Boethius, libro *De hebdomadibus*:<sup>7</sup> "In omnibus citra Primum aliud est quod est et quo est"; sed essentia est per esse; igitur esse est aliud ab essentia.

(4.010) Praeterea, secundum eundem:<sup>8</sup> "Quidlibet citra Primum recidit a simplicitate Primi; in omnibus igitur citra Primum est aliqualis compositio." Sed ista compositio non potest intelligi de compositione ex materia et forma, quia compositio ex materia et forma non est in intelligentiis, quae tamen recedunt a simplicitate Primi. Haec igitur compositio intelligitur de compositione ex essentia et esse, et si hoc, essentia et esse non sunt eadem, quia idem non facit compositionem cum se ipso.

(4.011) Praeterea, secundum eundem:<sup>9</sup> Omne quod est esse quod habet est per participationem Primi entis; igitur soli Primo inest esse essentialiter et causato per participationem; et per consequens esse non est de essentia rei causatae.

(4.012) Et confirmatur ratione: Dicimus enim quod ignitum est calidum per participationem, et ignis est calidus per essentiam. Et ideo caliditas inest ignito per accidens et igni per essentiam. Sic videtur esse ex parte alia.

(4.013) Praeterea, esse potest demonstrari de re; sed essentia rei non potest demonstrari de re; igitur etc. Probatio assumpti: Nam esse potest quaeri: Convenienter enim quaeritur an homo sit; sed omne quaeribile est per demonstrationem certificabile. Cum igitur esse potest quaeri sequitur quod esse posset demonstrari.

(4.014) Praeterea, quaestio quid est praesupponit quaestionem si est. Sed idem non praesupponit se ipsum; igitur aliud est quid et aliud esse.

(4.015) Praeterea, nihil potest intelligi sub opposito suae essentiae; sed essentia potest intelligi sub opposito esse — dicit enim Al-

<sup>6</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 91va).

<sup>7</sup> Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* (PL 64, 1311C).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

g a z e l<sup>10</sup> quod possum intelligere quaternarium et ignorare si est; igitur essentia non est idem quod esse.

(4.016) Praeterea, per P h i l o s o p h u m :<sup>11</sup> Esse se habet ad ens sicut vivere se habet ad viventem; sed vivere non est essentia viventis; igitur esse non est essentia entis.

(4.017) Praeterea, haec esset per se "Sortes est," quia praedicatum esset de essentia subiecti, et per consequens haec esset necessaria. Et confirmatur ratione sic: Res semper est sub sua essentia; si igitur esse sit de essentia Sortis, sequitur quod Sortes semper sit sub esse.

〈Quod esse et essentia sunt idem〉

(4.1) Ad oppositum: Si esse non sit de essentia, tunc essentiae per creationem acquiritur esse sicut subiecto quemadmodum materiae acquiritur forma per generationem; sed in omni transmutatione habente subiectum quod acquiritur per istam transmutationem producit de subiecto; igitur esse producit de essentia per creationem et ista creatio non esset de nihilo. T u d i c e s quod non est hic loquendum de creatione, quia P h i l o s o p h u s non posuit creationem; d i c e n d u m quod Philosophus habuit ponere creationem, quoniam i p s e posuit quidlibet citra Primum esse effectum Primi. Dicit enim II *Metaphysicae*<sup>12</sup> quod illud quod est primum verum et maxime ens est causa existendi omnibus entibus. Primum igitur produxit mundum: Aut igitur ex aliquo aut ex nihilo. Si ex nihilo, tunc creavit mundum. Si ex aliquo, et illud est effectus Primi, igitur producit a Primo: Aut igitur nullo praesupposito aut aliquo praesupposito. Si nullo praesupposito, creavit illud. Si aliquo praesupposito, quaerendum esset de illo in infinitum. Et ideo concedendum est secundum philosophiam quod Primum creat aliquid et quod creavit mundum. Sed sive hoc sit ab aeterno sive non, non est cura. Et hoc videtur rationabile: Cum Primum sit infinitae virtutis intensive potest de non-ente facere ens, etsi ens et non-ens in infinitum differant. Hoc etiam vult C o m m e n t a t o r in *De substantia orbis*,<sup>13</sup> qui dicit quod absurdum est dicere Primum esse causam orbium solis quantum ad motum, quia est causa orbium quantum ad substantiam. Et idem vult A v i c e n n a, VI *Metaphysicae* suae,<sup>14</sup> qui dicit quod Primum creavit primam intelligentiam, et ista aliam, sic usque ad orbis. Cum igitur isti p h i l o s o p h i creationem posuerunt et nos philosophantes ponere debemus.

<sup>10</sup> Auctoritas non invenitur in cap. 'De accidentibus,' ubi haec materia tractatur.

<sup>11</sup> Aristot., *De anima*, II, c. 2 (413a 22).

<sup>12</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1, t. 4 (993b 28-29).

<sup>13</sup> Averroes, *In De substantia orbis*, c. 2 (ed. Iuntina, IX, Venetiis, 1550, f. 4va).

<sup>14</sup> Potius Avicenna, *Metaph.*, IX, c. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 104rb).

(4.10) Ad principale: Arguo per rationem C o m m e n t a t o r i s, IV *Metaphysicae*, commento 3:<sup>15</sup> Causatum est: Aut igitur per essentiam aut per additum essentiae. Si per essentiam, habetur propositum quod esse sit de essentia. Si per additum essentiae, cum illud additum est, aut igitur est per essentiam aut per additum essentiae. Si per essentiam, eadem ratione fuit standum in primo. Si per additum essentiae, quaerendum est de illo addito, et sic in infinitum. Dicitur hic quod res est per additum suae essentiae sed illud additum non est, sicut Sortes est albus per albedinem sed ista albedo non est alba; c o n t r a : Illud quod non est non est additum essentiae, igitur si illud non esset non esset verum dicere quod res est per additum essentiae. Praeterea, si illud additum non sit, hoc non esset nisi quia illud additum est simplex, non compositum ex essentia et esse. Sed hoc non impedit, quia prima causa est et tamen in prima causa non est aliqua compositio ex essentia et esse. Aliter dicitur quod res est per additum essentiae et illud additum est per suam essentiam et non per additum suae essentiae, nec tamen fuit eadem ratione standum in primo. Verbi gratia: Si homo sit albus per additum sibi, ut per albedinem, si albedo foret alba hoc esset per suam essentiam et non per additum, nec tamen fuit eadem ratione standum in primo, quia si homo sit albus necessario hoc erit per additum suae essentiae; c o n t r a : Illud additum quo formaliter homo est non est in esse separatum ab homine etsi illud quo homo effective est sit in esse separatum ab homine. Illud igitur quo homo est formaliter est causatum; sed omnia causata sunt eiusdem rationis quantum ad hoc quod recedunt a simplicitate Primi, quantum etiam ad hoc quod sunt entia per participationem; igitur si illud additum ex se sit ens eadem ratione et quodlibet causatum. Vel si concedatur quod illud causatum ex se habeat esse, tunc est concedendum quod in aliquo causato esse et essentia non differunt et tale causatum est ex se necesse esse, quod est inconueniens de quolibet causato. Et per istud potest probari quod Sortes de necessitate est, quia sequitur esse Sortis de necessitate est; igitur Sortes de necessitate est. Consequentia patet de se. Probatio antecedentis, nam esse Sortis est unus effectus, quia non fuit ab aeterno, et esse Sortis est: Aut igitur est totaliter idem cum suo esse aut differt a suo esse. Si detur quod differt a suo esse et suum esse est habens esse, aut igitur est totaliter idem cum suo esse, et tunc eadem ratione standum fuit in primo, aut differt a suo esse et quaerendum est de suo esse, et sic in infinitum, quod est inconueniens. Si detur quod esse Sortis sit totaliter idem cum suo esse, tunc haec est necessaria: "Esse Sortis est," quia si aliquid sit tale quod ipsum est totaliter cum suo esse idem, illud de necessitate est. Istud argumentum tenent alii alterius opinionis <sup>16</sup> sic

<sup>15</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 32r).

<sup>16</sup> Scilicet opinio S. Thomae et Aegidii, *infra*, n. 4.26; opinionis/demonstrata unde *add.* C, differentia non *add.* G



arguentes: Si esse Sortis sit totaliter idem cum Sorte, tunc Sortes de necessitate est. Praeterea, si illud additum per quod Sortes est de se habeat esse, et illud additum non de se est substantia, aut enim est accidens aut solum est in genere substantiae per reductionem. Tunc esse non primo competit substantiae, quia primo competit illo addito essentiae per quod additum essentia est. Praeterea, illud additum differt a suo esse, igitur non habet ex se suum esse. Probatio antecedentis: Illud additum est unus effectus habens esse de novo, igitur capit esse suum de novo; sed nihil capit se ipsum; igitur capit esse aliud a se. Et per hoc argumentum probatur processus in infinitum, nam esse Sortis est unus effectus, igitur capit esse; sed non capit se ipsum; igitur capit esse differens a se. Illud esse est unus effectus; igitur capit esse differens a se, cum nihil possit<sup>17</sup> capere se ipsum. Et illud esse adhuc capit esse, et non se ipsum, igitur aliud esse, et sic in infinitum.

(4.11) Ad principale: Generatio terminatur ad substantiam rei: Per hoc enim differt ab aliis mutationibus. Et generatio non terminatur nisi ad esse; igitur esse est substantia rei. Probatio minoris, nam generatio est transmutatio a non-esse in esse, igitur generatio terminatur ad esse. Istud confirmatur sic: Sicut nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu, sic nihil terminat actionem sive transmutationem nisi secundum quod est in actu. Sed esse est actus primus; igitur esse magis terminat generationem quam aliquid aliud.

(4.12) Praeterea, si esse non sit de essentia rei, igitur posset demonstrari de re, quia per *Philosophum*, II *Posteriorum*,<sup>18</sup> esse non potest demonstrari nisi sit substantia. Sed esse non potest demonstrari, quia per *Philosophum* de subiecto debet praesupponi quid est et quia est. Esse igitur praesupponitur de subiecto, et per consequens non demonstratur de subiecto.

(4.13) Praeterea, homo et homo existens non differunt essentialiter; sed de intellectu hominis existentis est esse; igitur de intellectu hominis est esse. Et nihil est de intellectu hominis nisi sua essentia; igitur esse hominis est essentia hominis. Quod autem homo et homo existens non differant essentialiter patet, nam generato homine generatur homo existens, et generato homine existente generatur homo, igitur homo et homo existens non differunt. Sic enim arguit *Philosophus*, IV *Metaphysicae*,<sup>19</sup> probando quod homo, ens homo et unus homo non differunt, quia non differunt in generatione et corruptione.

(4.14) Praeterea, *Auctor De causis*, propositione quarta,<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> possit/posset G

<sup>18</sup> Aristot., *Anal. Poster.*, II, c. 7 (92b 3-26).

<sup>19</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, IV, c. 2, t. 3 (1003b 26-27).

<sup>20</sup> *Liber de causis* 4 (ed. O. Bardenhewer, 166, v. 19-20; ed. A. Pattin, 54).

dicat quod "Primum rerum creatarum est esse," quod non esset nisi esse esset de essentia.

(4.15) Praeterea, si esse non esset de essentia, quaestio si est esset quaestio ponens in numerum, quia illa quaestio est ponens in numerum quae quaerit diversum de diverso, et in quaestione si est quaeritur esse de essentia. Si igitur esse et essentia diversa sint, quaestio si est esset quaestio ponens in numerum; quod est contra *Philosophum*, II *Posteriorum*.<sup>21</sup>

〈Opinio Avicennae, Alberti et Boethii〉

(4.20) Circa istam quaestionem in principali sunt duae opiniones oppositae. *Quidam* ponunt quod esse non est idem cum essentia, et *quidam* ponunt contrariam.

(4.21) De prima opinione fuit *Avicenna*, ut recitat *Commentator*, IV *Metaphysicae*, commento 3.<sup>22</sup> Dixit enim Avicenna quod in omni causato esse est aliquid additum essentiae, et in Primo ente esse non differt ab essentia. Et unum motivum Avicennae, ut recitat *Commentator* ibidem, fuit istud, quia vidit quod esse est praedicatum denominativum et in denominativo est duplex intentio, scilicet accidentis et subiecti; ideo dixit Avicenna quod esse est praedicatum accidentale; et similiter dixit Avicenna quod hoc nomen res significat naturam rei absolute et ens significat naturam rei sub actu essendi. Unde dixit quod esse et res dicunt duas intentiones in anima et significant aliud in omnibus linguis, et hoc quia, ut dixit, aliter esset hic nugatio res ens. Et istius opinionis fuit *Albertus*, ut patet IV *Metaphysicae*, tractatu primo.<sup>23</sup> Dicit enim quod esse est dispositio accidentaliter uniuscuiusque entis causati, et sustentatus fuit super rationem Avicennae praetactam. Et idem vult *Boethius*,<sup>24</sup> qui dicit quod in omnibus citra Primum aliud est quod est et quo est. Et similiter:<sup>25</sup> "Omne ens citra Primum est ens per participationem," et sic nulli citra Primum inest esse essentialiter sed solum accidentaliter; esse igitur est accidens cuilibet enti causato.

〈Contra opinionem Avicennae, Alberti et Boethii〉

(4.22) Contra: Quod esse non sit accidens. Probatio, nam omne accidens praesupponit esse sui subiecti. Si igitur esse esset accidens, esse praesupponit esse, et ita idem praesupponeret se ipsum.

<sup>21</sup> Aristot., *Anal. Poster.*, II, c. 1 (89b 23-35).

<sup>22</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 32r).

<sup>23</sup> Albertus Magnus, *Metaph.*, IV, tr. 1, cc. 4-5 (*Opera omnia*, tom. XVI, pars 1 (Ed. B. Geyer, 1960), 165-167).

<sup>24</sup> Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* (PL 64, 1311C).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

(4.23) Praeterea, substantia est per suum esse. Si igitur esse esset accidens, substantia esset per suum accidens, et ita substantia non esset ens per se, et praeter hoc esse per prius inest ipsi esse quam alicui alii. Si igitur esse esset accidens esse per prius competeret accidenti quam substantiae.

(4.24) Praeterea, si esse sit accidens esset in aliquo genere accidentis. Sed non est dare quod sit in alio genere quam in genere actionis. Sed esse non est in genere actionis, quia actio praesupponit qualitates activas et passivas. Sed esse non praesupponit huiusmodi qualitates, quia sic aliquid posset agere antequam esset.

(4.25) Praeterea, motiva Avicennae non valent. Primo cum dicit quod esse est praedicatum denominativum et ens et res significant diversas intentiones, dicit Commentator, commento quo prius,<sup>26</sup> quod Avicenna non distinxit inter nomina significantia diversas intentiones et nomina significantia eandem intentionem diversis modis; unde dicit quod ens et res significant eandem intentionem sed modis diversis et hoc excusat nugationem. Et cum dicit quod esse est praedicatum denominativum, igitur est praedicatum accidentale, dicendum quod esse non est praedicatum denominativum sed significat substantiam rei per modum informantis.

#### 〈Opinio Thomae et Aegidii〉

(4.26) Aliter dicunt quidam quod esse non est essentia rei sed tamen est egrediens a principiis essentialibus rei cuius est esse et est in eodem genere per reductionem cum re cuius est esse, sicut motus est eiusdem generis per reductionem cum termino ad quem. Unde esse substantiae est unus actus in genere substantiae per reductionem et nec est substantia nec accidens. Et hanc opinionem tenent Thomas et Aegidius.<sup>27</sup>

#### 〈Contra opinionem Thomae et Aegidii〉

(4.27) Contra: Si esse sit in genere substantiae et non est in genere substantiae sicut aliquid imperfectum, igitur est in genere substantiae sicut aliqua perfectio. Esse igitur est aliquis actus in genere substantiae: Aut igitur est actus primus aut actus secundus. Si actus primus, tunc esse est substantia rei, quia forma rei est actus primus eius, et habetur propositum quod esse est de essentia. Nec est dare quod esse sit actus secundus, quia non est aliqua operatio, quia nec est intelligere nec sentire, et sic de aliis operationibus secundis.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. hic supra, nota 22.

<sup>27</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *In Aristot. Metaphysicam Commentarium*, IV, lect. 2 n. 558; Aegidius Romanus, *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia, de mensura Angelorum, et de cognitione Angelorum* (Venetiis, 1503), qq. 9–11.

(4.28) Praeterea, si esse sit in genere substantiae, aut igitur sicut simplex aut sicut compositum. Non sicut simplex, quia tunc vel esset materia vel forma. Non est materia, quia materia recipit esse et esse non recipit esse. Nec sicut forma, quia forma dat esse et esse non dat esse. Nec est in genere substantiae sicut compositum, quia sic esse esset compositum ex materia et forma, et esse Sortis esset compositum et non nisi ex materia Sortis et forma Sortis, et omne compositum ex materia Sortis et forma Sortis est Sortes; igitur esse Sortis esset Sortes, et hoc est propositum.

(4.29) Praeterea, esse praedicatur de Sorte et Platone: Aut igitur univoce, aut aequivoce aut denominative. Si univoce, igitur esse esset de essentia Sortis. Si aequivoce, haec esset distinguenda "Sortes est," quod non apparet verum. Si denominative, et in praedicatione denominativa praedicatur res unius generis de re alterius generis, tunc esse esset alterius generis quam Sortes et ita esse esset accidens, et hoc est prius improbatum.<sup>28</sup>

(4.210) Praeterea, si esse Sortis sit res de genere substantiae et esse Sortis non est separatum a Sorte, si imponatur nomen ad significandum totum compositum ex materia et forma Sortis simul cum esse Sortis, illud nomen non significabit nisi rem de genere substantiae. Sit *A* illud nomen. Tunc *A* non significat nisi rem de genere substantiae, non enim significat aliquod aggregatum per accidens; sed non significat speciem nec genus; igitur est nomen individui de genere substantiae et esse est intrinsecum ipsi *A*, quia est pars significati eius; igitur esse est de essentia individui de genere substantiae et alicuius individui hominis, quia *A* non est individuum alterius speciei quam hominis.

(4.211) Ad primum<sup>29</sup> istorum posset dici et bene quod esse est actus, sed actus est duplex: Actus ut actus et actus ut habitus. Et actus ut actus adhuc est duplex, scilicet primus et secundus. Actus ut actus primus est esse; actus ut actus secundus est operari, ut considerare et calfacere. Similiter, potest distingui de actu ut habitus, quia quidam est primus et quidam secundus. Actus ut habitus primus est forma substantialis. Actus ut habitus secundus est forma accidentalis, ut scientia vel calor. Et sic posset dici quod non omnis actus primus est forma substantialis sed solum ille qui est actus ut habitus.

<Diversae opiniones tenentes quod esse et essentia sunt idem>

(4.30) Alii ponunt quod esse et essentia sunt idem. Sed in modo ponendi dividuntur in tres sectas:

<sup>28</sup> Supra, nn. 4.22-4.25.

<sup>29</sup> Supra, n. 4.27.



〈Opinio Henrici Gandavensis〉

Primo ponitur quod cum verum sit creaturam participare esse, "creaturam autem participare a Deo potest intelligi dupliciter: Uno modo intelligendo essentiam creaturae ut aliquid substratum et esse quo participat ut aliquid in ipso receptum," ut actus inhaerens, quemadmodum aer comparatur ad lumen. Et hic videntur sonare verba Boethii, libro *De hebdomadibus*,<sup>30</sup> cum dicit "Quod est accepta essendi forma est atque subsistit." Isto modo intelligunt illi creaturam participare esse qui dicunt quod in creaturis essentia est aliud ab esse. Unde dicunt quod "creaturae se habent ad Deum sicut aer se habet ad solem illuminantem, ut sicut sol<sup>31</sup> qui est lucens per suam naturam sive per suam essentiam non est aliud quam ipsa lux, sic Deus, qui habet esse per suam naturam, non est nisi esse; et sicut aer de se est obscurus et de sua natura non est particeps lucis nisi a sole illuminetur, participans per hoc lumen a sole, sic creatura de se non habet esse nisi a Deo illustretur et detur sibi esse quo participet. Alio modo intelligitur essentiam participare esse intelligendo essentiam ut quid abstractum indifferens ad esse et non-esse, quae tamen essentia antequam sit in actu habet in Deo rationem idealem per quam constituitur in esse quidditativo. Fit autem in actu per hoc quod producitur a Deo ad similitudinem huius rationis exemplaris. Unde esse in actu creaturae est quaedam participatio divini esse. Et ideo essentia creaturae producta ad similitudinem ideae est ipsum esse participatum, et sic idem re sunt essentia creaturae et<sup>32</sup> esse participatum." Et formetur ratio sic: Creatura dicitur esse in actu per hoc quod producitur ad similitudinem divini esse sive ideae in mente divina; sed res per suam essentiam et non per additum est similitudo divini esse; igitur res per suam essentiam et non per additum est ens in actu. Et ponitur exemplum: "Si imago sigilli esset per se subsistens extra ceram in sua essentia per suam essentiam et non per additum esset similitudo sigilli." Unde isto secundo modo debet intelligi essentiam participare esse et non primo modo. Ista positio declaratur sic: Sicut res se habet ad veritatem, bonitatem et unitatem, sic se habet ad entitatem; sed res est bona et vera per hoc quod est similitudo divinae bonitatis et veritatis; igitur res habet esse per hoc quod producitur ad similitudinem divini esse. Ista positio est Henrici de Gandavo.<sup>33</sup>

(4.31) Ista positio ulterius confirmatur: Si substantia habeat esse in actu et esse non sit idem cum substantia rei, aut igitur est accidens aut alia substantia. Non est accidens, quia substantia non est per suum accidens et est per suum esse, igitur esse non accidit

<sup>30</sup> Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* (PL 64, 1311B).

<sup>31</sup> sol om. G

<sup>32</sup> et/ipsum add. (interl.) C

<sup>33</sup> Henr. Gandav., *Quodl.* I, q. 9 (ed. Parisiis, 1518; f. 11v).

substantiae. Nec est dare quod sit alia substantia, quia nec simplex nec composita. Non composita, ut patet; nec simplex, quia nec est materia nec forma.

(4.32) Pro ista etiam positione adducitur ratio C o m m e n t a t o r i s superius facta.<sup>34</sup>

〈Contra opinionem Henrici de Gandavo〉

(4.33) Contra istam positionem: Si esse non sit aliud ab essentia et res sit constituta in esse quidditativo ab aeterno, ut ponit ista positio, actio Dei creantis non se extenderet ad aliquid cum rem produceret in esse.

(4.34) Praeterea, secundum istam positionem non esset aliquid potentiale in rebus, quia ex quo esse dicit actum et quidlibet est idem cum suo esse, quidlibet esset actus et ita non esset potentiale<sup>35</sup> in rebus.

(4.35) Praeterea, ista positio non potest ponere essentiam participare esse, quia nihil participat se ipso, quia participare est partem capere; sed per istam positionem esse et essentia sunt idem.

〈Opinio tenens quod esse et essentia solum differunt in modo significandi〉

(4.36) Aliter ponitur<sup>36</sup> quod essentia et esse sunt idem et solum differunt in modo significandi, quia essentia significat rem absolute et esse significat rem quasi concernendo accidentia, et maxime significat rem per respectum ad agens, unde natura ut contrahit quemdam modum effective ab agente. Et per hoc substrahitur accidentibus; sic dicitur esse ens ab actu essendi.

〈Contra istam opinionem〉

(4.37) Contra: Ista positio non est rationabilis, quia accidentia et respectus ad agens praesupponit esse in effectum. Natura autem non habet ordinem ad primam causam sicut ad causam agentem nisi quia accipit esse ab ea, non autem per hoc quod accipit quod sit essentia. Unde oportet praeintelligere distinctionem esse saltem secundum rationem ante omnem comparisonem ad accidentia.

(4.38) Praeterea, omnis relatio realis requirit mutationem realem a parte alterius termini, accipiendo mutationem pro quacumque ad-

<sup>34</sup> Cf. hic supra, nota 22.

<sup>35</sup> potentiale/ponere genus G

<sup>36</sup> Sigerus de Brabantia, "Utrum esse in causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum?" (ed. M. Grabmann, *Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle*, t. I, Romae, 1924, 133-138).

quisitione non habiti. Sed quantum ad ipsam essentiam rei absolutae<sup>37</sup> non est aliqua mutatio: Esse enim est formalis ratio termini productionis seu creationis. Oportet igitur intelligere actionem terminari ad esse differens ab essentia.

〈Opinio Godefridi de Fontibus〉

(4.40) Aliter ponitur quod esse est idem quod essentia, ut esse substantiae est idem quod substantia et esse quantitatis idem cum quantitate. Hoc ponitur sic: Res habet triplex esse: Primo, in potentia Dei creantis; secundo, in potentia propinqua tam principiorum intrinsecorum quam extrinsecorum creatorum, sicut rosa habet esse in potentia materiae et in potentia activa agentis proximi; tertio, habet res esse in rerum natura extra intellectum, scilicet in se ipsa. Ulterius dicitur esse sciendum quod ista divisio entis in actum et potentiam non est divisio entis in materiam et formam, sed ista divisio dicit diversos modos essendi quae conveniunt toti rei, sicut dicimus hominem in actu et hominem in potentia, albedinem in actu et albedinem in potentia; sed dicitur in potentia respectu materiae et in actu respectu formae. Et quia potentia passiva dicit diminutam entitatem, ideo ens in potentia est ens secundum quid ut homo in potentia est homo secundum quid.

(4.41) Si igitur consideremus rem ipsam secundum primum esse quod habet, sic manifestum est quod habet diminutam entitatem, quia solum dicitur esse isto modo quia sibi non repugnat produci in esse sive ad esse proprium quod in se habebit et ad realitatem sui generis. Unde esse isto modo non differt a potentia activa Dei creantis.

(4.42) Si autem loquamur de re quantum ad secundum esse quod habebit, sic, licet habeat diminutam entitatem in comparatione ad esse quod habebit in se ipsa, in comparatione tamen ad esse quod habet in Deo potest dici perfectior entitas. Unde respectu huius entitatis potest esse scientia de re non ente in effectu. Unde res secundum istud esse non est res sui generis nisi secundum quid et in potentia. Unde res secundum istud esse non est res nisi in potentia, quatenus sua principia sunt in genere per reductionem. Unde istud esse non est aliud quam principia et esse principiorum propinquorum.

(4.43) Si autem loquatur de esse tertio modo secundum quod res habet esse in se ipsa in effectu, isto modo res est id quod est et esse rei non differt a re cuius est. Unde isto modo ponitur quod esse non est aliud quam natura ut est res sui generis, sicut esse quod res habet in potentia antequam sit in actu non est aliud quam esse principiorum talis rei secundum quod esse res non est id quod est nec res alicuius generis nisi secundum quid. Sic esse in effectu rei non est aliud quam ipsa natura rei ut est res sui generis. Unde producere

<sup>37</sup> absolutae/aliter G

rem ad esse est facere rem esse id quod est; similiter, quod sit res sui generis tantum; igitur habet aliquid de essentia quantum de esse, et e converso. Et sicut res habet esse sic habet quod sit res in genere. Unde secundum istam positionem quando res non habet esse in effectu tunc non est in aliquo genere; et haec est positio Magistri Godefridi<sup>38</sup> quam credo esse veram.

(4.44) Circa istam positionem est intelligendum quod nihil est in genere reali actualiter nisi actu existat. Quod patet ex hoc: Philosophus, VI *Metaphysicae* in fine,<sup>39</sup> dividit ens in ens verum extra animam et in ens diminutum quod solum habet esse in anima, et illud ens excludit a sua consideratione. Deinde dividit ens verum extra animam in decem praedicamenta, et sic quodlibet praedicamentum est verum ens extra animam, et nihil est actu in praedicamento nisi actualiter existat extra animam. Et ideo Caesar non est actu in genere substantiae nec est actu homo sed fuit in genere substantiae et fuit homo. Hoc vult Commentator in *De substantiis orbis* in principio,<sup>40</sup> et similiter I *Physicorum*,<sup>41</sup> distinguens duplex genus transmutationis in entibus: Quaedam enim est transmutatio secundum quam si aliquid transmutetur nec amittit nomen nec definitionem, et huiusmodi transmutationes sunt alteratio, augmentatio et loci mutatio. Alia est transmutatio secundum quam si aliquid transmutetur amittit nomen et definitionem, cuiusmodi transmutatio est generatio et corruptio. Sortes igitur cum corrumpitur amittit definitionem hominis et nomen hominis ita quod Sorte corrupto nec est homo nec animal rationale.

(4.45) Ulterius sciendum quod esse in communi non est de essentia Sortis sed esse existere Sortis est idem quod essentia Sortis, ita quod proprium esse rei est idem realiter cum sua essentia, tamen esse proprium rei non est idem cum illa re, ut esse Sortis non est idem cum Sorte nec essentia Sortis est idem cum Sorte. Haec enim est falsa: "Sortes est essentia Sortis"; si enim Sortes et sua essentia essent idem, quidquid esset pars Sortis esset pars essentiae Sortis, et tunc pes Sortis esset pes essentiae Sortis et de essentia Sortis.

(4.46) Sed tu dices: Quid igitur significat hoc nomen 'essentia' sive iste terminus 'essentia Sortis'? Aut significat materiam aut formam aut compositum. Non materiam, quia tunc forma non esset pars essentiae; nec significat formam, quia tunc materia non esset pars essentiae; igitur significat compositum ex materia et forma. Igitur isti termini 'Sortes' et 'essentia Sortis' significant idem, et sic

<sup>38</sup> Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* IV, q. 2 (lectio brevis) (ed. M. De Wulf - A. Pelzer, Louvain, 1904, *Les Philosophes Belges*, II, 323s.).

<sup>39</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 3, t. 8 (1027b 25-34).

<sup>40</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. De substantiis orbis*, c. 1 (ed. Iuntina, IX, Venetiis, 1550, f. 3r).

<sup>41</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Physicam*, I, com. 63 (ed. Iuntina, IV, 1550, f. 18v).



erit haec vera: "Sortes est essentia Sortis"; dicendum quod hoc nomen 'ens' et hoc nomen 'essentia' significant idem; et hoc nomen 'homo' et 'essentia hominis' significant idem sed alio et alio modo, quoniam per naturam ut significatur hoc nomine 'essentia' solum comprehenduntur illa quae ad naturam rei pertinent. Nec ex modo significandi dantur intelligi alia quae ad naturam rei non pertinent, immo potius ratione modi significandi talia excluduntur sic quod de illa non praedicantur. Sed hoc nomine 'homo' et hoc nomine 'ens' ex principali significato solum importantur illa quae ad naturam rei pertinent, sed ex modo significandi dantur alia intelligi quae non pertinent ad naturam rei vel saltem ex modo significandi talia non excluduntur. Et propter diversitatem modorum significandi est haec falsa "Sortes est essentia Sortis," non obstante quod Sortes et essentia Sortis idem significant.

(4.47) Consequenter est intelligendum quod haec est falsa: Essentia est esse ut dicunt omnes ponentes essentiam et esse non differre. Ista tamen satis posset concedi 'Essentia est esse'; alia tamen diversitas est inter essentiam et esse pro quo dicitur. Intelligendum quod in rebus est triplex differentia, scilicet differentia realis, differentia secundum rationem et differentia secundum intentionem. Ista differunt realiter quae sunt diversae res praeter operationem animae et constituunt aliquod prius utroque istorum; et sic differunt homo et albus. Et alia differunt secundum rationem tantum; et isto modo idem differt a se, quia intellectus utitur uno ut duobus. Isto etiam modo differunt definitio et definitum, ut animal rationale et homo. Et quae sic differunt neutrum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius nec etiam altero non intellecto. Sed differentia secundum intentionem est quando aliqua differunt magis quam secundum rationem et minus quam secundum rem. Unde differentia secundum intentionem est media inter differentiam realem et differentiam secundum rationem. Isto modo in simplicibus differunt genus et differentia, et neutrum est de per se intellectu alterius in talibus, et similiter unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius. Potest enim genus intelligi sub opposito unius differentiae, quia potest intelligi sub differentia opposita. Et dicitur quod isto modo differunt essentia et esse.

### 〈Instantiae〉

(4.50) Contra istam positionem arguitur: Simplicius dicit in *Praedicamentis* <sup>42</sup> quod quantum ad genus substantiae non refert utrum res sit in intellectu vel in effectum; igitur sive res habeat esse in actu sive non, ita quod solum habeat esse in intellectu, non minus erit in genere substantiae.

<sup>42</sup> Simplicius, *In Aristot. Praedicamenta*, com. 10 (Venezia, Bibl. Naz. Marciana, ms. lat. VI.152, f. 15va).

(4.51) Praeterea, hoc nomen 'homo' significat praeter omnem differentiam temporis, igitur hoc nomen 'homo' indifferenter abstrahitur ab omnibus suppositis cuiuslibet differentiae temporis; sed a quibus aliquid indifferenter abstrahitur de illis indifferenter dicitur; igitur sicut haec est vera "Gualterus est homo" sic et ista "Caesar est homo."

(4.52) Ad p r i m u m <sup>43</sup> istorum dicendum quod nos possumus loqui de genere dupliciter: Uno modo quantum ad intentionem generis quae convenit rei ut concipitur, et sic habet veritatem dictum Simplicii. Alio modo possumus loqui de genere quantum ad naturam substratam intentioni generis, et sic quantum ad genus substantiae multum refert utrum res sit in intellectu vel in effectu. Unde breviter genus est duplex, scilicet genus reale et genus logicum. In genere reali nihil est nisi quod actualiter existit extra animam; de nullo enim est verum dicere quod est homo vel quod est substantia nisi de eo quod actualiter existet; tamen in genere logico potest aliquid esse quod non existit actualiter. Unde nulla rosa existente, rosa est in genere logico sed non in genere reali. Et tunc est haec concedenda "Rosa est species substantiae," sed non sequitur "Rosa est substantia."

(4.53) C o n t r a : Rosa existente, in ista "Rosa est substantia" praedicatur genus de specie; igitur ista propositio est per se, et quae per se insit de necessitate insit; igitur haec est necessaria, et per consequens est vera, nulla rosa existente; d i c e n d u m quod haec est per se "Rosa est substantia," et tamen non est necessaria; et haec propositio "Quae per se insit de necessitate insit" habet intelligi de illis quae sic sunt per se sicut sunt praemissae in demonstratione potissima. Praemissae in demonstratione potissima sunt sic per se quod in eis praedicatur convertibile de convertibili, ut passio de definitione vel definitio de definito; et omnes tales propositiones sunt necessariae. Unde haec est necessaria "Rosa est substantia *B*" — sit *B* differentia rosae — et haec est vera sive rosa sit sive non. Nec sequitur "Rosa est substantia *B*, igitur rosa est substantia," quia in antecedente praedicatur convertibile de convertibili et in consequente non; et ideo consequentia non valet sicut nec ista "Homo albus est homo albus, igitur homo albus est homo."

(4.54) T u d i c e s : Omnis propositio est necessaria in qua praedicatur genus de specie, aliter foret haec contingens "Homo est animal"; et per consequens haec est necessaria "Rosa est substantia"; d i c e n d u m quod non oportet semper propositionem esse necessariam, nec etiam veram in qua praedicatur genus de specie per verbum de praesenti. Sed si ista species necessario habeat esse, tunc semper erit propositio vera in qua praedicatur genus de specie, et

<sup>43</sup> Supra, n. 4.50; cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* IV, q. 2 (lectio brevis) (ed. M. De Wulf - A. Pelzer, Louvain, 1904, *Les Philosophes Belges*, II, 324-325).

ideo posito quod haec sit necessaria "Homo est" erit haec necessaria "Homo est animal," et aliter non. Unde quod omnis propositio sit necessaria in qua praedicatur genus de specie, hoc habet intelligi in illis ubi species necessario habet esse, in aliis autem non.

(4.55) Ad aliud:<sup>44</sup> Quod haec propositio "Nomen significat praeter omnem differentiam temporis" potest intelligi dupliciter: Uno modo quod ipsum nomen nec in suo significato nec ex modo significandi aliquam differentiam temporis includat; et hoc est verum: Per hoc enim distinguitur nomen a verbo. Alio modo quod rem significatam per nomen non consignificatur aliqua differentia temporis; et hoc est falsum, quia rem significatam per hominem necessario consignificatur differentia temporis praesentis tamquam propria mensura talis rei. Nulla tamen differentia temporis est de essentia rei significatae per hominem.

(4.601) Ad primum principale:<sup>45</sup> Dicendum quod quaestio quid est et quaestio an est differunt. Utraque tamen quaerit de eadem re sed diversimode. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod sint diversae quaestiones, nam quaestio an est quaerit de essentia rei secundum quod res est in se ipsa extra animam sed quaestio quid est quaerit essentiam rei absolute.

(4.602) Vel aliter: Quod quaestio quid est non quaerit existentiam rei sed quaerit quod quid rei vel quidditatem rei sive definitionem. Sed quaestio an est quaerit existentiam rei. Modo existentia rei et definitio rei non sunt idem: Haec enim est falsa: "Animal rationale est existentia hominis" sicut ista "Homo est existentia hominis." Et ideo concedo quod bene quaeritur an nigredo sit sed non bene quaeritur an nigredo sit nigredo, quia sicut dictum est nigredo et esse nigredinis non sunt idem, etsi essentia nigredinis et esse nigredinis sint idem. Sed sicut bene quaeritur an nigredo sit, ita bene quaeritur an nigredo habeat existentiam.

(4.603) Et ad confirmationem argumenti:<sup>46</sup> Cum dicitur quod a generante non habet res quod sit idem quod est, ut a generante non habet Sortes quod sit Sortes sed a generante habet quod sit; igitur etc.; d i c e n d u m quod quia a generante non habet Sortes quod sit Sortes et a generante habet esse, ideo Sortes non est suum esse. Verumtamen sicut a generante habet Sortes esse ita a generante habet essentiam et a generante habet quod sit res alicuius generis.

(4.604) Ad aliud:<sup>47</sup> Concedo quod actio agentis terminatur ad aliquid absolutum et quod actio agentis terminatur ad essentiam quantum ad illud quod est, quoniam actio agentis terminatur ad

<sup>44</sup> Supra, n. 4.51.

<sup>45</sup> Supra, n. 4.01.

<sup>46</sup> Supra, n. 4.03.

<sup>47</sup> Supra, n. 4.04.

essentiam quantum ad illud quod est, quoniam actio agentis terminatur ad compositum ex materia et forma. Unde esse non est solum unum respectum sed dicit compositum ex materia et forma, et hoc dico si accipiatur esse rei compositae.

(4.605) Ad aliud:<sup>48</sup> Cum dicitur quod subiectum transmutationis differt ab utroque terminorum, et essentia est aliquando sub esse aliquando sub non-esse, igitur etc.; d i c e n d u m quod illud quod est subiectum in transmutatione differt ab utroque terminorum. Sed haec est falsa imaginatio quae ponit essentiam esse subiectum in transmutatione a non-esse in esse, quia subiectum cuiuslibet transmutationis est aliquid existens in actu nunc sub uno termino transmutationis et iam sub alio. Sed essentia non est aliquid existens nunc manens sub non-esse et iam sub esse, quia tunc idem simul esset sub esse et sub non-esse.

(4.606) Ad aliud:<sup>49</sup> Dicendum quod essentia nec de se est necesse esse nec de se est impossibile esse, sed de se est possibile esse. Et cum dicitur quod nihil est per id quod potest esse et non-esse; d i c e n d u m quod hoc est falsum; aliquid enim est per illud formaliter quod tamen de se non est necesse esse.

(4.607) Ad aliud:<sup>50</sup> Quod esse est idem cum essentia et quod essentia de se est determinata ad esse. Verumtamen ly de in proposito potest denotare circumstantiam causae formalis vel circumstantiam causae efficientis. Si denotet circumstantiam causae formalis sic est haec vera: "Essentia de se est determinata ad esse, quia essentia per se ipsam formaliter habet esse." Si autem denotet circumstantiam causae efficientis, sic nulla creatura de se est determinata ad esse. Unde sequitur: Quaelibet creatura formaliter habet esse ex se, et hoc probat ratio C o m m e n t a t o r i s, IV *Metaphysicae*;<sup>50a</sup> sed quaelibet creatura effective habet esse ab alio. Unde non omne quod de se formaliter habet esse est ex se necesse esse. Sed omne quod de se effective habet esse est ex se necesse esse.

(4.608) Ad aliud:<sup>51</sup> Cum dicitur quod illud quod est ex se possibile esse non potest habere esse per agens nisi agens sibi aliquid imprimat; d i c e n d u m quod aliquid esse possibile respectu esse potest intelligi dupliciter: Vel sic quod sit potentia receptiva alicuius actus, sicut est subiectum in transmutatione; et omne quod sic est possibile respectu esse ad hoc quod sibi adquiratur esse oportet quod agens aliquid sibi imprimat. Alio modo dicitur aliquid possibile esse

<sup>48</sup> Supra, n. 4.05.

<sup>49</sup> Supra, n. 4.06.

<sup>50</sup> Supra, n. 4.07.

<sup>50a</sup> Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 32r).

<sup>51</sup> Supra, n. 4.08.



quia potest esse terminus productionis alicuius agentis, et sic est Antichristus unum possibile esse. Et ad hoc quod tale possibile esse producat ad actum non oportet quod agens aliquid sibi imprimat, quia tale non dicitur possibile esse respectu alicuius formae imprimendae sed solum dicitur possibile esse in comparatione ad agens, ut scilicet quia potest esse terminus productionis alicuius agentis. Unde breviter: In omni transmutatione naturali est potentia duplex prae-supposita: Una potentia quae est receptiva formae in fine transmutationis et ista dicitur esse potentia subiectiva; et alia est potentia quae propter hoc dicitur esse potentia, quia potest esse terminus alicuius agentis. Primo modo dicitur materia esse potentia; secundo modo totum compositum dicitur esse potentia, ut tota aqua, si ex aere debeat generari aqua, quia totum compositum terminat actionem agentis.

(4.609) Ad aliud:<sup>52</sup> Quod in omni citra Primum aliud est quod est et quo est effective. Unde nihil citra Primum est ex se effective, tamen non in omni citra Primum est aliud quod est et quo est formaliter, nisi secundum rationem intelligendi.

(4.6010) Ad aliud:<sup>53</sup> Quod quilibet citra Primum recedit a simplicitate Primi, non tamen in quolibet citra Primum est compositio ex materia et forma, nec etiam ex essentia et esse; sed ex essentia et modo essendi sive modo intelligendi. Sed in Primo essentia et modus essendi seu intelligendi non differunt. Credo tamen quod in quolibet citra ens quod est communissimum est aliqualis compositio, et hoc tam in Deo quam in creatura, et qualiter hoc sit videbitur postea.<sup>54</sup>

(4.6011) Ad aliud:<sup>55</sup> Quod aliquid est ens per participationem et tamen est ens per essentiam; nec repugnant ista sicut nec repugnant quod aliquid sit ens de se formaliter et tamen quod sit ens effective ab alio.

(4.6012) Ad aliud:<sup>56</sup> Quod esse in effectu non potest demonstrari de re. Nec sequitur "potest quaeri, igitur potest demonstrari." Sed sequitur "Hoc est quaeribile, igitur vel est demonstrabile vel est ratio per quam aliquid potest demonstrari." Unde sciendum quod sunt duae quaestiones simplices et duae compositae. Quaestiones simplices sunt an est et quid est; quaestiones compositae sunt quia est et propter quid est. Et quaestiones compositae possunt terminari et certificari per demonstrationem sed quaestiones simplices non; immo illae quaestiones sunt rationes terminandi alia per demonstrationem,

<sup>52</sup> Supra, n. 4.09.

<sup>53</sup> Supra, n. 4.010.

<sup>54</sup> Haec positio non invenitur in his *Quaestionibus*.

<sup>55</sup> Supra, n. 4.011.

<sup>56</sup> Supra, n. 4.013.

quia quid est et si est sunt quaestiones praesuppositae. Sicut enim nullus potest terminare quaestionem quid est per demonstrationem, cum quidditas rei non possit demonstrari de re, sic nec quaestionem si est.

(4.6013) Ad aliud:<sup>57</sup> Quod idem uno modo praesupponit se ipsum alio modo, quia aliquid uno modo est notius se ipso alio modo, ut res significata per istam "Omne animal rationale est risibile" ut sic significatur est notior re significata per istam "Omnis homo est risibilis" ut sic significatur, et tamen eadem res significatur per utramque. Sic etsi esse et quid rei sint eadem, tamen quid rei praesupponit esse tamquam prius notum.

(4.6014) Ad aliud:<sup>58</sup> Quod haec propositio est neganda: Quod nihil potest intelligi esse sub opposito suae essentiae quia esse potest intelligi sub opposito esse. Bene enim contingit intelligere et vere quod esse Sortis non est. Unde argumentum non plus probat quod esse et esse non sunt idem. Unde non sequitur: Essentia potest intelligi sub opposito esse, igitur essentia et esse differunt.

(4.6015) Ad aliud:<sup>59</sup> Quod esse se habet ad ens sicut vivere ad viventem. Quanto ad hoc quod sicut vivere significatur per modum actus sic et esse; vel potest dici quod vivere et vivens significant eandem rem et sic esse et ens. Unde vivere essentialiter inest viventi. Verumtamen vivere uno modo est actus primus et sic est essentia viventis; vel alio modo est actus secundus et sic accidens viventi et vivere comparatur ad viventem sicut esse ad ens secundum quod vivere est actus primus viventis.

(4.6016) Ad ultimum:<sup>60</sup> Quod non sequitur quod haec sit necessaria "Sortes est," quia esse hic praedicatum est esse in communi, et dictum est prius quod esse in communi non est de essentia Sortis. Posito tamen quod esset de eius essentia non propter hoc sequitur quod haec foret necessaria; sicut non sequitur quod etsi aliquid sit res alicuius generis quod propter hoc de necessitate sit res illius generis.

### ⟨QUAESTIO QUINTA⟩

(5.0) *Omnis phoenix est*<sup>1</sup> Quaeritur de veritate huius "Omnis phoenix est." ■

<sup>57</sup> Supra, n. 4.014.

<sup>58</sup> Supra, n. 4.015.

<sup>59</sup> Supra, n. 4.016.

<sup>60</sup> Supra, n. 4.017.

<sup>1</sup> est/etc. *add.* C

<sup>2</sup> *omnis...* est *om.* C

〈Quod ista propositio sit falsa〉

(5.01) Quod sit falsa videtur, quia sequitur "Omnis phoenix est, igitur omne suppositum phoenicis est." Consequens falsum, quia phoenix praeterita est suppositum phoenicis, et tamen phoenix praeterita non est.

(5.02) Hic dicitur quod consequentia facta non valet, quia ex quo phoenix in antecedente restringitur ad standum pro praesentibus oportet quod habeat alia supposita quam praesentia, et ideo conceditur quod phoenix praeterita est suppositum phoenicis; *contra*: Si hoc esset verum, tunc Caesar esset unum suppositum hominis et Sortes existens est suppositum hominis, igitur Sortes et Caesar sunt duo supposita hominis; sed omnia duo supposita hominis sunt unum suppositum huius termini 'homines'; igitur Sortes et Caesar essent unum suppositum huius termini 'homines.' Aut igitur sunt unum suppositum praesens huius termini aut unum suppositum praeteritum aut unum suppositum futurum. Sed nullum istorum convenit dare: Non primum, quia sic foret haec vera: "Sortes et Caesar sunt homines," quod falsum est. Nec est dare secundum, quia tunc foret haec vera "Sortes et Caesar fuerunt homines," quod falsum est. Nec est dare tertium, quia sic foret haec vera "Sortes et Caesar erunt homines."

(5.03) Si dicatur quod haec est vera "Sortes et Caesar fuerunt homines"; *contra*: Volo quod Sortes nunc primo sit; ista tunc est falsa "Sortes et Caesar fuerunt homines" qualitercumque accipiatur praedicatum, quia nec fuerunt homines praesentes nec homines praeteriti nec homines futuri.

(5.04) Si dicatur quod Sortes et Caesar sunt suppositum huius termini 'homines' et tamen nec suppositum praesens nec praeteritum nec futurum; vel etiam si aliter dicatur quod Sortes et Caesar non sunt unum suppositum huius termini 'homines'; *contra primum*: Si illud foret verum, aliquid esset suppositum alicuius communis de quo commune non dicitur per aliquam compositionem; nec per verbum de praesenti, nec per verbum de praeterito, nec per verbum de futuro, quia quaelibet istarum est falsa "Sortes et Caesar sunt homines," "Sortes et Caesar fuerunt homines" vel "erunt homines." Et ulterius cum omne commune possit alicubi supponere pro supposito, oporteret dare quod terminus communis in istis de inesse posset habere plures acceptiones quam sunt istae: "quod est," "quod fuit," "quod erit." *Contra secundum* modum dicendi: Probo quod Caesar et Sortes sint suppositum huius termini 'homines,' quia Sorte corrupto erunt unum suppositum huius termini. Nunc autem ista positio ponit quod omne quod erit suppositum termini est suppositum termini, et praeterea Sortes et Caesar sunt duo supposita huius termini 'homo,' igitur sunt unum suppositum huius termini 'homines,' quia plurale non dicit nisi singulare

grammaticum; quaecumque igitur sunt duo supposita huius termini 'homo' sunt unum suppositum huius termini 'homines.' Praeterea, 'homo' et 'homo praesens' convertuntur quantum ad supposita; igitur si Caesar sit suppositum hominis erit suppositum hominis praesentis.

(5.05) Si dicatur quod 'homo' et 'homo praesens' non convertuntur quantum ad supposita; c o n t r a : Omne quod est suppositum praesentis hominis est suppositum praesens hominis praesentis, et omne praeteritum suppositum hominis est suppositum praeteritum hominis praesentis, et sic de suppositis futuris; igitur etc. Probatio assumpti: De quolibet<sup>3</sup> supposito est verum dicere quod est homo de eodem est verum dicere quod est homo praesens, et de quolibet<sup>4</sup> supposito est verum dicere quod fuit homo de eodem est verum dicere quod fuit homo praesens. Si igitur dicatur quod Caesar est suppositum hominis eodem modo debet dici quod Caesar est suppositum hominis praesentis.

(5.06) Et si dicatur quod de Caesare est verum dicere quod fuit homo praesens tamen non est suppositum hominis praesentis; c o n t r a : Caesar fuit suppositum hominis praesentis et modo non est, igitur est suppositum praeteritum eius; et ultra: igitur est suppositum eius per istam viam.

(5.07) Aliter dicitur ad argumentum: Concedo hoc consequens "Omne suppositum phoenicis est," et dicitur quod phoenix praeterita non est suppositum phoenicis sicut nec est phoenix; c o n t r a : Iste terminus 'phoenix' potest definiri pro phoenice praeterita, ut in ista "Omnis phoenix fuit," sumpto subiecto pro eo quod fuit; sed terminus non distribuitur nisi pro suo supposito, igitur phoenix praeterita est suppositum phoenicis.

(5.08) Et si dicatur quod terminus aliquando distribuitur pro eo quod non est suum suppositum sed pro eo quod fuit suum suppositum; c o n t r a : Illud pro quo terminus distribuitur potest excipi a termino, sed exceptio est extra captio partis a toto; igitur omne pro quo terminus distribuitur est sua pars subiectiva, et per consequens suum suppositum. Hoc potest argui sic; Sit *A* phoenix praeterita. Ista falsa est: "Omnis phoenix fuit aliud ab *A*," sumpto subiecto pro eo quod fuit et non nisi pro *A*, igitur excepto *A*, erit vera. Igitur haec est vera: "Omnis phoenix praeter *A* fuit aliud ab *A*." Cum igitur exceptio sit extra captio partis a toto oportet quod *A* sit suppositum phoenicis.

(5.1) Ad p r i n c i p a l e : Si praemissa foret vera, tunc iste terminus 'phoenix' restringeretur; sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc esset haec vera: "Omnia duo sunt"; sed haec est falsa, quia Caesar et Sortes sunt duo et tamen non sunt.

<sup>3</sup> quolibet/quocumque G

<sup>4</sup> quolibet/quocumque G



(5.10) *Dicitur* quod iste terminus 'duo' non est terminus restringibilis, et ideo haec est falsa "Omnia duo sunt"; *contra*: Omnis dualitas est, igitur omnia duo sunt. Antecedens verum, igitur consequens,<sup>5</sup> quia omnis dualitas est accidens et omne accidens est in subiecto, quia accidens esse est inesse; igitur haec est vera "Omnia duo sunt."

(5.11) *Dicitur* quod haec est falsa "Omnis dualitas est" et haec similiter "Omne accidens est in subiecto," sed haec est vera "Omne accidens existens est in subiecto"; *contra*: Demonstrata dualitate Sortis existentis et Caesaris, haec est vera "Ista dualitas est," et eadem ratione quaelibet alia est. Probo quod ista sit, quia aliqua unitas huius dualitatis, ut unitas Sortis. Si igitur ista dualitas non foret, aliquod ens esset pars non-entis; quod falsum est. Praeterea, omnis dualitas quae est in genere quantitatis est; sed dualitas non-entium est in genere quantitatis, ut dualitas Caesaris et Sortis; igitur illa dualitas est, et eadem ratione quaelibet alia.

(5.12) *Si dicatur* quod haec est falsa: Omnis dualitas quae est in genere quantitatis est; *contra*: Tunc aliquod non-ens esset dualitas in genere quantitatis, et si hoc, cum infinitae unitates erant quae modo non sunt, numerus illarum unitatum esset in genere quantitatis, non obstante quod illae unitates non sunt; igitur aliquis numerus actu infinitus esset in genere quantitatis. Praeterea, infinitae species specialissimae numeri fuerunt in genere quantitatis, quia infinitae unitates quae sunt principia numeri fuerunt. Si igitur omnis species quae fuit in genere quantitatis modo sit in genere quantitatis, infinitae species specialissimae forent nunc in genere quantitatis. Et si conclusio concedatur; *contra*: Si hoc esset verum, infinita genera generalissima essent in genere quantitatis. Probo, quia infinita genera subalterna essent in genere quantitatis, et per consequens infinita generalissima. Probo quod ibi essent infinita genera subalterna, quia quodlibet genus infimum quod non habet genus sub se habet sub se tantum duas species specialissimas, quia quodlibet genus habet tantum duas differentias per quas descendit in species et una differentia non constituit nisi unam speciem. Si igitur sint species specialissimae infinitae, igitur erunt infima infinita, quoniam si genera infima stant finita et species specialissimae non sunt nisi in duplo plures quam genera infima,<sup>6</sup> sequitur quod species specialissimae sunt infinitae. Probatio unius accepti, scilicet quod si genera subalterna sint infinita, igitur genera generalissima sint infinita, quia per *Philosophum*, *I Posteriorum*,<sup>7</sup> stantibus extremis impossibile est media esse infinita, igitur ex opposito si media sint infinita extrema non sunt finita.

<sup>5</sup> igitur consequens *om.* C

<sup>6</sup> infima/generalissima G

<sup>7</sup> Aristot., *Anal. Poster.* I, c. 19 (82a 2ss.).

(5.13) Hic dicitur quod haec est falsa "Quodlibet genus infimum habet tantum duas differentias per quas descendit in species." Unde ponitur quod est aliquod genus infimum habens sub se infinitas species et tale genus habet infinitas differentias per quas descendit in species; contra: Boethius, libro *Divisionum*,<sup>8</sup> dicit quod omnis divisio formalis est per duo membra primo. Cum igitur divisio generis in suas species sit divisio formalis erit tantum per duo membra primo. Praeterea, si essent species infinitae in eodem genere, descendendo a generalissimis non esset deveniendum ad specialissima sed esset standum ad aliquod genus infimum, et hoc propter infinitatem specierum. Unde dicit Porphyrius<sup>9</sup> quod "quia individua sunt infinita descendentem<sup>10</sup> a generalissimis ad specialissima iubet Plato quiescere."

(5.14) Ad principale: Haec est vera: "Quod numquam erit, potest fore." Si tamen subiectum solum staret pro praesentibus, ista foret falsa, quia omne quod est et numquam erit nunc ultimo est, et nullum tale potest fore. Quod autem haec sit vera "Quod numquam est, potest fore": quia haec est vera "Aliquid quod potest fore, non erit," quoniam nulla suntabilia quae numquam erunt; et sequitur "Aliquid quod potest fore, non erit; igitur aliquid quod numquam erit, potest fore."

(5.14I) Hic dicitur quod haec est vera: "Aliquid quod numquam erit, potest fore," sed non est vera pro aliquo quod nunc est, nec restringitur subiectum in proposito; contra: Nulla singularis huiusmodi est vera, quia detur una: Si hoc quod numquam erit, potest fore; igitur hoc numquam erit, et hoc potest fore. Si igitur antecedens esset determinate verum, consequens esset determinate verum. Et tunc de aliquo esset nunc determinatum quod numquam erit, et tamen illud posset fore. Sed hoc est falsum, quia si aliquid posset fore non est determinatum quod numquam erit. Hoc potest argui sub alia forma sic: Quaero an subiectum hic supponit solum pro his de quibus determinate dicitur, aut indifferenter pro his de quibus determinate dicitur et etiam indeterminate. Si detur primum, et pro nullo de quo subiectum determinate dicitur est haec vera, sequitur quod haec non sit vera. Si supponat indifferenter pro illis de quibus determinate dicitur et etiam pro quibus indeterminate dicitur, cum omnis propositio sit determinate vera in qua praedicatur commune de supposito, haec esset determinate vera: "A est aliquid quod numquam erit." Sit A illud de quo indeterminatum est utrum erit vel non; quod non est verum.

<sup>8</sup> Boethius, *Liber de divisione* (PL 64, 883D-885B).

<sup>9</sup> Porphyrius, *Isagoge*, cap. 'De specie' (Aristoteles latinus I, 6-7: *Categoriarum supplementa*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, 12, lin. 8-10). Cf. Plato, *Philebus* 16, *Politicus* 262A-C, *Soph.* 266A.

<sup>10</sup> descendentem/ideo de entibus G

(5.142) Hic dicitur uno modo quod iste terminus 'id quod numquam erit,' et similiter iste terminus 'futurum,' supponunt pro illis de quibus non dicuntur inevitabiliter sed indeterminate. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod haec sit determinate vera "*A* est aliquid quod numquam erit"; c o n t r a : Si iste terminus 'illud quod erit' vel 'futurum' supponant pro illis de quibus indeterminate dicitur, quatione supponunt pro uno et pro quolibet. Igitur pro eisdem suppositis omnino fieret distributio in istis: "Omne quod erit, erit"; et "Omne quod potest fore, erit"; et per consequens ista foret vera: "Omne quod potest fore, erit."

(5.143) Praeterea, significat *A* idem quod iste terminus 'id de quo indeterminatum est an eveniet.' Pro eisdem suppositis fieret distributio in istis: "Omne futurum est futurum" et "Omne quod est futurum vel *A* est futurum." Sed sequitur "Omne quod est futurum vel *A* est futurum, igitur Antichristus est futurus," et per consequens sequeretur "Omne futurum est futurum, igitur Antichristus est futurus." Sed antecedens est determinate verum, igitur consequens; sed hoc est falsum.

(5.144) Praeterea, detur unum pro quo fit distributio in ista: "Omne futurum erit" de quo tamen subiectum non dicitur determinate, et sit illud *A*. Tunc pro eisdem fit distributio in istis "Omne futurum erit" et "Omne futurum vel *A* erit." Sed sequitur "Omne futurum vel *A* erit, igitur *A* erit"; igitur sequeretur "Omne futurum erit, igitur *A* erit"; et ita ex determinate vero sequeretur indeterminate verum.

(5.145) Praeterea, haec esset determinate vera: "*A* est futurum." Sit *A* aliquid de quo indeterminatum est an eveniet, pro quo, t u d i c i s , quod iste terminus 'futurum' supponit. Probo, quia sua conversa est vera, ut ista: "Aliquod futurum est *A*," quia habet aliquam singularem veram.

(5.146) Aliter dicitur quod ista est vera: "Aliquid quod numquam erit, potest fore," et tamen nulla singularis est vera, quia ponitur quod commune non supponit pro aliquo supposito nisi illud commune determinate dicatur de illo supposito; et sic dicitur quod particularis est vera et tamen nulla singularis; c o n t r a : Si quaelibet singularis huiusmodi sit falsa "Aliquid quod numquam erit, potest fore," tunc opposita cuiuslibet singularis est vera et illae singulares inferunt hanc: "Nihil quod numquam erit, potest fore." Haec igitur est vera et sua opposita similiter, et sic contradictoria forent simul vera.

(5.147) Praeterea, demonstratis omnibus de quibus est in re determinatum quod erunt, haec esset vera: "Omne quod erit, est aliquod istorum." Ex quo sequitur: "Igitur tantum aliquod istorum est id quod erit"; et ultra sequitur: "Igitur Antichristus non erit." Haec igitur foret determinate vera. Quod antecedens ista foret vera

"Omne futurum est aliquod istorum" probatur, quia quaelibet singularis esset vera.

(5.148) Praeterea, de hoc quod dicitur quod terminus non distribuitur<sup>11</sup> pro aliquo nisi in re sit determinatum quod iste terminus sibi conveniet; *c o n t r a* sic: Pro eisdem fieret distributio in istis: "Omnis homo natus est homo" et "Omnis homo natus vel nasciturus est homo," quia hoc disiunctum 'natus vel nasciturus' non dicitur determinate nisi de hominibus natis; igitur ista foret vera: "Omnis homo natus vel nasciturus est natus" sicut ista "Omnis homo natus est natus." Sed sequitur "Omnis homo natus vel nasciturus est natus, et omnis homo nasciturus est homo natus vel nasciturus, igitur omnis homo nasciturus est natus." Ista igitur foret determinate vera.

(5.149) Praeterea, in ista: "Omnis homo nasciturus erit" non fieret distributio pro aliquo supposito, nec in ista: "Omnis homo erit," sumpto subiecto pro eo quod erit.

(5.1410) Ad *p r i m u m* istorum<sup>12</sup> dicitur quod haec est falsa: "Nihil quod numquam erit, potest fore," et tamen praedicatum vere removetur a quolibet pro quo fit distributio; nec valet in talibus: "Quaelibet singularis est vera, igitur universalis"; *c o n t r a*: Si praedicatum vere removeatur a quolibet pro quo fit distributio, tunc nihil est sumere sub subiecto a quo non vere removetur praedicatus terminus, et per consequens haec est vera per dici de nullo.

(5.1411) Praeterea, de alio<sup>13</sup> quod dicitur: Quod quaelibet singularis est vera et universalis non; *c o n t r a* sic: Universalis non posset induci ex singularibus; quod relinquitur pro absurdo. Et similiter: Universalis negativa non plus significat nisi praedicatum removeri a quolibet supposito subiecti, igitur si praedicatum vere removeatur a quolibet supposito subiecti erit ista universalis vera.

(5.15) Ad *p r i n c i p a l e*: Sequitur "Omnis phoenix est, phoenix praeterita est phoenix, igitur" etc. Probatio minoris: Nam phoenix praeterita fuit phoenix, igitur aliqua phoenix fuit phoenix praeterita; sed omnis phoenix est haec phoenix, demonstrata phoenix praesente; igitur haec phoenix fuit phoenix praeterita. Sed omne quod fuit haec phoenix est phoenix, igitur phoenix praeterita est phoenix.

(5.16) Praeterea, phoenix futura est phoenix, quia phoenix futura potest esse phoenix.

(5.161) Dicitur quod haec est falsa: "Phoenix praeterita est phoenix," et haec similiter "Phoenix futura est phoenix." Ad

<sup>11</sup> quod... distribuitur/non dicitur G

<sup>12</sup> Supra, n. 5.142.

<sup>13</sup> Supra, n. 5.145.



probationem dicitur quod haec est distinguenda: "Phoenix praeterita fuit phoenix," ex eo quod praedicatum potest accipi pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod fuit. Si pro eo quod fuit sic est vera. Si pro eo quod est, sic est falsa. Et eodem modo distinguitur ista: "Phoenix futura potest esse phoenix," sumpto praedicato pro eo quod est, sic est falsa, quia sic sequitur "Phoenix futura potest esse phoenix, igitur phoenix futura est phoenix." Et generaliter, sumptis extremis pro his quae sunt, ab affirmativa de possibili <sup>14</sup> sequitur sua de inesse nisi addatur aliquis modus extraneus compositioni ut 'heri' vel 'cras' vel 'in hoc instanti' vel aliquod tale; c o n t r a: Si praedicatum in ista de possibili habeat tales acceptiones haec esset falsa: "Omne quod potest esse falsum, potest esse falsum," sumpto praedicato pro eo quod est; igitur haec esset vera "Aliquid quod potest esse falsum, non potest esse falsum," ex qua sequitur "Igitur aliquid quod potest esse falsum, de necessitate non est falsum"; sed haec est omni modo falsa.

(5.162) Et si dicatur quod non sequitur "Aliquid quod potest esse falsum, non potest esse falsum, igitur aliquid quod potest esse falsum, de necessitate non est falsum"; c o n t r a: Per te praedicatum consequentis supponit pro suppositis. Aut igitur solum supponit pro his quae sunt aut etiam supponit pro his quae sunt et pro his quae possunt esse. Non est dare secundum, quia sic demonstrato aliquo quod non est falsum, quod tamen potest esse falsum, haec esset vera: "Hoc de necessitate est falsum," igitur praedicatum in illa de necessario solum supponit pro his quae sunt, et per consequens consequentia negata erit bona, quia termini supponunt uniformiter, et 'non possibile' aequipollet ei quod est 'necesse non.' Si autem concedatur ista, aliquid quod potest esse falsum, de necessitate non est falsum; c o n t r a: Tunc de eodem esset verum dicere "Hoc est id quod potest esse falsum" et "Hoc impossibile est esse falsum sive de necessitate non est falsum."

(5.17) Praeterea, quod in illis de praeterito et de futuro non habeat praedicatum tales acceptiones ostenditur, quia demonstrato instanti praeterito, haec esset vera "Hoc instans fuit praesens antequam fuit praeteritum." Si tamen iste terminus praesens haberet tales acceptiones, ista foret omni modo falsa, quia haec est falsa: "Hoc instans fuit praesens quod est antequam fuit praeteritum" et haec similiter est falsa: "Hoc instans fuit id quod fuit praesens antequam fuit praeteritum."

(5.171) Dicitur quod haec est distinguenda "Hoc instans fuit" etc. secundum compositionem et divisionem. Sensus compositus est iste: Haec fuit vera: "Hoc instans est praesens" antequam haec fuit vera "Hoc instans est praeteritum," et sic est haec vera; sed in sensu divisionis est falsa; c o n t r a: Adhuc ista "Haec fuit vera

<sup>14</sup> affirmativa... possibili/illa de possibili affirmativa G

'Hoc instans est praesens' " etc. est eodem modo distinguenda, et hac accepta, adhuc in sensu aliquo est eadem ratione distinguenda, et sic in infinitum. Et si concedatur processus in infinitum in distinctionibus, ut accepto sensu composito, adhuc sic propositio ulterius distinguenda. Qui sic dicunt non possunt istos sensus quos dicunt alicui manifestare nec possunt aliquem docere, quia tanta est multiplicitas in propositione per quam volunt docere quanta et in principali.

(5.172) Praeterea, quod praedicatum in illis de futuro non habeat duas acceptiones probo, quia si sic, haec foret falsa: "Antichristus incipiet esse," nam sumpto praedicato pro eo quod est, certum est quod est falsum, quia Antichristus non inciperet esse hoc instans nec illud. Similiter, sumpto praedicato pro eo quod erit, adhuc est falsa, quia haec est falsa: "Antichristus incipiet esse id quod erit," quia si Antichristus erit semper fuit id quod erit et ita numquam inciperet esse id quod erit. Et sic exponentes huius "Antichristus incipiet esse" repugnarent, quia si Antichristus erit, prius fuit id quod erit.

(5.173) Praeterea, de alio <sup>15</sup> quod dicitur: Quod affirmativa de possibili infert suam de inesse. Si hoc esset verum, sequeretur "Antichristus potest esse futurus, igitur Antichristus est futurus," ubi antecedens est determinate verum et consequens non.

(5.174) Et si dicatur quod sumpto praedicato pro eo quod est, haec est indeterminate vera: "Antichristus potest esse futurus"; contra: Sua opposita est determinate falsa, quia ex sua opposita sequitur haec "Antichristus de necessitate non erit," et haec est determinate falsa.

(5.175) Praeterea, haec est vera: "Antichristus albus potest esse Antichristus," et tamen haec falsa "Antichristus albus est Antichristus"; igitur consequentia non valet ab illa de possibili ad illam de inesse. Et similiter si affirmativa de possibili semper infert suum actum, omnis negativa de inesse infert negativam de necessario, et tunc sequeretur: "Sortes albus non est Sortes, igitur Sortes albus de necessitate non est Sortes."

(5.176) Praeterea, contra illud quod ponitur:<sup>16</sup> Quod sunt acceptiones in illa de praeterito; si hoc esset verum, posito quod iste homo albus nunc primo sit, haec esset vera: "Iste homo albus prius fuit homo albus," sumpto praedicato pro eo quod est. Nunc sequitur "Iste homo albus prius fuit homo albus, igitur iste homo albus prius fuit suppositum hominis albi," et ultra "Igitur homo albus prius fuit superius ad istum hominem albus," et per consequens distributo homine albo fiebat distributio pro isto homine albo, et per conse-

<sup>15</sup> Supra, n. 5.161.

<sup>16</sup> Supra, n. 5.17.

quens sequebatur "Heri omnis homo albus est aliud ab isto homine albo, igitur iste homo albus est aliud ab isto homine albo," et antecedens tunc fuit verum et consequens falsum.

(5.177) Praeterea, posito quod omnis homo heri fuerat albus et quod hodie non sunt alii homines albi nisi isti, demonstratis Sorte et Platone et Cicerone, haec tunc est vera secundum istam viam: "Quodlibet convertibile cum *A* semper fuit convertibile cum *A*." Sit *A* ista: "Omnis homo albus currit," ex qua sequitur quod cum convertibile cum ista heri fuit falsum, quod ista sit falsa, posito tamen quod quilibet homo qui modo est albus currat; sed isto casu posito certum est quod haec est modo vera: "Omnis homo albus currit."

(5.18) Ad principale: Posito quod terminus restringatur, haec esset vera: "Quod est vel non est, est"; sed haec est falsa, quia sequitur "Omne quod est vel non est, est; Caesar est vel non est; igitur Caesar est."

(5.19) Praeterea, isti termini convertuntur quantum ad supposita, scilicet iste terminus 'homo' et hoc disiunctum 'homo praesens vel praeteritus vel futurus.' Sed haec est falsa: "Omne quod est homo praesens vel praeteritus vel futurus est"; igitur et ista "Omnis homo est."

(5.110) Praeterea, si hoc verbum 'est' potest restringere, multo fortius aliquod immediate adiunctum termino posset restringere. Sed hoc est falsum, quia sic dicto "Homo praesens est" non restringitur iste terminus 'homo,' quia si sic tunc sic dicto "Homo praesens est" staret iste terminus 'homo' solum pro praesenti, igitur idem esset dicere "Homo praesens est" et dicere "Homo praesens praesens est," ubi est nugatio. Et hoc potest sic argui: 'Homo' restrictus ad standum pro praesentibus includit praesens, igitur si sic dicto "Homo praesens est" restringeretur iste terminus 'homo,' tunc in ista iste terminus 'homo' includeret praesens et sic esset hic nugatio implicita, quia prima pars includit secundam.

(5.111) Praeterea, demonstratis omnibus suppositis hominis, praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, ista foret vera: "Quodlibet istorum est," quia subiectum solum staret pro existentibus et esse inest cuilibet existenti.

<Quod propositio "Omnis phoenix est" est vera>

(5.20) Ad oppositum: Haec est vera "Tantum viventi inest vita." Si tamen terminus posset stare pro praeteritis, ista foret falsa, quia tunc esset ista vera "Vitae praeteritae inest vita."

(5.21) Praeterea, posito quod terminus non restringeretur in ista "Falsum dicitur a Sorte" posset iste terminus 'falsum' supponere pro hac "Sortes dicit falsum"; et tunc posito quod Sortes dicat se

dicere falsum et nihil aliud, esset ista vera: "Falsum dicitur a Sorte," ex qua sequitur quod dictum Sortis sit falsum et non dicit nisi Sortem dicere falsum, igitur haec est falsa; igitur sua opposita vera "Sortes non dicit falsum"; igitur si dicit falsum, non dicit falsum.

(5.210) Et si dicatur quod in ista "Falsum dicitur a Sorte" non supponat falsum pro ista "Sortes dicit falsum," sed hoc non est virtute restrictionis sed quia terminus diminute stat respectu talis praedicati; contra: Probo quod sic dicto "Falsum dicitur a Sorte" possit hoc praedicatum supponere pro ista "Sortes dicit falsum," quia posito quod Sortes dicat Platonem dicere falsum et quod Plato dicat Sortem dicere falsum, haec est vera: "Aliquae propositiones dicuntur ab istis," igitur subiectum huius supponit pro istis: "Sortes dicit falsum," "Plato dicit falsum." Et haec "Istae propositiones dicuntur ab istis" est singularis huius "Aliquae propositiones dicuntur ab istis," igitur semper sequitur "Istae propositiones dicuntur ab istis, igitur aliquae propositiones dicuntur ab istis." Posito igitur quod Sortes dicat Sortem dicere falsum et quod Plato dicat Platonem dicere falsum, erit haec vera: "Aliquae propositiones dicuntur ab istis," quia aliqua singularis est vera. Modo sequitur "Aliquae propositiones dicuntur ab istis, igitur uterque istorum dicit propositionem"; igitur isto casu posito est haec vera: "Aliqua propositio dicitur a Sorte" quod non esset nisi subiectum huius posset supponere pro hac "Sortes dicit falsum."

(5.22) Ad principale: Sequitur "Omnis phoenix est animal, igitur omnis phoenix est." Antecedens verum, igitur consequens. Probatio consequentiae: Sequitur "Omnis phoenix est animal, igitur omnis phoenix est corpus," et ultra "Igitur omnis phoenix est quoddam totum"; ultra "Igitur omnis phoenix est maior sua parte"; et ulterius "Igitur omnis phoenix est."<sup>17</sup> Ultima consequentia patet, quia illud quod non est, non est maius aliquo.

(5.23) Praeterea, eadem consequentia ostenditur sic: "Si omnis phoenix est corpus hominis, phoenix habet tres dimensiones"; et ultra: "Igitur omnis phoenix est." Ultima consequentia patet, quia illud quod non est, non habet dimensiones. Et hoc confirmatur, quia haec est vera: "Omnis phoenix est substantia." Si igitur non omnis phoenix habeat dimensiones, sequitur quod phoenix sit substantia incorporea; et ita quod phoenix sit intelligentia.

(5.24) Praeterea, haec est vera: "Omnis homo est substantia"; ex qua sequitur quod omnis homo est. Probatio consequentiae: Quaelibet singularis consequentis infertur ex aliquo singulari antecedentis, quia si iste homo sit substantia aut est substantia simplex aut composita. Non substantia simplex, quia nec est materia nec forma; igitur est substantia compisita.<sup>18</sup> Sed quidquid est substantia com-

<sup>17</sup> omnis... est/sola G

<sup>18</sup> igitur... composita om. G



posita, illud est quia illud quod non est compositum, non est. Hoc confirmatur: Nam omne compositum ex materia prima et forma est, quia materia prima est incorruptibilis, et per consequens semper est. Sed illud quod componitur ex ente, illud est. Cum igitur omnis homo sit compositus ex materia prima et aliqua forma, sequitur quod omnis homo est.

(5.25) Praeterea, sequitur "Caesar est homo, igitur Caesar est compositus ex corpore et anima"; et ultra: "Igitur corpus et anima componunt Caesarem"; et ultra: "Igitur anima informat corpus Caesaris"; et ulterius: "Igitur Caesar est." Quia si detur quod non sit, tunc in sua materia est alia forma quam anima Caesaris, et in sua materia est anima Caesaris; igitur formae oppositae sunt simul in eadem materia.

(5.26) Praeterea, sequitur "Caesar est homo, igitur Caesar est existens homo"; et ulterius "Igitur Caesar est existens." Prima consequentia patet, quia sequitur "Caesar est homo, igitur Caesar est ens homo," accipiendo ens participium; sed ens participium et existens sunt idem. Vel accipiaturs ista: "Caesar existit homo." Haec est vera secundum istam viam; ex qua sequitur "Igitur Caesar est existens homo"; et ultra: "Igitur Caesar est existens." Si dicatur quod non sequitur "Caesar est existens homo, igitur Caesar est existens"; contra: Oppositum non stat, quia si Caesar non est existens, Caesar est non-existens; et Caesar est homo, igitur Caesar est non-existens homo. Sed ista non stant simul: "Caesar est existens homo," "Caesar est non-existens homo."

(5.27) Praeterea, si terminus esset indifferens ad supposita praesentia, praeterita et futura, ut ponit ista positio,<sup>19</sup> isti termini converterentur quantum ad supposita, scilicet iste terminus 'homines praesentes vel praeteriti vel futuri.' Cum igitur haec sit vera "Gualterus<sup>20</sup> et Caesar sunt homines," ista foret vera: "Gualterus<sup>21</sup> et Caesar sunt homines praesentes vel praeteriti vel futuri." Sed haec est falsa.<sup>22</sup>

(5.28) Praeterea, si haec esset vera: "Caesar est homo," eadem ratione et ista "Antichristus est homo." Sed si haec sit vera ex determinate veris, sequeretur indeterminate verum, quoniam sequitur "Antichristus est homo, et non est homo praeteritus, igitur est homo futurus." Praemissae sunt determinate verae, et conclusio indeterminate vera, quia sequitur: "Antichristus est homo futurus, igitur Antichristus aliquando erit."

<sup>19</sup> Scilicet, positio hic data, nn. 5.20-5.29.

<sup>20</sup> Gualterus/Iohannes G

<sup>21</sup> Gualterus/Iohannes G

<sup>22</sup> Sed... falsa om. G

(5.29) Praeterea, si terminus communis supponeret pro praeteritis et futuris, ista foret falsa "Deus semper est," quia sequitur "Igitur Deus in quolibet tempore est"; et ulterius "Igitur Deus est in tempore praeterito."

〈Responsio auctoris〉

(5.30) Ad quaestionem dicendum quod haec est vera: "Omnis phoenix est," quia iste terminus 'phoenix' in proposito solum supponit pro phoenice praesente, quia ex quo iste terminus 'phoenix' significat unam rem de genere substantiae et secundum quod prius<sup>23</sup> dictum est "Nihil est in genere reali nisi actualiter existat," sequitur quod iste terminus 'phoenix' non supponit nisi pro praesente, quoniam non supponit nisi pro eo quod est in genere substantiae et nihil est in genere substantiae nisi actualiter existat.

(5.31) Circa istam positionem sciendum quod terminus communis significans rem per se in genere non praedicatur univoce de suppositis praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, sed analogice, quoniam si iste terminus 'homo' esset univocus ad Ioannem et Caesarem, essentia hominis salvaretur in Ioanne et etiam in Caesare. Sed hoc est falsum, quia Caesar non est, et ad destructionem esse sequitur destructio essentiae, cum esse et essentia idem sunt realiter. Hoc etiam patet aliter: Illud idem corrumpitur per corruptionem quod acquiritur per generationem; sed generatio terminatur ad ipsam essentiam rei — per hoc differt generatio ab aliis mutationibus, quia generatio terminatur ad substantiam —; igitur per corruptionem destruitur essentia rei. Propter quod Caesare corrupto non habet Caesar aliquam essentiam, ideo verum est quod prius<sup>24</sup> esset dictum, scilicet quod quantum aliquid habet de essentia tantum habet de esse, et e converso: ideo nihil est dicere rem habere essentiam et non habere esse.

(5.32) Praeterea, quod 'homo' non sit univocum ad supposita praesentia, praeterita et futura patet aliter sic: Supposita ad quae terminus est univocus non debent habere attributionem ad invicem, ita quod commune conveniat aliquibus per rationem aliorum. Sed supposita praeterita propter hoc dicuntur supposita hominis, quia aliquando fuerunt sua supposita praesentia, et supposita futura propter hoc dicuntur esse supposita, quia aliquando erunt supposita praesentia. Si enim foret aliquod suppositum quod numquam erit praesens nec fuit praesens, nullus diceret quod illud foret suppositum hominis. Supposita igitur praeterita et futura habent attributionem ad supposita praesentia, et ideo terminus non dicitur univoce de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris. Et hoc confirmatur, quia si

<sup>23</sup> Supra, n. 4.44.

<sup>24</sup> Secundum opinionem Godefridi et auctoris, supra, nn. 4.40-4.4.47.

suppositum praeteritum esset per se suppositum termini aliquod esset suppositum numeri compositum ex infinitis unitatibus, quia infinitae unitates sunt praeteritae, et tunc esset aliquis numerus actu infinitus, et praeter hoc essent infinitae species numeri in genere quantitatis, et per consequens infinita generalissima, ut prius<sup>25</sup> probatum est.

(5.33) Ex istis patet quod haec est vera: "Omnis phoenix est," "Omnis homo est," sed non quia subiectum restringitur sed quia iste terminus 'phoenix' significat unam rem extra animam quae non salvatur nisi in suppositis existentibus. Si enim iste terminus restringeretur, cum restrictio sit coarctatio termini ad standum pro paucioribus suppositis quam ad quae terminus de se est communis, deberet quod iste terminus 'phoenix' haberet plura supposita quam supposita praesentia; cuius oppositum est probatum. Unde tales termini sunt analogi: Per prius enim conveniunt praesentibus suppositis quam suppositis praeteritis vel futuris, quia non conveniunt praeteritis et futuris nisi per attributionem ad praesentia. Et ideo dico quod restrictio non est possibilis per mediatum nec quod plus est restrictio per immediatum<sup>26</sup> possibilis. Unde sic dicto "Homo albus currit" non restringitur 'homo' ad standum pro albis, quia sic esset hic nugatio, cum 'homo' stans pro albis includit album. Similiter 'homo' stans pro albis idem est quod homo albus, igitur idem esset dicere "Homo albus currit" et dicere "Homo albus albus currit."

(5.34) Tu dices: Si 'homo' in ista non restringeretur pro albis, tunc posset stare pro nigro, et tunc sequeretur "Homo niger currit, igitur homo albus currit"; dicendum quod sic dicto "Homo albus currit," iste terminus 'homo' nec supponit pro albis nec pro nigris, quia pars extremi non supponit pro aliquo; sed hoc totum 'homo albus' supponit pro albis.

(5.35) Adhuc arguitur contra istam positionem: Videtur enim ex ista positione quod nullus terminus sit univocus, quia iste terminus 'homo' non est univocus nec iste terminus 'animal,' et eadem ratione nec alii termini; dicendum quod iste terminus 'homo' est univocus ad supposita praesentia ita quod univoce dicitur de quolibet homine praesente; tamen est analogus ad praesentia et praeterita. Nec est inconveniens idem esse univocum respectu aliquorum et analogum respectu aliorum, sicut 'homo' est univocum ad hominem omnem verum et est analogum ad hominem verum et hominem depictum. Et sic est analogum ad hominem praesentem et praeteritum, et ideo non potest supponere pro praeteritis nisi respectu verbi de praeterito nec pro futuris nisi respectu verbi de futuris; et ideo haec est vera "Caesar fuit homo," et haec similiter "Antichristus erit homo."

<sup>25</sup> Supra, n. 5.12.

<sup>26</sup> immediatum/non est *add.* CG

(5.40) Ad primum principale:<sup>27</sup> Quod hoc consequens est verum "Omne suppositum phoenicis est." Et hoc habent restringentes dicere, — etsi dicant oppositum —, quia ita bene est iste terminus 'suppositum phoenicis' restringibilis sicut iste terminus 'phoenix,' et si restringatur solum stat pro praesentibus.

(5.401) Ad argumentum in contrarium:<sup>28</sup> Dico quod phoenix praeterita non est suppositum sed fuit suppositum phoenicis. Et ulterius, quando arguitur quod "in aliqua propositione distribuitur 'phoenix' pro phoenice praeterita et in alia propositione excipitur<sup>29</sup> 'phoenix praeterita' a phoenice, igitur" etc.; d i c e n d u m quod hoc est verum. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod phoenix praeterita sit suppositum phoenicis: Terminus enim sumptus sub hac acceptione quod fuit distribuitur pro eo quod fuit suum suppositum sicut sub hac acceptione quod est distribuitur pro eo quod est suum suppositum. Et eodem modo,<sup>30</sup> sumpto termino sub hac acceptione quod fuit, potest aliquid excipi a termino quod non est suum suppositum sed quod fuit suum suppositum. Nec est exceptio semper extra captio partis a toto sed vel eius quod est pars vel eius quod fuit pars.

(5.41) Ad aliud principale:<sup>31</sup> Quod haec est distinguenda: "Omnia duo sunt," ex eo quod ly duo potest accipi ut est concretum dualitatis quae est in genere quantitatis, vel ut est concretum dualitatis transcendentis. Primo modo est haec vera: "Omnia duo sunt," et ista similiter: "Omnis dualitas est." Secundo modo est haec falsa: "Omnia duo sunt." Et primo modo accipiendo ly duo est haec falsa; "Sortes existens et Caesar sunt duo"; sed secundo modo est vera.

(5.42) Ad argumentum in contrarium:<sup>32</sup> Quod haec est falsa "Dualitas istorum est," demonstrato uno existente et alio non-existente. Nec sequitur "Una unitas istius dualitatis est, igitur ista dualitas est." Et concedo quod aliquis est non-ens, cuius tamen alia pars est ens.

(5.43) Ad aliud principale:<sup>33</sup> Quod haec est vera "Quod numquam erit, potest fore," et tamen quaelibet singularis huius est falsa, quia non est dandum quod terminus supponat pro aliquo de quo indeterminatum est an terminus de eo dicatur, sicut probatum est prius.<sup>34</sup> Et ideo subiectum huius "Quod numquam erit, potest fore" solum supponit pro chimaera, et pro Caesare, et pro talibus de quibus est determinatum quod numquam erunt.

<sup>27</sup> Supra, n. 5.01.

<sup>28</sup> Supra, n. 5.08.

<sup>29</sup> excipitur/excluditur G

<sup>30</sup> eodem modo/ideo G

<sup>31</sup> Supra, n. 5.1.

<sup>32</sup> Supra, n. 5.11.

<sup>33</sup> Sopra, n. 5.14.

<sup>34</sup> Supra, n. 5.141.



(5.44) Ad argumentum in contrarium:<sup>35</sup> Dicitur quod opposita cuiuslibet singularis est vera et quod quaelibet singularis huius est vera vel "Quod numquam erit, potest fore"; et tamen haec est falsa. Nec potest ista induci ex suis singularibus. Et istud ponebatur ab *antiquo*,<sup>36</sup> scilicet quod in illis de futuro est particularis vera et tamen nulla singularis, ut ista "Aliquis homo generabit." Unde sciendum quod in universali propositione est triplex habitudo: Una praedicati ad subiectum, et alia praedicati ad contenta sub subiecto, et tertia subiecti ad sua contenta. Unde veritas universalis non solum dependent ex habitu dine subiecti ad sua contenta vel etiam ex habitu dine subiecti ad illa de quibus dicitur determinate vel indeterminate. Et quia indeterminatum est de quibus subiectum in proposito dicitur, non obstante quod praedicatum vere removetur a quolibet contento sub subiecto, tamen ista universalis est falsa.

(5.45) Ad primum in contrarium:<sup>37</sup> Quod demonstratis omnibus de quibus determinate dicitur futurum, haec est falsa: "Omne futurum est aliquod istorum," et tamen quaelibet singularis est vera; nec potest ista induci ex singularibus.

(5.46) Ad aliud:<sup>38</sup> Concedo quod pro eisdem fit distributio in istis "Omnis homo natus est natus" et "Omne quod est homo natus vel nasciturus est natus," quia de quocumque determinate dicitur subiectum unius de eodem determinate dicitur subiectum alterius, et tamen una istarum est vera et alia falsa. Haec enim est falsa "Omnis homo natus vel<sup>39</sup> nasciturus est homo"; nec potest ista induci ex suis singularibus.

(5.47) Ad aliud:<sup>40</sup> Quod pro nullo fit distributio in ista: "Omnis homo nasciturus est homo," quia de nullo determinate dicitur subiectum huius.

(5.48) Ad aliud principale:<sup>41</sup> Quod haec est falsa: "Phoenix praeterita est phoenix," nec sequitur "Phoenix praeterita fuit phoenix, igitur phoenix praeterita est phoenix." Unde ista opinio<sup>42</sup> quae ponit quod illa de praeterito infert illam de praesenti et illa de possibili suam de inesse est omnino neganda, quia ponit idem esse praeteritum et praesens, et ponit idem esse potentiam et actum, quod si aliquid possit esse aliquale quod ipsum est tale. Nec est distinguendum de acceptionibus a parte praedicati, quia terminus communis positus

<sup>35</sup> Supra, n. 5.146.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Aristot., *Periherm.*, c. 9 (18a 33 - 18b 13).

<sup>37</sup> Supra, n. 5.147.

<sup>38</sup> Supra, n. 5.148.

<sup>39</sup> natus vel *om.* G

<sup>40</sup> Supra, n. 5.149.

<sup>41</sup> Supra, n. 5.15.

<sup>42</sup> Supra, nn. 5.15 et 5.161.

a parte praedicati supponit principaliter pro suo significato. Et ideo dicunt Sophistae<sup>43</sup> quod praedicatum appellat suam formam, et ideo non convenienter additur signum praedicato sicut subiecto.

(5.49) Ad aliud principale:<sup>44</sup> Quod haec est falsa: "Omne quod est vel non est, est," ut est de disiuncto subiecto, quia idem quod hic subiicitur non significat rem alicuius generis, et ideo potest indifferenter supponere pro praesentibus et praeteritis. Si tamen poneretur restrictio, ista foret concedenda.

(5.410) Ad aliud principale:<sup>45</sup> Quod isti termini non convertuntur, scilicet 'homo' et hoc disiunctum 'homo praesens vel praeteritus vel futurus.' Et sicut dictum est<sup>46</sup> iste terminus 'homo' non est indifferens nisi ad supposita praesentia.

〈Instantiae contra opinionem auctoris〉

(5.411) Ad principale<sup>47</sup> arguitur: Si haec foret vera, "Omnis phoenix est" esset necessaria, quia sequeretur ex hac "Omnis phoenix est animal"; sed haec est contingens, quia infert contingens: Haec enim est contingens "Haec phoenix est"; d i c e n d u m quod propositio necessaria formaliter infert propositionem contingentem consequentia condicionata sed non consequentia simplici, quia talis consequentia tenet pro omni tempore. C o n t r a: Sit *A* sophisma: "Haec est vera '*A* de necessitate infert contingens, quia *A* de necessitate infert suam singularem,' " ex qua sequitur quod "*A* de necessitate infert contingens"; ex qua sequitur ulterius: "Igitur aliquod contingens de necessitate infertur ex *A*." Sed illud ex quo aliquod contingens de necessitate infertur non est necessarium, igitur *A* non est necessarium.

(5.412) Praeterea, aliqua inductio modo valeret et iam non, quia ista "Omnis phoenix est" ex aliis singularibus induceretur nunc et iam.

〈Responsiones ad instantias〉

(5.413) Ad primum d i c e n d u m: Concedo istam "*A* de necessitate infert contingens," sed ex hac non sequitur "Igitur aliquod contingens de necessitate infertur ex *A*"; sed haec est sua passiva ex *A*: "De necessitate infertur aliquod contingens"; et haec est vera.

(5.414) Ad aliud: Concedo quod aliqua inductio est modo bona et iam non, sicut universalis habet aliquas singulares nunc et iam ita ex aliis debet induci.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Guillelmus de Shyreswode, *Introductiones in logicam*, cap. 5: "Unde praedicatum solam formam dicit" (ed. M. Grabmann, p. 78).

<sup>44</sup> Supra, n. 5.18.

<sup>45</sup> Supra, n. 5.19.

<sup>46</sup> Supra, nn. 5.30ss.

<sup>47</sup> Supra, n. 5.22.

⟨Aliae instantiae et responsiones earum⟩

(5.51) *Adhuc arguitur*: Si iste terminus 'homo' solum haberet supposita praesentia, tunc determinaret sibi aliquam duritiam temporis, et per consequens non esset terminus nominalis cum nomen abstrahat a qualibet duritia temporis; *dicendum* est quod hoc nomen 'homo' nec in suo significato nec ex modo significandi aliquam duritiam temporis includit; res tamen significata per istum terminum necessarie mensuratur duritia temporis praesentis. Unde res significata per hominem aliquam duritiam temporis sibi determinat pro mensura sed nullam partem temporis sibi determinat.

(5.52) *Adhuc arguitur*: Haec est vera "Omnis homo est vel fuit." Quaero an in ista fiat distributio solum pro praesentibus aut simul cum hoc pro praeteritis. Si solum pro praesentibus, igitur respectu verbi de praeterito non posset 'homo' supponere pro praeteritis. Si autem supponat pro praeteritis, tunc sequeretur "Omnis homo est vel fuit, igitur Caesar est vel fuit"; et tunc membrum foret verum, scilicet "Caesar est homo"; *dicendum* quod haec est una disiunctiva "Omnis homo est vel fuit," quia hic sunt duae compositiones aequae formales, et ideo non potest haec esse de disiuncto praedicato. Dico tunc quod in prima parte huius disiunctivae solum fit distributio pro praesentibus, et in secunda parte fit distributio indifferenter pro praesentibus et praeteritis.

(5.53) Expliciunt quaestiones Gualteri Burley.<sup>48</sup>

*The University of the South  
Sewanee, Tennessee*

STEPHEN F. BROWN

<sup>48</sup> Gualteri Burley *om.* G

## REASSESSING NOMINALISM: A NOTE ON THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS OF PIERRE D'AILLY

Ecumenism has been with philosophers for a long time. By this is meant that the venture to achieve a harmonious and universal acceptance of truth by everyone is the very goal of the philosophical enterprise. Questions such as: Where did I come from?, Who am I?, Where am I going?, What is the good life?, and Is there a God to whom I can relate? form the warp and woof of every philosopher's trade. At times the effort to answer these questions has been genuinely synthetic when thinkers, living in simpler times, could rationally connect each question and solution in one vast global picture. At other times, when various economic, political and religious conditions prevented the tying of solutions together, a more analytic or less-cohesive attention was given to these same issues. Yet, the work of philosophy has always been to unite men in thought and to help them find some underlying meaning and worthwhileness in the totality of their lives.

While such has been the concern of philosophy, individual representatives in the field have expressed their thought in various ways. Their vocabularies, methods of argumentation, and choices of literary genre have often given the impression of their divisive spirit rather than their communality of purpose. Yet, it is certain that those who would interpret most philosophers in this way would be confusing their means with their end.

Behind these remarks lies the work of the historian of philosophy. It is his task to determine the precise position of any given thinker on these major issues. And since philosophy, like anything in life, depends on an action and reaction base, it is possible for one knowledgeable on many thinkers to situate individuals within the responsorial spectrum either as a centrist or as being to the right or left of center. It is possible, in other words, to decide whether this or that philosopher is, despite the verbal or technical means he employs



to express his mind, in agreement with the general historical solutions to central problems. In brief, he can judge whether his mind is conservative, or whether his posture lies outside the mainstream of those solutions and he would be considered free-thinking or liberal.

It is interesting to sort out the various factors brought to bear on determining the exact stance of any given philosopher. In the present instance, we propose to investigate the mind of Pierre D'Ailly (1350-1420), a renowned representative of late medieval thought. Straightway we find his name involved with nominalism, Ockhamism, voluntarism, theologism, and the radical reformation of all previous scholasticism.<sup>1</sup> We should like to suggest, however, that labels such as these (as well as others like scepticism and fideism) which have been applied to Ailly only serve to confuse the main purpose of the historian of philosophy. To repeat, this is to determine exactly the relationship of a given author's solutions with the general ones reached by the majority of thinkers.

Yet, as everyone knows, an historian of thought is limited in the quality of the judgments he can make. Being a rare commodity, objectivity is hindered by the availability of primary sources and also by the previous research work done on a given subject. In Ailly's case, the issue at hand has for a long time suffered from both of these factors. Very little critical work has been done on his authentic works,<sup>2</sup> many of his manuscripts are scattered far and wide in the libraries of the world, and most of the monographical studies on him is in a language rather remote from English-speaking students. In addition, most recently Courtenay pointed out that even these studies have gone through a series of changes. These changes involve his thinking initially with all those pejorative qualities mentioned above to the present more favorable assessments.<sup>3</sup> Older literature on the man, championed by authors such as Tscackert, Denifle, Manser, Gilson and Ehrle considered Ailly as a defender of the double-truth,

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<sup>1</sup> The impression of reformer in a negative sense is conveyed clearly in the recent title: *Reformers in Profile*, edited by Brian A. Gerrish (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), even though this book contains one of the finest biographies of Ailly by Francis Oakley on pp. 40-57.

■ To illustrate this point one has only to see the date on the most recent catalogue of Ailly's complete works, namely, P. Glorieux, "L'oeuvre littéraire de Pierre d'Ailly," *Mélanges de Science Religieuse*, 22 (juillet, 1965), 61-78.

■ William J. Courtenay, "Covenant and Causality in Pierre D'Ailly," *Speculum*, 46 (January, 1971), 94-119.

as one who denigrated natural reason and the principle of causality, and as one whose chief glory lay in setting the foundations for the destructive features of Luther's Protestant Reform. More recent studies indicate that Ailly exerted a more moderate and healthy influence in his time and that his thought was not at all so destructive or out-of-tune with some of the greatest thinkers of his day. Among the proponents of this latter view are authors such as Patronnier de Gandillac, Meller, Dettloff and Oakley.

Excepting Meller's study,<sup>4</sup> it can be said — with few familiar with Ailly's bibliography to contest the fact — that the most attention given him has centered on his strictly theological views. Many of the studies already done are concerned with his views on predestination, justification, the causality of the sacraments, and his use of the distinction between the divine ordinary and absolute powers.<sup>5</sup> Very little has been done on his specifically philosophical mind. The only exceptions to this fact are the few studies by Oakley on Ailly's moral theory.<sup>6</sup> Hence, there is the necessity to examine here the state of research on Ailly's epistemology and metaphysics. Since, in the mind of many, ethical conclusions depend on both of these philosophical divisions, it is important to do this as a test to determine whether Oakley's favorable judgments are well-founded. And it is important, too, to examine these areas to see whether Ailly's philosophical role is consonant with the glowingly positive and constructive assessments of his theology as proposed by Oberman and Courtenay.<sup>7</sup> If this cannot be done, even briefly, then perhaps the

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<sup>4</sup> Bernhard Meller, *Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Peter von Ailly*. Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder Verlag, 1954. The citations from Ailly's works below are taken from this work, and in particular from the *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*. Louvain: Quedlinberg, 1483.

<sup>5</sup> George Lindbeck, "Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as Illustrated by Pierre d'Ailly on Predestination and Justification," *The Harvard Theological Review*, 52 (1959), 43-60; Heiko Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism," *Ibid.*, 53 (1960), 47-76; Francis Oakley, "Pierre D'Ailly and the Absolute Power of God," *Ibid.*, 56 (1963), 59-73; and see note 3 above.

<sup>6</sup> Francis Oakley, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law," *Natural Law Forum*, 6 (1961), 65-83 and Idem, *The Political Thought of Pierre D'Ailly: The Voluntarist Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

<sup>7</sup> Oberman, "Some Notes...", p. 55: "The theology of the fourth school [of nominalism including Ailly] is a typical *Vermittlungstheologie*." Courtenay, *Op. cit.*, p. 118: "The dialectic of the powers... allows a nominalist such as D'Ailly to do justice to both partners God and man."

judgment of those who say he follows a double truth theory with all its consequent pitfalls must necessarily stand. Among these faults would be a disharmony between the findings of philosophy and theology, a total distrust in the human intellect to know anything and a belief in the impotency of the human will to effect any worthwhile moral goodness in life. The only conclusion to be reached, if these allegations are correct, is that Ailly did in fact choose liberally to pursue an escape into either a sceptical or a fideistic position.<sup>8</sup>

It is appropriate and in keeping with the norms according to which an historian of philosophy must work to present at this point a generally accepted overview of the common denominators in the current research on the epistemology and metaphysics of late medieval thinkers. It is from this vantage point that a conservative or liberal status can be decided upon for Ailly.

From a view of late medieval thought in the past which considered it solely in pejorative terms, recent scholars have indicated that, in its best form, late scholasticism is viewed as a new, albeit critical, venture in epistemology and metaphysics based on a realistic conceptualism. Such a view indicates that conceptualism does not at all carry with it the notion that man's reason limits itself to a knowledge of immediate objects. It positively implies more than this and even that man can achieve a naturally solid rational knowledge of God's existence and essence.

This evaluation of late scholasticism and of Ockham's thought in particular indicates that authors subsequent to him would for the most part construct a positively critical thought which would serve well as a bridge or transition philosophy from the time of the high middle ages to the newer incoming modern scientific advances. Yet, with the typical action and reaction nature of philosophy, it is understandable that there would be those who would tend to perpetuate the traces of older thought and those who would tend to be more daring and adventurous in their speculations.<sup>9</sup> The key term,

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<sup>8</sup> Such recently has been the overall assessment of late medieval thought by Gordon Leff in his *Bradwardine and the Pelagians* (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), pp. 225-262. This position has been severely counteracted by H. Oberman's *The Harvest of Medieval Theology*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1967. Citations from the work of Biel are taken here from the edition entitled: *Epithome pariter et collectarium circa quattuor Sententiarum libros*. Tübingen: Johann Otmar, 1501.

<sup>9</sup> Two articles most significant for assessing this conservative and liberal

serving as an umbrella for either of these styles is nominalism. It has been shown, however, that there are two possible definitions of this. One would be that it was a style of reasoning which asserted human knowledge is productive of only meaningless words incapable of granting men any true knowledge of the inner natures of things to say nothing of suprasensible realities. Another more favorable definition would be that nominalism was a system of thought which is, at one and the same time, preoccupied with the critical issues of certitude and truth while trying to build a better and more solid philosophical underpinning for the solution to crucial questions. It is this latter view which prevails among the more recent students of major scholastics of the later medieval period.

Faced with these two alternatives and tracing the major current of thought, it can be seen that there was, among the major philosophers of this period, a common view that man's knowledge is derived originally through sense experience and by a process of mental abstraction. While the bifurcation between an abstractive and an intuitive knowledge was possible — and became more pronounced throughout the 14th and 15th centuries — this does not mean that late medieval authors generally lacked rigid rules for an inductive, causal and empirically scientific demonstration of the existence of God.<sup>10</sup> Even though intuitive knowledge was considered by most to be the more perfect type of knowing involving, as it does, a truly real and existential grasp of its object,<sup>11</sup> abstractive knowledge was not considered a poor substitute for it. Most major philosophers during this time stated that it is only by abstractive knowledge that humans can know about some creatures as well as about God himself.<sup>12</sup>

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trend are: Oberman, "Some notes..." see note 5 above and Damasus Trapp, "Augustinian Theology in the 14th Century," *Augustiniana*, 6 (1956), 146-274.

<sup>10</sup> Damascene Webering, O.F.M., *The Theory of Demonstration According to William of Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953), pp. 95-97.

<sup>11</sup> A typical passage expressing the existential import of this intuitive knowledge is found in Ockham, *Opera philosophica et theologica*, critically edited by Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. and Stephen Brown, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1967), Vol. I, p. 31, lines 10-13: (In Prol. ad Ordinationem, q. 1): "Notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia virtute cujus potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita quod si res sit, statim intellectus judicat eam esse et evidenter cognoscit eam esse nisi forte impediatur propter imperfectionem illius notitiae."

<sup>12</sup> Webering, *Op. cit.*, p. 96: "How can we have abstractive knowledge without intuitive knowledge? To this Ockham answers that, so far as creatures are



Thus, for most philosophers in late medieval times, while the terminology of scientific knowledge has changed, there is a common link with preceeding thinkers insofar as they insist that all human knowledge is derived from real things. Late scholastics have a realistic view of inductive reasoning, and, contrary to former judgments on them, many insist that there is a coincidence between the concepts in our minds with real things outside of us.<sup>13</sup> It cannot generally be said, therefore, that the majority of thinkers then espoused any necessary separation or opposition between reason and faith or between their philosophical and theological expressions.<sup>14</sup> Neither can it be said that late scholastic thought, in its essential lines, is sceptical, fideistic, provocative of a double truth theory or rationalist. On the contrary, it is now being appreciated more that the vast majority of schoolmen from Ockham to Biel show a "confidence in the undisturbed connection between real objects and thought and between thought and reality."<sup>15</sup>

It is clearer now than previously that these same scholastics are in general agreement with their great metaphysical predecessors also. They defend man's capacity to know several things about God, as for instance, his capability to know that He exists and that He is wise and good.<sup>16</sup> This knowledge, they say, is acquired originally

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concerned, abstractive knowledge is possible without intuitive cognition, because intuitive cognition is not the essential and total cause of abstractive knowledge. And if this is the case with creatures, we have no reason to suppose that it should be different with our knowledge of God."

<sup>13</sup> A sample text here (cf. n. 8 above) would be Biel, *In II Sent.*, d. 34 C: "Etsi haberet intellectus vim productivam produceret rem simillimam imo consubstantialem rei cognite ab ea in nullo differentem nisi quod haec ab illa esset producta."

<sup>14</sup> R. Guelluy, *Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham*. Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1953, p. 364: "Notons d'autre part qu'Ockham refuse de séparer le domaine de la théologie de celui de la métaphysique... Le Venerabilis Inceptor ne semble... se donner pour but d'opposer la foi et la raison."

<sup>15</sup> Oberman, *The Harvest...*, p. 61.

<sup>16</sup> Ockham, (*Op. cit.*, p. 7, lines 12-15), *Prol. In Ord.*, q. 1: "Aliquae veritates naturaliter notae seu cognoscibiles sunt theologicae sicut quod Deus est, Deus est sapiens, bonus, etc, cum sint necessariae ad salutem; aliquae autem sunt supernaturaliter cognoscibiles." Biel gives the identical reading and adds that this knowledge pertains to metaphysics: "...in metaphysica demonstrantur demonstratione quia, in theologia propter quid." B. Häggglund in his *Theologie und Philosophie in der occamistischen Tradition* (Lund: Gleerup, 1955), p. 27, states that in Ockham and Biel there is an unbroken unity between philosophy

from sensible experience and by a process of mental abstraction. Even though this awareness is indirect, it was never for this reason considered unreal or insufficient to satisfy man's desire for truth.

While most philosophers during this time put great limits on the extent of knowing about God, realising that any purely natural cognition falls far short of the reality,<sup>17</sup> they insisted that what can be learnt is never to be considered of little worth nor is it to be despised. Some of them, with due allowances for the supremacy of the articles of faith, go so far as to say that a purely natural knowledge of God excels that given by merely accepting revealed facts. This they said was so because man can be better satisfied and learn more, if he seeks God through a knowledge of His creatures.<sup>18</sup>

It is against this general assessment of late medieval epistemology and metaphysics that Ailly's mind must be evaluated. Was he in agreement with this and thus a traditional or conservative thinker? Or, does he veer from these general considerations to such an extent that he must be classified as a radical and liberal free-thinker? Such brings us to the main considerations of our essay.

Recent studies indicate that the thought of this distinguished rector of the University of Paris was both affected by the philosophy of Ockham<sup>19</sup> and exerted an enormous influence on scholastic thought throughout the fifteenth century.<sup>20</sup> Yet, that his own scholarliness exceeded the factual data of his predecessors has also been called

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and theology and that theology for both, consequently, leans heavily on the findings of metaphysics: "Es besteht somit eine ungebrochene Verbindung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie, und zwar auf dem Wege über die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis der Metaphysik."

<sup>17</sup> Biel, for example, states that natural reason is compared to utter darkness when put alongside those things proposed for belief. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 4 E: "Sed in adventu majoris luminis fidei... sol intelligentiae naturalis contenebrescat, nihil continetur, nec possibilitatem aut causas requirat aut prescientes quia quod stultum est Dei sapientius est hominibus."

<sup>18</sup> Biel, *In II Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 2 G: "Melius scit considerare Deum in exterioribus creaturis quam in Scripturis."

<sup>19</sup> Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., *Collected Articles*. Ed. Eligius Buytaert, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1958), p. 425: "Ailly deeply admired Ockham without following him slavishly."

<sup>20</sup> Maurice Gandillac, "Usage et valeur des arguments probables chez Pierre D'Ailly," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 8 (1933), p. 441, n. 1: "La multiplicité des éditions de Pierre D'Ailly de 1434 à 1504 nous montre que... le Commentaire (sur les Sentences) du Cardinal de Cambrai avait gardé jusqu'au début du xvie siècle une véritable autorité."

into question. Some still think he did, others not. The only recourse in view of these contentions is to examine briefly his theory of knowledge and his metaphysics.

In his epistemology Ailly asserts unequivocally that our knowledge is derived from and really reflects things as they are. Like Ockham, he adopts a twofold way of arriving at true intellectual knowledge by intuition and by abstraction. He extols the primacy of intuition and believes that men can derive an exhaustive knowledge of singular things.<sup>21</sup> He differs from Ockham, however, insofar as he harkens back to earlier schoolmen for some of his principles. He insists, for instance, that man has an active and a passive intellect and that a species is required wherever there is question of abstractive knowledge.<sup>22</sup>

Once these few observations are made, Ailly continues to elaborate on the scope of human knowledge. He attempts everywhere to strike a middle position between the claims of those who say man can have an evident knowledge of everything on the one hand and of those who assert the impossibility of any such cognition.

In his metaphysics on the knowledge of suprasensibles in general and of God in particular Ailly says likewise unequivocally that man can acquire some knowledge from real things.<sup>23</sup> He indicates this by making reference to the fact that Aristotle had said all men desire to know and to the Averroistic comment that no natural appetite can be frustrated. While he grants the impossibility of knowing suprasensibles and God with the same absoluteness of things close at hand, he says men know these only in a conditioned way relative

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<sup>21</sup> Ailly, *In I Sent.*, q. 3, a. 1, C: "Omnis notitia seipsa est similis objecto ab ea distincto et per ipsam cognito. Patet, quia nisi esset similis, non plus representaret unum objectum ipsi potentiae quam aliud, quod est falsum ut patet... licet aliqua notitia se ipsa seu sua perfectione intrinseca sit magis similis suo objecto quam alia, tamen notitia et objectum non possunt esse magis vel minus seipsis similia quam de facto sunt, dum existunt in rerum natura. Prima pars patet, quia notitia propria et intuitiva alicujus objecti est magis similis objecto quam generalis et abstractiva. Secunda pars patet per se."

<sup>22</sup> Meller, *Op. cit.*, p. 67: "Ailly Stellungnahme zur scholastischen Spezieslehre, die sich auf seiner Theorie von *intellectus agens et possibilis* aufbaut und in Gegensatz zu Ockham an Thomas [Aquinas] orientiert ist..."

<sup>23</sup> Ailly, *In I Sent.*, q. 1, a. 1 D: "Igitur mediando inter istos errores sit haec conclusio: quod possibile est viatorem non solum de primo principio, sed etiam de multis aliis veritatibus habere evidentem absolutam sive notitiam simpliciter evidentem."

to their knowledge of sensible things. Such a knowledge excludes contradictions and thus is reliable and true knowledge. He insists that, although we know God by this conditioned knowledge and by an abstractive process, it is nonetheless a real and totally valid cognition derived from our knowledge of things in this world.<sup>24</sup> Ailly's affirmations on our knowledge of God are all the more realistic when it is seen that the only valid argument he admits for His existence is Ockham's *a posteriori* demonstration from the conservation of things in this world.<sup>25</sup>

Rounding out this brief resumé of Ailly's metaphysics are a few comments on his mode of understanding the divine essence or nature. He holds that all of our notions of Its simplicity, eternity and the like are concepts which stand for, rather than fully express the divine essence as it is in itself. Like Ockham, he insists that the divine attributes are totally identified with the divine essence. Specifically, he remarks that the divine intellect and will are so identified with God's nature that whatever pertains to them, for this same reason, pertains to the divine essence.<sup>26</sup> As a mere parenthesis, it must be said here that Ailly's views on such attributes clearly place him outside the accusation of voluntarism, as has been claimed for him.<sup>27</sup> Each divine attribute equally expresses the one same nature and no one of them is separated from it.

That Ailly's epistemology agrees with the general doctrine of the major schoolmen is evident from the above brief resumé. If the various points made are accurate, then it is no longer possible to hurl pejorative epithets at them. Far from being a sceptic, he is painstaking-

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 3 DD: "Ratione sumpta ex his nobis apparent de communi cursu naturae... sic ergo sumendo, patet quod multae rationes naturales possunt fieri et factae sunt a philosophis concludentes tantum unum Deum esse, licet non evidenter tamen probabiliter et probabilius quam posset concludi oppositum." "Lumen naturale sive cognitionem sine errore intellectui possibilem de communi cursu naturae."

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, C: "Ista ratio potest apparentius et efficacius formari, quam Aristoteles eam formavit: unde sicut dicit Ockham, apparentius potest probari primitias efficientis et ejus unitas per conservationem rei a sua causa, quam per productionem."

<sup>26</sup> *Princ. in IV Sent.*: "Voluntas et intellectus in Deo sunt idem omnino: ideo quidquid ex natura rei convenit divinae voluntati, convenit etiam divino intellectui."

<sup>27</sup> Oakley, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law," pp. 74f, and Meller, *Op. cit.*, p. 10.



ingly conscious that men can achieve true and precise knowledge. If nominalism means simply that human knowledge consists in disconnected and contentless names, then this too must be discounted from his thought. There have been so many studies done recently to indicate the generally constructive and positive nature of Ockhamism that if this term is applied to Ailly it would not necessarily imply anything negative. And finally, if the term reformer can be applied to him in the sense of completely revising scholastic thought, then the evidence for the same is nowhere evident from a reading of his own words.

If ecumenism is, indeed, the work of a genuine philosopher, then it certainly is part and parcel of Ailly's philosophical synthesis. Living at a time which was complicated by much economic, political and religious strife, he put together harmoniously the spirit which animated both the older (*via antiqua*) and the newer (*via moderna*) ways of reasoning. And in doing so, he is seen to have sacrificed nothing of the truth in what he actually accomplished. If his name is associated with the Lutheran reform, there is surely no evidence in his epistemology or metaphysics for this allegation. And finally, for his success at conciliating various factions in the area of natural reasoning, for his forging a new synthesis of thought, for his finesse in terminology and logical technique, as well as for his tremendously positive influence on countless numbers of students in late medieval times, he rightly deserves the two titles he merited then. First, in his role as a defending conservator of what was worthwhile, he was called "The Indefatigable Hammerer of those who wander from the path of Truth." And secondly, for his uniqueness of mind, "The Eagle of France."

*King's College*  
*Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania*

RICHARD P. DESHARNAIS, C.S.C.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM'S COMMENTARY  
ON PORPHYRY  
INTRODUCTION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION \*

Chapter Four

*Concerning Differentia*

§ 1

*In truth, differentia is said commonly...* After the author has talked about genus and species, in this third chapter he wants to talk about differentia. And this part is divided [into two sections], because first he states the divisions of differentia, secondly he takes one member which he wants to discuss above all others and which is one of the five universals [that is] distinct from the others. The second part begins here: "They also state the things discussed [thus]..." The first part is divided into two, because first he states three divisions of differentia together with a display of the members of these divisions; secondly, by way of recapitulation, he mentions the one member about which above all he means to talk. The second part [begins] here: "Therefore since there are three species of differentia..." The first part is divided into three parts in keeping with the fact that he states three divisions of differentia. In the first he says that 'differentia' is understood in three ways, namely commonly, properly and more properly. A differentia commonly so-called is anything by which something differs in any way whatever either from something else or from itself, namely in such a way that it is different or other without being some other thing. For example, Socrates differs from Plato in virtue of a certain [accidental] difference; likewise, Socrates the boy differs from Socrates the old man; likewise, Socrates at rest differs from Socrates doing something or behaving in some other way.

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But a differentia properly so called is that by which something differs from something else in virtue of an inseparable accident. An inseparable accident, however, is something like having a hook-nose or being blind or being scarred. But a differentia more properly so called is that by which something differs from something else in virtue of a specific differentia, as for instance a man differs from a horse in virtue of being rational.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to this part it must be noted first, that the differentia which the author here analyzes is not one of the five universals; for proprium as well as accident are contained under what is here divided, as is manifestly obvious from his examples. For 'to be black' and 'to be sitting' are differentiae commonly so called; likewise, 'to be risible' is a differentia properly so called. And thus he is here not dividing the differentia that is one of the five universals but the differentia which is an equivocate of these three universals, to wit of differentia, accident and proprium. For differentia more properly so called is one of the five universals, and differentia commonly so called is accident, which is one of the five universals; but it is more doubtful whether differentia properly so called is proprium, because perhaps it is something common to proprium and something else.

Secondly, it must be understood that this division as well as the other preceding divisions are divisions of a word into its significations.

Thirdly, it must be understood that a differentia is not that by which something differs from something else as by something intrinsic to it or as by something formally inhering in it; because a differentia is a predicable that is predicable of something without always being intrinsic to the latter or being something inhering in it. Rather, what is called a differentia is what is predicable of something not *in quid* but rather *in quale*,<sup>2</sup> and is a middle term for inferring something to be distinct from something else. And if something expresses an essential part of that of which it is predicated, then it is a specific differentia. So for instance, 'rational' expresses an essential part of man, namely the intellective soul; and it is the middle term for inferring that a donkey or an irrational animal is distinct from a man, as by arguing thus: Every man is rational, no irrational animal is rational, therefore no irrational animal is a man. If, however,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxiii; see also Moody, pp. 102-104.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, I: c. xxiii ll. 127-129.

it is the middle term for inferring the one to be distinct from the other — [but] not by means of true contingent propositions, which may be true or false without affecting the existence of that of which it is being predicated — then it is a differentia properly so called. For example, let Socrates be blind and Plato not; then the following is a valid argument: Socrates is blind, Plato is not blind, therefore Socrates is not Plato and conversely. This argument proceeds from one true proposition which cannot be false as long as Socrates exists, to wit 'Socrates is blind.' However, if this affirmative proposition in which this differentia is predicated of the subject can be true as well as false and yet the subject remain, then it is a differentia commonly so called. For example, if Socrates is white and Plato is black, then 'white' is a differentia of Socrates because this follows logically: 'Socrates is white and Plato is not white, therefore Plato is not Socrates.' And thus it is obvious that the differentia that is here being discussed is nothing except a certain non-quidditative predicable that is a means of inferring the thing in question to differ from something else, and this inference will proceed either by necessary or by contingent propositions. This notwithstanding, any thing is distinguished from other things through itself and in virtue of its intrinsic parts, if it has parts. However, these parts are not the differentiae. Wherefore it is not correctly said that the soul or any form whatever, or the matter, is the differentia of a thing; and yet, in virtue of it, it is properly distinguished from any other thing.

Fourthly, it must be noted that strictly speaking, it is never possible for something to differ from itself; because Socrates differs from himself neither *per se* nor *per accidens*, and similarly for all others. Nor is Socrates other than himself; nor does the author mean to say this here. Rather, he means to say that such a differentia, which is something predicable, is a middle term for inferring the removal of a predicate — composed of the subject and something else added in the place of the differentia — from the subject to which this differentia belongs. For example, in his (the author's) example the predicates 'old man' and 'boy' cannot belong to the same thing; likewise 'moved' and 'at rest' cannot be predicated truly of one and the same thing at one and the same time. Consequently the predicate 'old man' is a middle term for inferring this negative statement, 'Socrates is not the boy Socrates,' by arguing thus: 'No old man is the boy Socrates, Socrates is an old man, therefore Socrates is not the boy Socrates.' Likewise, this is a valid argument: 'Nothing moved



is Socrates at rest, Socrates is moved, therefore Socrates is not Socrates at rest.' And 'to differ' being understood in this way, this is also true: Socrates differs from the old man Socrates in virtue of the predicable 'boy,' because he is not the old man Socrates. But from this it does not follow that therefore Socrates differs from Socrates; rather, that is an instance of the fallacy of the consequent. And this is what the author says when he says that Socrates differs from himself now as a boy and now as a man, and when doing something or being at rest. That is, if Socrates is an old man, then the following is true: 'Socrates differs from the boy Socrates'; and if Socrates is being moved, this is true: 'Socrates differs from Socrates at rest,' because he is not Socrates at rest. But when either predicable can be predicated truly of one and the same thing at one and the same time, this must not be granted. Wherefore the following is simply false: 'White milk differs from sweet milk,' and similarly 'Socrates differs from the white Socrates,' because it implies 'Socrates is not the white Socrates,' which can have only two truth-conditions, namely either that Socrates is not Socrates, or that Socrates is not white — both of which are false if Socrates is white. And if it is said that a being *per se* differs from an accidental aggregate, but that Socrates is a being *per se* and the white Socrates is an accidental aggregate and that therefore Socrates differs from the white Socrates, then it must be replied that understood literally, the following is simply false: 'The white Socrates is an accidental aggregate'; for, it implies 'Socrates is an accidental aggregate.' For to go from a determinable taken together with a determination that neither takes away nor diminishes [to the determinable by itself] is always to employ a formally valid inference. So, for instance, 'A white man is running, therefore a man is running' is formally valid; and so in all other cases. But white is not a determination that takes away or diminishes; therefore this is formally valid: 'The white Socrates is an accidental aggregate, therefore Socrates is an accidental aggregate.' The consequent is false, and therefore the antecedent is false as well. Nevertheless, if some such proposition is found in an author, it must be glossed thus: 'A white Socrates is an accidental aggregate' — that is, this whole, 'A white Socrates', signifies an accidental aggregate; and thus it has either simple or material supposition, although not when taken literally.

Similarly, it must be understood that nothing differs from anything else in virtue of an inseparable accident; rather, the one

name that primarily signifies the inseparable accident or its intention in the mind is a middle term for inferring something to be denied of it, or conversely. In the same way must it be understood that a specific differentia is not something in a thing in virtue of which the thing differs from some other thing; for there is nothing in a thing except matter and form, and neither the matter nor the form is predicable of many in the way in which a specific differentia is in fact predicable of many. And consequently a differentia is not something in a thing, but is a predicable to which corresponds a certain part of a thing as its significate, and it is a middle term for inferring that something differs from the thing of which the differentia is being predicated.<sup>3</sup>

## § 2

*Generally, therefore...* In this part he deduces from the preceding tri-partite division of differentia the disagreements and agreements among the preceding parts of the division, saying that every differentia alters that of which it is being predicated, but that whereas a differentia commonly so called merely produces a change, a differentia more properly so called not merely produces a change but also makes it another thing.

It must here be understood, consequent to what was said above, that a differentia does not really alter that of which it is being predicated nor does it change it into another thing; rather, it must be understood that it is the intention of the author to say that every differentia alters that to which it advenes — that is, every differentia is a middle term for inferring a negative statement in which something is denied of something else; i.e., of that of which this differentia is being predicated.<sup>4</sup> So for instance, the differentia 'white,' which is a differentia properly so called, is a middle term for inferring 'Socrates is not the black Socrates' or 'Socrates differs from the black Socrates' by arguing thus: 'Nothing white is the black Socrates, Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is not the black Socrates or differs from the black Socrates.' And the same thing holds for every differentia; but only a differentia commonly and properly so called is such a means in the way indicated. But a differentia more properly so called makes something another thing — that is, it is a middle term

<sup>3</sup> Cf. loc. cit., ll. 35 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. pp. 307-309 above.

for inferring that that whose [differentia] it is or of which it is being predicated is another thing which is specifically distinct from that of which the differentia is being denied, such that it is a middle term for inferring that there are here two things which are distinct from each other. So for instance, 'rational' is a middle term for inferring that a man is a different sort of being from a donkey, and that no man can be a donkey. It is not thus with the other differentiae; for although 'white' may be the middle term for inferring that Socrates is not black, still, it is not a middle term for inferring that Socrates cannot be black.<sup>5</sup>

Differently, it can be understood that a specific differentia makes something another kind of thing — that is, it signifies an essential part of a thing by which that of which it is verified is really differentiated, as one kind of being from another.

### § 3

*For some of the differentiae...* In this part he takes the second division of differentia from the preceding division, and it is this: That there are some differentiae which simply alter that to which they advene, and that there are others which make them into other sorts of things. And these latter differentiae are called specific differentiae, whereas the former are simply differentiae without qualification (*simpliciter*), and are not called differentiae by any special name of differentia. Moreover, he cites examples, saying that rational advening to man results in another sort of thing and constitutes a determinate species of animal; but that to be moved, advening to something, does not make it another sort of thing but merely alters it. And thus some differentiae make a thing another sort of thing, and others merely alter it.

Here, as before, must it be understood that since a differentia is something † which is predicable of many, it does not really advene to that whose differentia it is, neither in virtue of informing it nor through composition, and consequently it neither alters it nor does

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<sup>5</sup> The point here being that a specific differentia is a middle term for inferring that two things are distinct in *kind*. Therefore the fact that Socrates does not have a certain property is insufficient to qualify as a differentia. What has to be shown is, that he cannot have such a property; i.e., that being an instance of that particular kind rules out his having that property. Cf. § 3 below.

† "A term" — suggested by E. A. Moody.

it make it another sort of thing except as the middle term of an inference, as has been said. And consequently, besides these, the specific differentiae also produce another sort of thing, because they necessarily are middle terms for inferring a substantial difference. However, it is not like this with the other differentiae, for given that Socrates is first white and then black, then although 'Socrates differs from the white Socrates' is true, still, 'Socrates is substantially different or has another substance from the one that he had when he was white' is not true; rather, it merely follows that he has changed qualitatively.

And if it is said that specific differentiae are found in accidents and yet there is here no substance, then it must be replied that only in the category of substance are there specific differentiae, because only substances are composed of parts differing in nature and no other thing is so composed. And consequently nothing else has a definition properly so called nor does it have such specific differentiae, but merely has differentiae commonly and properly so called.

Secondly, it must be said that the differentia advening to a genus does not properly make for the species itself but makes for something that is convertible with the species and that signifies precisely what is signified by the species — that is [for something which signifies] nothing that is extrinsic to that which is signified by the species, although it may signify the essential parts of it more explicitly. And this is the definition; because although the definiens and the definitum are not the same, still, they signify one and the same thing.<sup>6</sup>

#### § 4

*Therefore, from the fact that...* In this part he deduces a conclusion from the preceding division, which is that from the fact that there are some differentiae which produce another sort of thing and others merely effect an alteration in the way discussed, it follows that the differentiae that produce another sort of thing are most necessary for the division of genera into species, as well as for definitions composed of genus and differentia. For a division must be effected by means of differentiae that express essential parts and not accidents. Likewise, since a definition is a phrase indicating the essence of a thing, it must be made up of differentiae which express the essential

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxvi.



parts of the thing. But it is the differentiae which produce another sort of thing that are of this kind and not the other differentiae, because the others do not imply anything except an alteration in a thing or some other change. Therefore the former differentiae and not the latter are necessary for divisions and definitions.

It must be understood that certain definitions are definitions properly so called, others improperly. Those, namely, are properly so called that express the quiddity of a thing precisely, and according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII\* they are only of the substance itself, because it alone is composed of essential parts. And it is these definitions that are made up of the genus and the specific differentiae. The others, however, are definitions more improperly so called, and they can be formed from the differentia properly so called.

Secondly, it must be noted that not any differentia commonly or properly so called implies an alteration or change in that to which first belongs one differentia and afterwards another that is contrary to the first; because sometimes this happens by a change of the other extreme, and an alteration or change in something is not always implied when they are verified successively.<sup>7</sup> And this is what the author here means.

## § 5

*Therefore, beginning once more with the higher...* In this part the author states a third division of differentia which contains one division and one sub-division. Therefore he says that some differentiae are separable, others inseparable; separable ones are those like 'to be moved,' 'to be at rest,' 'to be white,' 'to be healthy' and others of this sort; inseparable [ones are those] like 'to be hook-nosed,' 'snub-nosed,' 'rational,' 'irrational' and others of this sort.<sup>8</sup> The sub-division is this: that some of the inseparable differentiae are predicated *per se* of those things whose differentiae they are, and others are predicated *per accidens*. For 'rational,' 'immortal' and 'able to be taught' belong to man *per se*, but 'to be hook-nosed' and 'to be blind' are predicated of man *per accidens* (accidentally) and not *per se*.

It must here be understood first, that what he calls separable differentiae are not any things existing in the things whose differen-

\* Arist., *Metaph.* VII, 4 (1030<sup>b</sup> 5-7).

<sup>7</sup> Changes in relational predicates would here be examples.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. xxiii ll. 28-34.

tiae they are, where it is possible for the former to be separated from the latter without the destruction of the latter; nor does he call inseparable differentiae those things that exist subjectively in the things whose differentiae they are, where it is not possible for them to be separated from the latter without their destruction; for differentiae are nothing but certain terms predicable of the things whose differentiae they are.<sup>9</sup> Rather, he calls separable differentiae those predicables that are predicable of the things whose differentiae they are, where it is possible for such a differentia not to be predicated truly of that of which it was previously predicated without these things being destroyed. For example, 'to be moved' is a differentia of Socrates because Socrates is being moved, and yet while Socrates remains in existence it is possible for 'Socrates is not being moved' to be true; and thus this differentia is separable — that is, it can be predicated truly and can be affirmed truly of Socrates as well as be denied truly of Socrates, Socrates remaining in existence and being undestroyed. But he calls inseparable differentiae those predicables which cannot be predicated truly and be denied truly of one and the same thing except by the destruction of some substances. So, for instance, if someone is presently snub-nosed, then it is not possible for him not to be snub-nosed unless he himself were destroyed or his nose were destroyed; and so it is in other cases.

Secondly, it must be noted that 'to be hook-nosed' or 'snub-nosed' is not predicated *per se* of that of which it is predicated, because such a predicate can be predicated of many or can belong to many, and a predicate of that sort is not predicated of anything *per se* unless it is something common at least to some of the things of which it is predicated *per se*. But there is no such common term of which such a relative term is predicated *per se* or necessarily, although it may be predicated of some singular such that this singular thing not having changed in substance, it is not possible for it to be denied of it truly.

## § 6

*Indeed, those which are per se...* In this part he states one difference between a differentia *per se* and a differentia *per accidens*, saying that a differentia *per se* is stated in a definition expressing an essence, and that it makes for another sort of thing; but that a dif-

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. xxiii ll. 36-38, and 91 ff., esp. 106 ff.

ferentia *per accidens* is not stated in the definition of that whose differentia it is, nor does it make for another sort of thing, but merely effects an alteration.

It must here be understood that this passage can be understood in two ways: In one way, that he takes '*per se*' as what is distinguished from every predicable which expresses something extrinsic to that of which it is verified; and in this way nothing is said *per se* of anything except what is said in the first mode of *per se* predication; and in that way a proper attribute is not predicated *per se* of a subject because an attribute always expresses something that is not of the essence of that of which it is verified. And '*per se*' being understood thus, this passage clearly means that a *per se* differentia is stated in a definition properly so called, and that no accidental differentia is stated in such a definition. But the preceding passage seems to be contrary to this, because in illustrating the notion of an essential differentia, he adduces the example of being teachable, and yet it is obvious that this is not an essential differentia in the first mode of *per se* predication but is merely predicated of man in the second mode of *per se* predication. Nevertheless, to this it can be replied that what the author is illustrating with respect to being teachable is not a matter of fact but that he is merely trying to make a point, wishing to understand by this some differentia that is predicable of man *per se* in the first mode. Or it can be replied that in this part he is speaking more strictly about differentia or *per se* differentiae than he was in the preceding part, and that he is stating the difference between a specific differentia and all others. For, these specific differentiae are stated in the definition of a thing, whereas the others are not, whether they (these others) be predicated in the second mode of *per se* predication or simply *per accidens* and hence in no mode of *per se* predication at all.

On the other hand, it may be said that he is talking about *per se* differentiae, whether these be predicated in the second or in the first mode of *per se* predication. In that case, there is a difference between these *per se* differentiae and accidental differentiae, because the *per se* differentiae result in another sort of thing because they are middle terms for inferring that that of which they are verified — and that of which or for which their opposites are verified — differ in species with respect to their substances. So, for example, what is rational and what is irrational are distinguished, and because of this they [i.e., 'rational' and 'irrational'] can be stated in the definition of

a thing. But there will here be a difference: because the differentiae that are predicated in the first mode of *per se* predication are stated in a definition most properly so called, whereas the other differentiae are stated in a definition understood in the widest sense.<sup>10</sup> But accidentally opposed differentiae do not imply that what they are being predicated of are distinct in species; for Socrates is snub-nosed and Plato is not snub-nosed and yet Socrates and Plato are not distinct in species. Hence such differentiae are middle terms for inferring that what they are predicated of are distinct, but they are not middle terms for inferring that these things are distinct in species. And it is this and not something else that he means by saying that *per se* differentiae result in another sort of thing, whereas accidental differentiae merely effect an alteration.

## § 7

*Those, however, which are per se...* In this part he states another difference between *per se* and accidental differentiae, which is that *per se* differentiae are not susceptible of more and less, whereas accidental differentiae — even if they are inseparable — are thus susceptible. The first part he himself proves thus: The essence of a thing is not susceptible of more and less, therefore those things which indicate the essence of a thing are not susceptible of more and less; but genus and species and specific differentiae indicate the essence of a thing because they make up the definition of a thing, therefore these differentiae, as well as genus and species, are not susceptible of more and less.

It must here be understood that he does not take 'to be susceptible of more and less' to mean to be really increased or diminished, for no differentiae can really be increased or diminished.<sup>11</sup> Rather,

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, I: c. xxvi for an explicit discussion of the notion of a definition. See also Moody, pp. 106–111.

<sup>11</sup> A real increase or diminution of that sort would amount to a change in the property itself, which is a metaphysical impossibility. This seems at variance with the opinion expressed by Ockham at *Sentences* I, Dist. 17 qu. 6 and 7, where he argues that there is a real augmentation and diminution of properties. However, Ockham there adds that "the augmentation of any form is actually that something really different from what was there before is added, and that after it is added it remains really distinct from it but together with it constitutes an essential unit." (*ibid.*, qu. 6.k.).



he here understands more and less as comparative degrees that are truly predicable of other things, or as positive adjectives taken together with the adverbs 'more' and 'less'. Wherefore, as he illustrates, being coloured or being snub-nosed is increased — that is, it happens to be true to say that one nose is more snub-nosed than another nose, and that one body is whiter than another body because the latter is less white.

Secondly, it must be understood that the being of a thing is frequently understood as the essence of a thing, and it is being understood thus in the present context. And the essence of a substance is neither increased nor diminished, although the essence of a quality may sometimes be increased and diminished.<sup>12</sup>

### § 8

*Therefore, since there are three species of differentia...* In this section, recapitulating some of the things said, he states one member [of the division of differentia] in particular about which he wants to talk above all others, saying that there are three species of differentia — namely differentia commonly, properly and more properly so called — and that some differentiae are separable and others inseparable, and similarly that some of the inseparable ones are *per se* and others accidental; and again, besides the preceding, that *per se* differentia is divided, for some *per se* differentiae are *divisive* of genera into their species and others are *constitutive* of the species into which the genera are divided.<sup>13</sup> For example, all of the following are *per se* differentiae: 'living,' 'non-living,' 'sensible,' 'insensible,' 'rational,' 'irrational,' 'mortal' and 'immortal.' But these two differentiae — 'living' and 'sensible' make up the substance of 'animal,'<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See note 7 above.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Kretzmann, pp. 55-56.

<sup>14</sup> It looks as though Ockham is here talking as though the differentiae, which after all are terms, "make up the substance of animal," i.e. effect an ontological constitution. However, this is not the case. Following Aristotle, Ockham distinguishes between primary and secondary substances, and claims that whereas a primary substance is an actual thing, "every secondary substance is a universal, since according to Aristotle it is either a genus or a species." (*Summa Logicae* I: c. xlii ll. 22-23.) Therefore Ockham is here using 'substance' to stand for secondary substances — in this case, the genus of animal — which, being a term, can thus be made up of differentiae (in his sense of being made up of something) without this having ontological implications. Cf. below, next paragraph, pp. 320-321; p. 327 et pass.

because an animal is a living sensible substance; whereas these two — ‘mortal’ and ‘immortal,’ ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ — are certain differentiae of ‘animal’ which are not constitutive differentiae of ‘animal’ but are divisive. For ‘animal’ is divided thus: some animals are mortal, others immortal; similarly one kind of animal is rational, another irrational. Nevertheless, the author says that although with respect to one and the same thing some differentiae are constitutive whereas others are divisive such that one and the same differentia cannot be constitutive and divisive of one and the same thing, still, one and the same differentia is constitutive with respect to the one and divisive with respect to the other. For instance, the differentiae that are divisive of ‘animal’ are ‘rational’ and ‘irrational,’ and they do not constitute animal but ‘man’ and ‘donkey,’ which latter they do not divide. And likewise for ‘mortal’ and ‘immortal,’ which are not constitutive of ‘animal’ but divide it and constitute ‘man’ and ‘God’ [respectively]. And thus it is obvious with respect to the divisive differentiae of ‘substance’ and of all the other genera: they always divide the one whereas they constitute the other, albeit not the same one. And consequently these two differentiae, namely ‘rational’ and ‘mortal,’ are not constitutive of ‘animal’ but of ‘man,’ of which they are not divisive. Similarly, these two — ‘rational’ and ‘immortal’ — are not differentiae that are constitutive of ‘animal’ but only of ‘God’; likewise these — ‘irrational’ and ‘mortal’ — are not constitutive differentiae of ‘animal,’ but only of kinds of animals; similarly, the divisive differentiae of ‘substance’ are constitutive not of ‘substance’ but of some kind of animal or of something lower. From all of this [the author] concludes that since all such differentiae are divisive of the one and constitutive of the other, it follows that they can all be called specific differentiae, because any one of them can be called a specific differentia of that of which it is constitutive, just as ‘sensible’ can be called the specific differentia of ‘animal.’ And consequently we need these differentiae primarily for divisions of genera and for definitions of species; and for divisions and definitions of this kind we do not require inseparable differentiae that are predicated accidentally, and much less do we require separable differentiae. Whence it is clear that since this little book is written primarily so that it might assist in divisions and definitions and in the understanding of the predicaments and other things of this kind, we must deal primarily with the differentiae that are styled specific.

Here it must be noted first, that differentiae are not constitutive of species as though they were certain things intrinsic to these species or even to any individuals whatever. Rather, they are said to be constitutive of the species because they constitute the definition which signifies the same real thing — indeed, the very same thing that is imported by the species; and this is what the author means, not something else.<sup>15</sup> They can also be said to be constitutive of the species because they express the essential parts of the things that are signified by the species.

Secondly, it must be noted that the author does not mean to say that 'mortal' is an essential differentia of 'man'; rather, he says this by way of example. In the same way, he does not mean to say that 'God' is something contained under 'animal,' because God is not an animal. Rather, he is speaking according to the opinion of others who did suppose this. In the same way, he says certain other things in imitation of the opinion of others and by way of example. This, however, must be noted: that the author here specifically states that 'rational' and 'mortal' constitute the species of man, and that 'irrational' and 'mortal' constitute another species, namely that of irrational animals, and that 'rational' and 'immortal' are differentiae of 'God' <sup>15a</sup> — [and he says this] not because matters stand thus but so as to make known that diverse differentiae taken together with a genus define a certain species, even though these differentiae may not be ordered according to higher and lower, as has been stated elsewhere.

## § 9

*The things discussed are also stated thus:* In this part the author intends to discuss one kind of differentia which is one of the five universals; and this part is divided into five sections in accordance with which he states five descriptions of this kind of differentia. The first description is that a differentia is that whereby a species derives from <sup>16</sup> a genus. This description he explains in a certain way as follows: It is obvious that a species has differentiae; but it does not have these from the genus; therefore it is by these differentiae that

<sup>15</sup> Cf. note 14 above.

<sup>15a</sup> Reading 'Dei' with the two Florence manuscripts and the Bruges codex, instead of 'divisivae'. I owe this reading to Dr. Gál and Dr. G. J. Etzkorn. As they have pointed out, Moody does not list this variant reading.

<sup>16</sup> This seems to be a standard phrase. Cf. Kretzmann, loc. cit.

the species derives from the genus. The major of this reasoning is clear, because a differentia is predicated of a species. The minor is proved, because if a species were to have its differentia from the genus, it would follow that the genus actually would have that differentia.<sup>17</sup> But it is obvious that a genus no more has the one differentia than it has another one contrary to it, for then there would be actual contraries which is impossible;<sup>18</sup> wherefore the genus itself does not have such a differentia actually, and consequently has it merely potentially. And it being assumed that a species derives from a genus by this very differentia and that the genus does not actually have these differentiae, it thus follows that a species does not arise from (is not derived from) what is nothing, nor likewise that opposites are in one and the same thing.

Concerning this part it must be noted that although every specific differentia is something through which a species derives from a genus, still, not every species derives from a genus by means of some differentia; for although every differentia is the differentia of some species, still, not every species has essential differentiae — which latter are here under discussion — for the species that import precisely simple things do not have essential differentiae, just as according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII neither do they have definitions properly so called.\* The reason for this is that a differentia always expresses an essential part of a thing; for, if it did not express a part of the thing but the whole, the very same thing would be expressed by the differentia and by the species. The consequent is false, because then the species would be the differentia and vice versa, which is false. But a simple thing does not have parts; therefore its species does not have an essential differentia.

Secondly, it must be noted that a species does not derive from a genus by a differentia as though the species contained the genus intrinsically, and in addition to the genus it intrinsically contained the specific differentia as well. Rather, 'to derive from' here means to have some predicate that is predicable truly of the species with the universal sign, where it [this predicate] is not thus predicated of the genus. And this is true, because whatever is predicated of the

<sup>17</sup> Literally: "would have it in act".

<sup>18</sup> The point here is that if the differentiae were actually present — were "in act" — there would be something which would actually have contrary properties simultaneously, which is impossible.

\* Arist., *Metaph.* VII, 4 (1030<sup>a</sup> 6-15).



genus is also predicated of the species, and moreover the genus is itself predicated of the species taken universally,<sup>19</sup> like this: 'Every man is an animal.' And beyond this, the differentia is predicated of the species taken universally, like this: 'Every man is rational.' Still, it is not predicated truly of genus in this way, for this following is false: 'Every animal is rational.' And this is what he says: 'For man, over and above animal, has rational and mortal' — that is, more predicates, namely 'rational' and 'mortal,' are predicated of 'man' taken universally than of 'animal' [taken universally]. And therefore, he says, 'for animal is neither it nor some part of these' — that is, not one of these differentiae is predicated of 'animal' taken universally, although one may be predicated of 'animal' understood particularly.<sup>20</sup>

Thirdly, it must be noted that a genus does not have a differentia potentially as though it were something potentially receiving the differentia; nor does the species actually have the differentia like something intrinsic to it: For none of these intentions is intrinsic to the other, nor is the one receptive of the other. Rather, 'to have the differentia potentially' here means to receive the predication of that differentia in a particular proposition, like in this one: 'Animal, or, some animal is rational.' And consequently the genus has the divisive differentiae potentially, not actually — that is, no differentia is predicated truly of a genus in a universal proposition, just as the following is not true: 'Every animal is rational.'<sup>21</sup> And in this sense the species does have the differentia in act, because the differentia is predicated of it taken universally.<sup>22</sup> And from this it follows that for contrary differentiae to be potentially with respect to one and the same thing is nothing else than for contrary differences to be predicated of one and the same genus understood particularly.<sup>23</sup> And this is not unfitting, just as it is not unfitting for subcontraries to be

<sup>19</sup> Literally: "taken with the universal sign."

<sup>20</sup> I.e., in a particularly quantified proposition.

<sup>21</sup> Ockham is here re-interpreting Porphyry to the effect that the latter is actually talking about modes of predication, not of being. 'To be in a genus potentially' comes out as 'to have the differentiae predicated in a particular but not in a universal proposition'; and 'to be in a species actually' comes out as 'to be predicated of it in a universal proposition'.

<sup>22</sup> I.e., "in a universally quantified proposition."

<sup>23</sup> I.e., "in a particularly quantified proposition." Henceforth I shall take this as well as the preceding explanation in note 22 as understood in this and similar contexts.

true simultaneously. But for contrary differentiae to be actual with respect to one and the same thing, that is, to be predicated of something understood universally, is impossible.

From the preceding it is clear that to have something potentially or actually is understood one way in logic and another way in a real science, and that ignorance of this equivocation results in the fact that many propositions of logic are understood incorrectly.

## § 10

*Moreover, they define it...* In this part the author states the second description of 'differentia,' which is this: A differentia is what is predicated *in quale* of many things differing in species. He first explains this definition thus: 'Rational,' which is a differentia, is predicated of man *in quale* and not *in quid*; therefore it is the same for other differentiae. He posits the antecedent because that in terms of which one replies to a question asked by using 'what is it?' is predicated *in quid*, and that in terms of which one replies to a question asked by using 'what is it like?' is predicated *in quale*. But to a question asked by using the phrase 'what is it?' one replies in terms of a genus, as for instance if someone asks 'What is man?' a fitting reply is that he is an animal and not that he is rational. However, if someone asks 'What is man like?', a fitting reply is that he is rational, and a reply in terms of a genus would be inappropriate. Therefore 'animal,' which is a genus, is predicated *in quid* and not *in quale*; and 'rational,' which is a differentia, is predicated *in quale* and not *in quid*.

Secondly, he argues that a differentia is predicated *in quale* in the following way: What stands in the place of the form is predicated *in quale*; but a differentia stands in the place of a form; therefore a differentia is predicated *in quale*. He does not prove the major but assumes it to be quite obvious. He does prove the minor, saying that just as a thing is composed of matter and form, or of something taking the place of matter and that of form, in the way in which a statue is composed of bronze and shape such that the bronze is the matter and the shape the form, so the species — to wit, man — which is common with respect to the individuals and specifically with respect to the higher genera, consists proportionately of the genus as the matter and the differentia as the form, just as man is this whole: rational mortal animal. Therefore the differentia is in the place of the form and consequently is predicated *in quale*.

Concerning this part it must be noted first, that it is not differentia in general that is here being defined, but merely the sort of differentia that is constitutive of a genus in the way indicated above. For not every differentia is predicated of many things differing in species, because there is no differentia in the case of an ultimate species (*species specialissima*).<sup>24</sup> But every differentia that is constitutive of a genus in the way indicated above is predicated of many things differing in species, whether actually or potentially; and this suffices for the intention of the author.

Secondly, it must be understood that to be a differentia it is not sufficient that something be predicated simply *in quale*, for an accident is also thus predicated *in quale*. Rather, at the same time it is necessary that it not express anything extrinsic to that for which it stands.

Thirdly, it must be understood that a differentia is predicated *in quale* because it does not primarily express a whole — that is, it is not a concrete version of an abstract term expressing primarily a whole.<sup>25</sup> Rather, its abstract term denotes precisely one part of a thing and not another.

Fourthly, it must be understood that some people who misunderstand these words think that every species is composed of a genus and a differentia — which is obviously false: First, because many species do not have differentiae of the kind now under discussion, as has been shown in the preceding part; second, because the species that does have differentiae is not made up of them, which fact is obvious because a species is an intention<sup>26</sup> that is distinct from a differentia and can be present in<sup>27</sup> a mind that is unaware or ignorant of the differentia. But it is impossible for a whole to be without each of its parts; therefore the differentia is not a part of the species. Similarly, if a species were composed of a genus and a differentia, it would follow that there would be no difference whatever between a species and its definition, since a definition is nothing but a complex of genus and differentiae; and consequently it [the species] would no more be defined than would the definition.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. p. 320 above.

<sup>25</sup> On abstract vs. concrete terms. Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. v-ix, esp. vi; see also Moody, pp. 56 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxi ll. 4-6.

<sup>27</sup> Literally: "can be had in."

And if it is said that the differentiae are not actually in a species as they are in its definition, and that thus there is a certain distinction between a species and its definition, then this grants the above thesis, for each part is equally actually in the one whole as it is in the other that is composed of it, just as the matter of which air is composed is as much in act then as when fire is composed of it. Therefore if a differentia is actual in the definition and is not actual in the species, it necessarily follows that either it is not a part of the species or it is not a part of the definition. It is clear that the differentia is a part of the definition; therefore it is not a part of the species. And consequently I say that it is not the meaning of the author that a species is composed of a genus and a differentia as of parts that are intrinsic to it; rather, his meaning is that a certain whole which is predicated truly and *per se* of a species, and conversely — not, however, as standing for itself but as standing for its content — is made up of genus and differentia, and that this is the definition.<sup>28</sup> So for instance, he adduces the example that a rational mortal animal really is a man and conversely, and yet it is obvious that this definition 'rational mortal animal' is not this species 'man.' Wherefore 'A definition is a species and a species is a definition' is a false predicative statement, whereas this one is true: 'A definition is of a species'; and this one is also true: 'A species is defined by a definition.'<sup>29</sup>

But what of the author's thesis about species and differentia, if this merely proves that a definition is composed of a genus and a differentia, and a species is not? It must be said that this suffices for the intention of the author, for his primary purpose is to prove that a differentia is predicated *in quale*, and this can be proved sufficiently from the fact that a definition is composed of a genus and a differentia whereas a species is not composed of a genus and a differentia. And this [can be proved] thus: In a definition, what is stated in the place of the form is predicated *in quale* of the species whose definition it is; but, in a definition, the differentia is stated in the place of the form; therefore it is predicated *in quale* of that very species. The major can be proved, for in a definition, what is subsequent (posterior) and as it were advenes to [i.e. qualifies] what

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., I: c. xxvi ll. 26–40 et passim.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., I: c. xxvi ll. 108 ff., where Ockham claims that strictly speaking the definiens and the definitum are never identical, whereas they do (when the definition is correct) import the same thing.



exists prior is stated in the place of the form, for matter is prior to form and form advenes to it [i.e. qualifies it].<sup>30</sup> Therefore analogously, what is stated in the place of the matter ought to be prior (precede) and what is stated in the place of the form ought to be posterior (follow). But what is posterior in a definition is predicated *in quale*, because it signifies a part and does not primarily signify the whole, which is the reason why it is predicated *in quale*. However, what is prior does signify the whole, and consequently is predicated *in quid*. Therefore the proposition that what is stated in a definition in the place of the form is predicated *in quale*, is true. But a differentia is of this kind, and is posterior to the genus; therefore it is predicated *in quale*.

And if it is asked why what signifies the whole is stated prior in a definition and takes precedence, rather than what signifies a part, it must be replied that this is so because what signifies the whole cannot be convertible with the definition, for then it would be a species; therefore it is something more common. A differentia, however, cannot be more common, and consequently it is posterior.

From the preceding it is clear that in a definition, the differentia that expresses the matter is thus stated in the place of the form, just as is the differentia expressing the form of a thing. Therefore if we take under substance the species 'body' — which is defined thus: 'A body is a material substance' — then this differentia 'material' expresses the matter of 'body' just as 'rational' expresses the form of 'man'; and thus in the definition 'material substance' it is stated in the place of the form, just as is 'rational' in 'rational animal'. It follows from the preceding that one speaks incorrectly when one says that the genus is the matter of a thing and the differentia is its form; for a genus is not in a thing, since according to the Commentator on *Metaphysics* VII, nothing is in a thing except its particular matter and its form.\* Nor does one speak correctly when one says that the genus imports the matter, because it does not import the matter more than it does the form. It also follows with respect to the most general genus of substance, that it is not taken from the matter, because then there would be matter in everything con-

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., I: c. xxiii ll. 51-69; see also St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 2 and 6.

\* Averr., *Metaph.* VII, comm. 44.

tained under it, which is false because there is no matter in the separate substances<sup>31</sup> and yet these are in the genus of substance.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore it must briefly be said that it is not the meaning of the author that every species or substance is composed of genus and differentia, nor that the differentia signifies precisely the form — because some signify the form and others the matter — nor even that the genus is taken from the matter more than from the form, but that it imports the whole. Instead, his meaning is that the genus and the differentia together constitute a definition which is convertible with the species and that it expresses explicitly what the species imports implicitly. He also wants to say that just as in composite things something is the matter and something else is the form, or something is in the place of the matter and something else in the place of the form, so in a definition the genus is in the place of the matter with respect to the differentia and has a certain property of matter; namely, because just as the matter is prior in nature to the form itself and the form advenes to the matter, so in a definition the genus — which is a certain intention or concept in the mind — precedes that very differentia and the differentia advenes to it (qualifies it). And so in a definition, the differentia is stated in the place of the form — and this is so whether the differentia primarily signifies either the matter or the form, because in respect to this present issue it makes no difference which is the case.

## § II

*Moreover, they describe...* Here he states the third description of 'differentia,' which is that a differentia is what divides a genus into its species, as for instance 'animal' is divided by 'rational' and 'irrational' into 'man' and 'horse'.

It must be understood that differentiae are divisive of a genus because any one of them is a means of inferring as it were from what is prior and better known that one species is distinct from another, as for example by arguing thus: No donkey is rational, every man is rational, therefore no man is a donkey. And because differentiae express parts of wholes, it follows that a negative statement in which

<sup>31</sup> 'Separate substance' is a common term for an angel or some such sort of being, since these have no matter.

<sup>32</sup> I.e., despite their immateriality, separate substances are still substances.

one differentia is denied of another is as it were prior to and better known than the negation in which one species is denied of another.

Secondly, it must be understood that although every differentia is something by which a genus is divided, nevertheless it is not the case that conversely every genus is divided by differentiae; for some genus does not have anything under it except species alone and is divided into these, but not by differentiae. And of this sort is every genus whose contents are simple and not composed of parts of a wholly different kind; to wit, one not composed of a genus and a differentia. Moreover, it is quite clear that such a genus does not have divisive essential differentiae; for I take such a genus and let it be *A*, and let it be divided by such differentiae, namely by *B* and *C*, and let the species into which the genus is thus divided be called *D* and *E*: Then *B* is the differentia of *D*, and *D* is the species. I then ask, whether *D* imports exactly the same thing as *B* or not. If it does import exactly the same thing, and conversely, then there is no more reason why *B* should be the differentia of *D* itself rather than conversely. In fact, they will simply be synonymous intentions. However, if *B* does not import exactly the same as *D* imports, then it imports either a part of the very thing imported by *D*, or the whole with respect to what is imported by *D*, or something that is neither a whole nor a part with respect to the latter. The first and second cannot be the case, because then it would follow that we would here have a composition, because [there would be] a whole and a part. Nor can the third be the case, because then *B* would either be a proprium or an accidental predicate, or it would necessarily be more common than *D* itself, the opposite of which is clearly true if *B* is a specific differentia — and we are talking about this right now. Therefore it is clear that no simple species has a differentia, and consequently that a genus all of whose contents are simple does not have divisive essential differentiae. Rather, as is obvious, the author divides such genera by accidental differentiae; for in dividing (analyzing) colour, they say that the one is dark, the other bright, and so on inductively for all other cases.<sup>33</sup>

It is clear from the preceding that sometimes a genus has a divisive differentia on one side [of its division] and does not have one on the other, namely when one thing directly contained under

<sup>33</sup> For a further discussion of this point, see *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxiii ll. 74-76.

the genus has certain contents that are composite, and another has only simple ones. For instance, the example about the genus of substance is adduced because substance is divided into corporeal and incorporeal substance, and incorporeal substance is not common except to simple substances, whereas the other is common to composite substances. Consequently the common term<sup>34</sup> which is common to simple substances does not have an essential differentia which indicates a part of a thing, but only has a differentia that is a privative or negative differentia of the part imported by the other, contrary differentia, such a differentia being not essential but rather accidental because the negative of 'corporeal substance' itself is 'immaterial' or 'incorporeal' or some such. And sometimes, on the other hand, there corresponds to it an essential differentia which is called essential not because it is of the essence of the species or even of what is contained under the species, but because it imports an essential part of an individual that is contained under the species. And consequently it is true that all contrary specific or essential or *per se* differentiae divide a genus into its species; but the proposition 'Every genus is divided by such differentiae' is simply false. And this is the meaning of the author.

## § 12

*Moreover, they also assign them in this way...* In this part he states the fourth description of 'differentia,' which is this: That a differentia is that in virtue of which singulars differ from each other. For some do not differ according to genus, as for instance we do not differ from the brutes in virtue of 'animal,'<sup>35</sup> for we as well as they are animals; rather, we differ from them by 'rational.'<sup>36</sup> Similarly, al-

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<sup>34</sup> The addition of 'term' is necessary so as to preclude a reading of this in a metaphysical sense, as e.g. to the effect that "the common thing which is precisely common to simple substances does not have an essential differentia." Such a reading would make nonsense out of the subsequent clause, which is to the effect that such differentiae "indicate" or "import" something. It must always be borne in mind that for Ockham, differentiae are *predicables*, which for him means that they are terms. See also p. 329 below, where he calls a differentia "A certain intention or concept in the mind" and similarly on p. 109, the passage beginning "It must here be noted first..."

<sup>35</sup> I.e., of being animals.

<sup>36</sup> I.e., in virtue of being rational.



though we agree with the gods in 'rational,'<sup>37</sup> we nevertheless differ from them by 'mortal.'<sup>38</sup>

Here it must be understood first that, as has been touched on before, for something to differ from something else by something is understood equivocally by the author in diverse places, because sometimes something is said to differ from something else as by something identical with it or intrinsic to it or by something whereby it does not itself really differ from the other thing; and 'to differ by something' is understood more strictly in this sense. In another way, 'to differ by something' is understood more broadly, as when the latter is itself the means for inferring something else. The author does not here understand 'to differ by a differentia' in the first sense, for since a differentia is nothing but a certain intention or concept in the mind, it is not something intrinsic to that which differs. Indeed, if that differentia were nothing, as when all minds were destroyed, man would still differ from horse as much as he does now. And 'to differ by something' being understood in this sense, any thing whatever differs from any other either by itself or by some part intrinsic to it, namely by the matter or by the form or by an integral part. But neither the genus nor the differentia is the matter or the form of a thing, nor is it an integral part of it. Consequently, if 'to differ by something' is understood in this sense, one thing does not differ from another either by a genus or by a differentia.

In the second sense, one thing differs from another by a genus and from a third by a differentia, because a genus as well as a differentia is a means (middle term) for inferring that something is distinct from something else. And it is in this sense that the author here understands 'to differ,' and not otherwise. And consequently he says that 'rational' sets us off from the irrational beings — that is, it is the middle term for inferring that we are not irrational, namely because we are rational.

Nevertheless, it must be understood that this does not suffice for [being] a *per se* differentia, but together with this it is necessary that it import some essential part of that of which it is being asserted; and by this genus is excluded, as likewise are proprium and accident.

It must be understood that whatever the author says about gods he states following the opinion of others who held that demons as

<sup>37</sup> I.e., in being rational.

<sup>38</sup> I.e., in being mortal.

well as certain eternal animals are gods, and that he states this by way of example. And it is not necessary that examples always be true, but it suffices that they lead to the truth or to a knowledge (an understanding) of the truth.

### § 13

*Moreover, those who investigate more deeply...* In this part the author states the fifth description of 'differentia,' which is as it were a correlative of and supplementary to the other definitions, and as it were removes their mistakes. Therefore he says that those who investigate the nature of differentia more deeply say that not everyone of those terms that divide a genus is a *per se* differentia, which is [the sort of differentia that is] here under discussion. Rather, that which contributes to the being of a thing and is a part of that thing, that is a differentia. The first part he proves by an example; for 'to be naturally capable of navigating' is a proprium of 'man.' Likewise, it divides the genus of man, namely 'animal' in a certain way; for, we divide 'animal' in that way, saying that some animals are naturally capable of navigating and others not. Still, because naturally capable of navigating does not complete the substance of man nor is a part of it but rather is a certain habit (disposition) of it, it is not a specific differentia that is a *per se* differentia. From which it follows that those differentiae are specific differentiae which make the species another species and which are predicated *in quale*. Recapitulating at the end, he says that what has been said about differentia is sufficient.

It must here be noted first that he does not mean to say that a differentia is a part of a thing or of its essence. Consequently, the passage in which he speaks thus: *but that which contributes to the being of a thing and is a part of the thing* must be understood thus: *That which contributes to the being of a thing* — that is, that which is stated in the definition expressing the being, that is, the essence, of a thing — *and that which is a part of the being of the thing* — that is, what is stated as a part in the definition expressing the whole essence of a thing and as expressing a part of the thing defined — is the differentia. And consequently it is not of the nature of a differentia that it be a part of a thing but that it be a part of the definition and that it express a part of the thing and not something extrinsic to it. Consequently, although this predicate 'naturally capable of navigating'

may be a proprium of 'man,' and although 'animal' may be divided by it as though by a non-essential differentia, still, since it does not complete the definition indicating the substance of the thing and is neither a part of the definition expressing the substance of the thing nor expresses one determinate part of the thing but instead is a certain disposition of it, that is, is a certain predicable connoting something extrinsic to man, namely the act of navigating — it therefore is neither a *per se* differentia of 'man' nor a specific differentia.

Secondly, it is to be noted that specific differentiae are said always to result in another species in two ways: in one way, because any specific differentia is a middle term for inferring that that of which it is verified differs in species from something else of which the opposite differentia is predicated; and in a way, this can apply not merely to a specific differentia but also to a proper attribute. In the second way, [it is said to result in another species] because it completes a definition that is convertible with some species — and this cannot apply to anything except a specific differentia — and at the same time is predicated *in quale* — by which genus is excluded.

Thirdly, it must be noted that according to what the author means, this last description of 'differentia' is common<sup>39</sup> to every differentia of genus as well as of species specialissima.

The fourth description must be supplemented by this: A differentia is that by which singulars differ from each other, namely those having a differentia; and it is what expresses a part of a thing. The third description must be supplemented by the very same phrase. The first must be supplemented in the very same way, namely to the effect that a differentia is that by which a species derives from a genus and which expresses an essential part of a thing and not something extrinsic to it. The second description is not common to every differentia because [it does not hold for] the differentia of a species specialissima.

<sup>39</sup> I.e., applies to.

## Chapter Five

*Concerning Proprium*

## § I

*Proprium*, however,... In this part the author deals only with 'proprium' by dividing 'proprium' into its significations or significates and explaining the members of this division, saying that 'proprium' is predicated in four ways:<sup>1</sup> In one way, a proprium is what belongs to some one species but does not belong to many species, although it does not belong to each individual of that same species. So, for example 'to be a doctor' or 'to be a geometer' is a proprium of man because man alone is of this sort, and yet not every man is. In the second way, that is called the proprium of some species which belongs to every individual contained under that species, as for instance 'to be two-legged' is said to be a proprium of 'man' because it belongs to every man; but it does not belong to man alone, but also to other animals of other species. In the third way, a proprium is said to be that which belongs to every individual contained under a certain species and only to such an individual, yet not always but at some determinate time it does belong to it and at another determinate time it does not belong to it. So for instance, 'to be grey in old age' belongs to every man and only to a man, yet not all the time but only in old age. In the fourth way, something, is said to be a proprium of some species when it belongs to each thing contained under that species and only to such a thing, and always. So for instance, 'to be risible' is a proprium of 'man' because man alone is risible and every man is risible and is risible all of the time. And if it be objected that a man is not always actually laughing, the author replies that this is irrelevant because although a man may not always be laughing, still, he is always naturally capable of laughing; and thus 'to be risible' is natural to man, just as 'able to neigh' is natural to a horse. Something is most properly called a proprium in this fourth way, because as such it is always convertible with that whose proprium it is. So, for instance, everything able to neigh is a horse and every horse is able to neigh. Similarly, every man is risible and everything risible is a man.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxiv. William of Sherwood has no such division in his *Introduction*.



It must here be understood first, that the proprium that is here being divided is not one of the five universals, but is an equivocal term<sup>2</sup> with respect to that proprium which is one of the five universals and that which is predicated accidentally and contingently. For as is obvious from the first member of the division, 'to be a doctor' is a proprium and yet it is predicated accidentally and contingently of man; for this is contingent: 'A man is a doctor.'

Secondly, it must be noted that in whichever of the preceding ways proprium may be understood, it cannot be admitted that a proprium belongs to that whose proprium it is like something real inhering in it, in the way in which an accident such as whiteness inheres in a wall.<sup>3</sup> Rather, to belong to something is here being understood as to be predicated of something, wherefore the sense is that a proprium belongs to that whose proprium it is — that is, a proprium is predicated of that whose proprium it is; yet it is not predicated of it as standing for itself but as standing for the external thing. And in this way the authors frequently understand 'to be predicated of' as 'to belong to,' 'to be in' and likewise, also as 'to inhere in'; and in this sense, 'risible' belongs to man because it is predicated truly of 'man.'

Thirdly, it must be understood that a proprium is not a proprium of some thing existing outside of the mind but is a proprium of something that is common to many things outside of the mind, for it is predicated of such a thing; not, however, as standing for itself but as standing for the things to which it is common. So for instance, 'risible' is said to be the proprium of the common [term] 'man' because it is predicated of it, yet not as standing for that common term itself but as standing for the things of which it is being predicated and to which it is common. So for instance, in the proposition 'Every man is risible,' the predicate 'risible' is being predi-

<sup>2</sup> Again, reasons like those advanced in note 34, Chapter Four *mutatis mutandis*, make an addition of 'term' necessary; cf. *supra* p. 328.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, I: c. xxxii: "However, just as [we say that] the predicate is predicated of the subject, so we say that the predicate is in the subject and [that] the predicate belongs to the subject, and [that]... the predicate inheres in the subject. These locutions must not be understood as though the predicate were posited as really inhering in the subject in the way in which whiteness is in a wall; rather, these [locutions] signify the same thing: 'to be predicated of'... Similarly, the words 'to come to,' 'to recede from,' 'to acquire,' 'to belong to,' 'not to belong to,' frequently are taken as 'to be predicated of'." See also Chapter Six, pp. 342 and 343 below.

cated of this common term 'man,' but not as standing for the common [term], because it does not stand for itself — for if it did, it would be denoted that this common term as standing for the things it stands for, because nothing is denoted by 'Every man is risible' except that this man is risible, and that one, and so on concerning singular (individual) particular men. And this suffices for the truth of this statement, although no common term is risible. So, for example, the following is true: 'Every man is singular,' such that the predicate is being predicated of one common term not as standing for itself but as standing for its singulars.

Fourthly, in connection with 'proprium' taken in the first way, it must be understood that a proprium construed in this way is predicated of that whose proprium it is not universally but merely particularly. If the following be said: " 'To be a doctor' is a proprium of man," let it be asked for what the word 'man' stands, i.e. whether it has personal supposition and stands for its contents, or simple supposition and stands for itself. Not the former, because then it would be false, since it would be false of any individual man. For 'To be a doctor is a proprium of this man' is false, and similarly concerning many or all individual men. If the word 'man' has simple supposition and stands for itself, then 'to be a doctor' is predicated primarily of 'man' rather than of 'this man.' But a predicate which belongs primarily to a common term belongs † to everything contained under that common term, and consequently every man would be a doctor, which is obviously false.

To this it must be replied that in the proposition " 'To be a doctor' is a proprium of man," the word 'man' does not have personal supposition and stand for what is contained under it — for the reason already given — but rather has simple supposition and stands for itself. For, it is a proprium with respect to this common term, seeing that it is predicated of this common term and of nothing else except that of which this common term is predicated, yet not as standing for itself but as standing for the individuals. But from this it does not follow that it belongs <sup>4</sup> to everything contained under it — unless it be a proprium understood in a different sense of the word. And when it is said that what belongs primarily to a common term also belongs to everything contained under it, it must be said that

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† Reading 'competit' for 'convenit'.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. § 3 above on the phrase 'to belong to,' and similar locutions.

for something to belong primarily to something can be understood in two ways: In one way, that it belongs to it adequately (commensurately) and *per se* and universally, and then it belongs to everything contained under it; in another way, that it cannot belong to something else unless that term belongs to it, and that whatever else is indicated, it can belong to the former without belonging to this other one. For instance, it is impossible for a certain individual to be a doctor unless a man be a doctor; yet if we point to anyone else, it is possible for a man to be a doctor without this particular man being a doctor. And in this sense it is not necessary that it belong to everything contained under it.

Fifthly, it must be understood that although 'to be a doctor' may be a proprium of man in the first way, still, 'to be able to be a doctor' is not a proprium of man in the first but in the fourth way; just as although 'to laugh' is a proprium of man in the first way and not in the fourth, nevertheless, 'to be able to laugh,' which is equivalent to 'to be risible,' is a proprium in the fourth way. For this is a contingent proposition: 'Every † man laughs'; whereas this one is necessary: 'Every man can laugh or is risible.' Nevertheless, there is a certain difference between 'to laugh' and 'to be a doctor'; for 'to laugh' can apply to a man as he is, whereas in the natural course of events 'to be a doctor' cannot apply to a man except through much effort and work.

Sixthly, it must be noted concerning the second way, that what belongs to everything under a species and not to one thing alone is called a proprium in a very improper manner; for, in this way a proprium is not distinguished from a common term but is distinguished from what is wholly by accident and what belongs to something praeternaturally or against its nature. For instance, to have three hands is not a proprium, although as a matter of fact every man could have three hands; rather, the proprium is for him to have two hands — that is, except for some defect of nature or some special cause or happenstance, it belongs to him to have two hands.

Seventhly, it must be noted concerning the third way, that such a proprium belongs to each individual at a determinate time unless it be impeded, as for example it sometimes happens that a man does not grow grey in old age.

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† I here read 'Omnis homo...', instead of 'Omnibus homo...', as Moody has it. Moody does not list this as a variant. This reading not only makes more sense than the one given by Moody, but also parallels that of the next sentence.

Eighthly, it must be noted concerning the fourth way, that just as in the other cases a proprium is not some thing formally inhering in that whose proprium it is, so neither is it thus in this fourth way. Rather, it is a predicable which, in a proposition, stands for everything for which that whose proprium it is, stands.

Ninthly, it must be noted that a proprium used in this sense does not signify something formally inhering in that whose proprium it is when it is predicated of it, as is frequently the case when it is used in the other ways. For if it is true to say that Socrates is a doctor, then 'to be a doctor' denotes medicine formally inhering in Socrates; but this does not hold for 'risible,' for, although it is true to say that every man is risible, still, it does not follow that some thing denoted by 'risible' is in man formally; rather, it suffices that it can be in him. For, it is one and the same thing to say that every man is risible and that every man can laugh. And consequently just as it is not denoted by 'Every man can laugh' that some thing is [actually] in man but it suffices that it can be, because it suffices that he be able to laugh actually; so the same thing holds for 'Every man is risible.'

It follows from this that risibility is not a certain thing formally inhering in man but that it is distinct from man, just as the ability to heat is not some thing formally inhering in heat. Instead, just as 'ability to heat' does not import anything except a heating principle through which heat may arise, so 'risibility' imports nothing except a man who can actually laugh. This can be proved as follows: If the ability to heat is some thing distinct from the heat but inhering in it, then it must be either a substance or an accident. But it is clear that it is not a substance, because a substance does not inhere in an accident. Nor is it an accident; for it is not an absolute [accident], as is obvious since it is clear that it is neither a quality nor a quantity, as can be shown inductively. Nor can it be a relative accident, not only because according to the understanding of the Philosopher it must be said that there is no thing that is not an absolute thing — as is shown in the *Categories* and in *Metaphysics* V — but also because if it were a relation or a relative thing, it would have to have an actual term. But it is manifest that its term is not a genus, nor is that relation or relative thing in act. Next, since from one heat there result in infinity of heatables, it would follow that in one heat there would be an infinity of abilities to heat, and thus in one subject there would be an actual infinity of accidents, which is absurd. Therefore it is clear that the ability to heat is not some thing formally



existing in what is able to heat; and for the same reason, 'risibility' is not some thing formally existing in man, but rather imports a man who is capable of actually laughing.

Tenthly, it must be understood that it follows from the preceding that proper attributes are not certain things that formally inhere in their subjects; rather they are certain predicables [which are predicable] in this fourth way of their respective subject.

Eleventhly, it must be understood that 'proprium,' understood in this fourth way, is not only predicated of the proprium of a species, but, understood in this fourth way, something is also said to be the proprium of a genus. For [in this sense] a genus thus has its proper attributes just as does a species, and the same holds for the other ways [of construing 'proprium']. But the author, in discussing the proprium of a species, intends thereby to talk equally and proportionately about the proprium of a genus and of anything higher.

## Chapter Six

### *Concerning Accident*

#### § I

*An accident is...* In this, the fifth chapter the author deals with 'accident'; and it is divided into two parts. In the first he deals with 'accident'; in the second he writes an epilogue about what has been determined, beginning here: *Therefore with respect to everything...* The first part is divided into two: in the first he gives one description,<sup>1</sup> in the second he posits two others, beginning here: *Moreover, they define...* The first is divided into three sections: In the first he posits one definition, in the second one division, in the third he meets an objection. Therefore in describing 'accident' he says that an accident is what belongs to a subject and does not belong to it without the latter being destroyed.

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<sup>1</sup> Ockham characterizes the difference between definition and description as follows: "A description is a statement composed of accidents and propria of the composite... (Therefore) it must be understood that in a description nothing must be posited which is predicated *in quid* or in the first mode of *per se* predication of what is prescribed; and in this, a description differs from a definition." (*Summa Logicae* I: c. xxvii ll. 1 ff.)

Here we must first see what it is that is here being described, namely whether it is a first or a second intention. And it must be said that the description, understood in different ways, can apply to either of the two. Concerning this it must be understood that 'accident' is understood in two ways: In one way, as something real that really inheres in something else as though formally inhering in a subject, as for instance whiteness and blackness and heat and things of this sort do; and 'accident' is more commonly understood in this way. In another way, something is called an accident if it is contingently predicable of something else. If 'accident' is understood in the first way, the preceding description should be understood thus: *An accident is what belongs to something* by really inhering in it, and *does not belong to it* — that is, the thing which first inhered in it can be taken away — *without the subject being destroyed* — that is, the thing in which it first inhered remaining in existence. So, for example, whiteness first really inheres in a wall and afterwards this whiteness can be removed, the wall remaining in existence and not being destroyed, because this wall can be made black or at least not white. And it must be understood that 'subject' is here <sup>2</sup> understood as standing for something which is not informed by something else as by a substantial form, because a substantial form first informs the matter and afterwards does not inform the very same matter, that matter nevertheless remaining in existence and not being destroyed.<sup>3</sup>

However, if 'accident' is understood in the second way, then the description should be understood thus: *An accident is what belongs to something* — that is, what is predicated of something — *and does not belong to it* — that is, can be denied truly of that same thing — *without the subject being destroyed* — that is, without destruction of that of which it was first predicated. And in this sense, to produce a worm or to illuminate the intervening air is an accident of the sun, because first it happens to be true to say that the sun is producing a worm and that it is illuminating the intervening air, and

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<sup>2</sup> I.e., in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> That is to say, the difference between an accidental and a substantial form is this: Whereas a loss or change of accidental form can occur without a concomitant loss of numerical identity of the thing or its identity as a member of the species to which the thing belongs, a similar loss of or change in a substantial form does entail a loss of numerical identity and of membership in the species. Only the same matter remains.

afterwards it happens to be true to say that the sun is not producing a worm and that it is not illuminating the intervening air, the sun nevertheless remaining in existence and not being destroyed. And yet nothing of the sun nor anything in the sun is destroyed by the fact that the sun is not producing or is not illuminating, nor is any real thing formally existing in the sun acquired by the fact that the sun is shining or producing; for then no created agent could act without being changed, which is absurd. And so in this context, 'to belong to' and 'not to belong to' are understood as 'to be affirmed of' and 'to be denied of' [respectively].<sup>4</sup>

## § 2

*Moreover, it is divided...* He here sets forth one division [of 'accident'] which is that some accidents are separable, others inseparable. A separable accident is something like the sleep belonging to an animal; an inseparable accident is something like the blackness in a raven and in an Aethiopian.

It must here be understood that 'accident' whether it be understood in the one way or the other can be divided thus.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, 'accident' being understood in the second way, what is called a separable accident is something which can be predicated truly and be denied truly of one and the same subject, the subject remaining in existence; and what is called an inseparable accident is something which cannot first be affirmed truly and afterwards be denied truly of it the subject remaining in existence.<sup>6</sup>

## § 3

*Moreover, it can also be thought...* He here meets an objection: For someone might say that this division contradicts the definition given previously. For, every accident belongs to and does not belong to a subject without the latter being destroyed; but every accident of that sort is separable, therefore every accident is separable and consequently none is inseparable. He replies to this, saying that

■ Cf. Chapter Five, note 3 above p. 333.

■ I.e., whether 'accidental' is understood as a first intention or as a second intention, the division between separable and inseparable accidents can still be drawn.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxv.

although a raven could not be white, it can nevertheless be conceived (thought) to be white; similarly concerning the Aethiopian who can be conceived to be white without the destruction of the subject, even though he could not be white. Consequently it is an accident, and yet it is inseparable.

It must be understood that there is a difference between 'proprium' predicated in the fourth way and an inseparable accident, whether 'inseparable accident' be understood in the one way or the other.<sup>7</sup> Because whatever a proprium is predicated of, it is predicated of it necessarily in such a way that the thing being posited, the proprium necessarily belongs to it. So for example, 'If this is a man, it is risible' is a necessary consequence, and so is 'If this [thing] is risible, it is a man,' anything risible having been pointed to. Moreover, although according to the opinion of the philosophers it may be impossible that some determinate thing being pointed to, it be the same thing and yet such an accident not belong to it, still there is some other thing to which the accident belongs wholly contingently. For example, although according to the opinion of the philosophers it is not possible that there be a raven and it not be black, still, it is possible for something else to be first black and afterwards not black. And in the one case the accident is an inseparable accident, and in the other it is a separable accident, as for instance blackness is a separable accident in an ox and an inseparable accident in a raven.

But this does not seem to save the opinion of the author, because not every accident would be present in and absent from a subject without the latter's destruction. Likewise, what he says — that a raven can be conceived of as white — seems to be irrelevant to this issue, for in that way man can be conceived of as non-risible, and consequently risible will be an inseparable accident. And this is confirmed, because if it can be conceived that a raven is white — whether it be conceived of by a true understanding (and this is impossible, because then a raven could be white) or by a false understanding — then by such an understanding man can be conceived of as being non-risible.

It must be said to the first of these that every accident may belong to and cease to belong to a subject without the latter being destroyed; but it does not follow from this that it is possible that it

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<sup>7</sup> See note 5 above.



be present in and absent from this subject without the latter's destruction.<sup>8</sup> Rather, this is a fallacy of the consequent, committed by arguing from a higher to a lower<sup>9</sup> without distribution.

And if it is said that the blackness in this raven cannot belong to and cease to belong to<sup>10</sup> it without this subject being destroyed because it cannot be in another subject, [and that] therefore not every accident can belong to and cease to belong to,<sup>11</sup> etc. — [then] it must be said that it is not the opinion of the author that every accident taken particularly can belong to something and cease to belong to something without the subject being destroyed, because according to the opinion of the philosophers the light of the sun and many other accidents of the higher bodies cannot fail to belong to them. Rather, it is his opinion that of whatever species [of accident] this whole phrase 'to belong to and not belong to a subject without the latter's destruction' is predicated and of whatever higher (more general), it (the accident) is not predicated as standing for itself but as standing for some particular; and this suffices, because thereby it is distinguished from a proprium.

As to the second, it must be said that when the author says that a raven may be conceived of as white, he means that it is not of the nature of whiteness that it could be in anything in which there is blackness, but that the fact that it could not be in a raven is grounded in the nature of the cause producing or conserving a raven, which latter cause, whether it be something intrinsic to the raven or extrinsic to it, is naturally a cause of blackness and not of whiteness. But it is not thus with a proprium and its opposite; for it is repugnant to non-risibility itself to be in many or indeed all things that are risible or of which 'risible' is predicated, so that nothing that remains the same thing can first be risible and afterwards non-risible, in the way that something can first be white and afterwards not be white, or black while remaining the same thing.

In corroboration of this I say that a raven can be conceived of as being white by a true understanding; nevertheless, what must be

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■ That is, although it may hold for accidents that they can belong to some subject and then cease to belong to the subject without the latter being destroyed, it does not follow from this that *this* accident can be present in or absent from *this* subject without the latter's destruction.

<sup>9</sup> That is to say, by arguing from the more to the less general.

<sup>10</sup> Literally: "cannot be present in and absent from it."

<sup>11</sup> Literally: "can be present in and absent from..."

understood by this is all of the following: namely that it can be conceived of by a true understanding that it is not because of the nature of whiteness that it is impossible for a raven to be white, but that this is so for another reason. However, it is not thus in the case of risible and non-risible.

#### § 4

*Moreover, it is also defined...* He here states two definitions of 'accident,' one of which is that an accident is what happens to be in a thing and not to be in it. The other definition is, that an accident is what is neither a genus nor a species nor a differentia nor a proprium, but is nevertheless something subsisting in a subject.

Concerning the first of these definitions,<sup>12</sup> it must be understood that this description does not seem to differ much from the first,<sup>13</sup> except that it seems to be as it were completive and expressive of the first. For the first merely says that an accident belongs to and does not belong to [a subject] without destruction of the latter. Now, however,<sup>14</sup> it is to the effect that it is not necessary that an accident first be in a subject and afterwards not be in it without the destruction of the subject, but that it suffices that this be possible and that it is not contrary to an accident that it first be in a subject and afterwards not without destruction of the subject. And this is expressed better by the description in which it is said that an accident is what may be and not be in one and the same thing. Secondly, it must be understood that this description can fit 'accident' said in either way, as is obvious, and that it must be understood in the same way.

Concerning the second description, it must be understood that it only applies to 'accident' said in the second way. The reason for this is that the author here intends to talk mainly about the predicables that a logician uses, and consequently is talking mainly about these, and because of this he here intends to describe one predicable that is distinct from the others. And consequently, when the author says that an accident always subsists in a subject, 'to subsist [in]' must be understood as 'to be predicated [of]': namely, that an accident is predicable of a subject. For if it is not assumed that he is only talking about common predicables, it follows from

<sup>12</sup> In this section.

<sup>13</sup> I.e., from the first definition of 'accident,'.

<sup>14</sup> I.e., "The present description, however...".

this description that matter would be an accident, for it is neither a genus nor a species nor a differentia nor a proprium, and it is certain that it subsists in a whole, and much more truly so than any accident. The opinion of the author therefore is this: that everything that is predicable of many but which is neither a genus nor a species nor a differentia nor a proprium, and is not predicated of all things but is predicated of some and not of others, that every such thing is an accident; that is, is contingently predicable.

## § 5

*Therefore with respect to all...* Continuing, he here restates the things to be discussed, [saying] that after we have talked about genus and about species and differentia and proprium and accident, we must list the things that are common to them as well as those that are proper.

It must be understood that neither here nor in any other place of this book is it found that the author says that he wants to talk about the preceding five as about five universals; and therefore, when he talks about proprium or accident, he is not always talking about something that is one of the five universals. Rather, his discussion is mainly concerned with five equivocal words; for, as is inductively obvious, 'genus' is an equivocal [word], as is 'species,' and likewise with the others; and some of their significations coincide, as has previously been stated. Nevertheless, because it is commonly held that there are five universals, we must take a look at their number and see whether they are sufficient.<sup>15</sup> And the sufficiency of three — namely of genus, species and differentia — must be admitted, as has been said in the prologue. But as to proprium and accident, one may speak otherwise, for a predicable that imports something extrinsic is either proper to the individuals of one species and then is called a proprium, or it is common to many individuals of diverse species and then it is called an accident, whether it be predicated contingently or necessarily. And the author frequently talks about proprium in this way below. And thus it is clear that the number and sufficiency of the five universals can be understood in two ways. But in the one interpretation, different members are posited than in the other;

<sup>15</sup> Literally: "and their sufficiency."

and the reason for this difference in assignment is nothing other than the equivocal nature of these names, to wit of 'proprium' and 'accident'.

## Chapter Seven

### *Concerning the Characteristics Common to All Five Universals*

#### § I

*However, it is common to all...* After the author has first talked about the preceding five predicables, in this part he intends to determine which properties they have in common and which are unique or proper to the one or other of them; and [his discussion] is divided into two parts. In the first he indicates one property that is common to all; in the second, he talks about them <sup>1</sup> with respect to the properties that are proper and that are common to some of them, [beginning] here: "moreover, it is common to genus and differentia...".

Accordingly he says in the first part that this predicate, namely 'to be predicated of many,' is common to all of the aforesaid predicables. Nevertheless, it does not belong to all of them to be predicated of the same plurality. For, a genus is predicated of species and of individuals, and similarly a differentia; a species, however, is predicated of individuals, and a proprium is predicated of individuals, and an accident is predicated of species as well as of individuals. He explains this by means of an example: 'Animal,' which is a genus, is predicated of 'horse,' 'ox' and 'dog,' and these are species; it is also predicated of this ox and this horse and similarly of other individual animals. Similarly, 'irrational,' which is a differentia, is predicated of horses and oxen and other particular irrational animals. But a species, such as 'man,' is predicated only of individuals. Similarly, a proprium, such as 'risible,' is predicated of 'man,' which is a species, as well as of particular men, who are individuals. An accident, likewise, is predicated of a species for it is clear concerning an inseparable accident, e.g. of 'black,' that it is predicated of the species of raven as well as of individual [ravens]

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<sup>1</sup> I.e., the preceding five predicables.



and of other individuals.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, 'to be moved,' which is a separable accident, is predicated of 'man' as well as 'horse,' and likewise of particular individuals; nevertheless, it is predicated primarily of the individuals and secondarily of the species which contain the individuals.

Now it must be understood first, that the author here understands 'species' as species specialissima, which latter is a species that is not a genus.<sup>3</sup> And it is only this sort of species that is predicated of individuals, because the other kind of species, to wit a subalternate species,<sup>4</sup> is predicated of both species and individuals.

Secondly, it must be understood that a genus is predicated of a species, yet not as standing for itself but as standing for the individuals; for in the referring act in which it is predicated of the species, the species is not the genus nor does the genus stand for itself and have simple supposition; rather, it stands only for the individuals, and has personal supposition. For example, the genus 'animal' is predicated of the species 'man' by speaking thus: 'Man is an animal'. And here 'man' as well as 'animal' have personal supposition and stand for the individuals and not for themselves; because if they did, the statement would be false. For this is false: 'This species "man" is this genus "animal".'

Thirdly, it is to be noted that when he says that 'animal' is predicated of horses, oxen and dogs, which are species, he does not mean that the horses are a species or that the oxen are a species. Rather, by the fact that he says that 'animal' is predicated of all oxen and horses he means to convey that 'animal' is predicated of the terms that are common to horses and oxen, and that these common terms are the species.<sup>5</sup>

Fourthly, it is to be noted that a species is predicated in a true predication of all the genera that are superior to it. Nor does the author mean to deny this, because it can be clearly proved by means of a conversion that if a genus is predicated of a species, the species is also predicated of the genus. So, for instance, 'Man is an animal, therefore an animal is man' follows logically. But he does want to say that a species is not predicated of a genus in a proper predication

<sup>2</sup> I.e., other individual black things.

<sup>3</sup> Literally: "which is a species such that it is not a genus...".

<sup>4</sup> A subalternate species is one that is a species in one respect — towards what is higher than it — and a genus in another — towards what is lower than it.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Chapter Four, note 21 p. 321.

and with the universal sign; for although 'An animal is a man' is true, 'Every animal is a man' is false. And this must be borne in mind if there are actually many individuals of diverse species.

Fifthly, it has to be understood that not every differentia is predicated of several species, because the differentia of a species specialissima is not thus predicated but is predicated of one species alone, as well as of the individuals of that species. And by the fact that he shows that the differentia of a genus is predicated of the species, it is shown sufficiently that the differentia of a species specialissima is predicated of only one species, seeing that any differentia is convertible with that whose differentia it is.

Sixthly, it must be understood that in giving examples of proprium, either he is talking about the sort of proprium that is distinct from an accident belonging to many individuals of diverse species — and then he understands 'proprium' only in the sense of what is proper to a species and not to a genus — or it can be said that since a proprium understood in the fourth way is convertible with that whose proprium it is, by the fact that he shows that the proprium of a species is predicated of that species and of the individuals of that species, he sufficiently establishes that the proprium of a genus is predicated of all the species of that genus.

Seventhly, it is to be noted that when he says that 'risible' is predicated of man and 'irrational' of horses and oxen, etc., any such statement as well as any others like it is to be distinguished by the fact that the subject can have either simple or personal supposition. If the first, then the subject stands for itself, and then such a proposition is true. Yet in actually predicating ['risible' of man], the subject must have personal supposition; that is, [it must stand] not for itself but for the individuals; whereas in talking about this predication, it can and [indeed] must stand for itself and have simple supposition. However, if the subject were to have personal supposition, any such statement would be false because nothing irrational is predicated of the species, as is inductively clear, for each singular proposition is true, and consequently [so is] the universal, and therefore its contradictory is false.<sup>6</sup> Likewise in 'Risible is a proprium of man,' 'risible' has simple supposition if the proposition is true; and yet in 'Man is risible,' the word 'risible' has personal supposition.

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<sup>6</sup> The sentence has something missing in the original, and as it stands it is incoherent. (Suggestion E. A. Moody).

And ignorance of this distinction is the cause of many errors in logic, and consequently in other real sciences.

Eighthly, it must be understood that the proposition 'Black is an accident' is in no way true if 'accident' is understood as standing for some real thing informing an external thing.<sup>7</sup> But it is true when understood as standing for something that is predicated contingently of something else; and then 'black' does not have personal supposition but simple supposition and stands for itself.<sup>8</sup> For if 'black' does have personal supposition, 'Black is a substance and not an accident' is simply true, just as a white man is a substance and not an aggregate composed of a subject and an accident.

Ninthly, it must be understood that the example about 'to be moved' is adduced only so that those who learn might realize the point. For, to be moved is as inseparable from all supercelestial [bodies] ■ as black is from a raven.

Tenthly, it must be understood that when he finally says that such a separable accident is predicated primarily of individuals and [only] in a secondary sense of those that contain the individuals, I say that 'for something to be predicated primarily of something' can be understood in two ways: *Either*, that such a predicate cannot be verified of anything except of that thing of which the subject is verified — and in this sense a separable accident is not predicated primarily of any subject, for it is predicated neither of a species nor of an individual. *Or*, that it is verified of some subject as standing for itself and is not predicated of any one thing primarily, understanding 'primarily' in the first sense — and in this sense it is predicated primarily of an individual because it is verified as standing for the individual, and is not predicated primarily and adequately of any common species. It is not like this in the case of a subject and a proper attribute; for although a proper attribute is not verified of its subject except as standing for the individual, yet is it predicated adequately of its first [proximate] subject.

<sup>7</sup> That is to say, if 'accident' stands for a property in the world.

<sup>8</sup> I.e., if 'black' stands for a concept in the mind which, being a term, can be predicated.

<sup>9</sup> The planets.

## Chapter Eight

*Concerning the Comparison of Genus to Differentia*

## § I

*Moreover, it is common...* In this part he talks about the common and proper properties [of genus and species] by comparing them with each other. And [this discussion] comes in parts, because first he compares genus to the remaining four [predicables], secondly [he compares] differentia to the remaining ones, beginning here: "Moreover, it is common to genus and to species..."; thirdly, he compares species to the remaining ones, beginning here: "Indeed, species, etc."; fourthly, [he compares] proprium to accident, beginning here: "Therefore it remains...". The first part is divided into four sections, in keeping with the fact that he compares four things to genus. The first part is divided into two: In the first he states four common properties of genus and differentia; secondly, he states the properties by which they differ, beginning here: "However, it is proper to genus...". In the first part he states the first property common to genus and differentia, which is that genus as well as differentia contains species, although a differentia does not contain all the species that the genus contains. For example, 'rational' is a differentia and 'animal' is a genus; and although 'rational' may not contain all the species that 'animal' contains, seeing that it does not contain the irrational animals, still, it does contain some species, to wit 'man' and 'God,' which species 'animal' also contains.

It must here be understood first, that the author here understands 'to contain' as 'to be more common'; wherefore, since the genus and the differentia are more common and the species is less common, it follows that the genus and the differentia are said to contain the species.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, it must be understood that the author is here talking about a differentia which is divisive of a genus, because that sort of differentia never contains as many species as does the genus of which it is divisive. Yet he does not want to say that every such differentia

<sup>1</sup> I.e., since genus and differentia are predicated of more things than the species, genus and differentia are said to contain the species. Cf. *Franciscan Studies*, 33 (1973), 240 ff. where to contain is spelled out as to be more common, i.e. to be predicated of more things.



would contain species, because the differentia of a species specialissima does not contain any species. Rather, he wants to say that many<sup>2</sup> such differentiae may contain such species.

Thirdly, it is to be noted that in giving the example that 'rational' contains both 'man' and 'God' as species, he was speaking according to the opinion of some people who claimed that demons are animals.

## § 2

*And whatever things are predicated...* In this part he states the second property of 'genus' and 'differentia' that is common to both, which is that just as anything that is predicated as a genus of a genus is predicated as a genus of all the species contained under that genus, so whatever is predicated of a differentia as a differentia is predicated of everything contained under that differentia. For example, 'substance' as well as 'living body' is predicated as a genus of 'animal,' which is a genus, and consequently 'living body' as well as 'substance' are genera with respect to all the species of 'animal' and also with respect to all the individuals of 'animal'. And thus, too, if 'rational' is a differentia, and similarly if 'using reason' is an inferior differentia, then of whatever 'using reason' is predicated as a differentia, of that very thing 'rational' is also predicated as a differentia. And because the passage seems to read contrary to this,<sup>3</sup> to wit that 'using reason' is predicated of 'rational' as a differentia — because the passage goes like this: "And since rational is a differentia, 'using reason' is predicated of it as a differentia; not, however, merely of what is rational, but 'using reason' is also predicated of those things that are subsumed under the species" — therefore this passage must be construed as follows: "And since 'using reason' is a divisive differentia of 'rational':" That is, 'rational' is predicated of the same thing of which 'using reason' is predicated as a differentia. However, that it is rational is predicated not merely of what uses reason, but is also predicated of those species that are under it. For, if the passage is understood as it appears at first glance,<sup>4</sup> it must be said that he states it by way of example. Wherefore it must be

<sup>2</sup> Instead of all.

<sup>3</sup> The Latin idiom here betrays the essentially oral character of teaching in the Middle Ages. Literally it reads, "And because the passage seems to sound contrary...".

<sup>4</sup> An idiom similar to the preceding one occurs at this point in the Latin.

noted that 'rational' does not have an inferior differentia under it if it is a constitutive differentia of 'man,' such that this differentia which divides 'animal' does not have an inferior differentia under it.

It also has to be understood that it is not improper for a differentia to be divided into differentiae when the superior differentia has an abstract term that is *per se* superior to the abstract terms of the lower differentiae. However, how this is to be understood is explained in *Metaphysics* VII.\*

### § 3

*Moreover, it is common...* He here states the third property common to 'genus' and 'differentia,' which is that just as when the genus is destroyed the species that are under it are destroyed as well, so when a differentia is destroyed, the species that are under it are also destroyed. For just as this follows logically: 'There is no animal, therefore there is neither an ox nor a horse, etc.,' so it also follows in the case of the differentia, for if there is nothing rational, then there is no animal using reason.

It must here be understood first, that the author does not mean this with respect to a destruction which is a corruption or destruction of some real thing. For, since neither a genus nor a species is anything except a certain intention or concept in the mind, it is possible that the intention which is the genus be destroyed in the mind and yet that there remain in the mind that intention which is the species. So for instance the word 'animal,' which is more common, can be destroyed and yet the word 'man' remain. And just as the word 'man' sometimes becomes known (is learned) prior to the word 'animal,' so it is possible that the intention that is the species is in the mind prior to the intention that is the genus; for otherwise no man would understand a species unless he understood all the higher genera. Rather, the author is here talking about a destruction that is a consequence of one negative proposition from another. Wherefore by saying that through the destruction of a genus the species that are under it are destroyed as well, he does not mean anything except that upon the denial of a genus having personal supposition there follows a denial of the species having the same supposition. So, for instance, 'A is not an animal, therefore A is neither a man nor a

\* Arist., *Metaph.* VII, 12 (1037<sup>b</sup> 28-1038<sup>a</sup> 35).

donkey' follows logically, and similarly concerning the other species [of 'animal']. And just as in words the following inference is valid: 'A stone is not an animal, therefore a stone is not a man' and yet the following one is invalid: 'The word "animal" does not exist, therefore the word "man" does not exist,' so it is with respect to concepts as it is with respect to words.<sup>5</sup>

Secondly, it must be noted that 'rational' does not have differentiae under it. Rather, what he says concerning 'rational' he says by way of example and not because matters stand thus.

#### § 4

*However, it is proper to genus...* In this part he states certain properties by which 'genus' and 'differentia' differ; and there are six [of them]. The first is that a genus is predicated of more things than [is] a differentia; and not merely this: indeed, of more than are a species or an accident. For example, 'animal' is predicated of 'horse' and 'man' as well as of many other species of 'animal', whether these be four-footed or not. 'Four-footed,' however, which is a differentia, is not predicated of anything except animals having four feet, and thus is not predicated of everything of which 'animal' is predicated. And it is similarly obvious concerning a species and an accident, that they are always predicated of fewer than is a genus.

#### § 5

*It is necessary...* He here replies to a tacit objection: For, someone could say that some differentia is predicated of more things than is some genus, as for instance 'corporeal' is predicated of more things than is 'animal.' He therefore replies and says that the previously stated difference [between 'genus' and 'differentia'] must be understood as concerning a genus and its divisive differentiae, because such a genus is predicated of more than is its differentia; [it must] not, however, [be understood] as being about a genus and its defining differentia. For example, 'animal' is divided by 'rational' and 'irrational,' and consequently is predicated of more than either of these. But it is defined by 'living sensitive substance,' and consequently is not predicated of more than is 'sensitive.'

<sup>5</sup> On the relationship between concepts and words, see *Summa Logicae* I: c. i and iii.

Here it has to be understood that although some differentia is predicated of many and some genus is predicated of fewer, still, some genus is predicated of more than is some differentia, because no differentia is predicated of everything of which the most general genus is predicated.

Similarly, it must be noted that sometimes a genus is predicated of more things than is an accident, and that some genus is predicated of more things than is any name denoting accidents of diverse natures. And this suffices for the intention of the author.

Similarly, it has to be understood that when he says that the differentiae contain the substance of a genus, he does not mean that a differentia is of the essence of a genus but rather means that the differentiae are stated in the definition of the genus, which definition imports explicitly the substance of what is imported implicitly by the genus.

## § 6

*Furthermore, the genus...* He here states the second property of 'genus,' which is that a genus contains the differentia potentially; so, for instance, some animal is rational, some irrational.<sup>6</sup>

As has been said before, it must be noted that the genus does not contain the differentia potentially as a subjective or effective principle nor in any sense of cause properly so called, but like a common term predicable of each differentia taken universally, and not conversely. And this is what he says, namely that some animal is rational, some irrational, but not every animal;<sup>7</sup> but [that] everything — adding 'rational' — is an animal, as is everything irrational. In the same way, the genus contains the species potentially, and thus to contain them potentially is here nothing else than to be in more things and to be more common.<sup>8</sup>

## § 7

*Furthermore, genera are indeed...* In this part he states the third property proper (peculiar) to 'genus,' which is that the genera are

<sup>6</sup> That is to say, the one kind is that of rational animal, the other of irrational animal.

<sup>7</sup> The point is that some animal is rational, some irrational, but that this holds only with an existential and not a universal quantifier governing 'animal'.

<sup>8</sup> On the locutions 'to be in' and 'to be common,' see Chapter Five, note 3 p. 333, and Chapter Seven note 1 above p. 344.



naturally prior to their divisive and inferior differentiae, and consequently that when the genera are removed, the differentiae are done away with as well and not conversely. So, for instance, 'animal' being removed, 'rational' as well as 'irrational' are done away with; but not conversely, for all the divisive differentiae of 'animal' being removed, it can still be understood that something is a sensitive living substance and consequently that it is an animal, because this is the definition of 'animal.'

It must here be noted that the author does not mean that genera are prior to differentiae, as though the differentiae could not exist in any way unless there were genera. Rather, he here calls prior that from which an inference is not convertible. And consequently, since '*A* is rational, therefore *A* is an animal' follows logically and not conversely, therefore this genus 'animal' is prior to this differentia. He understands it in the same way when he says that the genera being removed, the differentiae are also done away with. That is, upon a denial of a genus there follows a denial of whatever differentiae. And this must be understood as holding true if the genus as well as the differentiae have personal supposition. So for instance, '*A* is not an animal, therefore *A* is not rational' follows logically. But if they had simple supposition, the inference would be invalid. So, for instance, 'No differentia is "animal," therefore no differentia is "rational"' does not follow logically.

Secondly, it must be understood that this passage, in which he says that "if all the differentiae were removed, living sensitive substance — which is animal — would still be understandable," can be understood or explained in two ways. In one way, thus: "If all differentiae were removed" — that is, any differentiae being deleted — " 'living sensitive substance' would still be understandable." And this is true, for it is compatible with '*A* is not rational' that *A* is a living sensitive substance; and similarly it is compatible with '*A* is not irrational' that *A* is a living substance, etc. The passage can be explained in another way, by distinguishing concerning the differentiae: that sometimes the constitutive differentiae that are stated in the definition of a genus do not import the things that are imported by the divisive differentiae; and then this definition would be understandable even if all the divisive differentiae were done away with. Sometimes, however, the differentiae stated in the definition of a genus import those things that are imported primarily by the divisive differentiae, and in such a case this is not possible. This

distinction should be discussed in [connection with] *Metaphysics* VII, \* for it would take a long time to clarify it here; and consequently for now we must let the preceding exposition suffice.

## § 8

*Moreover, a genus is indeed...* He here states the fourth property peculiar to 'genus,' which is that a genus is predicated *in quid* whereas a differentia is not; rather, a differentia is predicated *in quale*, as has been said before.

As has been indicated before, it must here be noted that the reason why a genus is predicated *in quid* and a differentia is not, is this: A genus imports the whole thing and not one part more than another, and is therefore predicated *in quid*; a differentia, however, primarily imports only a part, in the way in which a concrete accidental term primarily imports the accident, and consequently it is predicated *in quale* and not *in quid*.

## § 9

*Further, a genus is indeed...* He here states the fifth property, which is that from the point of view of a species there is one genus whereas there are diverse differentiae. So for instance, with respect to the species, there is one genus of 'man' — which is 'animal' — but of that very man or of that very species there are many differentiae, such as 'rational' and 'mortal' and 'teachable,' which are all differentiae of 'man' by which he differs from the other animals.

It must here be understood that one species does not differ from others by differentiae as though by something intrinsic to it, but merely by some things that are the middle terms for inferring a negative statement in which the species is denied of another and conversely, as has been shown above.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, it has to be noted that there are many genera of one and the same species, as for instance of 'man' there is 'animal' and likewise 'substance.' Nor does the author mean to deny this. Rather, he means to say that of one species there are many differentiae that are not posited subalternately [with respect to it]. So, for instance,

■ Arist., *Metaph.* VII, 12 (1037<sup>b</sup>28 – 1038<sup>a</sup>35).

■ Cf. pp. 329 ff. above.

according to the opinion of those who say that 'mortal' is a differentia of 'man,' the differentiae 'rational' and 'mortal' are not differentiae that are posited subalternately, because in their opinion not everything rational is mortal. For according to them, God is rational and yet he is not mortal, nor is even everything mortal rational, but there are not many genera of one species having such differentiae that are not posited subalternately. And this is said with respect to the genera known to us, although according to the opinion of the Philosopher in the *Topics*,\* in the case of some species not having differentiae there are genera that are not posited subalternately with respect to it.

## § 10

*And in fact, genus...* He here states the sixth property, which is that genus is similar to matter, but that differentia is not similar to matter but to form.

It must here be understood that he is not saying that the genus is the matter or that it imports the matter, but that it is similar to matter. And this must be understood thus: that just as in a composite, the matter is prior to the form and the form advenes to it, so in a definition the genus is prior to the differentia, and the genus being stated, the differentia advenes to it. And therefore, just as in a composite the form is not the matter nor is intrinsic to the matter but is intrinsic to the whole composite, so in a definition the differentia neither is the genus nor is intrinsic to the genus, but is intrinsic to the whole definition; however, it is not intrinsic to the species, as has been indicated before.

## § 11

*However, since...* Lastly, he here recapitulates, saying that although there are some things that are common to 'genus' and 'differentia' over and above those stated, and similarly although there are some things that are proper to 'genus' and others that are proper to 'differentia' over and above those that have been stated, still, this must suffice.

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\* Arist., *Topics* VI, 6 (144<sup>b</sup> 12-30).

## Chapter Nine

*Concerning the Comparison of Genus to Species*

## § 1

*However, it is common to both genus and species...* The author, after having compared 'genus' to 'differentia,' in this part compares 'genus' to 'species,' and his discussion is divided into two parts. In the first part he states the properties that are common to both 'genus' and 'species'; secondly he states the properties that are not common, beginning here: "However, they differ..." The first common aspect is that both a genus and a species are predicated of many, as has been said.

It has to be understood that although according to the opinion of the philosophers some species cannot be predicated of many, neither actually nor potentially — for that potency which cannot be reduced to act is not a potency — still, in most cases a species is predicated of many. And in general, every species that is common to something generable and corruptible — which things are better known to us and about which the author talks frequently, following the opinion of the Philosopher — is predicated of many taken either all at once or successively. Nevertheless, according to the truth of the matter, any species whatever is predicable of many, because on this point the philosophers have erred. Moreover, he<sup>1</sup> here appends that he is talking not only about the species that is a genus as well as a species, but also about the species that is a species but not a genus.

## § 2

*Moreover, it is common...* He here states the second common property, which is that a genus as well as a species are prior to that of which they are predicated.

'Prior' must here be understood not in the sense of being but in the sense of logical priority, because neither the being of the species nor the being of the genus is necessary for the being of the individuals.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, an inference from an individual<sup>3</sup> to a species

<sup>1</sup> I.e., the author.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Chapter Three, § 15, *Franciscan Studies*, 33 (1973), 251-253.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. loc. cit.



having personal supposition — and similarly to a genus [having personal supposition] — is valid; but not conversely.

### § 3

*...and each is a certain whole...* He states the third common property, which is that a genus as well as a species is a certain whole with respect to those of which they are predicated.

As has been said before, it must be understood that what is here called 'whole' is what is more common to more and imports more, and that 'part' is understood as what is less common, where neither of these, however, is of the essence of the other.

### § 4

*However, species differs...* In this part he states the properties by which a genus differs from a species, the first of which is that a species is contained by the genus and does not itself contain the genus. He proves this property by saying that what is in more things than something else contains the latter; but a genus is in more things than is a species; therefore, etc. He proves the minor by the fact that genera precede species, and similarly that the genera informed by specific differentiae change <sup>4</sup> into those species and perfect the species, and therefore are in more things than are the species.

Here it must be understood that a genus does not contain a species except in the sense that it is more common than the species and imports everything imported by the species, and more. Secondly, it must be understood that he states explicitly that a species does not contain a genus, obviously suggesting by this that genera are not of the essence of species nor are parts of species, although they may be parts of the definition of some species.

Thirdly, it must be understood that when he says that a genus is in more things than is a species, he understands 'to be in' as 'to be predicated of'; because a genus is predicated of more things, nor is it in them otherwise than in their definitions.

Fourthly, it must be understood that genera do not precede species as parts thereof, but precede the differentiae in the definitions of the species; and this is all that he intends. For, from the fact that

<sup>4</sup> Literally: "pass over into."

the genus is stated first in the definition of a species and then the differentia, it follows that the genus is predicated of more than is the species. So, for example, from the fact that 'animal' is stated first in the definition of 'man' and likewise in the definition of 'donkey' and in the definition of 'ox', it follows that 'animal' is predicated of more things than is 'man' or 'donkey' or 'ox'; because necessarily, each part of a definition is always predicated of what is being defined.

Similarly, when he says that the genera informed by specific differentiae change into species, it must be understood that the genera are not informed by the specific differentiae except in the sense that the genus is stated first in the definition and afterwards the differentia is added to it, as form is added to matter. Nor do they change into species except in the sense that the whole definition composed of genus and differentia is convertible with the species. And similarly, what he says about genera perfecting species he merely means in the sense that the genera together with the differentiae define the species and express distinctly the essence of what is imported by the species. And consequently 'to precede,' 'to be in,' 'to (in)form,' 'to change into,' 'to perfect' and other expressions of this sort are understood equivocally in logic and the other real sciences.<sup>5</sup>

## § 5

*Whence genera are naturally prior...* From the preceding differences he deduces two further ones. The first is, that genera are naturally prior to species; the second, that the genera being destroyed, the species are also destroyed but not conversely.

Here it must be understood that he understands 'prior' in the sense of more common, because an inference from these <sup>6</sup> is not convertible. Secondly, as has been said before, it must be understood that the genera being annihilated, the species are destroyed as well but not conversely; because upon the denial of a genus there follows the denial of the species, but not conversely; and it <sup>7</sup> is a valid inference but not conversely, because 'A is not an animal, therefore A is not a man' follows logically, and not conversely.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Chapter Five, note 3 above p. 333.

<sup>6</sup> I.e., from the terms that are more common.

<sup>7</sup> The inference from the denial of the genus to that of the species.

## § 6

*For when there is a species...* He here states another property and difference, which is that if there is a species, it follows that there is a genus but not conversely.

It must be understood that it is not necessary that whenever there is a species there is a genus, because since these are nothing but intentions in the mind, it is possible that although the intention that is the genus is not in the mind, the intention that is the species is in the mind.<sup>8</sup> Rather, he means that arguing from a proposition in which 'being' or something else is predicated of a species to a proposition in which that same predicate is predicated of a genus constitutes a valid inference, but not conversely. So for instance, 'There is a man or a man runs, therefore there is an animal or an animal runs' follows logically, but not conversely. And it must be understood that all such rules must be understood to hold only if the terms have personal and not confused and distributive supposition. For if the terms have simple supposition, the inference is invalid. So for instance, '“Man” is a species, therefore “animal” is a species' does not follow logically. Likewise, if they have confused and distributive supposition, it is not necessarily a valid inference. So, for instance, 'Every man runs, therefore every animal runs' does not follow, although its converse does.

## § 7

*And genera...* He here states the third difference, which is that genera are predicated univocally of species, and not conversely.

It must be understood that genera are predicated of species taken in a universal manner and not conversely, although they may be predicated of them taken in a particular manner.<sup>9</sup>

## § 8

*Moreover, genera do indeed...* He states the fourth difference, which is that genera contain the contents of the species that are

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Chapter Eight, § 3 above p. 350 f.

<sup>9</sup> That is, genera may be predicated of species in universal propositions and not the other way around; they may also be predicated of the latter in particular propositions.

under them, but that the species do not contain the contents of the species but contain those of the differentiae. And he wants to say that a genus has more species under it than does a species, but that the species does not have under it more species than does the genus but has more differentiae than the genus.

It must here be understood that this is not a difference between any genus whatever and its species, because as has been shown before, some species do not have differentiae.<sup>10</sup> Rather, this is a difference between a genus and a species having differentiae; and frequently the author talks only about the genera and species that have differentiae, and not about the others.

Secondly, it should be known that a species having differentiae has more differentiae in its definition than does a genus. These differentiae, however, are divisive of the genus; but they do not belong to the genus itself as though defining it. And this is what the author means.<sup>11</sup>

## § 9

*Furthermore, a species neither...* He here states the fifth difference, which is that although some genera may be species and some species genera, no species is an ultimate [a most general] genus and no genus is a species specialissima.

## Chapter Ten

### *Concerning the Comparison of Genus to Proprium*

## § 1

*However, it is a common [property] of genus and proprium...* In this part he compares 'genus' to 'proprium'; and first he states the common properties, secondly those that are proper, [beginning] here: "However, they differ..." In the first part he states three common properties. The first is, that the genus as well as the proprium follows logically from the species. So for instance 'If it is a man, it is an animal' follows logically, and similarly 'If it is a man, it is risible.'

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Chapter Four, § 10 (p. 322) above.

<sup>11</sup> I.e., what Ockham thinks Porphyry should have said.



It must be understood that an inference from a species to a genus and to a proprium is always valid if the terms have personal supposition and do not have confused and distributive supposition in the consequent; otherwise, it is invalid.

## § 2

*And equally...* He states the second common property, which is that just as a genus is predicated equally of its species, so a proprium is predicated equally of what is contained under it and whose proprium it is. For just as 'animal' is predicated equally of 'man' and 'horse,' so 'risible' is predicated equally of 'Socrates' and 'Plato,' who are contained under 'man,' of which it ['risible'] is primarily predicated.

## § 3

*Moreover, it is common...* He states the third common property, which is that just as a genus is predicated univocally of its species, so a proprium is predicated univocally of those whose proprium it is.

It should be known that in this whole section he understands 'proprium' in the fourth way stated above,<sup>1</sup> and not in the other ways. Secondly, it should be known that in this last part he understands 'proprium' as what is peculiar to [is the proprium of] one species. Thirdly, it should be known that a proprium is, in a certain way, predicated univocally of whatever it is predicated, yet it is not predicated *in quid*, as is a genus.

## § 4

*However, they do differ...* He here states the properties that are proper and not common, the first of which is that the genus is prior to the proprium and the proprium is posterior. For first is 'animal,' and then it is divided by differentiae and propria.

It must be understood first, that he is here talking about the proprium of some species contained under a genus, and in such a case the genus is prior to that proprium because it is more common; for the genus is predicated of other species, but not so that proprium.

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<sup>1</sup> I.e., as what is convertible with that whose proprium it is; cf. Chapter Five, § 1 above p. 332.

Secondly, it must be understood that a genus is sometimes divided by the propria of its species, as for instance 'animal' can be divided by 'capable of learning' and 'incapable of learning.'

Thirdly, it must be understood that not every genus is divided by differentiae but only some, namely that genus which has species having differentiae.

### § 5

*Also, a genus...* He states the second difference, which is that every genus is predicated of several species, but that a proprium is not predicated of several species but of one species alone: of the one whose proprium it is. And he is here not talking about proprium in general, but about the proprium of some species.

### § 6

*Also, a proprium is indeed...* He states the third difference, which is that a proprium is predicated convertibly of that whose proprium it is — that is, a proprium is convertible with that whose proprium it is — whereas a genus is not convertible with anything — i.e., it is not predicated convertibly of any species. That is, a genus is not convertible with any species whatever, nor with the proprium of any species. So for instance, 'If *A* is an animal, *A* is a man' does not follow logically, nor does 'If *A* is an animal, *A* is risible'; and therefore 'animal' is not convertible with 'man' nor with 'risible.' But 'There is a man, therefore there is something risible' does follow logically and conversely; and consequently 'man' and 'risible' are convertible.

It should be understood that 'proprium' being understood in the fourth way, this constitutes a real difference, whether the proprium is that of a species or of a genus or whatever. Secondly, it should be understood that an inference from one of the convertibles to the other is always valid if the terms have personal supposition and have the same kind of personal supposition.

### § 7

*Moreover, a proprium...* He states the fourth difference, which is that a proprium is in the species whose proprium it is and in everything contained under it and in it alone, whereas the genus is in the

species and in everything contained in it but not in it alone.<sup>2</sup> And he here understands 'proprium' in the fourth way; similarly, he construes 'to be in' as 'to be predicated of'.

## § 8

*Moreover, species...* He states the fifth difference, which is that the species being destroyed, the genera are not destroyed; but that the propria being destroyed, those things whose propria they are, are destroyed at the same time. Similarly and conversely, those things whose propria they are being destroyed, the propria are destroyed as well. He wants to say that a denial of the genus does not follow upon the denial of the species. So, for instance, 'A donkey is not a man, therefore a donkey is not an animal' does not follow logically. But upon the denial of a proprium there does follow a denial of that whose proprium it is, and conversely. So for instance 'A donkey is not a man, therefore a donkey is not risible' does follow logically, and the converse, 'A donkey is not risible, therefore a donkey is not a man' also follows logically. And this is true if the terms have personal supposition. And consequently he [the author] is not talking about a real destruction but about a destruction which is a logical consequence of two negative propositions.

## Chapter Eleven

### *Concerning the Comparison of Genus to Accident*

## § 1

*But, it is common to both genus and accident...* In this part he compares 'genus' to 'accident'; and first he states one property that is common to them, secondly one that is not common, beginning here: "However, a genus differs...". Therefore first he says that it is common to genera as well as accidents to be predicated of many, and that this is so whether the accident is separable or inseparable. With

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■ I.e., the proprium is predicated of all and only those things of which the species is predicated, whereas the genus is predicated of whatever the species is predicated and more besides.

respect to a separable accident, this is clear because 'to be moved' is predicated of many; it is also clear with respect to an inseparable one, because 'black' is predicated of ravens and Aethiopians and some inanimate things.

It must be understood that he here construes an accident as what is contingently predicable of many and not as an accident existing outside the mind and informing its subject, for such a one is not predicated of many. Wherefore no whiteness is predicated of many; but the common term 'whiteness,' which is not any existing colour,<sup>1</sup> is predicated of many. Similarly, it should be known that there is no such predicable that is predicable of something here below<sup>2</sup> unless it be predicable of something else; and thus it is predicable of many, either all at once or successively.<sup>3</sup>

## § 2

*However, a genus differs...* In this part he states some properties that are proper, and there are four of them. The first is, that a genus precedes a species and is prior to it, whereas an accident is posterior to a species. For even though an accident be construed as inseparable, still, the accident is posterior to that to which it belongs.

It must be understood that a genus is not prior to a species except in the sense of inferential priority<sup>4</sup>, namely that it is something from which an inference is not convertible; and an accident can be prior in this sense. The difference, however, is that there is no such formal inference from a species to an accident as there is from a species to a genus; wherefore in no way can it be thought that the following are true simultaneously: 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is not an animal'. Yet it may very well be true that Socrates is a man and at the same time that he is not white; and thus there is no formal inference from a species to a separable accident, that is, to such a predicable. Similarly, there is a greater opposition between 'A is a raven' and 'A is not an animal' than between 'A is a raven' and 'A is not black'. Likewise, a genus is prior in virtue of a priority that it

<sup>1</sup> I.e., which is not the actual colour white.

<sup>2</sup> That is, in the world below the heavens.

<sup>3</sup> The point here is that any accident like 'whiteness' is, in principle, predicated of many; i.e. of more than one thing. In fact, this is a condition of its being an accident of this sort.

<sup>4</sup> Literally: "priority of consequence."



does not import anything posterior to what is imported by a species; but an accident — i.e. such a predicate — although in a certain way it may be prior, nevertheless sometimes does import something posterior to what is imported by the subject. For example, the predicate 'black' imports blackness, which is absolutely posterior to a raven because it is a true accident of it; and this suffices for the intention of the author. Similarly there is this difference: that every genus is prior by such a priority<sup>5</sup> to every species of which it is predicated, but not every such accident is prior to that of which it is predicated. For example, 'A is a doctor, therefore A is a man' follows logically, but the converse does not follow; and thus 'man' is prior and 'doctor' is posterior in virtue of such a priority.

### § 3

*And the things that participate in genera do indeed...* He here states the second difference, which is that those things that participate in genera participate in them equally, whereas the things that participate in accidents do not thus participate in them equally; and the reason for this is that accidents are susceptible of increase and decrease, whereas genera are not.

It must be understood that some things do not participate in genera except in the sense that the latter are predicated of them, so that 'to be participated in' is frequently the same in logic as 'to be predicated of,' and 'to participate' is the same as 'to be a subject of'; and it is here being understood in that way.<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, it must be understood that he wishes to say that such accidental predicates are predicated according to more and less of those things of which they are being predicated. So, for instance, one thing is more white and another less white. Not so with genera; wherefore it is not said that Socrates is more an animal than is Plato.

Thirdly, it must be understood that this difference does not hold universally, because some such predicate<sup>7</sup> is not predicated according to more and less, any more than are genera and species.

<sup>5</sup> I.e., an inferential priority.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Chapter Five, note 3 above p. 333.

<sup>7</sup> I.e., such accidents.

## § 4

*And in fact accidents...* He states the third difference, which is that accidents subsist in individuals, whereas genera and species do not subsist in individuals but are prior to individual substances.

It must be understood that such predicates do not subsist in individuals any more than words subsist in them. Rather, they<sup>8</sup> merely import certain things that frequently do subsist in individuals, i.e. exist in individual substances.<sup>9</sup> However, genus and species generally do not subsist in individuals nor import things subsisting in individuals, but import those very subsisting things themselves. And this is the author's meaning.

## § 5

*And a genus is indeed...* He states the fourth difference, which is that every genus is predicated *in quid* of all its species and inferiors, whereas an accident is predicated *in quale* or with respect to how [or in what state] something happens to be. So for instance, if someone is asked 'What is an Aethiopian like?', the reply is that he is black; and if someone asks 'In what state is Socrates?' the reply is that he is sitting or walking.

It must be understood that some predicate is said to be predicated *in quale* or *in quid* or with respect to how or when or where, etc. depending on the term by which one replies to the question which is asked using such an interrogative.

## § 6

*How genus differs from the others...* In this part he meets a certain tacit objection of the manner of discussing certain points that remain. For someone might say that just as in the preceding section he<sup>10</sup> has stated four combinations, comparing 'genus' to the other four predicables, so what has to be done afterwards is to compare any one of the remaining predicables to the other four. He meets this objection by saying that although it may have been said how 'genus' differs from the other four and one might compare any one of the latter to the other four in the same way, and that since there are five it would

<sup>8</sup> The predicables, which are terms.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. p. 363 f. above.

<sup>10</sup> Porphyry.

be possible to draw twenty distinctions or combinations — for the comparison of any of the five to the remaining four would produce twenty comparisons — still, this is not what remains to be done afterwards. For, the subsequent comparisons are always one less in number than the preceding ones, and so the second ones are one fewer than the first ones and consequently are only three; and similarly, the third are one less than the second and consequently there will be only two; and the fourth will be one less than the third and consequently there will be only one. And so there will only be ten in all, namely four plus three plus two plus one; and the reason for this is that 'genus' differs from the four, namely from 'differentia,' 'proprium,' 'accident,' and 'species,' and so there are four comparisons. For in comparing 'genus' to 'differentia' and stating the difference between them, the difference between 'differentia' and 'genus' is given as well, and consequently it is not necessary to compare 'differentia' to 'genus' but it suffices to compare it to 'species,' 'proprium' and 'accident'; and so there will here be but three comparisons. Similarly, from the fact that in the first comparisons the difference between 'genus' and 'species' has been given and in the second that between 'differentia' and 'species,' it follows that the difference between 'species' and 'genus' and between 'species' and 'differentia' has already been given, and consequently in the third set of distinctions or comparisons it is unnecessary to compare 'species' to anything except to 'proprium' and 'accident'; and so there will be but two comparisons. And for the very same reason, finally, is it necessary to compare 'proprium' only to 'accident,' because the difference between 'proprium' and the other three has been given before, and likewise the difference between 'accident' and the other three; and so there will only be ten in all. But the first four have been discussed before; now, however, we must talk about the remaining ones.

## Chapter Twelve

### *Concerning the Comparison of Differentia to Species*

#### § 1

*Therefore it is common to differentia...* In this part he compares 'differentia' to the other three, because a discussion of it in comparison to 'genus' was given previously. And first he compares 'dif-

ferentia' to 'species,' secondly to 'proprium,' beginning here: "But differentia...". The first is divided into two parts: in the first he states two common properties, in the second four differences, beginning here: "However, it is peculiar to...". The first common property is this: that species and differentiae are participated in equally by those things of which they are predicated, as for instance particular men participate equally in 'man' and rational,' which latter is the differentia.

It must be understood that he understands 'to be participated in' as 'to be predicated of,'<sup>1</sup> such that neither a differentia nor a species is predicated of anything according to more and less; as for example one does not say that Socrates is more man than is Plato, nor even that he is more rational.<sup>2</sup>

## § 2

*But it is common...* He states the second common property, which is that a differentia as well as a species always belong to those things that participate in them, just as Socrates is always rational and always a man.

It must be understood that although Socrates, if he does not exist, is neither rational nor a man, still, if Socrates does exist, he is necessarily a man as well as rational; and likewise with any other individual man.<sup>3</sup>

## § 3

*However, it is peculiar to differentia...* In this part he states four differences between differentia and species. The first is, that a dif-

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<sup>1</sup> Therefore, strictly speaking, the second last clause in the preceding paragraph should read, "as for instance 'man' and 'rational' are predicated equally of particular men." Cf. p. 362 f. above.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, Socrates may be more rational than Plato in yielding less to his irrational impulses, but for all that he does not have the faculty of rationality — of being a rational animal by nature — more than any other member of his species (and *a fortiori* not more than Plato). All members of the species participate in the differentia to the same degree, otherwise they would not be members of that species; for it is in virtue of participating in this differentia that they belong to the species. Cf. p. 371, § 1 below.

<sup>3</sup> This would suggest that Ockham accepted something very much like P. F. Strawson's analysis of predication of non-existent individuals. Cf. P. F. Strawson, "On Referring," *Mind* LIX (1950).



ferentia is predicated *in quale*, whereas a species is predicated *in quid*. For even if man is understood as a quality, still, it is not a quality *simpliciter* but is that which constitutes the differentiae advening to a genus.

It must be understood that because a differentia primarily imports a part of a thing, therefore it is predicated *in quale* irrespective of whether it denotes the matter of the thing or the form; and consequently it is in terms of it that a question asked by using 'what is it like?' is answered. A species, however, imports the whole thing and consequently is predicated *in quid*, and it is in terms of it that a reply to a question asked by using 'what is it?' is given.<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, it must be understood that the differentiae advening to a genus do not properly constitute the species but do so only in an improper way of talking, because they constitute the definition that is converted with the species;<sup>5</sup> and it is in this way that, in an improper way of talking, they constitute the species.

#### § 4

*Moreover, a differentia is often thought to be in many...* He states the second difference: that often the differentia is in more things — that is, is predicated of more things — than is the species. So, for instance, 'four-footed' is predicated of many things differing in species. But a species is predicated of individuals alone.

It must be understood that not every differentia is predicated of more things than is a species, but only some. Secondly, it must be understood that he is here talking about a species specialissima. Thirdly, it must be understood that it is merely by way of example that he says that four-footed is a differentia of animal.

#### § 5

*Moreover, difference first...* He states the third difference, which is that a differentia is more common than and prior to the species whose differentia it is. So for instance, 'rational' is prior to 'man' because 'rational' being deleted, 'man' is destroyed; but not conversely, because God — who is rational — would remain.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. p. 366, § 5 above.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I: c. xxiii ll. 106-108.

It must be understood that this difference is not common, because one differentia is convertible with the species whose differentia it is, another not. Secondly, it must be understood that what he says about 'rational' — that it is common to both 'man' and God — he says merely by way of example.<sup>6</sup>

## § 6

Moreover, a differentia is in fact... He states the fourth difference, which is that one differentia combined with another differentia, as for instance rational and mortal, make up the substance of man, whereas a species is not thus combined with another species. This is what he says: that one species is not combined with another species so as to give rise to something else; that is, one species does not define another nor is it combined with it. And because it is possible for someone to say that one species does give rise to another, as for instance a horse and a donkey give birth to a mule, he replies to this, saying that although some particular mare may have intercourse with some particular donkey to engender a mule, nevertheless mare *simpliciter* — that is, the species — never comes together with donkey *simpliciter* — that is, with this other species — to engender a mule; that is, these two species are not combined in a definition so as to express the substance of a mule.

It must be understood that two differentiae posited not merely subalternately sometimes are combined together in a definition, but sometimes two that are not subalternate are so as well. Nevertheless, what he says about 'rational' and 'mortal' he states merely by way of example, because according to the truth of the matter, 'mortal' is not an essential differentia of 'man'.<sup>7</sup>

Secondly, it must be understood that what he says about 'ra-

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<sup>6</sup> Presumably, the reason for this is that, as Ockham tells us at *Ordinatio* D II q. ix, "if we take 'univocal' in its strict meaning, nothing real is univocal to God and creatures..." (ed. G. Gál et S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1970, *Opera theologica* – II, 317). Therefore, in a strict sense, 'rational' will not be common. However, if 'univocal' is not taken in this strict sense, 'rational' will be common to both.

<sup>7</sup> Whereas 'rational' is because it signifies man by connoting the intellectual soul, which is identical with the nature signified by 'man'. Obviously, this is not the case with 'mortal'; rather, it is a differentia as understood in the widest sense. Cf. *ibid.*, I: c. xxiii ll. 1–30 et pass.

tional' and 'mortal' combining in the substance of man — thereby suggesting that some differentiae make up the substance of a species or the substance of a thing — ought not to be understood otherwise than that they make up a definition expressing the substance of the thing; and that they also express the parts constituting the substance of the thing. And this is true with respect to non-subalternate differentiae; and this is the way in which authors frequently talk about them. Whence, according to the truth of the matter and according to the literal meaning of the words, no differentia is of the substance of a species or thing, or is an essential and intrinsic part of it. Rather, it is merely a certain intention or concept in the mind, distinct from both the species and the thing yet expressing a part of the thing and standing for the very thing whose essential part it expresses.

## Chapter Thirteen

### *Concerning the Comparison of Differentia to Proprium*

#### § 1

*Indeed, it is common to differentia and proprium...* In this part he compares 'differentia' to 'proprium'; and first states two common properties, secondly he states two differences, beginning here: "Nevertheless, it is common to both proprium...". The first common property is this: that a differentia and a proprium are participated in equally by those which participate in them. So for instance, all rational beings are equally rational and risible beings equally risible.

It must be understood that he here understands 'to be participated in' as 'to be predicated of,' and thinks that the differentia and the proprium are not predicated with the adverbs 'more' and 'less' of the things of which they are predicated. So for instance, it is incorrect to say that Socrates is more rational and Plato less; and similarly with respect to risible.<sup>1</sup>

#### § 2

*And it is common to both...* He states the second property, which is that a differentia as well as a proprium always belongs to each

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 368 above.

thing contained [under the subject term] — that is, it is always predicated of everything contained under it. For although a man may not always be [actually] running, still he is always two-legged and is always able to run; and similarly, although a man may not always be [actually] laughing, still he is always able to laugh.<sup>2</sup>

It must here be understood that what he is here saying about being two-legged he is merely saying by way of example.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, it must be understood that although the differentia and the proprium may always be said of everything contained under the subject, still, the resulting acts are not always said of every such thing.

Thirdly, as before,<sup>4</sup> it has to be understood that a proprium is not some thing existing in a subject, but is merely some predicable that is verifiable of some subject not as standing for itself but as standing for that thing, because it stands for the very same thing for which the subject stands.

### § 3

*Nevertheless, it is peculiar to differentia...* In this part he states two differences between 'proprium' and 'differentia,' the first of which is that a differentia is frequently predicated of many species, as for instance 'rational' is said of both 'man' and 'God'; a proprium, however is predicated of one species alone: of the one whose proprium it is.

It must be understood that not every differentia is predicated of many species, but that some are and others are not,<sup>5</sup> and that in the present context he is talking about the proprium of a species and not about that of a genus.

### § 4

*Also, a differentia is in fact...* He here states the second difference, which is that a differentia is a logical consequence of <sup>6</sup> those whose differentia it is, and that it is not converted with them; that a proprium, however, is predicated convertibly of those whose pro-

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<sup>2</sup> In other words, the capability inherent in the possession of the property referred to by the differentia and the proprium is always there although it need not be actualized. Cf. the following paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> Because 'being two-legged' is not a proper differentia.

<sup>4</sup> Chapter Five, pp. 332-337.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Chapter Four, § 1 pp. 306-310.

<sup>6</sup> I.e., follows logically from.



primum it is. He means to say that some differentia is not convertible with the species whose differentia it is or of which it is predicated, but is more common than and in more things than it, although some differentia may be convertible. A proprium, however, is convertible with the species of which it is predicated. And thus he is talking about a proprium that is a proprium of a species and not about that of a genus.

## Chapter Fourteen

### *Concerning the Comparison of Differentia to Accident*

#### § 1

*However, it is common to differentia and accident...* In this part he compares 'differentia' to 'accident,' and it is divided into two parts. In the first part he states two common properties, and in the second he states some differences, beginning here: "However, they differ...". The first common property is, that a differentia as well as an accident is predicated of many.

It must be understood that he does not here understand an accident as some external thing informing matter or as some external thing, but as a predicable standing for whatever that of which it is being predicated stands.<sup>1</sup>

#### § 2

*But, it is a property that is common...* He states the second property that is common to 'differentia' and 'inseparable accident,' which is that just as the differentia is always in all the things of which it is predicated and to which it belongs, so inseparable accidents are always in — that is, are always predicated of — the things whose inseparable accidents they are. So for instance, 'two-legged' — which is a differentia — is always present in men, that is, is always predicated of men; and similarly, 'black' is always in ravens — that is, it is always predicated of ravens as long as they are ravens.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Literally: "but as a predicate standing for that for which stands that of which it is predicated."

<sup>2</sup> According to Ockham, then, the proper way of expressing this would be to say, "'Being two-legged' is always predicated of men, and 'being black' is always predicated of ravens (as long as they are ravens)."

## § 3

*However, they differ...* He here states three differences between 'differentia' and 'accident,' the first of which is that the differentia contains the species, whereas the accidents in one way contain it, due to the fact that they are in many subjects — that is, are predicated of many subjects — and in another way are contained in it, due to the fact that the subjects are not susceptible of merely one accident but of many.

It must be understood that just as it is possible for some thing to have many accidents from which it can take various accidental predicates, so the very same thing can have many parts from which it can take diverse differentiae; and just as a differentia is sometimes more common than a species and sometimes not, so this can also be the case with respect to an accident. Still, there is a difference, because a differentia contains the species, seeing that it is necessarily predicated of the species taken universally.<sup>3</sup> This does not hold for a separable accident, about which we are here talking; for, such a subject is susceptible of such an accident and of another opposed to the latter, and consequently it<sup>4</sup> is not predicated necessarily of such a species taken universally. And so this species in a certain sense is contained by such an accident, because such an accident is predicated of more things than is such a species and of more than this species; and in a sense it contains it, because not only is this accident predicated of the species but also the other one opposed to it. For example, 'to be a moved' in a sense contains 'man' because it is predicated of more things than is 'man,' to wit of 'donkey' and 'stone'; and in a sense it is contained under it because man not only is moved, but is also at rest. However, it is not thus with respect to a differentia.

## § 4

*Also, a differentia...* He states the second difference, which is that a differentia cannot be augmented or diminished, but that an accident is susceptible of more and less. He means to say that no differentia is predicated according to more and less, but that some accidents — that is, accidental predicables — are predicated with 'more' and 'less'.

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■ In a universally quantified proposition.

■ I.e., the separable accident.

## § 5

*Also, contrary differentiae are unmixed...* He states the third difference, which is that contrary differentiae are unmixed whereas contrary accidents are mixed. It must be understood that contrary accidents are not mixed such that they could [simultaneously] be in one and the same first subject, nor could they produce anything that is one *per se*. Rather, what he here calls a mixture is a predication of things that are the same in species. So for instance Socrates is white and Plato is black, and one part of Socrates is white and another black. However, this is not possible in the case of contrary differentiae.

## § 6

*And things of this sort are common...* He here recapitulates, saying that the things stated previously that are common, as well as the differences, are also differentiae of the others.<sup>5</sup> However, it has already been said how 'species' differs from the rest, to wit, from 'genus' and 'differentia,' to which it was not compared in this part seeing that it has [already] been said how 'genus' and 'differentia' differ from 'species'; and similarly, how 'differentia' differs from 'genus' was stated when it was said how 'genus' differs from 'differentia'.

## Chapter Fifteen

*Concerning the Comparison of Species to Proprium*

## § 1

*However, it is common to both species and proprium...* In this part he compares 'species' to the other remaining predicables; and first he compares it to 'proprium,' secondly to 'accident,' beginning here: "But, it is common to both 'species'..." The first part is divided into two parts: in the first he states the common properties, in the second he states the differences, beginning here: "However, they differ..." The first common property is, that either is predicated convertibly of the other. That is, just as a proprium is predicated

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<sup>5</sup> I.e., of the other predicables.

universally of that whose proprium it is, so also conversely; so that just as every man is risible, everything risible is a man. And 'risible' must be understood insofar as it is the same as 'that which is able to laugh', as has frequently been said before.<sup>1</sup>

## § 2

*For species are equally...* He states the second common property, which is that just as a species is participated in equally by those whose species it is, so a proprium is participated in equally — that is, is predicated equally — by those things of which it is predicated, such that neither is predicated according to more and less.<sup>2</sup>

## § 3

*However, a species differs...* In this part he states four differences between 'proprium' and 'species'. The first is, that a species can be a genus with respect to other species, but that a proprium cannot be a proprium of other species.

It must be understood that this difference can be understood in two ways: In one way, that he is talking about the proprium of a species specialissima and about a subalternate species, and in that case it is an obvious difference. Or it can be understood [as to the effect] that some species, namely a subalternate one, can be a genus to other species such that it is predicable of them immediately and not primarily of something else. But a proprium, although it can be the proprium of diverse species, nevertheless is not predicated of them immediately but is predicated primarily of something that is common to these species. For example, 'animal' is a species, and it is a genus with respect to 'man' and 'donkey' and other animals, and 'animal' is not predicated primarily of anything that is common to these because nothing is primarily common to these except 'animal' and its differentia; and consequently it is predicated of them immediately. But 'able to sense' is a proprium belonging to both 'man' and 'donkey,' as well as to all animals; yet it belongs to none

<sup>1</sup> Ockham here wants to rule out the possibility of interpreting the dispositional property as being necessarily actualized. Cf. Chapter Thirteen § 2 above p. 371 f.

<sup>2</sup> I.e., both terms are predicated without the addition of 'more' or 'less'. Cf. Chapter Fourteen § 4 above p. 374.



of these primarily, because primarily and adequately it belongs to 'animal'.

#### § 4

*Also, a species does indeed...* He states the second difference, which is that the species subsists prior to the proprium and that the proprium is posterior to the species; for it is necessary that man exist in order for him to be risible.

It must not be thought that the species subsist and the proprium arise in it, as for instance Socrates first subsists and then whiteness comes to be in him.<sup>3</sup> Rather, he means that what is imported primarily by the species subsists first before what is imported by the proprium advenes to it. So, for instance, a man exists first before he actually laughs. And consequently in a proposition in which the predication is most properly expressed, first the species is to be stated in the subject-place and afterwards the proprium in the predicate place. And 'to subsist' is thus understood as 'to be in the subject-place,' and 'to come to be in a species' is understood as 'to be predicated of a species.'

#### § 5

*Moreover, a species...* He states the third difference, which is that a species is always in a subject in act, that is, it is always predicated of a subject assertorically; but a proprium is sometimes predicated merely problematically [or in the mode of possibility]. So for instance, Socrates is always actually a man, yet although by nature he is always risible, he is not always actually laughing.

It must be understood that he merely wants to say that while a thing exists, the species is always predicated of it in an assertoric proposition in the present tense. So for instance, while Socrates exists, it is true to say that Socrates is a man. A proprium, however, is not always thus predicated while the thing exists, but rather is predicated by means of a proposition of possibility or a proposition equivalent to a proposition of possibility. So for instance, it is not always true to say while Socrates exists, that he is laughing; but it is true to say that he can laugh or that he is risible — which is the same thing. Thus it is not always true to say while Socrates exists, that

<sup>3</sup> I.e., that there is here a relation of temporal priority.

Socrates is laughing; nor, given that Socrates does not exist, is it true to say that Socrates is not a man <sup>4</sup> as it is true to say that Socrates is not laughing; but, [it is true to say] that he can be a man, just as he can be risible or can laugh.

Nevertheless, it must be understood that a proprium is always predicated in the way in which it is naturally apt to be predicated of the thing while that thing exists.<sup>5</sup>

## § 6

Moreover, of those whose... He here states the fourth difference, which is that 'species' and 'proprium' have different definitions; whence it follows that 'species' and 'proprium' are distinct, for things whose definitions differ are distinct. But 'species' and 'proprium' are of this sort; for the definition of 'species' is this, namely 'to be predicated *in quid* of many numerically diverse things'; and the definition of 'proprium' is this, namely 'to belong to all [members of the species in question] and to the latter alone and all of the time.'<sup>6</sup>

It must be understood that 'species' and 'proprium' are absolutely distinct such that a species is not really a proprium. Yet it cannot be said on the basis of this that 'man' and 'risible' are distinct, unless the terms 'man' and 'risible' have simple and not personal supposition. Whence to argue as follows: "'Man' is a species and 'risible' is a proprium, species and proprium are distinct, therefore man and risible are distinct" is to commit the fallacy of equivocation if the terms in the conclusion have personal supposition, because they have simple supposition in the premises. Because if they had simple supposition in the conclusion, the inference could be granted.

Secondly, it must be understood that these are not definitions properly so called, because they hold only for composite things and not for simple ones.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Chapter Twelve § 2 above p. 368. The point seems to be that 'man' can be affirmed or denied assertorically of Socrates only if the latter exists.

<sup>5</sup> That is to say, a proprium is always predicated in its proper sense. If, as in the case of 'risible,' the property referred to is a dispositional one, it must still be predicated as such.

<sup>6</sup> Literally: "to belong to all and to no others and all of the time."

<sup>7</sup> The definition of 'species' does not hold for species of non-composite things, for these do not differ in the above manner; *mutatis mutandis* for 'proprium'.

## Chapter Sixteen

*Concerning the Comparison of Species to Accident*

## § 1

*But, it is common to both species and accident...* He here compares 'species' to 'accident'; and first he states one common property, secondly some differences, beginning here: "But the propria of either..." Therefore he first says that it is common to both species and accidents to be predicated of many; and that there are few other properties that are common to them; and that therefore there is a very great difference between a species and an accident.

## § 2

*But the propria of either...* In this part he states four differences in virtue of which they differ. The first is, that a species is predicated *in quid* of that of which it is predicated, whereas an accident is predicated *in quale* or with respect to how something is or in some other way. This was discussed when he compared<sup>1</sup> 'accident' to 'genus.'<sup>2</sup>

## § 3

*Also, any substance...* He states the second difference, which is that any substance participates in one species only: that is, only one species (*supplying* 'specialissima') is predicated of one substance; but one substance participates in many accidents, separable as well as inseparable ones. That is, many accidents — separable as well as inseparable ones — are predicated of one and the same substance. So for instance, Socrates is both white and a musician.

## § 4

*Also, a species is really...* He states the third difference, which is that a species is understood prior to its accidents, even though these accidents be inseparable. The reason for this is that a subject always precedes what advenes to it. Similarly, accidents are of a posterior nature and advene to the nature of a subject. A species is therefore understood prior to the nature of an accident.

<sup>1</sup> Literally: "This was discovered where he compares accident to genus."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Chapter Eleven § 5 p. 366.

It must be understood first, that accidents really informing their subjects are posterior to the latter, and that consequently the subject or species is naturally in the subject-place, and that the intention or name importing the accident is naturally apt to be predicated of it. And this is what he means when he says that the species can be understood prior to its accidents. Wherefore such an accidental concept is not first, but it is necessary that another precede it. So for instance, if I said "white," it would be necessary to first think of something that is white.<sup>3</sup>

Secondly, it must be understood that although all accidents — that is, all accidental predicates — are of a posterior kind, they nevertheless do not advene to the nature of a subject in reality and on the part of the thing outside of the mind. Rather, they do so merely by way of predication and that by way of the concrete term and not by way of the abstract one.<sup>4</sup>

## § 5

*But participation in a species...* He states the fourth difference, which is that the participation in a species is the same for all [that participate in it] — that is, a species is predicated equally and not with the addition of 'more' and 'less.' However, it is not universally so with every accident, not even with an inseparable one; for one Aethiopian is more black than another, and the other is less black.<sup>5</sup>

## Chapter Seventeen

### *Concerning the Comparison of Proprium to Accident*

## § 1

*It remains to talk about...* In this part he compares 'proprium' to 'accident'; and first he gives the reason why he compares 'proprium' to 'accident' and not to the others, saying that it remains to talk about 'proprium' and 'accident,' for [since] it has already been said in what way these differ from 'genus,' 'species' and 'differentia,' there remains nothing except to say how they <sup>1</sup> differ from each other.

■ Cf. Chapter Fifteen, note 3, for a related point on the notion of priority.

<sup>4</sup> So, for example, we do not predicate 'whiteness' of Plato, but 'white'.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Chapter Fifteen § 2, p. 376. On the theory of intension and remission of qualities, see H. Shapiro, *Motion*, pp. 83 ff.

<sup>1</sup> I.e., 'proprium' and 'accident'.



## § 2

*Moreover, it is common...* He here compares 'proprium' to 'accident'; and first he states two properties common to them, secondly two differences beginning here: "However, they differ..." The first common property of 'proprium' and 'inseparable accident' is that the things in which a proprium and an inseparable accident are, never exist without them; because, just as a man does not exist unless he is risible, so neither does an Aethiopian exist without blackness.

It must be understood that a proprium and an accident are not really in their subjects in the way in which whiteness is in a wall; rather, they are merely considered to be in them by way of predication — that is, they are predicated of them.

Secondly, it must be understood that the author does not think that a man does not subsist unless his proprium is really in him,<sup>2</sup> but means to say that it is impossible for a man to subsist and yet not be risible; and this is not the case because his proprium subsists, but because man can laugh. This is what he says: "A man does not subsist without being risible"; that is, he does not subsist unless he be really risible. In the same way, an Aethiopian does not subsist unless he is black, because he cannot exist unless blackness is really in him; and consequently he cannot subsist without blackness existing in him. It is not thus with risible, because a man can be risible although nothing denoted by 'risible' is in him. Rather, it suffices that it can be in him, because it suffices that he can actually laugh.<sup>3</sup>

## § 3

*And in whatever way...* He states the second common property, which is that in whatever way a proprium belongs to all, — that is, is predicated universally — in that same way an inseparable accident also [belongs to or is predicated of something].

It must be understood that a proprium and an inseparable accident are not predicated universally in altogether the same way.

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<sup>2</sup> Literally: "is really from the side of the thing."

<sup>3</sup> That is to say, what we should call risibility must be in man, but the property need not be actualized. This property, however, is not a property like being white, but is what we should ordinarily call a dispositional property.

For a proprium is always predicated of everything contained under a certain species, as for instance 'risible' is of every man; not so an inseparable accident, for 'black' is not predicated of every man, but of every Aethiopian.

## § 4

*However, they differ...* In this part he states three differences. The first is, that a proprium is only in the one species whose proprium it is, whereas an accident is in many species. An example of the former is [the fact that] risible is only in man; an example of the second, the way in which 'black' is said of a raven, an Aethiopian and coal, and of many other inanimate things.

It must be understood that he is there talking about a proprium that belongs to only one species.

## § 5

*Wherefore a proprium...* From the preceding, he deduces the second difference, which is that a proprium is predicated conversely of everything whose [proprium] it is — that is, it is convertible with it. It is also predicated equally — that is, not according to more and less. An inseparable accident, however, is not convertible with that whose accident it is; nor is it predicated equally, but according to more and less. This is what he means by 'equal participation' and by 'more and less,' and nothing else.

## § 6

*But there are...* Lastly, he here concludes this part in which he undertook to talk about these things together,<sup>4</sup> saying that besides the preceding common and proper properties of the five predicables stated above, there are certain others: common as well as proper; but that these may suffice for the present.

*University of Victoria  
Victoria, British Columbia*

EIKE-HENNER W. KLUGE

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<sup>4</sup> That is to say, that part of this book in which he compared the five predicables.

## DOES WILLIAM OF OCKHAM HAVE A THEORY OF NATURAL LAW? \*

The question arises because William of Ockham develops a theory of natural law in his political writings while never mentioning natural law in his treatment of ethical and theological topics. Many commentators have noted this disparity, and there has been some speculation about its source. Some claim that Ockham's theory of natural law was merely an *ad hoc* device employed in his political tracts to build a more effective case for his view of Franciscan poverty. Others, giving more weight to the passages in which Ockham mentions natural law, claim that there is a conflict between these passages and certain parts of the ethical theory found in Ockham's *Quodlibeta* and his *Commentary on the Sentences*.<sup>1</sup> This article has two purposes: first, to show that there is no genuine conflict between these two parts of Ockham's writings and, second, to suggest why Ockham may have omitted using the term "natural law" in one group of writings yet introduced it in another.

It should be mentioned that it is plausible to maintain that Ockham introduced natural law as a new notion into his political writings because these writings were a separate enterprise in Ockham's life. Ockham, summoned to the papal court at Avignon to answer charges placed against his opinions expressed in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, soon became involved in a dispute between his own Franciscan order and the papacy on the obligations of the Franciscan vow of poverty. The writings that I have referred to as "polit-

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\* An earlier version of this article was read at the Sixth Conference on Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University.

<sup>1</sup> A summary presentation of this difficulty can be found in Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, III (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1959), 115-116. For an overview of the structure and difficulties of Ockham's ethics, also see Anita Garvens, "Die Grundlagen der Ethik Wilhelms von Ockham," *Franziskanische Studien*, 21 (1934), 243-273, 360-408 and Fr. Lucan Frepert, "The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, St. Bonaventure University, 1966).

ical" are those tracts of Ockham that deal generally with the power of the papacy and with the relation between the papacy and the secular state. This latter question is important because Ockham, in fleeing from Avignon in 1328, received protection from the Emperor, Ludwig of Bavaria, and so added another cause to his political repertoire. It is also interesting to note that in the twenty or so years of his "political" period, Ockham is not known to have returned directly to any of the logical, physical, or general theological topics that occupied his earlier years.<sup>2</sup>

First of all, then, in order to show the fundamental unity of Ockham's thinking, it is necessary to show that there is some element in the earlier treatments of ethical questions which serves the function of natural law. This function is notoriously hard to define; but it has, I believe usefully, been summarized by Professor Lon Fuller: "Its [the theory of natural law's] fundamental tenet is an affirmation of the role of human reason in the design and operation of legal institutions." Such a theory simply asserts that there are principles of social architecture which do not shift with every change in the details of the design toward which they are directed.<sup>3</sup> Now William of Ockham offers a theory of right reason as a source of principles which can direct human action. Brief attention to this theory will suffice to show that it meets Fuller's "most modest" criterion for a theory of natural law.

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, William of Ockham connects right reason with prudence and with practical reason. Prudence consists of the concrete directives of right reason which are derived from experience. An example of such a principle of prudence is: "This person should be calmed with soothing words." Practical reason, on the other hand, consists of the universal directives of right reason, for example, "Every irascible person should be calmed with soothing words."<sup>4</sup> The principles of practical reason are principles of moral science. They are known through themselves (*per se nota*); it is not necessary to think of them as laws promulgated by some authority. Ockham mentions that it is this type of principle that

<sup>2</sup> A summary of recent opinion on the dating of Ockham's works is found in James A. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," *Medieval Studies*, 30 (1968), 164-174.

<sup>3</sup> *The Anatomy of Law* (New York: The New American Library, 1969), p. 181.

<sup>4</sup> Lyon edition (1494-96), III, 11, U-X, and III, 12, H.



provides the basis for the moral philosophy of such non-Christian thinkers as Aristotle.<sup>5</sup>

The position of those who hold that there is a radical split between Ockham's ethical and political writings becomes difficult to maintain when, in his political writings, Ockham holds that there is a connection between natural equity and political rights on the one hand, and right reason on the other.<sup>6</sup> Ockham goes so far as to say, in the *Breviloquium de Potestate Papae*, that any positive law made against natural equity is null and void.<sup>7</sup> In making this claim, Ockham clearly shows the function of natural law in structuring more specific laws according to the general precepts of reason.

Ockham gives his theory of natural law its greatest development in the *Dialogus*. He there distinguishes three modes of natural law.<sup>8</sup> In the first sense natural law consists in conformity to right reason. In the second sense natural law refers to the state of nature or natural equity. Within the state of nature, before the development of an organized state, there is a kind of justice. This notion of natural law was significant in Ockham's dispute with the papacy because it provided grounds for showing that there existed laws independent of and prior to laws established by human institutions. In the third sense natural law consists of the "law of peoples" (*jus gentium*), which I take to mean the legal traditions of a people. We might call it "common law."

Of these three types of natural law, the first is of greatest interest to us here because it seems to have the closest connection with the notion of practical reason developed in Ockham's earlier writings. Unfortunately, it was not of greatest interest to Ockham in the *Dialogus* because it is not the aspect of natural law most relevant to his arguments about the possession and use of property. To better understand this variety of natural law, we must turn to those other parts of Ockham's political works where he discusses natural law in relation to right reason.

<sup>5</sup> *Quodlibeta Septem* (Strasbourg, 1491), II, 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Opus Nonaginta Dierum*, ed. H. Offler et al. in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Politica*, II (Manchester: The University Press, 1963), chap. 65.

<sup>7</sup> Ed. L. Baudry (Paris: J. Vrin, 1937), II, 24 (p. 67).

<sup>8</sup> *Dialogus de Imperio et Pontificia Potestate* (Lyon, 1494-96), part III, tract 2, book 3, chap. 6. For a detailed account of these three types of natural law see W. Kölmel, "Naturrecht bei Wilhelm Ockham," *Franziskanische Studien*, 35 (1953), 55-64.

One of the most important factors in Ockham's ethical theory is the dependence of ethical norms upon the will of God. Granted that these norms are norms of reason, they are none the less dependent upon the divine will for their binding power. The goodness of an act of human will consists precisely in the conformity of that act with the will of God, which will is expressed in right reason.<sup>9</sup> This relationship between God's will and moral norms is central to Ockham's ethics. And this same relationship poses a problem for Ockham's ethical theory when Ockham emphasizes that God is not bound by any strictures beyond himself in setting the standards of rational action which men are to follow.<sup>10</sup> This is the basis for the charge of arbitrariness which is often laid against Ockham's ethical theory.

Arbitrariness, if it is genuinely that, appears to count against the idea that Ockham has a doctrine of natural law. One of the purposes of natural law theory generally is to defend the power of reason against the arbitrariness of positive law. But the natural law, in Ockham's view, does admit of exceptions; only, however, if these exceptions are made by God.<sup>11</sup> Ockham always insists that the natural law, or the principles of right reason, are in the power of God. He claims that every kind of natural law is dependent upon the divine law, and that all natural law can be found, either implicitly or explicitly, in the scriptures.<sup>12</sup> The principles of right reason are also dependent upon the will of God. And in several well known passages Ockham dramatically points out that God could so structure right reason that theft and adultery would be in accord with it.<sup>13</sup> It is even possible for God to will that he not be loved.<sup>14</sup> These examples would seem to indicate that Ockham's moral theory does suffer from that arbitrariness which a theory of natural law is designed to combat.

However, dependence upon the will of God, as Ockham conceives that will, does not necessarily imply arbitrariness. For men to claim

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<sup>9</sup> "Potest dici quod omnis voluntas recta est conformis rationi rectae sed non est semper conformis rationi rectae praeviae quae ostendat causam quare voluntas debet hoc velle; sed eoipso quod voluntas divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est volendum." *Sentences* I, 41, 1, K.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 9, E-F, and *Opus Nonaginta Dierum*, chap. 95, 155-275; also Copleston, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109.

<sup>11</sup> *Dialogus*, III, 1, 2, 24.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 2, 3, 6.

<sup>13</sup> *Sentences* II, 19, o.

<sup>14</sup> *Quodlibet* III, 13.

that the will of God commands some action arbitrarily, they would have to be able to point to some external standard according to which the will of God is bound to operate. But granting the nature of God as creator of all things, it is impossible that there be any such independent standard. If men claim that God is acting in an arbitrary fashion, they are simply imposing the present structure of human reason upon God. Ockham, on the other hand, holds that human reason is dependent upon the will of God. Perhaps if God were to arrange it that adultery were the right thing to do, there would be men to claim that it would be perversely arbitrary and irrational, and therefore impossible, for God to command monogamous marriage.

The point is that neither Ockham nor any other Christian thinker can claim that God is rational because he looks to some independently established model as a guide for the structure of the universe. The Judeo-Christian tradition is clear in its rejection of Plato's Demiurge. For Ockham, the commands of God create the structures of human reason in such a way that to follow reason *is* to follow the divine command.

There is no need, therefore, to posit a vast division between Ockham's political writings and his earlier theory of morality. The difference between them, if I may be pardoned the phrase, seems to be merely nominal. But if the difference is merely nominal, why is there any difference at all? That is, why didn't Ockham express his theory of right reason in the earlier ethical writings in terms of natural law? It is, after all, a departure from the tradition of Scotus and others not to do so. What might be the reasons for such a departure?

In answer to the second question asked at the beginning of this article, there are two important reasons why Ockham might have avoided using the expression "natural law" in his general treatment of morality. The first of these reasons is that the introduction of "natural" considerations raises the philosophical problem of naturalism. This is the problem of the connection between the facts of nature and the prescriptions of morality. The second reason is connected with the possibility of changing the natural law. Some religious thinkers have felt that a theory of natural law inhibits the freedom of God to make moral demands upon men. This theory seems to place limitations on God's actions and to give men a false sense of moral security.

William of Ockham is quite concerned with the problem of nat-

uralism. In his view, freedom is basically freedom from any kind of natural necessity.<sup>15</sup> He defines freedom as: "The power by which I am able indifferently and contingently to posit an effect, so that I am able to cause the effect and not to cause the effect without any change being made in this power."<sup>16</sup> Freedom, or liberty, is fundamentally the freedom from external constraints on the will. The absence of external constraint on the will is of crucial importance to Ockham's view of morality because, as he points out, it is only the action of a free will that is subject to praise or blame.<sup>17</sup> Ockham's emphasis on freedom is designed to protect his theory from naturalism.

Professor R. M. Hare argues that: "What is wrong with naturalist theories is that they leave out prescriptive or commendatory elements in value judgments, by seeking to make them derivable from statements of fact."<sup>18</sup> This is an excellent description of the way in which natural law theory is often understood. In this presentation, for example, a person examines human nature and discovers that one of man's characteristics is that he is rational. If men follow their nature, therefore, they should not act in a way that injures their power of reasoning, for example, by becoming intoxicated.<sup>19</sup> Such reasoning is fallacious according to Hare, and I believe Ockham would agree, because it attempts to discover moral obligations within the facts of nature alone. Hare argues that in every prescriptive argument there must be at least one prescriptive premise.<sup>20</sup> He argues that every moral action must rest, in part, on a distinctively moral decision. Ockham's emphasis on the freedom of the human will indicates that he would agree with Hare's argument.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 16.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* The translation is from Philotheus Boehner, "Ockham's *Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus* and Its Main Problems," in *Collected Articles on Ockham*, ed. E. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1958), p. 426. See also L. Baudry, *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1958), p. 136.

<sup>17</sup> *Sentences* III, 10, H. Ockham has taken this view from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1109<sup>b</sup> 30.

<sup>18</sup> R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 82.

<sup>19</sup> For a critique of this kind of argument from a Thomist point of view, see Germain Grisez, "The First Principles of Practical Reason," *The Natural Law Forum*, 10 (1965), 168 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Hare, *op. cit.*, p. 28.



William of Ockham introduces a distinctly prescriptive element into moral reasoning by connecting human moral reasoning with the commands of God. Now the human will, acting freely, directs itself toward some end. It does so because it chooses to love someone or something either for its own sake or for the sake of someone or something else. The former kind of love Ockham calls the "love of friendship"; and the latter kind he refers to as "concupiscent love." Concupiscent love, love of something as a means to an end, obviously makes sense only in terms of the end itself. That end, as Ockham discusses it, is always *someone* who is loved for his own sake.<sup>21</sup> The moral goodness of human acts consists in their being done out of the love of friendship for God.<sup>22</sup>

Ockham's moral theory is highly personalist, therefore, demanding a personal and free commitment of love to God. This moral theory is not derived from nature but from man's direct relationship with God. This leads us to the second reason why Ockham might have chosen not to use the terminology of natural law in his ethical theory. It seems to have been a general characteristic of nominalist theology to insist that man and God were in direct contact, without any necessary natural intermediaries.

The contention that Medieval nominalism was a primarily religious effort to eliminate unnecessary connecting links between man and God is most forcefully made by Professor Heiko Oberman.<sup>23</sup> A nominalist approach to religious morality would, therefore, seek to eliminate natural law as such an intermediary. Indeed, we find exactly this approach in the work of the contemporary moral theologian Helmut Thielicke. He discusses nature as comprising the qualities of a species, as constituting an invariable substance, and as maintaining its continuity intact even in the face of the powers of sin and grace. He refers to a moral theory grounded in nature as being ontologically grounded and contrasts such a theory with a personalism which sees "all the realities of human life exclusively in terms of the personal relatedness of God and man." The personal relation established between God and man has, in Thielicke's view,

<sup>21</sup> *Sentences* II, 3, C.

<sup>22</sup> Erich Hochstetter collects several of Ockham's texts and arguments on this point in "Viator mundi," *Franziskanische Studien*, 32 (1950), 14-15.

<sup>23</sup> Heiko A. Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance," *Harvard Theological Review*, 53 (1960), 58 and 63.

undergone radical change at various times in human and individual history. Specifically, the Fall and Redemption drastically change this relationship — rather alter it to something entirely different. It is Thielicke's basic contention that religious morality, since it consists precisely in the personal relationship between man and God, cannot find its guidance in man's ontological structure — his nature.<sup>24</sup>

Now William of Ockham's critique of unnecessary ontological structures between man and God and his consequent emphasis on divine and human freedom, does not result in a critique of natural law theory because Ockham conceives of natural law more broadly than does Helmut Thielicke. Ockham recognized that a reified concept of universals and a hidebound legalism are not the same as natural law, at least in its fundamental formulation. Even Thielicke accepts the fact that human reason is essential in the design and operation of human institutions. And Thielicke is every bit as much opposed to emotivism and to absolute situational spontaneity as is any natural law theorist.<sup>25</sup>

What all this shows is that the various conflicts about natural law theories are in desperate need of sorting and analysis. I will only attempt here to mention briefly one area in which this sorting might be fruitfully done. The relation between freedom and reason, both notions essential, it seems to me, in any moral analysis, is in need of clarification.<sup>26</sup> Let me begin by separating off two extremes. On the one hand, those philosophers who take freedom as simply the intellectual recognition of the reasons or causes of our actions have "solved" the problem at the cost of eliminating one of its poles. Freedom has simply disappeared. This Hegelian view, found also in various forms of psychological reductionism, would identify natural law with the laws of nature, laws of scientific necessity. On the other side, those philosophers who deny the role of reason in ethics in favor of absolute situational spontaneity or purely emotional attitudes, have also denied one of the poles of the problem, this time the side of reason. Eliminating these extremes, we are left with a very broad area of agreement on the principle, as Kant put it, that "Pure reason

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<sup>24</sup> *Theological Ethics*, I, *Foundations*, trans. and ed. W. H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 195-220.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 652 ff.

<sup>26</sup> See R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 1-3.

is practical of itself alone, and it gives (to man) a universal law, which we call the moral law." <sup>27</sup>

But let us not be naive about the depth of this agreement, for it is obvious that the notions of practical, reason, universal, and moral which Kant uses are different from those of Ockham or Aquinas, of Thielicke or Fuller. At least, however, we have staked out an area in which the questions can be discussed. And we might be better prepared to avoid the question-begging response to other philosophies that, for example, because they do not share our concept of natural law, they do not have any notion of it at all. Only by a careful analysis of such questions as the relation between reason and will can we clarify the differences among contending philosophies as a way of resolving substantive philosophical issues.

It is in his concept of the relation of intellect and will that the distinctive aspects of Ockham's ethics come to light. Reason, in Ockham's view, is morally subordinate to freedom. Morality does not rest upon the quest for an ultimate end in the light of which particular choices become intelligible. It rather rests upon the initiative of the will in choosing the right end in accord with the will of God. Will, so far as morality is concerned, must take the initiative. This initiative is the essence of Ockham's "voluntarism." Intellect and will are, for Ockham, distinct functions of the human person. When the will acts, one enters into the domain of morality; when it acts according to right reason, precisely because it is right, the act performed is morally good. All these relationships need more developed discussion than is possible in such a short article as this. Some preliminary general conclusions can, however, be drawn.

A theory of natural law, as Fuller defines this term, centers upon the appeal to reason for the solution of moral problems. Ockham's theory of morality certainly depends upon an appeal to reason.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 32.

<sup>28</sup> The importance of right reason in Ockham's moral theory has been exhaustively demonstrated in David W. Clark's article "William of Ockham on Right Reason," *Speculum*, 48 (1973), 13-36. Unfortunately, Clark does not clarify the relation between reason and will which leads him to make such judgments as: "Moral autonomy centers [for Ockham] on the personal and immediate judgment of what is right; ..." p. 17. It seems to me, however, that, in Ockham's view, moral autonomy centers not on the judgment that "a" is the *right* thing to do in these circumstances, but in the free decision to *do* "a." This is a very important distinction which is at the heart of my argument in this last section.

It is by no stretch of the imagination an emotivist theory. It is a conventionalist theory only insofar as God sets the conventions and makes these conventions accessible to human reason. Never denying that God could change these principles of reason which we know, Ockham nowhere holds that they are about to be changed, and he does not depend upon a change of principles to solve the questions of Franciscan poverty and papal power with which he was concerned.

Ockham, to my knowledge, never speculates that God could remove the binding power of natural law or right reason. That is, while God is free to alter the content of natural law, either in general or in some specific case, the very meaning of goodness remains conformity to the will of God. Even if God should command that he be hated, or else that he not be loved, the goodness of a human act would still depend on its relation to the will of God. Beyond those elements of Ockham's theory which are conventional, divinely conventional, there is at least one element that is more than that.

It is, therefore, possible to claim both that Ockham has a theory of natural law and that this theory is compatible with the totality of his ethical theory. Ockham's introduction of the terminology of natural law undoubtedly had its rhetorical purposes. But I do not think it can be shown that this theory is inconsistent with his general approach to moral problems. The whole of his theory demands that reason play a prominent part in making moral decisions, yet does not allow that reason to stifle either the freedom of man or the freedom of God.

*Washington College  
Chestertown, Maryland*

KEVIN McDONNELL



## FRANCIS' ASSISI: ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY, 1175-1225

The history of Assisi in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is almost a microcosm of Italian history during that same period, reflecting a new experimentation with individuality and freedom. This seems to be a direct effect of the titanic struggles within the imperial and papal institutions, for the polarization of authority in the Empire and Church tended to divide loyalties, if not actually induce a sense of anomie. While some people resolved this conflict by unswervingly clinging to Pope or Emperor, or anti-pope or pretender, and while others alternated between the various camps, many sought new alternatives; the communes or city-republics were just such a political attempt at innovation, while heresies such as that of the Cathari or that of the Waldensians were religious attempts. And indeed, these new phenomena were not without their effect on the major institutions; in order to maintain what authority and power they still had, and in an effort to regain what they had lost, secular and religious princes often reacted by confirming these counter-institutions, and in some cases might even have initiated them. It was an age of obvious and sometimes radical change.

Assisi is well-known in the West as the birthplace of one such religious innovator, Giovanni di Bernardone, known to history as "Francis of Assisi." What is not so well-known is the history of the environment from which he came, and all but one of his biographers<sup>1</sup> seem to ignore most of this history. In Francis' lifetime, not only was there war between Assisi and Perugia, but the form of Assisian government was changed, its social structure was radically altered, its territory and sphere of influence were extended, and, as if to symbolize the socioeconomic and political alterations which were taking place, the city itself was physically transformed, with much destruction, renovation, and new construction.

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<sup>1</sup> Arnaldo Fortini, in FNV. See abbreviations, below.

For the convenience of the reader, the abbreviations employed in this study are listed below.

#### ABBREVIATIONS

- AFH. *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*. Florence: Brozzi-Quaracchi, 1908 ff.
- ASI. *Archivio Storico Italiano*. 16 vols. Florence: R. Deputazione di storia patria per la Toscana, 1842-1851.
- ASM. Allshorn, Lionel. *Stupor Mundi: The Life and Times of Frederick II*. London: Martin Secker, 1912.
- BAIS. *Acta Imperii Selecta*. Ed. Johann Frederick Böhmer. Innsbruck: Wagner, 1970.
- BDSPU. *Bollettino della regia deputazione di storia patria per l'Umbria*. Perugia, 1895 ff.
- BOMG. Barraclough, Geoffrey. *The Origins of Modern Germany*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
- CMH. *The Cambridge Medieval History*. 6 vols. 1924, rpt. London: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
- CSA. Cristofani, Antonio. *Delle storie d'Assisi libri sei*, 3rd. ed. Assisi: Tipografico Metastasio, 1902.
- EBI. Elliott-Binns, Leonard. *Innocent III*. 1931, rpt. London: Archon Books, 1968.
- FDG. *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*. 26 vols., orig. publ. Göttingen, 1862-86; rpt. Osnabruck: Otto Zeller, 1968.
- FFRRI. Ficker, Julius. *Forschungen zur Reichs- und Rechtsgeschichte Italiens*. 4 vols. Innsbruck: Wagner, 1868-74.
- FNV. Fortini, Arnaldo. *Nova vita di San Francesco*. 4 vols. Assisi: Tipografia Porziuncola, 1959.
- GHCR. Gregorovius, Ferdinand A. *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*. 8 vols., trans. from 4th German ed. by Annie Hamilton. London: George Bell, 1906.
- HHP. Heywood, William. *A History of Perugia*, ed. R. Langton Douglas. London: Methuen, 1910.
- MAI. Muratori, Ludovico Antonio. *Annali d'Italia dal principio dell'era volgare sino all'anno 1750*. 12 vols., orig. publ. Milan, 1744-49; Monaco: Agostino Olzati, 1761-64.
- MAIMA. Muratori, Ludovico Antonio. *Antiquitates Italicae medii aevi*. Orig. published in 6 vol., Milan, 1738-42; publ. in 17 vols. in *Omnia Opera*, Arretii: Michaelis Bellotti, 1773-80.
- MGH-CC. *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Legum Sectiones Quinque. Sect. IV: Constitutiones etc.*, I (1893). Orig. publ. Hannover, 1893; rpt. New York: Kraus, 1963.

- MGH-SS. *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, 30 vols. Hannover, 1826 ff.; rpt. New York: Kraus, 1963.
- MPL. Migne, Jacques Paul. *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina*. 221 vols., Paris: Migne, 1844-55.
- NKGWG. *Nachrichten von der königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, Philologische-Historische Klasse*, 1894-1933.
- PCMH. Previté-Orton, Charles William. *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- PHP. Pellini, Pompeo. *Dell'istoria di Perugia*. 2 vols. Venice: Giacomo Hertz. 1664.
- PRPR. Potthast, August. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno 1198 ad annum 1404*. 2 vols., orig. publ. Berlin, 1874-75; rpt. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1957.
- RAE. Raynaldus, Odoricus. *Annales Ecclesiastici ab a. 1198, Ubi Desinet Cardinalis Baronius*. Vols. 13-21. Coloniae Agrippinae: (Friessem?), 1693-1727.
- RIS. Muratori, Ludovico Antonio. *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*. 25 vols. Milan: Typographia Societatis palatinae, 1723-51.
- TCD. Theiner, Augustin. *Codex Diplomaticus Domini Temporalis S. Sedis*. 3 vols. Rome: Imprimerie du Vatican, 1861-62.
- VMA. Van Cleve, Thomas C. *Markward of Anweiler and the Sicilian Regency*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1937.
- WIC. Waley, Daniel Philip. *The Italian City-Republics*. New York: World University Library, 1969.
- WMO. Waley, Daniel Philip. *Mediaeval Orvieto: The Political History of an Italian City-State 1157-1334*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952.
- WPS. Waley, Daniel Philip. *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century*. New York: St. Martin's, 1961.

#### BACKGROUND

The general reasons for the new dynamic which appeared in Assisi at the end of the twelfth century center around the breakdown of authority which appeared throughout Europe during this century and which had already given rise to many communes or city-states. This breakdown of authority is a direct result of the tensions and conflicts between the Papacy and the Empire, and the excesses and abuses of papal and imperial authority which were wielded in the conflict, such as military campaigns, hasty interdicts and excommunications, and the imprisonment of clergy. Both sides ultimately

were to forfeit much of their power and authority, not only because the people of Europe lost faith in the constancy and stability of these two great powers, but also because socioeconomic services, which affected the security of the individual, suffered from the disharmony of Pope and Emperor.

The response of many areas, especially in Lombardy, to this tension, and the consequent breakdown of authority structures, demonstrates the individual initiative of the socioeconomic groups who most required the restoration of those structures and services which guaranteed their existence, particularly the safe and regular management of commercial enterprise. This response was the commune, a city-state which, modelled to some extent on the classical prototypes of Greece and Rome, claimed for itself some degree of autonomy from both Pope and Emperor. By acquiring this autonomy, and by increasing their powers through expansion of territory, diplomacy, and resolution of internal discords, the communes were not only able to answer the need for psychological security, but also to restore those services necessary for preservation of life and limb, commercial growth, and political stability. The successes of the early communes in meeting these goals must have served to further stimulate other towns to experiment with the viability of the commune as a political entity.

Certain preconditions seem to have been necessary, however, if a town were to succeed in establishing itself as a commune: Dissatisfaction with the present form of rule and the opportunity to change that rule; internal cooperation, especially between the knights and the merchants; sufficient economic base to maintain and defend the commune; and, ironically, the recognition of the commune by external authority — the emperor, the pope, pretenders or antipopes, or other communes. The particular situation of a town with respect to these conditions determined whether or not a commune could endure or even be brought into being. The fact that Southern Italy was without communes can be explained by the strong monarchy there, which met the needs of the inhabitants for an authority structure, maintained services, and did not permit the opportunity for governmental change.

The particular situation of Assisi was quite different, however. While Milan, Pisa, and Genoa were enjoying their new status as communes, the Assisians must have been suffering political and personal anomie. All too frequently the leadership of the Duchy of Spoleto, of



which they were a part, had been changed, and their allegiance was necessarily transferred with it, whether or not they wished it so. As a result of these frequent changes, we might expect a great many inconsistent policies in the ducal administration. Moreover, we know for a fact that by 1159 both Pope and Emperor held conflicting claims to ownership of the Duchy.

The threatening quality of feudal life in Assisi, as everywhere else, was yet another source of unrest. A *masnadiero* or "highwayman" was a soldier by day and a brigand by night. The robberies of merchants occurred so frequently that in Orvieto in 1199, when a local faction murdered the town's podestà, Pier Parenzo, his body was not immediately identified by the monks who, in passing by, mistook him for a merchant who had been killed by robbers.<sup>2</sup> The insecurity of the roads is directly traceable to the feudal lords in Italy, who were often nobles derived from the floods of Langobards, Franks, and Germans who had invaded Italy. Amid the feudal forest of alien towns, bastions, and castles, the communal city must have appeared like an oasis, not only to merchants, but to the indigenous population as well.

Assisi had been razed by the first Holy Roman Emperor in 773, and four centuries later she was once again the target of imperial armies. Four years after acceding to the imperial throne in 1152, Frederick Barbarossa had set fire to the city of Spoleto for resisting him. By 1159, Adrian IV was claiming the Duchy of Spoleto, of which Assisi was a part, for the Papacy<sup>3</sup> and his successor, Alexander III, reiterated this claim the following year.<sup>4</sup> In this same year, although the Empire claimed Tuscany and the Duchy of Spoleto in general, Frederick Barbarossa, in a letter dated Pavia, November 21, affirmed imperial hegemony over Assisi in particular:

"Let it be observed by all the faithful of our empire, in the future as in the present, that the town of Assisi, with its whole county thus belongs to our imperial jurisdiction in a special manner and without hindrance, that it is empowered to answer to no authority whatsoever, unless it come from our person, or our representative, and those of our successors." <sup>5</sup>

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■ S. Pier Parenzo. *La legenda scritta dal Maestro Giovanni*, ed. Vincenzo Natalini (Rome: Facultas Theologica Pontificii Athenaei Seminarii Romani, 1936), § 10-11.

■ *Gesta Friderici Imperatoris*, MGH-SS, XX, 461-462.

■ CMH, V, 429.

■ "Notum sit omnibus imperii nostri fidelibus, tam futuris quam presen-

Fourteen years later, in 1174, Frederick's deputy, Archbishop Christian of Mainz, arrived in the Duchy to enforce these and other imperial claims, and his visit is recorded in the *Chronicon Romualdi II Archiepiscopi Salernitani*: "Immediately after this, when he came to the Duchy of Spoleto and to the Marches, he ravaged many forts of that region, and seized the town of Assisi, and placed Spoleto under his rule." <sup>6</sup> Such treatment must have irritated the Assisians, not only toward the Emperor, but also toward the Pope and other authorities external to the city, and this resentment of capricious external authority may well explain why the Assisians sought to found a commune within that same generation.

#### UNDER IMPERIAL RULE: 1174-1198

The fragmentary nature of documentation for this quarter-century does not explain why Christian of Mainz would seize Assisi. There are probably several reasons besides the obvious ones of territorial expansion and the enlargement of the imperial coffers and armies. Tuscany and Spoleto were nominally imperial, being ruled by Frederick Barbarossa's uncle, Welf VI. Although Welf agreed to sell Spoleto to the Emperor in 1169,<sup>7</sup> Barbarossa might well have been concerned that his uncle's traditional partisanship for the Papacy would interfere with the smooth transferral of lands to the Empire. The importance of Central Italy for Frederick's political and military strategies is clarified for us by Walter Lenel as a first step in the redevelopment of imperial power, since Tuscany, Spoleto, and the Marches formed a broad barrier between the Papacy and its allies in Northern Italy.<sup>8</sup> While insuring the fidelity of Assisi's *Rocca*, the Empire exacted severe and far-reaching consequences in Assisian

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tibus, quod civitas Asisiensis [sic] cum toto suo comitatu ita specialiter et libere ad nostram imperialem iurisdictionem pertinet, quod nulli potestati de aliquo habet respondere, nisi nostre persone vel nostro certo misso nostrisque successoribus." Transcr. FFRRI, IV, 169-170.

■ "Dehinc ad Ducatum Spoletinum, & ad Marchiam veniens, multa castra regionis illius depopulatus est, & cepit Assisiam civitatem, & Spoletinam suo dominio subdidit." Transcr. in RIS, VII, 214.

<sup>7</sup> PCMH, I, 571.

<sup>8</sup> "Der Konstanzer Frieden v. 1183 und die italienische Politik Friedrichs I," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 128 (1923), 228.

society. We can infer just how catastrophic some of the effects of this seizure were, from the Pact made between the *maggiori* and *minori* of Assisi in November, 1210, which, when absolving many former citizens from the servitude incurred contemporaneously with Christian's conquest, referred to the event as the *captionem capitalem*, or "mortal blow":

"Therefore, whoever was a citizen of Assisi or its suburbs for two or three years before that mortal blow, and then from the time of that seizure or during the two or three years thereafter, promised to render due services to anyone, and who did such, or else was bound to services and was engaged in said services, from this day forward let him be absolved from homage and services." ■

The fact that both this pact and the Pact of 1203 refer to this time from 1174 to 1179 in determining who shall be freed from servitude, points up the violent social convulsions which Assisi must have felt then. Just as the Pact of 1210 indicates that many who had been citizens of Assisi lost their citizenship with Christian's arrival and that still others had been forced into servitude, the Pact of 1203 makes clear to us that many must have been released from servitude by Christian's advent:

"Therefore, we decree for the good of the peace and we command, on behalf of those citizens of this town or of its suburbs who were accustomed to render due services to their lords as homage, and who shall not have rendered them in the twenty-four years preceding this date, that from now on they not render such and that they be absolved from homage and from the aforesaid services..." <sup>10</sup>

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■ "Item quicumque fuit civis Assisii et suburbiorum a tribus vel ii. annis ante captionem capitalem et tunc temporis illius captionis vel iii. annis vel ii. postea promisit facere servitia debitale [sic] alicui, et fecit aut fuit detentus in servitiis et occupatus in servitiis, de cetero sit absolutus ab hominitio et servitiis." Transcr. FFRRI, IV, 291. We deduce that this *captio capitalis* signified Christian of Mainz' capture of Assisi and the events surrounding it, since in the Preliminary Pact between the *maggiori* and *minori* in 1203, the time limit of 24 years used there in reference to servitude, places it within 5 years of Christian's assault. Moreover, we have no evidence of any other "captures" of Assisi within the generation before 1210. Fortini also supports this deduction in FNV, I/1, 95.

<sup>10</sup> "Item ordinamus pro bono pacis et dicimus de civibus huius civitatis et suburbiorum qui consueverunt suis dominis facere debitalia servitia pro hominitio et non fecerint a XXIIIJ annis hinc retro, quod deinceps non faciant et sint absoluti ab hominitio et ipsis servitiis..." Transcr. FNV, III, 557.

What the nature of these social paroxysms was specifically, we do not yet know. However, we can be sure that one of the chief figures responsible for these disorders was Christian's lieutenant, Conrad of Urslingen.

Doubtless the indigenous counts and other nobles of Assisi were distressed by the social upheaval of the times, and they may even have been a source of irritation to the Emperor. Cristofani, even though his opinions bear the flavor of the popular movements of his own times — the Italy of Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi, and the "Red Shirts" — refers to a donation of 1160 which does seem to evidence a growing popular awareness supported by the nobility.<sup>11</sup> However, Fortini's reproduction of this very document dates the donation from 1140 rather than 1160, and thus somewhat reduces its relevance to the upheavals three decades later.<sup>12</sup> Even so, if there were any counts like "Matheus ascisiensis comes," who supported a popular consciousness, we can scarcely doubt Frederick's reasons for granting Conrad of Urslingen not merely the title "Duke of Spoleto," but the additional title of "Count of Assisi," which Conrad used in witnessing a document in 1177.<sup>13</sup>

Conrad of Urslingen was Count of Assisi from 1177 to 1198. According to Lenel, he had been made imperial legate for the whole Duchy about 1174.<sup>14</sup> By 1177, as we have mentioned, he was not only Duke of Spoleto, of which Assisi was traditionally a part, but also Count of Assisi (and, shortly thereafter, Nocera);<sup>15</sup> moreover, the Emperor strengthened Conrad's authority in these new offices

<sup>11</sup> CSA, p. 48.

<sup>12</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 533-534.

<sup>13</sup> MAIMA, XII, 776. Stephano Baluzo, in his *Vita Innocentiii III*, is not clear in distinguishing this "Conradus Suevus" from another "Conradus Suevus," Conrad of Lützelhard (or Lützen), nicknamed "Musca in cerebro" (RIS, III/1, 488, and MPL, CCXIV, xxiv). This unclarity led Muratori to confuse the two (MAI, VII, 89), and this error was subsequently perpetuated by other scholars, including Cristofani (CSA, p. 49), Fortini (FNV, I/1, 134, 151-152), and Boase (Thomas S. R. Boase, *St. Francis of Assisi* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968], p. 17). However, Waley, following FFRRI and Walter Lenel ("Der Konstanzer Frieden," see above), clearly distinguishes between these two German noblemen (WPS, p. 19).

<sup>14</sup> Walter Lenel, "Der Konstanzer Frieden," pp. 229, 230 n. 1.

<sup>15</sup> An interesting historical footnote is that Frederick had yielded the Duchy of Spoleto to Pope Alexander III in Oct./Nov. 1176, by the temporary terms of the Pact of Anagni. By the terms of the more permanent "Peace of



by visiting with him in the *Rocca* of Assisi at Christmas that year.<sup>16</sup> We know that Conrad served two emperors well, for both Barbarossa and Henry VI singled him out for special favors. He was with Frederick in June, 1183, at Constance, in treaty negotiations with the Lombard League,<sup>17</sup> and he signed the "Agreement with Milan"<sup>18</sup> on February 11, 1185. After 1186, Henry, now King of the Romans, became Conrad's superior in central Italy, even though Frederick remained Emperor until his death on June 10, 1190.<sup>19</sup> In April, 1195, at the Diet of Bari, the new Emperor Henry VI appointed Conrad "Viceregent of Sicily," confirming him as Duke of Spoleto.<sup>20</sup> This was not merely an honorific appointment, for Sicily was an important part of the Hohenstaufen plan for the subjugation of Italy and had only recently been regained by Henry. It was a natural base for naval operations in the Mediterranean, and in addition to being a center for world commercial activity, was probably the cultural jewel of the West. The Emperor's trust in Conrad knew no bounds: in 1195, the Empress Constance, soon after giving birth to a boy at Jesi, in the Marches of Ancona,<sup>21</sup> placed her son, the future Emperor Frederick II, into the care of the Duchess of Spoleto, and left to join Henry VI in Sicily. Conrad's wife took the child to Foligno, where he spent his early years. It is entirely possible that the infant emperor was baptised in Assisi, as the Assisian archivists suggest,<sup>22</sup> if we accept as reliable Albert of Stade's statement in his *Chronicle*, that Frederick's christening in Assisi was attended by 15 bishops and cardinals.<sup>23</sup> Neither Hagemann, nor Allshorn, nor the great Freder-

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Venice," in July/Sept. 1177, Spoleto was not given to the Papacy. Yet *even before these last negotiations took place*, Conrad was using the imperial title, "Duke of Spoleto," in February, 1177.

<sup>16</sup> Documents transcr. in MAIMA, XII, 776, and XIV, 642.

<sup>17</sup> Walter Lenel, p. 233.

<sup>18</sup> "Conventio cum Mediolanensibus," MGH-CC, I, 431.

<sup>19</sup> WPS, p. 23.

<sup>20</sup> FFRRI, II, 169; CMH, V, 472.

<sup>21</sup> Wolfgang Hagemann, "Jesi im Zeitalter Friedrichs II," *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, 36 (1956), 142-143. This is in correction of the *Chronicle* of the thirteenth century Franciscan, Albert of Stade, see below, p. 00.

<sup>22</sup> CSA, p. 53; FNV, I/1, 135.

<sup>23</sup> "A.D. 1195. Natus est imperatori Henrico filius in valle Spoletana, in civitate Asis [sic], nocte quae praecedit dormitionem Iohannis ewangelistae et 15 episcopis et cardinalibus praesentibus est baptizatus dictusque est Fridericus." MGH-SS, XVI, 352. But see n. 21, above.

ickian scholar Kantorowicz enlighten us on the place of Frederick's baptism; but it is very likely that between 1195 and 1197 the future emperor was visitor to Assisi, since Conrad maintained a residence there.<sup>24</sup> Conrad served with Markward of Anweiler and others as Henry's extraordinary ambassador to the Pope in March, 1197, and was again with the Emperor at Palermo in April.<sup>25</sup> In June, Conrad signed the "Pactum cum Venetis."<sup>26</sup> When Henry died three months later, at Messina, there is no doubt that Conrad was by his lord's side.<sup>27</sup>

It is much more difficult to ascertain the relationship between Conrad and Assisi and the quality of life there under his rule than it is to follow his diplomatic career. The Duchy was probably as much a challenge to Conrad's administrative talents as it was a reward for services rendered. Even after his appointment as Duke in 1177, the Duchy had not been entirely pacified, especially the city of Spoleto, and in 1184 the Emperor still found cause to describe that city as disloyal or *ungetreu*.<sup>28</sup> To the cities themselves, Conrad had permitted varying degrees of autonomy: in some cities, such as Terni, his authority was extensive, for although it had consuls, fines belonged to the Duke, and he seems to have administered criminal justice through his bailiffs.<sup>29</sup> In other cities such as Gubbio, he exercised a

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<sup>24</sup> Alfonso Brizi, in his work on the *Rocca* of Assisi, which was accessible to us only in the form of a review, says that a Perugian chronicler reports that in 1194 the *Rocca of Assisi* "fu scarcata" [sic] ("was empty"? or "gutted"?). (This Perugian chronicler was probably the anonymous member of the family Oddi, whose "Brevi Annali della Citta di Perugia" is transcribed in ASI, 16/1 [1850], 53-68; this quote appears on p. 55). The review then summarizes Brizi as saying that Conrad (of Lützen; cf. our discussion of this above, n. 13) had rooms there in 1197 and "vi teneva sicuro il figliulo dell'imperatore, il piccolo Federico II, che in Assisi tolse il battesimo." (Review of *Della Rocca di Assisi*, in BDSPU, 4 [1898], 557-560, p. 558). It is probable that the Perugian chronicler has placed too early the gutting of the castle, which did occur about 1198. Moreover, the dispatch with which the Assisians accomplished the destruction of the *rocca* in that year leads us to believe that, if the castle were a symbol of German oppression, it had been actively used by Conrad until he abandoned it to Pope Innocent in 1198; see below, pp. 00f., for these events.

<sup>25</sup> VMA, p. 64.

<sup>26</sup> MGH-CC, I, 529.

<sup>27</sup> VMA, p. 80; FFRRI, II, 371; Cf. also document cited in BAIS, p. 194, no. 212.

<sup>28</sup> BAIS, p. 144, no. 151.

<sup>29</sup> BAIS, p. 606, no. 894.

minimal authority.<sup>30</sup> Probably he chose not to interfere in the government of those cities which readily met their obligations to the Duchy, particularly in terms of financial and military support. His position in Assisi was obviously strong enough to prevent any outright rebellion as long as he was installed there. Geoffrey Barraclough, in his *The Origins of Modern Germany*, leads us to believe that Conrad acted more as an imperial official and administrator than as feudatory; probably the officials of Assisi, such as magistrates and consuls, were responsible to him and swore fealty to him. The city also probably paid him an annual hearth-tax, and he probably ruled the *contado* through a hierarchy of administrators, receiving hearth-taxes, tolls, and duties as additional income.<sup>31</sup> Elliott-Binns tells us that Conrad's rule "had been beneficial to his subjects — he had kept the lesser nobles in order and so enabled trade, and in particular the woolen trade, to develop — he knew [sic] that as a German he was not acceptable to them."<sup>32</sup> One way that Conrad sought to become more acceptable to the people of his Duchy was to cement his relationship to them through marriage. There is little doubt that the Duchess was a native of Nocera, for in 1218 the Pope assigned, until further notice, the incomes of the court of the city and county of Nocera to Conrad's widow.<sup>33</sup>

Cristofani, citing Manente, attempts to convince us that Conrad's rule was so benevolent that he permitted the Assisians to form a league with other cities of the Marches and Umbria to succour Orvieto, as she was being besieged by Henry.<sup>34</sup> We suspect that Conrad's rule was no more benevolent than the rule of any capable administrator; we do know that he dealt rather harshly with the Church in his Duchy. Ficker, citing a papal document of 1187 which states

<sup>30</sup> FFRRI, II, 244-245.

<sup>31</sup> BOMG, p. 185; Cf. also FNV, I/1, 126-127.

<sup>32</sup> EBI, p. 27.

<sup>33</sup> "Honorius Episcopus etc. Dilectis filiis... Potestati et universis tam civitatis quam diocesis Nucerrine, salutem etc. Presentium vobis auctoritate mandamus, quatenus donec de ipso ducatu plenarie disponamus, nobili mulieri... uxor quondam... Ducis Spoletani de hiis que de civitate vestra ac comitatu ipsius ad curiam pertinent, intendatis, Epi, clericorum et ecclesiarum per omnia vire salvo. Datum Laterani. VII Idus Ianuarii, anno tertio." TCD, I, 49, doc. lxix.

<sup>34</sup> CSA, p. 49. Like Heywood, we find this story highly improbable (HHP, p. 60); Waley makes no mention of such an alliance (WMO). However, see also FNV, I/1, 128; PHP, I, 203; and Fumi and Davidsohn's discussions in "L'assedio di Enrico VI di Svevia re de' Romani," BDSPU, 22 (1916), 203-216.

that Conrad ruled very despotically with Church possessions, would support this.<sup>35</sup> Surely Conrad bore no great love for the institution which continually opposed his Emperor's advances and which eventually evicted Conrad himself from his ducal office. If such were his attitude toward the Church, it may even have influenced the attitudes of the Assisians.

In the Fall of 1197, while Conrad was in Messina after the Emperor's death, the Roman Curia, acting with the aged Celestine III, sent papal representatives to Assisi, Gubbio, Spoleto, and the other towns of the Duchy, urging them to give their allegiance to the Church, even though the Church had no claim there since the Pact of Venice.<sup>36</sup> The young Cardinal, Lothario dei Conti, was an active participant in this plan to recoup Church power at the expense of a now headless Empire; shortly he was to become Pope Innocent III. The Empress Constance, in active support of the Church, meanwhile ordered all Germans out of Sicily. Though many attempted to remain, Markward of Anweiler and Conrad obeyed her order, perhaps out of concern for the safety of their possessions in Central Italy.<sup>37</sup> By the time the Pope wrote to the people of Ascoli on December 23, 1197, Perugia, Spoleto, Assisi, Spello, Gubbio, and Emelia had submitted to the papal legate, Cardinal Gregory of S. Maria in Porticu, or to his representatives.<sup>38</sup> Thus Assisi was actually in Church hands before Conrad's return from Sicily.<sup>39</sup> Pope Celestine died on January 8, 1198, and he was succeeded by Innocent III, who was consecrated on February 22. About this time Conrad was excommunicated, probably as an "invader" of papal territory, and by the end of March he had opened negotiations with Innocent. He offered to pay the Pope 10,000 *librae* immediately and 100 *librae* annually,

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<sup>35</sup> FFRRI, II, 245. The document in question is probably a letter from Pope Urban III to Emperor Frederick I, dated Verona, June 18, 1186: "Dux Spoletanus ita statum ecclesiarum, circa quas de mandato tue celsitudinis commoratur, in spiritualibus et temporalibus noscitur attrivisse, eas viris ecclesiasticis pro sua conferens et auferens voluntate, capiens clericos et ad redemptionem compellens, quod viri ecclesiastici, qui in terra commissa sue potestati consistunt, propria coguntur tecta deserere et in obprobrium ecclesiastici ordinis vite stipendia mendicare." Transcr. in FDG, 19 (1879), 66.

<sup>36</sup> VMA, p. 80.

<sup>37</sup> VMA, p. 83.

<sup>38</sup> Transcr. in NKGWG, 5 (1898), 43-44. Cf. also Waley's discussion in WPS, p. 31, and 31, n. 1.

<sup>39</sup> VMA, p. 94 n.; FFRRI, II, 380.



if he were permitted to hold the Duchy in fee. In addition, he promised to give two hundred knights for feudal service and to furnish security for all these. It was a tempting offer for the young Pope, but he apparently saw the inconsistency of accepting such an offer with the anti-German and anti-imperial sentiment which he was then trying to foment in Italy, for he rejected Conrad's offer:

"Granted that the Lord Pope would reckon this arrangement advantageous; nevertheless, because many might be scandalized by it — as if he wished to favor the Germans in Italy, who through cruel tyranny had reduced them to the most abject servitude — declining in the cause of liberty, he did not accept what was offered." <sup>40</sup>

By the middle of April, Conrad had decided to submit to the Pope unconditionally. Accordingly, he went to Narni, where, in the presence of the papal representatives Octavian, Bishop of Ostia, and Gerard, Cardinal-deacon of S. Adrian, Conrad swore copiously on the Gospels, relics, and a cross, to support the universal mandates of the Pope. He released all his former subjects of their fealty to him and transferred that fealty to the Pope. He further handed over to the Pope two of the Duchy's fortresses, Gualdo and Cesi, and attempted to hand over the third, the *Rocca* of Assisi.<sup>41</sup> Conrad left Italy for Germany, and imperial sovereignty in Assisi was at an end. Perhaps the greatest compliment to Conrad's rule there came from Innocent himself, for when he visited Perugia that summer, he named Cardinal-deacon Gregory of S. Maria in Aquiro as Rector in the Duchy of Spoleto and the County of Assisi, continuing the same administrative units which Conrad had governed.<sup>42</sup>

#### REBELLION, WAR, AND THE PERIOD OF THE CONSULATE: 1198-1212

The scanty supply of documentation does not permit an exact chronology or complete record of all the events in this pivotal period of Assisian history. Doubtless the Roman Revolution of 1197 and

<sup>40</sup> "Licet autem Dominus Papa conditionem istam utilem reputaret; quia tamen multi scandalizabuntur [sic] ex ea, tanquam vellet Theotonicos in Italia confovere, qui crudeli tyrannide redegerant eos in gravissimam servitutem, in favorem libertatis declinans, non acceptavit oblata." "Vita Innocentii III ex Stephano Baluzo," RIS, III/1, 488; cf. also GHCR, V/1, 29.

<sup>41</sup> RIS, III/1, 488.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.; cf. also GHCR, V/1, 30, and WPS, p. 37.

the rebellion against the Emperor in Southern Tuscany in the autumn of 1197<sup>43</sup> encouraged the Assisians to assert their claims to self-determination. Though they had submitted to Celestine's representatives by December 23, 1197, and though they must have submitted to Innocent before his bull of May 26, 1198 to Bishop Guido of Assisi, these submissions were probably nominal. Previté-Orton writes:

"The communes of the duchy of Spoleto (Umbria), driving out their German duke, acknowledged papal suzerainty; so did some of the March of Ancona, whence Markward withdrew to Sicily. Communal independence, however, both checked further advance and rendered his [i.e., the pope's] annexations mainly titular."<sup>44</sup>

Innocent's letter to Guido confirmed several old privileges and attempted a unification of ecclesiastical jurisdictions.<sup>45</sup> The attempt could have ended some of the secular struggles, but it failed, partly owing to the opposition of the canons of San Rufino and of the monks of Monte Subasio. Bishop Guido placed an interdict on those who actively opposed the plan for restoration. Apparently some of those who were thus censured tried to argue that they had been reinstated by the Pope, but in a letter of 1199, Innocent supported Guido's measures.<sup>46</sup>

The evidence of this discontent among the clergy, together with the special favors which the Pope showed Assisi's traditional rival, Perugia (visiting it in the summer of 1198, confirming special privileges to it that October), must have led the Assisians to oppose the exchange of an imperial domination for a papal one. In any case, they refused to hand over the *Rocca* to the papal representative, and instead rendered its fortifications useless.<sup>47</sup> By December 9, 1198,

<sup>43</sup> WPS, p. 31.

<sup>44</sup> PCMH, II, 645-646. This is in complete harmony with Gene Brucker's more general statement regarding communes: "They recognized the theoretical sovereignty of the German emperor or the Roman pope, while ignoring that authority, whenever possible, in fact and in practice." (*Renaissance Florence* [New York: John Wiley, 1969], p. 129).

Apparently Innocent received the homage of Assisi by the end of that summer; cf. GHCR, V/1, 30.

<sup>45</sup> Transcr. in FNV, III, 543-545.

<sup>46</sup> "Sicut nobis tuis" in MPL, CCXIV, 716.

<sup>47</sup> Some authors hold that it was razed completely, as does the *Vita Innocentii III*, which speaks of total destruction, "destruxerunt." (RIS, III/1, 488C). For further discussion and information on the present "*Rocca*," cf. FNV, III, 53-54.

we have the first concrete evidence of consular government in Assisi, a judgment in a civil dispute by the consul Bonbarone.<sup>48</sup> In the following year, the work of enlarging and strengthening the city walls was completed, and according to an inscription on the eastern gate of the city, "l'Archicciolo," this event occurred during the consulship of Tancred.<sup>49</sup> This year must also have been a year of great internal tensions for the Assisians, for the destruction of the *Rocca* seemed to signal attacks on the native nobility as well: many of them lost their palaces and towers in the city and their castles in the country. By the end of 1199, the dispossessed Assisian nobles had begun streaming into other cities, and on January 18, 1200, one such refugee, a certain Girardo Gislerij Alberici, some of whose lands lay in Perugian territory, asked for and received Perugian citizenship.<sup>50</sup> A week later, Fortebraccio and Oddo, the sons of Leonardo, the lord of Sassorosso, made a similar request.<sup>51</sup> Soon other nobles and their retainers found refuge in Perugia.<sup>52</sup> The internal struggle had become an external one, and the Perugians willingly allied themselves with the Assisian refugees in bringing about a war against Assisi. Soon other cities were involved as well. Foligno allied herself with Perugia in October of 1201, and Assisi sought and obtained men and arms from Nocera, Bevagna, Spello, Rosciano, and Fabriano.<sup>53</sup> Tensions built rapidly in both camps and culminated in

<sup>48</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 546. It should be noted that to affirm that Assisi had its own consuls in the year 1112, based on a document cited in BDSPU, VIII (1902), p. 284, is erroneous. While the names Morico, Marescotto, and Rinaldo seem to appear there as consuls for the year 1112, they were actually consuls in 1211 who authenticated a document of 1112. See FNV, III, 173 on this. While it is very unlikely that Assisi had consular government before 1198, it is not impossible. (Cf. BOMG, p. 185, mentioned above, and FNV, I/1, 126 f.). However, if Assisi did have consuls before 1198, they would not have been chosen by the citizens themselves, but by the Emperor, following PCMH, I, 567: "Frederick [I] reclaimed the *regalia*, the customs and tolls, mints, and jurisdiction, including the appointment of the consuls..."

<sup>49</sup> "HOC OPUS FACTURA [sic] EST ANNO DOMINICE INCARNATIONIS MCLXXXIX STUDIO CONTADINI BARTOLI ET LOMBARDI BRUNELLI, TANCREDO CONSULE." Transcr. in L. Bracaloni, "Assisi medioevali: Studio storico-topografico," AFH, 7, No. 1 (1914), 10; cf. also FNV, II, 291 and III, 53.

<sup>50</sup> Document transcr. in BDSPU, 6 (1900), 323.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 324.

<sup>52</sup> BDSPU, 8 (1902), 138, doc. lxxx—1203, Novembre: "Concessioni fatte dai consoli perugini agli assisiani al servizio del C. di P."

<sup>53</sup> FNV, II, 166-169.

November, 1202, in the "Battle of Collestrada." This was a decisive victory for the Perugians and is celebrated in imaginative, if somewhat gory verse by the Perugian chronicler Boniface of Verona, in his *Eulisteia*:

Slaughtered are Assisi's powerful,  
And slain they lie mangled.  
How many bodies lie strewn through the fields,  
Their members severed!  
Neither is the hand by the foot,  
Nor bowel and belly joined,  
Nor the eye where its socket made a window.<sup>54</sup>

Such a smashing defeat must have moderated the goals of the Assisian leadership somewhat; by November of the following year a peace had been concluded, not between Perugia and Assisi, but between the *buoni uomini* and the *uomini del popolo* of Assisi. Prefacing its ordinances with "Quia in Asisio erat quedam discordia inter bonos homines et homines populi propter destructionem castrorum et hominitia...", the document requires the Commune to make some degree of restitution to various nobles whose property had been destroyed (probably those nobles who had remained loyal to the Commune); furthermore, it confirms the services and homage due to the nobles, exempting those *uomini* of the city and suburbs who had established a lapse in services and homage within a statute of limitations of twenty-four years duration (the rural serfs, however, were to remain in their former condition). The Pact of 1203 further ordered that no citizen could enter into pacts with any city (Perugia?), castle, or lord, without the common deliberation of the Commune; that, serfs excepted, any citizen of the Commune or its *contado*, who, during the conflict with Perugia, had left Assisi and, to her detriment, gone over to her enemies, was outlawed, and his goods confiscate; and finally that all citizens, whether *milites* or not, should stand together to preserve the rights of all. It placed *mercatores* on an equal level with *milites*, particularly respecting their right to the protection of the Commune.<sup>55</sup> This agreement did much more than

<sup>54</sup> "Cecidere potentes / Assisii, cesique iacent deformia quantum/ Corpora strata horum semota membra per agros./ Non est ipsa manus ubi pes, non viscera ventri/ Iuncta, nec est oculis ubi vertex facta finestra." Transcr. in ASI, 16/1 (1850), 9; cf. also FNV, II, 169-178.

<sup>55</sup> Transcr. in FNV, III, 556-559.



make reparations to certain nobles, or liberate certain *uomini* from the obligations of services and homage. It brought the nobles into the city, into the houses provided by the Commune, where they could be more closely observed and where they would necessarily become more involved in the life of the Commune, supplying it with financial and military aid as well. It demonstrated the impotence of the *popolo minuto*, those rural and other serfs who are not emancipated by the Pact. However, it also portended the total emancipation which would follow in less than a decade.

In the very month that the Assisians were signing the Pact in their city, the Perugians were signing a document which promised, to the *milites* and *pedites* of Assisi who had come to the service of Perugia, the protection and support of that city: homes, food, expense money, and the return of their possessions and property in Assisi, if and when that city should be conquered.<sup>56</sup>

However, Assisi did not limit her strategy to internal unification; she expanded externally as well. The month following the Pact of 1203 saw the submission to the Commune of Bulgarellus and Albertinus, whose castle of Serpiglione was on the boundary of the contados of Assisi and Gubbio. They promised to hold their castle and court for the Commune; to give aid, assistance, and counsel to the Assisians against all enemies, excepting the Gubbians; and to collect from the *uomini* of Assisi not more than one denaro per load as "passipedio." They further agreed to pay the sum of 100 *librae* for the rights of Assisian citizenship.<sup>57</sup> This agreement was particularly beneficial to the Assisian merchants, whose economic position was greatly secured by a policy of defining the maximum toll which could be demanded from a merchant as he brought goods through the lands and territories of the *buoni uomini*. For the Commune generally, this agreement meant additional financial and military support; moreover, it provided some control over the new allies, for by granting them the rights and privileges of citizenship, it guaranteed their interest and involvement in the Commune.

In order to further strengthen themselves as the war with Perugia dragged on, the Assisians elected their first podestà, an administrative office usually created in times of stress, that centralizes the jurisdictions and functions normally held by the consuls, and occa-

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<sup>56</sup> Transcr. in FNV, III, 559 f.

<sup>57</sup> Transcr. in FNV, III, 553.

sionally adds certain extraordinary powers to them. Unfortunately, the Assisians' choice for such an office, while a good one, met with unexpected resistance from outside the Commune. While Girardo di Giliberto may have been a consul of Assisi in 1203 and a podestà of Spoleto in 1201,<sup>58</sup> his excellent qualifications were severely undermined by the fact that he was excommunicate from the Church. The papal ministers refused to confirm him in his new office, and Innocent III brought an interdict against the Assisians so long as Girardo held office. The citizens quickly reconsidered, for by June of that year (1204) the Pope had absolved the Assisians from the interdict with the bull *Gratum gerimus*,<sup>59</sup> and by September of that same year a certain Ugolino was the new podestà of the Commune.<sup>60</sup>

The Assisians had no great affection for the Pope, however, and continued to deal with excommunicates when it profited them. A year after they had been absolved by Innocent, the Assisians received a charter from Philip of Swabia, confirming the privileges granted to them by Philip's legate, the excommunicate bishop, Liupold of Worms.<sup>61</sup> Philip was trying desperately to advance his claims to the imperial throne, Otto's cause having been greatly weakened in Germany. Philip sent Liupold, who was also the Hohenstaufen claimant to the Archbishopric of Mainz, as his legate, together with a body of armed men, to win the support of the provinces of central Italy for his imperial claims. Though he won the support of some barons, according to Waley "the only commune known to have recognized him is Assisi."<sup>62</sup> Though in reality Philip never gained the support of the Italian provinces, and though he was murdered three years later, largely neutralizing the privileges he had confirmed to Assisi, the document stands as the first external recognition of the rights of the Commune of Assisi by one of the major powers. In particular, it ordained that no fortress should be rebuilt in the city,<sup>63</sup> but that the

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<sup>58</sup> FNV II, 181-182.

<sup>59</sup> Transcr. in MPL, CCXV, 365. Although this letter is dated by Fortini in 1205 (FNV, II, 182), Potthast and Migne, following Raynaldus' *Annales Ecclesiastici*, place it in 1204 (PRPR, I, 193, no. 2237; RAE, XIII, 122, an. 1204, n. 77).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. document transcribed in FNV, III, 560.

<sup>61</sup> Transcr. in FFRI, IV, 263-264 and in FNV, III, 560-562.

<sup>62</sup> WPS, p. 48.

<sup>63</sup> FFRI, IV, 263: "...per nuncium regum vel imperatorum vel per ipsos seu per alias personas..."

court would hold the city of Assisi in common for all time and without divisions. It was an equitable document, granting privileges to both *militēs* and *uomini*; Philip further promised not to make any pact with the Perugians or with the Assisian refugees who were their allies, unless he first gained the approval of the Assisian consuls, and the Commune promised the same to Philip.<sup>64</sup> This diploma also provided that the imperial court could reclaim fiefs given to those who had not served and did not wish to serve the court. This last provision was particularly aimed at the Assisian nobles allied with Perugia, and in the following month several of the refugees, perhaps out of fear of losing their fiefs to the court of Philip (should he become Emperor), renounced their claims for damages caused by the Assisians and freed the Commune of Perugia from any promises or guarantees it had made to them regarding the restitution of their possessions should Assisi be defeated.<sup>65</sup> By the end of that month (August), the desertion of allies among the *fuorusciti* was sufficiently serious to induce the Perugian podestà, Giovanni Guidone Papa (who was also a Roman consul), to issue an ordinance specifying the terms of peace with Assisi. This document is very instructive, as is Philip's diploma, regarding the burgeoning strength of the Assisians; since both documents are addressed to the men of Isola as well as Assisi, we may assume that Isola was a constant ally to Assisi. Both documents also support the thesis that Nocera, which had submitted to Perugia in 1202, was being occupied by the Assisians. By the terms of the ordinance,<sup>66</sup> the Perugians demanded that before any peace negotiation could occur, the Assisians should relinquish the castle of Sassorosso to Leonardo and Fortebraccio of Gislerio, its original owners, now refugees in Perugia,<sup>67</sup> who had held it in fief "per privilegium scriptum Imperatoris." Regarding the other refugees, the ordinance called for similar restitutions, based on their *status quo ante* in Assisi. It further called for the Commune of Assisi to resign to Perugia the city and county of Nocera, excepting the two castles of Postignano and Cisterna. The document was not vindictive, and its conciliatory character leads us to hypothesize that Perugia was growing tired of the war and the drain it effected on its resources.

<sup>64</sup> FFRI, IV, 264.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. documents transcr. in FNV, III, 562-564.

<sup>66</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 565-566.

<sup>67</sup> See above, p. 00.

The Assisians apparently ignored this offer of a settlement from Perugia; such an impotent declaration emphasized their own increasing strength. Six months later, in February, 1206, Assisi formally annexed the castle and court of Valfabbrica, which lay to the north toward Gubbio, not far from Perugian territory, by officially granting citizenship to its inhabitants, many of whom in fact already had Assisian citizenship.<sup>68</sup> Doubtless the Valfabbricans regretted this action three years later when their castle was razed by the Perugian army, and their lord, the Prior of the Benedictine monastery of Santa Maria di Valfabbrica, was compelled to swear to the Podestà and Comune of Perugia that the castle would not be rebuilt and that the Valfabbricans would especially protect Perugians in Valfabbrica.<sup>69</sup>

This blow to Assisi's strength reflected the changing political situation in Europe. Though Innocent had previously capitulated to Philip of Swabia, Philip had now been dead for over a year, and Otto of Brunswick's star was rapidly rising on the horizon, as was the Pope's. Less than two months after the surrender of Valfabbrica, the Assisians had reconsidered their position and entered into negotiations with Perugia. Bernardo di domina Eufemia was the Assisian arbitrator, and Ugucione di Guidone di Giovanni represented Perugia. Their decision, which was delivered on September 2, 1209, in the church nearest to the place where Perugia had defeated the Assisians in battle seven years earlier, favored Perugia, and it is doubtful that the Commune of Assisi or its consuls ever accepted or ratified this decision.<sup>70</sup> A month later, October 4, 1209, Otto IV received the imperial crown at Rome, and immediately turned his benevolence away from the Church, reneging on the Donation of Neuss (1201) and its renewal in the Promise of Spires (1209).<sup>71</sup> Marching northward from Rome, he took the Tuscan cities and then turned toward Umbria. By February of 1210, his position there was secure enough to enable him to name Dipold of Schweinspunt as Duke of Spoleto. In the same month, Perugia allied itself even more closely to the papal cause, promising to help Innocent defend the

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<sup>68</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 567.

<sup>69</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 569.

<sup>70</sup> Documents transcr. in FNV, III, 570-573.

<sup>71</sup> These promises were in fact probably invalid on a technicality, since they had never been ratified by the German princes. Cf. BOMG, p. 212.



territory from Perugia to Rome.<sup>72</sup> It was obvious, then, where Assisi's sympathies lay, when, in November, a pact between the *maggiori* and *minori* was again concluded, this one more comprehensive than that of 1203. It begins, "Ad honorem domini nostri Ihesu Christi et beate Marie Virginis et domini Octonis imperatoris et domini ducis Dy [opuldi]." Not only is Innocent ignored in the preface, but Duke Dipold, who held the Duchy against the Pope's wishes, is commemorated, even though Assisian obligations to him were probably greatly decreased since the time of Conrad.<sup>73</sup> We have no evidence that Dipold ever visited Assisi, much less received homage from it. The pact, since it involved all the Assisians, including the nobles who had fled from Assisi in the previous decade, virtually ended the war between Assisi and Perugia, though their rivalry was to flame up again and again in succeeding years. Probably of major influence in bringing about the pact was the Emperor Otto himself, who was in Assisi five days before the pact was concluded.<sup>74</sup> It virtually abolished, at least theoretically, all servitude and homage, the lords renouncing their feudal rights for a small periodical payment. It provided for the protection of foreigners, fixed taxes and incomes and the repayment of debts; it placed the inhabitants of the suburbs on an equal basis with the inhabitants of the town. Most important of all, it recognized and expressed what might be termed the "communal mind."

"...such an arrangement and perpetual contract for the good of the peace and for harmony has been made by the nobility and commoners of Assisi in that they shall not divisively make any pact or contract with the Lord Pope or his nuncios, even if they be his legate or legates, neither with any emperor or king or their ambassadors, even if they be legates of the same, nor with the inhabitants of any town, or garrison, or with any noble person, but whatever they shall do with the aforementioned persons

<sup>72</sup> Transcr. in FFRRI, IV, 276, no. 225.

<sup>73</sup> Transcr. FFRRI, IV, 290, no. 244. The brackets are Ficker's own. Though in a letter from Foligno, dated March, 1210, Dipold uses the title "Diepuldus dei et imperiali gratia dux Spoleti, com[es Acerrarum et] capitaneus magister totius Apulie et Terre Laboris," no mention is made of Assisi being in his jurisdiction, especially as a countdom. Transcr. in FFRRI, IV, 277-278; the brackets are his own.

<sup>74</sup> Document cited in Johann Frederick Böhmer, *Regesta Imperii*, V (Innsbruck: [Wagner?], 1881), 126-127. However, see his discussion of this date; if we accept his hypothesis that the correct date should be October 4, 1210, our point regarding Otto's influence may still be well-taken.

they shall do in common with each other, for the honor and safety, and increase of the Commune of Assisi. And no one from among the nobility or commoners shall produce any division between noblemen, and likewise between common people, within or without the town of Assisi, but they shall stand in common with each other, and in community, and they shall do communally that which is done for the town, after the manner of good citizens.”<sup>75</sup>

Among the witnesses present, we find the names of Leonardo, Fortebraccio di Gislerio, and others who had incited Perugia to war eight years earlier. Assisi was greatly strengthened by this pact; when Otto was excommunicated in the same month, the Commune's internal cohesion must have helped it maintain its strength. When, in 1211, the Diet of Nuremburg offered the crown of Germany to Frederick II, there is still no record of any change in Assisi's position. The new cathedral of San Rufino was being built; the Pact of 1210 mentions the monies to be set aside for this purpose. In 1212 the Benedictine monks of Monte Subasio donated to the Commune a house on the *mercatum*, or *forum*, for use as a public palace.<sup>76</sup> In Roman times this had been a temple to Minerva, but since then had come to be called San Donato, under its Benedictine ownership. This donation again demonstrates the new communal spirit; by providing a building for the Commune on the public marketplace, in which the business of government could function, the monks provided an additional opportunity to strengthen the internal ties of the community. The building became the residence of the magistrate, and by 1215 the podestà was already exercising his functions there, as evidenced by documents signed “in Palatio Comunis.”<sup>77</sup> Assisi, strengthened by its new harmony, was growing, and in 1212 it was ready for some changes in government to accommodate that growth.

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<sup>75</sup> “...talis institutio et perpetualis locatio pro bono pacis et concordie a maioribus et minoribus Asisii facta est quod divisim non facient aliquid pactum vel locationem cum Dno. Papa vel nuntiis seu legatis ejus sive legato, neque cum imperatore, vel rege, vel nuntiis seu legatis eorundem, neque cum civitate, vel castro, vel cum maiori persona, sed comuniter facient cum predictis personis quicquid facient pro honore et salute, et augmento Comunis Asisii. Et nullus de maioribus vel minoribus operabitur aliquam divisionem in civitate Asisii inter homines, vel extra, et minores homines Asisii similiter, sed comuniter stabunt et in comunantiam, et facient comuniter ea que facienda sunt pro civitate, more bonorum civium.” Transcr. FNV, III, 574 ff.

<sup>76</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 579 f.

<sup>77</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 588.

## THE PERIOD OF THE PODESTATE: 1212-1215

Though we have records of three podestàs holding office in Assisi before 1212 (Girardo di Giliberto, Ugolino, and Carsedonio), they had held these offices in extraordinary circumstances, and often coexisted with the consuls. From 1212 on there is no trace of the consular regime, and we may assume that the podestà emerged as the dominant figure in the government of the Commune. This was probably due to a need for a strong central figure in the rapidly growing Commune. Until 1225, nearly all the podestàs were citizens of Assisi, and, for the propriety of the city, were probably nobles. They were elected by the *consiglio generale*, and combined the military, judicial, and executive functions, in much the same way as the dictators of Ancient Rome. According to Fortini, the podestàs in Assisi went in an uninterrupted series to the 16th century (1519).<sup>78</sup>

Simply because the city had a new-found harmony and growth, however, it should not be thought that the early years of the *podestate* were without stress and strain. The documents of the period show clearly that feuds, or *rapresaglie*, were still a part of daily life, and were even conducted against the Commune, when a party felt that he had been wronged.<sup>79</sup> These *rapresaglie* provoked still others, and greatly added to the violence of the daily life.

Though some historians hold that Dipold was driven out of Spoleto in 1211, while Otto was in retreat,<sup>80</sup> it is more probable that this was later, since in the summer of 1213 we find him promising the Spoletans that he will help them to destroy Trevi.<sup>81</sup> According to Waley,<sup>82</sup> Spoleto accomplished this without Dipold's help. Also that summer, Frederick II reconfirmed Otto's Donation of Neuss at Eger, and gave up Spoleto, Ancona, Ravenna, and other central Italian territories to enlarge the Patrimony of Peter.<sup>83</sup> Assisians were still supporting Otto at the end of 1213, as evidenced by their dating of a document "domino Octone imperante."<sup>84</sup> The following summer

<sup>78</sup> FNV, III, 175.

<sup>79</sup> Refer to the case of Simon della Rocca, in documents transcribed in FNV, III, 582-583, 585-586, 588-589, and 590.

<sup>80</sup> CMH, VI, 137-138.

<sup>81</sup> Transcr. FFRRI, IV, 304, no. 258.

<sup>82</sup> WPS, p. 64.

<sup>83</sup> ASM, p. 46.

<sup>84</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 583.

though, Otto was decisively defeated at Bouvines, and Dipold probably left Spoleto thereafter. By early 1215, Assisi had acknowledged its position in the papal camp, for it began dating quittances in the "Pontificatus Domini Innocentii III Pape."<sup>85</sup> In 1215, too, the Pope added to the offices of his cousin James, already the rector of the Patrimony in Tuscany, the Duchy of Spoleto.<sup>86</sup> Though the records of Assisi never mention either him or the Spoletan rector after 1220, Cardinal Ranier, we may be certain that the Papacy had indirect jurisdiction in the Commune.

In 1217, Assisi again began external expansions, partly at the expense of Perugia. The Commune of Perugia began suffering internal divisions between the *nobiles* and the *populares* in 1214, over the payment of an extraordinary tax called a *colletta*. Though this strife was temporarily resolved by Innocent's bull *Veri pacifi*,<sup>87</sup> it was renewed in 1217 and again in 1222. On both of these occasions the Assisians profited from the discord. In 1217, the Assisians returned to their rule the very important castle of Postignano; which must have reverted to Perugian rule sometime after 1209.<sup>88</sup> Innocent having died at Perugia in 1216, the new pope, Honorius III, assuaged the Perugian divisions with a papal bull on February 22, 1218.<sup>89</sup> Once again however, in 1222, the internal conflict was renewed, and Assisian gains were even more significant. In a public gathering in Assisi on April 14, thirteen citizens of Bettona swore to Tommaso di Grimaldo, the podestà of Assisi, that they would accept the sovereignty of Assisi.<sup>90</sup> Assisi must have waged war against Bettona, for by February of 1223 the Bettonese were suing for peace.<sup>91</sup> On April 10, 1223, the *sindaco* and the consul of Bettona, and the *sindaco* of Assisi entrusted the resolution of hostilities to Carsedonio, the podestà of Assisi. His decision was in effect a submission by the Commune of Bettona to the Commune of Assisi.<sup>92</sup>

While all these events were taking place, the Pope's represen-

<sup>85</sup> FNV, III, 584, 586, 587, 590, 591.

<sup>86</sup> WPS, pp. 65-66.

<sup>87</sup> Transcr. in TCD, I, 44-45.

<sup>88</sup> In 1209 it was still in possession of Assisi; see above, p. 00. The 1217 document of submission is transcribed in FNV, III, 597-598.

<sup>89</sup> BDSPU, 8 (1902), 156-157.

<sup>90</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 598-599.

<sup>91</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 601-602.

<sup>92</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 602-604.



tative, Cardinal Colonna, was attempting a reconciliation between the Perugian factions. His efforts could hardly be called successful however, for on June 24, 1223, several of the Perugian nobles formed an alliance with the Commune of Assisi (and, incidentally, with the other traditional enemies of Perugia, Gubbio and Citta di Castello).<sup>93</sup> Although Honorius III issued the bull *Ea quae auctoritate* to the podestà and people of Perugia in October 1223, confirming the pact closed by Cardinal Colonna,<sup>94</sup> the factions did not long remain at peace, for in June, 1225, the war was rekindled in Perugia,<sup>95</sup> and a month later the Perugian cavaliers reconfirmed their alliance with the Commune of Assisi.<sup>96</sup> There are no records available regarding the outcome of these latest dissensions; probably they had no great impact, for three years later, in 1228, Assisi, under strong pressure from Gregory IX, was to join Perugia and other cities in the Guelf league, in opposition to the growing power of Frederick II.<sup>97</sup>

With their entry into this league, the Assisians embarked on a new stage of their development, and brought to a close the formative years of their growth. If its admission to the Guelf league in 1228 symbolizes the external strength of the Commune, the work begun that same year in amplifying and reconstructing the *forum* or *mercatum* symbolizes its internal strength. In the next century, Assisi

<sup>93</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 604-606.

<sup>94</sup> Transcr. TCD, I, 76-79.

<sup>95</sup> *Vita Gregorii IX*, in RIS, III/1, 577; *Brevi Annali*, in ASI, 16/1 (1850), 55.

<sup>96</sup> Transcr. FNV, III, 611-612.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. documents transcribed in FNV, III, 616-618. The only other event of any significance during this period is the fact that after Otto's death in 1218, Frederick II allowed Rainald of Urslingen, the son of Duke Conrad, to entitle himself Duke of Spoleto (CMH, VI, 140), and this explains Allshorn's report that the Duke of Spoleto was with Frederick in 1220 (ASM, p. 56), while it was in fact a papal fief. In 1220, Frederick received the imperial crown and renewed his concessions to the Church. By 1223, Assisi seems to have accepted imperial as well as papal jurisdiction, if the documents are any clue to its sympathies. This was despite a letter from Pope Honorius in May, 1222, in which he announces to everyone in the Duchy of Spoleto that they are forbidden to send troops to anybody on the emperor's order and warns them against the intrigues of the imperial seneschal, Gunzelin von Wolfenbüttel (transcr. FFRRI, IV, 334-335). Another source informs us that Gunzelin was the imperial vicar in Tuscany and that he usurped the rule of the Duchy of Spoleto; Frederick repudiated him, however, and replaced him in Tuscany with the Duke of Spoleto (CMH, VI, 144). This Duke of Spoleto was probably Rainald (see above), whose title was honorific and had no territorial significance (WPS, p. 125).

grew so rapidly that its walls tripled in size.<sup>98</sup> However, the frequent skirmishes with Perugia, culminating in that city's capture of Assisi in the fourteenth century, was a constant drain on all its resources. Though Assisi was in some ways akin to another hill-city, Rome, it never won the glory of recognition that Rome or the great communes of Northern Italy achieved on the field of battle, in politics, and economics. Were it not for the remarkable life of one of its citizens, St. Francis, Assisi might have forever remained forgotten, in the shadows of Florence, Siena, Milan, Venice, and so many other Italian cities.

#### URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Although we have no specific data on the population of Assisi before the census taken in 1232, we can state with certainty that the fifty-year period of Assisian history covered in this paper (1175-1225) was one of rapid urban growth. In 1199 the walls of the town were expanded and enlarged, much of the building material probably coming from the destroyed *Rocca*. When the Pacts of 1203 and 1210 were ratified, many of the nobles who had formerly lived in the country took up residences in the town. This requirement of the Pacts helped add substantially to the population, for the nobles brought their households — family and retainers — with them. In similar agreements, the lords of castles such as Serpigliano, Valfabbrica, and Postignano, and the citizens of towns like Bettona, took up residences in Assisi, or sent representatives to reside there.

When, in the Pact of 1210, the Commune recognized the equality of the inhabitants of the *sobborghi* to the citizens of the town, it accepted the responsibility for the many people who lived just outside the city walls, and it must have encouraged others to come and settle there, since expansion was easier outside the walls of the city. Many peasants were attracted to the security offered by the Commune, not only in time of war, but also in dealing with their lords. If the population of Iesi had increased by 1000 due to the influx of peasants in the years 1211-1217,<sup>99</sup> Assisi, which had championed the liberation of serfs with the Pacts of 1203 and 1210, must also have felt such an influx.

<sup>98</sup> L. Bracaloni, "Assisi medioevali," *AFH*, 7, No. 1 (1914), 14.

<sup>99</sup> *WIC*, pp. 37-38.

As the commercial life of the Commune increased, and as legislation was enacted which favored commercial enterprise, many of the *mercatores* who had lived outside of the walls must have moved into the city, near to the *mercatum*, where they could be closer to the shops and offices where the goods destined for consumption and other exchange were displayed and in part produced. Here merchants from other regions also came to present their wares to the public, and here, after 1212, the political as well as the economic life of the Commune was focused.<sup>100</sup> According to many of the communal documents transcribed in Fortini, and already cited in this article, the feudatories who settled in Assisi frequently built their houses in the vicinity of the *mercatum*.<sup>101</sup> Thus many of the nobles lived in close proximity to the merchants and shopkeepers who already resided there, and the *mercatum*, like the *forum* which it superseded, was the heart of Assisian society. So important was it to the life of the Commune, that the city statutes written in later years show that the penalties for crimes committed on the *mercatum* were double the usual penalties.<sup>102</sup>

Small wonder then, that an area so central to the vitality of a thriving citizenry should have been the target for renovation and expansion in 1228. Many of the houses standing in front of the churches around the *mercatum* (including the Church of St. Nicholas, the patron of merchants) were torn down, and the *mercatum* was renamed "la platea nova" or "la platea comunis."<sup>103</sup>

By 1241, the *Ospedale* of San Rufino, which was annexed to the Church of San Giorgio after 1167, had been moved from the east side of the city more towards the south, where it was nearer to San Giorgio. Doubtless this move also took place during the expanding years of the commune which we have just described.<sup>104</sup>

Despite its general expansion, Assisi was not without its contractions. Not only did it suffer a temporary loss in population from the Assisians who fled to seek refuge in Perugia and other cities, but its occupation of Nocera, Bettona, and other communes and *contrade* must have also depleted its population somewhat, at least for a time. Moreover, though we may surmise that some refugees

<sup>100</sup> See above, p. 00.

<sup>101</sup> FNV, III, 12.

<sup>102</sup> FNV, III, 23.

<sup>103</sup> FNV, III, 17.

<sup>104</sup> FNV, III, 56.

never returned to Assisi, we can be certain that Duke Conrad and his court never did, and this permanent loss in population was probably substantial, since there were many Germans and German sympathizers in Umbria, who had served Conrad from his service under Christian of Mainz to his service as Viceregent of Sicily under Henry VI. Many of them probably lived there with their families, and although some may have married into the native population and settled down, the majority probably left.

However, the fact that Assisi should expand physically as it did, in spite of these drops in population, serves to further emphasize the tremendous attraction it must have had for immigrants. They came not only from among the dispossessed, the peasants, and the merchant class, but also included notaries and men like Girardo di Giliberto, Assisi's first podestà, who came with professional political experiences to Assisi and received citizenship there, becoming a consul in 1203.<sup>105</sup> The increase in population and the accomodating physical growth of the city are not unique to Assisi however, for Waley points out to us, in his *The Italian City-Republics*, that "the most fundamental change [in northern and central Italy] was in the size of population, which is estimated to have doubled between the tenth and fourteenth centuries. The town-dwelling population certainly increased in an infinitely greater proportion, as the absolute demographic growth was accompanied by a wholesale movement townwards from the countryside." <sup>106</sup>

In the census lists of 1232, the most specific material available on the population of Assisi, there are 2255 *focolari*, or hearths, counted. Fortini, basing his estimate on the large extended families of this time, which included servants as well as kin, uses the rather liberal multiplier of 10.00 to arrive at a population figure of 22,550 for the city and *contrada* of Assisi at this time, without counting parish priests and monks.<sup>107</sup> Herlihy, in his study of Pistoia at this time, uses the more conservative multiplier of 4.65, justifying this figure by the large proportion of women who were listed as heads of households (and would, therefore, have smaller households).<sup>108</sup> Since many

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<sup>105</sup> See above, p. 00.

<sup>106</sup> WIC, p. 14.

<sup>107</sup> FNV, III, 73.

<sup>108</sup> David Joseph Herlihy, *Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia: the Social History of an Italian Town, 1200-1430* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 61, 117-118.



women appear in the Assisian lists as well, we find, using Herlihy's multiplier, a population of 10,462 for Assisi at this time, and this approximates Waley's estimate of 10,000 inhabitants for Assisi.<sup>109</sup> By way of comparison however, in 1243 Pistoia had 7312 hearths;<sup>110</sup> Perugia had 5529 in 1285.<sup>111</sup> In the early thirteenth century, Florence had almost 50,000 inhabitants.<sup>112</sup> Assisi was a small commune, but as we have seen, its daily life was no less dynamic than that of the larger Italian communes.

### ASSISIAN SOCIETY AND SOCIAL GROUPS

As this article clearly demonstrates, any attempt to neatly classify the elements of Assisian society would fall far short of its mark. Though the commune certainly inherited two basic social groups from an earlier age, these groups, the nobility and non-nobility, became less and less distinct as the city grew.

The essential distinction between the two groups is that of imperial or papal recognition of nobility, which, as we have seen <sup>113</sup> might be withdrawn at the whim of the papal or imperial courts. Because this distinction was usually hereditary, it became more closely associated with blood, or family lineage. The four terms often applied to the nobility — *buoni uomini*, *magnati*, *maiores*, and *milites* — can easily symbolize the social and family prestige, the economic status, the political power, and the military strength and duties of this social group. According to Brucker, there were within the patriciate infinite gradations of wealth, status, and pre-eminence; what united the nobility as a class was blood, community of interests, and shared tradition.<sup>114</sup> That these gradations should occur is the natural result of changing social and political conditions, an increasing population of nobles, and a fairly constant economic base founded on the land. While a first-born son might inherit all of his father's

<sup>109</sup> WPS, p. 86.

<sup>110</sup> Herlihy, *Pistoia*, p. 62.

<sup>111</sup> WPS, p. 85, n. 3.

<sup>112</sup> WIC, p. 35.

<sup>113</sup> See above, pp. 00 f.

<sup>114</sup> Gene A. Brucker, "The Patterns of Social Change," in *Social and Economic Foundations of the Italian Renaissance*, ed. Anthony Molho (New York: John Wiley, 1969), p. 133.

estate, a fifth-born was often reduced to seeking his fortune in the world, entering the employ of some great secular or ecclesiastical lord, or aspiring to the religious life. Many of these latter-born, by virtue of the superior educations offered them, turned to law as a vocation, often becoming judges, imperial and papal notaries, etc.

Thus we see in Assisian society that many of the powerful land-owning nobles, such as the lords of Sassorosso, whose reputation for violence and disorder threatened the security of the young city and the commerce of its merchants, are the prime targets of the reprisals conducted against the nobles by the *popolani*, while still other nobles allied themselves with the non-nobility in the creation of the Commune. In this light, we can understand the appearance of nobles in the lists of podestàs, consuls and judges. As we have noted,<sup>115</sup> their presence added to the prestige of their office, and made dealing with other nobles and courts more feasible. Many nobles followed ecclesiastical and religious vocations in Assisi, as evidenced not only by the lists of the Priors of San Rufino,<sup>116</sup> but also by the followers of St. Francis himself. It is also from Francis, or at least his biographer, that we obtain our evidence for the poverty of some nobility. In his *Vita secunda*,<sup>117</sup> Thomas of Celano tells us of a poor knight who was almost naked, to whom St. Francis gave his own garments.

As the ranks of the nobles thickened, and as the blood lines were thinned by generations, it is not surprising that the category "nobles" becomes more irrelevant. It is even less surprising when one realizes that the growing economic, political, and military power of some of the *popolani*, the *popolo grasso*, made the term "nobility" a purely academic distinction in some cases. The position and gradations of these upwardly mobile non-nobles is no less vacillating than that of the nobles however, since they were usually rooted on the unstable foundations of capital enterprise. However, to those who rose to positions of prominence, most, if not all, the advantages of nobility were available, including marriage with noble families. Sons of these *nouveau riche* businessmen were educated together with the sons of nobles, and, like Francis, were trained for cavalry combat, which

<sup>115</sup> See above, p. 00, also FNV, II, 193.

<sup>116</sup> FNV, III, 34-35.

<sup>117</sup> *Vita Secunda*, Pars I, caput ii, in *Analecta Franciscana*, X (Quaracchi: Tipographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1941), p. 133.

had been the prerogative of noblemen. The Commune of Assisi guaranteed the *mercatores* political equality with the *milites*, as we have seen, by the Pact of 1203.<sup>118</sup> As this group of wealthy businessmen rose in power, their families banded together in *consorteria*, both for defense and offense, and these family and clan associations rivalled those of the nobility, making blood lineage even less distinctly a trait of the nobility.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, we see that to label one element of Assisian society as "nobles" and another as "bourgeoisie" tells us very little that is factual about these groups, and through its stereotyping may even conceal from us the real dynamics of the situation.

With regard to the other elements of Assisian society who, together with the *popolo grasso* are composed of non-nobility, our position is much less informed, since the source material on Assisian lower classes is fragmentary and especially scanty. We do know however, that there was a *popolo minuto*, composed of rustic serfs and the like, who were explicitly not among those emancipated by the Pact of 1203.<sup>120</sup> In addition to those serfs who actually worked the land and served the lords, this group probably included some few peasants who were occupied as weavers, carriers, scavengers, and the like. They are recognizable by the offerings of *amiscere* which they owed the lord, if not actual *servizi*. Though they may even have been quite numerous, they were powerless, probably as much due to a lack of organization as a lack of resources.

We may also speculate that there was a social group corresponding to Brucker's *artefici*,<sup>121</sup> who were liberated from "servitia debitalia pro hominico,"<sup>122</sup> but for one reason or another had not achieved the preeminence of the *popolo grasso*, or, achieving it, had lost it. Because much early communal legislation appears to favor shopkeepers as well as more powerful merchants, we may surmise that this group participated to some degree in the political processes of the Commune. However, we should be mindful of Waley's statement regarding Orvieto, when we are considering the government of Assisi: "Certainly the government was not democratic in the modern sense, for even under the popular regime only members of the Guilds

<sup>118</sup> See above, p. 00.

<sup>119</sup> For more on these *consorteria*, cf. FNV, III, 44.

<sup>120</sup> See above, p. 00.

<sup>121</sup> Brucker, "Patterns of Social Change," p. 132.

<sup>122</sup> FNV, II, 132.

shared in it; the exclusion of journeymen and apprentices, as well as those who exercised no trade, meant that less than half of the adult male population was concerned in the politics of the commune."<sup>123</sup> In later years, the guilds would strengthen the power of the *artefici*, but it is doubtful that, in the period of Assisian history we have just discussed, many of the *artefici* were considered, like the *mercatores*, the legal equals of the *milites*. At this period, however, they remain an amorphous and anonymous group who were probably represented in the *consiglio generale* of the Commune. In all probability, these anonymous masses substantially constituted the population of the Commune. Perhaps then too, it is to this group, the lowest of the freedmen, that the *servi rustici* owed their emancipation in 1210, nearly a half-century prior to the more famous emancipation of serfs at Bologna in 1256-7.

The truth of Waley's statement that "the division between the nobles and the Popolo was clear-cut institutionally, but it corresponded with no distinct economic or social dichotomy"<sup>124</sup> is supported by our analysis of Assisian society. This was a period of change and movement; twenty-four years might make a pauper of a lord or a rich merchant of a serf. From this change, and the often painful accommodations to it, was born a new political and social entity: the Commune.

*Memorial University of Newfoundland*  
*St. John's, Newfoundland*

PAUL V. RILEY, JR.

<sup>123</sup> WMO, p. xviii.

<sup>124</sup> WMO, p. xxiv.



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## GERARD ODON'S "DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS"

Gerard Odon, successor to the deposed Michael of Cesena as Minister General of the Franciscans, is mostly remembered in our times for his administrative career during the pontificates of John XXII and Benedict XII.<sup>1</sup> He was fiercely attacked within the Franciscan Order by the friends of Michael of Cesena: Francis of Marchia called him "Theologiae doctor indoctus;" Blaise of Muro charged him with teaching many things contrary to solid learning and Christian faith as well as with unduly persecuting Friars who lived praiseworthy Franciscan lives; and William of Ockham accused him of seven heresies.<sup>2</sup>

Concerning his educational career, Gerard in his own era was given the title "Doctor Moralis," perhaps as Fortunatus of Saint-Bonaventure argued, because of the moral insight he manifests on many points in his *Commentary on the Sentences*,<sup>3</sup> or maybe on account of his elaborate *Scriptum super Librum Ethicorum*, without doubt his principal work.

James J. Walsh has indicated Gerard's importance in the ethical discussions of the 14th and 15th centuries.<sup>4</sup> Vassili P. Zoubov has studied his question "Utrum continuum componatur ex indivisibilibus" and has shown the relation of our author to his finitist disciples, Nicholas Bonet and Nicholas of Autrecourt, and his opponents on this question: John the Canon, Peter Tartaret and Cajetan of Tiène.<sup>5</sup>

Aside from these points of ethics and physics the doctrinal positions of Gerard are hardly known. Especially are we ignorant of Gerard's contribution to the field of logic. In the present article we will

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<sup>1</sup> For a general introduction to the life and writings of Gerard see N. Valois, "Guiral Ot, Frère Mineur" in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, 36 (1927), 203-225.

<sup>2</sup> N. Valois, "Guiral Ot...", 206-210.

<sup>3</sup> N. Valois, "Guiral Ot...", 224.

<sup>4</sup> James J. Walsh, "Buridan and Seneca" in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 27 (1966), 39.

<sup>5</sup> Vassili P. Zoubov, "Walter Catton, Gerard d'Odon et Nicolas Bonet" *Physis*, 1 (1959), 261-278.

try to fill in this gap by editing his *De Suppositionibus* — such a central treatise for medieval logic, philosophy and theology.

#### A. THE DEFINITION OF SUPPOSITION

Gerard begins his *De Suppositionibus* with a definition of supposition which at once criticizes an earlier definition of supposition as inadequate and goes on to complete it. "Suppositio autem termini est acceptio termini pro aliquo in usum loquendi de ipso."<sup>6</sup> The first part of the definition is granted by all logicians, our author tells us. Peter of Spain, for example, gives exactly the first part — but as his complete definition: "Suppositio autem est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo."<sup>7</sup> Gerard, however, argues that a definition like Peter's is incomplete. You must add "in usum loquendi de ipso" to render it complete. The addition links Gerard with the position of Roger (?) Bacon, Walter Burley and William of Ockham who insist that supposition is the property of a term actually and knowingly employed in a proposition to refer to something.<sup>8</sup> It also implies a denial of natural supposition.

Neither does Gerard limit supposition to *substantive* terms after the manner of Peter of Spain, but rather, like Lambert of Auxerre, Walter Burley and William of Ockham, he takes supposition in a more common way to include non-substantive terms. He thus appears to follow the trend in these same authors to unify the once disparate treatises on supposition (limited to *substantive* terms) and on copulation (limited to *adjectival* terms).<sup>9</sup>

Attacking the position represented by Walter Burley's *De Suppositionibus*, and employing the latter's very argument and example, Gerard considers it an oversimplification to contend that part of a term or extreme cannot have supposition. First of all, an argument like Burley's could likewise be used to prove no complete term or extreme has supposition.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, the question of the supposition of parts of extremes needs a number of distinctions, and in discussing

<sup>6</sup> Gerard Odon, *De Suppositionibus*, infra, n. 1.1.

<sup>7</sup> Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales*, ed. I. M. Bochenski (Rome, 1947), 68.

<sup>8</sup> See S. F. Brown, "Walter Burleigh's Treatise *De Suppositionibus* and its Influence on William of Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*, 32 (1972), 19-21.

<sup>9</sup> See S. F. Brown, "Walter Burleigh's...", 19-21.

<sup>10</sup> Gerard Odon, *De Suppositionibus*, infra, n. 1.3.



them Gerard incorporates in his *De Suppositionibus* material that in the major logical works of the 13th century belonged to a separate treatise *De Restrictionibus*. This section also allows him to touch briefly on the supposition of oblique terms, predicate terms and the peculiar supposition of middle terms in a syllogism.<sup>11</sup>

## B. THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION

Although the first announced division of supposition is into material and formal,<sup>12</sup> there are some other divisions implied in Gerard's structure. First is the division into proper and improper. This is not an announced division, but improper supposition is specifically handled — at the end of the treatise, where its origin is ascribed to the *Etymology* of Isidore of Seville.<sup>13</sup> There is also no explicit division into absolute and relative supposition, but the supposition of relative terms is certainly treated — as one of the special types of confused supposition.<sup>14</sup>

The first of the announced divisions, material supposition, is subdivided into vocal and rational. When a term supposits for itself it supposits materially and it can do this in two ways. For it can supposit for itself purely as a *vox*, independent of any meaning attached to it, as in the proposition "Bal est monosyllabum"; then "Bal" has vocal supposition. Or it can supposit for itself as a meaningful word, as in the statement "Bene est adverbium"; then the subject term has rational supposition.<sup>15</sup> Along with these and his other kinds of supposition Gerard provides the rules which govern each type, corollaries flowing from these rules, and important observations or inferences concerning each kind of supposition.

The other major division of supposition, formal supposition, occurs when a term stands for something other than itself. Since this can happen in many ways there are many subdivisions under formal supposition.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Infra*, n. 1.22.

<sup>12</sup> *Infra*, n. 1.12.

<sup>13</sup> *Infra*, nn. 11.0–11.1.

<sup>14</sup> *Infra*, nn. 10.9–10.95.

<sup>15</sup> *Infra*, nn. 2.0–3.12.

<sup>16</sup> *Infra*, nn. 1.12 and 4.0–10.96.

a) *Simpliciter simplex* — when a term stands for its significate, as in the proposition “Homo est species specialissima” where the subject term stands for the nature of man and not for anything inferior or superior to it.<sup>17</sup> Right from the beginning of his treatment of formal supposition we find Gerard in agreement with the realist position of Burley and the 13th century logicians and in opposition to the position of Ockham who declares that a term has *personal* supposition when it stands for its significate.<sup>18</sup>

b) *Simpliciter personalis* — when a term stands for those things which participate in the significate or nature. For instance, in the proposition “Nullus homo est species,” *species* is not denied of the nature “man” but of the individuals who share that nature. Thus, in the statement “Nullus homo est species,” *homo* supposits for these individuals.<sup>19</sup> During the discussion of this type of supposition he indicates that *suppositio simpliciter simplex* has a certain natural priority to *suppositio simpliciter personalis*, once more denying the position taken by Ockham.<sup>20</sup>

c) *Simpliciter communis* — when a term stands for something superior to the significate, as in the proposition “Homo est omnia.” *Homo* in this proposition should not be taken strictly but we should make an effort to grasp what *homo* stands for. *Homo* really must stand for *ens*, which is superior to *homo*, if we wish to give a beneficent interpretation to our original proposition.<sup>21</sup> Such supposition seems to belong to the improper area, but the structure of his treatise (a term stands for its significate, or for its inferiors, or for its superiors etc.) seems to force Gerard to locate it here rather than at the end of his treatise.

d) *Personaliter simplex* — when a term stands both for its significate and for the inferiors who participate in or are contained under the significate, it has *suppositio personaliter simplex*. Gerard gives as his example: “Homo est unus secundum speciem specialis-

<sup>17</sup> *Infra*, nn. 4.0-4.50.

<sup>18</sup> See S. F. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s...,” 24-25.

<sup>19</sup> *Infra*, nn. 5.0 and 5.1-5.40.

<sup>20</sup> *Infra*, nn. 5.2-5.20.

<sup>21</sup> *Infra*, nn. 6.0-6.1.

simam." Such unity, he argues, belongs to *man* and to its inferiors, individual men, not however to its superiors.<sup>22</sup>

e) *Communiter simplex* — when a term stands both for its significate and for its superiors. In the examples "Homo est universalis" or "Homo praedicatur de pluribus," *homo* stands for its significate and for its superiors, e.g. *animal*, or *corpus* or *substantia*, but not for individuals contained under the species *man*.<sup>23</sup>

f) *Communicabilis* — when a term stands for its significate as well as its inferiors and its superiors it has *suppositio communicabilis* (which others call personal supposition — not *suppositio simpliciter personalis*). For instance, in the proposition "Homo est animal" the term *homo* stands for its significate and its inferiors, as can happen also with *suppositio personaliter simplex*, but it can also stand for the superiors to *man*, as in the propositions "Corpus est animal" or "Substantia est animal." Thus, this supposition is of a special sort and must not be confused with *suppositio personaliter simplex*.<sup>24</sup>

*Suppositio communicabilis* is subdivided into *determined* supposition and *confused* supposition. The former is further subdivided into discrete and indiscrete. The latter, *confused supposition*, occurs in many ways, and thus has many subdivisions, since the supposition of a term can be confused 1) *per compositionem termini* (e.g. "Nemo dormit" where *Nemo* is equivalent to *Nullus homo*); 2) *per consignificationem termini* (e.g. "Homines disputant" where the subject is plural in number); 3) *per adiectionem numeri* (e.g. "Triplex ratio probat hanc conclusionem," where the adjective *triplex* multiplies the suppositio of *ratio*); 4) *per reduplicationem termini* (e.g. "Triangulus habet tres angulos in quantum triangulus" where the *in quantum* effectively universalizes the subject and makes the proposition become "Omnis triangulus habet tres angulos"); 5) *per negationem praedicati* (e.g. "Quoddam animal non est quadrupes" where the predicate term is confused and equals "ergo non est asinus," "ergo non est equus" etc.); 6) *per dispositionem signi* (e.g. "Omnis triangulus habet tres angulos" or "Unusquisque triangulus habet tres angulos" where the *omnis* and *unusquisque* distribute *triangulus*); 7) *per confusionem adiuncti* (e.g. "Omnis homo est animal" where the *omnis*, by confusing the *homo*, automatically implies the multiplication of *animal*);

<sup>22</sup> Infra, nn. 7.0–7.8.

■ Infra, nn. 8.0–8.7.

■ Infra, nn. 9.0–9.32.

8) *per relationem termini confusi* (e.g. "Omnis homo aliquando vigilat qui etiam aliquando dormit" where the *qui* takes on the extension of its antecedent 'Omnis homo'). Finally, the supposition of a term can be affected by the tense of the verbs or predicates employed (e.g. "Homines sunt mortui" where the predicate limits *homo* to its past supposits.<sup>25</sup> Thus Gerard has incorporated into his treatise *De Suppositionibus* at this place the separate 13th century logical treatises *De Distributionibus* and *De Restrictionibus*.

Gerard's work would have both for William of Ockham and Walter Burley difficulties that would render it on some points unacceptable, but it also shows us an instance of how early 14th century logicians were personal in the way they thought through their treatises. Gerard's treatise is structured in his own individual way and the divisions he provides for formal supposition in particular show this. Gerard's *De Suppositionibus*, for all its personal stamp, seems to have had little influence. Although the Pseudo-Aureoli *Summa Logicae* quotes our author's *De Syllogismis*, we know of no author who employs his *De suppositionibus*<sup>26</sup>; nevertheless its authenticity is without doubt because Gerard himself refers to it in his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.<sup>27</sup>

The edition we have made of this work, probably written between 1320 and 1324,<sup>28</sup> is based on three manuscript copies: Paris, *Bibliothèque Nationale*, ms. lat. 644I, ff. 136<sup>ra</sup>–139<sup>rb</sup> and Madrid, *Biblioteca de la Universidad*, ms. 105, ff. 14<sup>ra</sup>–19<sup>ra</sup> as well as 37<sup>rb</sup>–41<sup>va</sup>. We have employed the Paris manuscript as our basic document since it has a better text. This manuscript is described in the new edition of William of Ockham's *Summa Logicae*.<sup>29</sup> The Madrid manuscript

<sup>25</sup> *Infra*, nn. 10.0–10.96.

<sup>26</sup> Pseudo-Aureoli, *Summa Logicae*, ms. Vat. lat. 946, f. 7rb.

<sup>27</sup> *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 4, art. 5: "De suppositione autem confusa seu communicabili et de speciebus eius et de omni specie suppositionis sufficienter me reputo dixisse in quodam tractatu quem feci de suppositionibus terminorum" (cod. Madrid, Bibl. Nacional 65, f. 48rb).

<sup>28</sup> Although the Friars generally were not allowed to lecture on Arts until after they had completed their theology studies, there is no reason why Gerard could not have written this treatise before he started lecturing on the *Sentences* in 1324.

<sup>29</sup> Guillelmi de Ockham, *Summa Logicae* (*Opera Philosophica* I, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál, Stephen Brown, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), 48\*.



containing the two other copies is described in the general catalogue of that library.<sup>30</sup> The symbols used are :

P — Paris, *Bibliothèque Nationale*, lat. 6441

M — Madrid, *Biblioteca de la Universidad* 105, ff. 14<sup>ra</sup>–19<sup>ra</sup>

S — Madrid, *Biblioteca de la Universidad* 105, ff. 37<sup>rb</sup>–41<sup>va</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> D. José Villa-amil y Castro, *Catalogo de los manuscritos existentes en la Biblioteca del noviciado de la Universidad central (procedentes de la antigua de Alcalá)*, Madrid 1878, 37.

⟨TRACTATUS DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS GERARDI ODONIS⟩

(I.O) Quoniam qui <sup>1</sup> virtutis <sup>2</sup> nominum sunt ignari <sup>3</sup> de facili paralogizantur, et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes, ne studiosos scientiae ac veritatis amicos ex huius virtutis <sup>4</sup> ignorantia faciliter paralogizari in veritatis inquisitione <sup>5</sup> contingat, de suppositionibus notitiam aliqualem tradere studui, in quibus ultimate <sup>6</sup> consistit virtus et ultimum de potentia terminorum.

(I.I) Suppositio autem termini est acceptio termini <sup>7</sup> pro aliquo <sup>8</sup> in <sup>9</sup> usum loquendi de ipso. Huius autem descriptionis pars prima ab omnibus logicis est concessa. Secunda vero probatur ostendendo quod prima non est sufficiens sine secunda. Et proba quod non omnis terminus acceptus pro aliquo habeat <sup>10</sup> suppositionem: Nullus terminus acceptus ut accipiens solum <sup>11</sup> ipso et non <sup>12</sup> de ipso nec de aliquo <sup>13</sup> alio quocumque <sup>14</sup> loquatur habet aliquam suppositionem. Quod patet, quia in tali termino vel circa talem terminum nihil supponit, <sup>15</sup> ut si aliquis idiota orationem <sup>16</sup> latinam legat et <sup>17</sup> non intelligat nihil supponit in terminis orationis; nec enim ⟨habet⟩ significationem nec appellationem nec aliquid huiusmodi; sed loquitur per terminos, non de terminis nec de <sup>18</sup> significatis. Sed terminus sic acceptus est acceptus <sup>19</sup> pro aliquo, quia pro logica ratione per quam loquitur, non de qua loquitur. Igitur non omnis ⟨terminus acceptus⟩ pro aliquo <sup>20</sup> habet aliquam suppositionem. Est igitur addendum <sup>21</sup> in descriptione <sup>22</sup> quod terminus hic <sup>23</sup> sit <sup>24</sup> acceptus in usum loquendi de ipso pro quo sumitur.

(I.IO) Ex his autem particulis collige duas maximas. Prima est ex prima ⟨parte descriptionis⟩; quod omnis terminus supponens pro aliquo supponit pro illo supposito pro <sup>25</sup> quo accipitur. Haec maxima patet, quia suppositio est acceptio, quare suppositio pro aliquo est acceptio pro eodem. Secunda maxima: quod nullus terminus <sup>26</sup> in

<sup>1</sup> qui *om.* P

<sup>2</sup> virtutis/virtutes M

<sup>3</sup> ignari/significari P

<sup>4</sup> virtutis/veritatis S

<sup>5</sup> in... inquisitione *interl.* S; inquisitione/acquisitione M

<sup>6</sup> ultimate/utilitate *del. et corr. (mg.)* in ultimate S

<sup>7</sup> termini *om.* P

<sup>8</sup> aliquo/aliquibus P

<sup>9</sup> in *om.* P

<sup>10</sup> habeat/habet S

<sup>11</sup> solum/ut *add. (mg.)* MS

<sup>12</sup> non/ut *add. (mg.)* MS

<sup>13</sup> aliquo *om.* PS

<sup>14</sup> quocumque *om.* M

<sup>15</sup> supponit/supponitur PS

<sup>16</sup> orationem/conclusionem S

<sup>17</sup> et/cum S

<sup>18</sup> nec de/et S

<sup>19</sup> est acceptus *om.* MS

<sup>20</sup> quia pro... aliquo *om. (hom.)* MS

<sup>21</sup> addendum/attendendum S

<sup>22</sup> in descriptione *om.* S

<sup>23</sup> hic *om.* MS

<sup>24</sup> sit *om.* M

<sup>25</sup> illo... pro *om.* PS

<sup>26</sup> nullus terminus/nulla propositio est S

ore ignorantis propriam vocem habet aliquam suppositionem. Haec maxima patet, quia ex secunda parte descriptionis habetur quod terminus sumitur in usum loquendi de illo pro quo sumitur. Sed ignorans propriam vocem non loquitur<sup>27</sup> de aliquo; sed<sup>28</sup> potest loqui per ipsam; quare etc.<sup>29</sup>

(I.II) Suppositio autem dicta est suppositio propter duo quae supponuntur in termino supponente. Primum est determinata significatio termini ad hoc quod non negetur loquela. Et hoc dicit Aristoteles *IV Metaphysicae*:<sup>30</sup> "Significare quidem aliquid et ipsi et aliis necesse est si dicat aliquid." Secundum est potestas utendi termino pro suo significato vel pro participantibus significatum vel pro participatis per significatum.<sup>31</sup> Aliter enim negaretur loquela. Et hoc innuit Aristoteles *I Elenchorum*<sup>32</sup> dicens quod in disputatione nominibus notis utimur pro rebus<sup>33</sup> et aliquando uno pro multis, puta nomine generis pro infinitis contentis sub genere. Propter hoc ergo suppositio dicta est suppositio.

(I.I2) Suppositio autem in multa genera dividitur, quorum numerus<sup>34</sup> et sufficientia sic habetur: quoniam omnis terminus acceptus pro aliquo, ut dictum est,<sup>35</sup> vel est acceptus pro se ipso, et tunc est suppositio materialis,<sup>36</sup> vel pro alio, et sic est suppositio formalis.<sup>37</sup> Si pro se ipso hoc contingit dupliciter: quia vel pro se voce sola, et est suppositio vocalis quia pro voce sola;<sup>38</sup> vel pro se voce significativa, et est suppositio rationalis, quia ad vocem ratio significandi, quae est forma dictionis, est addita. Si pro alio hoc contingit sex modis, quia vel pro significato tantum et praecise et est suppositio simpliciter simplex; vel pro participantibus<sup>39</sup> significatum tantum et praecise et est suppositio simpliciter personalis; vel pro aliquo superiori ad significatum praecise et est suppositio simpliciter<sup>40</sup> communis; vel<sup>41</sup> pro significato et participantibus significatum insimul et est suppositio personaliter<sup>42</sup> simplex; vel pro significato et participatis per significatum et est suppositio communiter simplex; vel pro significato et participantibus et participatis insimul et est suppositio communicabilis.

(I.I3) Suppositio autem debetur voci licet non significativae nec consignificativae, ut hic: "Bal nihil significat", et voci consignifi-

<sup>27</sup> loquitur *om.* PS

<sup>28</sup> sed *om.* PS

<sup>29</sup> quare etc. *om.* PS

<sup>30</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.* IV, c. 3, t. 9  
(1006a 21-23).

<sup>31</sup> significatum/significetur M

<sup>32</sup> Aristot., *De Soph. Elenchis* I, t. 1  
(165a 6-13).

<sup>33</sup> rebus *om.* P

<sup>34</sup> numerus/unus M

<sup>35</sup> ut... est *om.* S

<sup>36</sup> et tunc... materialis *om.* MS

<sup>37</sup> et sic... formalis *om.* MS

<sup>38</sup> quia... sola *om.* M

<sup>39</sup> participantibus/significatum simul  
et est suppositio simpliciter personalis vel pro participatis per *add.* M

<sup>40</sup> personalis... simpliciter *om.* M

<sup>41</sup> pro... vel *om.* S

<sup>42</sup> personaliter *om.* MP

cativae licet non significativae,<sup>43</sup> ut hic: "Omnis<sup>44</sup> est signum"<sup>45</sup> et voci significativae, ut hic: "Homo currit"; sed differenter, quia vox non significativa nec consignificativa habet tantum suppositionem vocalem, quia tantum accipitur pro se voce sola; vox autem consignificativa <licet non significativa> habet suppositionem vocalem<sup>46</sup> et rationalem; vocalem quidem quia potest sumi pro se voce sola, ut "Omnis est dysyllabum," rationalem quidem, quia potest sumi pro se<sup>47</sup> voce significativa vel consignificativa ratione significandi ad vocem addita, ut hic "Omnis<sup>48</sup> est numeri singularis" vel "Omnis homo<sup>49</sup> est nomen." Utrobique enim praedicatur modus significandi essentialis vel accidentalis de dictione seu voce significativa. Quare non est putandum quod aliam suppositionem habeat haec dictio 'omnis' hic et ibi sicut nec 'homo' si dicatur "Homo est rationalis" et "Homo est risibilis." Vox autem significativa potest habere suppositionem vocalem ratione vocis et rationalem ratione rationis, et ultra haec<sup>50</sup> formalem ratione<sup>51</sup> significati.

(1.2) Sed hic occurrunt duo dubia. Primum: quomodo vox non significativa habet suppositionem cum supra dictum sit quod omnis suppositio supponit significationem. Secundum: quomodo vox significativa ut distincta contra nullo modo significativam et consignificativam supponit in oratione, si videlicet oportet<sup>52</sup> quod sit terminus et extremum orationis an sufficiat quod sit pars termini vel extremi.

(1.21) Ad primum dico quod quaelibet vox in singulari accepta<sup>53</sup> naturaliter<sup>54</sup> significat se ipsam in universali, id est quaelibet vox individua significat totam speciem suam et pro illa supponit, et de illa fit sermo. Quod patet cum quaeritur: materia<sup>55</sup> prima quanta? Hic enim non solum quaeritur de hac singulari voce sed de qualibet eiusdem speciei cum ista.<sup>56</sup> Et haec<sup>57</sup> significatio sufficit suppositione vocali et rationali sed non formali. Hic autem dicitur vox non significativa quia non significat ad placitum; quare non est repugnantia in dictis.

(1.22) Ad secundum dico quod pars extremi vel termini in quam resolvitur propositio duplex est: una quae est determinabilis, alia quae est determinatio. Haec enim determinatio est duplex: una substantiva, puta termini substantivi in obliquo positi, ut 'disciplina oppositarum est eadem'; alia<sup>58</sup> est adiectiva, puta nominis adiectivi

<sup>43</sup> ut hic... significativae *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>44</sup> omnis/homo *add.* M

<sup>45</sup> signum/significativus P

<sup>46</sup> quia... vocalem *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>47</sup> voce... se *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>48</sup> Omnis/homo *add.* MS

<sup>49</sup> homo *om.* P

<sup>50</sup> haec/habet M

<sup>51</sup> ratione/rationem P

<sup>52</sup> si... oportet/valet quod M

<sup>53</sup> accepta *om.* P

<sup>54</sup> naturaliter *lac.* M

<sup>55</sup> materia/magister P

<sup>56</sup> ista/ipsa materia M

<sup>57</sup> haec/termini M

<sup>58</sup> alia/substantia P



vel aliarum partium orationis. Et ista est multiplex: quaedam est subiecti, ut 'Sortes hilariter <sup>59</sup> currit'; quaedam praedicati, ut 'Sortes velociter currit'; quaedam unionis subiecti et praedicati, ut 'Sortes contingenter currit'; quaedam distributionis subiecti vel praedicati, ut 'Contingit omne animal esse hominem.' Hic enim non fertur contingentia ad unionem animalis cum homine, quia illa est necessaria, sed ad distributionem animalis quae est contingens, ut si <sup>60</sup> animal distribuatur pro solis hominibus, quod fieret animalibus caeteris non existentibus. Modo dico quod determinabile cum adiectiva determinatione <sup>61</sup> non habet aliam et aliam suppositionem, ita quod determinabile unam habeat et determinatio aliam, quia vel illa determinatio nullam habet suppositionem, ut determinatio adverbialis, vel habet eandem cum suo determinabili, ut 'Homo albus currit.' Secundo <sup>62</sup> dico quod obliquus substantivus potest habere propriam suppositionem distinctam a suppositione sui determinabilis. Quod probo duplici ratione: Prima est haec: omnis <sup>63</sup> terminus confusus habet suppositionem distinctam a suppositione non confusi, quia si habet confusionem habet suppositionem cum confusio sit differentia suppositionis. Sed confusa et non <sup>64</sup> confusa non est eadem, quare illa propositio patet. Sed obliquus determinans potest confundi suo determinabili non confuso; ergo habet propriam suppositionem aliam a suppositione sui determinabilis. Minor patet hic: "Deus cognovit omnem hominem." Ecce quod obliquus confunditur per signum universalem. Hic terminus confunditur non confuso: "Cognitio enim Dei est unica." Quare hic in propositione vera non est confusa. Secundo sic: omnis terminus qui solus est terminus medius in syllogismo habet propriam <sup>65</sup> suppositionem distinctam a suppositionibus extremitatum. Quod patet, quoniam aliter non attenderetur variatio termini medii circa syllogismum. Sed terminus obliquus potest esse medium in syllogismo, ut patet *I Priorum*:<sup>66</sup> "De omni bono est aliqua disciplina; sed sanitas est bonum; ergo de sanitate est aliqua disciplina."

(1.3) Nec valet signum quod per sophistam inducitur: quod non est bona consequentia ab extremo ad extremum, licet pars extremi sit consequens <sup>67</sup> ad partem extremi, <sup>68</sup> ut hic: 'Sortes currit ad hospitium, ergo Sortes <sup>69</sup> est ad hospitium,' et tamen 'esse' est consequens ad 'currere,' quia tamen 'esse <sup>70</sup> ad hospitium' non <sup>71</sup> est consequens ad 'currere ad hospitium,' ideo consequentia non est bona. Et hic est signum: quod pars extremi non habeat suppositionem.

<sup>59</sup> hilariter *om.* P

<sup>60</sup> si scilicet MS

<sup>61</sup> determinatione/de simulatione S

<sup>62</sup> Secundo/sicut P

<sup>63</sup> omnis/Si igitur P

<sup>64</sup> et non/quando S

<sup>65</sup> propriam *om.* P

<sup>66</sup> Aristot., *Anal. Priora* I, c. 36 (48b 10-14).

<sup>67</sup> ad/partem extremi ubi totum extremum sit consequens ad *add.* M

<sup>68</sup> partem extremi totum extremum MS

<sup>69</sup> Sortes *om.* PS

<sup>70</sup> est... esse *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>71</sup> non *om.* MS

Sed hoc signum positum est ridiculum quam signum. Pari enim ratione et pari signo posset probari quod etiam extremum non haberet suppositionem, quia numquam est bona consequentia a propositione ad propositionem, licet extremum sit consequens ad extremum ubi propositio sit consequens ad <sup>72</sup> propositionem, ut patet hic: 'homo currit, ergo animal currit,' quia hominem currere est animal currere.<sup>73</sup> Sed hic 'homo <sup>74</sup> convertitur cum risibili, ergo animal' non sequitur, licet animal sit consequens ad hominem pro eo quia hominem converti cum risibili <sup>75</sup> non est animal converti cum risibili. Et haec dicta sint in generali: quid est suppositio, et quare dicitur suppositio, et quot sunt genera suppositionum, et quae voces et quae non <sup>76</sup> sunt aptae natae supponere.

(2.0) Suppositio autem vocalis est acceptio termini pro se voce sola in usum loquendi de ipsa, ut in his 'bal est monosyllabum,' <sup>77</sup> 'ens est monosyllabum.' In his enim omnibus sola vox est terminus et supponit pro se voce sola.

(2.1) De huiusmodi vero suppositione datur talis regula: omnis terminus vocaliter <sup>78</sup> supponens potest inferre aliquem terminum formaliter supponentem et inferri ab ipso. Quod patet in singulis, ut hic 'bal habet accentum acutum, ergo ista vox habet accentum acutum'; <sup>79</sup> etiam si dicatur e converso: 'omnis vox monosyllaba habet accentum acutum, ergo bal habet accentum acutum.' Ratio autem et causa veritatis huius regulae est quoniam aliqua vox est vox in se et in suo significato; ipsa enim est vox in singulari et significat vocem in generali.

(2.2) Unde sequitur corrolarium quod eadem vox possit supponere formaliter pro se ipsa vocaliter supponente, quia ipsa in se continetur sub suo significato, ut hoc quod dico 'vox' continetur sub suo significato,<sup>80</sup> quare quantum ad significatum potest distribui pro se ipsa significante vel non significante, ut hic: 'omnis vox est sonus' hic supponit 'vox' formaliter, et sequitur: 'ergo hoc quod dico 'vox' sumptum <sup>81</sup> materialiter et vocaliter <sup>82</sup> est sonus.'

(3.0) Suppositio autem rationalis est acceptio termini pro se voce significativa in usum loquendi de ipsa, ut in his 'bene est adverbium,' 'bonum est nomen,' 'plurale <sup>83</sup> est numeri singularis.'

<sup>72</sup> extremum ubi... ad *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>73</sup> est... currere *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>74</sup> homo/non *add.* P

<sup>75</sup> cum risibili *om.* PS

<sup>76</sup> quae non/quomodo P

<sup>77</sup> 'non' est monosyllabum *add.* PM

<sup>78</sup> vocaliter *om.* P

<sup>79</sup> ergo... acutum *om.* MS

<sup>80</sup> significato *om.* P

<sup>81</sup> sumptum/sumpta P

<sup>82</sup> vocaliter/formaliter vocaliter S

<sup>83</sup> plurale/tale P

(3.I) De huiusmodi vero suppositione datur regula similis praecedenti, scilicet quod omnis terminus rationaliter <sup>84</sup> supponens potest inferre aliquem terminum formaliter supponentem et inferri ab ipso, ut in his patet: 'vox est numeri singularis,'<sup>85</sup> ergo aliquod nomen est numeri singularis' et e converso: 'omne nomen est numeri singularis vel pluralis, ergo <sup>86</sup> vox est huiusmodi' iste terminus <'vox'> non habet suppositionem formalem sed iste terminus 'vox' habet in praedictis omnibus suppositionem rationalem.<sup>87</sup> Ratio vero et causa veritatis huius regulae est quoniam aliqua dictio est in se dictio et in suo significato. Ipsa enim est dictio in singulari et significat dictionem in generali, ut hoc quod est dictum dictio vel nomen vel pronomen vel verbum vel adverbium.

(3.II) Ex quibus nota unum et infer alterum. Nota ergo quod dictio potest habere idem pro modo significandi essentiali et pro significato,<sup>88</sup> ut haec dictio 'nomen,' vel idem <sup>89</sup> pro modo significandi accidentali <sup>90</sup> et suo significato, ut haec dictio 'singulare' <sup>91</sup> quia pro modo et etiam pro significato. Sumo <sup>92</sup> autem 'singulare' ut significat illum modum: habet enim pro modo significandi accidentali <sup>93</sup> vel potest habere opposita utriusque, ut scilicet dictio sit nomen et significet aliam partem orationis, ut haec dictio 'verbum,' vel quod habeat unum modum significandi accidentalem et significet oppositum, ut haec dictio 'plurale' quae in se est numeri singularis et tamen hic significat oppositum quia pluralem numerum.

(3.I2) Infer autem quod eadem dictio potest formaliter supponere pro se ipsa rationaliter <sup>94</sup> supponente, ut hic: 'omne nomen significat substantiam, ergo nomen significat substantiam.'<sup>95</sup> Haec dictio 'nomen' in antecedente supponit formaliter, in consequente rationaliter.<sup>96</sup> Aliquando vere <supponit> pro opposito, ut " 'singularia' est numeri pluralis; 'plurale' vero singularis."

(4.0) Suppositio autem simpliciter simplex est acceptio termini pro suo tantum significato in usum loquendi de ipso, ut in his 'homo est species specialissima,' 'homo convertitur cum risibili.' In his enim praedicatum est tale quod soli significato convenit et nulli superiori vel inferiori ad significatum.

(4.I) De hac autem suppositione dantur tres <sup>97</sup> regulae, et ex qualibet regula infertur unum corollarium. Prima est haec: nullus

<sup>84</sup> rationaliter/taliter P

<sup>85</sup> singularis/vel pluralis *add.* M

<sup>86</sup> aliquod... ergo *om.* M

<sup>87</sup> rationalem/personalem S

<sup>88</sup> potest... significato *om.* S

<sup>89</sup> nomen... idem/singulare habet singularem M

<sup>90</sup> accidentali/actuali MS

<sup>91</sup> et... singulare *om.* MS

<sup>92</sup> Sumo/Non S

<sup>93</sup> habet... accidentali *om.* MS

<sup>94</sup> rationaliter/totaliter P

<sup>95</sup> ergo... substantiam *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>96</sup> rationaliter/totaliter P

<sup>97</sup> tres/tales P

terminus communis in numero plurali acceptus vel <sup>98</sup> signo universalis vel particulari vel pronomine demonstrativo determinatus habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem. Hoc probatur, quoniam nullus terminus habens suppositionem simpliciter simplicem supponit pro multitudine contentorum sub <sup>99</sup> suo significato vel pro parte multitudinis, ut patet ex definitione huius suppositionis. Sed terminus in numero plurali acceptus vel signo universalis determinatus supponit pro multitudine. Quod patet, quia sequitur 'homines currunt, ergo multi currunt,' quia iste modus significandi ponit multitudinem ex parte significati; et etiam 'omnis homo currit,' sequitur ergo cursus ponitur ad minus circa tres homines, *I Caeli et Mundi*.<sup>1</sup> Eodem modo de aliis signis universalibus quae necessario denotant <sup>2</sup> aliquam multitudinem, ut 'uterque' vel 'neuter' dualitatem, et sic de aliis. Signum autem particulare denotat partem multitudinis et inde dictum est particulare. Pronomen vere demonstrativum denotat singulare, quia universale non est demonstrabile; quare terminus communis demonstrative determinatus stat pro aliquo singulari, et terminus signo particulari vel pronomine demonstrativo determinatus supponit pro parte multitudinis. Quare nullus terminus communis aliquo istorum quatuor modorum dispositus habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem.

(4.10) Ex hac regula sequitur corrolarium quod haec est falsa: 'Aliquis homo est species,' quoniam istud praedicatum 'species' de nullo subiecto <sup>3</sup> verificatur non habente suppositionem simpliciter simplicem, quia verificatur tantum de significato, non de contentis sub significato. Sed 'aliquis <sup>4</sup> homo' non habet hic <sup>5</sup> simplicem suppositionem, ut patet ex regula, ergo illa est falsa.

(4.11) Minor confirmatur quadrupliciter: Primo, quia de homine sic accepto, scilicet signo particulari determinato verificatur istud praedicatum 'individuum vagum.' <sup>6</sup> Haec enim est vera: 'Aliquis homo est individuum'; sed 'individuum' non verificatur de homine nisi pro aliquo contento sub homine, non de significato hominis; ergo 'homo' sic acceptus non habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem.

(4.12) Secundo, quia eius subcontraria <sup>7</sup> est vera, ista scilicet: 'Aliquis homo non est species.' Quod patet, quia eius contradictoria est falsa, ista scilicet: 'Omnis homo est species.' <sup>8</sup> Sed duae subcontrariae <sup>9</sup> non sunt simul verae nisi pro alio et alio, ut hic:

<sup>98</sup> vel/nec M

<sup>99</sup> sub/pro P

<sup>1</sup> Aristot., *De Coelo et Mundo*, I, c. 1, t. 2 (268a 16-19)

<sup>2</sup> denotant/demonstrant M

<sup>3</sup> subiecto/modo P

<sup>4</sup> aliquis om. MS

<sup>5</sup> hic/simpliciter add. M

<sup>6</sup> vagum lac. M

<sup>7</sup> subcontraria/subalterna MS

<sup>8</sup> Quod... species om. (hom.) S

<sup>9</sup> subcontrariae/subalternae S



'Aliquis homo currit,' 'Aliquis homo non currit'; in <sup>10</sup> una verificatur pro uno et in <sup>11</sup> altera pro altero. Ergo posito quod haec sint simul verae pro altero erit vera ista 'Aliquis homo est species' et pro altero ista 'Aliquis homo non est species.' Quare in utraque <sup>12</sup> iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro aliquo contento sub significato determinate et neutra pro significato determinate,<sup>13</sup> quare non habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem. Et hoc posito haec erit necessario falsa 'Aliquis homo est species,' quia ut dictum est, species non verificatur de aliquo contento sub homine.

(4.13) *Tertio*, quia haec est falsa: 'Aliquis hominum est species' ergo et ista 'Aliquis homo est species.' Prima est falsa, quia sensus est quod aliquis homo de numero hominum et connumeratus inter homines sit species. Hoc autem est falsum, quia homo ut est species non enumeratur <sup>14</sup> inter homines, quia tunc homo ut <sup>15</sup> species esset unus numero <sup>16</sup> de numero hominum, quod evidenter est falsum. Consequentia tenet, quia idem est dictu hic et ibi, et eadem causa veritatis vel falsitatis utrobique, ut dicendo "Aliquis homo currit," 'Aliquis hominum currit,' quia semper hoc signum 'aliquis' denotat <sup>17</sup> et exercet explicite vel implicite partitionem.

(4.14) *Quarto*, quia ut communiter dicitur per doctores:<sup>18</sup> secundum etymologiam idem est dictu 'aliquis' quam <sup>19</sup> 'alius quis,' quare 'aliquis homo' quasi 'alius <sup>20</sup> homo ab alio homine.' <sup>21</sup> Sed 'alius homo' non est species. Ergo nec aliquis homo, quia utrobique iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro parte multitudinis hominum, ut dicit regula.

(4.20) Sed hic solent aliqui <sup>22</sup> obicere putantes hanc esse veram: 'Aliquis homo est species,' dicentes: haec est falsa 'Nullus homo est species' ergo haec est vera: 'Aliquis homo est species' per legem contradictoriorum.<sup>23</sup>

(4.21) Item, haec est vera 'Aliqua species est homo,' ergo haec est vera 'Aliquis homo est species' per legem conversionis.

(4.22) Item, si haec est falsa 'Aliquis homo est species' ■■ convertetur in falsam: quare haec <sup>25</sup> 'Aliqua species est homo' erit falsa in quam prima convertitur.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>10</sup> in *om.* PS

<sup>11</sup> in *om.* PS

<sup>12</sup> et... utraque *om.* S

<sup>13</sup> et... determinate *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>14</sup> enumeratur/numeratur M, connumeratur S

<sup>15</sup> ut *om.* PS

■■ unus numero/unius numeri S

<sup>17</sup> denotat/demonstrat M

<sup>18</sup> Cf. e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Qq. Disp. De Veritate*, Q. 1, art. 1, Corp.

<sup>19</sup> per... quam *om.* S

<sup>20</sup> alius/quando S

<sup>21</sup> ab... homine *om.* M

<sup>22</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

■■ contradictoriorum/contradictoriam PS

■■ Aliquis... species/Aliqua species est homo S

<sup>25</sup> haec/est falsa *add.* S

<sup>26</sup> erit... convertitur *om.* S

(4.23) Item, aliquis homo vere praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid. Ergo 'aliquis homo est species.'

(4.30) Ad haec respondeo. Ad primum<sup>27</sup> dico quod haec est vera 'Nullus homo est species' quia hic terminus 'homo' supponit pro participantibus significatum suum,<sup>28</sup> non pro significato suo, et habet suppositionem simpliciter personalem, ut infra videbitur. Unde argumentum<sup>29</sup> est ad oppositum, quia si istae sunt contradictoriae, necesse est quod subiectum particularis supponit pro aliqua parte indeterminata illius multitudinis pro qua supponit subiectum universalis de qua quidem parte non verificatur hoc praedicatum 'species.' Et iterum si negativa<sup>30</sup> est vera,<sup>31</sup> affirmativa est falsa.

(4.31) Ad s e c u n d u m dico quod nulla est consequentia illius conversionis quia committitur fallacia accidentis procedendo a simplici ad personalem. In antecedente enim iste terminus 'homo' habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem, in consequente vero personalem, ut consuetum est dicere, per virtutem illius signi particularis sibi additi, quoniam determinatio addita suo determinabili et eadem parte<sup>32</sup> orationis et immediate potentior est determinatione addita ex altera parte orationis et<sup>33</sup> mediate. Sic autem est in proposito, quia istud praedicatum 'species' determinat hoc subiectum 'homo' ad suppositionem simplicem quantum est de se. Sed prohibetur per signum sibi additum immediate.

(4.32) Ad t e r t i u m dico quod peccat in duobus: P r i m o, quia fiunt quod nulla falsa<sup>34</sup> convertatur in veram, et sunt instantiae infinitae, ut hic 'Omne animal est homo.' Sequitur<sup>35</sup> per legem conversionis 'Ergo aliquis<sup>36</sup> homo est animal.' Propositio antecedens est falsa, consequens est vera.

(4.33) S e c u n d o, quia fiunt quod haec sit bona consequentia per conversionem: 'Aliquis homo est species, ergo aliqua species<sup>37</sup> est homo.' Debet enim hic addi in consequente 'Ergo est aliquis homo,' ad hoc<sup>38</sup> ut hic terminus 'homo' habeat eandem suppositionem in antecedente et in consequente. In antecedente enim non<sup>39</sup> habet simplicem, quare nec<sup>40</sup> in consequente debet habere.

(4.34) Ad q u a r t u m dico quod 'aliquis homo' non praedicatur univoce de Sorte et Platone, quia vel non habet<sup>41</sup> rationem

<sup>27</sup> Ad primum/et S

<sup>28</sup> participantibus... suum/particularibus S

<sup>29</sup> Unde argumentum/Bene S

<sup>30</sup> negativa/necessaria M, vera P

<sup>31</sup> vera om. P

<sup>32</sup> et... parte om. S

<sup>33</sup> immediate... et om. (hom.) PS

<sup>34</sup> falsa/fallacia M

<sup>35</sup> Sequitur om. S

<sup>36</sup> aliquis/quidam M

<sup>37</sup> ergo... species om. M

<sup>38</sup> ad hoc/animal M, om. S

<sup>39</sup> non/homo add. M

<sup>40</sup> nec/ut P

<sup>41</sup> habet/suppositionem add. P

aliquam secundum quam praedicetur vel non eandem habet 'aliquis homo' et postea <sup>42</sup> 'aliquis alius homo.'

(4.4) *S e c u n d a* regula est haec: Nullus terminus habens suppositionem simpliciter simplicem potest terminum sibi superiorem <sup>43</sup> vel inferiorem inferre vel inferri ab ipso. Haec regula patet, quoniam antecedens potest supponere pro consequente et consequens pro antecedente <sup>44</sup> in praedicamentaliter ordinatis. Sed, ut patet ex definitione, terminus habens suppositionem simpliciter simplicem non potest supponere pro superiori vel inferiori. Ergo non potest habere superius vel inferius ut sic pro antecedente vel pro consequente. Unde in tali processu esset fallacia accidentis procedendo a simplici <sup>45</sup> ad non-simplicem vel e converso, ut 'hic homo convertitur cum risibili, ergo animal' vel 'ergo Sortes' <sup>46</sup> non sequitur propter praedictam fallaciam.

(4.40) Ex hac regula sequitur corrolarium quod omnis terminus qui sub una acceptione et inferri et inferre potest et sub alia nec inferre nec inferri potest habet aliam <sup>47</sup> et aliam suppositionem, ut si haec consequentia est bona: 'Sortes currit, ergo homo' et haec non est bona 'Sortes est individuum, ergo homo,' <sup>48</sup> necesse est quod iste terminus 'Sortes' habeat aliam et aliam suppositionem hic et ibi. Quare dicens quod iste terminus 'Sortes' simpliciter et per se sumptus non potest habere distinctas suppositiones dixerit haec ignoranter et sine ratione. Unde in primo antecedente habet suppositionem communicabilem <sup>49</sup> in secundo vero habet suppositionem <sup>50</sup> simpliciter simplicem.

(4.5) *T e r t i a* regula est quod omnis terminus habens suppositionem simpliciter simplicem adiungitur alicui ad superiorum et inferiorum differentiam pertinenti. <sup>51</sup> Haec regula patet, quoniam nisi terminus supponens simpliciter pro suo tantum significato adiungeretur alicui quod convenit significato et non superiori nec inferiori posset utique supponere pro superiori vel inferiori, quod est contra definitionem. Quare illud cui adiungitur pertinet ad differentiam superiorum et inferiorum. Ad evidentiam autem huius regulae sciendum est quod huiusmodi adiunctum potest sumi multipliciter. <sup>52</sup> Uno modo per comparisonem ad superiora, ut hic: 'Homo immediate supponitur animali.' <sup>53</sup> Alio modo per comparisonem ad inferiora, ut hic: 'Homo immediate supponitur' <sup>54</sup> Sorti et Platoni. Alio modo

<sup>42</sup> postea/habet *add.* M

<sup>43</sup> terminum... superiorem/cuilibet sibi superiori S

<sup>44</sup> et... antecedente *om.* S

<sup>45</sup> esset... simplici *om.* P

<sup>46</sup> Sortes/vel Plato *add.* P

<sup>47</sup> alia... aliam *om.* P

<sup>48</sup> et... homo *om.* M

<sup>49</sup> communicabilem/communicalem M, communicantem S

<sup>50</sup> vero... suppositionem *om.* M

<sup>51</sup> pertinenti/facienti M

<sup>52</sup> multipliciter/tripliciter M

<sup>53</sup> animali/alteri M

<sup>54</sup> Alio... supponitur *om.* (*hom.*) MP

per comparisonem ad convertibilia, ut hic: 'Homo convertitur cum risibili,' 'Homo est primum subiectum risibilitatis.' Alio modo per comparisonem ad <sup>55</sup> coequaeva, ut hic: 'Homo est nobilissimum animalium.' Hoc enim praedicatum non potest dici de aliquo superiori ad hominem, quia non connumeratur inter animalia, nec de aliquo inferiori, non enim est verum quod Sortes est nobilissimum animalium.<sup>56</sup> In prima enim comparatione hominis ad alia animalia non fit comparatio inter homines. In secunda tamen fit alio modo per comparisonem <sup>57</sup> ad potentias et ad earum actus et habitus, ut hic: 'Ens est primum obiectum intellectus,' 'Secundum aliquos ens est primum subiectum metaphysicae,' 'Sonus est primum obiectum auditus.'

(4.50) Ex his sequitur <sup>58</sup> corrolarium quod illud adiunctum determinans terminum cui adiungitur ad supponendum simpliciter est gradus praedicamentalis seu praecisio seu decisio vel aliquid includens huiusmodi gradum vel praecise pertinens ad ipsum. Ad evidentiam autem huius corrolarii considerandum est quod linea praedicamentalis includendo extrema dividitur primo per tres gradus, scilicet in gradum suprapraedicamentalem, qui est gradus transcendentiae, et in gradum subpraedicamentalem,<sup>59</sup> qui est gradus singularitatis seu individualitatis,<sup>60</sup> et in gradum praedicamentalem, qui postea subdividitur in gradum generalissimae generalitatis et in gradum specialissimae specialitatis et in gradus intermedios subalternitatis. Differunt autem isti gradus a rebus graduatis per hoc quod ipsi gradus sunt secundae intentiones, utpote transcendentia, generalitas, specialitas, singularitas et similia. Res vero graduatae et per hos gradus et in his gradibus ordinatae sunt primae intentiones, utpote ens, substantia, homo, Sortes et similia secundum quod in intentionibus est ostensum. Quando ergo dicitur 'Homo est species specialissima' gradus huiusmodi praedicatur de significato hominis, non de aliquo superiori vel inferiori ad hominem. Quare hic terminus 'homo' habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem. In quinque autem modis praemissis <sup>61</sup> praedicatur aliquid pertinens ad huiusmodi gradum. Quare ratione huius fit comparatio hominis ad superiora, ad <sup>62</sup> inferiora, ad convertibilia et ad potentias et coequaeva pro quanto comparatio dicit primitatem vel mediationem vel adaequationem.

(5.0) Suppositio autem simpliciter personalis est acceptio termini pro participantibus significatum termini <sup>63</sup> tantum in usum loquendi de ipsis, ut 'Omne quod est ideo est quia unum numero' aequivalet istam: 'Omne <sup>64</sup> ens est unum numero.' Constat autem quod

<sup>55</sup> convertibilia... ad *om.* (*hom.*) MP

<sup>56</sup> animalium/animantium S

<sup>57</sup> comparisonem/actionem P

<sup>58</sup> Sonus... sequitur *om.* S

<sup>59</sup> subpraedicamentalem/subpersonalem S

<sup>60</sup> individualitatis/simpliciter *add.* MS

<sup>61</sup> praemissis/praedictis M

<sup>62</sup> ad/et P

<sup>63</sup> termini *om.* M

<sup>64</sup> omne/conclusionem S



significatum entis non est unum numero.<sup>65</sup> Supponit igitur iste terminus 'ens' pro necessario<sup>66</sup> contentis sub ente, ut hic: 'Nullus homo est species.' Hoc enim praedicatum 'species' non negatur de significato hominis, tamen negatur vere de contentis sub homine. Quare hic terminus 'homo' supponit tantum pro illis.

(5.1) De hac suppositione dantur quattuor regulae. Prima, quod nullus terminus singularis<sup>67</sup> habet suppositionem simpliciter personalem. Cuius ratio est quia non sunt participantia significatum eius. Ipsum enim est sic participans quod non participatum<sup>68</sup> continetur sub altero<sup>69</sup> quod non continet alterum.

(5.10) Ex hac regula sequitur corrolarium quod non semper habent eandem suppositionem terminus discretus et terminus communis pronomine demonstrativo determinatus, etiam sub eodem praedicato, ut in his 'Sortes est unum numero' et 'Hic homo est unum numero,' iste enim terminus 'Sortes' habet<sup>70</sup> suppositionem simpliciter simplicem, quia supponit tantum pro significato. Iste autem terminus 'homo' habet suppositionem simpliciter personalem, quia supponit pro aliquo contento sub significato tantum.

(5.2) Secunda regula est quod nullus terminus communis indefinite sumptus habet suppositionem simpliciter personalem. Cuius ratio est quia terminus habens hanc suppositionem non stat pro significato, ut patet ex definitione. Sed terminus indefinite, id est de se, sumptus semper stat pro significato; quare numquam supponit simpliciter personaliter. Ad evidentiam minoris<sup>71</sup> sciendum quod nullus terminus supponit pro aliquo nisi pro significato vel pro altero propter significatum et in formali suppositione; et etiam in materiali, vocali et rationali habet veritatem: ibi enim est significatio.<sup>72</sup> Haec patent supra in distinctione<sup>73</sup> suppositionum. Quare terminus primo natus est supponere pro significato quam pro aliquo altero. Sed terminus de se sumptus et indefinite non potest<sup>74</sup> non supponere pro illo pro quo natus est supponere. Quare non potest non supponere pro<sup>75</sup> significato.

(5.20) Ex his sequitur corrolarium quod propositio in qua subicitur terminus communis habens suppositionem simpliciter simplicem non est distinguenda, ut hic 'homo est species,' quia iste terminus 'homo' stat pro illo pro quo primo natus<sup>76</sup> est stare et supponere. Et haec suppositio est<sup>77</sup> naturalior, licet aliqui dixerint oppositum.

<sup>65</sup> Constat... numero *om.* (*hom.*) MP

<sup>66</sup> necessario/ultimo P, ultimis S

<sup>67</sup> singularis/singularitatis M

<sup>68</sup> participatum/participantur sic M

<sup>69</sup> sub altero/sic subalterno P

<sup>70</sup> Sortes habet/hominibus S

<sup>71</sup> minoris/huius est S

<sup>72</sup> vocali... significatio *om.* P

<sup>73</sup> distinctione/definitione S

<sup>74</sup> quam... potest *om.* S

<sup>75</sup> illo... pro *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>76</sup> natus/naturaliter S

<sup>77</sup> est/ei *add.* M

(5.3) Tertia regula est quod nullus terminus habens suppositionem simpliciter personalem cum signo potest se ipsum inferre sine signo, ut hic 'Omne ens est unum numero, ergo ens.' Non sequitur, quia <sup>78</sup> 'ens' in antecedente habet suppositionem simpliciter personalem, quia stat tantum pro contentis sub significato; in consequente vero non solum <sup>79</sup> pro illis, ut probatum est in regula praecedente.

(5.30) Ex hoc sequitur correlarium quod ista propositio est falsa in qua dicitur quod omnis terminus sumptus cum signo infert se ipsum sine signo. Hoc patet ex dictis.

(5.4) Quarta regula est haec: Omnis terminus habens suppositionem simpliciter personalem adiungitur alicui inter significatum termini et contenta sub significato differentiam facienti. Ad evidentiam huius regulae sciendum quod huiusmodi adiunctum potest sumi multipliciter.<sup>80</sup> Primo modo per comparisonem ad ipsum gradum in quo est illud contentum sub significato, ut 'Omne ens est singulare et unum numero.' Alio modo per comparisonem ad superiora, ut 'Omne animal est per se includens rationale vel irrationale.' Hoc enim verum est non de significato animalis, quia animal nec per se est rationale nec per se irrationale sed <sup>81</sup> de contentis sub animali. Vel hic: 'Nullus homo est species'; hoc enim praedicatum 'species' vere negatur de sub homine contentis, non de homine. Alio modo per comparisonem ad coequaeva, ut hic: 'Omne ens comparatum omni ente est illi <sup>82</sup> idem vel diversum.' Hoc enim verum est de sub ente <sup>83</sup> contentis, non de ente, quia significatum entis a <sup>84</sup> nullo est diversum, sed hoc ens ab illo ente.

(5.40) Ex his sequitur corrolarium quod illud adiunctum dicit gradum inferioritatis vel in quo fundatur inferioritas vel aliquid pertinens praecise ad huiusmodi gradum. Ad evidentiam huius sciendum quod huiusmodi gradus est ratio et causa, et quod <sup>85</sup> hoc dicatur inferius et illud superius, et quod istud diversificetur <sup>86</sup> ab illo et per consequens huiusmodi gradus sequitur <sup>87</sup> ratio non ut est res sed ut est graduata et in gradibus ordinata.

(6.0) Suppositio autem simpliciter communis est acceptio termini pro aliquo superiori ad significatum praecise in usum loquendi de ipso, ut hic 'Homo est omnia,' <sup>88</sup> quae est propositio Philosophi <sup>89</sup> et Gregorii. <sup>90</sup> Iste enim terminus 'homo' non supponit

<sup>78</sup> Non... quia/ergo P

<sup>79</sup> vero... solum/nullo nec non S

<sup>80</sup> multipliciter/tripliciter P

<sup>81</sup> nec... sed om. S

<sup>82</sup> illi om. MS

<sup>83</sup> sub ente/se M

<sup>84</sup> a om. P

<sup>85</sup> et quod/et P, quod MS

<sup>86</sup> diversificetur/verificetur M

<sup>87</sup> gradus sequitur/consequitur S

<sup>88</sup> omnia/aliam S

<sup>89</sup> Aristot., *De Anima*, III, c. 3, t. 4 (431b 13).

<sup>90</sup> Gregorius, *Moralium*, VI, c. 16 (PL 75, 740): "Universitatis autem nomine homo signatur, quia in

pro suo significato primo nec pro contentis sub significato,<sup>91</sup> quia nec de homine in communi nec de contentis sub homine verum est dicere quod sit omnia. Sed supponit pro aliquo incluso in homine, puta pro ente. Et de illo verum est dicere quod ens est omnia, sicut est verum dicere quod omnia sunt ens.

(6.1) Sed est sciendum quod haec suppositio simpliciter communis non est vera de virtute sermonis sed de bonitate intellectus,<sup>92</sup> quia si esset vera de virtute sermonis haec esset vera de virtute sermonis: 'Homo est asinus'; aliquid enim includitur in homine quod est asinus,<sup>93</sup> et universaliter in secunda figura posset argui ex puris affirmativis sine fallacia consequentis; quod probatur esse falsum, *I Posteriorum*.<sup>94</sup> Propter hoc de bonitate intellectus<sup>95</sup> verificatur, quoniam aliquid verificatur de aliquo. Dicitur ad bonum intellectum uno modo in se, alio modo in suo consequente, ut in his: 'Homo currit' 'cursus' non verificatur de homine in se sed de aliquo in suo consequente;<sup>96</sup> consequens enim ad cursus est velox motus. Quare non recurrendo ad transsumptionem dicimus quod 'cursus' verificatur de aliquo in suo consequente. Et propter hoc non dantur regulae de ista suppositione, quia non tenet de virtute sermonis. Et iuxta hoc solvitur iste paralogismus: "Quod ego sum, tu non es; sed ego sum homo; ergo tu<sup>97</sup> non es homo." Maior est distinguenda sic: Quod ego sum in me tu non es, sed quod ego sum in consequente tu es. Item: "Qui dicit te esse animal dicit verum; sed qui dicit te esse asinum dicit te esse animal; ergo qui dicit te esse asinum dicit verum; quare tu es asinus." Maior est distinguenda, quia qui dicit te esse animal in se dicit verum, sed qui te dicit<sup>98</sup> esse animal in consequente potest dicere falsum.

(7.0) Suppositio autem personaliter simplex est acceptio termini pro significato et contentis sub significato tantum in usum loquendi de ipsis, ut in his: 'Homo est unus secundum speciem specialissimam.' Talis enim unitas<sup>99</sup> convenit homini et contentis sub homine et nulli superiori ad hominem. Haec enim est falsa: 'Animal est unum secundum speciem specialissimam.' Quod probatur dupliciter.<sup>1</sup> Primo sic: quia omne quod est unum aliqua unitate est divisum et diversum ab eo quod est sub aliqua unitate<sup>2</sup> connumerata cum prima,<sup>3</sup> ut si homo est unus hac unitate specifica quae vocetur *a* et asinus alia unitate quae vocetur *b*, et istae sint ad invicem connumeratae, necesse

ipso vera species, et magna communio universitatis ostenditur."

<sup>91</sup> significato/ipso S

<sup>92</sup> intellectus/intelligentis S

<sup>93</sup> aliquid... asinus *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>94</sup> Aristot., *Anal. Poster.* I, c. 16, t. III (80a 27 - b 16)

<sup>95</sup> intellectus/aliquando *add.* S

<sup>96</sup> ut... consequente *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>97</sup> sed... tu/ergo ego sum tu S

<sup>98</sup> verum... dicit *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>99</sup> unitas/veritas S

<sup>1</sup> dupliciter *om.* M

<sup>2</sup> et per consequens (n. 5, 40) unitate *om.* P

<sup>3</sup> unitate est... prima *om.* S

est quod homo sit divisus <sup>4</sup> ab asino, quoniam unitas hominis dicit divisionem hominis ab eo quod est ab alia unitate. Sed animal non est divisum, diversum vel negatum ab eo quod est unum unitate specifica asini, ut patet de se; ergo non est unum unitate specifica hominis. Secundo sic: omne unum unitate alia praecisa non est divisibile, immo indivisibile, in multitudinem oppositionum illi unitati ut sic.<sup>5</sup> Cubitus est unus unitate continentis determinatae ad cubitum. Ipse non est divisibilis in multos cubitos. Si aliquid est unum unitate generis non est divisibile in multa talia genera, et ita unum secundum speciem specialissimam non est divisibile in plures species specialissimas. Sed animal est divisibile in plures species specialissimas.<sup>6</sup> Ergo animal non est unum secundum speciem <sup>7</sup> specialissimam. Similiter hic: 'Homo includit per se rationale'; hoc enim verum est de homine et contentis sub homine, non tamen de animali et aliis superioribus ad hominem, dicente Porphyrio <sup>8</sup> quod 'differentia est qua abundat species a genere.' Similiter hic: 'Bipes est minus commune animali' et sic de similibus infinitis.

(7.1) De hac autem suppositione dantur sex regulae. Prima, quod nullus terminus discretus vel singularis habet suppositionem personaliter simplicem.<sup>9</sup> Ratio huius est quia eius significatum non habet inferiora.

(7.2) Secunda regula est haec: Omnis terminus praeter discretum <sup>10</sup> potest habere suppositionem personaliter simplicem. Ratio huius est quia omnis terminus communis vel habet superiorem sibi vel non.<sup>11</sup> Si non, aliquid sibi poterit attribui et suis inferioribus, non tamen superiori, quia non habet. Quare <sup>12</sup> poterit accipi pro significato et contentis sub significato solum, et per consequens personaliter simplicem <sup>13</sup> suppositionem habere. Si vero habeat superiorem sibi, tunc poterit ei per se differentia attribui et cuilibet suo inferiori <sup>14</sup> quae non attribuetur superiori, ut dictum est, vel individuo. Quare poterit terminus sumi pro significato et contentis sub ipso tantum, et per consequens habere huiusmodi suppositionem.

(7.3) Tertia regula est quod nullus terminus habens hanc suppositionem potest inferre terminum sibi superiorem indefinite sumptum. Non enim <sup>15</sup> sequitur: 'Homo est unus secundum speciem specialissimam, ergo animal.' Fallacia accidentis est, quia supple minorem et complendo syllogismum in tertia figura et dicendo 'Omnis

<sup>4</sup> divisus/diversus P, visus S

<sup>5</sup> alia... sic *om.* MS

<sup>6</sup> Sed... specialissimas *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>7</sup> secundum speciem *om.* P

<sup>8</sup> Porphy., *Isagoge*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, *Arist. Latin.* I, 6-7 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966), p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> personaliter simplicem/simpliciter personalem P

<sup>10</sup> discretum *om.* S

<sup>11</sup> non/inferiorem S

<sup>12</sup> Quare/aequaliter S

<sup>13</sup> personaliter simplicem/personaliter M, simplicem S

<sup>14</sup> inferiori/superiori S

<sup>15</sup> Non enim/Unde M



homo est animal' variatur medium, quod est 'homo,' a suppositione personaliter simplici ad communicabilem; et hoc modo <sup>16</sup> in aliis.

(7.4) Quarta regula est quod terminus habens huiusmodi suppositionem infert inferiora sua determinate vel indeterminate, copulative vel disiunctive sine fallacia, ut in his: 'Homo per se includit rationale, ergo Sortes, ergo Plato, ergo aliquis homo.'

(7.5) Quinta regula est quod omnis terminus habens huiusmodi suppositionem adiungitur alicui inter significatum et superiora ad significatum differentiam facienti.

(7.6) Sexta regula est quod omnis terminus habens huiusmodi suppositionem adiungitur alicui inter significatum et superiora <sup>17</sup> ad significatum convenientiam facienti.

(7.7) Ad evidentiam harum ultimarum regularum sciendum quod significatum termini communis in tertio gradu lineae praedicamentalis constitutum comparatum <sup>18</sup> ad superiora est inferius, comparatum vero ad inferiora est superius, et idcirco quoad aliqua convenit cum utrisque et quoad aliqua differt ab utrisque, quoad aliqua <sup>19</sup> convenit cum superioribus et differt ab inferioribus, quoad aliqua convenit cum inferioribus et differt a superioribus.<sup>20</sup>

(7.8) Illa vero quibus convenit cum utrisque sunt praedicata realia, non ut realia distinguuntur ab entibus rationis sed ut distinguuntur contra gradualia. Ut realia dicantur illa quae sequuntur rem gratia rei, ut animal vel <sup>21</sup> rationale, vel risibile, vel album, vel huiusmodi, gradualia vero dicantur illa quae sequuntur <sup>22</sup> rem gratia gradus rei, puta superiori alteri vel superiori eidem, vel ei pari <sup>23</sup> vel consequenti tantum.<sup>24</sup> Illa ergo quibus significatum termini convenit cum superiori et inferiori sunt praedicata realia sequentia rem gratia rei.<sup>25</sup> Illa vero quibus differt ab utrisque sunt praedicata gradualia praecise pertinentia ad gradum praecisum, ut transcendentia vel singularitas vel generalissima generalitas. Illa vero quibus convenit cum superioribus et differt ab inferioribus et sine praecisione a superioribus, ut si attribuantur homini universalitas hoc praedicatum est graduale praescindens inferiora hominis, quia nulli debetur, non tamen praescindens superiora <sup>26</sup> hominis, immo arguens, quia bene sequitur si homo est universale quod animal et alia superiora sunt universalia. Illa vero quibus convenit cum inferioribus et differt a

<sup>16</sup> modo/nomen M

<sup>17</sup> superiora/inferiora S

<sup>18</sup> comparatum *om.* M

<sup>19</sup> differt... aliqua *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>20</sup> differt... superioribus *om.* S

<sup>21</sup> vel *om.* M

<sup>22</sup> illa... sequuntur *om.* M

<sup>23</sup> ei pari/aequiparantia S

<sup>24</sup> consequenti tantum/converti cum eo S

<sup>25</sup> puta superiori... rei *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>26</sup> superiora/inferiora S

superioribus sunt praedicata gradualia <sup>27</sup> dicentia praecisionem a superioribus, non ab inferioribus, ut 'Homo est unus unitate speciei specialissimae' haec universalitas <sup>28</sup> sic determinata sequitur rem ut in tali gradu et praescindit a se superiora et arguit inferiora. Sequitur enim quod si homo est unus hac unitate, ergo Sortes, ergo Plato; non tamen sequitur 'ergo animal est sic unum.' Per hoc patet quod illud adiunctum determinans terminum ad suppositionem personaliter simplicem oportet esse de illis quibus significatum non convenit cum inferioribus et differt a superioribus.

(8.0) Suppositio autem communiter simplex est acceptio termini pro significato suo et superioribus ad significatum tantum in usum loquendi de ipso ut in his: 'Homo est universalis,' 'Homo praedicatur de pluribus.' In his enim 'homo' sumitur pro suo significato et pro superioribus suis, quod patet quia hoc praedicatum <sup>29</sup> verificatur de ipsis et non contentis sub homine.

(8.1) De ista autem suppositione dantur sex regulae. Prima, quod nullus terminus communissimus habet suppositionem communiter simplicem. Ratio autem huius est, quia non habet superiora.<sup>30</sup>

(8.2) Secunda regula est quod omnis terminus praeter communissimos potest habere suppositionem communiter simplicem, quia potest sibi adiungi aliquid in quo convenit cum superioribus et differt ab inferioribus.

(8.3) Tertia regula est quod nullus terminus habens suppositionem communiter simplicem potest inferre terminum sibi inferiorem vel inferri ab eo. Quod patet, quoniam adiunctum repugnat cuilibet inferiori ad terminum vel ad significatum termini, ut patet ex dictis.

(8.4) Quarta regula est quod omnis terminus habens huiusmodi <sup>31</sup> suppositionem potest inferre terminum sibi superiorem, ut 'Homo est universalis, ergo animal, ergo corpus, ergo substantia.'

(8.5) Quinta regula est quod omnis terminus habens suppositionem communiter simplicem adiungitur alicui inter significatum et contenta sub significato differentiam facienti.

(8.6) Sexta regula est haec: Omnis terminus habens huiusmodi suppositionem adiungitur alicui inter significatum termini et superiora ad ipsum convenientiam <sup>32</sup> facienti.

(8.7) Harum regularum evidentia habetur ex his quae notantur in fine suppositionis personaliter simplicis. Posset autem ab hoc addit alia regula quod nullus terminus in plurali numero sumptus vel signo

<sup>27</sup> gradualia/realia S

<sup>28</sup> universalitas/est veritas S

<sup>29</sup> hoc praedicatum/si praedicata M

<sup>30</sup> secunda regula (n. 7, 2) superiora  
om. (hom.) P

<sup>31</sup> huiusmodi/hanc S

<sup>32</sup> convenientiam/differentiam S

universali vel particulari vel pronomine demonstrativo determinatus habet suppositionem communiter simplicem. Similis autem regula data est de suppositione simpliciter simplici. Unde ista potest probari ut illa, quia eadem est causa et ratio utriusque. Quare illud pro isto sufficit.

(9.0) Suppositio autem communicabilis quae consuevit a pluribus<sup>33</sup> dici personalis sine aliqua determinatione est acceptio termini pro significato et contentis sub significato et superioribus ad significatum indifferenter<sup>34</sup> in usum loquendi de ipsis, ut hic: "Homo est animal," iste enim terminus 'homo' supponit pro suo significato de quo vere dicitur quod est animal et pro cuiuscumque contento sub suo significato de quo vere dicitur quod est animal,<sup>35</sup> puta 'Sortes est animal,' 'Plato est animal,' et pro quocumque superiori ad significatum suum de quo vere dicitur quod est animal, puta 'Corpus est animal,' 'Substantia est animal,'<sup>36</sup> 'Ens est animal.'

(9.1) De hac suppositione in communi dantur tres regulae. Prima est quod omnis terminus potest supponere communicabiliter. Huius autem ratio est quia cuilibet termino potest aliquid adiungi quod convenit<sup>37</sup> significato suo et contentis sub significato suo si sint et superioribus ad significatum si etiam sint. Hoc autem dico quoniam aliqui termini sunt discreti et non habent inferiorem, aliqui communissimi et non habent superiorem. Et ideo isti termini possunt excludi ab hac suppositione sicut supra excluduntur termini communissimi a suppositione communiter simplici et simpliciter communi et termini discreti a suppositione personaliter simplici et simpliciter personali, propter hanc causam, quia isti non habent superiorem nec illi inferiorem. Sed hic non oportet quod in illis erat aliquid adiunctum differentiam faciens inter superiora et inferiora et illud determinabat terminos quibus<sup>38</sup> adiungebatur ad tales suppositiones; et ideo<sup>39</sup> ex vi talium suppositionum illi termini debuerunt excludi a natura talium suppositionum. In istis vero adiunctum nullam facit differentiam inter superiora et inferiora. Quare si poneretur per impossibile quod communissimi termini haberent aliquem terminum<sup>40</sup> superiorem sibi vel discreti inferiorem sibi,<sup>41</sup> nulla esset differentia superiorum et inferiorum quantum ad illud adiunctum. Et ideo ex vi naturae istarum suppositionum non oportet excludi huiusmodi terminos.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. e.g. Guillelmus de Shyreswode, *Introductiones in Logicam* (ed. M. Grabmann, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 10, München, 1937), 75.

<sup>34</sup> indifferenter/et differenter P

<sup>35</sup> et pro... animal om. (hom.) M

<sup>36</sup> substantia... animal om. (hom.) M

<sup>37</sup> convenit/communicet P

<sup>38</sup> quibus/cui S, om. P

<sup>39</sup> et ideo/si communes S

<sup>40</sup> aliquem terminum om. M

<sup>41</sup> sibi om. MP

(9.2) Secunda regula est quod omnis <sup>42</sup> terminus supponens communicabiliter potest terminum sibi superiorem et inferiorem inferre et ab ipsis inferri, supposito, ut dictum est, quod habeat superiores et inferiores, <sup>43</sup> ut patet hic: 'Homo <sup>44</sup> est animal,' hii duo termini habent suppositionem communicabilem. Unde ex parte utriusque patere possunt huiusmodi illationes, puta 'Homo est animal, ergo homo <sup>45</sup> est substantia'; ecce quod 'animal' infert suum superius. Item, 'homo est animal, ergo homo est rationale animal vel irrationale animal'; ecce quod infert suum superius disiunctive. Inferius autem sic: 'Homo est corpus animatum, ergo planta vel animal'; ecce infertur <sup>46</sup> a superiori disiunctive. Et hic: 'Sortes est homo, ergo Sortes est animal.' Et haec quattuor illationum genera sunt etiam ex parte subiecti, scilicet ipsius hominis.

(9.21) Et si obiciatur per instantias quod non sequitur: 'Omnes apostoli Dei <sup>47</sup> sunt duodecim, ergo Petrus est duodecim' et ita iste terminus 'apostoli' habens hanc suppositionem non infert aliquod de suis inferioribus etiam disiunctive:

(9.22) Item, 'Omnis homo est animal, ergo est hoc animal vel illud' <sup>48</sup> non sequitur, et tamen 'animal' habet huiusmodi suppositionem.

(9.23) Respondeo quod in hac propositione 'Omnes apostoli sunt duodecim' istud aggregatum 'omnes apostoli' est unus terminus, scilicet subiectum, non quod istud solum 'apostoli' sit subiectum, immo totum aggregatum. Quod patet, quia <sup>49</sup> praedicatum non dicitur de apostolis sed de multitudine denotata per li 'omnes.' Igitur principaliter et formaliter est subiectum hic li omnes quam li apostoli, quia formale in multitudine est ipsa universitas, materiale vero ipsi apostoli.<sup>50</sup> Et materialiter contrahit universitatem importatam per li omnes. Quare ista est singularis, et Petrus non est inferius ad subiectum eius; quare non est instantia contra regulam.<sup>51</sup>

(9.24) Ad secundum dico quod praedicatum inferre suum inferius contingit dupliciter: uno modo, quod inferius praedicati attribuitur toti subiecto, ut hic: 'Omnis homo <sup>52</sup> est animal, ergo omnis homo est hoc animal';<sup>53</sup> alio modo, quod inferius praedicati seu pars subiectiva praedicati attribuitur non toti subiecto sed pars praedicati, ut hic 'Omnis homo est animal, ergo hic homo est hoc animal et ille homo est illud animal.' <sup>54</sup> Non est autem ita in suppositione sim-

<sup>42</sup> omnis *om.* MP

<sup>43</sup> inferre... inferiores *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>44</sup> Homo *om.* P

<sup>45</sup> homo *om.* P

<sup>46</sup> suum... infertur *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>47</sup> Dei *om.* P

<sup>48</sup> illud/et sic de singulis *add.* M

<sup>49</sup> patet quia *om.* P

<sup>50</sup> quia... apostoli *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>51</sup> regulam/totum P

<sup>52</sup> homo *om.* P

<sup>53</sup> omnis... animal *om.* S

<sup>54</sup> ergo... animal *om.* (*hom.*) S



pliciter simplici; non enim sequitur: 'Substantia est praedicamentum, ergo haec substantia vel illa est hoc praedicamentum vel illud.' Regula ergo extenditur ad utrumque modum illationis;<sup>55</sup> quare non est instantia.

(9.3) Tertia regula est quod omnis terminus habens suppositionem hanc adiungitur alicui reali prout reale distinguitur<sup>56</sup> contra graduale, ut dictum est supra, non ut distinguitur contra ens rationis; immo<sup>57</sup> ens rationis dicitur reale hoc modo quia sequitur realiter rem ut rem vel ut<sup>58</sup> rei similitudinem, non ut rem graduatam.<sup>59</sup> Hoc autem dico non generaliter de omni ente rationis sed de aliquibus, puta si dicam 'columna est dextra,' haec dexteritas est ens rationis, tamen non determinat columnam ad supponendum simpliciter, immo ad supponendum<sup>60</sup> communicabiliter, quod patet per illationes. Sequitur enim 'Columna est dextra, ergo haec vel illa,' et etiam 'ergo corpus est dextrum vel substantia.'

(9.31) Si vero obiciatur quia dicendo 'Omne genus est universale' subiectum habet suppositionem communicabilem vel personalem et etiam praedicatum,<sup>61</sup> et tamen utrumque dicit gradum et non rem nisi rem<sup>62</sup> ut in gradu:

(9.32) Respondeo quod termini<sup>63</sup> graduales possunt comparari ad terminos reales vel ad terminos graduales. Primo modo comparati sequuntur legem gradualium terminorum, secundo vero modo comparati tenent legem<sup>64</sup> realium terminorum, quia hoc modo intelliguntur facere praedicamentalem lineam et suam categoriam, quia nullo modo sunt gradus et decisiones,<sup>65</sup> verum etiam illi gradus intelliguntur ut graduati et in gradibus ordinati. Hoc autem modo sumuntur et comparantur hic ubi<sup>66</sup> comparatur<sup>67</sup> universalitati et generalitati.<sup>68</sup>

(10.0) Suppositionum autem communicabilium seu personalium alia est ad unum determinata, alia in plura confusa. Suppositio autem ad unum determinata<sup>69</sup> est duplex: una discrete et discrete determinata, alia indiscrete et indiscrete determinata.<sup>70</sup> Suppositionum autem in plura confusa, alia confunditur per compositionem termini,<sup>71</sup>

<sup>55</sup> illationis/sub disiunctione *add.* M

<sup>56</sup> alicui... distinguitur/aliqui aliquid reale significanti prout reale distinguitur S, *om.* P

<sup>57</sup> immo/nec P

<sup>58</sup> ut... ut/vel S

<sup>59</sup> rem graduatam/rei graduatio P

<sup>60</sup> non... supponendum/est de suppositione P

<sup>61</sup> et... praedicatum *om.* M

<sup>62</sup> nisi rem/natura S, *om.* M

<sup>63</sup> termini/universales *add.* M

<sup>64</sup> gradualium... legem *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>65</sup> decisiones/dimensiones P

<sup>66</sup> ubi/vero P

<sup>67</sup> comparatur/ubi cum prima *add.* S

<sup>68</sup> generalitati/ad unum determinata, alia ad plura confusa *add.* M

<sup>69</sup> alia... determinata *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>70</sup> est... determinata *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>71</sup> confunditur... termini/indistincte et distincte determinata S

alia per consignificationem termini, alia per reduplicationem termini, alia per adiectionem termini, alia per negationem praedicati, alia per dispositionem signi,<sup>72</sup> alia per confusionem adiuncti, alia per relationem termini confusi. In his igitur decem modis comprehenditur suppositio personalis.<sup>73</sup>

(10.10) Suppositio autem distincte determinata seu suppositio discreta, quod est idem, est suppositio communicabilis seu personalis<sup>74</sup> termini ad supponendum pro uno singulari significato principaliter determinati. Hoc autem potest fieri dupliciter: primo modo per terminum singularem,<sup>75</sup> ut 'Sortes disputat'; alio modo per terminum communem<sup>76</sup> pronomine demonstrativo determinatum, ut 'Hic homo disputat,' vel 'Tu, homo, loqueris.' Aliquando autem potest fieri cum pronomine possessivo singularis numeri sumpto a primitivo termino numeri singularis supposito quod possessio<sup>77</sup> non fit multiplicata, ut si dicatur:<sup>78</sup> 'Nasus tuus est curvus,'<sup>79</sup> quia nasus non multiplicatur tibi. Quia si dicerem 'Capillus tuus est albus,'<sup>80</sup> quia capillus multiplicatur<sup>81</sup> tibi, li capillus non supponeret discrete, tamen nasus supponeret<sup>82</sup> discrete, ratione dicta. Oportet etiam quod terminus communis sit singularis numeri quocumque modo determinetur,<sup>83</sup> quia si esset pluralis numeri non supponeret determinate, ut si dicam 'Hii homines disputant,' li 'homines' confunditur in plura per significationem numeri.<sup>84</sup>

(10.11) Suppositio autem indistincte<sup>85</sup> determinata seu suppositio indiscreta, quod est<sup>86</sup> idem, est suppositio personalis seu communicabilis termini ad supponendum pro uno singulari vago principaliter determinati. Haec autem suppositio semper fit per terminum communem vel indefinite sumptum sine<sup>87</sup> signo, ut 'homo legit.'<sup>88</sup> Differt ergo indiscreta suppositio a discreta, quia propositio in qua est discreta suppositio ex parte termini supponentis discrete non habet nisi unicam causam veritatis, ut dicendo 'Sortes currit' ex parte Sortis non habetur nisi unica causa veritatis<sup>89</sup> in propositione: illa est positio<sup>90</sup> cursus circa Sortem. Ubi vero est indiscreta suppositio ex parte termini supponentis indiscrete tot sunt causae veritatis vel tot possunt esse quot sunt supposita termini taliter suppo-

<sup>72</sup> alia per adiectionem... signi *om.*

(*hom.*) S

<sup>73</sup> In his... personalis *om.* M

<sup>74</sup> personalis/praedicabilis M

<sup>75</sup> singularem/simplem M

<sup>76</sup> communem/communiorem P

<sup>77</sup> possessio/possessivo M

<sup>78</sup> dicatur/dicam M

<sup>79</sup> curvus/simus M

<sup>80</sup> quia nasus... albus *om.* S

<sup>81</sup> Quia si... multiplicatur *om.* M

<sup>82</sup> supponeret *om.* MS

<sup>83</sup> determinetur/tenetur S

<sup>84</sup> significationem numeri/confusionem veram S

<sup>85</sup> indistincte/indiscrete distincte P

<sup>86</sup> est *om.* MP

<sup>87</sup> sine/particulari *add.* S

<sup>88</sup> legit/vel vage sumptum cum particulari signo ut 'homo legit' *add.* M

<sup>89</sup> ut... veritatis *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>90</sup> est positio/ponitur P

nentis, ut dicendo 'Homo currit' ex parte hominis tot sunt causae veritatis huius propositionis quot sunt supposita hominis,<sup>91</sup> quia positio cursus circa hunc hominem vel circa illum, et sic de singulis. Singulae enim positiones reddunt eam totam veram.

(10.12) Ex hac differentia sequitur alia, quia terminus discrete supponens infert terminum indiscrete supponentem et non e converso. Sequitur enim 'Hic homo disputat, ergo homo disputat'; sed non convertitur: 'Homo disputat, ergo hic homo Sortes vel Plato.' Non sequitur, quia esset<sup>92</sup> processus a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam, ut patet ex prima differentia, et per consequens fallacia consequentis.

(10.13) Et hic attendant quae dicunt antiqua opera<sup>93</sup> de suppositionibus sufficere et istud superfluere ubi habent differentias inter has consequentias: 'Hic homo est individuum, ergo homo est individuum'<sup>94</sup> et 'Hic homo est albus,<sup>95</sup> ergo homo est albus.' Prima consequentia est nulla, secunda est bona. Non enim potest dici secundum antiquitatem quod hic terminus 'homo' in antecedente primae consequentiae habeat suppositionem simplicem, quia antiquitas dicit quod simplex suppositio est acceptio termini pro re universali significata per ipsum. Hoc autem non potest hic dici sine evidenti contradictione. Non ergo possunt dicere quod ibi sit processus a simplici ad personalem, Legant ergo quae scribuntur hic et invenient maxime de suppositione simpliciter personali.<sup>96</sup>

(10.2) Suppositio confusa per compositionem termini est suppositio termini includentis in sua compositione<sup>97</sup> negationem, ut hic est suppositio huius termini 'nemo.' Si dicatur 'Nemo<sup>98</sup> dormit' aequivalet<sup>99</sup> huic: 'Nullus homo dormit'; quare sicut subiectum secundae confunditur ita subiectum primae.<sup>1</sup> Est autem sciendum quod triplex negatio potest compositionem ingredi, scilicet negatio privans, ut hic 'iniustus,' negatio infinitans, ut 'non-iustus,' negatio negans, ut 'nemo' etsi aliquod aliud nomen tale inveniat vel fingatur. Differt autem negatio tertia a primis, quoniam primae negant habitum oppositum affirmatione monstratum, quia dicunt carentiam eius circa subiectum absolutum quantum ad negationem privativam vel circa quodcumque subiectum<sup>2</sup> quantum ad infinitatem. Tertia vero negatio non negat habitum affirmatione monstratum sed aliquid negat ab eo, ut 'nemo' non negat hominem sed aliquid ab homine, ut hic 'Nemo est asinus' hic non negatur homo sed asinus

<sup>91</sup> tot... hominis om. (hom.) S

<sup>92</sup> esset om. P

<sup>93</sup> Cf. e.g. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae Logicales*, tr. VI (ed. I. M. Bochenski), 57-64.

<sup>94</sup> ergo... individuum om. (hom.) PS

<sup>95</sup> et... albus om. S

<sup>96</sup> personali/in sua compositione add. M

<sup>97</sup> in... compositione om. M

<sup>98</sup> Si... Nemo om. (hom.) S

<sup>99</sup> aequivalet/valet MP

<sup>1</sup> confunditur... primae/concluditur ita sunt in primo M

<sup>2</sup> subiectum om. P

negatur ab homine. Si autem dicatur "Iniustus vel non-iustus currit" non negatur cursus ab iusto sed iustitia a subiecto. Secundo, differt ab eis, quia negatio negans facit propositionem negativam,<sup>3</sup> primae vero non. Hic enim est negativa 'Nemo dormit'; hae vero affirmativae: 'Iniustus dormit' vel <sup>4</sup> 'Non-iustus dormit.' Tertio differunt, quoniam negatio vel terminus includens eam supponit pro habitu affirmatione <sup>5</sup> monstrato, ut 'Nemo dormit'; hic terminus 'nemo' supponit pro homine. Termini vero includentes primas negationes non supponunt pro habitu opposito affirmatione <sup>6</sup> monstrato, ut 'iniustus' <sup>7</sup> vel 'non-iustus' numquam supponit pro iusto, quare haec tertia negatio confundit terminum in quo per compositionem <sup>8</sup> includitur; aliae vero non.

(10.3) Suppositio autem confusa <sup>9</sup> per consignificationem termini est suppositio personalis seu communicabilis termini numeri pluralis, ut 'homines disputant.' Iste enim modus significandi qui est numerus ponit in significato proprietatem sibi correspondentem, scilicet multitudinem vel unitatem, multitudinem scilicet numerus pluralis, unitatem numerus singularis. Et ideo nomina propria non habent pluralem nec illa quae significant res non plurificatas <sup>10</sup> vel non plurificabiles,<sup>11</sup> ut sol et luna et huiusmodi. Unde bona consequentia est 'homines currunt, ergo multi currunt,' quia terminus in numero plurali sumptus confunditur per consignificationem,<sup>12</sup> id est per talem <sup>13</sup> modum significandi qui est pluralis numerus. Differt autem ista confusio a praecedenti, quoniam in virtute primae confusionis licet descendere ad quodlibet suppositum termini confusi simul et copulative; in hac autem non. Voco terminum confusum in prima confusione terminum illum cuius sunt supposita in quae fit distributio et confusio; ut hic 'Nemo currit' licet inferre quodlibet suppositum hominis simul et copulative. Sequitur enim 'ergo Sortes non currit' et 'ergo Plato non currit,' et sic de omnibus aliis. In secunda vero suppositione non licet. Non enim sequitur 'Homines currunt, ergo Sortes et Plato,' sed bene sequitur 'Ergo Sortes et Plato, vel alii duo vel unus istorum cum alio.'

(10.4) Suppositio confusa per adiectionem numeri est suppositio communicabilis termini per dictionem numeralem determinati. Unde illa determinatio potest esse nominalis vel adverbialis. Nominalis confundit nomen. Adverbialis confundit verbum. Nominalis adhuc duplex: una cum plurali numero, ut 'Tres rationes probant hanc con-

<sup>3</sup> negativam *om.* P

<sup>4</sup> vel *om.* PS

<sup>5</sup> affirmatione/affirmative PS

<sup>6</sup> affirmatione/affirmative S

<sup>7</sup> iniustus/iustus MS

<sup>8</sup> compositionem/comparationem MS

<sup>9</sup> confusa *om.* P

<sup>10</sup> plurificatas/plurificans P, plurificares S

<sup>11</sup> plurificabiles/plurales P

<sup>12</sup> consignificationem/significationem P

<sup>13</sup> id... talem *om.* P



clusionem' vel cum singulari, ut 'Triplex ratio probat hanc conclusionem.' <sup>14</sup> Sed in prima sunt duae causae confusionis: una est modus significandi pluralis numeri, alia est adiectio expressa numeri. In secunda vero est unica causa solum. Ista enim nominalis determinatio potest fieri per nomina non <sup>15</sup> significantia aliquam speciem numeri sed genera, ut 'multae rationes probant' et 'multiplex ratio probat.' Adverbialis vero determinatio potest fieri etiam cum determinata <sup>16</sup> specie numeri vel cum indeterminata, ut 'Iste arguit multipliciter' vel 'multotiens' vel 'tripliciter' vel 'tribus <modis>.' <sup>17</sup> In his enim omnibus confunditur istud verbum 'arguit,' quia denotatur per illa adverbialia multiplicatio vel plurificatio actus verbi. Haec autem confusio non differt a praecedenti nisi quia illa exercetur per consignificationem solius termini; haec autem exercetur per significationem <sup>18</sup> alterius dictionis.

(10.5) Suppositio autem confusa per reduplicationem termini est suppositio personalis termini reduplicati, ut cum dicitur 'Triangulus habet tres' <sup>19</sup> in quantum triangulus,' sequitur per naturam reduplicationis 'ergo omnis triangulus,' 'ergo iste,' 'ergo ille,' quod non fieret nisi triangulus per reduplicationem fuisset primo <sup>20</sup> confusus. Est autem sciendum quod reduplicatio vel dictio exercens eam praesupponit in termino reduplicato aliquod genus suppositionis. Et si inveniatur terminum supponentem <sup>21</sup> simpliciter personaliter vel personaliter simpliciter <sup>22</sup> vel communiter non <sup>23</sup> variat in aliquo suppositionem nec confundit terminum. Si autem ipsum inveniatur supponentem personaliter confundit eum universaliter sicut faceret signum universale. Verbi gratia de utroque: de primo sic 'Ens in quantum ens est subiectum primum metaphysicae.' Ens autem per reduplicationem ex natura sola praedicati, scilicet <sup>24</sup> primum subiectum, habet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem. Adveniens autem dictio reduplicans <sup>25</sup> specificat causam quare istud praedicatum inest tali subiecto; non tamen confundit quia confusio est in supposita. Ens autem non supponit pro suppositis cum haberet suppositionem simpliciter simplicem; quare non est confusum in supposita, et per consequens nullo modo. De secundo sic: 'ens est bonum in quantum ens.' Ecce quod ens <sup>26</sup> ante reduplicationem habet suppositionem communicabilem seu personalem. Adveniens autem dictio reduplicans non variat genus suppositionis, scilicet personalis, sed sub illo genere dat speciem,

<sup>14</sup> vel... conclusionem *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>15</sup> non/nisi P

<sup>16</sup> determinata/indeterminata M

<sup>17</sup> tribus modis/ter M

<sup>18</sup> solius... significationem *om.* M

<sup>19</sup> habet tres *om.* M

<sup>20</sup> primo/prima S, *om.* M

<sup>21</sup> terminum supponentem/tamen suppositio S

<sup>22</sup> simpliciter... simpliciter/simpliciter personalem vel personaliter simplicem S, simpliciter vel simpliciter personaliter M

<sup>23</sup> non *om.* P

<sup>24</sup> Ens... scilicet *om.* S

<sup>25</sup> dictio reduplicans/reduplicatio S

<sup>26</sup> Ecce... ens *om.* (*hom.*) S

scilicet confusae suppositionis,<sup>27</sup> quia dat vel denotat causam adaequatam praedicati in subiecto, et ideo propter adaequationem causae denotat<sup>28</sup> praedicatum inesse subiecto universaliter, id est omni vel cuilibet<sup>29</sup> contento sub eo, et ideo in hac suppositione confusa per reduplicationem<sup>30</sup> supponitur suppositio personalis simpliciter communicabilis vel suppositio personaliter simplex.<sup>31</sup> De hac autem suppositione datur regula quod sub omni termino confuso per reduplicationem licet descendere ad omnia sub ipso contenta simul et copulative, ut 'Homo est risibilis<sup>32</sup> in quantum homo, ergo iste homo,' 'ille homo,' 'ergo Sortes,' 'ergo Plato.' Et haec tractatur<sup>33</sup> in libro *Priorum*, cap. 'De reduplicatione.'<sup>34</sup>

(10.6) Suppositio autem confusa per negationem praedicati est suppositio communicabilis vel personalis termini in praedicato enunciationis negativae positi, ut dicendo quod animal non est asinus. Iste terminus 'asinus' confunditur in omnia<sup>35</sup> sua supposita per negationem latam ad compositionem<sup>36</sup> enunciationis. Unde sensus est quod illud animal de quo negatur 'asinus' est nullus asinus. Unde datur regula quod sub omni termino confuso per negationem licet descendere ad omnia sua<sup>37</sup> supposita simul et copulative, ut si dicam<sup>38</sup> 'Quoddam animal non est quadrupes, ergo non est asinus,' 'ergo non est equus,' 'ergo non est leo,'<sup>39</sup> et sic de aliis. Et fundatur ista regula super illam maximam 'A quocumque removetur totum universale et quaelibet eius pars.'

(10.7) Suppositio autem confusa per dispositionem signi est suppositio communicabilis termini per signum universale determinati, ut 'Omnis triangulus habet tres' et 'Unusquisque triangulus habet tres<sup>40</sup> angulos.'<sup>41</sup> Sciendum autem quod signorum universalium aliud confundit et distribuit indistincte et absolute, ut 'omne,'<sup>42</sup> aliud autem sigillatim et distincte, ut 'unumquodque' et 'singulum.' Et secundum hoc suppositio confusa per dispositionem signi duplex est: alia absoluta et alia sigillata. Differunt autem ab invicem hae suppositiones, quia ubi subiectum confunditur et distribuitur absolute quidquid est de ratione et conceptu praedicati attribuitur indivise ei et cuilibet contento sub eo, ut 'Omnis homo habet nasum.' Ubi vero confunditur sigillatim non attribuitur praedicatum indivise subiecto et cuilibet<sup>43</sup>

<sup>27</sup> scilicet... suppositionis *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>28</sup> causam... denotat *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>29</sup> cuilibet/cuicumque P

<sup>30</sup> reduplicationem/reductionem P

<sup>31</sup> personaliter simplex/personalis simpliciter M

<sup>32</sup> risibilis/rationalis P

<sup>33</sup> tractatur/traditur M, creditur S

<sup>34</sup> Aristot., *Anal. Priora*, c. 38 (49a 11-26).

<sup>35</sup> omnia *om.* P

<sup>36</sup> compositionem/comparationem S

<sup>37</sup> omnia sua *om.* M

<sup>38</sup> dicam/dicatur P

<sup>39</sup> ergo... leo *om.* MS

<sup>40</sup> Unusquisque... tres *om.* S

<sup>41</sup> tres angulos/triangulus P

<sup>42</sup> ut omne *om.* P

<sup>43</sup> et cuilibet/in talibus S

contento sub eo sed particulatim, ut hic: 'Singuli homines habent singulos nasos.' Ecce quod istud praedicatum 'habere singulos nasos' attribuitur cuilibet contento sub homine sigillatim et particulatim non totaliter et indivisim, quia tunc <sup>44</sup> sequeretur quod unus homo haberet singulos nasos et ita plures, sed attribuitur <sup>45</sup> correspondententer, ut sit sensus quod unusquisque homo vel singulus habet nasum suum.

(10.71) De his ergo dantur tales regulae. Prima, quod omnis terminus supponens confuse et absolute infert absolute simul et copulative omnia sub se contenta, ut, 'omnis homo, ergo Sortes,' 'ergo Plato.' Secunda, quod omnis terminus supponens confuse sigillatim infert tantum sub se <sup>46</sup> contenta correlative, tamen sigillata, scilicet correspondentia sui adiuncti, ut 'Singuli homines singulos habent nasos.' Ecce quod praedicatum attribuitur subiecto, quia pars sigillata <sup>47</sup> parti sigillatae, <sup>48</sup> quia iste nasus isti homini et ille illi et sic de aliis.

(10.8) Suppositio autem confusa per confusionem adiuncti est suppositio communicabilis seu personalis termini per multiplicationem adiuncti necessario multiplicati, ut hic 'Omnis homo est animal.' Iste <sup>49</sup> autem terminus 'animal' confunditur et multiplicatur ad multiplicationem hominis, non <sup>50</sup> quod signum confundens hunc terminum, scilicet hominem, confundat ipsum animal, sed quod ad multiplicationem huius sequitur multiplicatio illius, et hoc est confundi per confusionem adiuncti.

(10.81) Ex his infero quattuor <sup>51</sup> corrolaria. Primum, quod haec confusio fit gratia materiae, non gratia formae. Quod patet, quia est dare terminos in quibus sic et in quibus non. In quibus sic sicut <sup>52</sup> isti: 'Ter genuisti hominem'; ecce quod hoc verbum 'genuisti' confunditur per hoc adverbium 'ter.' Sed hoc nomen <sup>53</sup> 'hominem' confunditur <sup>54</sup> quia ad multiplicationem generationum sequitur multiplicatio hominum; ecce in quibus sic. Sed in quibus non sub eadem forma, sicut isti: 'Ter vidisti hominem'; ecce quod hoc verbum <sup>55</sup> 'vidisti' confunditur per hoc adverbium 'ter' quia est multiplicatio visionum. Sed iste terminus 'hominem' non confunditur, quia uno solo homine viso haec <sup>56</sup> est vera 'ter vidisti hominem.' Item, sub alia forma: 'Omnes homines sunt actu in loco'; ecce quod homine confuso et multiplicato per signum multiplicatur et confunditur locus per illam maximam quod duo corpora non sunt in eodem loco. Ecce termini

<sup>44</sup> tunc *om.* M

<sup>45</sup> attribuitur/animal tribuitur S

<sup>46</sup> se/esse S

<sup>47</sup> sigillata/singularis S

<sup>48</sup> parti sigillatae *om.* S

<sup>49</sup> Iste/Secundus S

<sup>50</sup> non *om.* P

<sup>51</sup> quattuor/quinque S

<sup>52</sup> sicut/fiunt M

<sup>53</sup> hoc nomen/haec natura P

<sup>54</sup> per... confunditur *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>55</sup> hoc verbum *om.* M

<sup>56</sup> haec/si est M

in quibus sic,<sup>57</sup> in quibus non, sub eadem forma, sicut isti: 'Omnes homines sunt actu in tempore seu in die',<sup>58</sup> ecce quod multiplicato homine per signum non multiplicatur tempus vel dies,<sup>59</sup> quia omnes qui actu sunt sunt in eodem tempore et in eodem die.<sup>60</sup> Item, sub alia forma verbum multiplex est dictum hic: Ad multiplicationem verborum<sup>61</sup> sequitur multiplicatio dictionum; sed hic multiplex verbum est intellectum: Ad multiplicationem verborum non sequitur multiplicatio<sup>62</sup> intellectionum, quia possibile est unica intellectione omnia esse intellecta; et hoc in quacumque forma locutionis dentur<sup>63</sup> termini in quibus sic possunt dari, termini in quibus non; quare certissimum est quod huiusmodi confusio non fit gratia formae enunciandi sed solum gratia materiae.

(10.821) Secundum corrolarium est quod praepositio vel postpositio<sup>64</sup> dictionis confundentis terminum primo confusum non facit differentiam in confundendo vel non confundendo terminum secundo confusum. Quod patet ex corrolario praecedenti, quia non fit gratia formae. Quod patet etiam in exemplis: sumo istam propositionem, *Vi Metaphysicae*.<sup>65</sup> "Cor est principium animalium." Constat enim quod hic terminus 'cor' confunditur quia impossibile est quod praedicatum verificatur de subiecto pro uno solo corde, et tamen illud gratia cuius confunditur<sup>66</sup> postponitur ei, videlicet 'animalium.'

(10.822) Item, *I Physicorum*<sup>67</sup>: 'Subiecta quidem materia cum forma causa est eorum quae fiunt.' Hic etiam constat quod hii termini 'materia cum forma' non determinantur ad unum sed confunduntur ad<sup>68</sup> plura, quia impossibile est quod una materia cum una<sup>69</sup> forma sit causa omnium quae sunt; et illud per<sup>70</sup> quod confunduntur postponitur eis, scilicet 'eorum quae sunt.'

(10.823) Item, in propositione communi 'Homo disputat hic et Romae' iste terminus 'homo' confunditur per copulam praedicati, supposito quod sit categorica propositio de copulato praedicato, quia illa copula aequivalet multitudini consignificatae per pluralem numerum, quia non potest verificari de homine pro uno homine quod disputet hic et Romae, et tamen copula praedicati postponitur<sup>71</sup> subiecto.

<sup>57</sup> sic/quod termini *add.* M, sed termini *add.* S

<sup>58</sup> seu in die *om.* S

<sup>59</sup> vel dies *om.* S

<sup>60</sup> et... die *om.* S

<sup>61</sup> verborum/istorum P

<sup>62</sup> verborum... multiplicatio *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>63</sup> quacumque... dentur/quocumque modo forma detur P

<sup>64</sup> postpositio/compositio S

<sup>65</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, V, c. 1, t. 1 1013a 5)

<sup>66</sup> quia... confunditur *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>67</sup> Aristot., *Physica*, I, c. 9, t. 81 (192a 13-14)

<sup>68</sup> ad/in S, *om.* M

<sup>69</sup> materia... una *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>70</sup> per/propter P

<sup>71</sup> postponitur/supponitur P, praepositur S



(10.824) Sed hic dicunt *quidam*<sup>72</sup> quod haec categorica est falsa 'Homo disputat hic et Romae,' cuius motivum est quia putat hunc terminum 'homo' habere suppositionem determinatam quia non potest confundi per aliquid praecedens ipsum; quare oportet quod retineat suppositionem determinatam et quod sit sensus quod unicus homo disputat hic et Romae. Sed nihil est,<sup>73</sup> quia constat per usum *philosophorum* et per rationem quod acceptio termini potest confundi ad plura per aliquid<sup>74</sup> subsequens, ut patet *VII Metaphysicae*,<sup>75</sup> quod "Substantia est prima omnium<sup>76</sup> definitione, cognitione et tempore." Iste terminus 'substantia' confunditur per subsequens, quia uni soli substantiae praedicatum subsequens<sup>77</sup> non potest vere attribui. Nec debet fingi, sicut dictum est ab aliquibus,<sup>78</sup> quod substantia supponat ibi pro prima causa, quia probatio *Philosophi*<sup>79</sup> est in oppositum dicentis "Necesse est in uniuscuiusque ratione<sup>80</sup> substantiae rationem esse." Constat autem quod non ratione primae causae nec alicuius unius<sup>81</sup> substantiae sed in rationibus diversorum accidentium sunt rationes diversarum substantiarum, ut<sup>82</sup> in definitione<sup>83</sup> simi nasus et in definitione ruri crus. Quare hic terminus 'substantia' confunditur per aliquid subsequens.

(10.825) Per rationem autem patet, quoniam<sup>84</sup> confusio quae non fit gratia formae vel modi enuncianti sed per solam materiale communicantiam<sup>85</sup> aliquorum fit indifferenter per praecedens vel subsequens; aliter enim forma et modus enuncianti determinarent huiusmodi confusionem, quod est contra suppositum.<sup>86</sup> Sed haec confusio est vel fit non gratia formae vel modi sed solum communicative,<sup>87</sup> causa quorundam quae sic<sup>88</sup> se habent quod<sup>89</sup> uno multiplicato multiplicatur reliquum, ut patet ex corrolario praecedente, ergo etc. Quare<sup>90</sup> propter hoc dicere quod haec sit falsa 'homo disputat hic et Romae' est ignoranter asserere.

(10.83) Tertium corrolarium est quod haec est vera: 'Animal<sup>91</sup> est omnis homo.' Et hic terminus 'animal' habet suppositionem con-

<sup>72</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

<sup>73</sup> nihil est/rationale M

<sup>74</sup> aliquid/aliquod P, praepositur S

<sup>75</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VII, c. 1, t. 4  
(1028a 31-32)

<sup>76</sup> omnium/accidentium *add.* P

<sup>77</sup> subsequens *om.* P

<sup>78</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

<sup>79</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VII, c. 1, t. 4  
(1928a 35-36)

<sup>80</sup> ratione/rationis P

<sup>81</sup> alicuius unius/aliqui uni S

<sup>82</sup> ut/minorem si *add.* P, nec S, *om.* M

<sup>83</sup> definitione/ratione P

<sup>84</sup> quoniam/quod S

<sup>85</sup> communicantiam/concomitantiam  
P

<sup>86</sup> contra suppositum/communiter  
sumptum M

<sup>87</sup> communicative/concommunican-  
tiae M

<sup>88</sup> quorundam... sic/quare intelligen-  
dum quae fit M

<sup>89</sup> quod/pro P

<sup>90</sup> ergo... Quare/quare contingat ergo S

<sup>91</sup> Animal/Nihil P

fusam propter confusionem adiuncti, scilicet hominis; et <sup>92</sup> hoc secundum patet ex praedictis,<sup>93</sup> scilicet quod hic terminus 'animal' possit confundi per communicantiam<sup>94</sup> subsequentis. Ex isto secundo infertur primum. Quod illa sit vera etiam confirmatur sic: 'Omnis homo est animal, ergo hoc animal est omnis homo.'<sup>95</sup> Antecedens patet. Probo consequentiam: manente eadem causa totali manet idem effectus. Sed totalis causa veritatis<sup>96</sup> huius propositionis 'Omnis homo est animal' est composito seu unio animalis<sup>97</sup> ad omnem hominem.<sup>98</sup> Quod patet *VI Metaphysicae*<sup>99</sup> ubi dicitur "Verum quidem affirmationem habet in composito et negationem in disiuncto seu diviso"; et *IX Metaphysicae*<sup>1</sup> quod verum<sup>2</sup> "est in rebus componi aut dividi," id est causa<sup>3</sup> veritatis. Unde "verum est divisum putans dividi et compositum putans componi." Unde habeo quod tota causa veritatis huius affirmativae 'Omnis homo est animal' est compositio seu unio animalis ad omnem hominem. Sed eadem est causa veritatis huius "Animal est omnis homo"; quod patet quia ista eadem compositio seu unio importatur per utramque propositionem. Eadem enim est unio et compositio omnis hominis ad<sup>4</sup> animal et animal ad omnem hominem, licet aliter 'animal' respiciat omnem hominem et aliter 'omnis homo' animal. Hoc enim non facit differentiam in propositionibus enunciantibus de simplici inesse, ut hic 'Omnis homo est risibilis' et 'Omne risibile est homo,' licet enim istud<sup>5</sup> sit subiectum et illud propria passio, quia tamen unica est eorum compositio seu unio, ideo eadem est causa veritatis utriusque propositionis; quare similiter in proposito si una est vera reliqua erit vera propter identitatem causae totalis.

(10.84) Quantum corrolarium est quod haec est contradictio 'Ter commedisti illud quod non ter<sup>6</sup> commedisti,' licet quidam<sup>7</sup> putaverunt eas esse compossibiles in veritate.<sup>8</sup> Cuius motivum fuit, quia iste accusativus 'illud' postponebatur<sup>9</sup> isti adverbio 'ter,' quare confundebatur, et iste accusativus 'quod' praeponebatur,<sup>10</sup> quare non confundebatur. Sed hoc nihil est, ut ostensum est in secundo corrolario, quia praepositio vel postpositio dictionis confundentis terminum

<sup>92</sup> scilicet... et *om.* MS

<sup>93</sup> praedictis/habitis S

<sup>94</sup> communicantiam/concomitantiam P

<sup>95</sup> homo *om.* MS

<sup>96</sup> veritatis *om.* P

<sup>97</sup> unio animalis/modalis S

<sup>98</sup> ad... hominem *om.* P

<sup>99</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 4, t. 8 (1027b 20-22)

<sup>1</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, IX, c. 10, t. 21 1051b 2-4)

<sup>2</sup> verum/ubi nota P

<sup>3</sup> id... causa/recta MP

<sup>4</sup> hominis ad/homo est M, omne *add.* P

<sup>5</sup> licet... istud/sed si illud M

<sup>6</sup> ter *om.* M

<sup>7</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

<sup>8</sup> in veritate/manifeste S

<sup>9</sup> postponebatur/proponebatur P, praeponebatur S

<sup>10</sup> quod praeponebatur/non postponebatur P

primo confusum non facit differentiam in confundendo <sup>11</sup> terminum secundo confusum.

(10.840) Item, ex alio: quod relativum habet eandem suppositionem cum antecedente licet terminus antecedens fuit confusus per signum, relativum vero non, ut in his: 'Omnis homo est risibilis qui et <sup>12</sup> est susceptibilis disciplinae.' Sicut enim prima propositio est universalis per confusionem sui subiecti, <sup>13</sup> ita secunda est per confusionem subiecti <sup>14</sup> primae, quod est confusum. Ita dico hic: 'Ter commedisti panem quem <sup>15</sup> non <sup>16</sup> ter commedisti' eandem penitus suppositionem habent hii duo acti, unus <sup>17</sup> antecedens et alter relativum eius. Quare affirmare <sup>18</sup> de antecedente quod negatur de relativo est expressa contradictio.

(10.9) Suppositio autem confusa per relationem termini confusi est suppositio personalis termini relativi antecedens confusi, ut 'Omnis homo aliquando vigilat qui etiam aliquando dormit.' Iste terminus 'qui' quia refert antecedens confusum confunditur et hoc est confundi per relationem termini confusi.

(10.90) Ad evidentiam autem huius confusionis et regularum de ipsa ponendarum sciendum <sup>19</sup> quod relativorum alia sunt relativa substantiae, alia accidentis. Relativorum autem substantiae alia sunt relativa identitatis, alia diversitatis. Item, relativorum <sup>20</sup> identitatis alia sunt simplicis identitatis, alia reciprocae identitatis. <sup>21</sup> Exemplum de primis, ut 'qui,' vel 'ille' vel 'ipse'; de reciprocis, ut 'sibi,' <sup>22</sup> 'sui,' 'se.'

(10.91) Dico igitur quod confusio per solam relationem habet locum tantum in relativis substantiae identitatis simplicis <sup>23</sup> vel reciprocae; quod patebit in regulis. Quarum prima sit ista: Omne relativum substantiae identitatis simplicis pro eodem modo et eodem <sup>24</sup> genere supponit pro quo et quomodo supponit suum antecedens; hoc supposito quod antecedens supponat formaliter, quia ut dictum est supra terminus potest bene formaliter supponere pro termino vocaliter vel rationaliter, id est utroque modo materialiter supponente, ut 'Homo est nomen qui est communis generis.'

(10.910) Ex ista regula concessa sequitur corrolarium quod licitum est ponere antecedens loco relativi et relativum loco <sup>25</sup> antece-

<sup>11</sup> confundendo/constituendo S

<sup>12</sup> et/cum S, *om.* M

<sup>13</sup> subiecti/termini homo S

<sup>14</sup> ita... subiecti/quia est relativum subiecti P, *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>15</sup> quem/quia M, quod S

<sup>16</sup> non/datur *add.* P

<sup>17</sup> acti unus/et causa unius M, acti unde S

<sup>18</sup> affirmare/affirmatur P

<sup>19</sup> sciendum/dicendum S

<sup>20</sup> relativorum/relativa P

<sup>21</sup> alia... identitatis *om.* S

<sup>22</sup> sibi *om.* MS

<sup>23</sup> simplicis *om.* P

<sup>24</sup> et eodem *om.* PS

<sup>25</sup> loco *om.* PS

dentis postquam pro eodem et eodem modo supponunt. Si vero dicatur <sup>26</sup> quod corrolarium non est verum nisi antecedens sit terminus singularis, quia cum dicitur "Homo currit, ille laborat" sensus est quod <sup>27</sup> unus et idem currat et laboret. Si vero dicatur 'Homo currit et homo laborat' <sup>28</sup> non est idem sensus de virtute sermonis, quia potest intelligi quod unus currat et alter laboret. Quare non videtur <sup>29</sup> licitum ponere antecedens pro relativo universaliter.

(10.911) Sed hoc nihil est. Non enim oportet cogitare instantias contra principia, <sup>30</sup> puta contra hoc principium <sup>31</sup> 'De nullo simul esse et non esse.' Quomodo ergo non avertit qui hic dicit <sup>32</sup> quod si duo termini pro eodem et eodem modo supponunt idem est ponere unum vel alterum, quia dato quod non, ergo vel non pro eodem vel non eodem modo supponunt. Quod contradicit ei quod est positum in regula; quare negare corrolarium concessa regula est sibi ipsi contradicere.

(10.912) Dico igitur quando <sup>33</sup> dicitur 'Homo currit qui laborat' quod non est sensus quod idem homo numero signatus currat et laboret, quia non est sensus antecedentis nisi de singulari vago de quo est verum dicere quod currit, quocumque singulari signato currente. Et iste <sup>34</sup> idem sensus est in relativo respectu <sup>35</sup> laboris et idem sensus esset antecedente repetito, quia instantia nulla fuit. <sup>36</sup>

(10.92) Secunda regula est quod omne <sup>37</sup> relativum identitatis reciprocae sicut 'sui', 'se' pro eodem supponit <sup>38</sup> et eodem genere suppositionis <sup>39</sup> sed non eodem modo supponit pro quo suum antecedens, ut 'Omnis homo diligit se.' Hic terminus 'homo' supponit personaliter et confuse pro quolibet homine. Hoc vero relativum 'se' etiam pro quolibet homine personaliter et confuse sed non eodem modo, quia 'homo' supponit confuse absolute, ly 'se' vero confuse sigillatim. Harum autem confusionum differentia dicta est supra.

(10.93) Tertia regula est quod nullum relativum diversitatis supponit pro eodem pro quo suum antecedens, quia haec est ratio differentiae inter haec relativa, <sup>40</sup> quia relativum identitatis refert idem, relativum vero diversitatis diversum. Sed *quidam* <sup>41</sup> motus est ad dicendum oppositum tali motivo; <sup>42</sup> ponit quod istae sunt verae: "Alterum contradictoriorum verum et reliquum falsum." 'Alterum'

<sup>26</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

<sup>27</sup> quod/idem est quod *add.* P

<sup>28</sup> sensus... laborat *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>29</sup> non videtur/intelligitur P

<sup>30</sup> principia/praesentia P

<sup>31</sup> hoc principium/haec praesentia P

<sup>32</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

<sup>33</sup> Dico... quando/Dato igitur quod P

<sup>34</sup> iste *om.* P

<sup>35</sup> respectu/tamen S

<sup>36</sup> laboris... fuit *om.* S

<sup>37</sup> omne/non omnem P

<sup>38</sup> supponit/genere S

<sup>39</sup> et... suppositionis *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>40</sup> inter... relativa/inter haec M, item P

<sup>41</sup> Hanc auctoritatem non invenimus.

<sup>42</sup> motivo/termino motivo M



dicatur esse antecedens et supponere pro utroque, 'reliquum' vero est relativum et oportet quod supponat pro aliquo de illis pro quibus <non> supponit antecedens, scilicet 'alterum.'

(10.930) Sed hic est maxima affinitas, quia saltem catuli de vico sciunt quod 'alterum' est signum particulare partitivum duorum <sup>43</sup> et 'utrumque' est signum universale distributivum duorum. Dicere igitur quod 'alterum' supponit pro utroque est dicere quod <sup>44</sup> 'aliquid' supponit pro omni indifferenter et per consequens quod eandem suppositionem praestat signum universale et particulare et per consequens <sup>45</sup> quod eadem est suppositio ad unum determinata et suppositio in plura confusa, quod dicere est asini non hominis. Dico igitur quod 'alterum' supponit pro altero — vide si est mihi credendum — et reliquum pro reliquo, cum hoc et illud indistincte et indistincte semper.

(10.94) Quarta regula est quod relativum accidentis semper supponit pro eodem in genere vel <sup>46</sup> specie, non tamen <sup>47</sup> pro eodem in numero, licet aliquando, ut 'Sortes est hodie talis qualis fuit heri' vel 'Sortes est albus <sup>48</sup> et heri fuit talis.'

(10.95) Ex regulis sequitur <sup>49</sup> corollarium quod relativa substantiae diversitatis et relativa accidentis, quaecumque sint illa, habere possunt proprios modos suppositionum distinctos a modis suppositionum suorum antecedentium, ut 'Iste homo dormit et reliqui homines vigilant.' Ecce quod antecedens habet suppositionem determinatam discretam, relativum vero confusam; et in relativis accidentis similiter, ut hic 'Sortes lapsus dormit et omnes tales vigilant.' Antecedens habet suppositionem discretam, relativum <sup>50</sup> vero confusam. <sup>51</sup>

(10.96) Suppositio autem personalis seu communicabilis termini subiecti variatur ex natura <sup>52</sup> praedicati in comparatione <sup>53</sup> ad supposita diversorum temporum et hoc sex modis, quia praedicatum ex natura sua quantum ad significationem vel quantum ad consignificationem, id est ex natura suae significationis vel <sup>54</sup> consignificationis determinat terminum subiectum ad supponendum pro solis suppositis praesentibus, ut 'homines actu vigilant' vel pro solis praeteritis, ut 'homines <sup>55</sup> sunt mortui' vel pro futuris, ut 'homines sunt generandi,' vel pro praesentibus et praeteritis indifferenter et nullo modo pro futuris, ut 'Homines fecerunt libros,' vel pro praesentibus et fu-

<sup>43</sup> partitivum duorum *om.* M

<sup>44</sup> alterum... quod *om.* (*hom.*) S

<sup>45</sup> quod... consequens *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>46</sup> vel/et P

<sup>47</sup> tamen/semper *add.* S

<sup>48</sup> albus/animal P

<sup>49</sup> regulis sequitur/relativis P

<sup>50</sup> relativum/reliquum S

<sup>51</sup> et in relativis... confusam *om.* (*hom.*) M

<sup>52</sup> natura/variatur *add.* P

<sup>53</sup> comparatione/compositione M

<sup>54</sup> significationis vel *om.* (*hom.*) P

<sup>55</sup> actu... homines *om.* (*hom.*) S

turis <sup>56</sup> indifferenter <sup>57</sup> et nullo modo pro praeteritis, ut 'Homines scribent' vel indifferenter pro praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, ut 'Homines sunt intelligibiles.'

(II.0) Suppositio autem aliquando fit per proprium terminum, aliquando per alienum, ut in quibusdam figurativis locutionibus de quibus ponit Isidorus <sup>58</sup> quattuor genera, ut <sup>59</sup> terminus alienus sumitur loco proprii, scilicet in locutione metaphorica et metanymica et antonomastica et synedochica. Per metaphoricam sumitur simile pro simili transsumptive;<sup>60</sup> ut 'pratium ridet'; per metanymicam contentum pro continente vel e converso, ut 'Audiat terra verba oris mei'; per antonomasticam commune pro proprio, ut 'Apostolus praedicat,' id est Paulus; per synedochicam totum pro parte, ut 'Albus <secundum> dentes.'

(II.1) Est autem regula <sup>61</sup> quod eandem suppositionem habet terminus <sup>62</sup> alienus quam haberet terminus proprius si fuisset acceptus, ut dicendo 'Apostolus praedicat' iste terminus 'Apostolus' habet hic suppositionem discretam sicut habuisset 'Paulus' si fuisset acceptus. Et hic 'Vincit leo de tribu Iudae' <sup>63</sup> iste terminus 'leo' supponit metaphorice pro Christo et habet singularem seu discretam suppositionem, sicut hic <sup>64</sup> terminus 'Christus' qui significat Dei Filium benedictum cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto regnantem in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

(II.2) Explicit tractatus de suppositionibus editus per fratrem Geraldum Hodonis ordinis Fratrum Minorum.<sup>65</sup>

*University of the South  
Sewanee, Tennessee*

STEPHEN F. BROWN

<sup>56</sup> indifferenter... futuris om. (hom.) S

<sup>57</sup> indifferenter/in antecedente P

<sup>58</sup> Isidorus, *Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri XX*, I, c. 37, n. 13 (synedoché), n. 8 (metonymia), n. 11 (antonomasia) (ed. W. M. Lindsay), Oxford, 1911.

<sup>59</sup> Isidorus... ut/quattuor S

<sup>60</sup> transsumptive/transsumptione M

<sup>61</sup> regula/ratio P

<sup>62</sup> terminus/antecedens P

<sup>63</sup> Iudae/Iuda MS

<sup>64</sup> sicut hic/sic P

<sup>65</sup> Explicit... Minorum/Expliciunt suppositiones editae per fratrem G. ho. Ordine fratrum minorum M, om. P

## TOWARD A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DUNS SCOTUS ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The Testimony in favor of the philosophical and historical importance of Scotus' argument for God's existence is quite articulate and insistent:

Of the great scholastics, perhaps no one devoted more attention and care to developing a proof for the existence of God than did Duns Scotus. Unlike Aquinas, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and so many others, he made no attempt to exploit the multitude of ways he considered possible, but rather concentrated his efforts on a single proof incorporating into it what he believed to be the best elements of the arguments of his predecessors and contemporaries.<sup>1</sup>

One writer goes so far as to say that

it is getting to be rather generally admitted that, for accuracy and depth and scope, this is the most perfect and complete and thorough proof for the existence of God that has ever been worked out by any man.<sup>2</sup>

That might seem to be quite a bit more than we may want to credit Scotus with, but, in the final analysis, though one may entertain serious doubts about the cogency of the argument, still it is difficult to escape the judgment that

it may be the most carefully thought out attempt of any schoolman to prove the existence of God within the epistemic norms for demonstration laid down in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Allan B. Wolter, "Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God," in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 28 (1954), 94-95.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Merton, *The Seven Storey Mountain* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948), p. 94, quoted in Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy*, tr. and ed. by Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), p. 138n.

<sup>3</sup> These remarks of Allan Wolter may be found in his preface to his edition and translation of Duns Scotus' *A Treatise on God as First Principle* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966), p. v.

As I proceeded to collect a bibliography on the subject, I found that my list of titles was becoming considerably larger than I had ever expected. In fact, it is considerably larger than, say, a bibliography on Descartes on the existence of God. This came to me as a great surprise, to say the least.

Moreover, I often found that the general Scotistic bibliographies, particularly Smeets' *Lineamenta*, are quite difficult to obtain, and searching for some of them involves a considerable expenditure of time.

Hence, because of the philosophical and historical importance of the subject matter, and the difficulty in obtaining certain crucial general Scotistic bibliographies, I have prepared the following bibliography.

This bibliography could not have been prepared without the help of the following: St. Mary of the Lake Seminary (Mundelein, Illinois), St. Louis University, Marquette University, Notre Dame University, the Newberry Library, the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto), the Scotus Commission (Rome), the Vatican Library, and the St. John's University Monastic Microfilm Project. I am most grateful to Northern Illinois University for supporting this work and to Fathers Bernardine M. Bonansea, O.F.M., and Roy R. Effler, O.F.M., for their kind suggestions and help.

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—, *Lectura in Librum Primum Sententiarum*, Dist. 2, Pars I, Qq. 1-2.

Edition: Opera Omnia Vaticana,<sup>4</sup> Vol. XVI, pp. 111-146.

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<sup>1</sup> My ordering of the primary sources is not necessarily an attempt at establishing their chronological order.

<sup>2</sup> *Opera Omnia*, 12 volumes, edited by Luke Wadding. Lugduni: Durand, 1639. Reprinted by Georg Olms (Hildesheim), 1968.

<sup>3</sup> *Opera Omnia*, iuxta editionem Waddingi, 26 vols. Paris: Vivès, 1891-1895. Reprinted by Gregg International Press (Farnborough), 1970.

<sup>4</sup> *Opera Omnia*, iussu et auctoritate Pacifici M. Perantoni... studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita praeside Carole Balić, 9 vols. to date. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950 ff.



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 Editions: Wadding, Vol. V.I, pp. 233-286.  
 Wadding-Vivès, Vol. VIII, pp. 393b-487a.  
 Fernandez García,<sup>5</sup> Vol. I, pp. 179-223.  
 Opera Omnia Vaticana, Vol. II, pp. 125-221.
- , *De primo Principio*, cap. 3.  
 Editions: Wadding, Vol. III, pp. 229a-236b.  
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 Schapin,<sup>8</sup> pp. 116-167.  
 Kluxen.<sup>9</sup>
- , *Reportatio in Librum Primum Sententiarum*, Dist. 2, Qq. 1-3.<sup>10</sup>  
*Reportatio I A* (Parisiensis) (Magna, Examinata).  
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<sup>5</sup> *Commentaria Oxoniensia*, 2 vols., ed. Marianus Fernandez García. Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1912-1914.

<sup>6</sup> *De Primo Principio*. A Revised Text and a Translation by Evan Roche. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1949.

<sup>7</sup> *A Treatise on God as First Principle*, tr. and ed. by Allan B. Wolter. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966.

<sup>8</sup> *Il Primo Principio degli Esseri*, introduzione, traduzione, commento a cura di Pietro Scapin. Padova: Liviana Editrice, 1973. Pp. 243-247 is the *coloratio* of the *ratio Anselmi*; pp. 116-167 is the God-proof.

<sup>9</sup> *Abhandlung über das erste Prinzip*. Herausgegeben u. übersetzt von Wolfgang Kluxen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974.

<sup>10</sup> Because of the complexity of the manuscript situation of the *Reportatio*, I am listing the known mss. according to Fr. Balić's enumeration (cf. the *Opera Omnia Vaticana*, Vol. I, p. 145\*). The differences between the mss. are often quite substantive.

The Vienna (Staatsbibliothek 1453) ms. bears this remark on fol. 125v: "Explicat reportatio super primum sententiarum sub magistro johanne scoto, et examinata cum eodem venerando doctore." Hence the title "*examinata*." This particular ms. is the best and the most important of the *Reportatio* mss. See ff. 12va-15rb for Scotus' proof of the existence of God. Unlike the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*, the Vienna ms. presents a discussion of whether the existence of God is knowable and whether such knowledge is self-evident *after* the proof of God's existence.

*Reportatio I C (Cantabrigiensis)*

Ms.: cod. Tuderti 12, ff. 121ra-192vb.

*Reportatio I D (Cantabrigiensis)*

Mss.: cod. Vat. Borghese lat. 50, ff. 1r-47v.

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*Reportatio I E*

Ms.: cod. Vat. lat. 13687, ff. 1ra-98va.

*Additiones Magnae in I Sent.*

Mss.: cod. Asciburgi bibl. archiv. abbat. cod. pap. 7, ff. 1ra-7ra.

cod. Vat. lat. 876, ff. 226ra-292ra.

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cod. Kassel. bibl. region. cod. theol. 171, ff. 1ra-5vb.

cod. Oxon. Balliol 205, ff. 1r-185v.

cod. Oxon. Balliol 302, ff. 135ra-210va.

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cod. Paris bibl. nat. 3061, ff. 123ra-176rb.

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cod. Venet. bibl. Marc. cod. lat. III, 230, 1r-150r.

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*Ioannis Scoti de Ordine Minorum Sacrae Theologiae Professoris Praecellentissimi, super Primum Sententiarum Quaestiones Reportationum Parisiensium a Batholomaeo Bellato Feltrense, sacrae paginae Doctore clarissimo, nec non Regente erudito tunc temporis Conventus Bononiae, emendata cum diligentia, finiunt feliciter: nec non operatae characterizataeque sublimi litterarum effigie ductu et impensis viri circumspetti Domini Joannis de Annunziata de Augusta. Bologna: Johannes Schreiber, 1478. [Editio princeps of William of Alnwick's abridgement of Reportatio I A.]*

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<sup>11</sup> I obtained this reference from Rev. Roy R. Effler, O.F.M., who indicated that the two tomes lack mention of author, publisher and date. However, handwritten on the flyleaf of his copy is the indication that Minges is the author, Quaracchi the place of publication and 1908 the date.

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Northern Illinois University  
DeKalb, Illinois

DONALD A. CRESS

## OLIVI'S "POSTILLA SUPER MATTHAEUM" (MS. New College B. 49)

Although the declaration of the Franciscan chronicler Mariano da Firenze that Olivi had composed *postillae* on the whole Bible is an over-statement,<sup>1</sup> his Biblical commentaries are very numerous, but unlike his *Questiones on the Sentences*<sup>2</sup> and minor works, these have not attracted the notice of scholars with the exception of his *Postilla super Apocalipsim*, condemned by the Church in 1326.<sup>3</sup> For this reason I am venturing to give my impressions of his *Postilla super Matthaeum*, in the hope of arousing the interest of more competent Biblical scholars.

I have used as my source MS. New College B. 49, but have also examined two other manuscripts, Paris Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Latin 15,888 and Corpus Christi Cambridge MS. 321.<sup>4</sup> The former belonged to a Paris master, Pierre de Limoges, who died in 1306, and was one of the many manuscripts left by him to the Sorbonne. It is thus almost contemporary and besides the *postilla*, ascribed on fol. 1 to "Petrus Iohannis," also contains Olivi's commentaries on Romans and the *Canticum Canticorum*. The manuscript is written either in a South French or Italian hand and is highly ornate, as the title page of each work has an illuminated letter and an elaborate border, the letters being in blue with a pink frame and a gold interior. Each chapter begins either with a blue letter on a red hatched ground

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<sup>1</sup> *Compendium Chronicarum Fratrum Minorum, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 2 (1909), 462.

<sup>2</sup> *Questiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, IV-VI (Quaracchi, 1922-26).

<sup>3</sup> R. Manselli, *La Lectura in Apocalipsim di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi* (Rome, 1955). The *Postilla* is being edited by W. Lewis.

<sup>4</sup> For the manuscripts in foreign libraries see F. Ehrle, "Petrus Iohannis Olivi, sein Leben und sein Schriften," *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte*, III (Berlin, 1887) 487-88; and D. Pacetti, *Petrus Iohannis Olivi, Questiones Quatuor de Domina*, Bibliotheca Franciscana Ascetica Medii Aevi, VIII, (Quaracchi, 1954), 18.



or a red one on a blue hatched ground, and the paragraphs are marked in red and blue. The present binding is of apple green leather. Although it is written in a clear liturgical hand in two columns and the text has been corrected by a contemporary it is not particularly good.<sup>5</sup> The *Corpus Christi* manuscript is late 14th century, also written in two columns and in a small, ugly and much contracted hand. The prototype must also have been much abbreviated as on fol. 3r the copyist confesses that owing to the difficulty of deciphering the abbreviations he had been unable to finish transcribing it. After the *postilla* a list is given of the questions raised in each of its chapters, and this is followed by an unfinished copy of Olivi's treatise on the Lord's Prayer.<sup>6</sup> The text has certainly been carelessly transcribed, as chapter 1 breaks off on fol. 11va, to be followed by chapters 4 and 3, then comes the end of chapter 1, and chapters 2 and 5. A folio from a beautifully written early XIth century manuscript has been inserted, giving the end of the text of an Anglo-Saxon dialogue, a Latin version of which is printed in Bede's *Collectanea* (Cologne, 1612), III, p. 488. The manuscript is anonymous, but a contemporary note on fol. 1v tentatively suggests that William of Auvergne was the author. Another note gives R-ye as its provenance, which is possibly Ramsey abbey. The beginning of the *postilla* is transcribed on the same folio in a seventeenth century hand.<sup>7</sup>

MS. New College 49 is a large manuscript bound in white vellum and once chained to a lectern or shelf. It is either late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, and is written in a large and very clear liturgical hand. The first folio has miniatures of the four evangelical symbols at the corners, and there are decorated initial letters at the beginning of the chapters. Its provenance is unknown but it is certainly English. It is neither in Dr. N. Ker's list of the surviving manuscripts from English religious houses nor in that of those left to

<sup>5</sup> *Postilla super Mattheum* fols. 15ra-134va; *Epistola ad Romanos* fols. 135ra-163ra; *Canticum Canticorum*, fols. 163ra-259rb. For Pierre de Limoges, cf. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire de Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1932) N. 178, pp. 364-66. I owe my information about the connection of Pierre de Limoges with the manuscript, its date, the handwriting and the state of the text to the kindness of Mlle. d'Alverny.

<sup>6</sup> Fols. 210rb-215ra; fols. 215rb-218ra; The treatise is edited by F. Delorme in *Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà* (Rome, 1951), I, 179-218.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. M. R. James, *Descriptive Catalogue of MSS Corpus Christi*, Cambridge (Cambridge, 1911), Pt. IV, II, pt. I, p. 118.

New College by William of Wykeham and Bishop Rede of Chichester.<sup>8</sup> The ascription is to "Petrus Iohannis" but after the ban placed on Olivi's writings by the Franciscan General Chapter of 1319 his works were often transcribed anonymously or attributed to other writers. On the final folio, however, a warning written in a cursive hand is given to the readers. "There was a heretic named Peter, the son of John, an accomplice of the heresiarch, Abbot Joachim and, as it is uncertain which Peter, son of John, wrote this work, I have thought it my duty to warn the imprudent reader."<sup>9</sup> The warning was certainly necessary as the *postilla* is full of Joachite passages.

"Postilla" was a new term used in the thirteenth century, perhaps, as Miss Smalley suggests, for a continuous gloss following the text commented on, the word "gloss" now being reserved for marginal and interlinear glosses.<sup>10</sup> Like several of Olivi's major works the *Postilla super Mattheum* was a set of lectures given at a Franciscan friary where he held the office of lector. It is uncertain at what stage in his career these were given, whether between the time when he left Paris and the Chapter General of Strasbourg of 1282, or during his later lectorships at S. Croce and Montpellier. The former is perhaps the more likely, although there are allusions in the text to other works, a commentary on Isaiah, the short treatise on the Lord's prayer, and questions on various subjects.<sup>11</sup> In the commentary, however, he deals briefly with a matter already discussed in Isaiah, so that it is possible that the two sets of lectures were given simultaneously.<sup>12</sup> The *postilla* is cited in the commentaries on Kings and Acts and Co-

<sup>8</sup> *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, 2nd ed. (London, 1964); A. F. Leach, "Wykeham's Books at New College," *Collectanea III*, O.H.S., 1896, Pt. IV, pp. 211-244.

<sup>9</sup> "Erat quidam Petrus Iohannis hereticus, unus complicitibus Ioachimi abbatis heresiarche, cum ergo non constat cuius Petri Iohannis hoc opus sit, non alienum putavi ab officio meo imprudentem lectorem admonere." The rest is erased. fol. 159vb.

<sup>10</sup> B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1952), p. 270.

<sup>11</sup> *Brevis exposiuncula de oratione dominica*, fol. 60ra; *questiones de delusione sensuum nostrorum que fit a demonibus vario modo*, fol. 31va; *questio prima de paupertate*, fol. 64vb; *de venali peccato*, fol. 46ra; *de gratia*, fol. 88rb; *de votis evangelicis*, fol. 118ra; *quomodo spiritus separati quam uniti affligantur ab igni corporali*, fol. 141va; *an duo corpora possint essere in eodem loco*, fol. 159va.

<sup>12</sup> "De hoc etiam super 7mo capitulo Ysaie diffusius sum locutus" fol. 14va; cf. V. Doucet, "De Operibus Manuscriptis Fr. P. J. Olivi in Bibl. Univ. Patavinae," *AFH*, 28 (1935), 156-197 and Pacetti, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

rinthians and is probably the earliest one on the Gospels, as it and John precede those on Mark and Luke. The date could be approximately fixed if the attack on two questions in Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*<sup>13</sup> taken almost verbatim from the *postilla* and found with a treatise on the *usus pauper* in MS. Vat. 4986 could be precisely dated.<sup>14</sup> The Vatican manuscript however contains besides early *questiones* one on the legitimacy of a papal resignation, obviously inspired by the case of Celestine V, and is generally regarded as a revision of his *questiones* made shortly before his death. The treatise on the *usus pauper* and the other early *questiones*, but not the attack on Aquinas, are in MSS. Vat. Borghese 46 and 358, both of which were in the hands of Olivi's judges in 1283.<sup>15</sup> Nicholas III's bull, *Exiit qui seminat*, of 1279, and the minister general's encyclical of the same year are both mentioned in the treatise, so it must have been composed between 1279 and 1283, and the position of the attack in MS. Vat. 4986 suggests an approximate date. Also, Olivi would not have been lecturing during the examination of his writings. Thus, the *postilla* was probably an early work.

Olivi was well equipped for his work as a Biblical commentator. On the whole he does not make much use of the gloss except for etymological, historical and geographical information, and when he does so he often gives authorities not in the printed text. The parallels with the *Catena Aurea* are much closer and more numerous and would suggest that he and Aquinas were possibly using the same model. Both base their exposition on the same writers, Chrysostom, whose homilies on Matthew were available in a Latin translation, Origen, Hilary of Poitiers, Isidore, Bede and the Carolingian divines Rabanus and Remigius, and make little use of their contemporaries or near contemporaries. There are a few exceptions to this anonymity. William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure, for whom unlike most of the Spirituals he had a great respect and sympathy and whom he calls a foremost authority,<sup>16</sup> are named,<sup>17</sup> as is also "brother Thomas," from two questions of whose *Summa* he gives

<sup>13</sup> Q. 108, Art. 2; Q. 188, Art. 7., cf. *infra* n. 18.

<sup>14</sup> Ms. Vat 4986, fols. 75r-77v. Extracts have been edited by Ehrle, *op. cit.*, pp. 519-23.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. A. Maier, "Per la storia del processo contra Olivi," *Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia* (Rome, 1951), V, 326-39.

<sup>16</sup> "Principalis doctor." fol. 38vb.

<sup>17</sup> Fols. 39ra, 49ra, 70ra, 78vb.

long excerpts.<sup>18</sup> In the first of these Aquinas had maintained that Christ's commands to his disciples, when he sent them out to preach, that they were to take nothing for the way<sup>19</sup> were not intended to be permanent since they had been rescinded at the last supper, but were merely permission to receive what they needed from those to whom they preached. In the second question he had denied that complete poverty was a synonym for perfection, which consisted in supernatural charity to which poverty was only a means, and had argued that the possession of a limited amount of property by a religious order was not an imperfection, since it prevented solicitude for the morrow, which was an obstacle to contemplation, and enabled the order to carry out the work for which it had been founded. The type and extent of property owned depended on this, for the monastic orders were bound to dispense alms and hospitality and the military orders needed castles and arms. Such opinions were anathema to the stricter Franciscans and Olivi attacks them with immense vigour as entirely contrary to the rules of St. Francis and St. Dominic and to the teaching of the Gospels and the Fathers. Christ's words at the last supper, "but now he that has a purse let him take it, and likewise his scrip, and he that hath no sword let him sell his garment and buy one,"<sup>20</sup> were intended to apply only to times of persecution when a different way of life was necessary temporarily. The ownership of property in common made nonsense of our Lord's instructions to possess neither gold nor silver,<sup>21</sup> and the making of the duties of hospitality or warfare an excuse for wealth had led to covetousness, luxury, and the relaxation of discipline. The military orders had fought better when poor, and the religious orders which like his own lived on alms, or by the labours of their hands, were clearly more perfect than those which out of the abundance of their riches gave alms to the poor, for Christ had expressly commended the poor widow who had placed her two mites in the treasury.<sup>22</sup> It was perhaps true that

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<sup>18</sup> Fols. 78ra-81va. For Olivi's attack on Aquinas, cf. M. T. d'Alverny, "Un Adversaire de St. Thomas: Petrus Johannis Olivi," *St. Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Studies II* (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, Canada, 1974) pp. 179-218. Mlle. d'Alverny thinks the *Postilla super Mattheum* was composed during Olivi's lectorship at St. Croce.

<sup>19</sup> Mt. 11, 9-11.

<sup>20</sup> Lk. 22, 36.

<sup>21</sup> Mt. 10, 9; Mk. 6, 8; Lk. 9, 3; 10, 4.

<sup>22</sup> Lk. 22, 1-4.



the certainty of obtaining the bare necessities of life prevented solicitude, but this could be insured by the Franciscan use of these without their possession or any legal title to them, and ownership of any sort always led to the scandal of litigation. The energy and bitterness of his attack were probably due to the growing laxity over the rule of poverty amongst the Franciscans since Bonaventure's death, and the way they were making their pastoral work an excuse for the erection of magnificent churches and large conventual buildings and the free and lavish use of material goods, which made their assertion that they had no possessions sheer hypocrisy. The opinions of Aquinas were, however, held to be highly dangerous in contemporary Franciscan circles. Although the exact date of the final version of William de la Mare's *Correctorium Fratris Thomae*, a detailed criticism of 123 passages from the *Summa* and other works is uncertain, the Chapter General of Strasbourg ordered that a first draft of it, the *Declarationes Fratris Willelmi*, hitherto copied into the margins of the manuscripts of the exceptionally intelligent lectors, the only members of the order permitted to read the *Summa*, should now be written in a separate notebook to be read in conjunction with it.<sup>23</sup>

Olivi's criticism of Aquinas was merely the negative side of his teaching on evangelical poverty and the sermon on the mount naturally gave him ample opportunity for the expression of his views. The poor in spirit of the first beatitude were, according to the Fathers, the humble and lowly who had spurned all earthly and transitory things and every worldly honour to adhere to God as their end and future reward. Poverty was to them the highest happiness and so delightful that it seemed a foretaste of Heaven.<sup>24</sup> He strongly deplored the custom among the Franciscans of appointing proctors, who, as agents of the Papacy, to whom the churches, friaries, and other goods of the order officially belonged, sued for their restoration if they were taken away. Religious orders holding property as a community

<sup>23</sup> G. Fussenegger, *Diffinitiones Capituli Generalis Argentinae*, AFH, 26 (1933), I. 16, II.2, pp. 137, 139. On the question of the date of the *Correctorium*, cf. F. Pelster, "Les *Declarationes* et les *Questiones* de Guillaume de la Mare," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et médiévale* (Louvain), 3 (1931), 397-411; "Das *Ur-Correctorium* Willelms de la Mare," *Gregorianum*, 28 (1947), 220-35; P. Glorieux, "Non in Marginibus Positis," RTAM, 15 (1948), 182-84; V. Heynck, "Zur Datierung des *Correctorium Fratris Thomae* Willelms de la Mare," *Franziskanische Studien*, 49 (1967), 1-21.

<sup>24</sup> Fols. 37vb, 40rb. Mt. 5, 3.

could defend their rights in the law courts without sin, provided that their motives were good, but the perfect who had renounced ownership even in common could only humbly petition their despoilers to restore what they had taken.<sup>25</sup> It was the poor and not the rich who were generous, for they coveted nothing and showed their love for their neighbours by bodily labours instead of almsgiving, and especially by working for the salvation of souls.<sup>26</sup> Christ and his apostles had shown the meaning of poverty, for the former had nowhere to lay his head and the latter had boasted of having neither silver nor gold and had been content with only their garments.<sup>27</sup> It was foolish to be anxious about food or clothing, since God, who had created man and endowed him with an immortal soul would surely provide for his temporal needs.<sup>28</sup> Complete poverty, however, did not automatically prevent covetousness. In the *Collations* Abbot Moses had described hermits who attached importance to using special stools, pens and needles and who resented other members of their community reading a particular manuscript.<sup>29</sup> A very sensible objection was now raised that Christ had not displayed such lack of foresight for the morrow since he and the apostles had possessed a common purse and he had ordered the collection of the fragments left after the feeding of the 5,000. Moreover, when Agabus prophesied the famine in Claudius's reign, the Church at Jerusalem made a collection for their brethren in Judaea, and Paul had provided for himself by working with his hands, besides bringing the offerings of his converts to Jerusalem. Olivi gave the usual somewhat lame Franciscan answer, of the different standards for the perfect and the imperfect. Christ had occasionally given an example to the latter, but in the case of the former all anxiety for the morrow was forbidden, since it would destroy their tranquillity of mind and distract them from constant prayer and concentration on the salvation of souls. He admitted that on certain occasions, as at the time of the Passion, the apostles had been dispensed from strict poverty, but, as solicitude was the source of avarice, the perfect should only seek alms for their imme-

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<sup>25</sup> Fol. 55rb.

<sup>26</sup> Fol. 58vb.

<sup>27</sup> Fol. 62va. Lk. 9, 58; Acts 3, 6; I Tim. 6, 8.

<sup>28</sup> Fol. 63va. Mt. 6, 25.

<sup>29</sup> "Nam et plerumque nonnulli tanto zelo codicem servant ut eum nec leviter quidem legi vel contigi ab aliquo sinant et inde occasiones impatientie ac mortis incurrunt." fol. 62vb. Cf. Cassian, *Collations*, Part I, c. 6, PL 49; 488.

diat necessities, unless they had to provide for the sick or the imperfect.<sup>30</sup> Another interpretation of the collection of the fragments was the double position of the apostles, as professors of absolute poverty and as the future bishops of the Church whose duty it was to care for the poor members of their flock.<sup>31</sup> At any rate when the disciples set out on their preaching tour they were forbidden to take money with them, since poverty was especially fitting for bishops.<sup>32</sup> Olivi's explanation of the house where Christ healed Peter's mother-in-law is certainly ingenious as he suggested that it may have belonged to his wife.<sup>33</sup> Although Christ had not had a house, the Franciscans as a religious community were entitled to have permanent friaries since they were not in the position of itinerant preachers.<sup>34</sup> When commenting on the incident of the tribute money found in the fish, he applied Christ's words, "therefore the children are free," to those, who because of their complete poverty were the adopted sons of God. He also quoted Jerome's opinion that Christ had not paid for himself and Peter out of the money in the purse to show that bishops should not appropriate to themselves money intended for the poor, adding, however, the suggestion that Christ and the apostles did not normally possess a common purse and when they occasionally did, very soon gave the contents to the poor.<sup>35</sup> Those who humbled themselves and became like children were the men living in apostolic poverty.<sup>36</sup> The invitation to the rich young ruler was to fulfill the counsels as well as the commandments of Christ by renouncing his possessions and following him. To those who argued that no one should embark on the religious life unless he had first followed the commandments, Olivi answered by citing the example of Matthew, called to be an apostle from the customs house.<sup>37</sup> Also, if there were two paths, the shorter and more direct was the one to choose. Evangelic poverty was like the spur on the foot of the traveller, the horse of the knight,

<sup>30</sup> Fol. 101b-va. Mt. 14, 20-21; Mk. 6, 43-44; Lk. 9, 14, 17; Jo. 6, 12-13; 12, 6; Acts 11, 28-30; 20, 34; 1 Cor. 16, 1-3.

<sup>31</sup> Fol. 101va.

<sup>32</sup> Fol. 82ra.

<sup>33</sup> Fol. 70rb. Mt. 8, 14; Mk. 1, 30; Lk. 4, 38.

<sup>34</sup> Fol. 71ra.

<sup>35</sup> Fol. 111vb. Mt. 17, 23-26. Jerome, "Commentarium in Evangelium Matthae," lib. III, c. 17, PL 26; 136.

<sup>36</sup> Fol. 114rb. Mt. 18, 3; Lk. 18, 17.

<sup>37</sup> Fol. 119ra-rb. Mt. 19, 16-22; 9, 9; Mk. 10, 17-22; 2, 14; Lk. 18, 18-23;

the stick of the wayfarer and the ship of the sailor.<sup>38</sup> Peter's words to Christ, "Lo, we have left everything," showed that the apostles had abandoned all their possessions to follow Christ, but the promise that they and their imitators should receive a hundredfold did not entitle them to be lavish in the use of those things which they were permitted to use.<sup>39</sup> Like all the Spirituals Olivi was emphatic about the *usus pauper*. Even the parable of the guests invited to the marriage feast was made an argument for evangelical poverty, for the invitation was rejected and the messengers attacked by those who refused to embrace it.<sup>40</sup> On the day of Judgment the followers of evangelical poverty, who had concentrated on the seven spiritual works of mercy would act with the angels as judges and intercede for those who had shown them the seven corporal works of mercy.<sup>41</sup> The final proofs of Christ's complete poverty were supplied by the events of Holy Week. He had lodged at Bethany with Martha, Mary and Lazarus because he was too poor to pay for a lodging at Jerusalem, and for the same reason the room in which the last supper was held had belonged to a secret disciple. Even his tomb was the property of Joseph of Arimathaea.<sup>42</sup> There was not much that was new in Olivi's theory. Many of his arguments and examples had already appeared in the writings of Bonaventure and others during the conflict with the University of Paris and the secular clergy.

Olivi's teaching on contemplation is closely connected with his theory of evangelical poverty and to a lesser extent with his Joachimism. The four chief apostles were paired together, Peter and Andrew representing both the prelates, rulers of the Church during the second age and the active life, and James and John, the order of contemplatives of the age of the Holy Spirit and the contemplative life. More conventional types of contemplation were Mary Magdalen and Rachel, who had died on giving birth to Benjamin, the symbol of the ecstasy of its final stage. His prescriptions for the attainment of this were also traditional, for in commenting on Christ's first temptation he advocated fasting as one of the chief aids to prayer and contemplation.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> "Sicut est calceus pedi itineranti, et equus militi, et baculus viatori et navis transvadanti" (fol. 119vb).

<sup>39</sup> Fol. 120ra-vb. Mt. 19, 27-28; Mk. 10, 28-30; Lk. 14, 16-22.

<sup>40</sup> Fol. 127rb. Mt. 22, 1-6; Lk. 14, 16-22.

<sup>41</sup> Fol. 140va.

<sup>42</sup> Fols. 124vb, 143vb, 155vb. Mt. 26, 18, 27-60; Mk. 14, 12-14; Lk. 22, 8-12.

<sup>43</sup> Fols. 36va, 20vb, 29vb, 143rb. Mt. 4, 1-4.



The sermon on the mount, particularly the beatitudes and the Lord's prayer, naturally supplied Olivi with much material for the development of his teaching on contemplation. He made the first three beatitudes the road of advancement by means of detachment, the abdication of personal possessions, penitence, contrition, and active charity, to contemplation and final union with God. "After these follow two, the first being complete abstraction from any thought or image obstructing pure and simple contemplation of God. The last is truly the utter peace and cessation of any activity which would hinder that sweet intoxication and absolute repose and savour of the absorption of the mind in God, called by the apostle the unity of the spirit."<sup>44</sup> Almost immediately after this he once more describes the way through poverty, detachment, rectitude, and love to the superabundant contemplation of God, by the total suspension and elevation of the mind and the purification of the heart, which leads to the enjoyment of God, the ultimate goal of our thoughts, affections and desires, and to the peace not undeservedly ordained for us by Christ.<sup>45</sup>

Much the same ground is covered in Olivi's treatment of the Lord's prayer. Its seven petitions correspond to the seven beatitudes, and the need for solitude is stressed in order to enter into the chamber of Christ,<sup>46</sup> which means mystically entering into the chamber of the heart and shutting out, not only from the senses but also from the potencies of the soul, all exterior things which would hinder quiet prayer. Prolixity in prayer must be avoided, but preference for mental prayer did not apply to community worship in praise of God. Worship, thanksgiving, supplication and all other forms of prayer were contained in the Lord's prayer.<sup>47</sup> In commenting on other parts

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<sup>44</sup> "Post hec autem secuntur due, quarum prima est summa abstractio et abstentio ab omni cogitatu vel specie impediante puram et simplicem contemplationem Dei. Ultima vero est summa tranquillitas seu summum silentium omnium actuum impredientium illum qui dicitur deliciosissima ebrietas et quietissima requies ac saporatio ac deiformissima transformatio mentis in Deum, que ab apostolo unitas spiritus vocatur" (fol. 39rb. Mt. 5, 1-12).

<sup>45</sup> "Ac deinde in superexcessum divine speculationis totum suum intellectum suspendere et sublevare, quod est proprium munditie cordialis seu mundicordium Ac deinde divine fruitioni affectum suum totaliter incorporare, quod est ultimus finis nostre mentis, nostrique desiderii, ac perconsequens et pax eius, ideo non immerito sunt sic ordinate a Christo" (fol. 39vb).

<sup>46</sup> "in cubiculum Christi" (fol. 59ra).

<sup>47</sup> Fol. 60rb.

of the sermon on the mount he returns to the same theme. The treasure laid up in Heaven was the concentration of the mind and all the affections on the highest Good, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge and all celestial delights.<sup>48</sup> The true light of the body is the inner eye of the soul gazing fixedly on God, its only end to whom all its desires and acts are directed, and through whom it and all its powers are ruled and illuminated.<sup>49</sup> The words "ask and it shall be given to you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened to you" are applied to prayer, study, and action, but chiefly to prayer, first for the gift of grace to walk in the way to God, secondly for light to find and keep to the right path, and thirdly, when the road had been found and followed, to enter the palace of God, and enjoy the quiet of contemplation.<sup>50</sup> The strait gate and narrow way were the life of poverty and contemplation. When the soul desires to return to God it must suppress altogether its natural attraction to and inclination towards the external world, and turn its affections solely towards God, raising and uniting itself to the one absolute Good. The more it advances, the more it must turn away from sensory phenomena to concentrate and plunge itself more deeply into the invisible and ineffable God-head.<sup>51</sup> This was not a contradiction of Christ's declaration that his yoke was easy, since his law was in itself sweet although human weakness and corruption made it seem harsh and burdensome.<sup>52</sup>

Certain parables were also used. The seed which fell on the good ground and brought forth a hundredfold represented the contemplatives, and that which brought forth sixtyfold, the active lovers, whose devotion was shown in works of charity towards their neighbours.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Fol. 62va. Mt. 6, 20.

<sup>49</sup> Fol. 63ra. Mt. 6, 22.

<sup>50</sup> "In primo petatur donum gratie prebentis viris ad perambulandum viam Dei, in 2° queratur ipsa via, ne scilicet erret homo in viis contrariis, 3° inventa et perambulata iam via nititur homo intrare in palatium Dei et in terminum vie, que est gloria aut finalis quies contemplationis" (fol. 66va. Mt. 7, 7).

<sup>51</sup> "Quando ergo anima vult redire ad Deum totam effusionem suorum sensuum et appetituum et voluntatum vitiosarum oportet eam omnino cohibere et se totam ad divinum recolligere. Et ad unum simplex Bonum omnis affectus suos elevare et unire. Et quanto plus proficit tanto magis oportet priorem effusionem tam sensibilium quam sensuum funditus abnegare et ad illud invisibile et simplissimum Bonum tanto magis se recolligere et profundare" (fol. 67ra).

<sup>52</sup> Fol. 67ra. Mt. 11, 30.

<sup>53</sup> Fol. 98ra. Mt. 13, 8.

The treasure hidden in the field symbolized the multiform and infinite perfections of the supreme, invisible Good, whilst the pearl of great price typified its unity, simplicity, beauty, brilliance, and lucidity; and to this the mind must adhere forgetting everything else.<sup>54</sup> The most far-fetched symbolism, however, comes in the commentary on the parable of the wedding guests. The oxen and fatted birds prepared for the feast were either Christ, the perfect example of both action and contemplation, who had sacrificed himself for man's redemption, or the prophets and saints of the Old Testament, who both as contemplative and active lives were offered up for the world.<sup>55</sup>

Christ's transfiguration was interpreted by Olivi allegorically rather than literally. The six days between it and St. Peter's confession were the six stages of contemplation, which, however, he did not describe. At the top of the mountain, the mind, after a period of preparation by means of persistent, profound, and tranquil prayer, in a state of ecstasy beheld Christ in his glory. This final stage was represented by the voice from the cloud. The attainment of such heights was granted only to a few, hence only three of the twelve, Peter, James and John, saw Christ transfigured with Moses and Elias. Their disappearance, leaving Christ with the apostles, also had an allegorical sense. In the initial stage of contemplation the soul was led to God through a multiplicity of things, but finally everything else vanished and it saw only God.<sup>56</sup> Olivi's preoccupation with contemplation made him describe the kingdom from which the Pharisees excluded the people, an action for which they were denounced by Christ, as "the highest perfection of love, humility and every virtue, the highest truth, and the sweetness of the contemplation of God and of Christian wisdom."<sup>57</sup> The two women grinding at the mill and two men in a bed were also symbols of the active and the contemplative lives, in which carnal affections and desires had been

<sup>54</sup> Fol. 98va. Mt. 13, 44-46.

<sup>55</sup> "Per tauros scilicet pingues vitulos et per altilia, id est aves bene alitas seu pascas potest intelligi Christus, qui per fortitudinem active fuit quasi taurus et per volatum contemplative fuit aves divinis suavitatibus impinguata, qui ad litteram pro nobis reficiendis fuit occisus. ...vel tam ipse quam omnes prophete et sancti prioris qui in activa et contemplativa usque ad mortem mactati fuerunt, possunt per hoc intelligi (fol. 127ra. Mt. 22, 1-14).

<sup>56</sup> Fols. 102va-110ra. Mt. 17, 1-8.

<sup>57</sup> "Regnum autem istud secundum gratiam est summa perfectio caritatis et humilitatis ceterarumque virtutum, et summa veritas et suavitas divine contemplationis et sapientie Christiane" (fol. 131rb. Mt. 23, 13).

mortified and the word of God had been ground by meditation and action into flour and bread.<sup>58</sup>

One of the appendices to Olivi's commentary on the crucifixion is a beautiful little treatise on the shape of the cross. The two bars, one reaching upwards and the other outstretched horizontally symbolized the active and contemplative lives. It was also Jacob's ladder ascending up to God, down which angelic influences descended upon us, raising us upwards. Birds flying skywards with extended wings were types of contemplative souls. He does not say what the ship moving across the water with sails unfurled, or propelled by oars, represented, but his Joachism makes it unlikely that it was the Church.<sup>59</sup> The last and fullest description of the contemplative process occurs in his commentary on the announcement by the angel to the holy women of Christ's resurrection, and his appearance to them on their way to tell the disciples, and his later one to the apostles on a mountain in Galilee. Allegorically, this represents the way to attain to wisdom and the knowledge of the glorified Christ. First, the lower cognitive and affective powers of the mind must be filled with desire for him and compassion for his sufferings and those of his members. Then follows angelic illumination and purification which destroy all obstacles to understanding and devotion, after which comes the meeting with Christ and the holding of his feet, that is of his humanity through which his divinity is apprehended and worshipped. Finally, by Christ's greeting, the intellect and the will, the higher faculties of the soul, which make it like Christ, though in a very different manner, the image of God, are raised up and, now free from earthly things, reach the mountain of contemplation and behold Christ in his glory.<sup>60</sup> Though Olivi's teaching is traditional, it is not conventional, but was apparently the result of personal experience.

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<sup>58</sup> "Per duos in lecto ordo continentium seu contemplativorum... per duos molentes duplex vita, scilicet activa et contemplativa, quarum est macerare carnalem sensum et affectum atque terere verbum Dei per meditationem et per operationem, ut fiat inde farina et panis (fol. 137rb. Mt. 24, 40-41).

<sup>59</sup> "Quia in cruce Christi consistit rectitudo intelligentie speculative et practice et vite contemplative et active... ita quod prima tendit in sursum, secunda in latum... Hec ergo est scala Iacob in qua Dominus stabat, per quam angelice influentie ad nos descendunt et reascendendo, nos sursum agunt. Sub hac forma volant aves id est contemplative mentes, alis scilicet in latum protensis. In hac forma currit navis, sive quando per velum a vento sufflatum agitur et deducitur, sive quando per ramos in latum protensos aque franguntur et navis impingitur, per hanc igitur ad portum glorie transvadamus" (fol. 154rb. Cf. Gen. 28, 12).

<sup>60</sup> "Nota quod mystice ostenditur hic modus pertingendi ad sapientiam et



The most interesting and original feature of the *Postilla* is that it shows that Olivi was already an exponent of the theories associated with the name of the famous abbot Joachim. His audience was obviously familiar with these and seems to have understood his imagery and allusions without explanation or comment. The three ages of the Church, the small elect band of contemplatives, who had revived the evangelic life and were to be the founders of the Church of the third age, their persecution by the carnal Church and the coming of Antichrist are central themes, introduced often in very unpromising places. Christ's third temptation, when Satan offered him all the kingdoms of the world, was a prophecy of the coming of Antichrist, who would be enthroned in the Temple as if he were God and the house built on sand in the sermon on the mount typified the carnal Church of the end of the second age.<sup>61</sup> Christ's entering the room where Jairus's daughter lay dead and restoring her to life represented the end both of the synagogue and of the carnal Church and their replacement, the first by the Church of the second age, founded by Christ and the apostles, and the second by the Church of the age of the Holy Spirit.<sup>62</sup> The seven different kinds of miracles performed by Christ stood for the seven subdivisions of the three ages.<sup>63</sup> The healing of the man with the withered hand signified both the superseding of the Old Law by that of the New Testament and the conversion of the carnal Sabbath of the second age into the spiritual Sabbath of the third, when sin would cease and men would devote themselves to the contemplation of God.<sup>64</sup> The seven evil spirits, which took pos-

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notitiam glorie Christi. Oportet enim primo ut pars mentis nostre inferior tam cogitativa quam affectiva ardenti desiderio et intima compassione querat et visitet Christum passum tam in capite quam in membris, et ille sunt due Marie... Ad hoc autem sequitur angelica illuminatio et confortatio obstacula intelligentie et devotionis evertens... Post hoc autem Christi occursus et salutare alloquium sequitur, ita ut predicta teneant pedes eius id est humanitatem eius, sentientes ibi esse deitatem et ideo adorant eum et Christi autem alloquio eriguntur, ut denuntient superiori intellectui et affectui quia illi sunt proprie imago Deisicut Filius est imago Patris, licet longe dispariter. Item autem XI discipuli, affectus et intellectus supremi... a mundanis ad supramundana transmigrarent in montem contemplationis... et ibidem Christum in gloria sue maiestatis adorant et vident" (fol. 158vb. Mt. 28, 1-10).

<sup>61</sup> Fols. 33va, 68va. Mt. 4, 8-9; 7, 26-27.

<sup>62</sup> Fol. 74vb. Mt. 9, 23-26.

<sup>63</sup> Fol. 86vb.

<sup>64</sup> Fol. 90ra. Mt. 12, 9-13.

session once more of the soul of the man whose house had been swept and garnished were the Pharisees and the members of the carnal Church, who had persecuted the Spirituals out of envy at the admiration aroused by their sanctity.<sup>65</sup>

Olivi's interpretation of certain parables is strongly coloured by the Joachite tradition. Those of the sower, the wheat and the tares, the grain of mustard seed, the treasure hidden in the field and the precious pearl were all symbols of the seven periods of the Church of the second age and of the different types of life within it. The first two represented its beginnings, the separation of the wheat from the tares being both the separation of the disciples from the Jews and that of the elect from the followers of Antichrist at the inauguration of the age of the Holy Spirit. The grain of mustard seed and the leaven hidden in the meal typified the growth of the Church, whilst the treasure in the field, the precious pearl and the net cast into the sea represented its end, the first two being the revival of the evangelic life of poverty by St. Francis and his disciples and the last, the final conversion of the world.<sup>66</sup> The seed falling among thorns and on the rocks in the first parable was the flighty and the worldly, and after a very complicated play with the three numbers, Olivi finally decided that the good seed which multiplied thirtyfold, sixtyfold and a hundredfold represented three orders in the Church, the married, the widows and the virgins.<sup>67</sup> In his commentary on the parable of the labourers in the vineyard the different ages of the world and their subdivision are worked out much more elaborately. The different hours typified the subdivisions of the different ages, the first and the second being paralleled. The first was the age of Adam or of Christ and the apostles; the third, of Abraham or Moses or of the councils which had given to the Church its law; the sixth, that of David or of the doctors whose prototype was Solomon; the ninth, that of the captivity of the Jews in Babylon or of the schism between the Greek and Roman churches and of the losses to Christendom caused by the Saracen conquests, the period of the foundation of the great monastic orders. Christ had appeared at the eleventh hour and called the disciples and the Gentiles, and at the same time in the second age the evangelical life had been renewed on earth by St. Francis, the hum-

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<sup>65</sup> Fols. 93vb-95ra. Mt. 12, 43-45.

<sup>66</sup> Fol. 95vb. Mt. 13.

<sup>67</sup> Fol. 96rb-va.

blest of Christ's little ones but exalted above all men by the stigmata. The evening of the day was the last Judgment when the Pharisees and Scribes grumbled because the disciples who had not borne the heat of the day, received the same reward as themselves, for under the Old Law men had worked in expectation of recompense, whilst under the New they laboured for love of Christ and were too humble to think themselves worthy of any reward. The heat of the day through which the different groups of labourers worked was also given a Joachite interpretation. It stood for the three weights removed by Christ: marriage, for the second age was that of the clergy; avarice and pride, due to temporal possessions; and the barrenness and lack of spirituality of the Jews and of the carnal Church during the sixth age.<sup>68</sup>

Olivi's interpretation of certain events in the life of Christ is strongly coloured by the Joachite tradition. Christ had appeared to the apostles walking on the sea at the fourth watch of the night and each watch prefigured an important crisis in the history of the Church. The first was the age of persecution or of the martyrs, the second that of the heretics or of the doctors opposed to them, and the third that of the simoniacs and the degenerate and worldly clergy and monks, the oppressors of the adherents of evangelical poverty. Antichrist and his followers, the hypocrites who transformed themselves into angels of light would appear in the fourth age, and then Christ would come again and kill the evil spirit by the breath of his mouth.<sup>69</sup> A more indirect interpretation was given to the feeding of the five thousand, the sign from heaven demanded by the Pharisees, and Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi.<sup>70</sup> The five loaves and the two fishes were the Pentateuch and the prophetic and historical books of the Old Testament which gave a flavour to the Old Law. These were multiplied in a mystical sense or given a spiritual interpretation at his coming.<sup>71</sup> The same would happen to all the books of the Bible

<sup>68</sup> Fols. 121ra-122va (fol. 122 is wrongly numbered 121). Mt. 20, 1-16.

<sup>69</sup> "Prima fuit a paganis, qui fuerunt quasi nox terribilis contra quam martires vigilaverunt, 2<sup>a</sup> hereticorum habentium nomen Christianorum et verba scripturarum... et contra hanc doctores, 3<sup>a</sup> symoniacorum et negotiosorum clericorum et religiosorum, contra quam fuerunt zelatores religionis et evangelice puritatis et paupertatis, 4<sup>a</sup> est hypocritarum transfigurantium se in angelos lucis, ut caput eorum Antichristus... In hac autem venturus est Christus, ut interficiat impium spiritu oris sui" (fol. 102rb. Mt. 14, 23-34).

<sup>70</sup> Mt. 14, 14-21; 16, 1, 13-16.

<sup>71</sup> "Sicut in vespere a Christo fracti et multiplicati sunt quinque panes et

at the end of the Church. The sign demanded by the Pharisees was for a manifestation of earthly glory such as would be displayed by Antichrist.<sup>72</sup> At the time of Peter's confession there had been various speculations about Christ, some saying that he was John the Baptist and others Elias or another of the prophets risen from the dead. In the same way in the last days of the Church, the life of Christ would be differently interpreted, but the only true interpretation was that of the contemplatives vowed to evangelical poverty who, in spite of being persecuted by the followers of Antichrist, would be the founders of the church of the third age.<sup>73</sup> Immediately after Peter's confession Christ had foretold his Passion and his Resurrection on the third day after his death. This represented allegorically either the three laws of nature, grace, and glory, or the books of the Bible, the first day those of the Old Testament, the second those of the New, and the third the spiritual understanding of the scriptures which characterized the age of the Holy Spirit.<sup>74</sup> The transfiguration six days later symbolized the end or sixth division of each age, for Christ had appeared in the last period of the age of the Old Testament and the evangelical life had been revived at the same stage of the age of the New, whilst after the opening of the seventh seal <sup>75</sup> the Sabbath would begin, and the kingdoms of the world would become the kingdom of God and of his Son. Moses, Elias and Christ also typified the three ages and the three Laws, Moses being the Old and Christ the New, whilst it was believed by the Joachites that Elias would reappear during the third age when the Jews would be converted and a reconciliation between them and the Gentiles would take place.<sup>76</sup>

The events immediately preceeding Christ's Passion, particularly his descriptions of the last Judgment and of the destruction of the Temple enable Olivi to develop his Joachite theories. His triumphal

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*duo pisces, sic in fine synagoge quinque libros Moysi, id est legem et duos pisces, id est libros prophetiales et historiales, qui erant in condimentum legis Christus apparuit et in sensus mysticos multiplicavit, et aliquid simile creditur facturus in fine ecclesie respectu utriusque testamenti*" (fol. 101va).

<sup>72</sup> "Dicendum quod in signum quod illi querebant, intelligebant ipsi quod Christus magnificaret et glorificaret se coram eis sicut facturus est Antichristus" (fol. 105va).

<sup>73</sup> Fol. 107rb-va. Mt. 16, 13-16.

<sup>74</sup> Fol. 107vb. Mt. 16, 21.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Rev. 8, 1.

<sup>76</sup> Fols. 108va-109ra, passim. Mt. 17, 1-8. Many Franciscans thought that St. Francis was the second Elias.



entry into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday signified the new illumination at the end of each age, for his coming had brought with it the light of the New Testament and with the coming of Antichrist and the end of the carnal Church would come the full understanding of the scriptures and the clear vision of God.<sup>77</sup> The Pharisees and Herodians who had tried to entrap Christ over the tribute to Caesar were the hypocritical monks and clergy of the carnal Church, Christ himself typifying the spiritual men of the coming age of the Spirit.<sup>78</sup> The seven brothers, each of whom had in turn married the same woman, were the seven ages of the Old Testament, the period of the married, but the coming of Christ had freed men from the law of the flesh and brought about a spiritual resurrection.<sup>79</sup> The prophecies about the siege of Jerusalem and the last days could more fittingly be applied to the time of Antichrist. The false Christs who would appear were variously interpreted as Simon Magus or Nero, the first persecutor of the Christians, or as the heresiarchs who had denied the divinity or the humanity of Christ. There were differences of opinion about the pseudo-prophets, some regarding them as the false brethren mentioned by St. Paul, others as the antichrists of St. John, and others as the real Antichrist, about whose person Olivi was somewhat doubtful.<sup>80</sup> Did the words "Lo he is in the desert" and "Lo, he is in the bedchamber"<sup>81</sup> mean that he would be an austere man and unknown to the world like a king working in secret? On the other hand the scriptures expressly stated that he would be a lover of riches. Perhaps, the pseudo-prophets who proclaimed him would feign poverty, though he himself whilst praising wealth would protect and foster their pretended poverty. The corpse round which the eagles would gather was Christ, the food of the good, and the eagles might be interpreted either as the blessed or the contemplatives of the third age.<sup>82</sup> Many modern authorities asserted that the sun had been

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<sup>77</sup> "Semper circa fines est aliqua sollemnis clarificatio veritatis. Unde sicut ultimus finis synagoge introduxit claritatem Novi Testamenti et ultimus finis mundi introducit claram visionem Dei et finis ecclesie circa Antichristum introducit claram contemplationem fidei" (fol. 123vb. Mt. 21, 1-17).

<sup>78</sup> "Allegorice autem potest tota parabola aptari ad finalia tempora ecclesie ut per Christum significantur spirituales viri et per alios pseudo-religiosi vel pseudo-clerici" (fol. 128va. Mt. 22, 15-22).

<sup>79</sup> Fol. 129ra. Mt. 22, 23-32.

<sup>80</sup> Fol. 134ra. Mt. 24, 5-11.

<sup>81</sup> Fol. 135ra. Mt. 24, 26.

<sup>82</sup> Fol. 135rb. Mt. 24, 28.

darkened at the time of Christ's death and lights like stars had fallen from Heaven at the fall of Jerusalem, and Olivi thought that this would happen again both at the time of the death of Antichrist and at the last Judgment, which would come at the end of the third age.<sup>83</sup> This was symbolized by the fig tree, which suffered excessively during the winter of persecution, but put forth its tender shoots, fresh leaves and sweet fruits of spiritual doctrine when summer was at hand.<sup>84</sup> Here Olivi mentions the belief of the later Joachites that in addition to Antichrist, who would appear before the conversion of the Jews and before the beginning of the third age, another cruel tyrant identified by him as Gog, would appear after their conversion, whose coming would be followed by the last Judgement.<sup>85</sup> The two men in the field, the two women grinding at the mill and the two men in a bed represented different orders in the Church; the first pair, the two orders of preachers; the second, the married, who were turned round and round by temporal cares like a rotating mill; and the third, the contemplatives.<sup>86</sup> The two men in the field were the worldly and tyrannical prelates or the hypocritical pseudo-religious or pseudo-prophets, symbolized in the Apocalypse by the beast rising from the earth having two horns like a lamb,<sup>87</sup> a figure generally taken by the Joachites to represent Antichrist.<sup>88</sup> In the parable of the wise and foolish virgins the number five symbolized the first five subdivisions of different ages, and just as Christ had appeared on earth in the sixth period of the Old Testament, so in that of the New he would return in spirit to separate the grain from the chaff<sup>89</sup> and claim his true spouse, the contemplative church of the third age. This too would be divided into five shorter eras followed by the day of Judgment. Good and bad had existed together in the first two ages, and the oil in the lamps was charity which the foolish virgins lacked, being cold, sluggish and remiss in the good works typified by the lamps.<sup>90</sup> Re-

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<sup>83</sup> Fol. 135va. Mt. 24, 29; 27, 45.

<sup>84</sup> Fol. 136ra. Mt. 24, 32.

<sup>85</sup> Fols. 136vb-137ra.

<sup>86</sup> "Per duos in mola ordo conjugatorum, qui dum per diversas curas temporalium rotantur quasi molam in circuitu trahunt" (fol. 137rb). Mt. 24, 40-41.

<sup>87</sup> Rev. 13, 11.

<sup>88</sup> "Prelati carnales et tyrannizantes et pseudo-religiosi, seu pseudo-prophete ypocritaliter viventes ut primi intelligantur per bestiam ascendentem de terra, habentem duo cornua similia igni" (fol. 138ra). Cf. Mt. 24, 51.

<sup>89</sup> Mt. 3, 12; 25, 1-13.

demption or damnation would depend on the performance of the six corporal and the six spiritual works of mercy, the first by the ordinary Christian, and the second, only four of which are enumerated, teaching, exhortation against temptation, contemplation and correction, by the spiritual men, who had surrendered everything for Christ's sake. These with the angels would act as Christ's assessors, and they were not mentioned in the Gospels, either because of their humility or because their inclusion was a foregone conclusion.<sup>91</sup> Allegorically, the six works of mercy were the six ages of the world and of the Church. The crucifixion had taken place on the sixth day of the week in the sixth period of the Old Testament, and in the sixth age of the New, Christ would be crucified again by the repudiation of the evangelical life, revived by St. Francis, and by the persecution of its adherents. He was prudent enough not to make this last point categorically, but the implication was obvious.<sup>92</sup>

Christ's passion supplied Olivi with material for similar interpretations. St. Peter's denial represented three periods in the history of the Church, first the rejection of Christ by the Jews, or, if it was better to keep strictly to Christian times, the periods of the Arian controversy, of the coming of Antichrist and of the end of the world. The apostle himself stood for the innumerable weak Christians, who would fall away at each of these times.<sup>93</sup> The evangelists differed about the time of the crucifixion, Mark saying that it had taken place at the third hour, and John that it was at the sixth that Pilate had delivered Christ up to be crucified. These discrepancies symbolized the different ages, the third hour being that of grace or of the Holy Spirit and the sixth the last period of the old dispensation during which the Passion took place.<sup>94</sup> The darkness which covered the earth typified the blindness of the Jews and of the carnal Church in the

<sup>90</sup> Fols. 138rb-138va. Mt. 25, 3.

<sup>91</sup> "Hic igitur agitur de iudicio secundum ultimum modum et ideo angeli et viri apostolici, qui propter excessum humilitatis et paupertatis et mundane abiectionis vocantur hic minimi, designantur stare quasi iudices vel iudicis assessores... (fol. 140va).

<sup>92</sup> "2° est ad designandum sex etates mundi, vel sex tempora ecclesiastica in quibus sola opera misericordie sunt necessaria et in quorum sexto preeminet carcer persecutionum. Unde et Christus in sexto etate crucifixus est" (fol. 140vb. Mt. 26-27).

<sup>93</sup> Fol. 147ra. Mt. 26, 69-75.

<sup>94</sup> Fol. 153ra. Mk. 20, 25; Jo. 19, 14.

sixth division of the second age.<sup>95</sup> The most elaborate Joachite passage, however, occurs in the appendix on the seven wounds of Christ attached to this part of the commentary. The Passion was an allegory of the sufferings of the Church, and the opening of the seven seals in the Apocalypse represented seven crises in its history, the two last being the crucifixion of the evangelical life in the person of St. Francis and his disciples, of which the stigmata was a symbol. The vinegar in the sponge offered to Christ on the cross was the scum of false Christians, heretics and Jews, whose levity and hypocrisy were typified by the reed. Annas, Caiaphas, Herod and Pilate, the representatives of the priestly and secular powers, although hostile to each other, had united against Christ. These were types of the rulers of the synagogue and of the carnal Church and of the Greek and Roman authorities who had persecuted Christ and his followers, and in the schism of the last days would plot against the humble and simple men, filled with the spirit of Christ.<sup>96</sup> The dead who came out of their tombs after the resurrection were alleged by Jerome to have ascended with Christ to Heaven and certain learned men believed that there would be two resurrections before the general one, the first after the first crucifixion and the second after the second, that of the evangelical life and rule by the heretical church or synagogue, which might rightly be described as a spiritual Egypt or Sodom. Then would be fulfilled the words of Daniel and of the Apocalypse, "In that time thy people shall be saved, and many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake," and "After three days and a half the spirit of life from God entered into them and they stood upon their feet."<sup>97</sup> Olivi had heard from a very holy man that it had been revealed that the passion and resurrection of Christ would be renewed in the angel of the sixth seal, generally identified by the Franciscan Joachites as St. Francis and in his followers and that they would have a teacher and comforter from Heaven such as the apostles had had in the risen Christ. Olivi is here deliberately vague, declaring that these matters must be left to the divine disposition.<sup>98</sup> The rending

<sup>95</sup> Fol. 155ra. Mt. 27, 45.

<sup>96</sup> Fol. 154vb. Mt. 27, 48; Rv. 5-8.

<sup>97</sup> Fol. 155rb. Mt. 27, 52-53; Dan. 12, 2; Rev. 11, 11.

<sup>98</sup> "A viro valde spirituali audiui revelatum esse quod in angelo sexti signaculi cum quibusdam consociis suis de illo implebitur istud ut sicut est conformis Christo in passione, sic sit in resurrectione. Et ut discipuli illius temporis, qui fere in errorem ducentur, de celis habeant instructorem et confortatorem sicut apostoli



of the veil of the temple and the shattering of the rocks at Christ's death symbolized the harshness of the Old Law and the hardness of the human heart. The veil caused by the imagery of the law and the prophets and the ignorance of mankind had been rent asunder by Christ's passion in the sixth age of the world, and the same would perhaps happen in the sixth age of the Church at the opening of the sixth seal when spiritual understanding and a perfect way of life would emerge as if from the grave.<sup>99</sup> Much the same imagery is used about Christ's tomb, closed by Joseph of Arimathea with a great stone. It was the Old Testament which the Jews with their love of the letter and of ceremonies had sealed with seven seals which would be broken at the resurrection of the lion, the lamb without spot.<sup>100</sup>

If the *Postilla* is an early work, Olivi's apocalyptic theories seem to have played little part in the proceedings arising from the controversy with "Frater Ar" and the condemnation at the Chapter General of Strasbourg. The documents connected with the former, the *Rotulus*, the *Letter of the Seven Seals* and his own defence are concerned mainly with his philosophical opinions and the questions of evangelical poverty and the *usus pauper*.<sup>101</sup> Presumably the laxer interpretation of poverty since Bonaventure's death made a certain section of the order anxious for an excuse to secure the condemnation of so staunch an upholder of the stricter tradition on other grounds. Such at least was the opinion of the Spirituals.<sup>102</sup>

Except for Aquinas, Olivi's attitude to his sources is respectful but not uncritical. In spite of his frequent citations he ventures at times to disagree with Origen and Chrysostom. He rejects the former's explanation that Judas had arranged with the Temple guard to kiss Jesus whom they must have known well by sight, because he was

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habuerunt Christum resurgentem. Quid tamen sit de hoc divino iudicio et consilio teneo relinquendum" (fol. 155rb. Rev. 7, 2).

<sup>99</sup> Fol. 155rb-va. Rev. 6, 12.

<sup>100</sup> "Mistice per hoc monumentum designatur scriptura veteris testamenti que fuit Iosep... quam Iudei amatores littere et ceremonialium fortiter sigillarunt in cortice eius... et in ea sunt septem sigilla que solvit leo resurgens; agnus sine macula" (fol. 156ra. Mt. 27, 60, 66; Rev. 5, 1-8).

<sup>101</sup> *Quodlibeta* (Venice, early 16th century), fols. 42ra-53ra; J. Koch, "Die Verurteilung Olivi's auf dem Konzil von Vienne und ihre Vorgeschichte," *Scholastik*, 5 (1930), 489-522; AFH, 28 (1935), 115-155, 374-407; 29 (1936), 98-141, 365-395.

<sup>102</sup> Angelo da Clareno, *Historia Septem Tribulationum*, Trib V, ALKG, II, 290-300; A. Ghinato, *Sussidi e testi per la gioventù francescana*, 10, I, 136-148.

popularly believed to be able to assume different forms, pointing out that in the darkness of the night he might easily have escaped and one of the disciples been arrested instead.<sup>103</sup> He also regarded as a reflection on the perfection of Mary, Chrysostom's suggestion that Christ's mother and brethren had asked out of pride to see him when he was teaching.<sup>104</sup> In cases where he cites more than one authority on the same passage he always says which he prefers.

Unlike many Franciscan commentators Olivi is not particularly interested in social and political problems and his allusions to contemporary life are comparatively few and given without comment. There are a few references to teaching, as when he suggests that since doubts lead to investigation a good master should give his pupils many proofs and solutions,<sup>105</sup> a maxim which he certainly carried out in practice. He seems to have accepted the institutions and conventions of his age unquestioningly, regarding kingly authority as ordained by God for the punishment of evildoers and the spiritual authority as supreme over the temporal.<sup>106</sup> Amongst ecclesiastical institutions he mentions procurations and the oaths taken by canons to their bishop to observe the statutes of their church and compares prelates to the labourers in the vineyard.<sup>107</sup> There are no criticisms of the luxury and corruption of the contemporary church, since it was the carnal church, which, after the coming of Antichrist and the persecution of the elect would inevitably be destroyed just as the synagogue had been at the coming of Christ. As might be expected from a thinker of his eminence there are passages showing his interest in contemporary philosophy and science. For instance, he tries to explain the transfiguration by means of the current theories of the relation between light and colour.<sup>108</sup> He refers only once to Aristotle,<sup>109</sup> but two passages denouncing the philosophers who hold that everything is determined by the stars are obviously a hit at the Averroists.<sup>110</sup> Origen's theory that souls were not permanently damned to the pains of Hell is attributed to his sharing the opinion of the

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<sup>103</sup> Fol. 148vb; cf. Mt. 26, 48.

<sup>104</sup> Fol. 95va; cf. Mt. 12, 45-50.

<sup>105</sup> Fol. 158rb.

<sup>106</sup> Fols. 49rb, 128va.

<sup>107</sup> Fols. 51vb, 82rb, 121ra-rb.

<sup>108</sup> Fol. 109ra.

<sup>109</sup> Fol. 117vb.

<sup>110</sup> Fol. 110vb.

Platonists and Pythagoreans about the transmigration of souls, and the attacks on the Manichaeans were probably aimed at the Cathari.<sup>111</sup>

Apart from the matters already discussed Olivi displays many of the characteristics of the contemporary Dominican or Franciscan Biblical commentator. He was clearly greatly interested in the original languages of the Scriptures, in Jewish custom, the history and geography of Palestine in the time of our Lord, and in textual criticism. He constantly gives Hebrew and Greek words and their Latin equivalents. Christ had told his disciples on their preaching tour when entering a house to say "peace be to you" because *Salelech* or *Samalech* 'peace be to you' was a common Hebrew greeting, corresponding to the Greek *chaire* or the Latin *ave*; *Nazareth* was derived from *Nazareus* meaning 'holy' or the Hebrew *Nezer*; *mammon* was the Syrian for 'riches'; and the name *Beelzebub* came from *Baal*, the god of wine, and was given by the Jews to the chief of the devils.<sup>112</sup> St. Matthew at the time of his call was sitting *in teloneo*, a word derived from the Greek *telon* for which the Latin equivalent was *vectigal*; *epinision*, the Greek term for 'bread' in the Lord's Prayer meant *superstantialis*; and *hypocrite* was composed of two Greek words *upos* and *crisis*, meaning literally 'under the gold,' but which in combination were used colloquially for an actor.<sup>113</sup> Also, when describing the anointing of Christ by Mary before his passion, he says that according to John the ointment was made from nard and *pisticum*, the latter meaning 'faithful,' the Greek for 'faith' being *pistis*, and thus it was pure and not adulterated.<sup>114</sup> All these derivations are to be found in the gloss or in the standard authorities also cited in the *Catena Aurea*, but it is interesting that the two noted English Franciscan Hebraists, Roger Bacon and William de la Mare, were both at the friary at Paris when Olivi was there as a student. Most of his information in regard to Jewish custom and ancient history and geography comes from the same sources. He was well informed on the Jewish coins and knew what philacteries were and that the eye of the needle was a gate of Jerusalem.<sup>115</sup> Locusts were fried and eaten by the poorer Jews and the wild honey might have

<sup>111</sup> Fols. 49rb, 67va, 100vb, 141rb.

<sup>112</sup> Fols. 20vb, 68va, 82ra.

<sup>113</sup> Fols. 53rb, 40ra, 72vb.

<sup>114</sup> Fol. 143ra.

<sup>115</sup> Fols. 98vb, 111rb, 119vb.

been a leaf with a honeyed scent.<sup>116</sup> The abomination of desolation was either a statue of Tiberius placed in the Temple by Pilate, or an equestrian one put there by Hadrian.<sup>117</sup> His description of Caesarea Philippi is a conflation of his sources. The information that it had been founded by the tetrarch Philip and named by him after Tiberius and lay at the foot of Lebanon, where two rivulets, Dan and Jor, rose and combined to form the Jordan is taken from the gloss with the addition from Chrysostom that its modern name was Paneas. Olivi, however, adds that the Master of the Histories had said that it was on the northern boundary of Judaea, which is neither in the gloss or the *Catena Aurea*.<sup>118</sup> He takes from the gloss two alternative accounts of the parentage of Herodias, either that she was the daughter of an Arab king or that she was Herod's niece. Her death and that of Herod in exile and the earth opening to swallow up Salome, he learned from Orosius,<sup>119</sup> and his interesting description of the Essenes is also from the Master of the Histories.<sup>120</sup> Sometimes his additions show his common sense, for after mentioning that the Jews used unguents on feast days, he suggests that this would mitigate the smell of sweat caused by the heat.<sup>121</sup> On one occasion he misread his source, for though Rabanus said that the Jews lived on the roofs of their houses, he did not actually state that they preached from them.<sup>122</sup> His comparisons of the Septuagint and the Greek text of the New Testament with "nostra littera" are very numerous, but I have been unable to ascertain from which of the 13th century *Correctoria* he derived his information. One of the most interesting is a commentary on John 18, 28, "and they led Jesus from Caiaphas into the hall of Judgment." Augustine had held either that Caiaphas was in the *praetorium* or that his house was there and, though others had held that the codex he used was incorrect, both the Greek version and the Bible of Charlemagne read "ductus a Caiaphas in pretorio, id est de domo Caiaphas ad domum Pilati."<sup>123</sup> Another is connected with a wrong attribution by St. Matthew, for the prophecy

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<sup>116</sup> Fol. 21vb.

<sup>117</sup> Fol. 133vb.

<sup>118</sup> Fol. 106ra.

<sup>119</sup> Fols. 99vb, 100rb.

<sup>120</sup> Fol. 22rb.

<sup>121</sup> Fol. 60vb.

<sup>122</sup> Fol. 84ra.

<sup>123</sup> Fol. 150ra.



which follows the buying of the potter's field, "then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet, saying, 'And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of him that was valued, whom the children of Israel did value: and gave them for the potter's field as the Lord appointed me' is from Zachariah."<sup>124</sup> The belief in the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures made it impossible for Olivi to admit that the evangelist had made a mistake, so he gave St. Augustine's explanation that the quotation was a conflation of the text from Zachariah with one from Jeremiah, describing his own purchase of a potter's field. St. Matthew's purpose according to Augustine had been to show that all prophets spoke through the same Spirit and that the passage had a didactic significance, since the reader, not finding the 30 pieces of silver in Jeremiah, would be forced to make a combination of the two texts.<sup>125</sup> A similar difficulty for Olivi was the differences between the Gospels. He was fond of comparing them, but had to explain away any discrepancies, sometimes with considerable ingenuity. For instance, why Mark and Luke had said that one blind man was healed at Jericho and Matthew that there were two, was that one was much more important than the other, since Mark had given his father's name, calling him the son of Timaeus.<sup>126</sup> Although Olivi did not ignore the literal sense, his preference was for the spiritual interpretations, called by him the mystical and the allegorical, perhaps because these gave more scope for his Joachite speculations. His tendency towards mysticism would also account for this.

The *Postilla super Mattheum* was popular both in orthodox and in heterodox circles. The Observantines, partly because of the tradition that their founder, Giovanni da Valle, had been a disciple of Angelo da Clareno, felt a special link with the Spirituels. Olivi was a favourite with St. Bernardino, who called him "an angelic man."<sup>127</sup> He knew and used his mystical and ascetic writings, some of his *quodlibets* and *questiones*, especially the ones on poverty and the commentaries on Job, Acts, Romans, the Gospels and the Apocalypse, leaving out the Joachite passages.<sup>128</sup> He was particularly fond of the *Postilla super Mattheum*, and wrote in September 1440 to Fr. Jacobus Biade, lector at S. Croce, asking for the loan of their codex which,

<sup>124</sup> Mt. 27, 9, 10; Jer. 32, 7-9; Zach. 11, 12.

<sup>125</sup> Fol. 151ra.

<sup>126</sup> Fol. 122vb. Mt. 20, 30; Mk. 10, 46; Lk. 18, 7-9.

<sup>127</sup> Doucet, op. cit., p. 233.

<sup>128</sup> Pacetti, op. cit., pp. 30-36.

because the ban on Olivi's works had not yet been lifted, was attributed to Nicholas de Lyra. Autographical manuscripts containing his "questiones et notae diversae" and his "postillae in evangelia et epistolas," which are collections of passages for use in his sermons, show the great value he assigned to it and Olivi's other writings. Even before borrowing it, he had used it at least 28 times in his Lenten sermons delivered in 1434.<sup>129</sup> It was also used in another set of Lenten sermons, where, in the ones for Good Friday, he borrowed extensively from the treatise on the seven words from the cross, appended to the 27th chapter of the *Postilla*, and in other sermons, particularly one for Christmas Eve and another for the Epiphany, and in three treatises, one on the blessed Virgin, one on the Holy Ghost and a third on the Beatitudes.<sup>130</sup> It was also known to the Provençal Beguins, who quote from it in one of their writings.<sup>131</sup>

The *Postilla super Mattheum* like many of Olivi's other works shows that he was a bridge figure. Leader of the Spirituals, whose Joachism and strict definition of the rule of poverty he shared, though with moderation and common sense, he had the same intellectual interests as the learned friars of his age, amongst whom he was a notable figure. In his last days he dreaded a schism in his order and tried hard, but unsuccessfully, to restrain the fanaticism of his disciples. Unlike St. Francis he would certainly have included books and the other requisites for a sound academic training among the things which the friars were permitted to use, for like Grosseteste he believed that the two pillars of their vocation were learning and poverty.

*Oxford, England*

DECIMA L. DOUIE

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<sup>129</sup> *Opera Omnia S. Bernardini Senensis* (Quaracchi, 1963) VIII, IX, 321 passim; I, 48 s., 73-81 passim 238, 333-393 passim; 449; II, 61, 193-255 passim, 318-237 passim; cf. Pacetti op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>130</sup> *Opera Omnia*, III, 125, 197-217 passim, 243-266 passim, 350, 352, 391, 413, 419; IV, 517, 520, 582; V, 143-150 passim, 176, 265, 292; VI, 149, 245-252 passim, 300, 310, 334-357 passim, 416-438 passim, 465-471 passim.

<sup>131</sup> I owe this information to Miss M. Reeves.

## A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST BY WILLIAM WOODFORD, O.F.M.

The contents of the libraries of medieval religious houses will always hold a particular fascination for students of medieval history, precisely because they reveal so much about those who read, studied and consulted them.<sup>1</sup> Books tell as much about their readers as they do about those who write them. It is remarkable to recall that almost all of the thousands of manuscripts now scattered throughout the western world in public and private collections of many varied kinds were once part of libraries where they had a definite place, a specific importance and a sure identity in the context of a larger whole. These volumes belonged to libraries or particular collections which had a distinct character from the groups or individuals who had formed them, for a library is clearly something more than a place for housing books. A library is a dialogue of minds, a meeting point of past and present that leads on to a future, a birth-place of that most formidable of human powers, the power of thought.

It is equally fascinating to discover what books were actually known to a particular writer or schoolman. We discover these usually from the references to sources which a writer gives in the course of his works. Indeed, it is often possible to reconstruct partially the contents of a library from the references to other works given by a writer who was a member of the house where once the books were conserved.

In the text edited below from William Woodford's *Defensorium Fratrum Mendicantium contra Richardum Armachanum*, we are presented with a list of medieval theologians, philosophers and canonists which gives a very good cross section of the writers with whose works

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<sup>1</sup> B. H. Streeter, *The Chained Library* (London, 1931); J. W. Thompson (ed.), *The Medieval Library* (Chicago, 1939, 2nd edition New York, 1957); Thomas Kelly, *Early Public Libraries. A History of Public Libraries in Great Britain before 1850* (The Library Association, London, 1966) 13-37, esp. the bibliography: 35-37; N. R. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain - A List of Surviving Books* (London, 1964).

Woodford was familiar and which may be of some assistance in determining the contents of the library at the London friary.<sup>2</sup>

Woodford's *Defensorium* was written about 1395/96 against the eighth book of Fitzralph's *De Pauperie Salvatoris* which was added to the first seven, it appears, when Fitzralph revised the work at Avignon in 1358/59.<sup>3</sup> The *Defensorium* is conserved at Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 75, fols. 11a-178va and at Cambridge, University College Library, Ff.I.21, fols. 11-260r. The passage we are concerned with here is found towards the end of the work: MS Oxford, fols. 177ra-178ra, MS Cambridge, fols. 257v-259r. It forms part of Woodford's answer to Fitzralph's contention that the Church was in a far better and much healthier state before the Mendicant Orders were founded. Fitzralph had maintained that prior to the arrival of the Friars the Church had been adorned with miracles, had had a much more serene and peaceful existence and had counted a greater number of learned doctors, scripture scholars and holy men. For the purpose of answering this criticism Woodford compares the hundred years prior to the existence of the Mendicant Orders with the period stretching roughly from the approval of the Franciscans to the middle of the fourteenth century. He presents first of all a list of some of the saints canonized by the Church who had lived during this latter period. Then turning to the assertion that the Church had had a more peaceful existence prior to the coming of the Friars, he concludes that on a comparison of the two periods this

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<sup>2</sup> On the library of the London friary see: C. L. Kingsford, *The Grey Friars of London...* (Aberdeen, 1915), 170-171, 231-235; J. Leland, *Collectanea de Rebus Britannicis...* (edit. T. Hearne, London, 1774), vol. IV, 49-51; A. Parkinson, *Collectanea Anglo-Minoritica...* (London 1725), Part 2, 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> See Katherine Walsh, "The *De Vita Evangelica* of Geoffrey Hardeby OESA (c. 1320-1385). A Study in the Mendicant Controversies of the Fourteenth Century," *Analecta Augustiniana*, 33 (1970), 226-228. Woodford's work covers a vast range of topics from the definition of begging and its scriptural basis to the actual condition of the Franciscan Order in the fourteenth century. The *Defensorium* is an important work which deserves to be edited — we hope to undertake this task shortly. Miss Walsh has drawn attention to the MS of the eighth book of Fitzralph's *De Pauperie Salvatoris* conserved at Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Cod. lat. 3222, fols. 1-78 (*Ibid.*, 227). On Woodford confer: A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, III (Oxford, 1958), 2081-2082; J. I. Catto, "New Light on Thomas Docketing O.F.M.," *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 6 (1969), 135-149; Eric Doyle, O.F.M., "William Woodford's *De Dominio Civili Clericorum* against John Wyclif" *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 66 (1973), 49-109.



assertion is false. He points out that during the hundred years before the Mendicant Orders the Church in general and in the kingdom of England in particular, had had far more troubles and dissensions than in the period since they were founded up to Fitzralph's own time, who himself brought great disturbance to the Church, and up to the time of John Wyclif, who re-introduced many ancient heresies into the Church:

Septimo est falsum loquendo consequenter pro eodem centenario ante ingressum fratrum quod ecclesia viam vitae gerebat tranquillius, cum tam in universali ecclesia quam etiam in regno isto plures fuerunt dissensiones periculosae et plures molestiones quam fuerunt citra usque ad tempora Armachani illius qui turbavit ecclesiam vehementer et ad tempora maioris haeretici Magistri Joannis Wyclif qui antiquas haereses nimis multas innovavit cum diabolica sua secta ut ex chronicis per Dei gratiam in alio tractatu speciali erit ostensum.<sup>4</sup>

He comes finally to consider in some detail the assertion that there was a greater number of learned doctors in the Church before the time of the Friars. He notes first of all that in the hundred years before the Mendicant Orders appeared, no famous doctor is recorded among the Popes. He then emphasizes that Innocent III was a famous doctor and he approved the Friars Minor and the Dominicans:

Sed Innocentius sub quo inceperunt et Praedicatores et Minores fuit praeclarus doctor et fecit librum de miseria conditionis humanae et librum qui dicitur speculum missae et alia diversa. Et post eum fuerunt in papatu alii doctores praeclari ut inferius erit tactum.<sup>5</sup>

He concludes his reflections on those previous hundred years by remarking that during this time the only famous doctors recorded are St Anselm, Hugh of St Victor, St Bernard, Gratian, Peter Lombard, Abbot Joachim and Peter Comestor.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> MS Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 75, fol. 176va. I am inclined to think that this "special tract" is the work *Contra Haereses Exortas Tempore Richardi II* listed by Tanner, *Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica* (London, 1748), 785, and recorded by T. W. Williams, *Somerset Medieval Libraries* (Bristol, 1897), 118, as once to have been in Wells Cathedral Library: "Wydford contra haereses exortas tempore Richardi 2<sup>i</sup>."

<sup>5</sup> MS Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 75, fol. 176vb.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 177ra.

Woodford now turns his attention to the period since the Friars were founded. He gives a list of some forty-three writers which includes Franciscans, Dominicans, Hermits of St Augustine and secular masters. The list may be described as a "Select Bibliography." It is not, of course, a complete list of the writers and sources Woodford quotes or refers to in his works; he is concerned here only with the writers who have appeared since the Mendicant Orders were founded. One interesting omission from the list of Franciscans is Friar Roger Bacon, though there is no doubt that Woodford was acquainted with his works.<sup>7</sup> Also worthy of note in the list is Woodford's mild defence of Peter John Olivi.

Most of these works would have been known to Woodford and used by him in the libraries at the Oxford friary.<sup>8</sup> There is evidence, however, which points to the library of the London Greyfriars. Woodford composed his *Defensorium* about 1396 and in that year he obtained from Pope Boniface IX confirmation of certain privileges at the London friary which included the right to a private room.<sup>9</sup> It is safe to assume therefore that the *Defensorium* was written at the London Greyfriars.

We know something of the content of the library at Greyfriars, London from the list of manuscripts drawn up by John Leland in the sixteenth century.<sup>10</sup> This list, by no means exhaustive, may be taken as a good indication of what books were in the library in Woodford's time, even before the new library was built.<sup>11</sup> Of the writers given by Leland the following are mentioned by Woodford: Alexander of Hales, Richard Fishacre, Robert Grosseteste, John of Wales, John Pecham, William of Ware, Robert Cowton, Giles of Rome,

<sup>7</sup> *De Causis Condemnationis Articulorum 18 Damnatorum Joannis Wyclif in Fasciculus Rerum Expetendarum ac Fugiendarum*, vol. I (edit. E. Brown, London, 1690), 197: "Et Rogerus Bacon in libro suo curioso de retardatione accidentium senectutis et senii, narrat de quadam muliere Norvicensis dioecesis, quod vixit per tres annos sana sine cibo et potu corporali." See *Fratri Rogeri Bacon De Retardatione Accidentium Senectutis. Cum Aliis Opusculis de Rebus Medicinalibus* nunc primum ediderunt A. G. Little, E. Withington (Oxonii, 1928).

<sup>8</sup> On the Oxford friary libraries see A. G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford, 1892), 55-62; Ker, *Medieval Libraries*, 141-142. The works of Nicholas Gorham, for example, were in the Oxford friary: see Little, *The Grey Friars*, 57.

<sup>9</sup> Little, *The Grey Friars*, 312-313.

<sup>10</sup> *Collectanea*, IV, 49-51.

<sup>11</sup> See Kingsford, *The Grey Friars*, 170-171. The new library was built in the early fifteenth century.

William of Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine. Besides these we know that the *Lectura in Quinque Libros Decretalium* by Henry of Segusio and Commentaries by Nicholas of Lyre were also in the library; both of these writers are listed by Woodford.<sup>12</sup> It is possible, of course, that Woodford drew up this list from memory. However, given that more than a quarter of the authors in both lists are identical, it may well be that the other writers given by Woodford were also represented on the shelves of the library at the London Greyfriars. In any case the list is instructive in providing us with a good cross section of the authors known and read by Woodford himself.

### THE TEXT OF WOODFORD'S *DEFENSORIUM* \*

(Cambridge, University College Library, Ff.I.21, ff. 257v-259r  
Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 75, ff. 177ra-178ra)

#### ABBREVIATIONS

AFH	<i>Archivum Franciscanum Historicum</i>
AHDLMA	<i>Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen age</i>
ALKM	<i>Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters</i>
C	Ms Cambridge, University College Library, Ff. I.21
CF	<i>Collectanea Franciscana</i>
DDC	<i>Dictionnaire de droit canonique</i>
DTC	<i>Dictionnaire de théologie catholique</i>
EF	<i>Etudes Franciscaines</i>
Emden	A. B. Emden, <i>A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500</i> , 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-1958)
f.	folio
ff.	folios
FranS	<i>Franziskanische Studien</i>
FS	<i>Franciscan Studies</i>
GloLit	P. Glorieux, <i>La littérature quodlibétique...</i> , 2 vols. (Paris, 1925, 1935)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 170, 231-232. On Thomas Wynchelsey's contribution to the library Parkinson points out, *Collectanea*, Part 2, 3-4: "Notandum. It may be presumed that this Br. Doctor Winchelsey procured the said Sums of Money from certain Benefactors who were willing to contribute to so good a Work: which is all that can be mean'd by his being said to have *given* so much."

\* I wish to make acknowledgment to the Syndics of Cambridge University Library and to the President and Fellows of Magdalen College, Oxford, for their kind permission to publish this excerpt.

GloRep	P. Glorieux, <i>Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle</i> , 2 vols. (Paris, 1933, 1934)
O	MS Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 75
om	omittit
RPL	<i>Revue Philosophique de Louvain</i>
RSR	<i>Revue des Sciences Religieuses</i>
RT	<i>Revue Thomiste</i>
RTAM	<i>Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale</i>
WW	<i>Wissenschaft und Weisheit</i>
ZFK	<i>Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte</i>
ZKT	<i>Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie</i>

[C f. 257v; O f. 177ra] Sed post ingressum fratrum fuerunt multo<sup>1</sup> numerosiores doctores praeclari in ecclesia.<sup>2</sup> Nam post fuit in papatu Frater Petrus de Tarento<sup>3</sup> doctor solemnus, qui scripsit super Sententias egregie et fecit opera diversa; post Joannes XXI<sup>4</sup> fuit in papatu doctor famosus ante papatum ut docent chronicae.<sup>5</sup>

Post ingressum etiam fratrum fuit Cantuariæ<sup>6</sup> Sanctus Edmundus doctor praeclarus;<sup>7</sup> Magister Stephanus Lange-

<sup>1</sup> multo/multos O

<sup>2</sup> in ecclesia/ecclesiae O

<sup>3</sup> Peter of Tarentaise, O.P., c. 1224–1276. Pope Innocent V, Jan 21st to Jun 22nd 1276. GloRep I, 107–112; *Innocentii Quinti in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum Commentaria* (Toulouse, 1649–52); H. D. Simonin, *Les Ecrits de Pierre de Tarentaise in Beatus Innocentius V (Petrus de Tarentasia O.P.)*. *Studia et Documenta* (Roma, 1943), 163–335; R. Martin, O.P., *Pour une réédition critique du Commentaire de Pierre de Tarentaise sur le livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard in Miscellanea A. de Meyer*, I (Louvain, 1946), 590–602; M. H. Laurent, *Le Bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps*. *Studi e testi* 129 (Città del Vaticano, 1947); V. Doucet, O.F.M., “Commentaire sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller,” *AFH*, 57 (1954), 156.

<sup>4</sup> XXI/XXII C

<sup>5</sup> John XXI, c. 1210/15–1277. Pope from Sept 13th 1276 to May 20th 1277. Petrus Juliani, Petrus Hispanus. L. M. de Rijk, *Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis) Tractatus: called afterwards Summule Logicales...* (Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972); J. M. da Cruz Pontes, *A Obra Filosofica de Pedro Hispano Portugallense*. *Novos Problemas Textuais* (Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, 1972).

<sup>6</sup> Cantuariæ/Cantuariensi etiam C

<sup>7</sup> St. Edmund of Abingdon, c. 1170–1240. Archbishop of Canterbury 1234–1240. GloRep I, 261–262; C. H. Lawrence, *St Edmund of Abingdon: A Study in Hagiography and History* (Oxford, 1960); “Edmund of Abingdon,” *The Month*, 29 (1963), 213–229; H. P. Forshaw, “St Edmund’s Speculum. A Classic of Victorine Spirituality,” *AHDLMA*, 39 (1972), 7–40; *Edmund of Abingdon. Speculum Religiosorum and Speculum Ecclesie* (edit. H. P. Forshaw, Oxford University Press, London, 1973).



tensis<sup>8</sup> etiam doctor praeclarus;<sup>9</sup> Frater Joannes Peccham<sup>10</sup> doctor praeclarus, qui scripsit<sup>11</sup> solemniter super quattuor libros Sententiarum, quodlibeta etiam diversa; qui etiam composuit sequentias<sup>12</sup> per omnes dominicas anni et de omnibus festis solemnibus in anno<sup>13</sup> et novam historiam de Trinitate; Frater Robertus<sup>14</sup> Kilwardby<sup>15</sup> qui scripsit multa bona et finaliter fuit cardinalis; post Bradwardyn<sup>16</sup> doctor famosus, qui scripsit volumen *De causa Dei contra Pelagianos*.

Post ingressum etiam fratrum fuit Magister Robertus Grostet<sup>17</sup> doctor [O f. 177rb] praeclarus, qui multa scripsit et fuit

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Langton, c. 1155-1228. Archbishop of Canterbury 1207-1228. GlorRep I, 238-260; F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton* (Oxford, 1928); G. Lacombe et alii, "Studies on the Commentaries of Cardinal Stephen Langton," AHDLM, 5 (1930), 5-266; L. Antl, "An Introduction to the *Quaestiones Theologicae* of Stephen Langton," FS, 12 (1953), 151-175.

<sup>9</sup> Magister Stephanus... praeclarus/om O

<sup>10</sup> John Pecham, O.F.M., c. 1220/5-1292. Archbishop of Canterbury 1279-1292. GloRep II, 87-98; GloLit II, 173-180; *Registrum Epistolarum Fr. Johannis Pecham* (edit. C. T. Martin, 3 vols., London, 1882-1885); *Fratris Johannis Pecham... Tractatus Tres De Paupertate...* (edit. C. L. Kingsford, A. G. Little, F. Tocco, Aberdoniae, 1910); G. Melani, *Tractatus de Anima Johannis Pecham* (Firenze, 1949); D. L. Douie, *Archbishop Pecham* (Oxford, 1952); Emden III, 1445-1447; Conrad Harkins, O.F.M., "The Authorship of a Commentary on the Franciscan Rule Published among the Works of St Bonaventure," FS, 29 (1969), 157-248.

<sup>11</sup> Frater Joannes... scripsit/frater Joannes Peccham doctor praeclarus. Frater Joannes qui scripsit O

<sup>12</sup> sequentias/sententias O

<sup>13</sup> in anno/om O

<sup>14</sup> Robertus/Joannes O

<sup>15</sup> Robert Kilwardby, O.P., c. 1215-1279. Archbishop of Canterbury 1272-1278. F. Stegmüller "Les Questions du Commentaire des Sentences de Robert Kilwardby," RTAM, 6 (1934), 55-79, 215-228; Gedeon Gál, O.F.M., "Robert Kilwardby's Questions on the Metaphysics and Physics of Aristotle," FS, 13 (March 1953), 7-29; E. M. F. Sommer-Seckendorff, *Studies in the Life of Robert Kilwardby O.P.* (Rome, 1937); Emden II, 1051-1052.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Bradwardine, 1300-1349. Archbishop of Canterbury Jul. 19th to Aug. 26th 1349. *De Causa Dei adversus Pelagium et de Virtute Causae Causarum ad suos Mertonenses Libri Tres* (edit. H. Savile, London, 1618); G. Leff, "Thomas Bradwardine's De Causa Dei," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 7 (1956), 21-29; Emden I, 244-246; G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians* (Cambridge, 1957); H. A. Oberman, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine. A Fourteenth Century Augustinian* (Utrecht, 1957).

<sup>17</sup> Robert Grosseteste, c. 1168-1253. Bishop of Lincoln 1235-1253. *Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Quondam Lincolnensis Epistolae*, Rolls Series, 25 (edit. H. R. Luard, London, 1861); S. H. Thompson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste* (New York, 1940); *Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop* (edit. D. A. Callus, O.P., Oxford, 1955); Emden II, 830-833.

episcopus lincolniensis. Post ingressum fratrum fuit *Frater Hugo*<sup>18</sup> de ordine Praedicatorum cardinalis, qui concordantias compilavit et totam sacram scripturam postillavit et *Frater Bonaventura*<sup>19</sup> de ordine Minorum fuit cardinalis qui scripsit *Apologiam* et super Sententias egregie et alia multa fecit.

Post etiam ingressum fratrum fuit *Parisiensis*<sup>20</sup> qui scripsit libros de universo corporali et spirituali, de immortalitate animae, de sacramentis, de praebendis et alios multos et fuit doctor praeclarus. Post ingressum fratrum fuit *Magister Henricus de Gandavo*<sup>21</sup> doctor praeclarus qui scripsit quodlibeta multa. Post fuit *Altissiodorensis*<sup>22</sup> qui scripsit super Sententias et fuit doctor praeclarus.<sup>23</sup> Post fuit *Bertrandus*<sup>24</sup> frater minor qui scripsit egregie

<sup>18</sup> Hugh of Saint-Cher, O.P., c. 1200–1263. First Dominican Cardinal. GloRep I, 43–51. Kilian Lynch, O.F.M., "Some Fontes of the Commentary of Hugh of St Cher: William of Auxerre, Guy d'Orchelles, Alexander of Hales," FS, 13 (June/Sept 1953) 119–146; C. Jerman, "Hugh of St Cher," *Dominicana*, 44 (1959), 338–347; J. P. Torrell, "Hugues de Saint-Cher et Thomas d'Aquin," RT, 82 (1974), 5–22.

<sup>19</sup> St Bonaventure, O.F.M., 1217–1274. *Doctoris Seraphici S Bonaventurae S.R.E. Cardinalis Opera Omnia*... 10 vols., (Ad Claras Aquas, 1882–1902); *Collocationes in Hexaëmeron et Bonaventuriana Quaedam Selecta*... (edit. F. Delorme, O.F.M., Ad Claras Aquas, 1934); R. E. Lerner, "A Collection of Sermons given in Paris c. 1267 including a new text by St Bonaventure on the Life of St Francis," *Speculum*, 49 (1974), 466–498; *S. Bonaventura 1274–1974 I–IV* (Collegio S. Bonaventura, Grottaferrata, Roma, 1972–1974), V: *Bibliographia Bonaventuriana* c. 1850–1973 (Grottaferrata, Roma, 1974).

<sup>20</sup> William of Auvergne, c. 1190–1249. GloRep, I, 315–320. The various parts of his chief work, *Magisterium Divinale*, have been printed under their own titles: *De Trinitate*, *De Universo*, *De Anima*, *De Immortalitate Animae*, *De Sacramentis*..., in *Guillelmi Alverni... Opera Omnia* (Paris, 1674; reprinted Frankfurt a.M., 1963). On the plan of the *Magisterium divinale* see J. Kramp, "Das Wilhelms von Auvergne *Magisterium divinale*," *Gregorianum*, 1 (1920), 538–616; 2 (1921), 174–195.

<sup>21</sup> Henry of Ghent, c. 1217–1293. GloRep, I, 387–391; GloLit I, 177–199; *Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum Henrici a Gandavo* (Paris 1520; reprinted 2 vols. St Bonaventure, New York, 1953); *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo* (Paris, 1518, Venice 1608, 1613); R. Macken, "Les Quodlibets d'Henri de Gand et leur exemplar parisien," RTAM, 37 (1970), 75–96.

<sup>22</sup> William of Auxerre, c. 1150–1231. GloRep, I, 293–294; *Summa Super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum (Summa Aurea)* (Paris, 1500, 1518, Venice, 1591); C. Ottaviano, *Guglielmo d'Auxerre (d. 1231). La vita, le opere, il pensiero* (Roma, 1930); Doucet "Commentaires," AFH, 57 (1954), 122.

<sup>23</sup> qui scripsit quodlibeta... praeclarus/om O

<sup>24</sup> Bertrand de la Tour, O.F.M. † 1332. GloRep, II, 238–242; *Postillae super Epistolas*, MS Oxford, Balliol College Library 180; *Postillae super Dominicalia*, MS London, British (Museum) Library, Royal 4.D.IV; MS Oxford, Balliol College

super epistolas anni volumen unum et super evangelia per anni circulum volumen aliud. Post fuit *Frater Raymundus*<sup>25</sup> de ordine Praedicatorum qui compilavit ad praeceptum papae quinque libros Decretalium. Post fuit *Dominus Albertus*<sup>26</sup> de ordine Praedicatorum qui egregie scripsit multa philosophica et etiam<sup>27</sup> multa theologica et fuit praeclari nominis doctor famosus. Post fuit *Durandus de Sancto Porciano*<sup>28</sup> doctor praeclarus de ordine Praedicatorum et scripsit egregie super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Post fuit doctor antiquus *Magister Alexander Hales*<sup>29</sup> primo fuit doctor parisiensis, post frater minor qui scripsit solemniter super<sup>30</sup> quattuor libros Sententiarum et fecit postillas bonas<sup>31</sup> diversas. Post fuit *Doctor Subtilis*<sup>32</sup> qui egregie scripsit super quattuor libros Sententiarum, qui fecit [O f. r77ra] quodlibeta multa et scripsit tam in theologia quam in philosophia libros subtiles valde multos.

Library, 179; J. B. Schneyer, "Lateinische Sermones—Initien des Hochmittelalters für die Heiligenfeste des Franziskanerordens," AFH, 61 (1968), 11–12.

<sup>25</sup> St. Raymund of Peñafort, O.P., c. 1175/80–1275. R. Naz, "Raymond de Pennafort...", DDC, 7, 461–464; P. Torquebiau, "Corpus Iuris Canonici II: Les Décrétales de Gregoire IX," DDC, 4, 627–632; W. A. Hinnebusch, O.P., *The History of the Dominican Order, II: Intellectual and Cultural Life to 1500* (New York, 1973), 248–252.

<sup>26</sup> St. Albert the Great, O.P., c. 1200–1280. *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, 38 vols. (Paris, 1890–1899). A new critical edition of the *Opera Omnia* has been appearing since 1951. F. J. Cantania, "A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great," *The Modern Schoolman*, 37 (1959), 11–28.

<sup>27</sup> et etiam/etiam et O

<sup>28</sup> Durandus of Saint Pourçain, O.P., c. 1275–1334. GloRep, I, 214–220. *Durandi a Sancto Porciano in Sententias Theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum Libri Quattuor* (Paris, 1508–1550; Lyons 1533–1595; Venice, 1571, 1586); J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts: I Teil, Literargeschichtliche Grundlegungen: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 26:1 (Münster i.W., 1927).

<sup>29</sup> Alexander of Hales, O.F.M. c. 1185–1245. *Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis Minorum Summa Theologica...* Tomus I–IV (Ad Claras Aquas, [Quaracchi], 1924–1948); I. Hersher, "A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales," FS, 5 (1945), 434–454.

<sup>30</sup> super/om C

<sup>31</sup> bonas/om C

<sup>32</sup> John Duns Scotus, O.F.M., c. 1266–1308. *Opera Omnia* (Vivès, Paris, 1891–1895); Nine volumes have appeared thus far of the critical edition of his works *Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani Joannis Duns Scoti... Opera Omnia*. Vols. I–VII (Civitas Vaticana, 1950, 1954, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1973) contain the *Ordinatio*, *Prologus*, *Liber II*, d. 3; vols. XVI–XVII (1960, 1966) contain *Liber I Sententiarum*, dd. 1–45. O. Schäfer, *Bibliographia de Vita Operibus et Doctrina Iohannis Duns Scoti... Saec. XIX–XX* (Romae, 1955): *De Doctrina Iohannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi 11–17 Sept. 1966*

Post etiam ingressum fratrum fuit Sanctus Thomas<sup>33</sup> doctor egregius cuius tot sunt opera praeclara quae non possunt faciliter numerari. De eodem ordine Frater Richardus<sup>34</sup> Ffishshakel<sup>35</sup> qui bene et pulchre scripsit super libros Sententiarum. Post fuit Doctor de Aureolis<sup>36</sup> de ordine Minorum qui scripsit egregie super libros Sententiarum, qui fecit librum qui dicitur *Compendium Sacrae Scripturae* et librum de conceptione Virginis gloriosae et alia multa. Et post Franciscus de Maironis<sup>37</sup> eiusdem ordinis qui scripsit pulchre super quattuor libros Sententiarum, qui fecit tractatum bonum de indulgentiis, qui scripsit egregie super multos libros beati Augustini, qui fecit tractatum de virtutibus theologicis, alium de virtutibus moralibus, alium de virtutibus intellectualibus et tractatum de voluntario et involuntario ac sermones multum famosos.

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celebrati, 4 vols. (Romae, 1968); *Deus et Homo ad Mentem J. Duns Scoti. Acta Tertii Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Vindebonae 28 Sept. – 2 Oct. 1970* (Romae 1972).

<sup>33</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., c. 1225–1274. *Opera Omnia* (Romae, 1882 ff. Leonine edition) – F. Van Steenberghen, “L’Edition léonine des oeuvres de Saint Thomas,” RPL, 72 (1974), 5–10; *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974 Commemorative Studies* 1, 2 (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1974); *Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo VII Centenario. Congresso Internazionale, Roma-Napoli 17–24 Aprile 1974* (Romae, 1974); *Rassegni di Letteratura tomistica V* (Nuova serie del *Bulletin Thomiste*, 17 (Napoli, 1973); F. Russo, “L’Index Thomisticus,” RSR, 61 (1973), 363–370; P. Mandonnet – J. Destrez, *Bibliographie Thomiste* (revised by M. D. Chenu, O.P., Paris, 1960).

<sup>34</sup> frater Richardus/om O

<sup>35</sup> Richard Fishacre, Fitzacre, O.P. † 1248. F. Pelster, “Das Leben und die Schriften der Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Richard Fishacre,” ZKT, 54 (1930), 515–533; D. E. Sharp, “The Philosophy of Richard Fishacre (d. 1248),” *New Scholasticism*, 7 (1933), 281–297; Emden, II, 685–686; R. J. Long, “The Science of Theology according to Richard Fishacre. Edition of the Prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences,” *Medieval Studies*, 34 (1972), 71–98; L. B. Gillon, “L’Esprit ‘partie’ del’univers. Autour d’un texte de Richard Fishacre” in *San Tommaso. Fonti e Riflessi del suo pensiero* (Roma, 1974), 210–222.

<sup>36</sup> Peter Auriol, O.F.M. c. 1280–1322. GloRep, II, 244–248. *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum* (edit. E. M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1953); *In II Librum Sententiarum* (edit. A. Zanetti, Romae 1605); *Fr. Gulielmi Guarrae, Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti, Fr. Petri Aureoli, Quaestiones Disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis* (Ad Claras Aquas, 1904) 23–94, 95–153; *Compendium Sensus Litteralis Totius Divinae Scripturae a Cl. Theologo Fr. Petro Aureoli Ord. Min...* (Ad Claras Aquas, 1896).

<sup>37</sup> Francis of Meyronnes, O.F.M. c. 1285–1328. GloLit, II, 89–90, 320; *Praeclarissima... Scripta... Francisci de Mayronis* (Venice, 1520); B. Roth, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M. Sein Leben, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott* (Werl 1936); H. Rossman, “Die Quodlibeta und verschiedene sonstige Schriften des Franz von Meyronnes O.F.M.,” *FranS*, 54 (1972), 1–76.



Post fuit Frater Joannes Wallensis<sup>38</sup> doctor eximius qui scripsit librum qui dicitur *Ad omne genus humanum*,<sup>39</sup> qui scripsit dietarium, qui scripsit itinerarium de virtutibus [C f. 258v] et alia multa. Post fuit Doctor de Lyra<sup>40</sup> eiusdem ordinis Minorum qui super totam sacram scripturam scripsit opus pretiosum et alia fecit diversa. Post fuit Frater<sup>41</sup> Petrus Joannis<sup>42</sup> qui etiam scripsit super totam sacram scripturam et subtilissime super Apocalypsim et super evangelia [O f. 177vb] licet aliqua dicta sua super evangelio Joannis et super Apocalypsim sunt reprobata, sicut et aliqua dicta Abbatibus Joachim fuerunt reprobata. Non minus tamen fuit Joachim doctor praeclarus. Unde et aliqua dicta Augustini doctoris praeclarissimi sunt revocata. Scripsit iste Petrus Joannis<sup>43</sup> quaestiones utiles de sacramentis et paupertate fratrum. Nicolaus<sup>44</sup> Gosham<sup>45</sup> etiam de ordine Praedicatorum scripsit notabiles postillas<sup>46</sup>

<sup>38</sup> John of Wales, O.F.M. † 1285. GloRep, II, 114-118; A. G. Little, *Studies in English Franciscan History* (Manchester 1917) 158-192; Emden, III, 1960-1961; W. A. Pantin, "John of Wales and Medieval Humanism" in *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn* (Dublin, 1961), 297-319; Balduinus ab Amsterdam, "The Commentary on St. John's Gospel edited in 1589 under the name of St. Bonaventure: An authentic work of John of Wales O.Min. († ca. 1300)," CF, 40 (1970), 71-96.

<sup>39</sup> humanum/hominum O

<sup>40</sup> Nicholas of Lyre, O.F.M., c. 1270 - c. 1349. GloRep, II, 215-231; H. Labrosse, "Sources de la Biographie et oeuvres de Nicholas de Lyre," EF, 16 (1906), 383-404; 17 (1907), 489-505, 593-608; 19 (1909), 41-52, 153-175, 368-379; 35 (1923), 171-187, 400-432; F. Pelster, "Nikolaus von Lyra und seine *Quaestio de Usu Paupere*," AFH, 46 (1953), 211-250; H. Rütting, "Kritische Bemerkungen zu einer mittelalterlichen Biographie des Nikolaus von Lyra," AFH, 60 (1967), 42-54.

<sup>41</sup> Frater/Pater C

<sup>42</sup> Joannis/Joannes O

<sup>43</sup> Peter John Olivi, O.F.M., 1248-1298. GloLit, II, 205-211; GloRep, II, 127-134; *Quodlibeta Petri Joannis Provinzialis* (Venice 1509); *Petrus Joannis Olivi O.F.M. Quaestiones in IIum Librum Sententiarum*, 3 vols. (Ad Claras Aquas, 1922/1924/1926); F. Ehrle, "Petrus Johannis Olivi, sein Leben und seine Schriften," ALKM, 3 (1887), 409-552; S. Gieben, "Bibliographia Oliviana (1885-1967)," CF, 38 (1968), 167-195; B. Tierney, *Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350. A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages* (Leiden, 1972), 93-130; R. Manselli, *La Lectura super Apocalypsim di Pietro Giovanni Olivi* (Istituto storico italiano per il medioevo. Studi storici, 19-21, Roma, 1955).

<sup>44</sup> Nicolaus/Richardus O

<sup>45</sup> Nicholas of Gorran, O.P., 1232 - c. 1295. *Commentaria in IV Evangelia* (Cologne, 1472); *Postillae in Epistolas Canonicas Septem* (Paris, 1543); L. F. Hartmann, "Nicholas of Gorran," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, X, 453; Schneyer, "Lateinische Sermones Initien," AFH, 61 (1968), 35-36.

<sup>46</sup> notabiles postillas/postillas notablies postillas O

super sacra scriptura et Magister Thomas Dockyng<sup>47</sup> de ordine Minorum scripsit egregie super Lucam, super Deuteronomium, super Job et super epistolas Pauli.

Post ingressum fratrum de ordine etiam Augustiniensi fuit Doctor Aegidius<sup>48</sup> qui fecit librum qui dicitur *Theoremata Aegidii de Corpore Christi*, qui composuit illud volumen egregium quod dicitur *Aegidius de Regimine Principum*, qui scripsit et in theologia et in philosophia libros alios valde utiles. De eodem ordine posterius Gregorius de Arimino<sup>49</sup> qui super Sententias scripsit curiose pariter et fructuose.

Post ingressum etiam fratrum scripserunt opera magnae sapientiae multa Inceptor Ockham,<sup>50</sup> Inceptor Warus,<sup>51</sup> Inceptor Cowton,<sup>52</sup> Inceptor Chatton,<sup>53</sup> quorum opera perma-

<sup>47</sup> Thomas Docking, O.F.M. † c. 1269. A. G. Little, *Franciscan Papers, Lists and Documents* (Manchester 1943), 98–121; *The Grey Friars in Oxford...* (Oxford, 1892), 151–152; J. I. Catto, "New Light on Thomas Docking, O.F.M.," *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 4 (1968), 135–149.

<sup>48</sup> Giles of Rome, O.E.S.A., c. 1243–1316. GloRep, II, 293–308; *De Corpore Christi Theoremata* 50 (Bologna, 1481; Cologne, 1490; Venice, 1502; Rome, 1555); *De Regimine Principum* (Rome, 1482; Venice, 1498; 1502; Rome, 1556; Venice, 1585; Rome, 1607); P. W. Nash, "Giles of Rome: Auditor and Critic of St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, 28 (1950), 1–20.

<sup>49</sup> Gregory of Rimini, O.E.S.A., c. end of 13th cent. to 1358. *Gregorii Ariminensis Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum* (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1955 – reprint of 1522 edition); G. Leff, *Gregory of Rimini*, (New York, 1961).

<sup>50</sup> William of Ockham, O.F.M. c. 1285–1347. Stephen Brown – Gedeon Gál, *Venerabilis Inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum: Prologus et Distinctio Prima* (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967); *Ordinatio Distinctiones II–III* (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1970); V. Heynck, "Ockham–Literatur 1919–1949," *FranS*, 32 (1950), 164–183; J. P. Reilly, Jr., "Ockham Bibliography 1950–1967," *FS*, 28 (1968), 197–214.

<sup>51</sup> William of Ware, O.F.M., c. 1255/60–? GloRep, II, 144–145; Emden, III, 1986; G. Gál, O.F.M., "Guilielmi de Ware, O.F.M. Doctrina Philosophica per Summa Capita Proposita," *FS*, 14 (1954), 155–180; 265–292.

<sup>52</sup> Robert Cowton, O.F.M., fl. Oxford 1300–1313. A. G. Little, "The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century," *AFH*, 19 (1926), 873–874; Emden, I, 507; S. F. Brown, "Robert Cowton O.F.M. and the Analogy of the Concept of Being," *FS*, 31 (1971), 5–40.

<sup>53</sup> Walter Chatton, O.F.M. c. 1285–1343. E. Longpré, "Gualterio di Catton un Maestro Francescano," *Studi Francescani*, 9 (1935), 101–114; L. Baudry, "Gauthier de Chatton et son Commentaire sur les Sentences," *AHDLMA*, 18 (1943), 337–369; J. J. O'Callaghan, *Walter of Chatton's Doctrine of Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge. Study and Text* (Doctorate Abstract, University of Toronto, 1949); J. Auer, "Die 'skotistische' Lehre von der Heilsgewissheit: Walter von Chatton, der erste 'Skotist'," *WW*, 16 (1953), 1–19; N. A. Fitzpatrick, O.F.M., "Walter Chatton on the Univocity of Being," *FS*, 31 (1971), 88–177.

nent ad utilitatem ecclesiae. Et multi alii praeclari doctores,<sup>54</sup> theologi fuerunt post ingressum fratrum quos longum esset enumerare.<sup>55</sup>

Et manifestum est quod in decretis fuerunt doctores plures post ingressum fratrum quam umquam prius fuerunt. Gratianus<sup>56</sup> qui compilavit decreta fuit modicum [O f. 178ra] ante ingressum fratrum. Sed post fuerunt Joannes de Deo,<sup>57</sup> Hostiensis,<sup>58</sup> doctor solemnissimus decretorum, Innocentius,<sup>59</sup> Bernardus,<sup>60</sup> Willelmus de Awdino<sup>61</sup> viri solemnes et doctores magni. Auctor libri qui dicitur *Summa Confessorum*,<sup>62</sup> auctor libri qui dicitur *Decretum Iuris*,<sup>63</sup> auctor libri qui dicitur *Summa Summarum*,<sup>64</sup> auctor libri qui

<sup>54</sup> doctores/om C

<sup>55</sup> enumerare/enuntiare O

<sup>56</sup> Gratian, see DDC, 4, 611-627.

<sup>57</sup> John of God, John of Spain, taught Canon Law at Bologna c. 1250. DDC, 6, 99.

<sup>58</sup> Henry of Suse, Henricus de Segusio, † 1271. Cardinal Bishop of Ostia. *Summa Aurea* (Venice, 1570); *Lectura in Quinque Libros Decretalium* (Venice, 1581); C. Lefebvre, "Hostiensis," DDC, 5, 1211-1227.

<sup>59</sup> Innocentius IV, c. 1200-1254. Pope 1243-1254. *Commentaria super Libros Quinque Decretalium* (Frankfurt, 1570); E. Amann, "Innocent IV," DTC, VII, 2<sup>e</sup> Partie, 1981-1995.

<sup>60</sup> Bernard of Compostella the Younger, † 1271. Author of a *Margarita* or analytical table to Innocent IV's *Apparatus in Quinque Libros Decretalium*. Composed a Commentary on the Decretals of Innocent IV c. 1250 and a *Lectura* on the Decretals of Gregory IX to Lib. I, tit. 6, c. 1260-1267. L. E. Boyle, "Bernard of Compostella the Younger," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, II, 339; DDC, 2, 777-779.

<sup>61</sup> Willelmus de Awdino: William Amidamus, O.S.A., [?] † 1356. He is described as "canonista peritus" in H. Hurter, *Nomenclator Literarius*, IV (Oeniponte, 1899) 510-511. I am not certain, however, of the identity.

■ Author of the *Summa Confessorum*: most probably John of Fribourg, but there are so many authors, cf. J. Dietterle, *Die Franziskanischen "Summae Confessorum" und ihre Bestimmungen über den Ablass* (Döbeln, 1893); "Die 'Summae Confessorum' (sive de casibus conscientiae) von ihren Anfängen an bis zu Silvester Prierias," ZFK, 24 (1903), 353-374, 520-548; 25 (1904), 248-272; 26 (1905), 59-81, 349-362; 27 (1906), 70-79, 166-188; DTC, XII, 1<sup>e</sup> Partie, 948, 1004. Presuming the author to be John of Freiburg (Rumsik), O.P., † 1314, he wrote a *Summa Confessorum* c. 1280-1298 inspired by the *Summa de Poenitentiis* of St. Raymund of Peñafort - DTC, VIII, 1<sup>e</sup> Partie, 761-762; W. Hinnebusch, "John of Freiburg (Rumsik)," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, VII, 1051.

<sup>63</sup> Author of the *Decretum Iuris*. I have not been able to trace this work at all. Could Woodford be referring to Joannes Teutonicus † 1245/46?

<sup>64</sup> Author of the *Summa Summarum*: William of Pagula. Author of a large Compendium of Canon Law and theology in five books, 257 chapters, c. 1325-1327. Cf. W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge 1955), 196; Emden, III, 1436-1437.

dicitur <sup>65</sup> *Tabula* <sup>66</sup> *Herefordiensis* <sup>67</sup> et est tabula solemnitas utriusque iuris. Et multa alia sunt [C 259r] post ingressum fratrum scripta solemnitas in facultate iuris canonici et satis pauca ante ingressum fratrum.

Et ideo loquendo de centenario annorum ante ingressum fratrum nimis falsum dictum est quod ecclesia pluribus claris doctoribus abundavit <sup>68</sup> quam post ingressum fratrum et pluribus sacrorum librorum scriptoribus. Et sic istud dictum secundum multiplici falsitate est repletum.

*Franciscan Study Centre*  
*Canterbury, England*

ERIC DOYLE, O.F.M.

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<sup>65</sup> Decretum iuris... dicitur/om C

<sup>66</sup> *Tabula*/om O

<sup>67</sup> Author of the *Tabula Herefordiensis*: Joannes Herefordiensis, Joannes de Erfordia, de Saxonia, de Saxo, Alemannus, Lector Magdeburgensis. Friar Minor, fl. the end of the 13th century and beginning of the 14th century. Author of a *Summa Confessorum*, *Summa Iuris*, *Tabula Utriusque Iuris*. See R. Naz, "Jean d'Erfurt O.F.M. ou De Saxe," DDC, 6, 98-99; B. Kurtzheid, "Die *Tabula Utriusque Iuris* des Johannes von Erfurt," *FranS*, 4 (1917), 230-253; Doucet, "Commentaire," *AFH*, 47 (1954), 135.

<sup>68</sup> doctoribus abundavit/abundavit doctoribus C



# THE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCISCANS AND THEIR CRITICS

## I. The Order's Growth and Character

Historians of the Franciscan Order have written about the period between the mid-fourteenth and the early fifteenth centuries as an adjunct to two peripheral themes: the rise of the Observants and the Great Schism. Conscious of the parallel development of the Observants, some have seen in Conventual history little beyond the decadence and decline that inevitably precede a reform movement.<sup>1</sup> Those who have studied the Franciscan involvement in the schism, on the other hand, have either overlooked the Order's internal history entirely or have subordinated it to the broader subject of Minorite participation in church history.<sup>2</sup> Writing on Conventual history after 1350, J. R. H. Moorman, David Knowles, A. G. Little and

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<sup>1</sup> Riccardo Pratesi, for example, in "Francesco Micheli del Padovano, di Firenze, teologo ed umanista francescano del sec. XV," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 47 and 48 (1954 and 1955), refers to the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries as an era of "slackness" and "decadence" in the Order, and points to the insubordination, strife and violence of the friars, along with their ambition for offices, as evidence of this.

■ In a pair of complementary articles, "Die avignonesische Obedienz der Mendikanterorden zur Zeit des grossen Schismas," in *Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte*, I and II, and "Die avignonesische Obedienz im Franziskanerorden zur Zeit des grossen abendländischen Schismas," in *Franziskanische Studien*, I (1914), 165-192, 312-327 and 479-490, Konrad Eubel edited and commented on documents illustrating the history of the Clementine friars during the schism. Otto Hüttebräuker, *Der Minoritenorden zur Zeit des Grossen Schismas* (Berlin, 1893), is limited to an appreciation of structural changes in the Order and a survey of benefits conferred on the Minorites by the Urbanist and Clementine popes. However, he does recognize in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries "the most important and far-reaching period in the Order's history after the early thirteenth century," and concludes that, because of the even closer ties with the papacy created during the schism, the Franciscan Order consciously underwent a tremendous revitalization and advance, which assured its predominant position in the fifteenth century.

others gave an important emphasis to the anti-mendicant literature of the period. And, although they make allowances for exaggeration in degree in the works of the friars' critics, they largely accept their allegations in kind. Too often the abundant anti-mendicant literature of these years has been used to prove flagrant laxness among the Conventuals by historians who have then argued that this corruption itself accounts for the copious writings against the friars.

Moorman repeats the accusations in the critical treatises largely without comment, despite his acquaintance with much of the documentary evidence from within the Order.<sup>3</sup> Knowles points to the "spirit of the age" as one cause of the fourteenth-century criticism of the mendicants, and notes that historians' dark view of the period after 1350 has been influenced by their estimates of the psychological and demographic effects of the plague of 1348-49.<sup>4</sup> The assumption of an inevitable link between falling population and spiritual decline has distorted the interpretation of fourteenth-century history.

In *Studies in English Franciscan History*, A. G. Little was ambivalent in his use of the satirical and polemical literature against the friars, now acknowledging its validity, now adopting a skeptical attitude toward it.<sup>5</sup> In an important article on the mendicant-clerical disputes of the fourteenth century, Père Hugolin Lippens shed new light on anti-mendicant criticism. Stressing the clergy's reliance on custom and that of the mendicants on written law, he showed that jurisdictional clashes and written polemic between the two groups were all but inevitable.<sup>6</sup> By contrast, G. M. Trevelyan, who wrote a good deal about the friars in his *England in the Age of Wyclif*, was only too happy to use the claims of Wyclif and other opponents of the friars to make a case against them, and freely admitted his reliance on the critical literature:

In the attempt that I have made in this chapter to give some representation of the state and influence of the Church at the end of the fourteenth century, I have relied very much, as will

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<sup>3</sup> J. R. H. Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origin to the Year 1517* (Oxford, 1968).

<sup>4</sup> David Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England*, Vol. II (Cambridge, England, 1955).

<sup>5</sup> A. G. Little, *Studies in English Franciscan History* (Manchester, 1917).

<sup>6</sup> H. Lippens, "Le droit nouveau des Mendicants en conflit avec le droit coutumier du clergé séculier du concile de Vienne à celui de Trente," in *AFH*, 47 (1954), 241-292.

be seen by the authorities quoted, on the consensus of opinion of satirists and other writers of the period. I have indeed as far as possible trusted to the documents of more official and responsible persons, but it is impossible to get much idea of the actual influence of an institution from official documents, for they only represent what the institution is meant to be and not what it is.<sup>7</sup>

It will be argued here that certain kinds of "official documents" can provide at least as much information about an institution, if not more, than satirical writings, and that the fourteenth-century statutes of the Franciscans say a great deal both about the Order's influence and about its internal condition.

In a 1953 article in *Speculum*, Arnold Williams argued that the anti-mendicant literature was formulaic rather than original, based on a pattern of criticism established by William of St. Amour a hundred years earlier.<sup>8</sup> Chaucer's friar in *The Canterbury Tales* and his excoriation of the mendicants in the Summoner's Tale and elsewhere were, Williams claimed, not drawn from Chaucer's own experience at all and therefore cannot be cited as a reflection of the friars' behavior in his day.<sup>9</sup> Even if Williams' evidence were convincing, the material presented below from contemporary statutes and from critics within the Order would show that Chaucer's characters were based on fact. Unfortunately, the article's credibility is weakened by numerous inaccuracies and by the author's apparently cursory knowledge of Wyclif, whose arguments often parallel those in *The Canterbury Tales*.

Aubrey Gwynn and L. L. Hammerich have done important work on Richard FitzRalph, but Gwynn was primarily interested in his biography and sermon technique, and Hammerich in his personality and activities at the curia.<sup>10</sup> Neither attempted to place him

<sup>7</sup> George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England in the Age of Wyclif* (London, 1899), pp. 105-106.

<sup>8</sup> Arnold Williams, "Chaucer and the Friars," in *Speculum*, 28 (1953), 499-513.

<sup>9</sup> G. R. Owst, in *Preaching in Medieval England* (Cambridge, England, 1926) and *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England* (Cambridge, England, 1933), pointed out that a century or more of pulpit commonplaces lie behind Wyclif and Langland, and that the characters in *The Canterbury Tales* drew on traditional sermon-types as their models. But this hardly means that Chaucer or Langland failed to draw on their own experience.

<sup>10</sup> Aubrey Gwynn, "Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh," in *Studies, An Irish Quarterly Review*, 22 (1933), 389-405 and 591-607; 23 (1934), 395-411;

within the broad context of anti-mendicant polemic that extended chronologically throughout the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth, and geographically to nearly all parts of Europe.

The secondary literature on Franciscan history after 1350 largely reflects the conclusions of Wyclif, FitzRalph and other opponents of the mendicants; it describes the second half of the century as a relatively obscure and undistinguished period in the Order's history marked by wide deviation from the example of Francis.

The writings on which this conclusion is based were not uniform in genre, structure or intent. Their tone ranged from the affable ridicule of popular songs and poems to the bitter ranting of Wyclif's polemical treatises. In general, however, this literature falls into two categories. One includes polemical works written by learned clerics, often academicians, intended to oppose the mendicants on theoretical grounds. The other includes the wide variety of popular works which amused readers or hearers by pointing to mendicant hypocrisy.

The anti-mendicant controversy, unlike other contemporary controversies (the anti-feminist argument, for example), was not really a debate. It was overwhelmingly one-sided. While the friars had their defenders — Roger Conway and Bartholomew of Bolsenheim among the learned, the Dominican Daw Topias among the more popular — few replies to the anti-mendicant writers were circulated. Bartholomew's response to FitzRalph answered only the archbishop's theoretical arguments about mendicancy; unlike Armagh, he did not draw arguments from his own experience or from the behavior of his mendicant colleagues. Late fourteenth-century friars wrote no apologies on the model of Bonaventure's *Quare Fratres Minores Praedicent et Confessiones Audiant* of the thirteenth century.

Other kinds of evidence, however, can be set against the anti-mendicant writings. The fourteenth-century Minorites had critics within the Order as well as outside it; their accusations carry considerable weight. Papal bulls and decrees, and especially the Consti-

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24 (1935), 558-572; 25 (1936), 81-96 and 28 (1937), 50-67; and "The Sermon-Diary of Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh," in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 44, Section C, No. 1 (Dublin, 1937), 1-57. L. L. Hammerich, *The Beginning of Strife between Richard Fitzralph and the Mendicants*, *Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab., Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser*, 26, 3 (Copenhagen, 1938); A. G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford, 1892); Knowles, op. cit.; and R. L. Poole, "Richard Fitzralph," in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, VII (London, 1887-1890), pp. 194-198, all supplement Gwynn and Hammerich significantly.



tutions and general, provincial and convent statutes of the Franciscans provide a rich complement to the more familiar works of contemporary critics. This material from within the Order (and no attempt is made here to survey it all) often validates and frequently compounds many of the allegations made by critics outside the Order. Less predictably, however, it reveals at the same time the Order's great institutional strength, and the vast resources of popular reverence it commanded.

There were five principal dimensions of fourteenth-century criticism of the mendicant orders: 1) the excessive numbers of friars, 2) their deceit and hypocrisy, 3) their abuse of the vow of poverty, 4) their usurpation of the privileges of secular clerks, and 5) their eccentric defense of their own orders and harsh treatment of each other. Although it is often difficult to separate these interrelated points of criticism, only the first two will be discussed here; the final three will form the subject of a subsequent article.

"...as thikke as motes in a sonne-beem"

Chaucer's reference to the abundance of friars <sup>11</sup> is echoed often in the anti-mendicant literature. In 1384, Wyclif surveyed the priestly office from its first institution to his own time, and found that, whereas Christ had brought in sufficient priests, now there were too many of them. In post-apostolic times monks had appeared, then canons, then friars, and "Who mai denye that ne this noumbre of thes offieris is now to myche?" <sup>12</sup> Comparing the differences between the Franciscans and Christ, he noted that Jesus had twelve disciples, but "these founed freris rekken nevere how mony their have." <sup>13</sup> In his *Vox Clamantis* Gower admitted he didn't know "whether it is a sign of favor or doom for these friars, but all the world abounds with them." <sup>14</sup> David Knowles has suggested that Wyclif and others

<sup>11</sup> The mendicants' critics wrote about friars in general; references to a specific Order are rare. However, it is often evident that they had the Franciscans in mind, and the Franciscans did outnumber other mendicants. I have tried to use the term "friar" only where it echoes their equally imprecise usage.

<sup>12</sup> John Wyclif, *De Ecclesia et Membris Ejus*, in *Select Works of John Wyclif*, Vol. III: *Miscellaneous Works*, ed. Thomas Arnold (Oxford, 1871), p. 346. The editor dates this treatise 1384. A similar argument appears in *De Blasphemia, Contra Fratres*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 418.

<sup>13</sup> *De Blasphemia, Contra Fratres*, in Arnold, pp. 415-416.

<sup>14</sup> *The Major Latin Works of John Gower*, ed. Eric W. Stockton (Seattle,

thought there were more friars than there actually were because the mendicants, especially the Franciscans and Carmelites, showed "a remarkable bouyancy" in membership after the plague years.<sup>15</sup> The friars' critics attributed this "bouyancy" to another mendicant vice: "stealing" children to fill their depleted ranks. Gower compared the friars to fowlers, who lure unsuspecting birds into their nets; boys, he wrote, were lured into the Order with "sonorous words."<sup>16</sup> The anonymous author of "Jacke Upland's" long poem against the friars asked

Why steal ye mens children  
for to make hem of your sect,  
sith that theft is against Gods hests,  
and sith your sect is not perfect?  
Yee know not whether the rule that yee bind him to  
be best for him or worst.<sup>17</sup>

Wyclif wrote that the friars "bigile yonge children to here veyn religion, sweryng that it is the bests";<sup>18</sup> the author of the anti-mendicant *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars* made a similar accusation, claiming that the friars "drawen childre fro Cristis reli-

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1962), p. 182; Stockton's translation. Elsewhere Gower refers to the "throng of friars" which "overflows the mendicant order," and adds "Just as you cannot count the acorns on a spreading oak tree, so you cannot reckon the numbers of friars." (*Major Latin Works*, pp. 183 and 188). Langland in *Piers Plowman* remarked that all religious Orders prescribe fixed limits for their monks and nuns – all, that is, except the friars, whose numbers were increasing beyond all reckoning. (B text, ed. Walter W. Skeat [London, 1869], XX, pp. 262–65 and p. 379. See also C text, XXII, pp. 264–72.)

<sup>15</sup> Knowles, op. cit., p. 262. He is of course referring to England, but so was Wyclif.

<sup>16</sup> *Vox Clamantis*, in *Major Latin Works*, p. 189. The Latin is:

"Ut vocat ad laqueos volucrem dum fistulat auceps,

Sic trahit infantes fratris abvire sonus:

Ut laqueatur avis laqueorum nescia fraudis

Sic puer in fratrem fraude latente cadit." (*The Complete Latin Works of John Gower*, ed. G. C. Macaulay [Oxford, 1902], IV, 193.)

<sup>17</sup> *Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, Composed during the Period from the Accession of Edward III to that of Richard III*, Vol. II, ed. Thomas Wright, Rolls Series, Vol. XIV, ii (London, 1861), p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, in *The Early English Works of Wyclif Hitherto Unprinted*, ed. F. D. Matthew (Early English Text Society, 1880), No. 74, p. 8.

gioun into hor private ordir by ypocrisie, leeingis, and steel-ynge." <sup>19</sup>

The Franciscans encountered boys most frequently at the universities, and the charge of stealing young students was common. (These may well have been the "poor men's children" frequently mentioned in the anti-mendicant literature. In stealing them, it was said, the friars were guilty of a worse crime than that of stealing an ox.) <sup>20</sup> Many such students were mere children — fourteen was the normal age to begin college studies in this period — who had not the experience or discretion to choose a vocation wisely. Furthermore, the friars' critics claimed, once in the Order, young professed were not permitted to leave it for any reason:

Also frieris seyn, if a mon be oones professid to hor religioun, he may never leeve hit and be savid, thot he be novere so unable therto, for al tyme of his lif. And so thei wil nede hym to lyve in suche a staate everemore, to whiche God makes hym evere unable, and so nede hym to be dampned. <sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 373. Similar accusation is made in Wyclif's *De Blasphemia, Contra Fratres*, Arnold, pp. 380-381, 416. *Fifty Heresies* may have been written by Wyclif or by one of his followers (Arnold, p. 366). It would be tempting to argue on behalf of Wyclif's authorship from the similarities in phraseology, terminology and the repetition of examples that occur in this treatise and in others that are certainly his. However, such similarities recur constantly throughout this literature; certain words and phrases were clearly commonplaces, as were a number of stock examples of friars' misbehavior. The claim that the friars forced children into their Order despite its imperfections — or because they erroneously believed it to be perfect — for example, occur not only in the two works cited above but also in the popular poem cited in note 17 above and elsewhere.

The charge of stealing children conflicts with other evidence. The Franciscans seem to have been unusually scrupulous about whom they admitted into their Order in the fourteenth century. Novices were examined with care, and in some areas at least, the entry of lay novices was prohibited. *Archivo Ibero-Americano*, 7 (1917), 363.

Interestingly enough, English monks of all orders petitioned Rome for at least twenty years after 1349 asking that the age of ordination be lowered, so that more monks could be ordained to fill the ranks depleted by plague. Knowles, *Religious Orders*, II, 11-12.

<sup>20</sup> Wyclif, *De Ecclesia et Membris Ejus*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 348. Elsewhere, in the reply to Daw Topias' defense of the friars, it is an axe. Wright, *Political Poems*, II, p. 84.

<sup>21</sup> Wyclif, *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 369.

The friars' apparent ubiquity was heightened, in the eyes of their critics, by the size and extravagance of their buildings, whose "gaye wyndowes and colours and peyntyngis and bybwynrie" attracted the curious to worship on holy days and distracted them from thinking about their sins. Their convents were costly, and the friars thought of them as their own, forgetting that Jesus was sheltered only in other people's houses, and always in plain homes of the common people.<sup>22</sup>

Also freris bylden mony grete churchis and costily waste housis, and cloystris as hit were castels, and that withoute nede, wherthorw parische churchis and comyne weyes ben payred, and in mony places undone... Byfore that freris comen in ther were churchis ynowe. What skil is hit now to make so myche cost in new byldyng, and lete olde parische churchis falle donne? <sup>23</sup>

FitzRalph accused the friars of erecting churches that were finer than cathedrals, ornamented more splendidly than those of great prelates; their belfries, he said, were extravagantly expensive, and armed knights could fight with their lances upright in the halls of their great double cloisters.<sup>24</sup>

In *Piers Plowman*, the friars are accused of squandering their begging income on costly buildings;<sup>25</sup> in another place, though, Langland admits that the friars' churches are subsidized by popular donations.<sup>26</sup> Gower imagined mendicant convents to be lavish indeed:

...an extensive structure, a house supported by a thousand marble columns, with decorations high on the walls. It is resplendent with various pictures and every elegance. Every cell in which a worthless friar dwells is beautiful, decked with many kinds of rich carving.... No king in power has any more magnificent chambers than theirs for himself.<sup>27</sup>

A church built for the friars, he wrote, "towers above all others," with folding doors, elaborate porticoes, and so many halls and bed chambers you would think it was a labyrinth.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Wyclif, *De Blasphemia, Contra Fratres*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 415. See also *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, in Matthew, op. cit., p. 8.

■ Wyclif, *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 380.

<sup>24</sup> Gwynn, in *Studies*, 28 (1937), 59.

<sup>25</sup> *Piers Plowman*, B text, ed. Skeat, XV, 322, p. 272.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., XIV, 198-199, p. 246.

<sup>27</sup> *Major Latin Works*, ed. Stockton, pp. 192-193.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. A contemporary poem claims that the friars' houses, built with



That the Franciscan Order was large in the late fourteenth century is undeniable; one estimate has placed the number of Franciscans in 1384 at between thirty and forty thousand, and new houses were still being founded.<sup>29</sup> To take only one example, the London convent of the Grey Friars seems to have kept a complement of at least a hundred brothers throughout the fourteenth century.<sup>30</sup> The friars

lavish donations, seem to go up more quickly than any monastery of a possession order, or any royal or episcopal building. Either the friars are thieves, he concludes, or counterfeiterers. Wright, *Political Poems*, I, p. 255.

<sup>29</sup> Heribert Holzapfel, *Handbuch der Geschichte des Franziskanerordens* (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1909), pp. 142-145. Elsewhere, Holzapfel suggested that, because the number of friars decreased by two-thirds after the plague while the number of new foundations *increased*, the greatly increased wealth of those friars who survived led to the increased criticism of the friars after 1350. (Ibid., p. 66.) Hüttebräuker, *op. cit.*, estimated that in the late fourteenth century the number of Franciscan houses throughout Europe was about 1400, of which half were in Italy. Bartholomew of Pisa, writing probably in the late 1380's, listed 1,531 convents (omitting some vicariates) in his *De Conformitate* (*Analecta Franciscana*, IV, fructus 8, 178-336 and fructus 11, 503-558). Ubald d'Alençon, "Statistique franciscaine de 1385," in *Etudes Franciscaines*, 10 (1903), 95-97, concluded from a Bodleian manuscript that there were closer to 2,288, including the Second and Third Orders. G. Golubovich, *Biblioteca Bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente Franceseano*, II (Florence, 1913), 250-260, using the same manuscript (Bodl. Miscell. Canon. n. 525, fols. 240v-41v), counted 2,225. Compiled from a number of manuscripts, Golubovich's statistics show steady and marked growth in the numbers of Franciscan convents between 1334 and 1385; however, the manuscript evidence is incomplete, and says nothing of the numbers of friars or Clares or tertiaries in each house. (The Third Order Secular is not included in these figures; its size and great importance for fourteenth-century Minorite history are discussed below.)

Richard Emery, *The Friars in Medieval France* (London and New York, 1962) has estimated the number of friar convents in France, basing his figures primarily on wills; while he found that fewer Franciscan convents were being founded between 1351 and 1450, this is difficult to interpret, both because there is no reliable way to determine the number of friars in each convent and because new foundations predictably declined after a certain saturation point had been reached. Knowles' figures for England (*op. cit.*, pp. 255-262), based on donations of benefactors made on a per capita basis and on records of the poll taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1380-81, provide a much more accurate estimate of Minorite population. The Franciscans' number followed the general population pattern for England, with a peak around 1300, a slight and then a great decline (close to 50%) after 1348-9, then a steady increase until about 1422, to a point some 25-35% higher than the 1350 level. See also Knowles and R. Neville Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses, England and Wales* (London, 1953), p. 363 and *passim*.

<sup>30</sup> Gwynn, in *Studies*, 28 (1937), 53.

were not only numerous but highly visible. Richard Emery has written that mendicant houses in France were

...so located that no inhabitant of France lived more than thirty miles from some mendicant convent; the vast majority of Frenchmen must have lived within a day's walking distance of at least two such houses. These are the geographical facts behind the ubiquitousness [sic] of the medieval friar; he became almost at once a familiar figure everywhere.<sup>30a</sup>

If the overall numbers of friars were high, in the eyes of their critics the proportion of *masters* within the Franciscan Order approached superfluity. A list of convents and their officers drawn up at the Provincial Chapter of Tuscany held in 1394 attests to the abundance of masters in that province at least; every convent, even the smallest, had a master who read the Sentences in the convent school. Even convents too small to need a *vicarius* invariably had a lector; some larger houses had more than one.<sup>31</sup>

A paragraph in the 1373 Statutes of the General Chapter of Toulouse indicated that many Franciscans were seeking higher grades of academic degrees in the ever-increasing universities. In these statutes, Gregory XI warned the friars against the temptation to follow the *cursus* leading to higher degrees, fearing that the Order would be ridiculed because of the multiplication of kinds and levels of degrees held by friars, and he prohibited them from pursuing higher degrees in Italian universities.<sup>32</sup> In the same statutes, the number of lectors in the convent and convent school of Toulouse was limited to one, and mendicants were forbidden to teach in the University of Toulouse.<sup>33</sup> Clearly the number of masters exceeded the number of positions open to them.

If the Franciscans didn't literally "steal children" to increase their numbers, they did nevertheless attempt to persuade them, often at a very young age, to join the Order voluntarily. Before 1317,

<sup>30a</sup> Emery, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>31</sup> P. Benvenutus Bughetti, O.F.M., "Tabulae Capitulares Provinciae Tusciae O.M.," in AFH, 10 (1917), 413-497. Little, *Studies in English Franciscan History* (Manchester, 1917), p. 164, notes that having a lecturer for each house was also the Dominican ideal.

<sup>32</sup> Giuseppe Abate, "Costituzioni inedite dei frati minori del XIV Secolo," in *Miscellanea francescana*, 29, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1929), 174.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

boys were not allowed to profess at younger than eighteen; in that year it was reduced to fourteen, and we hear of boys who had made their professions at eleven or twelve.<sup>34</sup> (In this same period the Dominicans were admitting boys of ten.)<sup>35</sup> Roger Bacon denounced "the boys of the two student Orders," who, making their profession too early in life, learned a great deal yet remained ignorant.<sup>36</sup> It has often been assumed that lowering the entry age invariably represented an attempt to fill an Order's diminishing ranks. This seems to have been true of the Preachers, whose numbers were declining in this period.<sup>37</sup> That the Franciscans sought to facilitate the entry of university students into the Order seems clear; whether they were desperate to replenish their declining numbers is more difficult to judge. Certainly university officials thought so, and tried to protect students against indiscriminate recruitment. At Oxford, the friars were prohibited in 1358 from receiving novices who were less than eighteen years old, and guilty Orders were to forfeit their right to deliver or hear lectures for an entire year; Cambridge instituted similar restrictions.<sup>38</sup>

The fifteenth-century Observant preacher Johann Brugman, in his vitriolic *Speculum Imperfectionis Fratrum Minorum*, was severely critical of Franciscan masters of novices, accusing them of the most flagrant vice, and recommending that they be abolished.<sup>39</sup> If his

<sup>34</sup> Guillaume Mollat, "Exodes de l'Ordre des frères mineurs au XIV<sup>ème</sup> siècle," AFH, 60 (1967), 213-215.

<sup>35</sup> E. Delaruelle et al., *L'Eglise au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire, Histoire de l'Eglise*, 14, I (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1962), 1067.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Little, *Grey Friars in Oxford*, p. 42.

<sup>37</sup> The provincial chapter of the Dominicans held at Ulm in 1400 declared that "leading convents are deficient in numbers." Bened.-Maria Reichert, "Akten des Provinzialkapitel des Dominikanerprovinz Teutonia aus den Jahren 1398, 1400, 1401, 1402," in *Römische Quartalschrift*, 11 (1897), 303.

<sup>38</sup> Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England*, II, 155. The universities appealed again to Parliament in 1366 to lend force to their decrees, which were being ignored by the friars, but their petition was rejected. A similar attempt in 1402 failed again, although a law passed in the same year prohibited any youth from being received into a religious Order until after he had passed his fourteenth year and had the consent of his parents or guardians. Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order*, p. 353; Gower, *Vox Clamantis*, ed. H. O. Coxe (London, 1850), p. xxviii. Hammerich, op. cit., p. 46 notes that Spanish Minorite convents were "obliged to admit young and unfit persons" after 1348.

<sup>39</sup> Hieronymus Goyens, O.F.M., "*Speculum Imperfectionis Fratrum Minorum Compactum per Venerabilem et Religiosum P. F. Iohannem Brugman, O.F.M.*," AFH, 2 (1909), 620.

comments contain a measure of truth, their insufficiently trained young novices may have drawn down criticism on the whole Order. But the fourteenth-century Minorites themselves were aware of the problems created by young friars. Unfit novices were to be summarily expelled once their crimes became known.<sup>40</sup> Novices' companions were secretly questioned about the candidate's behavior and character a month before his profession.<sup>41</sup> A passage in the Farinerian constitutions<sup>42</sup> forbids accepting novices who have been members of other Orders. If the Franciscans were anxious to increase their numbers, and were having difficulty recruiting novices, such a prohibition would have been illogical.

This passage suggests that "apostates" — novices or professed religious who left their Orders to enter another Order, or to live as laymen — may have posed a common problem to the fourteenth-century religious community, not merely to the mendicants.

For Franciscans, leaving the Order was not a simple matter, and entailed some humiliation. Under Nicholas IV's Constitution *In vestri ordinis Regula* of 1286, a Minorite had to obtain permission from his superior to leave, and was prohibited from acquiring benefices or holding office in his new Order. For a brief period, Benedict XII added the requirement of papal permission, in *Regularem vitam* of 1335, but his successors ceased to require this.

Two things are striking about those mendicants who did leave the Order in the second half of the fourteenth century. One is that many of them cited the extreme *austerity* of the Franciscan life (not, as contemporary critics suggest, its extreme luxury and corruption) as their reason for wanting to join another Order (usually the Benedictine). Or, alternatively, they cited the unjust persecution to which friars were subjected — a detail which takes on validity in the context of the widespread prejudice and persecution of mendicants discussed below.<sup>43</sup> The other is that, although many were unduly influenced by other people in their decision to join the Fran-

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<sup>40</sup> Delorme, "Documenta saec. XIV Provinciae SF Umbriae," AFH, 5 (1912), 542.

<sup>41</sup> Ordinations of a provincial chapter held in 1343, in AFH, 5 (1912), 532.

<sup>42</sup> "Statuta Generalia Ordinis Edita in Capitulo Generali an. 1354 Assisii Celebrato, Communiter Farineriana Appellata," AFH, 35 (1942), 92.

<sup>43</sup> Holzapfel, op. cit., p. 81 suggested that the claim of austerity was a euphemistic formula, disguising simple lack of fervor (*Unlust*) for the Franciscan life as originally envisioned.



ciscans, this pressure seems to have come most often not from Minorites anxious to recruit them but from parents, friends or tutors.<sup>44</sup>

Troublesome bretheren who turned apostate were sometimes brought back and transferred to other custodies or provinces, and they were to be accepted back into the Order if they wished to be.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps because of the notoriety an apostate could cause, the fourteenth-century Franciscans too often resorted to the unfortunate expedient of imprisoning (and excommunicating) apostates. However, too little attention has been paid to the fact that some apostates did return to the Order — apparently in numbers significant enough to warrant legislation in contemporary statutes. In addition to the Cahorsin passage mentioned above, statutes made for the convent of Lyons in 1375 stipulated that apostates who left the Order “thoughtlessly and without scandal” as children or adolescents could not only return to the Order but, with a dispensation, be promoted to high office within it.<sup>46</sup>

Where their critics accused the friars of extravagance in building, the large number of great Franciscan churches built during the fourteenth century give abundant support to their criticism. Guardians were warned against running up onerous debts in building costs,<sup>47</sup> and we know that, for example, Greyfriars in London, enlarged in the fourteenth century, measured 300' × 90', and had marble pillars and floors and thirty-six stained glass windows — not unlike the friary church Gower described.<sup>48</sup> However, far from representing mendicant alienation from the people, these churches were a monumental witness to their spiritual alliance with them. While it is true that nobility and royalty endowed and subsidized Franciscan churches, burghers and common people also contributed. Greyfriars, the most cherished burial place for the English nobility, was paid for only in part by noble and royal donations. Only a few of its ornamental windows were paid for by wealthy benefactors; the rest were

<sup>44</sup> Mollat, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

<sup>45</sup> Bihl, “Constitutiones Generales Edita in Capitulis Generalibus Caturci An. 1337 et Lugduni An. 1351 Celebrata,” *AFH*, 30 (1938), 144.

<sup>46</sup> Athanasius Lopez and Lucius M. a Nuñez, O.F.M., “Descriptio Codicum Franciscalium Bibliothecae Ecclesiae Primatialis Toletanae,” *Archivo Ibero-Americano*, 7 (1917), 266.

<sup>47</sup> *AFH*, 30 (1938), 133.

<sup>48</sup> Little, *Studies*, p. 75.

given by London citizens or guilds, and by "small subscribers." <sup>49</sup> Popular devotion to friars' churches came in part from the fact that they were functional as well as splendid, built to shelter the mendicant preacher and the crowds that came to hear him. So strong was this popular attachment that efforts made in the thirteenth century to destroy a Minorite stone cloister at Southampton met with considerable resistance from the townspeople. <sup>50</sup>

Blame for extravagance in building, then, seems to have rested as much with the friars' loyal supporters, great and small, as with the religious themselves. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the Minorites did not always betray their Rule in using what was given to them.

In 1368, Martial de Baux granted an annuity to the Franciscans of Limoges. Since under their Rule they were not allowed to keep it, they sold it to their Cardinal Protector, Nicholas of Bessa, Cardinal Deacon of Santa Maria in Via Lata, as a private person. In return he gave them sixty *livres*, which was enough for them to repair and rebuild their cloister, and to found a hospital dedicated to Saint Gerald. <sup>51</sup>

There is no reason to believe this an isolated or unusual example. Yet it counterbalances the image of conspicuous extravagance presented in the anti-mendicant literature, and suggests that, although they envisioned ambitious building projects, the Minorites were capable of using donations in much the same ways as their thirteenth-century predecessors did. If the Franciscans of the fourteenth century were different in number and wealth, they were not entirely different in kind.

*"...ther shal no saule have rowme in helle  
Of frers ther is suche throng"*

An anonymous poem claimed that, if a man were to kill his entire family, he could confess to a friar and be forgiven for less than the price of a pair of shoes. <sup>52</sup> Anti-mendicant writers constantly

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 62-63.

<sup>51</sup> Ferdinand-Marie Delorme, "Les Cordeliers dans le Limousin aux XIII<sup>e</sup>-XV<sup>e</sup> siècle," in AFH, 33 (1940), 117-118.

<sup>52</sup> Wright, *Political Poems*, I, p. 266. Another poem in the same collection echoes this:

asserted that the friar's own sins lead believers into error, and they would surely be condemned along with those they led astray. "Soothing the sinner in his sin,"<sup>53</sup> the friars brought false security to unsuspecting believers, and enriched themselves at the same time.<sup>54</sup>

In a memorable passage in *Piers Plowman*, a friar offers Lady Lucre absolution from sexual sins in return for a load of wheat. The fact that he offers this, "speaking," in J. F. Goodridge's translation, "in the dulcet undertones of the confession-box," is not insignificant. He went on to ask her for a contribution to help his fellow friars put in a stained glass window, in return for having her name engraved on it, and thus being assured of heaven. She agrees, on condition that he not punish sexual sinners too harshly, and promises to contribute handsomely to the decoration of the friars' church, adding that "evry segge shal seyn I am a sustre of youre hous."<sup>55</sup>

Confession and soliciting contributions were understandably linked in the case of the mendicants; hearing confessions, begging and preaching were their primary functions outside the cloister. Both their critics and the friars themselves on occasion doubtless confused the donation with payment for a religious service. Chaucer pointed

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"...for six pens er thai fayle,  
Sle thi fadre, and jape thi modre,  
and thai [the friars] wyl the assoile."

"On the Minorite Friars," Wright, II, p. 270.

<sup>53</sup> The phrase occurs in a bill of grievances drawn up by the clergy of Canturbury in 1356, cited in Gwynn in *Studies*, 26 (1937), 51.

<sup>54</sup> In *Piers Plowman*, Langland accused the friars of "feasting on men's sins," profiting from the money wealthy patrons left to them for absolution. (B text, ed. Skeat, XIII, 40-45, p. 212.)

W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, England, 1955), pp. 205 ff, describes a treatise called *Memoriae Presbiterorum*, written by an English canonist at Avignon in 1344, in which the author accuses the mendicants of giving facile absolution to wartime plunderers in return for a portion of the plunder, and of imposing overly light penances on magnates. But complaints of this sort were by no means new in the fourteenth century; in the mid-thirteenth Matthew Paris complained that the presence of itinerant mendicant confessors encouraged people to sin with impunity, knowing they could confess to a friar whom they would never see again. *Matthew Paris's English History*, trans. J. A. Giles, 2 (London, 1853), 138-139.

<sup>55</sup> *Piers Plowman*, B Text, ed. Skeat (*Early English Text Society*), III, 35-63, pp. 33-35.

out that, for the friar, light penance brought a large donation; for the contributor, a large gift assuaged his conscience.<sup>56</sup>

But if in the eyes of the anti-mendicant writers facile penance created false assurance, letters of fraternity constituted an even worse deception. Fourteenth-century friars granted to benefactors of their Orders letters which allowed them to share in the good deeds of the religious community both while they lived and after their deaths. But to their critics, these letters were just another example of the mendicants' exploitation of popular gullibility, since they were not given away freely to everyone, but only to those from whom contributions had been elicited, or were expected. That these letters were a hoax seemed obvious from the fact that the friars *themselves* were ignorant of their own merits: "Also, these freris wot not whether thei shal be saved, or whether thei ben now viserde devels, as Schariot [Judas Iscariot] was...." If they should prove to be unworthy of heaven themselves, then they would be forcing their *confratres* to share their damnation, and "hit were no kyndenesse thus to venyme hor gift."<sup>57</sup> Worst of all, through these "letters of bretherhed" they taught the people to put their trust in a piece of parchment sealed with lies rather than in God's help and their own virtuous lives.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> *Canterbury Tales*, in *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson, Second Edition (Boston, 1957), General Prologue, lines 221-232, p. 19.

"Ful swetely herde he [friar Huberd] confessioun,  
And plesaunt was his absolucioun:  
He was an esy man to yeve penaunce,  
Ther as he wiste to have a good pitaunce.  
For unto a povre ordre for to yive  
Is signe that a man is wel yshryvne;  
For if he yaf, he dorste make avaunt,  
He wiste that a man was repentaunt;  
For many a man so hard is of his herte,  
He may nat wepe, althogh hym soore smerte.  
Therefore in stede of wepyng and preyeres  
Men moote yeve silver to the povre freres."

<sup>57</sup> Wyclif, *De Blasphemia, Contra Fratres*, in Thomas Arnold, ed., *Select English Works of John Wyclif*, III (Oxford, 1871), 421. Wyclif claimed these letters were, in effect, sold rather than granted freely.

<sup>58</sup> Wyclif, *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 377. Piers warned against trusting in trentals, pardons, or letters of fraternity. *Piers Plowman*, B Text, ed. Skeat (London, 1869), VII, 191-194, p. 121. A contemporary poet asked the friars why, if these letters were so efficacious, they didn't grant them to everyone, out of charity. Wright, op. cit., II, p. 21.

The friars' habits, too, were believed to be efficacious in preserving their



Although evidence from within the Order puts some of the friars' behavior in a different light, it often corroborated these accusations of the friars' enemies. Direct or implied criticism from the Minorites themselves was often even more damning than the complaints of outsiders. The Observant Johann Brugman, for example, accused Minorite confessors of giving absolution with thoughtless abandon, and of assigning indiscreet or even scandalous penances, while they themselves kept company with usurers, panderers and adulterers.<sup>59</sup>

That numerous letters of fraternity were granted by the Franciscans and other friars in the late fourteenth century is undeniable, although the vast majority of extant letters come from the fifteenth century. However, the character and significance of these letters differed from the way the friars' critics described them.<sup>60</sup> Letters or documents of this kind, granting participation in the merits of a religious community and, in some cases, promising to their possessors a monastic burial, had been known in the West for centuries. Originally used to cement alliances between entire monastic communities, they had been adopted by the mendicant Orders to reward benefactors, and as a means of stimulating contributions to supplement their begging income. Although letters granted to important benefactors were unique, blank forms were often used for less important persons; names were added as needed. Letters of fraternity were adopted during this period by guilds, hospitals and other institutions and were used as a form of subscription through which donors could underwrite their building projects or other activities. (More of the

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wearers from damnation. Burial in a mendicant habit (a privilege granted to those who possessed letters of fraternity) became the focus of popular superstition, and critics of the mendicants accused them of exploiting this superstition for their own gain. Wright, I, 256 and II, 21, 32.

<sup>59</sup> Iohannes Brugman, O.F.M., *Speculum Imperfectionis Fratrum Minorum*, in AFH, 2 (1909), 621.

<sup>60</sup> The following is derived in large part from Rev. Prebendary Clark-Maxwell, "Some Letters of Confraternity," in *Archaeologia or Miscellaneous Tracts relating to Antiquity*, 75 (1926), 19-59, and 79 (1929), 179-216; P. Hugolino Lippens, "De Litteris Confraternitatis apud Fratres Minores ab Ordinis Initio ad Annum 1517," AFH, 32 (1939), 49-88; Lippens' article "Le droit nouveau" mentioned above, AFH, 47 (1954), 241-292; and A. G. Little, "Franciscan Letters of Fraternity," *The Bodleian Library Record*, 5 (1954-6), 13-25.

Examples of these letters are in AFH, 20 (1927), 222-223, AFH, 23 (1930), 242-245, AFH, 26 (1933), 231-233. The small amount of work done on the important topic of letters of fraternity has been concentrated on the form, phraseology and numbers of extant letters rather than on their role in popular piety.

extant letters of fraternity or affiliation were issued by these bodies than by any single monastic or mendicant Order.)

Letters of fraternity issued by religious Orders served a variety of purposes; as a marketable commodity, they could be used to pay debts, and simply to identify their owners. Fraternity in one Order did not preclude a similar affiliation with another. Men and women often held letters in several Orders and might still choose to be buried in the cemetery of an Order with which they had no affiliation whatever. This multiple affiliation, and the surprisingly small number of *confratres* and *consorores* who actually received Franciscan burial in England, led Little to doubt whether people set much store by letters of fraternity.<sup>61</sup> But the continual discovery of more and more of these letters, the frequency with which they were cited by contemporary critics, and their importance as a source of mendicant-clerical controversy suggest that they were important to their possessors. Repeated papal authorization for granting them seems to lend weight to this conclusion.<sup>62</sup>

The deceit the friars practiced on the people in general through letters of fraternity was, so their critics claimed, a mirror of their conduct with individuals. Sometimes feigning knowledge of medicine and skill in treating women's complexions and "prevyete,"<sup>63</sup> some-

<sup>61</sup> A. G. Little, "Franciscan Letters of Fraternity," pp. 19-20.

<sup>62</sup> Lippens, "De Litteris Confraternitatis," p. 51. This authorization was first made in an early fourteenth century bull whose text is lost, *Beneficia sanctorum*. Later bulls confirmed and amplified the friars' privileges in receiving *confratres* and *consorores* into their orders.

<sup>63</sup> Wyclif, *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, in *The English Works of Wyclif Hitherto Unprinted*, ed. F. D. Matthew (London, 1880), Early English Text Society, Vol. 74, p. 10. Petrus de Lutra, "Liga Fratrum," in *Unbekannte Kirchenpolitische Streitschriften*, ed. R. Scholz (Rome, 1914), Vol. II, pp. 44-45. In *Piers Plowman*, Friar Flatter appears as a doctor, and Peace tells of how he knew a friar-doctor once, "at a courte pere I dwelt, /And [the friar] was my lordes leche and my ladyes bothe. /And at pe last pis limitour, po my lorde was out, /He salued so owre wommen til somme were with childe!" B Text, ed. Skeat (London, 1869), XX, 342-345, p. 383. The friar often claimed to be a doctor — in *Piers Plowman* he is referred to as "Doctor Friar Flatter, Physician and Surgeon." In *Studies in English Franciscan History*, p. 79, A. G. Little refers to fifteenth-century Franciscans who accepted fees for their medical skill. The Minorite constitutions prohibited the friars from practicing medicine, and from studying it. The convent statutes of Leon of 1375 cautioned that the Franciscans were not revered when they tried to pursue an art of which they were ignorant, and added that considerable scandal had resulted from friars' attempts to practice medicine. *Archivo Ibero-Americano*, 7 (1917), 266.

times under pretext of hearing confessions,<sup>64</sup> or simply lying in wait "in feldis alone or gardyns," the friars engaged in seduction and other forms of "gostily lechorie."<sup>65</sup> Sometimes they gained entrance by peddling pins, girdles, spices, or even furs and lap-dogs.<sup>66</sup>

The Regensburg canon Konrad of Megenberg accused the mendicants of prevaricating and of using the confessional as a cloak for sin.<sup>67</sup> All women were in danger, but women tertiaries were a particular target of mendicant vice.<sup>68</sup> The Premonstratensian Petrus de Lutra emphasized the "pestiferous connection" between the religious and the tertiaries; taking advantage of their gullibility, the friars taught them false doctrines, seduced them, and even offered them the Eucharist during interdicts.<sup>69</sup>

Gower's wry description of the lecherous friar was particularly scathing:

Venit ad lectum quando maritus abest :  
 Sic absente viro temerarius intrat adulter  
 Frater, et alterius propriat acta sibi...  
 Sponsi defectus suplet devocio fratris,  
 Et genus amplificans atria plena facit.  
 Verberat iste vepres, voluerem capit alter; et iste  
 Seminat in fundum, set metet alter agrum...  
 O pietas fratris, que circuit et iuvat omnes,  
 Et gerit alterius sic pacienter onus:  
 O qui non animas tantum, sed corpora nostra,  
 In sudore suo sanctificare venit.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Gower, "Mirour de l'Omme," in Macaulay, op. cit., 1376-1379.

<sup>65</sup> Wyclif, *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, in Matthew, op. cit., p. 12. *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 399. See also Wright, op. cit., II, 44, 49.

<sup>66</sup> *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, pp. 12, 42. Gower, *Vox Clamantis*, p. 189. Wright, II, 264, 265. "Thai dele with purses, pynnes and knyves, With girdles and gloves, for wenches and wyves..."

<sup>67</sup> Konrad von Megenberg, *Lacrima Ecclesiae*, in Hermann Meyer, "Lacrima Ecclesiae. Neue Forschungen zu den Schriften Konrads von Megenberg," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, 39 (1914), 491.

<sup>68</sup> Wyclif, *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, p. 6.

<sup>69</sup> Petrus de Lutra (Peter von Kaiserslautern), *Liga Fratrum*, ed. R. Scholz, in *Unbekannte Kirchenpolitische Streitschriften*, II, 44-45, 62.

<sup>70</sup> Gower, *Vox Clamantis*, in Macaulay, op. cit., pp. 189-190. This theme is common in the anti-mendicant literature of this period, e.g. Wright, *Political Poems and Songs*, Vol. I, p. 266:

"Were I a man that hous helde,  
 If any woman with me dwelde,  
 Ther is no frer, bot he were gelde,

In another passage Gower laments that friars are not made like bees, which lose their stings once they've been used.<sup>71</sup>

According to their critics, the friars persuaded women to cooperate in their "fornycacioun and avoutrie" by arguing that "it is lesse synne to treaspase with hem than with othere weddid men."<sup>72</sup> When not directly involved themselves, the friars encouraged others in adultery (just as they "meddled in marriage") and even accepted money for doing so.<sup>73</sup> There are also occasional accusations of homosexuality.<sup>74</sup>

Within the Order, explicit indictments of Minorites for sexual impropriety were not uncommon. A paragraph in the Umbrian statutes of 1342 prohibiting long conversations in the women's convents between friars and Clares, typical of many similar passages,<sup>75</sup> reflects an attempt to prevent suspicious liaisons. Brugman was both explicit and prolix on the subject of mendicant sex, accusing members

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Shuld com within my wones.  
For may he til a woman synne,  
In priveyte, he wyl not blynne,..."

Elsewhere friars are accused of turning their ornate dwellings into havens for "horedome." Wright, I, 264, 270.

<sup>71</sup> "Inter apes statuit natura, quod esse notandum  
Sentio, quo poterit frater habere notam;  
Nam si pungat apis, pungenti culpa repugnat,  
Amplius ut stimulum non habet ipse suum;  
Postque domi latebras tenet, et non evolat ultra  
Floribus ut campi mellificare queat:  
O Deus, in simili forma si frater adulter  
Perderet inflatum dum stimularet acum,  
Amplius ut flores non colliget in muliere,  
Nec vagus a domibus pergat in orbe suis,  
Causa cessante, quia tunc cessaret ab ipsis  
Effectus, quo nunc plura pericla latent."

*Vox Clamantis*, IV, 877-888, in *The Complete Latin Works of John Gower*, ed. G. C. Macaulay, p. 233.

<sup>72</sup> Wyclif, *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, p. 6.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., pp. 6, 20; see also FitzRalph in A. Gwynn, *Studies*, 26 (1937), 51. The English satirist who called himself "Jack Upland" claimed that the friars gained considerable money from involving themselves in marriages and divorces (Wright, II, 68). Wyclif, in *De Ecclesia*, p. 348 concurs, adding that in making these arrangements the friars frequently deceived both parties.

<sup>74</sup> Wyclif, *Fifty Heresies*, p. 399, *On the Leaven*, p. 6, and Wright, II, 49.

<sup>75</sup> F. Delorme, "Documenta Saeculi XIV Provinciae Umbriae," *AFH*, 5 (1912) 535.



of his Order (in this instance, former Conventuals who had become Observants) of fornicating openly and begetting children.<sup>76</sup> Franciscan confessors, he wrote, not only paid a good deal of attention to the fleshly sins of penitents but sought to indulge in these pleasures themselves; by their excesses they encouraged women to cuckold their husbands and men to make fools of their wives.<sup>77</sup>

Criticism of this sort may have been encouraged by the fact that, as Richard FitzRalph implied, Franciscans not infrequently served as confessors to women and not to their husbands. A passage in *Unusquisque* argued that giving confessional privileges to the friars disturbed the normal distribution of the sacraments. In particular, it led to husbands' and wives' confession to different priests. "Quos ergo deus coniunxit," he concluded, "homo non separet. Cum igitur separatur confessio viri et uxoris, unius coniuncti separatur confessio, quod fieri constat illis esse nocivum, quia satis est notorium, quod unus sciens utriusque morbum congruencius posset eis mederi quam duo." <sup>78</sup>

Although they were expected to go out in the world and minister to the people, all too often the mendicants remained cloistered, declared their critics, harboring the rich but forgetting about the poor. "Yif thei han grete waste houses for to recyven lordis and ladies, ye to soiorne among hem daies and yeries, and other riche men nyyt and day, and helpen not pore nedi men with hereberwe [harbor] in so grete placis as kyngis paleis, hou recyue thei pore men to herberwe?" <sup>79</sup> They do go out to visit the rich when they are sick, or

<sup>76</sup> Brugman, *op. cit.*, p. 616.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 620-621.

<sup>78</sup> The text is edited in Hammerich, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-66. Although this passage says nothing of *which* spouse adhered to the mendicant confessor, the general affinity between the friars — particularly the Franciscans — and women so sharply emphasized in this literature suggests that it was the wife. According to Knighton, for example, the friars helped to finance the papal crusade into Flanders in 1383 largely by soliciting gifts from women. While all English kings from Henry III to Richard II had Dominican confessors, their queens preferred the Franciscans. *Cambridge Medieval History*, 6 (New York and Cambridge, England, 1929), 749.

<sup>79</sup> *On the Leaven*, p. 14. An anonymous poem of 1382, "On the Council of London," described the different receptions given the rich and poor:

Si dives in patria quisquis infirmetur,  
Illuc frater properans et currens monetur;  
Et statim cum venerit infirmo loquetur,  
Ut cadaver mortuum fratribus donetur.

in prison, and "gon gladly and faste to lordis housis and ladies that ben gloriously araied," but fail to heed the poor man's requests for help, refusing "to come in pore mennus houses for stynk and othere filthe."<sup>80</sup> The friars shunned burial of the poor as unprofitable,<sup>81</sup> and Chaucer's friar Huberd avoided beggars because their company held no advantage for him.<sup>82</sup>

Time and again in the anti-mendicant literature the friars are rebuked for courting the favor of the rich; Gower described them as chameleon-like, assuming now one guise, now another.<sup>83</sup> A satirical poem from the Rhineland described the friars as

Advocati, medici et procuratores,  
Tutores et iudices sunt et curatores,  
Voluntatis ultimae sunt ordinatores,  
Fidei commissarii et executores,  
Cunctorum contractuum sunt mediatores.<sup>84</sup>

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With an O and an I, ore petunt ista,  
Dum cor et memoria simul sunt in cista.  
Quod si pauper adiens fratres infirmetur,  
Et petat ut inter hos sepulturae detur,  
Gardianus absens est, statim respondetur,  
Et sic satis breviter pauper excludetur.  
With an O and an I, quilibet est negans,  
Quod quis ibi veniat nisi dans vel legans.

Wright, I, 257. See also *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, p. 368 and Wright, I, 22.

<sup>80</sup> *On the Leaven of the Pharisees*, pp. 14, 15, 17. *Piers Plowman* warns against "false brethren" who preach mortification but practice gluttony, and have no pity for the poor. B Text, ed. Skeat (London, 1869), XIII, 25-79, pp. 211-214.

<sup>81</sup> Richard FitzRalph (in Hammerich, op. cit., p. 678) accused the mendicants of inattention to the sacraments; burials they welcomed because of the fees which accompanied them, but burial of the poor was neglected. Jack Upland (Wright, II, 22-23, 33) chastised the friars for refusing to bury the poor, who, since they were more holy than the rich, deserve it more. See also *Vox Clamantis*, ed. Macaulay, 183.

<sup>82</sup> Prologue, *Canterbury Tales*, ed. Robinson, lines 240-248, p. 19.

<sup>83</sup> Gower, *Vox Clamantis*, ed. Macaulay, p. 189.

<sup>84</sup> Koch, *Die frühesten Niederlassungen der Minoriten im Rheingebiete* (Leipzig, 1881), p. 114. Chaucer's friar was very helpful as a mediator during "love-days" — days appointed for settlement of disputes out of court. *Canterbury Tales*, in *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson, Second Edition (Boston, 1957), General Prologue, line 258, p. 19.

Wyclif described how they brought trinkets and little cakes and fruit into aristocratic houses, hoping to wheedle larger gifts from their occupants.<sup>85</sup> Friar Huberd made it a great point to be entertaining; he played instruments, his eyes dancing, "took the prize" in ballad singing, and even affected a lisp to make his speech sweeter.<sup>86</sup> By such flattery of the great, the anti-mendicant writers insisted, the friars allied themselves with lords who represented tyranny, extortion and vice.<sup>87</sup> Refusing to hear any but the confessions of the rich, they sought worldly offices in the lords' courts, as stewards, kitchen clerks, counsellors, or even chamberlains.<sup>88</sup> And no court was closed to the friar who was master of theology.<sup>89</sup>

But even this ill-advised loyalty was short-lived. Once an influential man lost his wealth or power, the friars would leave him. "So long as fortune is your friend," Lust-of-the-Eyes says in *Piers Plowman*, "the friars will always love you," but the formerly rich were invariably scorned when they could give no more.<sup>90</sup>

All these practices — giving facile penance and letters of fraternity, seduction and cultivation of the rich — together constituted the friars' worst offense: they were hypocrites. The contrast, their critics claimed, between the friars' doctrines and their actual behavior was everywhere apparent. The clergy of Canterbury accused them of begging for alms while riding in state, with horses and trappings surpassing those of the greatest prelates in England.<sup>91</sup> Claiming in their

<sup>85</sup> *On the Leaven*, p. 12. Chaucer's friar wooed young women by bringing them little favors. Prologue, *Canterbury Tales*, ed. Robinson, lines 233-234.

<sup>86</sup> Prologue, *Canterbury Tales*, ed. Robinson, lines 236-237, 264-268. In *On the Leaven*, p. 9, Wyclif refers to the friars' "songs or knacking and harping, dancing" to "geten the stynkyng love of damyselis."

<sup>87</sup> Gwynn, op. cit., p. 51. *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, in Arnold, op. cit., p. 387.

<sup>88</sup> Wright, *Political Poems and Songs*, Vol. II, p. 22. Gower, *Vox Clamantis*, ed. Macaulay, op. cit., p. 188.

<sup>89</sup> *Vox Clamantis*, ed. Macaulay, p. 189.

<sup>90</sup> *Piers Plowman*, B Text, ed. Skeat (*Early English Text Society*, London, 1869), p. 170. *Vox Clamantis*, ed. Macaulay, p. 184.

<sup>91</sup> Gwynn, *Studies*, 26 (1937), 51. In the convent statutes of Leon, the Franciscans were prohibited from keeping horses or grooms. *Archivo Ibero-Americano*, 7 (1917), 262. In *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, pp. 210-212, Owst noted that friars arrived to deliver their sermons on horseback, dressed in gaudy robes. Chaucer's friar favored dainty food and impressive dress. *Canterbury Tales*, ed. Robinson, lines 259-263, 1839-1845. FitzRalph also accused the friars of wearing costly clothes. Williams, op. cit., p. 508, citing BM ms. Lansdowne, fol. 131v.

sermons to condemn the use of money, they heaped up riches in private. Fine linen soothed their flesh under their rough outer garments, and their honeyed words fell from tongues that dripped poison. In short, whatever virtues Francis sought to institute in his holy Order, these friars did their best to vitiate,<sup>92</sup> and thus fell into the worst possible sin. Wyclif wrote:

Ypocrisie is a fals feynyng of holynes whan it is not in trewthe bifore god, and so ypocrisie is fully contrarie to crist, that is trewthe as the gospel techthe, and it is comunly the moste perylous synne of alle. For comunly an ypocrite doth nevere verrey penaunce, for trist that he has in his owen holy feyned lif and for likyng of veyne glorie and for wynnynge of worldly goodis; and ypocrites ben most cursed bifore al other theves, for thei ben theves of goodis of grace and dysceyven other men in goodis of fortune or goodis of kynde, and as a thing is betere so the mysusyng ther-of is more dampnable, as lyncolne and other clerkis proven; and therfore crist in the gospel cursid so ofte ypocritis more than othere synful men."<sup>93</sup>

These accusations of the friars' critics — neglect of the poor, cultivating the rich and giving them hospitality within their cloisters, and hypocritical behavior — all parallel criticisms raised from within the Order.

The fourteenth century was marked by a significant change in the Franciscan life. One dimension of this change was the Minorites' abandoning their itinerant mission and with it, most likely, some measure of their dedication to the poor. The Constitutions of this period repeatedly enjoined the Minorites against going outside the convent except in a small number of restricted instances. The 1331 General Constitutions of Perpignan forbade the friars from going into cities more than once a week; young brothers could go only once a month.<sup>94</sup> (A prohibition against keeping secular clothes in their cells suggests that some Minorites were accustomed to going outside the convent incognito.<sup>95</sup>) Travel, even from one Franciscan house to

<sup>92</sup> *Vox Clamantis*, ed. Macaulay, pp. 187, 195.

<sup>93</sup> *On the Leaven*, pp. 3-4. See also Wright, I, pp. 253-263, II, p. 264, and Mayer, op. cit., p. 491.

<sup>94</sup> P. Saturninus Mencherini, O.F.M., "Constitutiones Generales Ordinis Fratrum Minorum a Cap. Perpiniani Anno 1331 Celebrato Editae," AFH, 2 (1909), 289-290.

<sup>95</sup> General Constitutions of Lyons, II, ii, AFH, 30 (1938), 160.



another, had become a formal procedure, regulated by official authorization; letters from superiors had to be carried by all travellers, who were not always hospitably welcomed.<sup>96</sup> During the Schism, journeys of mendicants from Clementine to Urbanite provinces, or the reverse, came under particular official scrutiny.<sup>97</sup>

The growing tendency to neglect the poor is reflected in the *Ordinationes* of Benedict XII. There the ministers, custodians and guardians of the order were told to compel all Franciscans, *etiam notabiles*, to hear the confessions of poor men and women as well as rich.<sup>98</sup>

The Franciscans' relations with royalty and with noble families had undeniably become close by the fourteenth century. Minorite confessors were in residence at many courts; some performed a number of functions. One "friar John Welle," chaplain to John of Gaunt, went to Rome on his behalf at least once, and procured bulls for him on at least two other occasions.<sup>99</sup> The English kings were generous to the Franciscans, and had apartments at Greyfriars, York. It was commonplace in this period for Franciscan convents to provide lodgings for nobles and for secular prelates.<sup>100</sup>

No writer outside the order was as merciless in exposing Mino-

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<sup>96</sup> General Constitutions of Naples, 22, 24 in Giuseppe Abate, "Costituzioni Inedite dei Frati Minori," MF, 29 (1929), 171.

<sup>97</sup> Statutes of the Paris Chapter of 1382 called by Angelo of Spoleto, in *Archivo Ibero-Americano*, 7 (1917), 251.

<sup>98</sup> AFH, 30 (1938), 372.

<sup>99</sup> Little, *Studies in English Franciscan History*, pp. 85, 91. The close connection between the French kings and the Dominicans is well known; that English rulers were accustomed to have both Dominican and Franciscan confessors has been mentioned above. Eminent mendicant papal confessors included the Dominican Raymond of Peñafort, confessor of Gregory IX, and the Franciscan confessor and biographer of Innocent IV, Nicholas de Carbio. Noble loyalty was not infrequently divided among several Orders; Guillaume de Nangis noted that on his death the Count of Valois' body was buried at the Dominican cemetery in Paris, his heart at the Franciscan. *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis*, ed. H. Géraud, II (Paris, 1843), 65.

Friars often travelled on behalf of their wealthy patrons; the accusation of "Rome-running" which occurs so frequently in the fourteenth-century statutes was doubtless brought on in part by these services. Abuse of this practice occasioned a warning in the *Memorialia* of the 1354 Chapter General at Assisi that any Minorite travelling to the curia on behalf of prelates or princes must carry testimonial letters. AFH, 35 (1942), 221.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., pp. 39 and 75-76.

rite hypocrisy as Brugman. While they preached about vice and virtue, rewards and punishment, the Franciscans' own behavior was contemptible, he charged. They were arrogant, presumptuous, willful, dissolute, gluttonous, rabble-rousing, egotistical and slanderous. They got drunk in the company of scholars, and generally vitiated by example what they taught in their sermons.<sup>101</sup> The priests of his own order, he wrote, were porcine where they should have been angelic, and the guardians were even worse.

...Quid enim prodest quod ministri seu vicarii alte clamant in conventibus, si gardiani et praesidentes nolunt manutenere quod per illos salubriter et industrie in visitationibus practicum est, et in capitulis proclamatum exstat adversus defectus fratrum seu conventuum? Pestis autem et ruina totius Ordinis radicaliter procedit ab huiusmodi casibus et accidentibus oppositis, quae sequuntur, utpote si directe vel indirecte insteterit implicate vel explicite pro officio, tanquam honorem consequendo, si ad hoc fratres obsequio, munusculo, recreatione, solatio vel promissione, blandimento, adulatione vel altera practica simili induxerit, si zelum Dei et disciplinam Ordinis ante oculos non posuerit, si libertatem et consolationem propriam, commodumve quaesierit, si fatuellis iuvenibus et remissis fratribus largam licentiam dederit, si timore depositionis ab officio de illicito licitum gloriabundus fecerit, si acceptor personarum fuerit, si dissolutus animo saltem et immaturus in opere exstiterit, si communitatem refectorii, dormitorii, chori, intrare dissimulaverit; si debiles, infirmos et tristes consolari renuerit; si crudelem et impetuosum se ostenderit; si devotionem, recollectionem, orationem contemnens, se et fratres suos ad opera exteriora, tanquam mechanicos et negotiatores, indiscrete effundi permiserit;... Si amicos antiquos, quasi nihil boni fecissent conventui aut Ordini, superbia et arroganti fronte contempserint et consolari ac visitare in rationabilibus non curaverint; si cum curatis passim bella, dissensiones suscitaverint; si Officium divinum manutenere neglexerint et ad ipsum primi recurrere et ultimi manere iuxta posse non studuerint... Si mulierculas et suspectas tanquam venenum non abhorreant; si ambiciose tortuosa in officio sectati fuerint, et ad hoc fratres zelatores et probos amoveri a loco diffamacionibus procuraverint; si in passionibus passivis a praelato in eum factis, instar basilisci fulminando, impatientissime se habendo, claves conventus et sigilla praelato suo obiciendo, irregulariter se habuerint; si in visitatione aut depositione nomina visitantium sibi studiose revelari studuerint; si revelantes huiusmodi capituli secreta, tanquam latro latronem et complex complicem sacramentaliter, cum non liceat, absol-

<sup>101</sup> Brugman, op. cit., p. 621.

verint; si fratribus cum visitantibus vel deponentibus cum, comminatorie, exprobratorie, timorem, terrorem et persecutionem incusserint: audeo dicere, quod si talia contigerint, illic sol tendit ad occasum, religio ad interitum, conventus ad ruinam, sanctitas ad suspendium, observantia in favillam redigitur.<sup>102</sup>

Brugman's violent and sweeping critique touched on virtually every area of anti-mendicant criticism. Of course, his theme was the corruption of the Observants of the early fifteenth century, not the Conventuals of the late fourteenth. But there are enough references in his *Speculum Imperfectionis* to the "other orders" and to the Conventuals to suggest that his criticisms were applicable to the most numerous segment of the Order in the late fourteenth century.

One of Brugman's themes was the violence of his fellow friars, an accusation commonly made by anti-mendicant writers. Of their fighting and "other bodili harmes," Wyclif wrote, "tungis suffisen not to telle."<sup>103</sup> If prospective Minorites present themselves at the convent armed with clubs and other weapons, it was said, then they would be more quickly and reverently received into the Order.<sup>104</sup> Where they were not directly involved, the friars fomented violence, according to their opponents. They helped to bring about the deaths of priests that taught the truth and exposed mendicant hypocrisy; they encouraged peaceable men to "take vengeance openly" against one another, and to sue one another in the courts.<sup>105</sup>

Mendicant influence could move entire lands to battle. When early in the 1380's Urban VI preached a crusade against Flemish supporters of his rival at Avignon, the preaching friars were instrumental in recruiting and financing the fighting men that subsequently invaded Flanders in 1383 (led by Henry Despencer, Bishop of Norwich, who crushed the peasant revolt in Norfolk). Wyclif blamed the entire expedition on the friars. Mendicants were sometimes to be found on

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., pp. 623-625.

<sup>103</sup> *De Ecclesia et Membris Ejus*, p. 349. The large number of Franciscans who held inquisitorial positions — and who therefore had the right to carry weapons — may account for these accusations to some extent. Henry Charles Lea, *The Inquisition of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), p. 78.

<sup>104</sup> Brugman, op. cit., p. 615.

<sup>105</sup> *On the Leaven*, p. 16; *De Ecclesia et Membris Ejus*, p. 348. Some blamed the Peasant Revolt of 1381 on the friars. *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, ed. Shirley (London, 1858); *Chronicon Angliae, auctore Monacho... S. Albani*, ed. Maunde Thompson, Rolls Series (London, 1874), 312.

the battlefield, now as confessor to soldiers, now as soldiers themselves.<sup>106</sup>

The statutes of this period give ample evidence from within the Order of the violence of the fourteenth-century Franciscans. In the Constitutions of Cahors they were prohibited from carrying arms and attacking each other with swords; this prohibition was repeated in later statutes as well, including the great Farinerian collection of 1354. There the injunction against violent attack forbids striking, throwing stones or other missiles and carrying or possessing swords or mutilating seculars, and even hiring assassins.

...Si vero manum levaverit vel aliquid ad percutiendum acceperit contra fratrem, ei probationis capucium tribus mensibus imponatur per alterum praedictorum. Si autem non graviter percusserit, vel ad percutiendum graviter lapidem vel aliud proiecerit, vel gladium aut aliquid aliud eduxerit, et qui etiam arma offensionis portaverit vel in cella vel alibi retinuerit, poena carceris puniatur. Quodsi aliquis frater fratrem alium vel saecularem enormiter vulneraverit vel mutilaverit, vel alicui venenum dederit, perpetuo carceri mancipetur. Et eidem poenae subiaceat, qui haec eadem vel similia per alium fieri fecerit vel procuraverit, vel ad huiusmodi facienda inventus fuerit machinari.<sup>107</sup>

Convent statutes from Leon dated 1375 provided that if fighting occurred within the convent and a friar was wounded, his attacker was to be imprisoned and tortured until he revealed the true circumstances of the attack.<sup>108</sup>

The Minorites seemed excessively violent even in a violent age, particularly when their privileges were threatened. When the clergy of Saint Stephens in Prague demanded the *quarta* due them from a burial in a Minorite cemetery, the friars refused; the priests of the cathedral pronounced their excommunication in the presence of the entire parish. In retaliation, the Minorites armed themselves, gathered together their supporters, and burst into the sanctuary. A bloody battle ensued. The people were horrified, and the Ordinary, John Drazik, attempted to have the Franciscans expelled from Bohemia,

<sup>106</sup> *De Ecclesia et Membris Ejus*, p. 348; *Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars*, p. 386. In *Piers Plowman*, B Text ed. Skeat (London, 1869), XV, 118-121, p. 261, the remark is made that priests were accustomed to wear short-swords and to carry daggers and sheath-knives.

<sup>107</sup> AFH, 35 (1942), 186.

<sup>108</sup> *Archivo Ibero-Americano*, 7 (1917), 268.



but the mendicant conservator was able to smooth things over and the sentence of excommunication was lifted.<sup>109</sup> This happened in 1334, but similar disputes between the friars and secular clergy and among the friars themselves occurred throughout the century, some of which make critical passages in the anti-mendicant literature pale by comparison.

Criticism of the friars was not without justification, nor was it limited to non-mendicant opponents. The most serious focus of this criticism — friar appropriation of the functions of secular priests, and the disputes which resulted — will be discussed in a subsequent article.

*Berkeley, California*

CAROLLY ERICKSON

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<sup>109</sup> Lippens, "Le droit nouveau," p. 259.

## OPINIONES RICHARDI RUFİ CORNUBIENSIS A CENSORE REPROBATAE

Richardus Rufus Cornubiensis, O.F.M. prima vice legit *Sententias* Petri Lombardi Oxonii inter annos 1250–1252.<sup>1</sup> Haec prima lectura in tres primos libros *Sententiarum*, accuratissime simul ac pulcherrime scripta, asservatur Oxonii, in cod. 62 Collegii Balliol. Post hanc primam lecturam, anno 1253, Richardus Parisios se contulit et ibi iterum legit *Sententias*, cursorie, iuxta Thomam Eccleston,<sup>2</sup> sollemniter, iuxta Rogerum Baco.<sup>3</sup> Haec tamen secunda lectura, praeterquam in libro Petri Lombardi, nititur in commentario S. Bonaventurae. Etenim Rufus hoc commentario, recenter exarato, et in suo genere (eo saltem tempore) optimo, usus est in scholis suis. Eum quidem plerumque in formam breviorē redegīt, numerum praesertim argumentorum pro et contra minuendo, sed eodem tempore etiam dubia sua circa solutiones Bonaventurae manifestavit et solutiones, quae magis sibi placuerunt, proposuit. Multas autem ex his opinionibus adducit ac si essent ‘opiniones aliorum.’ Quaedam revera fuerunt opiniones ab aliis propositae, sed aliae videntur esse ab ipsomet Richardo excogitatae. Ipse tamen non est conatus huiusmodi opiniones scholaribus suis imponere tamquam veras et indiscussas; immo saepe, postquam illas opiniones manifesto studio et amore recitavit, eos exhortatus est ad viam communem sequendam. Nihilominus quidam censor plus quam quinquaginta ex his opinionibus velut calumniosas, erroneas, periculosas vel absurdas notavit.

Liber primus et secundus huius *Abbreviationis* criticae asservatur

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<sup>1</sup> Notitias de vita et operibus Richardi Rufi in unum collegit A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500*, III (Oxford, 1959), 1604 s. Adde R. C. Dales, “The Influence of Grossatestes’s *Hexaëmeron* on the *Sentences* Commentaries of Richard Fishacre, O.P. and Richard Rufus of Cornwall, O.F.M.,” *Viator*, 2 (1971), 270–300.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Eccleston, *De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam*, coll. XI (ed. A. G. Little, Manchester, 1951, p. 51).

<sup>3</sup> Rogerus Bacon, *Compendium Studii Theologiae*, cap. 4 (ed. H. Rashdall, Aberdoniae, 1911, p. 52).

in bibliotheca Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 12.993, ff. 1-320, liber vero tertius (qui desinit in vigesima distinctione) et quartus habetur Assisii, bibl. comm., cod. 176, ff. 1-223. Ambo tamen codices eadem manu scripti sunt et aliquando Assisii, in bibliotheca Sacri Conventus simul asservabantur. Aspice numerum foliorum, et statim videbis quam haec *Abbreviatio* longe sit a brevitate.

Ambo haec opera, commentarium scilicet Oxoniensem et *Abbreviationem*, bonae memoriae F. Pelster iam dudum magistraliter descripsit et esse opera genuina Richardi Rufi Cornubiensis comprobavit.<sup>4</sup>

Eodem tempore quo *Abbreviationem* notam fecit, plures ex opinionibus a censore notatis tetigit, sed omnes, data occasione, simul et diffusius tractare in votis habuit. Istae enim opiniones, iudicio suo, multum conferunt ad problemata illius aetatis cognoscenda, et simul revelant proprium et singulare ingenium Richardi Rufi.<sup>5</sup> Propositum tamen suum clarus acutor, anno 1956 vita functus, perficere non potuit. Qua de causa opportunum visum est nobis opiniones et sententias Rufi, vel a Rufo velut 'opiniones aliorum' recitatas, quas censor reprehensibiles iudicavit, cum brevi introductione hic evulgare.

Erat enim Richardus vir subtilis ingenii et magnae eruditionis, qui dialecticae et philosophiae Aristotelis non solum diligenter studuit, sed disciplinas philosophicas ut Magister Artium tum Parisiis tum Oxonii per multos annos laudabiliter professus est.<sup>6</sup> Fius famae

<sup>4</sup> F. Pelster, "Der älteste Sentenzenkommentar aus der Oxforder Schule: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des theologischen Lehrbetriebes an der Oxforder Universität," *Scholastik*, 1 (1926), 50-80; "Die älteste Abkürzung und Kritik von Sentenzenkommentar des hl. Bonaventura: Ein Werk des Rich. Rufus de Cornubia (Paris 1253-55)," *Gregorianum*, 17 (1936), 195-223.

<sup>5</sup> F. Pelster, "Richardus Rufus Anglicus O.F.M. (c. 1250), ein Vorläufer des Duns Scotus in der Lehre von Wirkung der priestlichen Lossprechung," *Scholastik*, 25 (1950), 550: "Diese Zensuren, deren Gesamtheit ich bei anderer Gelegenheit zu behandeln gedenke, gewahren einen Einblick in den Stand mancher Fragen jener Zeit, und vor allem lassen sie die Eigenheit, ja Eigenwilligkeit Richards deutlich erkennen."

<sup>6</sup> Cf. G. Gál, "Commentarius in *Metaphysicam* Aristotelis (cod. Vat. lat. 4538): Fons Doctrinae Richardi Rufi," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 43 (1950), 209-42. Ratio cur tunc non credidimus hunc commentarium posse Richardo Rufo attribui, erat quia ipse eum frequenter citat et exscribit, sed semper ut opus alicuius philosophi saecularis. Nunc tamen non excludimus quin Rufus, mirum caput, ad opus proprium, quod ut philosophus saecularis scripserat, remittat auditores vel lectores his, et similibus, verbis: "quemadmodum illi saeculares philosophi volunt."

et magnae exsistimationis, in qua habitus erat, testimonio est Thomas Eccleston, qui ipsum de facie novit. Erat autem Rufus, iuxta Eccleston,<sup>7</sup> "lector egregius," qui cum legeret *Sententias* Parisiis "magnus et admirabilis philosophus iudicatus est." De eius vero magna ac duratura auctoritate, praesertim in schola Oxoniensi, Rogerus Baco, maledicus senex, anno 1292 his verbis testatur: "Et optime noui pessimum et stultissimum<sup>8</sup> istorum errorum [autorem], qui vocatus est Ricardus Cornubiensis, famosissimus apud stultam multitudinem; set apud sapientes fuit insanus, et reprobatus Parisius propter errores quos invenerat, [et] promulgauerat quando solempniter legebat sententias ibidem postquam legerat sententias Oxonie ab anno Domini 1250. Ab illo mcll. igitur tempore remansit multitudo in huius magistri erroribus usque nunc, scilicet per quadraginta annos et amplius, et maxime invalescit Oxonie, sicut ibidem incepit hec demencia infinita." <sup>9</sup>

En testimonium indubitabile 'reprobationis' Richardi Rufi eiusque lecturae Parisiensis. Et revera in codicibus Vaticano et Assisiensi perspicuae sunt notae cuiusdam censoris, qui opiniones vel sententias, quae sibi non placuerunt, linea verticali in margine ducta signavit et verbum 'Calumpniosum' apposuit. Saepe tamen rationem quoque assignavit reprehensionis. Quidam lector, qui a censore dissentit, nonnullas ex his censuris erasit, vestigia tamen censurae penitus delere non potuit. Quandoque sola linea verticalis apparet, sine ulla scriptura. Opiniones hoc modo signatas non exscripsimus.

Significatum verbi 'calumniosum' est satis vagum; sed nihil commune habet cum falsa accusatione. Significat potius opinionem singularem, contentiosam, insidiosam vel quae male intelligi potest. Quod non significet semper opinionem erroneam, ex eo patet quod censor post verbum 'calumniosum' quandoque addit etiam verba 'hoc est erroneum,' vel similia.

Quantum ad opiniones censura notatas imprimis notandum est quod ratio reprehensionis non erat dissensio a Bonaventura. Rufus enim non raro dissentit a Bonaventura et tamen censor nihil ei obicit. Aliud quoque notavimus: censor non habuit erga Richardum benevolentiam nec aequo animo eum iudicavit. Quandoque enim notat

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Eccleston, opus cit., p. 30; ubi et sequens, p. 51.

<sup>8</sup> Series sermonis, nostro iudicio, requireret potius: "pessimorum et stultissimorum."

<sup>9</sup> Rogerus Bacon, opus cit., pp. 52 s.



res parvi vel nullius momenti, ut ex. gr. ubi dicit "Calumniosum. Improbatur communem distinctionem sine causa" (I, § 4). Alibi, zelo corrigendi ductus, ipsemet cadit in errorem et reprehendit non solum opinionem Cornubiensis sed etiam Bonaventurae, immo Ecclesiae Romanae, ut ex. gr. quando scribit: "Calumniosum, quia ponit quod aliquae sectae conferunt Baptismum, cum Ecclesia teneat quod non possunt baptizare" (IV, § 1). Hanc tamen censuram ipse, vel alius, eradere conatus est. Iterum alibi, ipsemet censor mendacii accusatur a quodam lectore. Censor enim reprehendit Richardum, dicens: "Hoc quod recitat per modum opinionis sapit errorem; nec illud improbat, sed potius defendit, dicendo hoc consonum dictis Sanctorum, et respondendo ad obiecta." Cui censor censoris: "Mentiris, quia immo improbat et opinionem veram recitat et tenet" (II, § 8).

Revera Rufus magnam partem opinionum, quas censor reprehendit, non defendit ut veram, sed 'recitat,' velut opiniones aliorum. Et quaedam revera fuerunt opiniones aliorum, quae tamen communiter non amplius tenebantur. Quaedam tamen apparent tam novae et insolitae, ut eas difficile vel impossibile esset apud alios invenire. Ceterum, huiusmodi via ac ratio opiniones novas vel audaces proponendi satis communis erat. Ad eam saepe recurrebant ex. gr. Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Petrus de Trabibus et Guillelmus de Ockham.<sup>10</sup> Et si de talibus opinionibus rationem reddere iussi sunt, in promptu habebant excusationem: recitative dixi, non assertive.

Opiniones a censore notatas earumque momentum F. Pelster, ut diximus, iam breviter tetigit. Nec nos intendimus hic de omnibus 52 opinionibus disserere. Sunt enim satis faciles ad intelligendum. Facilius tamen et plenius intelligi possunt si simul cum quaestionibus parallelis S. Bonaventurae leguntur. Earum enim occasione propositae fuerunt.

Quasdam tamen ex his opinionibus, praesertim illas quae saepius recurrunt, specialius subnotare iuvat, ut earum momentum et locus in historia philosophiae et theologiae scholasticae facilius appareat.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. G. Gál, "Commentarius Petri de Trabibus in IV Librum Sententiarum Petro de Tarantasia Falso Inscriptus," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 45 (1952), 241-78. Pagina 243, linea 23, loco 639 lege 359.

a) *Principium oeconomiae*

Primo loco mentio facienda est de sic dicto principio oeconomiae, quod Rufus, licet semel tantum expresserit, implicite tamen velut ducem sequitur. Hoc principium revera est Aristotelis, sed eo multi alii ducti sunt. Sape recurrit apud Duns Scotum, frequentissime tamen apud Guillelmum de Ockham, ita ut nomen 'Rasorium Ockham' obtinuerit.<sup>11</sup> Forma huius principii, quod fere idem est ac principium rationis sufficientis, apud auctores scholasticos haec est: Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate. Nostris tamen temporibus familiarior est forma: Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate. Ambae tamen propositiones idem significant. Forma principii apud Cornubiensem nondum est tam bene definita, sed intentio eadem est: "Ideo alii aliter dicunt, qui *malunt ponere finita quam infinita et unum quam multa*, si possibile est" (II, § 9).

Simile est huic quod apud Doctorem Subtilem legimus:<sup>12</sup> "Illud enim ponendum est in natura quod melius est, si sit possibile...; sed paucitas sine multitudine est melior in natura, si sit possibilis."

Hoc principium, tacite adhibitum, ducit Rufum in multis quaestionibus solvendis, ut ex. gr. ubi de distinctione inter animam et eius potentias agit; similiter ubi de relationibus est quaestio. Mentem tamen suam firmissime de hac re exprimit ubi de gratia et de virtutibus loquitur: "Ut saepe dico, aliqui dicunt quod omnes virtutes, omnia dona, omnis gratia gratum faciens, quae simul sunt in anima, sunt unus habitus, unus amor numero, solum differrens per diversitatem operis sive obiecti et materiae" (IV, § 7). Ipsemet Ockham cautius adhibuit ratorium suum!

b) *Anima et eius potentiae*

Primum problema, in cuius solutione Cornubiensis principium oeconomiae tacite applicat, respicit quaestionem de distinctione inter animam et eius potentias, necnon distinctionem inter potentias ipsas (I, § 1). Quaestio proposita erat utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem cum essentia animae annon. Iuxta Bonaventuram non sunt omnino idem, non sunt tamen accidentia. Egrediuntur ab anima et sunt animae consubstantiales, et ita sunt in eodem genere in quo

<sup>11</sup> Cf. P. Boehner, *Ockham. Philosophical Writings* (Edinburgh, 1962), pp. xx-xxi.

<sup>12</sup> Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 16, q. unica, n. 15 (*Opera Omnia*, VI, ed. Wadding, Lugduni 1639, 770).

est anima, in genere scilicet substantiae, sed tantum per reductionem.<sup>13</sup>

Rufo haec solutio non placet. Ipse praefert opinionem antiquiorem, a Bonaventura etiam recitatam sed non receptam. Iuxta hanc positionem potentiae sunt idem per essentiam cum anima. Nihil enim aliud sunt nisi tres relationes, et hae relationes sunt ipsamet essentia, quae tribus relationibus refertur.

Eandem solutionem repetit et defendit etiam in alia quaestione, ubi idem problema tangit: "Potentiae animae sunt ipsa essentia animae, et omnes et singulae"; praedicatio tamen unius de alia non est formalis: "sed non est formalis praedicatio" (II, § 1). Aliis verbis: intellectus quidem est voluntas et memoria, et omnes tres sunt una essentia, sed definitio intellectus non est definitio voluntatis vel memoriae nec ipsius animae. Et etiam hic repetit, quod prius dixit, nempe tres potentias non esse nisi tres relationes; tres vero relationes non sunt nisi ipsa essentia tribus modis relata.

Haec est ratio, cur dimittat, ut inutilem, quaestionem de sede principali imaginis divinae in anima. "Non est magna vis in his" (II, § 4), utrum scilicet imago sit potius in intellectu quam in voluntate vel e converso. Omne enim quod est in vi affectiva seu in voluntate, est etiam in vi cognitiva seu in intellectu, quia ambae hae potentiae sunt una et eadem animae essentia.

Cornubiensis, ut iam vidimus, cum illis sentit "qui malunt ponere unum, si possibile est." Et si omnia convenienter explicari possunt ponendo unam animae essentiam quae intelligit, vult et meminit, non debet poni una essentia cum tribus qualitatibus vel accidentibus absolutis. Nulla etiam necessitas est tres relationes considerare ut tria accidentia, sed convenienter concipi possunt ut una eademque essentia tribus modis relata.

### c) *Relationes et earum fundamentum*

Rufus cum de potentiis animae ageret, per tangentem iam innuit quid sibi de relationibus videretur. Plures tamen occasiones ei se obtulerunt ut mentem suam de hac re fusius et planius manifestaret. Ubi ex. gr. quaerit, utrum in divinis debeant poni proprietates non solum vocaliter sed etiam realiter, vult etiam scire cuiusmodi relatio exprimatur per hoc nomen 'creator.' Nomen istud, iuxta Rufum, ve-

<sup>13</sup> Bonaventura, *In IV Libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 3, pars 2, a. 1, q. 3 (*Opera Omnia*, I, Quaracchi 1882-1902, 85 s.).

ram quidem relationem significat, quae tamen relatio nequaquam est aliquod accidens; nec est ordo Dei ad creaturam, sed potius simultas Dei et creaturae. Est enim ipse Deus temporaliter relatus ad creaturam (I, § 7). Similiter, una persona divina refertur quidem ad aliam personam per suam proprietatem, sed quia persona est persona prae-cise per suam proprietatem, ideo una persona se ipsa et suo nomine refertur ad aliam.

Hanc positionem iam Bonaventura reiecit;<sup>14</sup> censor vero considerat eam simpliciter absurdam.

In alia etiam quaestione, ubi quaerit, utrum aliqua, ut ex. gr. 'creator' vel 'dominus' dicantur deo Deo ex tempore (I, § 8), iterum supponit relationem non differre a suo fundamento. Ideo censor notat: "idem quod prius nititur astruere."

Sed quidquid dicat censor, peritia et subtilitas dialectica Cornubiensis notatu sane digna est. Hoc apparet ubi explicat quomodo sit intelligenda haec propositio: Deus temporaliter relatus est ab aeterno. Hic, iuxta eum, considerandum est imprimis, utrum 'Deus temporaliter relatus' dicatur de re an de dicto; deinde, utrum propositio sumatur in sensu divisionis vel in sensu compositionis. De re enim et in sensu divisionis propositio vera est, in alio vero sensu falsa. Seu id quod est temporaliter relatus, est ab aeterno; sed non ut temporaliter relatus.

Cum ulterius quaerit, utrum ea quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore secundum substantiam vel secundum veram relationem dicantur, iterum insistit in hoc quod "ipse Deus, sic relatus, est haec relatio."

Richardus iam hucusque, brevi spatio, enuntiavit vel 'recitavit' tres positiones, de quibus quinquaginta post annis viri studiosi ardentissime disceptabunt: potentiae animae non distinguuntur realiter nec inter se nec ab anima; solum in tantum distinguuntur quod una non praedicatur formaliter de alia; relationes (saltem aliquae) non sunt accidentia distincta a fundamento, sed sunt ipsummet fundamentum variis modis relatum.

#### d) *Distinctio et non-identitas formalis*

F. Pelster originem famosae distinctionis formalis scotisticae in scriptis Richardi Rufi iam dudum detexit et paucis illustravit.<sup>15</sup> Problema distinctionis etiam in excerptis infra edendis iterum atque

<sup>14</sup> Bonaventura, loco cit., dist. 26, q. 1. (I, 452).

<sup>15</sup> F. Pelster, "Die älteste Abkürzung" cit., pp. 218 s.; cf. etiam G. Gál,



iterum in conspectum venit ; et Rufus, ubicumque potest, reicit pluralitatem et defendit unitatem. Quotiescumque autem hoc facit, toties censor eum reprehendit.

Iam vidimus quomodo Rufus solvit quaestionem de distinctione inter animam et eius potentias necnon inter potentias ipsas (I, § 1 ; II, § 7). Quomodo differunt? Quantum ad essentiam spectat, nullo modo. Una enim et eadem res est anima et eius potentiae, et differunt solum sicut relationes a fundamento et relationes inter se. Quae tamen relationes non sunt accidentia absoluta, extrinsecus advenientia, sed sunt ipsummet fundamentum variis modis relatum. Omnimoda autem unitate minime obstande, inter animam et eius potentias et inter potentias ipsas "non est formalis praedicatio" (II, § 7); similiter, licet res relata sit ipsamet relatio, "sed non formali praedicatione" (II, § 7).

Quid sibi volunt verba 'non est formalis praedicatio'? Expositionem verborum 'formalis praedicatio' apud Rufum nondum legimus, sed non dubitamus quin sua expositio similis esset illi quam apud Scotum legimus: "Et intelligo illa non esse eadem formaliter quorum unum non est de intellectu alterius per se et primo; et ita sapientia non est de per se intellectu scientiae nec voluntatis." <sup>16</sup> Idem, adhuc planius, alibi: "Hoc declaro, quia 'includere formaliter' est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaretur, inclusum esset definitio vel pars definitionis; sicut autem definitio bonitatis in communi non habet in se sapientiam, ita nec infinita infinitam: est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae definitiones si essent definibiles." <sup>17</sup> Aliis verbis, illa non sunt eadem formaliter quorum unum potest definiri sine alio et definitio unius non potest praedicari de alio.

Cornubiensis distinctionem seu potius non-identitatem formalem applicat etiam ad mysteria divina. Primo, ubi quaerit de appropriatione attributorum divinatorum, declarat cognitionem et dilectionem esse quidem eandem rem realiter in Deo, "non tamen formali praedicatione" (I, § 10). Idem dicit de ideis divinis et de attributis essen-

"Viae ad Exsistentiam Dei Probendam in Doctrina Richardi Rufi, O.F.M." *Franziskanische Studien*, 38 (1956), 182.

<sup>16</sup> Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio*, I, d. 45, q. 2 (Oxonii, cod. Merton 59, f. 187r).

<sup>17</sup> Idem, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 193 (*Opera Omnia* IV, Civitas Vaticana 1950 ss., 262).

tialibus, quae sunt potentia, sapientia, bonitas etc. Haec enim omnia sunt una et eadem essentia divina, quae est simplicissima, sunt tamen plura, in quantum "unum non est alterum formali praedicatione" (I, § 11).

His visis, nostro quidem iudicio, parvus locus remanet dubitationi quin Doctor Subtilis non alium quam Richardum Rufum habuerit in mente quando dixit: "Et istud argumentum 'de non formali identitate' dixerunt antiqui doctores ponentes in divinis aliquam esse praedicationem veram per identitatem quae tamen non esset formalis: ita concedo ego, per identitatem bonitatem esse veritatem in re, non tamen veritatem esse formaliter bonitatem."<sup>18</sup>

e) *Quid est gratia gratum faciens?*

Notatu sane dignae sunt etiam opiniones quas Richardus in secundo libro *Abbreviationis* de quidditate gratiae gratum facientis 'recitat' (II, §§ 8–9). Iuxta opinionem Doctoris Seraphici gratia gratum faciens est quoddam donum creatum quod informat animam Deo gratam. Si ulterius quaeratur utrum hoc donum sit in genere substantiae aut in genere accidentis, Bonaventura respondet, cum multis aliis, quod est in genere accidentis. Ex hoc autem quod hoc donum divinum seu gratia tollitur, immo in nihilum redigitur, quotiescumque homo graviter peccat, plane sequitur eam esse in genere accidentis corruptibilis.<sup>19</sup>

Quibusdam, dicit Rufus, durum videtur quod tam nobilis creatura tota die cederet in pure nihil. Inter 'quosdam', utique ipsemet numerandus est. Et statim proponit seu 'recitat' modum ponendi per quem tam magnum inconveniens vitari posset. Iuxta hunc autem modum ponendi gratia et virtus idem sunt in subiecto et non differunt nisi ratione. En iterum principium oeconomiae.

<sup>18</sup> Idem, ibidem, n. 194 (p. 262). T. Szabó iam diu, satis quidem ingeniose, conatus est assignare originem distinctionis formalis scotisticae in distinctione minima bonaventuriana: "Distinctio formalis germana Scoti specie convenit cum distinctione minima Bonaventurae, ab eoque originem propriam ducit." Haec est conclusio ad quam pervenit in elucubratione sua "De Distinctionis Formalis Origine Bonaventuriana Disquisitio Historico-critica" (*Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis Romae Anno Sancto MCML Celebrati*, Romae 1951, 444). Etiam editores Scoti remittunt lectores ad Bonaventuram, *In IV Libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; d. 45, a. 2, q. 1 in corp. (I, 113, 804). Sed ibi verbum 'formalis' non occurrit.

<sup>19</sup> Bonaventura, *In IV Libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 26, qq. 2–4 (II, 633–41).

Virtus autem de qua hic loquitur nihil aliud est quam ipsa vita animae, quae consistit in cognitione et volitione, seu, verbis Rufo magis caris, in aspectu et affectu, sive in cognitione et amore. Immo, ut etiam umbra divisionis et pluralitatis tollatur, haec vita animae vocari potest “cognitio amans sive amor cognoscens” (II, § 8).

Deinde Richardus distinguit amorem in actu primo et in actu secundo. Amor in actu primo est amor-habitus, in actu vero secundo est amor-usus. Alia distinctio, augustiniana, amoris naturalis est in amorem ordinatum, qui caritas est, et in amorem inordinatum, qui cupiditas est.

Id quod reddit animam Deo gratam est amor ordinatus. Ad hoc autem ut amor sit ordinatus, requiruntur debitae circumstantiae. Sed istae circumstantiae debitae non veniunt ab extrinseco, immo educuntur et extrahuntur ex substantia ipsius amoris; non quidem virtute liberi arbitrii, sed operatione Spiritus Sancti. Non est igitur gratia accidens quoddam supernaturale, potentiis animae superadditum, quod per peccatum mortale tollitur et in nihilum redigitur, sed est caritas seu amor naturalis bene ordinatus. Iste quidem amor corrumpi potest, et ex ordinato fieri inordinatus, sed per hoc nullum ens adnihilatur.

Et si dicatur quod haec positio sapit haeresim Pelagianam, Rufus respondet: nullo modo. Immo, e contrario, ei contradicit, in quantum fatetur debitas circumstantias, ad amorem ordinatum requisitas, non posse in actum deduci nisi operatione Spiritus Sancti.

Iam pridem Petrus Lombardus <sup>20</sup> negavit caritatem seu gratiam gratum facientem esse aliquod accidens creatum, animae infusum; econtra docuit eam esse ipsummet Spiritum Sanctum. Haec est prima ex octo positionibus in quibus, iuxta verba Bonaventurae, “communitè doctores Parisienses non sequuntur Magistrum.” <sup>21</sup> Rufus igitur, ut patet, convenit cum Magistro in hoc quod negat caritatem seu gratiam gratum facientem esse aliquod accidens creatum; non asserit tamen eam esse ipsum Spiritum Sanctum, sed amorem naturalem adiutorio Spiritus Sancti bene ordinatum. Forsitan credidit sic esse intelligenda verba Petri Lombardi: “...Spiritus Sanctus caritas est Patris et Filii, qua se invicem diligunt et nos, et ipse idem est caritas

<sup>20</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, I, d. 17, c. 6 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV, Grottaferrata 1971, 148–52).

<sup>21</sup> Bonaventura, *In IV Libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 44, dubium III (II, 1016).

quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris ad diligendum Deum et proximum.”<sup>22</sup>

Cum hac positione intime cohaeret alia, a censore solito modo reprehensa, quae asserit gratiam gratum facientem et virtutem formatam esse unam per essentiam, quia “omnes virtutes in una anima sunt unus habitus numero” (II, § 9).

f) *Exsistentia et natura characteris sacramentalis*

In tertio libro, qui finem capit in vigesima distinctione, censor nonnisi tres opiniones notavit. Prima harum asserit Beatam Virginem nihil fecisse opere corporali in conceptione Filii; alia tenet hanc propositionem ‘Filius Dei incepit esse’ admitti posse; tertia, contra opinionem communem, contendit animae Christi, in quantum Verbo unitae, communicatam fuisse a Deo omnem potentiam sicut omnem scientiam. Sed auctores posteriores, quantum sciamus, nullam harum receperunt.

In quarto tamen libro non minus quam undeviginti opiniones ad se converterunt animum et pennam censoris. Eisdem etiam studiosi theologiae scholasticae attento animo legent. Exempli gratia ea quae Rufus proponit vel ‘recitat’ de malis ministris rem sacramenti seu gratiam non conferentibus; de modo essendi Christi sub speciebus panis et vini; de peccatis venialibus confitendis; de potestate clavium etc., solutiones adumbrant quae saeculis subsequentibus iterum atque iterum in lucem venient. Hic tamen de solo caractere sacramentali pauca dicere sufficiat. De hoc enim problemate Richardus non minus quam ter agit (IV, §§ 4–5 et 19).

Tempore quo Noster *Abbreviationem* composuit (Parisiis, circa 1253), inter theologos iam communis evasit opinio iuxta quam tria sacramenta, scilicet Baptismus, Confirmatio et Ordo, characterem seu signum indelebile imprimunt in animam. Sed quonam fundamento haec opinio nitebatur? Exsistentia characteris ratione naturali probari non potest, nec aliquid de eo in Scriptura sacra legitur. Restant igitur auctoritas Ecclesiae et traditio Patrum. Cornubiensis de epistola Innocentii III ad archiepiscopum Arelatensem,<sup>23</sup> in qua character saepius nominatur, nihil penitus dicit. Forsitan eam ignoravit. Novit tamen auctoritates Patrum quibus alii exsistentiam cha-

<sup>22</sup> Petrus Lombardus, loco cit., p. 148.

<sup>23</sup> *Decretales Gregorii IX*, III, tit. 42, c. 3 (II, A. Friedberg, Lipsiae 1879, 644 ss.).



racteris probare eiusque naturam illustrare conabantur. Eas singulatim recenset, attento examini subicit et velut ad rem non pertinentes reicit. Omnia enim quae apud Ambrosium, Augustinum, Damascenum, Isidorum et Hugonem de caractere dicuntur, etiam de ipso sacramento Baptismatis dici possunt.

Defensores characteris allegare solebant hanc pulchram definitionem: "Character est signum sanctum communionis fidei et sanctae ordinationis, datum accedenti a hierarcha," quam Rufus in *Glossa Alexandri Halensis* <sup>24</sup> legere potuit. Hanc definitionem adscripserunt Ps.-Dionysio, eamque inveniri posse dicebant in libro *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, cap. 2.

Ad hanc auctoritatem Richardus respondet per interemptionem: "Quibus ego: quod inspiciant bene utramque translationem et omnino nihil tale invenient; nec etiam nomen 'character' ibi nominatur" (IV, § 19). Et hoc verum est, ut iam ante Rufum, Albertus Magnus animadvertit.<sup>25</sup> Loquitur enim ibi Ps.-Dionysius de quibusdam actibus symbolicis, qui in Ecclesia orientali praecedebant Baptismum.

Post destructionem omnium auctoritatum, Cornubiensis, auditoribus absque dubio non parum mirantibus, prosequitur: "Quid ergo in tot et tantis dicam? Sequamur modum communem" (IV, § 4).

Post mortem Rufi, Bonaventurae et Thomae Aquinatis, controversia de exsistentia et natura characteris iterum exarsit. Controversia autem agitabatur imprimis circa doctrinam Petri Ioannis Olivi. Ipse enim, iuxta adversarios, "contra canonicas sanctiones docuit quod character, qui imprimitur in collatione sacramentorum ecclesiasticorum, nihil plus ponit in anima quam dedicatio in ecclesia." <sup>26</sup> Cui accusationi Ubertinus de Casali, in sua *Defensione Spiritualium* <sup>27</sup> respondet: "Quod postea imponunt ei, quod character nihil ponit in anima plus quam dedicatio in ecclesia, ostenditur quod immo expresse dicit quod character ponit tria vel quatuor divinissima, quae tangit et explicat diffuse."

Quaestionem Petri Ioannis Olivi de caractere sacramentali prae

<sup>24</sup> Alexander de Hales, *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum*, XV, d. 6, n. 2 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, IV, Quaracchi 1957, 105).

<sup>25</sup> Albertus Magnus, *In IV Libros Sententiarum*, IV, d. 6, a. 4 (*Opera Omnia*, XXIX, ed. A. Borgnet, Parisiis 1894, 123).

<sup>26</sup> *Accusationes Raymundi de Fronsiano et Bonagratiae de Bergamo contra Spirituales*, 1 martii 1311 (apud F. Ehrle, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne," *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, II [1886], 369).

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, p. 397.

manibus non habemus. Habemus tamen quaestiones Petri de Trabibus, qui eum fere in omnibus fidelissime secutus est. Hic autem, sub saepe usitato pallio 'aliis autem videtur', asserit "quod character de prima sui ratione non est nisi quaedam consignatio sanctificans et consecrans consignatum...: quae consignatio non fit per alicuius formae vel qualitatis absolutae impressionem, sed per receptionem ad meriti Christi participationem..."<sup>28</sup> Et adducit exemplum de installatione canonicorum: "Sicut si aliquis admittatur ad collegium alicuius ecclesiae, hoc ipso quod participat bonis collegii et actibus et iuribus eius, consignatur canonicus esse et posse illa quae canonicis sunt concessa."

Duns Scotus etiam firmiter asseverat existentiam characteris probari non posse neque per rationem, neque per sacram Scripturam, neque per auctoritatem sanctorum Patrum. Propter auctoritatem tamen Ecclesiae (scilicet Innocentii III) necesse est admittere characterem imprimi in animam per tria sacramenta. Si autem ulterius quaeratur an character sit forma absoluta aut respectiva, Doctor Subtilis, argumentis Thomae Aquinatis reiectis, concludit: "potest dici characterem esse tantummodo quendam respectum extrinsecus advenientem ipsi animae, causatum a Deo immediate in susceptione sacramenti initerabilis."<sup>29</sup>

Nostra tamen hic magis interest modus quo Scotus evacuat auctoritates quae adduci solebant ad existentiam characteris probandam: "Sed illae auctoritates videntur tantum esse vocales et non ad intentionem eorum. Sicut enim patet respiciendo translationem et expositionem Vercellensis, cap. 2 *Ecclesiasticae Hierarchiae*... Auctoritas Damasceni valde inepte adducitur, quia pars unius orationis coniungitur cum parte alterius... Alia autem auctoritas Damasceni nihil valet... Hoc etiam confirmatur, quia Augustinus, qui tantum tractavit ex intentione de Baptismo... non tacuisset de caractere si ipse fuisset immediatus et necessarius effectus Baptismi."<sup>30</sup>

Qui haec legit simul cum excerptis infra edendis, vix potest reprimere suspicionem quin Scotus, dum haec scriberet, quaestiones Cornubiensis prae oculis habuerit.

<sup>28</sup> Petrus de Trabibus, *In IV Libros Sententiarum*, IV, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1 (apud G. Gál, "Commentarius Petri de Trabibus" cit., p. 264).

<sup>29</sup> Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, IV, d. 6, q. 10, n. 9 (ed. Wadding, VIII, 356).

<sup>30</sup> Idem, ibidem, p. 341.

Disceptatio de existentia et natura characteris prosequatur usque ad Concilium Tridentinum et ultra, sed ea ad rem nostram non pertinet.

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Opiniones Rufi censura notatas, ut iam diximus, quantum ad primum et secundum librum *Abbreviationis* descripsimus e codice Vat. lat. 12.933; quantum vero ad tertium et quartum librum e codice 176 bibliothecae communalis Assisiensis. Initio indicamus numerum distinctionis et quaestionis Richardi, cum titulo, quandoque aliquantulum abbreviato, deinde folia codicis quae quaestionem integram continent; postea quaestionem parallelam Bonaventurae (quae bis tantum desideratur), cum volumine et paginis *Operum Omnium*; in fine tandem excerptorum adduntur folia ubi singula excerpta leguntur.

## I

### OPINIONES NOTATAE IN LIBRO PRIMO

(Cod. Vat. lat. 12.993)

#### § I

Dist. 3, q. 5: *Sequitur de comparatione istarum potentiarum ad ipsam animam, utrum scilicet sint idem in essentia cum anima vel non* (ff. 13vb-14va). — B o n a v., ibidem, pars 2, a. 1, q. 3 (*Opera Omnia* I, 84-87).

R e s p o n d e o : multae sunt hic opiniones, sed duae notabiles. Una ergo ponit hoc quod videtur A u g u s t i n u s velle,<sup>1</sup> scilicet quod idem sunt per essentiam; et potentiae istae non sunt nisi relationes diversae et ipsa essentia animae est istae tres relationes. Et isti concedunt primas rationes et respondent ad alias.

Dicunt ergo ad primam contra,<sup>2</sup> quod verum est: in Deo habens est id quod habetur universaliter, et in nullo alio est illud universaliter verum. Unde in anima non est universaliter habens id quod habetur, quia anima habet accidentia et illa non est. Est tamen aliqua quae habet scilicet potentias naturales.

Ad sequentia omnia dicunt quod ipsi animae idem est esse ani-

<sup>1</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, X, c. 11, n. 18 (PL 42, 983 s).

<sup>2</sup> Respiciuntur argumenta (fundamenta) quae Bonaventura pro sua opinione adduxit, loco cit., p. 85.

mam et posse operari; prima(!) scilicet ex naturali operatione animae quae est vivere. Unde idem est in anima essentia animae et potentia, et eodem anima est anima quo potest operari illam operationem. Sed re vera non est idem animam esse et animam operari. Unde non eodem modo ipsa est et operatur. Ipsa enim est essentia vel per essentiam, nullo addito, operatur autem per eius formam substantialem quae addit super esse vel essentiam. Deus autem est nullo addito super esse. Unde eodem Deus est Deus et Deus est. Similiter eodem Deus est et operatur. Non autem sic in creatura, quia quaelibet creatura est ens aliquo addito super ens et super esse. Unde alio lapis est et alio lapis est lapis. Sed eodem lapis est lapis et operatur propriam operationem naturalem lapidis.

Item, si anima vere habeat materiam, tunc re vera non est totaliter idem sua potentia et sua essentia; sed sua forma substantialis et sua potentia naturalis, per quam semper operatur, idem sunt, sed differunt in modo, eo quod potentia relationem dicit et haec relatio accidens non est, sed [*cod.*: scilicet] ipsa eadem essentia formae relata.

Ad ultimum iam patet quod non sequitur. Una enim essentia pluribus relationibus referri potest. Relatio enim non multiplicat essentiam nisi secundum rationem tantum (f. 14ra-b).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum. Hic tollit pluralitatem potentiarum animae.*

## § 2

Dist. 5, q. 2: *Postea quaeritur utrum essentia <divina> generetur* (ff. 18va-b). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, a. 2, q. 1 (I, 116 s.).

Sunt etiam aliqui qui dicunt quod si essentia gigneret vel gigneretur, sequeretur omnes tres personas gignere vel gigni. Bene enim sequitur, ut dicunt, ‘essentia gignit, ergo quaelibet persona gignit’; et hoc quia essentia res unica est et mere simplex.

Istud tamen ego non satis video, scilicet quod hoc sequatur. Posset enim dici quod ipsa in una proprietate gignit et in alia gignitur. Et ita forte diceret *Ioachim*<sup>3</sup> (f. 18vb).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum. Hoc est erroneum.*

## § 3

Dist. 10, q. 1: *Utrum sit necesse ponere personam procedentem per modum liberalitatis* (f. 32ra-b). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, a. 1, q. 1 (I, 194 ss.).

<sup>3</sup> *Ioachim de Flore* docuit unitatem personarum divinarum non esse veram



Item, iste modus communis est et ideo supponendus. Et tamen aliqui dicunt quod liberalitas vel voluntas in divinis non est propria ratio personae producentis, sed potius productae. Isti dicunt quod liberalitas sive donum sive dilectio procedit, sed non proprie a voluntate etc., sed potius a cognitione quae origo est dilectionis proprie, ut videtur Augustinus velle.<sup>4</sup> Isti dicunt quod donum procedit proprie a donativo in actu et amor ab amativo in actu. Primum autem subiectum harum rationum est cognoscens, et ideo proprie, ut dicunt, a cognoscente amativo in actu procedit amor. Et isti non concedunt quod proprie ab amante procedit amor.

Sed contra istos obicitur: amor procedit, aut ergo ab amante aut non amante. Si primo modo, hoc est contra eos; si secundo modo, sed ille a quo procedit amor amat, ergo non amans amat:

Item, amor procedit ab amativo in actu, ut dicunt, non ab amativo in potentia; sed idem est amativum in actu quod amans, et aedificativum in actu quod aedificans, et sic de aliis; ergo amor procedit ab amante:

Ad hoc respondent. Ad primum, scilicet quod neutram harum concedunt 'ab amante procedit amor,' 'a non-amante procedit.' Nec est divisio per opposita contradictorie, quia verbum affirmatur in utraque, sed est divisio quasi per contraria mediata, inter quae est medium hoc ipsum 'amativum in actu,' differens ratione et definitione ab eo quod est amans. Nam cum dico 'amativum in actu' principaliter et in recto significatur potens, secundario et in obliquo actus; cum vero dico 'amans' e converso, principaliter et in recto significatur actus et agens, secundario et ex consequenti potens. Bene enim sequitur 'si est amans, est potens amare.' A potentia vero et potente propriissime procedit actus vel ut actus.

Et ita responsum est etiam ad secundum. Unde paralogismus accidentis subtilis est in utroque praedicto argumento. Nam etsi idem in subiecto sit amativum in actu et amans, quia tamen differunt ratione non necesse est quidquid uni proprie inest et alteri inesse (f. 32ra-b).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum. Dicit quod non est processus in divinis per modum liberalitatis, cum tamen donum ex liberalitate procedat.*

#### § 4

Dist. 17, q. 3: *Postea quaeritur utrum caritas sit amanda ex caritate* (f. 47va-b). — Bonav., ibidem, pars 1, q. 2 (I, 296 s.).

De hac distinctione <inter dilectionem concupiscentiae et amicitiae> non vidi apud auctores. Puto ergo simpliciter et sine distinc-

et propriam sed potius collectivam vel similitudinariam. Error eius condemnatus est in Concilio oecumenico Lateranensi IV (a. 1215). Cf. *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, tit. 1, c. 2 (ed. cit., II, 6 s.).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. August., *De Spiritu et Littera*, c. 36, n. 64 (PL 44, 243).

tionem quod caritas amanda est se ipsa caritate. Unde Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, libro IX, cap. 6: "Amor amatur, nec alio nisi amore amari potest, id est se ipso."<sup>5</sup> Unde eadem dilectione numero diligitur proximus et ipsamet dilectio.<sup>6</sup> Et comprehenditur caritas sub secundo illorum quatuor, *De Doctrina Christiana*, scilicet sub hoc quod dicit 'quod nos sumus.'<sup>7</sup> Hoc enim diligere debemus. Nos sumus iusti et proximum diligere debemus, vel quia est iustus et ad hoc ut sit iustus, sicut docet Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, libro VIII<sup>8</sup> (f. 740b).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Improbatur communem distinctionem sine causa.*

### § 5

Dist. 17, q. 9: *Utrum caritas possit diminui* (ff. 50ra–50va). – Bonav., ibidem, pars 2, q. 2 (I, 313 ss.).

Ego in his quaestionibus non video Sanctos expresse aliquid definire. Puto autem, sine praeiudicio, quod augmentum caritatis potius attenditur penes ipsam affectionem quam penes habitum. Unde Augustinus, *In Evangelium Ioannis*, homilia 4: "Tota vita cristiani boni sanctum desiderium est. Quod autem desideras, desiderando capax efficeris. Sicut enim si velis implere aliquem sinum, et nosti quam magnum est quod dabitur, extendis sinum vel sacci vel utris. Vides, quia angustus est sinus tuus, extendendo facis capaciorem; Deus differendo extendit desiderium, desiderando extendit animum, extendendo facit capaciorem. Desideramus, fratres, quia implendi sumus."<sup>9</sup> Hic videtur mihi Augustinus subtiliter insinuare quomodo augetur caritas in nobis, scilicet penes affectionem. Unde non videtur quod infundatur alia caritas ex qua cum praecedente fiat unum, sed prioris, quae habitus est, affectio sive usus intendatur, et hoc sit caritatem augeri. Et e converso per eiusdem affectionis remissionem fit diminutio caritatis. Unde nec augmentum nec diminutio attenditur in caritate quantum ad essentiam ipsius habitus. Ipsa enim essentia habitus non habet partes nisi essentielles, scilicet genus et differentiam, quae partes si auferantur, ipsa tota essentia auferetur. Et haec sine assertionem dicta sint, quia

<sup>5</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, IX, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42, 965).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. August., *De Trinit.*, VIII, c. 8, n. 12 (PL 42, 958).

<sup>7</sup> August., *De Doctrina Christ.*, I, c. 23, n. 22: "Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod iuxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est, de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant" (PL 34, 27).

<sup>8</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, VIII, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42, 956).

<sup>9</sup> August., *In Epist. Ioannis*, tract. 4, n. 6 (PL 35, 2008).

ut dixi, certa testimonia Sanctorum super his non habeo (f. 50rb-va).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Ponit caritatem augeri et minui secundum affectionem.*

### § 6

*Dist. 19, q. 8: Utrum in divinis sit ponere differentiam secundum numerum* (f. 55ra-b). — *Bona v.*, ibidem, pars 2, q. 4 (I, 362 ss.).

Sed aliqui nolunt numerum abstractum simpliciter dici numerum. Unde ipsi respondent quod pluralitas personarum medium tenet inter 'idem numero' et simpliciter 'diversum numero.' Unde non concedunt absolute quod sit ibi diversitas secundum numerum, sed secundum numerum personarum. Ipsum enim quod est, non numeratur, sed ipse qui est. Unde sunt ibi plures qui. Et hoc vult dicere *Damascenus* cum dicit: "numero, non natura, differunt hypostases."<sup>10</sup> Per hanc enim additionem 'non natura' contraxit differentiam ad [*cod.*: sed] numerum, et extraxit a propria sua ratione. Et ita patent obiecta.

Sed, sicut alias dictum est, secundum *Augustinum*,<sup>11</sup> qui excellentius intelligunt et magis elongantur a terrenis, verius percipiunt ibi rationem numeri (f. 55rb).

*Censura: Calumniosum.*

### § 7

*Dist. 26, q. 1: Utrum in divinis sit ponere proprietates non solum vocaliter sed etiam realiter* (ff. 67rb-vb). — *Bona v.*, ibidem (I, 451-54).

Aliis autem videtur quod relatio non dicit ordinem, sed potius simultatem, et hoc nomen 'creator' veram relationem significat quae est ipse Deus relatus temporaliter. Unde non est accidens ali-quod in Deo, et se ipso refertur Deus ad creaturam, non tamen per hoc nomen 'Deus' aut per hoc nomen 'essentia.' Persona autem se ipsa et suo nomine refertur ad aliam, et nihilominus refertur per suam proprietatem, quia persona est persona per suam proprietatem, et ideo cum refertur per proprietatem, refertur se ipsa. Et sic patet responsio ad tertium et ad quartum (f. 67vb).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum. Hoc simpliciter est absurdum sicut expresse apparet.*

<sup>10</sup> Ioannes Damasc., *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III, c. 6 (PG 94, 1002 C); versio Burgundionis, cap. 50 (ed. E. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 8, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1955, 186).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. August., *De Trinit.*, I, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 42, 822).

## § 8

Dist. 30, q. 1: *Utrum aliquid dicatur de Deo ex tempore* (ff. 75vb-76vb). – B o n a v., ibidem (I, 521 s.).

Et ideo dicunt alii quod cum dicitur 'Deus est dominus' praedicatur hic non temporale de aeterno nec aeternum simpliciter et absolute de aeterno, sed aeternum temporaliter relatum praedicatur hic de aeterno. Nec praedicatur hic *quid* sed *ad aliquid*, scilicet aeternum sic relatum. Et ideo insufficiens est divisio cum dicit 'aut praedicatur hic aeternum aut temporale,' et utrumque dicit *quid*, 'dominus' vero dicit *ad aliquid*.

Sed cum quaeritur 'aeternum temporaliter relatum,' haec relatio non [*cod.*: homo?] nihil est, <ergo> aliquid est; aut ergo aeternum aut temporale, et ita ut prius. Respondetur quod haec relatio est Deus sic relatus.

Sed *contra*: Deus sic relatus est ab aeterno; haec tamen est falsa 'haec relatio est ab aeterno,' et haec 'creator est ab aeterno,' et haec 'creatio est ab aeterno,' et consimiles. Alia enim est vis harum locutionum et illius 'Deus sic relatus est ab aeterno,' propter implicationem scilicet quae importatur per hoc quod dicitur 'sic relatus.' Est enim sensus: Deus, qui est sic relatus, est ab aeterno. Et haec simpliciter est vera, quia haec implicatio non trahit Deum a sua ratione. Sed cum dicitur 'creator est ab aeterno,' nulla hic intelligitur implicatio, et ideo simpliciter falsa est.

Et secundum haec talis est falsa 'Sortes, qui est scitus a Deo, est ab aeterno,' sicut infra dicetur. Secundum haec etiam non sequitur 'Sortes fuit ab aeterno, et Sortes est albus, ergo albus fuit ab aeterno.' Et tamen esset vera haec his positis 'Sortes, qui est albus, fuit ab aeterno.' Et haec utiliter considerata sunt.

Videtur ergo quod ista sit distinguenda 'Deus [*cod.*: terminus] temporaliter relatus est ab aeterno et est Deus,' de re scilicet et de dicto. De re si intelligatur et divisa, hoc ipsum 'temporaliter relatus' non aequipollet ei quod est 'creator' vel 'dominus.' Unde haec vera est et illa falsa, scilicet 'creator est ab aeterno.' Si autem de dicto et composita intelligatur hoc ipsum 'Deus temporaliter relatus,' sic aequipollet ei quod est creator. Et sic falsa est haec 'Deus temporaliter relatus est ab aeterno,' quia is est sensus 'Deus temporaliter relatus in hac ratione et secundum quod huiusmodi fuit ab aeterno.' Et est paralogismus figurae dictionis: Deus est ab aeterno, et Deus temporaliter relatus secundum quod huiusmodi est Deus, ergo etc. Similiter et hic: Deus est haec relatio, et non fuit haec relatio, ergo Deus est aliquid quod non fuit. Et hic: Deus est haec relatio, et haec relatio non fuit ab aeterno, ergo Deus non fuit ab aeterno.

Sed adhuc *obici*s: Deus sic relatus est temporalis et ex tempore. Istae videntur verae, quia Deus incepit esse dominus et est dominus ex tempore. Quod si concedatur, concludo: Deus sic relatus est temporalis, ergo non est aeternum nec Deus:



R e s p o n d e t u r, ut praedictum est: Deus sic relatus est Deus et est aeternum et est ab aeterno, sed Deus non est sic relatus ab aeterno. Differt enim ponere hoc quod dico 'relatus' in subiecto vel in praedicato. Unde cum hoc quod dico 'sic relatus' non trahat hoc nomen 'Deus' a sua ratione, ideo haec est vera 'Deus sic relatus est aeternus et ab aeterno et non temporalis,' et tamen vera, ut praedictum est, 'Deus ex tempore est sic relatus et incepit esse dominus.' Et isto bene viso patent omnia ; et est subtile et valet ad multa (f. 76ra-vb).

C e n s u r a: *Hoc est calumniosum. Idem quod supra nititur astruere.*

## § 9

D i s t. 30, q. 3: *Utrum huiusmodi nomina <quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore> dicantur secundum substantiam aut secundum relationem quae sit vera relatio* (ff. 76vb-77va). — B o n a v., ibidem, (I, 524 s.).

A l i i aliter dicunt quod est hic duplex relatio. Et ipsa essentia, ipse Deus non his nominibus dicuntur relative sed nomine domini et creatoris; et ipse Deus sic relatus est haec relatio. Unde haec relatio non est accidens nec aliquid adveniens Deo. Et sic intelligendum est quod dicit M a g i s t e r <sup>12</sup> quod haec relatio non est in Creatore, scilicet sicut accidens vel sicut aliud in alio, sed ipse relatus est ipsa relatio. Nec omnia relativa sunt accidentia, nec in Deo nec in creatura, sicut hic dicit A u g u s t i n u s in littera,<sup>13</sup> sed illa sola quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur accidunt. Et exemplificat de nummo. Nummus isto modo non dicitur relative sed nomine pretii vel pignoris; et sic nummus, nullo modo in se mutatus, de non pretio <fit> pretium etc. Multo magis potest Deus ex tempore relative dici ad creaturam, nulla omnino mutatione in ipso facta. Haec est enim natura relativorum quod in utroque extremo est vere relatio et incipit esse, tamen mutatio in uno extremorum tantum fit. Et hoc satis docet P h i l o s o p h u s.<sup>14</sup> Sicut ergo dicit A u g u s t i n u s <sup>15</sup> hic plane quod temporaliter incipit esse dominus [*cod.*: Deus], quod antea non dicebatur, manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens dici [*cod.*: Dei]. Deus temporaliter incipit esse dominus, et vere relative dicitur hoc nomine, et ipse Deus est haec relatio, et tamen haec relatio non est aeterna, sicut praedictum est in primo problemate. Et patet quod haec relatio non addit aliquid

<sup>12</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, I, d. 30, c. 1 (ed. cit., p. 220).

<sup>13</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, V, c. 16, n. 17 (PL 42, 922); habetur apud Petrum Lombardum (loco cit., p. 221).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Aristot., *Praedicamenta*, c. 7 (7b 15-22).

<sup>15</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, V, c. 16, n. 17 (PL 42, 922).

super essentiam. Ubi enim additio, ibi est aliquid et aliquid. Sed haec relatio nominat essentiam relatam, essentia vero nominat se ipsam absolutam. Nec debet proprie dici 'haec relatio est in Deo,' sed 'haec relatio est ipse Deus,' et e converso 'Deus est haec relatio et ex tempore.' Nec tamen ex his sequitur vel quod Deus sit ex tempore vel quod haec relatio sit ab aeterno, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.

Et ex his patent obiecta in contrarium. De primo enim patet qualiter illud *Magistri* intelligendum est.

De secundo non est simile, quia scientia et scibile non sunt de prima specie relationis, dominus autem et servus sunt de prima, et utrumque refertur ad alterum; et vere et proprie refertur Creator ad creaturam, nullo modo tamen dependet Deus. Unde non omnis relatio est dependentia, sed sola illa quae accidens est et materiam habet.

De tertio iam patet ex dictis, quod haec relatio nihil addit essentiae, sed est ipsa essentia per se ipsa relata ad creaturam et ex tempore, nihil tamen novum fit in ea, sed in altero extremo facta est mutatio. Et est optimum exemplum *Augustini* quod ponit de nummo.

De quarto etiam patet ex dictis, quia non omnis relatio dicit dependentiam nec etiam ordinem, sed potius simultatem. Et ita patent ad omnia (f. 77rb–va).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum.*

## § 10

*Dist. 34, q. 3: Utrum in divinis sit ponere appropriationem* (f. 86ra–b). – *Bonav.*, ibidem (I, 592 s.).

*Alii* dicunt, sicut de hac appropriatione: secundum rem in divinis cognitio est dilectio, non tamen formali praedicatione. Sed cognitio formali praedicatione se habet ad Patrem et Filium et non ad Spiritum Sanctum, et dilectio e converso formali praedicatione se habet ad tertiam personam et non ad alias duas. Talis convenientia in formali praedicatione seu ratione dicunt quod est ratio appropriationis aliquorum nominum essentialium ex parte rei. Ego in eis nihil assero nisi quod communiter dicitur, quod est appropriatio in quibusdam nominibus communibus (f. 86rb).

*Censura: Calumniosum, quia essentialia uniformiter praedicantur de tribus personis.*

## § 11

*Dist. 35, q. 3: An sint in Deo ideae plures differentes ita quod una non sit alia per praedicationem* (f. 87ra–va).

Respondeo secundum aliquos quod sunt plures et differentes, scilicet quod haec non est illa. Isti dicunt quod idea est nomen se-

cundae intentionis sicut notio. Et dicit Augustinus, *De Trinitate* V, cap. 7, quod genitor est ingenitus, et tamen alia est notio haec et illa.<sup>16</sup> Et nos dicimus quod homo est animal, et tamen hoc universale 'homo' non est hoc universale 'animal.'

Similiter dicunt de duobus suppositis huius nominis 'idea': *a* est *b*, et tamen haec idea non est illa.

Alii dicunt quod — sicut dicunt hierarchici<sup>17</sup> — plura sunt divina spectacula, quae tamen sunt essentialia, ut potentia, sapientia, veritas, bonitas etc. Quomodo ergo sunt plura? Dicunt quod quia unum non est alterum formali praedicatione, et per hoc aliquo modo inter se sunt distinguibilia, licet vere idem sint in essentia; et secundum quod unum est distinguibile ab alio praecise significatur hoc nomine 'spectaculum.' Similiter dicunt in proposito de hoc nomine 'idea' (f. 87rb–va).

**Censura:** *Calumniosum, quia essentialia ponit aliquo modo inter se esse distinguibilia, et quod unum formaliter non praedicatur de altero.*

## § 12

**Dist.** 35, q. 9: *Utrum numerus idearum sit finitus aut infinitus* (f. 89rb). — **Bona v.**, ibidem q. 5 (I, 611 s.).

Alii dicunt quod Deus potest facere infinita, quamvis non faciat, et ideo ideae infinitae sunt in Deo, quia non tantum entium vel futurorum sed omnium Deo possibile. Nihil enim potest Deus, ut dicunt, quod non actu cognoscat.

Sed istud (s. *lin.*: haec ultima propositio) habet calumniam. Videtur enim quod Deus possit scire aliqua quae non scit, sicut et facere. Et de hoc infra dicitur. Et si aliqua nova faceret quae non faciet, illa cognosceret se ipso relato ad illa et esset relatus ad illa ad quae prius non fuit relatus. Et ita si idea relatio est Dei ad creaturam, essent plures ideae quam nunc sint, quia plures respectus ad plures creaturas. Et ita patet responsio ad utramque partem. Sed ego non definio quae pars huius problematis sit ponenda (f. 89rb).

**Censura:** *Calumniosum. Istud est absurdissimum cum aliis quae ibi dicit de relationibus.*

<sup>16</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, V, c. 6, n. 7 (PL 42, 915).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Ps.-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 2, § 1 (PG 3, 635–38); Hugo de S. Victore, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, I, pars I, c. 9 (PL 176, 210 B).

## § 13

Dist. 38, q. 4: *Utrum necesse sit Deum praescire quod scit* (ff. 98rb-100rb). — B o n a v., ibidem, a. 2, q. 2 (I, 677 ss.).

Hic respondetur diversimode. Quidam dicunt sine distinctione simpliciter quod Deus potest non scire aliquid quod scit et quod erit. Et istud plane vult Magister<sup>18</sup> in fine huius distinctionis. Et isti istud probant sic: Deus scit *a*, Deus potest scire *a*, Deus potest non scire *a*. Tres sunt propositiones; secunda et tertia in eodem gradu et ordine sunt, et hoc quia potestas rationalis omnino aequae primo valet ad opposita. Sed secunda aliquo modo prior est quam prima, sicut aliquo modo in Deo est saltem secundum rationem intelligendi potentia prior quam scientia et scientia quam voluntas. Ergo a primo: tertia propositio aliquo modo prioritatis prior est quam prima. Potest igitur Deus non scire *a*, nec dum scit *a* nec postquam scit *a*, sed aliquo modo antequam scit *a*. Et ita in ipso nunc aeternitatis ponunt aliquem modum vel rationem prioritatis, potentiae scilicet et scientiae; sicut est prioritas originis inter personas, sic etiam, modo aliquo, inter quaedam essentialia, vel simpliciter vel appropriata. Unde haec in aliquo modo et aliqua ratione prioritatis praecedit illam 'Deus potest non scire *a*,' illam scilicet 'Deus scit *a*.' Isto supposito de facili respondent ad obiecta.

Ad primum enim, ut tactum fuit, idem est scire et scivisse incomplexum ante exhibitionem suae praesentiae in esse: verbi gratia scit mundum, scivit mundum, potest scire, potuit scivisse mundum. Omnes istae verae fuerunt antequam mundus esset et nulla necessaria, sed post exhibitam praesentiam mundi verae sunt istae et necessariae: scit et scivit mundum. Similiter et istae 'scit et scivit mundum esse et fuisse,' haec autem falsa 'scit mundum fore,' et haec vera 'scivit mundum fore.' Et est sensus huius 'scit quod mundus fuit futurus' et non iste sensus est 'scit quod mundus est futurus.' Et ista est notabilitas necessaria et generalis. Et ex his patet quod sensus huius 'Deus scivit Antichristum fore' est iste 'Deus scit quod Antichristus fuit futurus.' Sed si dico 'Antichristus fuit futurus,' est vera de praeterito, sed dependet ex futuro, quia nondum est Antichristus nec fuit. Si autem dico 'mundus fuit futurus' haec est vera de praeterito et non dependens ex futuro, quia mundus iam est et fuit, et ideo haec est necessaria, illa vero non.

Et iam patet quod verum est quod scientia Dei non dependet ex futuro, sed tamen est hoc verum de praeterito dependens ex futuro, quia hoc verbum 'scivit' non praedicatur de Deo in ratione praeteritionis; et ideo sensus est, ut dixi, 'Deus scit Antichristum fuisse futurum,' ut ipsa praeteritio ad ipsam futuritionem rei futurae refe-

<sup>18</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, I, d. 38, c. 2: "Si vero dicis Deum non potuisse non praescire omne quod fit, falsum est. Potuit enim facere ut non fieret, et ita non esse praescitum" (ed. cit., p. 279).



ratur. Et ita patet responsio ad illud quod sequitur 'in Deo differt scire et scivisse' etc., quia ex hac 'Antichristus erit' dependet illa 'tu scivisti' etc. Probatio: si enim Antichristus non erit, tu non scivisti Antichristum fore.

Item haec est contingens 'Antichristus erit,' similiter et eius contradictoria 'Antichristus non erit.' Sed ex hac sequitur 'non scivisti Antichristum fore.' Et si antecedens est possibile, consequens est possibile, id est non impossibile. Ergo haec non est impossibilis 'tu non scivisti Antichristum fore,' ergo eius contradictoria non est necessaria. Quod plane verum est.

Et ad secundam partem ex dictis: quia differt dicere 'Deus praescivit Antichristum' et 'Deus praescivit mundum,' similiter differt dicere 'scit Antichristum,' 'scit mundum.' Primae enim non sunt necessariae, secundae sunt necessariae. Potest enim Deus non scire Antichristum, sed non potest non scire mundum, quia Deus non potest facere quod praeteritum non sit praeteritum, facere scilicet quod duo opposita contradictorie sint simul vera. Hoc enim posse non est posse.

Ad tertium patet ex dictis, quod non sequitur 'potest non scire *a*, ergo potest fieri de sciente non sciens,' quia aliquo modo prioritatis prius potest non scire *a* quam scit *a*. Non tamen potest fieri de sciente non sciens vel e converso, quia non potest primo esse sciens *a* et deinde fieri non sciens *a* nec e converso. Sed in rei veritate potest non scire *a*, non postquam scit *a* vel cum scit *a*, ita quod ambo ista sint simul: 'scit *a*,' 'non scit *a*.'

Ad quartum patet quod minor non est necessaria, haec scilicet '*a* est praescitum a Deo.' Haec enim erit falsa quando *a* erit praesens, ergo non est necessaria. Similiter nec haec est necessaria '*a* est scitum a Deo,' quia Deus potest non scire *a*, ex quo *a* nondum est exhibitum in esse.

Ad quintum et ad sextum iam patet ex dictis, quia haec 'Deus potest non scire *a*' in aliqua ratione prioritatis se habet ad hanc 'Deus scit *a*,' quia et haec 'Deus potest scire *a*' ad eandem in aliqua ratione prioritatis se habet. Quod adhuc patet per hoc quod ista 'Deus scit *a*' supponit illam 'Deus potest scire *a*,' et non e converso. Sequitur enim 'Deus scit *a*, ergo potest scire *a*,' sed non sequitur e converso. Generalior enim intentio est in hac quam in illa; et potest aliquid esse subiectum suae scientiae quod nondum est et e converso, sicut vult *Magister* in hac distinctione et in proxima sequente. Quod enim Deus potest non praescire et non scire aliquid quod erit, plane vult in fine huius distinctionis. Illud vero alterum vult in sequenti distinctione, scilicet quod potest scire aliquid quod non scit.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, I, d. 39, c. 1: "Et tamen conceditur posse scire quod non scit, et posse non scire quod scit; quia potest aliquid esse subiectum eius scientiae quod non est, et potest non esse subiectum quod est, sine permutatione ipsius scientiae" (ed. cit., p. 281).

Ad septimum: verum est quod Deum scire *a* non est mutabile, quia 'mutare' dicit unum post alium; sed non potest Deus post scire *a* non scire *a*, nec e converso. Et ideo Deum scire *a* est immutabile, sed tamen non est necessarium, sicut iam frequenter patet ex dictis. Unde illa propositio falsa est: omne immutabile est necessarium.

Ad octavum. Similiter illa est falsa: omne aeternum est necessarium. Et tamen potest distinguere 'aeternum' substantive vel adiective. Substantive vera est illa maior et minor falsa, quia Deum scire *a* est verum aeternum, quia ab aeterno; tamen ab aeterno potuit non esse verum, ut patet ex praedictis, et ideo non est necessarium.

Ex his recte patet solutio illius rationis *Philosophi* quam non solvit.<sup>20</sup> Et est talis: sit *a* contingens futurum. *A* erit, haec est vera; et si hoc, prius fuit vera, sicut heri; et si hoc, semper prius fuit vera; et si hoc, non potuit non esse vera; et si hoc, est et fuit necessaria. Ergo *a* primo: si haec est vera, haec est necessaria.

Item, si haec semper prius fuit vera, ab aeterno fuit vera; et si hoc, eius veritas principium non habet, ergo nec finem habebit, ergo etc.

*Respondeo*: haec fuit vera ab aeterno, et ab aeterno potuit non esse vera, ut patet ex dictis, et ideo non est necessaria. Et ita patet ex his quod praescientia Dei vel scientia non repugnat vero contingenti nec dat necessitatem futuris.

Alius est modus, forte communior et aliquibus acceptior, quem et ideo nos sequi debemus... (ff. 98va-99vb).

*Censura: Calumniosum.*

#### § 14

*Dist. 39, q. 2: Utrum Deus possit scire vel praescire plura quam sciat* (f. 101va-b). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, a. 1, q. 3 (I, 690 s.).

Ego hanc distinctionem <inter scientiam approbationis, visionis et intelligentiae> apud aliquem *Sanctum* non inveni. Et ideo sicut nec *Magister* distinguit in littera, simpliciter et absolute videtur quod possit dici quod Deus potest scire aliquid quod non scit (f. 101vb).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hoc simpliciter derogat divinae scientiae.*

#### § 15

*Dist. 40, q. 3: Utrum praedestinatio inferat necessitatem salutis praedestinatis, et hoc est: utrum repugnent praedestinatio et libe-*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Aristot., *Perihermenias*, cap. 9 (18b 9-15).

*rum arbitrium* (ff. 104vb-105rb). — B o n a v., ibidem, a. 2, q. 2 (I, 706-09).

Puto tamen quod possibile est cum gratia Dei istud intelligere, supposito quod in ipso nunc aeternitatis non sit successio et tamen sit aliquis modus vel ratio prioritatis. Dicamus ergo quod tres sunt propositiones: 'Deus praedestinat istum,' <'Deus potest praedestinare istum,'> 'Deus potest non praedestinare istum.' Secunda et tertia in eodem ordine sunt, sed secunda respectu primae in aliquo modo prioritatis se habet. Quod patet maxime in comparatione ad creaturas, eo quod aliquid est subiectum suae potentiae quod non est subiectum suae scientiae nec suae voluntatis. Et item, secunda sequitur ex prima et non e converso. Dicamus enim plane et nude: Deus praedestinat istum. Quid est hoc dictu? Deus scit istum salvandum et vult istum salvari. Utraque harum vera est, sed neutra necessaria. Unde Deus potest non scire istum esse salvandum et potest non velle istum salvari. Et istae duae negativae quoquo modo in ratione prioritatis se habent ad illas duas affirmativas. Unde Deus potest non praedestinare istum, nec cum nec postquam praedestinat istum, sed in aliquo modo prius quam praedestinat istum.

Item, antequam iste sit glorificatus, idem est dicere 'Deus praedestinat istum' et 'Deus praedestinavit istum.' Et est sensus huius: Deus scit et vult istum fuisse salvandum. Non enim praedicatur in ratione praeteritionis de Deo. Sed cum iam glorificatus est Petrus, falsa est haec 'Deus praedestinat Petrum,' propter rationem futuri-tionis, et haec vera 'Deus praedestinavit Petrum.' Et est sensus: Deus scit et vult Petrum fuisse salvandum. Et haec non solum est vera sed etiam necessaria, quia haec 'Petrus fuit salvandus' est vera de praeterito, non iam dependens ex futuro. Et ex his, ut mihi videtur, patent omnia (f. 105ra-b).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hic eandem prioritatem iterat quam posuit prius; et quod potentia plurimum est quam scientia.*

## § 16

*Dist. 42, q. 5: An Deus possit quidlibet in quodlibet mutare* (f. 115ra).

Quaeri etiam potest hic an Deus possit quidlibet in quodlibet mutare. Et videtur quod sic, per A u g u s t i n u m, *De Civitate Dei*, libro XXI, cap. 5: "Sicut, inquit, non fuit impossibile Deo creaturas quas voluit instituere, sic ei non est impossibile in quidquid voluerit quas instituit mutare naturas." <sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> August., *De Civit. Dei*, XXI, c. 5, n. 2 (PL 41, 716), sententialiter.

**C o n t r a:** dicit **B o e t h i u s**: "Solae illae creaturae mutari in se possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum." <sup>22</sup> Sed substantiae et accidenti nihil est commune, ergo non potest mutare substantiam in accidens nec e converso. Quod puto verum esse. Hoc enim non est aliquid posse. Sed accidens potest causare ex substantia, non tamen substantiam mutare in accidens. Bene enim dixit **P h i l o s o p h u s**: "Non est transmutatio de uno genere in aliud" <sup>23</sup> (f. 115ra).

**C e n s u r a:** *Calumniosum. Hoc expresse derogat divinae potentiae.*

### § 17

**D i s t.** 44, q. 4: *Utrum <Deus> potuit facere mundum antiquiorem* (ff. 119rb-120ra). — **B o n a v**, ibidem, a. 1, q. 4 (I, 787 ss.).

Videtur ergo simpliciter esse ponendum quod non potuit Deus facere mundum antiquiorem. Et ad prima obiecta simul respondendum quod quamvis divina virtus ad nihil artetur, tamen creaturam et temporale non potest facere nisi ex tempore. Nec sunt apud ipsum anni habentes extensionem, sed nec dies. Haec ergo omnia intelligenda sunt spiritualiter dicta et sunt ipsa aeternitas quae est apud Deum et est ipse Deus.

Aliis tamen videtur quod durum sit dicere quod Deus non potuit alium mundum facere ante istum... (f. 119va).

**R e s p o n d e o:** non potuit Deus facere ut aliqua revolutio esset prius exhibita in esse quam fuit in veritate hoc revolutum *a*. Potuit tamen fecisse ut *a* revolutio esset secunda respectu alicuius alterius, vel tertia, vel quarta. Similiter potuit fecisse alium mundum quando fecit istum, sed non potuit fecisse ut ille alius esset prius quam in veritate fuit iste, quia non potuit fecisse ut ille alius fuisset ab aeterno. Similiter, dicatur *a* primum instans temporis: non potuit Deus facere ut <sit> aliud instans prius quam in veritate fuit *a*, nec etiam potuit facere ut *a* esset prius quam fuit. Potuit tamen fecisse ut aliud instans esset primum, et *a* respectu illius esset secundum<sup>us</sup> vel tertium etc. Et sic respondendum ad omnia (f. 120ra).

**C e n s u r a** deleta est.

<sup>22</sup> Boethius, *De Persona et Duabus Naturis*, cap. 6 (PL 64, 1349 D).

<sup>23</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, IX, c. 7 (1057a<sup>26</sup>-28).



## II

## OPINIONES NOTATAE IN LIBRO SECUNDO

(Cod. Vat. lat. 12.993)

## § 1

Dist. 1, p. 1, q. 1: *An possit esse creatio* (ff. 131ra-vb).

Item, non potest facere de accidente substantiam, nec de sapore lineam etc...

Ad tertium patet quia hoc non est posse, nec facere, scilicet de accidente substantiam, quia nihil habent commune secundum rem. Cum autem aliquid fit de aliquo, commune aliquid oportet esse in utroque (f. 131va).

Censura: *Calumniosum*. Cetera legi non possunt. Vide supra, I, § 16.

## § 2

Dist. 1, p. 2, q. 1: *Utrum a primo efficiente potuerit esse rerum multitudo* (ff. 135ra-vb). — Bona v., ibidem, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 39 s.).

Mihi ergo, sine praeiudicio, prior modus<sup>1</sup> magis placet, cum illas ideas vocet Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, libro IX, in fine, principales causas in Verbo Dei per quas factus est mundus.<sup>2</sup> Si illae rationes aeternae causae sunt istorum, quare non secundum illarum pluralitatem et ab illa erit pluralitas creaturarum? Et cum aperte dicat Hugo: tantum istorum causa non fuissent si ista futura non fuissent? ■ Ubi innuit quod illae rationes causae vel causa sunt istorum.

Philosophus<sup>4</sup> etiam dicit in determinando illam quaestionem quomodo ab uno et simplici Deo fiunt multa diversa, dicit, inquam, ipse, scilicet Deus, est causa plurium entium secundum quod ex eo intelliguntur multi modi.

Et, supra, has rationes vocat modos, ut supra habitum est, et numeros et etiam figuras. Et quid figurant haec nisi aliquam aliquo

<sup>1</sup> Prima scilicet opinio a Bonaventura recitata et reiecta: "Quidam enim dixerunt quod quamvis unus esset Conditor, tamen multa et varia facit propter multitudinem *formarum idealium* (loco cit., p. 40).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. August., *De Civit. Dei*, IX, c. 22 (PL 41, 274).

<sup>3</sup> Hugo de S. Victore, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, I, pars I, c. 15 (PL 176, 212 C).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. potius Avicenna, *Metaph.*, IX, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1508, f. 101va).

modo distinctionem, vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem, in ipso Deo?

Nescio. Nihil assero in his... (f. 135va).

C e n s u r a legi non potest.

### § 3

Dist. 2, p. 1, q. 3: *Utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram permanentem* (ff. 138rb–139va). – B o n a v., ibidem, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3 (II, 61 ss.).

Respondeo: q u i d a m dixerunt quod aevum est totum simplex et non successivum, nec est proprie quantitas (f. 138va).

Istud autem aliis non placet...

Item, hoc nomen 'aevum' raro invenio apud auctores. Tamen in D i o n y s i o, *De Divinis Nominibus*, cap. 10,<sup>5</sup> secundum unam translationem nomen aevi invenio. In alio autem loco huius est nomen aeterni.<sup>6</sup> Distinguitur ergo ibi aevum creatum et increatum sicut et aeternum. Quandoque etiam accipitur aevum pro temporali, quamvis in S c r i p t u r a aliquando dicantur ea quae magis proprie sunt, ut mentes, esse in aevo; ea vero quae in generatione, ut corpora, magis proprie esse in tempore. Nec aliqua fit ibi distinctio inter aevum et illud cuius est aevum, sicut inter mensuram et mensuratum.

Sed D a m a s c e n u s, cap. 15,<sup>7</sup> hoc nomen 'saeculum' distinguit. Et est prima eius acceptio uniuscuiusque eorum quae sunt vita; secunda, mille annorum tempus; tertia, universa praesens vita; quarta, futura vita post resurrectionem quae erit infinita; quinta, quod saeculum dicitur non tempus neque temporis aliqua pars a Solis motu mensurata, sed quod simul protenditur cum aeternis, velut quidam temporalis motus et spatium. Quod enim est his quae sub tempore sunt tempus, hoc aeternis est saeculum.

Ecce, saeculum videtur in aliqua acceptione idem esse quod aevum. Et praedictus modus solvendi satis concordat, ut videtur, huic quinto modo dicendi saeculum. Et videtur D a m a s c e n u s id velle quod praedicta solutio.

Sed tamen quia secundum A u g u s t i n u m <sup>8</sup> non dicitur prius et posterius nisi quatuor modis: aeternitate, tempore, electione, origine; et secundum omnes philosophos non est continua successio

<sup>5</sup> Ps.–Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 10, § 2 (PG 3, 938 B).

<sup>6</sup> Idem, ibidem, § 3. Nomen 'aevi' occurrit in versione Scoti Eriugenae, 'aeterni' vero in versione Ioannis Sarraceni (apud *Dionysiaca*, I, Bruges 1937, 482).

<sup>7</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, II, c. 1 (PG 94, 862 B); versio Burgundionis, cap. 15 (ed. cit., p. 66), partem ad sensum, partem ad verbum.

<sup>8</sup> August., *Confessiones*, XII, c. 29, n. 40 (PL 32, 842).

nisi in tempore, ideo aliis videtur quod nullo modo circa esse sanctorum angelorum sit successio, quia non temporis duratio. Illud enim est in tempore quod superatur a tempore. Unde Philosophus: "Quoniam autem sicut in numero, in tempore accipietur aliquod plus tempus omni eo quod est in tempore."<sup>9</sup> Et post: "Senescunt omnia sub tempore et patiuntur." "Corruptionis enim causa per se tempus est"<sup>10</sup> etc.

Isti ergo dicunt quod circa esse illorum non est successio, sed imaginatio mendosa ita ponit, ita fingit; pure autem intelligens nequaquam, sed esse illorum et vitam aeternam, fixam, non transeuntem intelligunt. Et dicunt quod aevum suum est ipsa vita ipsorum secundum primam significationem saeculi praedictam. Et quod quinta acceptio, quam dat Damascenus, in idem redit cum prima, aut quod ponitur illa secundum modum communiter apprehendentium, qui non utuntur puro intellectu sed phantastico. Et quod dicit Damascenus 'protenditur cum aeternis,' intelligunt sine omni successione, sine fine duratione. Bene concedunt quod angeli indigent Deo conservante esse suum et vitam, non tamen est ibi continua successio. Posset enim, ut dicunt, mendosa imaginatio sic procedere in tantum ut fingeret circa ipsam essentiam divinam mensuram compositam successivam, quod credere nefas est.

Isti ergo respondent ad contra obiecta. Ad primum enim dicunt quod non est aliud illa mensura quam vita sua aeterna et quod haec mensura non proprie tenet rationem mensurae nec est vere quantitas.

Ad secundum dicunt quod Deus angelum, dum est, non esse facere non potest. Potest tamen facere ut postea non sit et cedat in pure nihil.

Ad tertium dicunt quod anima Petri diutius fuisse in gloria dicitur, quia fuit dum longius tempus fuit. Sed istud tempus nec in ipso nec in sua gloria transivit, sed in aliis rebus temporalibus. Et talium vita dicitur esse dum est tempus, et gloria unius dum est maius tempus et alterius dum est minus tempus. Simpliciter autem in tempore non est nisi res quae vel ipsa in se vel aliqua eius proprietas deficiat in tempore.

Ecce, isti problemata de aevo dicta et dicenda brevi sermone absolvunt. Ego autem in his nihil assero, sed modos diversorum et rationes dixi. Fingat ergo quisque etc. (ff. 138va-139rb).

**Censura:** *Calumniosum.*

■ Aristot., *Physica*, IV, c. 12 (221a 26-27).

<sup>10</sup> Idem, ibidem (221a 31-32); ibidem et sequens (221b 1-2).

## § 4

Dist. 16, q. 6: *Utrum principalius sit imago in cognitiva quam in affectiva* (ff. 202rb–203ra). – Bona v., ibidem, a. 2, q. 3 (II, 404 ss.).

Vis etiam rationalis communiter accipitur et ad cognitivam et ad affectivam. Nec est magna vis in his. Quidquid enim est in affectiva vi animae est et in cognitiva. Nihil enim afficit nisi cognitum. Sed per appropriationem et per prius et posterius fiunt tales distinctiones (f. 203ra).

Censura: *Calumniosum. Hic solito more confundit potentias.*

## § 5

Dist. 18, q. 1: *Utrum mulier formata fuerit... de costa viri dormientis* (ff. 206va–207va). – Bona v., ibidem, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 431–34).

Tertium non tenet, quia etsi illa costa superflua erat Adae in quantum erat individuum, erat tamen opportuna in quantum erat mulieris principium; et ideo resurget in muliere, non in viro. Haec duo ultima ego non assero sed nec vera esse puto (f. 207va).

Censura: *Calumniosum.* (Sequitur longior explicato, quae tamen legi non potest).

## § 6

Dist. 18, q. 2: *Utrum mulier formata sit de costa secundum rationem seminalem* (ff. 207va–208vb). – Bona v., ibidem, a. 1, q. 2 (II, 434–48).

Item, si quaeratur utrum mulier facta sit de costa secundum rationes seminales, dicunt quod non, quia costa respectu corporis ex ea formandi non habuit nisi solam potentiam obedientiae. Et isti concedunt ultimas rationes et respondent ad primas.

Et licet probabilis sit modus iste, mihi tamen videtur in principio quod hoc nomen ‘semen’ primo et principaliter nominat corpus aliquod naturale imperfectum, possibile respectu naturae perfectae, sicut est granum et [*cod.*: etc.] sicut est semen hominis. Et sic dictum semen simpliciter activum non est, sed simpliciter passivum et transmutabile. Unde Philosophus: “Idem semen, passum sic vel sic, fit mas vel femina.”<sup>11</sup> Sed quia tale semen mixtum est ex qua-

<sup>11</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, IX, c. 9 (1058b 23–24).



tuor <elementis>, habet in se principium aliquo modo activum. Ipsum tamen simpliciter semen, ut dixi, magis est passivum.

Extenditur autem nomen seminis a tali corpore usque ad formam aliquam incompletam existentem in materia, possibilem respectu aliarum specialium, quae sunt radicaliter in illa. Tales enim formas incompletas vocat Augustinus<sup>12</sup> etiam semina. Unde dicit semina invisibilia et occulta. Talem ergo formam vocat semen invisibile; vocat et semen seminis; vocat vim et potentiam causalem; vocat secretum sinum naturae, et multis aliis modis.

Et quia omne quod fit de natura, sive illud fiat solito cursu naturae sive non, sed sola potentia Dei, habet talem formam in materia de qua ipsum potest fieri. Omne quod fit de natura, potest dici habere rationem seminalem in materia, quia haec ratio seminalis forma est. Et non est universaliter activa, sed ubi solito cursu naturae fit quod fit. Universaliter autem tenet rationem eius de quo potest forma specialis produci. Habet enim natura in se unde potest fieri ex ea quod fit, a quocumque fiat illud, non autem habet universaliter posse facere illud. Et haec est sententia Augustini generaliter. Et secundum hunc modum tam in costa quam in panibus evangelicis potest dici ratio seminalis respectu eorum quae producta sunt ex illis.

Potest tamen concedi magis proprie quod ratio seminalis dicatur ubi solito cursu naturae ex tali forma incompleta educitur specialis, et solito cursu naturae fit quod fit, sicut in generatione univoca, sicut planta ex planta etc. Non ergo fiat litigatio de nomine; et dicatur quod universaliter in natura corporali est vel ratio seminalis vel forma aliqua incompleta, possibilis respectu eius quod producitur ex ea, a quocumque producat.

Patet tamen inspicienti Augustinum quod ipse talem formam vocat semen indifferenter, sive illa productio fiat solito cursu naturae vel non. Unde *De Trinitate*, libro III, cap. 9: "Surculus semen est arboris et granum semen surculi. Iam vero huiusmodi etiam grani semen, quamvis oculis videre nequeamus, ratione tamen conicere possumus, quia nisi talis aliqua vis esset in istis elementis non plerumque nascerentur ex terra quae ibi seminata non essent."<sup>13</sup> Ecce, vim illam, scilicet factam, semen grani vocat. Panes etiam quinque evangelicos semen vocat. "Panes illi quinque, inquit, quasi semina erant non terrae mandata, sed ab eo qui terram fecit multiplicata."<sup>14</sup>

Notandum etiam, propter problema propositum, quod haec praepositio 'secundum' potest dicere circumstantiam causae efficientis vel causae formalis sive materialis. Primo modo non fuit corpus mulieris in costa secundum rationem seminalem nec educta

<sup>12</sup> Cf. August., *De Trinit.*, III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 875 s.); *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, cap. 10-11, 18 (PL 34, 346, 351).

<sup>13</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 876).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. August., *Enarr. in Psalmum XC*, sermo II, n. 6 (PL 36, 1164).

de costa, secundo modo fuit. Ergo corpus mulieris rationem seminalem habuit in costa, et secundum illam factum est ex costa, uno modo accipiendi 'secundum' et alio modo non.

Primis ergo rationibus concessis, ad contra obiecta ex isto solo modo dicto patet responsio. Nam ad primum dicendum quod verum est: illa quae secundum causam seminalem fiunt, dicuntur naturaliter fieri, et sic prout li secundum dicit causam efficientem, non autem prout dicit causam materialem sive formalem.

Ad omnia alia ex dictis patet responsio, quod facile est videre currendo per singula. Secundum enim potentiam Dei formatum fuit corpus de costa uno sensu, secundum rationem seminalem alio sensu (f. 208ra-vb).

C e n s u r a legi non potest.

## § 7

D i s t. 24, q. 3: *Quaeritur de potentiis animae: utrum differant per essentiam affectus et aspectus et aliae* (ff. 234va-235rb). – B o n a v., ibidem, a. 2, q. I (II, 558-63).

Q u i d a m <sup>15</sup> ergo dicunt quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem ipsi animae sicut sunt eius principia intrinseca essentialia, nec adeo diversae ut cedant in aliud genus praedicamenti, sicut accidentia, sed in genere substantiae sunt, tamen per reductionem...

Istam reductionem non satis intelligo, quae tamen in aliquibus plane ponenda est. Verbi gratia species coloris genita in medio non est alterius generis praedicamenti quam color, sed non est color simpliciter et formaliter loquendo, nec sub alio genere qualitatis, et ideo per reductionem, scilicet mediante colore, reducitur ad praedicamentum qualitatis. Sed in proposito nihil tale video. Et praeterea aut ibitur in infinitum aut necesse est ponere tam in anima quam in materia prima potentias quae non sunt aliud per essentiam quam anima et quam materia. Si enim est potentia quae sit aliud, cum ipsa forma sit et in anima, eius capax est anima, ergo potens illam capere; ergo per potentiam aliquam potens; ergo illa potentia non erit aliud per essentiam quam illa anima vel forma substantialis animae, si anima composita est. Et ideo de plano sequuntur aliqui A u g u s t i n u m <sup>16</sup> et dicunt quod potentiae animae sunt ipsa essentia animae et omnes et singulae, sed non est formalis praedicatio. Si enim esset, sequeretur quod tot essentiae quot potentiae. Nec est verum quod omnis relatio in creaturis sit accidens. In multis enim est instantia;

<sup>15</sup> Haec est opinio tertia et ultima a Bonaventura recitata (loco cit., p. 560).

<sup>16</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, XI, c. 11, n. 18 (PL 42, 983); cf. etiam Ps.-Augustinus, *De Spiritu et Anima*, cap. 13 (PL 40, 788 s.).

et esset ire in infinitum nisi in multis esset ipsa res relata ipsa sui relatio, sed non formali praedicatione.

Isti ergo respondent ad primum contra, quod vera est haec potentiarum distinctio, et tamen solum secundum relationes, sicut dicit Augustinus: "eo sunt tria quo ad se invicem referuntur."<sup>17</sup> Aliae vero potentiae animae non ad se invicem referuntur sed ad opera sua, et ipsa una essentia animae propter diversa diversa sortitur vocabula. Et sunt illae potentiae nihil aliud quam habitudines sive relationes ipsius animae ad diversa opera.

Ad secundum respondetur quod istud non sequitur 'actus sunt diversi per essentiam, ergo et potentiae,' nisi essentiam potentiarum vocemus ipsas relationes vel definitiones sive quidditates ipsarum relationum. De ipsis enim verum est quod differunt secundum diversitates operum. De relationibus dico non de substantiis; ipsae enim relationes sunt una substantia, et numerantur in quantum sunt relationes non autem in quantum sunt substantia.

Ad tertium respondetur quod falsum est. Distinctio enim per relationes est distinctio realis, sed non est distinctio substantiarum. Et eo verius est anima imago Dei quod ipsa est una essentia et tres relationes. Si enim tres eius potentiae essent tres qualitates vel tres substantiae, multo minus esset anima imago illius supersimplicis Trinitatis.

Ad quartum respondetur quod male inducta est illa auctoritas. Intendit enim ibi Augustinus<sup>18</sup> directe contrarium, scilicet quod haec tria sunt in anima essentialiter et non accidentia. Unde statim subiungit: "non tamquam in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore." Intendit ergo quod haec sunt in anima essentialiter, id est quod non sunt aliud per essentiam quam anima, sicut accidentia sunt aliud quam substantia, non autem intendit quod inter se numerentur essentialiter vel differant (ff. 234vb-235rb).

C e n s u r a: *Calumniosum. Hic etiam confundit potentias animae.*

## § 8

Dist. 26, q. 3: *Utrum gratia sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis vel incorruptibilis* (ff. 248va-249vb). — B o n a v., ibidem, q. 4 (II, 639 ss.).

Durum videtur quibusdam quod tam nobilis creatura tota die cederet in pure nihil, peccante scilicet homine mortaliter. Et ideo quasi pie videntur sibi moveri, dicentes quod gratia et virtus id idem sunt in subiecto et differunt ratione. Dicunt ergo quod cum tria sint in anima, essentia, virtus et operatio; haec virtus sive potentia

<sup>17</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, XI, c. 11, n. 18 (PL 42, 983).

<sup>18</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, IX, c. 4, n. 5 (PL 42, 963).

naturalis animae est. Et est duplex, scilicet <intellectiva> et motiva sive cognitiva et amativa, tertium vero, scilicet operatio, vita est, ut dicunt. Nam vita actio est, ut dicit D a m a s c e n u s, cap. 59.<sup>19</sup> Et haec actio duplex est: aspectus scilicet et affectus, sive cognitio et amor. Et haec est vita naturalis ipsius animae rationalis, cognitio scilicet amans sive amor cognoscens. Unde si istis duobus privari potest, ita tamen ut aliquid eius tempore remanet, tunc est ipsa mortalis; quod si non, non. Illa duplex operatio egreditur ab illa duplici potentia. Actus ergo et operatio amor est. Sed actus dicitur dupliciter: primus scilicet et secundus actus. Primus, amor est, qui et habitus; actus secundus, usus est amoris habitus. Ab illa potentia amativa egreditur amor utroque modo dictus. Sed est amor ordinatus et inordinatus. Haec differentia 'ordinatus' unde procedit? Dicunt quod inde unde et ipsa substantia amoris, et sic ab illa potentia praedicta. Et haec differentia est ordo amoris; et consistit in circumstantiis debitis quae requiruntur in amore ordinato. Istae circumstantiae non putant quod sint creaturae aliquae ab extrinseco venientes et superadductae in ipsam potentiam et super substantiam ipsius amoris, sed ex substantia ipsius amoris educuntur et extrahuntur, et ambo ab ipsa potentia, scilicet amor cum ipsis circumstantiis. Sed quo movente, quo educente extrahuntur? Dicunt quod per operationem Spiritus Sancti tantum. Nulla enim creatura sufficit ad educendum has debitas circumstantias amoris de ipsa potentia amativa.

Et istud videtur D a m a s c e n u s<sup>20</sup> intelligere cum dicit quod virtutes sunt naturales et non ab externis inductae. Et dicunt quod hoc modo sunt naturales: non quod natura per se possit eas producere, sed quod in ipsa substantia amoris naturalis sunt in potentia et sola operatione Spiritus Sancti possunt educi de potentia ad actum. Istud etiam videtur A u g u s t i n u s innuere, ut dicunt, cum dicit: Amor naturalis bene ordinatus caritas est; inordinatus cupiditas est.<sup>21</sup>

Secundum hanc positionem facile esset respondere ad problema et ad obiecta. Dicerent enim quod corrumpitur gratia et virtus, sed non cedunt in pure nihil.

Sed quia talis positio haeresim Pelagianam sapere videtur, qui ponit quod liberum arbitrium per se solum sufficit et potest in gratiam et adquirere sibi vitam aeternam, ideo communiter ponitur et sentit Ecclesia quod gratia penitus ab extrinseco infunditur et nullo modo venit ab intrinseco [*cod.*: extrinseco].

Illi tamen respondent et dicunt quod talis positio nullo modo sapit praedictam haeresim, immo illa positio contradicit huic haeresi

<sup>19</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III, c. 15 (PG 94, 1047 B); versio Burgundionis, cap. 59, n. 4 (ed. cit., p. 229).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III, c. 14 (PG 94, 1038 A – 1039 B); versio Burgundionis, cap. 58, nn. 6–12 (ed. cit., pp. 217–20).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. August., *Enarratio in Psalmum IX*, n. 15 (PL 36, 124); *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, cap. 36 (PL 40, 25).



in hoc quod fatetur quod illas circumstantias solus Spiritus Sanctus potest ad actum educere; et nullo modo homo vel liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, potest in gratiam assurgere.

Sed quidquid sit de hac potestate vel alia, communem potestatem sequamur... (ff. 248vb–249rb).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hoc quod recitat per modum opinionis, sapit errorem; nec illud improbat, sed potius defendit, dicendo hoc consonum dictis Sanctorum, et respondendo ad obiecta.*

*Censura censoris: Mentiris, quia immo improbat et opinionem veram recitat et tenet.*

### § 9

*Dist. 27, q. 2: Utrum gratia gratum faciens et virtus differant per essentiam* (ff. 251rb–vb). – *Bonav.*, ibidem, a. 1, q. 2 (II, 656 ss.).

Ad tertium respondetur<sup>22</sup> quod a caritate non potest circumscribi gratia, quia caritas semper nominat virtutem formatam. Sed si quis caritatem habitum amoris vocaret, quo natus est homo diligere Deum propter se est super omnia, sic licet modo non possit absque gratia reperiri, potest tamen intelligi. Sic fuit in Adam et in primo angelo ante lapsum.

Sed quia ista diversificatio inter gratiam et virtutem, proprie dicta utraque, non habet auctoritatem a Sanctis nec rationem cogentem suae necessitatis, nec etiam utilitatem, ut videtur, ideo alii aliter dicunt, qui malunt ponere finita quam infinita et unum quam multa, si possibile est. Dicunt ergo quod unum sunt et idem per essentiam gratia creata gratum faciens et virtus gratuita, scilicet formata. Dicunt etiam quod sicut una est gratia in anima, sic et una virtus et unus habitus, et omnes virtutes in una anima sunt unus habitus numero, et non differunt virtutes inter se nisi per opera et obiecta. Et hoc dicunt Augustinum innuere in multis locis et praecipue in libro *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*.<sup>23</sup>

Isti ergo respondent ad primum contra, quod Anselmus<sup>24</sup> in illa auctoritate vocat Dei gratiam vel ipsum Deum, scilicet Spiri-

<sup>22</sup> Sic respondet Bonaventura ad sextum argumentum in oppositum (loco cit., p. 658).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. August., *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, I, cap. 6 et 15 (PL 32, 1314 s., 1322).

<sup>24</sup> Anselmus, *De Concordia Praedest. et Liberi Arbitrii*, q. 3, c. 4: "Sicut illam [rectitudinem] nullus accipit nisi gratia praeveniente, ita nullus eam servat nisi eadem gratia subsequente" (PL 158, 525 A; *Opera Omnia*, II, ed. F. Schmitt, Romae 1940, 267).

tum Sanctum, vel aliquam gratiam gratis datam disponentem ad susceptionem rectitudinis simpliciter voluntatis.

Ad secundum et tertium respondent per interemptionem, quia falsum supponitur in utroque, eo quod idem secundum essentiam dicunt gratiam et virtutem, ut dictum est. Unde unum non movet mediante altero, sicut nec idem movet mediante se; similiter non multiplicatur unum nisi et alterum, nisi sit secundum respectus et operationes (f. 251va-b).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Confundit solito more habitus gra-  
tuitos.*

### § 10

*Dist. 27, q. 6: Utrum contingat per gratiam mereri ipsius com-  
plementum* (f. 253ra-vb). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, a. 2, q. 4 (II, 666 ss.).

Multa hic dicta sunt, sed mihi videtur quod plane et ad certum huic quaestioni responderi non potest nisi constet de definitione eius quod est 'mereri.' Mallem ergo ab aliquo auctore audire definitionem eius quod est 'mereri.' Et tunc esset facile respondere ad propositum. Si enim 'mereri' dicit aliquam commensurationem vel certam proportionem ad gloriam, sine praeiudicio mihi videtur quod simpliciter et absolute loquendo nullus potest vitam aeternam mereri ex condigno (f. 253vb).

*Censura: Calumniosum.*

### § 11

*Dist., 30, q. 6: Deinde quaeritur de veritate humanae naturae. Et primo utrum aliquid transeat in eam per actum generative* (ff. 264va-267rb). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, a. 3, q. 1 (II, 726-32).

Iste modus, etsi probabilis sit, non modicam tamen dubitationem relinquit de hac scilicet radicali humiditate ratione cuius fuimus omnes in Adam quantum ad corpus. Hac [*cod.*: haec] enim, si corpus naturale est, stat eius divisio in partes secundum speciem, licet divisibile sit in infinitum per partem secundum naturam. Tales enim partes operationem naturalem non habent. Unde aliud corpus in sui naturam convertere non possunt. Et iterum, partes secundum materiam fluunt et non remanent. Divisio autem quantitativa per partes secundum speciem tam modicae humiditatis cito terminaretur et ideo tam diu posterius nihil de substantia corporis Adae habuissent. Cum enim illa humiditas mixtum corpus fuerit ex quattuor elementis, et virtus elementaris sit maior in corpore maiori et minor in minori, humidum autem cibale ab extrinseco adveniens sine comparatione

maius sit illa, post aliquas divisiones numero finitas penitus vincet humidum cibale et illam ex toto in sui naturam converteret, et ita posterius generandi nihil de substantia primi parentis haberent.

Quaero: aut corpus meum fuit in corpore Adae aut non. Si non, ergo non est ex illo. Sed hoc falsum, ergo primum. Si fuit in illo, ergo corpus meum aliquid fuit in illo. Quaero, quid? Non accidens, nec sola materia, nec sola forma. Numquam enim sola forma fit corpus organicum. Ibi autem fuit aliquid ens in potentia hoc corpus organicum, quia omne quod fit, fit ex aliquo ente in potentia illud quod fit. Ergo corpus meum <erat> ibi aliquod aggregatum ex materia et forma. Quaero: istud aggregatum aut fuit corpus sensibile aut non. Si sic, eadem ratione et corpus tuum fuit illi aggregatum, scilicet corpus sensibile, et ita de aliis. Quaero ergo: omnia corpora nostra aut fuerunt ibi idem corpus sensibile aut diversa corpora sensibilia. Si idem: cum actus et potentia non diversificent essentiam, omnia corpora nostra modo essent idem numero et per essentiam. Hoc enim quod fuerunt tunc, sunt modo. Si ergo tunc fuerunt idem numero sensibile, et nunc sunt simpliciter idem.

Si vero [*cod.*: ergo] diversa erant ibi corpora et sensibilia, contra: tot partes sensibiles non erant in toto corpore Adae. Et qua ratione esset corpus meum istud sensibile signatum, et tuum <esset> illud potius quam e converso. Et istud melius potest quaeri in primo semine quod decidit Adam in generatione primi filii. Modicum enim fuit illud in quantitate. Unde pauciores habuit partes sensibiles.

Ex his ergo patet quod illud aggregatum quod corpus meum fuit, si [*cod.*: ubi] nullum corpus erat sensibile, ergo nec corpus quantum naturale omnino. Nullum autem est corpus actu quantum extra animam quod non sit naturale et etiam sensibile. Ergo meum corpus in illo non fuit corpus aliquod actu quantum omnino. Quod puto verum esse sine praeiudicio.

Est autem corpus-substantia et corpus-quantitas. Corpus-quantitas accidens est et est ipsa trina dimensio; corpus-substantia aggregatum ex materia et forma, et istud est subiectum corporis-quantitatis. Materia vero prima in toto corpore est dimensionaliter extensa sub formis et in quolibet puncto illius corporis est ipsa eadem sed non dimensionaliter. Similiter est de forma-substantia corporali individuali. Ergo est ibi aggregatum etiam dupliciter: dimensionaliter scilicet et non dimensionaliter. Est autem ratio seminalis, ut praedictum est, forma univoca non individualis, sed generalis. Corpora ergo nostra fuerunt aliquid in corpore Adae. Sed quid aliquid? Sine praeiudicio, omnia corpora nostra fuerunt ibi unum et idem aggregatum ex materia et forma vel formis univocis sive rationibus seminalibus. Unum, dico, et idem genere tantum, et fuerunt aggregatum non sensibile nec dimensionatum in actu, sed in potentia existens tale et tale. Fuit enim illud aggregatum in potentia omnia corpora nostra et omnes partes corporis nostri.

Et propter hoc patet quod nec maior nec minor erat moles corporis Adae propter omnia corpora nostra quae in ipso fuerunt. Illud

enim aggregatum quod omnia corpora nostra fuerunt, non fuit ibi actu tumens, sicut dicit Augustinus *De Vera Religione*: Numeri seminum non tument sicut ipsa semina tument<sup>25</sup> (f. 266ra–va).

*Censura*: *Hic multa ponit singularia et extranea de veritate humanae naturae.*

### § 12

*Dist.*, 31, q. 6: *Deinde quaeritur: cum [originale peccatum] mediante carne traducatur, aut hoc est ratione substantiae carnis aut ratione condicionis alicuius suae proprietatis* (ff. 271va–274rb). – Cf. Bonav., ibidem, a. 2, q. 3 (II, 753 ss.).

Mihi, sine praeiudicio, non placet haec distinctio libidinis <in improbam voluntatem, delectationem immoderatam et corruptionem vitiosam>, sicut nec multae aliae distinctiones quae auctoritatem non habent alicuius Sancti expositoris. Libido etiam tertio modo hic dicta, quae est idem quod foeditas praedicta, nihil aliud mihi videtur esse quam libido proprie dicta, quae est affectio aliquo modo <in>ordinata et ordinem naturae transgrediens (f. 272ra).

*Censura*: *Hoc calumniosum, quia more solito destruit distinctionem communem et ponit libidinem solum in anima non in carne.*

### § 13

*Dist.*, 42, q. 5: *Utrum peccatum dividatur per differentias materiales tantum an per formales* (ff. 310vb–311rb). – Bonav., ibidem, a. 3, q. 1 (II, 970 ss.).

Alii dicunt ad propositam quaestionem quod omnes virtutes non habent simpliciter omnes differentias formales sive specificas; qui dicunt quod omnes virtutes in una anima sunt unus habitus; et earum divisio sive distinctio non est <nisi> per opera et obiecta. Et hoc videtur Augustinus velle in libro *De Moribus Ecclesiae*; <sup>26</sup> et etiam Hugo <sup>27</sup> hoc videtur velle et expresse. Et isti dicunt quod peccatum formaliter privatio est et non actus nec habitus. Unde licet haec formales differentias habeant, non tamen propter hoc potest

<sup>25</sup> August., *De Vera Religione*, cap. 42: “Si enim numeri seminum sicut ipsa semina tumerent...” (PL 34, 158).

<sup>26</sup> Videsis hic supra, notam 23.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Hugo de S. Victore, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, II, pars XIII, c. 1 (PL 176, 526 D); eadem leguntur apud Wernerum, *Deflorationes SS. Patrum*, I (PL 157, 842 C).



peccatum <differentias formales habere>. Modo logico tamen concedi potest quod peccatum habeat formales differentias: privatio enim dividitur per privationes in suo modo formali (f. 313rb).

Censura: *Hic iterum repetit de confusione habituum.*

### III

#### OPINIONES NOTATAE IN LIBRO TERTIO

(Assisii, Bibl. Commun., cod. 176)

#### § I

Dist. 4, q. 7: *Utrum beata Virgo fuerit in aliquo cooperata Spiritui Sancto mediante aliqua potentia in conceptione Filii Dei* (ff. 15va–16ra). — Bonav., ibidem, a. 3, q. 1 (III, 110–113).

Ego in his non intelligo quid ipsa fecit omnino in illa conceptione, — opere corporali, dico —, nec etiam quomodo ipsa ministravit dictam materiam. Absit enim quod cogitetur quod ipsa unquam seminaverit. Unde Damascenus, 46: “Non spermaticos, id est non seminaliter, sed conditive per Spiritum Sanctum.”<sup>1</sup> Nec video etiam quod ipsa separavit illam guttam a corpore suo nisi voluntate consentiente, sed Spiritus Sanctus, scilicet conditive, ut dicit Damascenus. Et aperte dicitur in tertia distinctione quod opere Spiritus Sancti fuit illa portio a reliqua carne separata, et ita parva erat ut humano visui vix posset subici.<sup>2</sup> Nec video et de aliis membris quid faciant in generatione prolis et quam potentiam activam teneant. Deus enim format in ventre. Ieremiae 1: *Priusquam formarer in utero*<sup>3</sup> etc. Et Machabeorum II: *Singulorum membra non ego ipse compegi, sed Creator qui formavit*<sup>4</sup> etc. Et Augustinus, XIX: “Deus meus, qui dedisti vitam infanti et corpus membris compegisti et figura decorasti”<sup>5</sup> etc. Et *De Civitate Dei*, libro XXII, c. 23: “*Neque qui plantat est aliquid* etc. Ita hic dici potest: nec qui concubuit nec qui seminavit est aliquid, sed qui format, Deus. Nec mater quae conceptum portat et partum nutrit est aliquid, sed qui incrementum

<sup>1</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III, c. 2 (PG 94, 986 B); versio Burgundionis, cap. 46 (ed. cit., p. 171).

<sup>2</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Liber Sententiarum*, III, d. 3, c. 4 (ed. Quaracchi 1916, 362).

<sup>3</sup> Ierem. 1, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Machab. II, 7, 22.

<sup>5</sup> August., *Confessiones*, I, c. 7, n. 12 (PL 32, 666).

dat, Deus. Ipse enim operatione, qua usque nunc operatur, facit ut numeros suos explicent semina, et a quibusdam latentibus et invisibilibus in formas visibiles huius quod aspicimus decoris evolvant.”<sup>6</sup> Et contra, tertio libro, quinta distinctione: “Seminare ad virum pertinet, excipere [*cod.*: accipere] ad feminam. Hucusque coniuges opere suo possunt.” “Ut autem concipiatur fetus atque nascatur divini est operis, non humani”<sup>7</sup> (f. 16ra).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Videtur ponere quod beata Virgo nihil fecerit in conceptione Filii, ex quo sequitur quod non fuerit vere mater.*

## § 2

*Dist. II, q. 5: Utrum haec sit concedenda ‘iste homo incepit esse,’ demonstrato Christo (f. 31ra–b). – Bona v., ibidem, a. 2, q. 2 (III, 251–55).*

Aliis videtur, secundum *Damascenum*, quod utraque harum sit concedenda ‘iste homo fuit ab aeterno,’ ‘iste homo incepit esse.’ Dicit enim capitulo 48: Hic homo increabilis est et impassibilis et incircumscriptibilis. Et ego dico: hic homo est creabilis et passibilis etc.<sup>8</sup> Ergo secundum *Damascenum* ambo sunt concedenda. Ergo tale argumentum non valet in ista materia ‘est increabilis, ergo non est creabilis,’ a privatione scilicet ad negationem. Sed hoc solum genus argumenti fallit in hac materia. Ergo non sequitur ‘incepit esse, ergo non fuit ab aeterno’; nec e converso ‘fuit ab aeterno, ergo non incepit esse.’ Affirmatio et negatio numquam simul simpliciter et subiecto de eodem cum determinatione concedenda est, habitus autem et privatio in hac materia de eodem subiecto concedi debent propter diversas naturas quae supponuntur eodem termino.

Sed hac ratione videtur quod haec sit concedenda [*cod.*: excedenda] ‘Filius Dei incepit esse,’ quod revera secundum regulas *Damasceni* videtur. Sed idem hic communiter non tenetur. Et hoc puto maxime propter infirmitatem *Arii* et haeresim vitandam illorum qui ponebant Filium Dei esse puram creaturam.

Et secundum omnes praedictos modos solvendi patet responsio ad utramque partem (f. 31rb).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum quia dicit quod haec est concedenda ‘Filius Dei incepit esse.’ Ad quam sequitur: habuit esse post non esse, sive esse et prius non fuisse. Et ita non fuit ab aeterno. Quod negat.*

<sup>6</sup> August., *De Civit. Dei*, XXII, c. 24, n. 3 (PL 41, 789).

<sup>7</sup> Haec dicit Augustinus, *Contra Iulianum*, V, c. 8 (PL 44, 804); apud Petrum Lombardum in distinctione quinta libri tertii non leguntur.

<sup>8</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III, c. 4 (PG 94, 998 D); versio

## § 3

Dist., 14, q. 9: *Utrum anima Christi communicaverit omnem potentiam sicut omnem scientiam* (ff. 37va–38ra). – Bonav., ibidem, a. 3, q. 3 (III, 323 ss.).

Non quaeritur hic utrum creaturae nudae dederit Deus omnem potentiam, sed utrum animae Christi in quantum Verbo unitae et in quantum huiusmodi dedit Deus, <omnem potentiam> sicut et omnem scientiam.

Quod mihi videtur simpliciter esse concedendum, modo praeterminato, scilicet in quantum Verbo unitae. Hoc mihi videtur quod velit Ambrosius in littera, quidquid Magister in contrarium dicit.<sup>9</sup> Hoc mihi videtur et Augustinus<sup>10</sup> velle et Damascenus,<sup>11</sup> quia dicit de intellectu ipsius animae quod ipse est intellectus Dei et Deo unitus secundum hypostasim. Et Richardus de Sancto Victore, in libro *De Contemplatione*, parte quarta, cap. 19: “Quidquid habet Pater ex natura, accepit anima Christi ex gratia.” “Si accepit omnem plenitudinem gratiae, ergo et plenitudinem sapientiae, ergo et plenitudinem potentiae” [*cod.: scientiae*].<sup>12</sup>

Sed numquid propter hoc creatura Creatori aequatur? Non, quia haec creatura non habet ex natura sed ex gratia unionis. Ergo in dicta responsione non oportuit opponere nisi per communicationem, quia non aliud hic quaeri debet quam utrum animae Verbo unitae et secundum quod huiusmodi communicavit omnipotentiam (ff. 37vb–38ra).

Censura: *Hoc est calumniosum*. – Reliqua pars censurae legi non potest.

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Burgundionis, cap. 48: “Etenim Christus, qui est quod utrumque, et Deus et homo dicitur, et creabilis et increabilis, et passibilis et impassibilis” (ed. cit., p. 182).

<sup>9</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Liber Sententiarum*, III, d. 14, c. 2 (ed. cit., p. 610), ubi citatur auctoritas Bedae Venerabilis, *Homilia in Annuntiatione* (PL 94, 11), perperam Ambrosio adscripta. Haec autem auctoritas, iuxta Petrum Lombardum, de persona est intelligenda.

<sup>10</sup> Forsitan Rufus cogitat de Ps.–Augustino seu de Ambrosiastro, *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 74: “Impossibile est ut Salvatoris voluntas non impleatur” (inter opera Augustini, PL 35, 2274).

<sup>11</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III, c. 6 (PG 94, 1006 C); versio Burgundionis, cap. 50, n. 4: “Regio intellectus factus est deitatis, unitae ipsi secundum hypostasim” (ed. cit., p. 189).

<sup>12</sup> Richardus de S. Victore, *Benjamin Maior*, IV, c. 18 (PL 196, 159).

## IV

## OPINIONES NOTATAE IN LIBRO QUARTO

(Assisii, Bibl. Commun., cod. 176)

## § 1

Dist., 5, q. 2: *Utrum haeretici possint baptizare* (ff. 75va–76ra).  
– Bonav., ibidem, a. 1, q. 2 (IV, 123 s.).

Et ut plenius videamus quae sectae possunt conferre Baptismum et quae non, audiamus documentum Augustini, I <De> *Libero Arbitrio*: “In quo, inquit, nobiscum sentiunt in eo etiam nobiscum sunt, in eo autem a nobis recesserunt in quo a nobis dissentiunt.” “Proinde illa in quibus nobiscum sunt eos agere non vetamus, in quibus autem nobiscum non sentiunt, ut veniendo accipiant adhortamur.”<sup>1</sup>

Ex his patet generaliter quae secta possit et quae non. Quae enim in sacramento cum Ecclesia non communicat, illud sacramentum conferre non potest. Quod sic intelligo: omnis qui intendit facere quod facit Ecclesia, in hoc communicat cum Ecclesia. Et intelligatur composita locutio. Unde omnis talis si immergit et profert verba evangelica, baptizat.

Notandum etiam quod apud infideles est sacramentum matrimonii, et in hoc communicant cum Ecclesia. Putant etiam Iudaei et etiam pagani habere ecclesiam, hoc est congregationem fidelium, et sic aliquo modo communicant cum Ecclesia (ff. 75vb–76ra).

Censura: *Calumniosum, quia ponit quod aliquae sectae conferunt Baptismum, cum Ecclesia teneat quod non possunt baptizare. Etiam quod dicit quod Iudaei communicant cum Ecclesia, quia putant se habere ecclesiam.* – Hanc censuram quidam inde a primo quia usque ad finem delere conatus est. Quod mirum non est, cum Censor contradicat non solum ipsi Bonaventurae sed etiam doctrinae Ecclesiae.

## § 2

Dist. 5, q. 3: *Utrum ministri catholici et mali dent rem sacramenti* (f. 76ra–va). – Bonav., ibidem, a. 2, q. 1 (IV, 124 s.).

Respondeo: dicit Augustinus, libro tertio, cap. <18>: Avari “remissionem peccatorum non dant quae per orationem sancto-

<sup>1</sup> August., sed potius in *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, I, c. 1, n. 2; ubi etiam sequens, c. 2, n. 3 (PL 43, 110).



rum, id est [*cod.*: et] per columbae gemitus datur. Quicumque baptizet, si ad eius pacem illi pertinent quibus datur. Non enim raptoribus diceret Dominus: *si dimiseritis peccata, dimittentur*" etc.<sup>2</sup> Et libro quinto, cap. <21>: "Sacramenta gratiae dat Deus per malos, ipsam vero gratiam non nisi per se ipsum vel per sanctos suos. Et ideo remissionem peccatorum vel per se ipsum facit vel per illius columbae membra quibus ait: *si cui dimiseritis*" etc.<sup>3</sup>

Ex his potest responderi ad propositam quaestionem, quod mali ministri rem sacramenti non conferunt, ipsis tamen ministrantibus Deus per se ipsum dat gratiam et remissionem peccatorum et non per malos ministros. Hoc est non per orationes illorum, sed per orationem sanctorum, hoc est per gemitum columbae.

Sacramenta virtutem habent a Christo et non a ministro, sicut semen iactum in terra aequaliter fructificat sive sit bonus qui seminat sive malus. Sic Christus in suo sacramento semper digne percipienti dat gratiam (f. 76rb).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Quod mali rem sacramenti non conferunt et quod in hoc differt malus a bono.*

### § 3

*Dist. 5, q. 6: Utrum potestas dimittendi peccata ipsi Christo data sit* (f. 78ra–va). — *Bona v.*, ibidem, a. 3, q. 2 (IV, 130 s.).

Istud ultimum,<sup>4</sup> et etiam tota haec determinatio, non videntur proprie dicta, id est verum et bonum possit subintelligi. Differt ergo — et considerandum — in quo modo et in qua forma proponatur problema. Si enim sic quaeritur 'utrum Christo data fuerit talis potestas simplex,' concedendum est et etiam si sic proponatur 'utrum isti homini, scilicet filio Virginis,' eodem modo respondendum, quia iste homo est omnipotens, quia est Deus. Si autem sic proponatur 'utrum Christo vel huic homini, unde homo, collata sit talis potestas,' haec est neganda vere et simpliciter. Hic homo dimittit peccata, sed non unde homo. Et unitas operationum sequitur unitatem personae, sed non cum quacumque determinatione. Quidquid enim potest Deus, potest hic homo, sed non unde homo.

Si autem sic proponatur 'utrum hic homo, vel Christus secundum quod homo, habuit hanc potestatem,' distinguendum est, quia haec praepositio 'secundum' dicitur multipliciter, sicut docetur in libro tertio. Si autem li secundum notet causam, falsa est; si unita-

<sup>2</sup> August., *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, III, c. 18, n. 23 (PL 43, 150).

<sup>3</sup> Idem, ibidem, V, c. 21, n. 29 (PL 43, 191); respicitur Ioan. 20, 23.

<sup>4</sup> Scilicet responsio Bonaventurae ad tertium argumentum; ubi asserit: "unitas operationis non sequitur unitatem personae sed naturae" (loco cit., p. 131).

tem personae, vera est. Et isti sunt duo modi suae multiplicитatis, ut docet *Magister* libro tertio, distinctione decima.<sup>5</sup> Sunt et alii modi suae multiplicитatis ibidem positi (f. 78ra–va).

*Censura: Calumniosum, quia dicit quod unitas operationum sequitur unitatem personae.*

#### § 4

*Dist.*, 6, q. 1: *Quid sit character* (ff. 78va–80ra). – *Bonav.*, ibidem, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 1 (IV, 136 ss.).

Sunt autem aliqui qui non distinguunt omnino et dicunt quod Graecum nomen est character, quod significat proprie impressionem vel figurationem, sicut dicunt qui experti sunt in illa lingua. Haec autem duo proprie dicta non sunt nisi in corpore, ergo in sacramentis nonnisi transumptive.

Et hoc modo potest dici character ipsum sacramentum. Unde *Augustinus* sic utitur utroque indifferenter pro altero et non distinguit omnino inter Baptismum et characterem in omnibus libris quos scripsit de Baptismo.<sup>6</sup> Similiter nec *Hugo*<sup>7</sup> inter haec distinguit nec alius *Sanctus*, ut dicunt. Immo *Isidorus* libro secundo *De Officiis* expresse dicit: Character est Regis mei Baptismus.<sup>8</sup> Quod sumptum videtur ab *Augustino*, *Super Ioannem*, homilia sexta, ubi loquens de Baptismo ait: “Tene quod accepisti: non mutatur sed agnoscitur. Character est Regis mei. Non ero sacrilegus. Corrigo desertorem, non muto characterem.”<sup>9</sup> Similiter *De Baptismo*, libro VI, *Augustinus* pro eodem accipit Baptismum et characterem,<sup>10</sup> et nusquam invenitur quod distinguat inter haec.

Isti ergo dicunt quod Sancti et Doctores transumptive solum in sacramentis accipiunt nomen characteris et idem intelligunt utroque nomine. Tropus enim et pulcher modus loquendi est cum dicitur quod omnia sacramenta sunt character Christi.

Istis si obicitur id quod communiter dicitur quod in *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, cap. 2, a *Dionysio* definitur character sic: “Cha-

<sup>5</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Liber Sententiarum*, III, d. 10, c. 1 (ed. cit., p. 594).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. August., *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, I, c. 4, n. 5; VI, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 43, 112, 197).

<sup>7</sup> Hugo de S. Victore, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, pars VI (PL 176, 441–60), ubi nullam facit quaestionem de characterem.

<sup>8</sup> Isidorus Hispalensis, *De Ecclesiasticis Officiis*, II, c. 25, n. 10: “Dum autem [haereticus extra Ecclesiam baptizatus] venerit, non mutatur sed agnoscitur; character est enim regis mei: non ero sacrilegus, si corrigo desertorem, et non muto characterem” (PL 83, 823).

<sup>9</sup> August., *In Ioannis Evangelium*, tract. VI, c. 1, n. 16 (PL 35, 1433), unde verba illa Isidorus re vera mutuavit.

<sup>10</sup> August., *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, VI, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 43, 197).

racter est signum sanctum communionis fidei et sanctae ordinationis, datum accedenti a hierarcha,"<sup>11</sup> ipsi respondent quod ibi omnino nihil tale invenitur nec etiam nomen 'character' ibi nominatur.<sup>12</sup> Et *Expositor* super hunc locum nihil de hoc tangit.<sup>13</sup> Nec mirum. Non enim intendit *Dionysius* ibi describere characterem vel Baptismum, sed intendit in tota parte illa assignare mysteria, hoc est quid significant ea quae aguntur cum aliquis conversus baptizatur.

Praeterea tota ratio convenit tam Baptismo quam characteri, ergo in hoc non differunt. Quaeritur autem hic quid sit character per distinctionem contra sacramentum. Est autem ille locus secundi capituli unde hoc sumitur, ubi textus talis: "Divinorum partis et sacrae ordinationis, quorum est symbolum" etc.<sup>14</sup> In alia vero translatione est textus talis: "In Deo manentium adimpletionis et sanctae ordinationis, quorum est signum sanctum" etc.<sup>15</sup>

Item, si opponitur eis quod in *Damasceno* invenitur quod character est sigillum, custodia et illuminatio, respondent quod verum est, scilicet quod haec verba sunt capitulo 83,<sup>16</sup> sed de Baptismo dicta. Quod si [*cod.*: scilicet?] ibidem nominaretur, non propter hoc esset probatum quod quaeritur, quia haec omnia vere conveniunt Baptismo. Ergo, ut dixi, isti, quia nullos *Sanctos* inveniunt qui

<sup>11</sup> Haec definitio conficta est ex verbis Ps.-Dionysii, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, cap. 2, pars 2, 4 (PG 3, 399 D); legitur verbotenus in Alexandri Halensis *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum*, IV, d. 6, n. 2 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, XV, Quaracchi 1957, 105).

<sup>12</sup> Hoc iam Albertus Magnus animadvertit, ut diximus in introductione, ubi videsis notam 25.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Thomas Gallus (Vercellensis), *Paraphrasis Ecclesiasticae Hierarchiae*, cap. 2 (apud Dionysium Carthusianum, *Commentaria in Ecclesiasticam Hierarchiam*, post art. 17, *Opera Omnia*, XV, Tornaci 1902, 407 ss.). Robertus Grossatesta locum illum sic exponit: "Dicto [*cod.*: dico] itaque ordine, dictis symbolis significato homine a malo ad Deum reducto, Deus ipsum ad sui participationem benignissime suscipit, et suum lumen ipsi tradit, quo (f. 149rb) eum spiritualiter figurat et caracterizat... Horum itaque in hac theoria contentorum, hoc est susceptionis ad divinam participationem et signationis lumine vultus divini et deificationis et communicationis divinae haereditatis et sacrae dispositionis omnium cum Deo et cum salvatis, symbolum est signatio cruciformis quam super accedentem ad Baptismum manus impositione describit hierarcha" (*cod.* Vat. lat., Chigi A. V. 129, f. 149ra-b). Rufus tamen non videtur legisse nec versionem nec expositionem Lincolniensis; alioquin enim nominavisset eum.

<sup>14</sup> Versio Scoti Eriugena (apud *Dionysiaca*, II, 1143).

<sup>15</sup> Versio Ioannis Sarraceni (apud *Dionysiaca*, II, 1143).

<sup>16</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, IV, c. 9 (PG 94, 1122 C); versio Burgundionis, cap. 82: "Igitur nunc quidem per baptisma 'primitias Sancti Spiritus' accipimus, et principium alterius vitae fit nobis regeneratio et sigillum et custodia et illuminatio" (ed. cit., p. 295).

distinguant essentialiter characterem et sacramentum, dicunt quod aut idem sunt secundum rem, sed unum nomen dicitur proprie et alterum transumptive, aut character omnino nihil est. *G u i l l e l m u s* autem, episcopus Parisiensis, dicebat quod character nihil est.<sup>17</sup>

Quid ergo in tot et tantis dicam? Sequamur modum communem. Et puto quod ille modus praedictus sit quem communius tenent moderni, scilicet quod character sit quoddam lumen infusum a Deo spirituale... (f. 79va–b).

*C e n s u r a*: *Calumniosum, quia dicit quod character non est nisi signum sensibile exterius; destruens distinctionem communem de characterē. Et hoc infra levius [ita pro: plenius?] de Ordine.*

## § 5

*Dist.*, 6, q. 3: *In quo sit character sicut in subiecto* (ff. 80va–81ra). – *B o n a v.*, ibidem, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 3 (IV, 141 s.).

Similiter potest dici de characterē: nullum est inconueniens quod una aliqua forma sit in diversis potentiis animae. Una, dico, secundum essentiam et differens tamen ratione, retinens rationem veri prout est in cognitiva, rationem vero motivi prout est in affectiva.

Istud problema et praecedens et infinita alia quae laboriose quaeruntur de characterē, omnia cassata essent et labor in illis abscinderetur et finis poneretur labori circa characterem si vera esset praedicta positio de characterē<sup>18</sup> (f. 81ra).

*C e n s u r a*: *Caluminosum. Hic approbat positionem supra positam de characterē.*

## § 6

*Dist.*, 6, q. 6: *Utrum Baptismus habeat iterari* (f. 82ra–va). – *B o n a v.*, ibidem, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 6 (IV, 146).

*R e s p o n s i o*. Secundum aliquos tinctio dupliciter dicitur: active et passive. Et haec utraque adhuc dupliciter, habitus

<sup>17</sup> Guillelmus de Alvernia, *De Sacramentis*, cap. 3, inter alia, haec habet: "Nos autem dicimus quod illud quod imprimitur in Baptismo, praeter gratiam gratum Deo facientem et quod remanet post amissionem ipsius sanctitatis, quaedam est cuius exemplum et figura est sanctitas basilicarum consecratarum et vasorum" (*Opera Omnia*, Nürimbergae 1496, f. 111rb huius tractatus). Haec est opinio quam, ut in introductione, § f, vidimus, adversarii attribuerunt Petro Ioannis Olivi et quam Petrus de Trabibus 'recitat.'

<sup>18</sup> In paragrapho scilicet praecedenti.



scilicet vel usus. Tinctio-passio habitualis iterari non potest, quia decedere non potest, ut dicit Augustinus,<sup>19</sup> et hoc ideo quia non potest passio-habitus abesse ubi praecessit proprius usus. Non potest tinctio-passio habitus decedere, quia non potest tinctio-passio usus non fuisse. Tinctio autem passio usus revera decedit et non manet, et ideo iterari potest. Sed in eadem persona non debet propter rationes praedictas. Ergo tinctio-habitus non potest iterari omnino nec debet. Tinctio-usus potest et non debet. Et ideo quandoque ad hoc, quandoque ad illud rationes dat Augustinus. Sed quia de definitione formali Baptismi est tinctio-habitus et non usus, ideo simpliciter verum est quod quia Baptismus non potest decedere, non potest iterari, sed semper manet manente subiecto in quo praecessit eius usus, scilicet tinctio-passio (f. 82va).

*Censura: Calumniosum, quia ponit quod Baptismus est passio-habitus et quod propter hoc non iteratur quia semel est baptizatus.*

## § 7

*Dist., 7, p. 2, q. 2: Utrum eadem gratia conferatur in Baptismo et Confirmatione* (f. 86ra–va). – Bonav., ibidem, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 169 ss.).

Ut saepe dico, aliqui dicunt quod omnes virtutes, omnia dona, omnis gratia gratum faciens, quae simul sunt in una anima, sunt unus habitus, unus amor numero, solum differens per diversitatem operis sive obiecti vel materiae. Et una <cum hoc> isti dicunt quod in Confirmatione non confertur alia gratia, alia virtus, sed augetur aut virtus-caritas sive gratia per intensionem affectionis voluntariae et datur Spiritus Sanctus non solum cum primo datur gratia gratum faciens, sed etiam cum datur augmentum virtutis et gratiae. Datur enim Spiritus Sanctus sicut percipitur, datur et magis datur, sicut ei conformatur creatura rationalis et magis conformatur. Unde semper in proficiendo datur Spiritus Sanctus. Et hoc intendit Rabanus et alii, qui dicunt gratiam hic conferri et Spiritum Sanctum dari<sup>20</sup> (f. 89ra–b).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hic solito more tollit pluralitatem habituum gratuitorum et moralium.*

<sup>19</sup> Cf. August., *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, VI, c. 1, (PL 43, 197).

<sup>20</sup> Rabanus Maurus, *De Institutione Clericorum*, cap. 30 (PL 107, 314); Ps.–Hugo de S. Victore, *Summa Sententiarum*, tract. VI, c. 1 (PL 176, 138).

## § 8

*Dist.*, 8, p. 2, q. 1: *Quaeritur de forma verbi, et hoc super panem... scilicet de pronomine 'hoc'* (ff. 90rb-91ra). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 (IV, 189-92).

*Alii* adhuc aliter dicunt quod caro Christi habet aliquod univocum cum corpore quod debet converti in ipsam Christi carnem. Si ergo tale univocum in ipso pane est, et materiam primam etiam communicant panis scilicet et quaelibet caro humana, dicunt quod aggregatum ex materia prima et illo communi univoco est corpus Christi, sed in caelo, non autem hic, nisi cum prolata sint haec verba. Et ita quod est in caelo corpus Christi, fit hic corpus Christi. Et est talis modus dicendi, ut dicunt, 'illud aggregatum est corpus Christi,' sicut cum dicimus 'animal est iste homo.'

Potest etiam forte ita esse, ut dicunt, quod sicut hic quattuor sunt vocabula 'hoc est corpus meum,' sic sunt formae generales univocae duae, et tertia forma speciei specialissimae, scilicet carnis humanae, et quarta forma individualis propria carnis Christi.

*Sed contra*: nihil commune ponimus corpori [*cod.*: corpus] Christi et pani, nullam formam communem, quidquid sit de materia prima. Et in physicis transmutationibus forte posset talis modus poni, sed ista conversio simpliciter miraculosa est et supra naturam. Et ideo nihil commune ponimus hic in eo quod convertitur et in eo in quod convertitur.

Modus ergo paenultimus<sup>21</sup> tenendus, qui etiam est communis. Et patent omnia obiecta (f. 91ra).

*Censura*: *Calumniosum*. Reliqua pars censurae deleta est.

## § 9

*Dist.*, 10, p. 1, q. 4: *Utrum corpus Christi sit sub speciebus dimensive* (ff. 98va-99rb). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 4 (IV, 222 s.).

*Alii* pro eodem habent illud problema cum secundo praedicto.<sup>22</sup> Idem enim est, ut dicunt, esse hic dimensive sive dimensionaliter quod hic actu suam propriam quantitatem habere et figuram. Et,

<sup>21</sup> Scilicet modus quem Bonaventura tenet (loco cit., p. 191).

<sup>22</sup> Hic Rufus memorat opinionem prius, *dist.* 10, q. 2, recitatam: "Respondeo: quidam non asserendo coniectant quod sit hic corpus-substantia non secundum quantitatem, nec secundum alia accidentia, quia haec nihil faciunt ad finem huius sacramenti, qui est cibatio" (f. 97va). Hanc opinionem recitavit et reiecit Bonaventura in quaestione secunda huius distinctionis (IV, 219 s.). Ea, iuxta Cornubiensem, elici potest ex quibusdam verbis Lanfranci.

ut praedictum est, non asserendo sed coniectando, putant quod non est ibi dimensionaliter nec in figura propria (f. 99ra–b).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hic videtur improbare...* – Cetera legi non possunt, quia deleta sunt.

### § 10

*Dist.*, 10, p. 1, q. 5: *Utrum corpus Christi sit in qualibet parte hostiae* (ff. 99va–100ra). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 5 (IV, 224 s.).

Sicut prius dixi,<sup>23</sup> per modum supra dictum manifesta essent hic quaesita et multa alia, sicut de figura corporis Christi, utrum sit hic circulare simul et semicirculare, simul et triangulare, et utrum sedeat hic aut iaceat, et cetera talia (f. 100ra).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hic videtur nos ad priorem positionem inclinare... quam deberet reprobare.* – Sed censura erasa est.

### § 11

*Dist.*, 10, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2: *Utrum talis existentia [sub sacramento] sit supra sensum comprehensoris* (f. 102rb–va). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 236 s.).

Haec ambo problemata, cum multis aliis, cassata essent si vera esset illa coniectura quae supra tacta est in secundo problemate huius distinctionis<sup>24</sup> (f. 102va).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hic ad priorem positionem inclinatos sicut prius.*

### § 12

*Dist.*, 11, q. 6: *Quibus verbis debeat exprimi haec conversio* (ff. 105va–106ra). – *Bona v.*, ibidem, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 6 (IV, 250 ss.).

Aliis videtur quod haec est propria: ex pane fit corpus. Significat enim li ex transmutationem et ordinem. – Et non valet quod

<sup>23</sup> Scilicet in quaestione quarta huius distinctionis. Vide paragraphum praecedentem.

<sup>24</sup> Hic iterum provocat ad quaestionem secundam huius distinctionis, de qua in nota 22 diximus.

contra obicit de verbo,<sup>25</sup> quia verbum non transmutatur in corpus, panis autem transmutatur. 'Ex' autem, ut praedictum est, duo notat. Et sic accipiunt philosophi has praepositiones.<sup>26</sup> Augustinus autem distinguit inter has,<sup>27</sup> sicut alias dictum est (f. 106ra).

C e n s u r a: *Calumniosum.*

### § 13

D i s t., II, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2: *Quale corpus dedit [Christus] discipulis in cena* (ff. 108rb–109rb). – B o n a v., ibidem, pars II, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 263 s.).

Aliis ergo videtur quod Hugo<sup>28</sup> bene et subtiliter dixit. Habet enim Christus esse differens, in forma scilicet sua propria et esse sacramentaliter, et sub hoc duplici esse habet in se condiciones diversas. Sub primo enim est corpus Christi visibile, sub secundo invisibile. Similiter pro illo statu ante passionem passibile, [pro alio post passionem] impassibile.

Ex istis videtur quod 'mortuum' non est condicio corporis Christi sub sacramento, hoc est sub illo esse. Unde si aliquis confecisset in triduo, esset corpus Christi sub sacramento nec mortuum nec vivum.

Isti dicunt quod haec quodammodo multiplex est 'dedit corpus passibile.' Dedit enim illud quod erat passibile, sed non dedit secundum quod passibile, quia dedit sub esse sacramentali, sub quo esse nec est nec fuit passibile sicut nec visibile. Haec tamen ego non assero. Quidam tamen cum legitur apud aliquem Sanctum quod dedit corpus impassibile, sic glossant: id est dedit sub tali forma sub qua non erat passibile. Et isti non discordant secundum rem ab eo quod dicit Hugo, sed in idem redit quod dicunt: in eo quod dabat mortalis fuit, in eo quod dabatur immortalis <et quod> ait Hugo: "Quomodo enim immortalis non dabatur qui invisibiliter sumebatur?"<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Bonaventura scilicet: "Et dicendum, quod illa [praedicatio] est vera et propria in qua verbum significans non *identitatem* nec *innovationem* nec *ordinationem naturalem* cum praepositione importante *transitum*, non causam. Unde haec est propria: panis convertitur in corpus Christi" (IV, 252).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Aristot., *Metaph.*, II (1a), c. 2 (994a 22–24).

<sup>27</sup> August., *De Natura Boni contra Manichaeos*, cap. 27 (PL 42, 560).

<sup>28</sup> Hugo de S. Victore, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, II, pars VIII, c. 12, asserit Christum mortalem in cena dedisse discipulis corpus impassibile et immortale. Huic opinioni consentit Guillelmus de Militona, *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, tract. IV, pars 9, q. 40 (ed. G. Gál, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, XXIII, Quaracchi 1961, 740); eam tamen Bonaventura, ut minus rationabilem, reicit (IV, 263).

<sup>29</sup> Hugo de S. Victore, loco cit.



Sed numquid opinio H u g o n i s ponit duo contradictoria simul vera de eodem? Videtur quod sic,<sup>30</sup> quia simul, secundum ipsum, corpus Christi erat mortale et immortale, visibile et invisibile, passibile et non passibile:

Haec non valent, quia tunc Christus fuit passibilis, mortalis, visibilis, et istae affirmationes verae sunt simpliciter et harum negationes falsae sunt simpliciter. Nihilominus tamen istae negationes verae sunt: Christus non fuit tunc passibilis sub specie panis, hoc est secundum illud esse. Et istae negationes non contradicunt praedictis affirmationibus, sed est paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter: Christus non fuit passibilis nec patiebatur sub forma panis, ergo non fuit passibilis. Sub hac enim forma non fuit passibilis, sub alia fuit passibilis. Et non sequitur: ergo fuit passibilis et non fuit passibilis. Affirmativa sequitur ex affirmativa, negativa autem non sequitur ex negativa, sed est plane paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter (f. 109ra-b).

*Censura: Caluminosum, quia indubitanter tenendum quod Christus est vivum sub sacramento.*

#### § 14

Dist., 14, a. 2, q. 1: *In qua vi animae sit poenitentia?* (ff. 119ra-va). – Bonav., ibidem, pars I, a. 2, q. 1 (IV, 323-26).

Alii nullam vim faciunt in tali quaestione, scilicet quae virtus in qua vi animae sit, sed quaelibet est in qualibet, ut dicunt, quia virtus est amor cognoscens sive cognitio amans, secundum Augustinum.<sup>31</sup> Si amor, ergo est in affectiva; si cognitio, ergo est in aspectiva. Et iterum: quidquid est in affectiva, est in aspectiva, quia ipsa aspectiva praesupponitur et cognoscens afficitur.

Dicunt etiam quod potentiae animae sunt una essentia sed diversae relationes ad diversa opera. Similiter ex alia parte omnes virtutes in una anima sunt unus et idem amor. Et ille habitus est in vi concupiscibili. Sed diversae virtutes dicuntur secundum diversa opera et ideo congruit opera virtutum ad opera virium comparare, sed habitus virtutum ad affectum sive principium amativum in anima tantum congruit appropriare (f. 119va).

*Censura: Hoc est calumniosum. Hic more solito confundit habitus.*

<sup>30</sup> Ita videtur Bonaventurae, loco cit.

<sup>31</sup> August., *De Trinit.*, X, c. 11, n. 18 (PL 42, 983 s.); vide supra, I, § 1.

## § 15

Dist., 17, q. 16: *Utrum venialia sint confitenda* (ff. 156vb–158vb). – Bonav., ibidem, pars III, a. 2, q. 1 (IV, 457 s.).

Nescio in his. Sed si praecipit nobis Deus ut nullum peccatum habeamus omnino, secundum Augustinum<sup>32</sup> et Anselmum<sup>33</sup> hoc semper nobis praecipit Deus. In prohibitione est non solum mortale sed et veniale peccatum. Cuius contrarium isti dicunt.<sup>34</sup> Si ergo praecipimur nullum etiam veniale habere et ad hoc tenemur, quare non tenemur illa confiteri cum habemus?

Sed ais: secundum hoc omnes sumus transgressores praecepti, et ita in peccato mortali. Aut, forte quod verum est, nullus omnino adimplet illud praeceptum. Sed non sequitur ex hoc quod omnes et semper sint transgressores. Transgredi enim importat contemptum, ut videtur.

Aut ergo sic respondendum, aut dividendum est hoc ipsum ‘transgredi praeceptum,’ secundum quod alias divisum est inter peccatum mortale et veniale. Qui enim scienter et deliberatione sufficiente praecedente, actualiter advertens quod hoc prohibet Deus, facit quidlibet [*cod.*: quilibet] sive omittit, talis transgressio est mortalis, quia cum contemptu. Si autem, quod communiter accidit, e contrario ignoranter scilicet aut inconsiderate, venialis est. Hoc modo forte qui peccatum veniale aliquod, quantumlibet parvum, scienter et ex industria celaret et nollet confiteri, mortaliter transgrederetur.

Praeterea magna est differentia venialium inter se: aliquod enim ita grande et notabile est ut oporteat illud confiteri, et aliquod difficile cadit a memoria; aliqua vero alia sunt quae vix advertit homo sive cum illa committit sive post. Quare ergo illa non tenemur etiam in specie et numero confiteri si copiam habemus sacerdotis vel proximi, illa autem in generali? Nescio. In omnibus his non definio (f. 158vb).

Censura: *Calumniosum. Hic multa dicuntur periculosa per totum et erronea aliqua.*

## § 16

Dist., 18, q. 2: *Utrum clavis possit in culpam vel in poenam* (ff. 167ra–168rb). – Bonav., ibidem, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (IV, 472 ss.).

Ex his et ex dictis Hugonis<sup>35</sup> videtur quod possit dici quod Deus principaliter et primo per se ipsum dimittit culpam, secundario

<sup>32</sup> Cf. August., *Enarratio in Psalmum XCIII*, n. 22 (PL 36, 1209); *De Utilitate Credendi ad Honoratum*, cap. 12, n. 27 (PL 42, 85).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *Meditatio* (PL 158, 722–25; ed. F. S. Schmitt, III, 76–79).

<sup>34</sup> Bonaventura non dicit peccata venialia non esse prohibita, sed negat confessionem eorum esse sub praecepto (loc. cit., IV, 458).

<sup>35</sup> Hugo de S. Victore, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, II, pars XIV,

idem Deus per sacerdotem sive sacerdos per ipsum et per potestatem acceptam ab eo. Unde ipsa dimissio sacerdotis nihil aliud videtur esse quam Dei confirmatio. Unde Augustinus hic in littera: « Laudant vobiscum et confirmant » etc.<sup>36</sup>

Et haec sententia multum videtur convenire sententiae Augustini<sup>37</sup> dicentis hic in littera quod Deus remissionem peccatorum vel per se ipsum facit vel per ipsius columbae membra. Et hoc modo omnino idem primo per se ipsum facit Deus et secundo per sacerdotem sive ipse sacerdos per illum. Et non est nugatio nec superfluum. Concedit enim Deus sacerdoti ut hoc faciat ut sic sit hierarchia humana. Si enim nulli omnino in Ecclesia communicaret potestatem dimittendi etc., non esset hierarchia humana omnino, ut videtur. Et ut dicit Hugo, hoc ideo concedit Deus ut homo qui noluit superiori obedire, scilicet Deo, ab homine sibi pari salutem recipiat et sic tumor superbiae sanetur humilitate.

Et in omnibus istis nihil assero. – Communiter autem dicitur sic quod Deus inchoat solutionem, dimittendo culpam et poenam aeternam, sacerdos vero consummat, dimittendo aliquid de poena ex vi clavium (f. 168ra).

Censura: deleta est; solum vestigium verbi ‘calumniosum’ legi potest.

## § 17

Dist., 18, q. 3: *Utrum sacerdos possit aliquid supra poenam* (f. 168rb-vb). – Bonav., ibidem, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 476 ss.).

Ut supra dixi, secundum Hugonem,<sup>38</sup> videtur quod possit dici quod sacerdos dimittit tam culpam quam poenam; omne scilicet illud quod Deus propria auctoritate dimittit, sacerdos potestate accepta a Deo dimittit (f. 168vb).

Censura: *Calumniosum*.

c. 8 (PL 176, 566 A-B). – Hunc paragraphum edidit F. Pelster, “Richardus Rufus... ein Vorläufer” cit.

<sup>36</sup> Ps.-August., *De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia*, cap. 10, n. 25 (PL 40, 1122); citatur a Petro Lombardo, in hac distinctione, cap. 5 (ed. cit., p. 861).

<sup>37</sup> August., *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, V, c. 21, n. 29 (PL 43, 191); citatur hic in littera, cap. 5 (ed. cit., p. 862).

<sup>38</sup> Citatur in paragrapho praecedenti, nota 35.

## § 18

Dist., 19, q. 5: *Utrum malus sacerdos communicet cum bono in potestate clavium* (ff. 174vb–175va). – Bonav., ibidem, a. 1, q. 2 (IV, 501 ss.).

Nescio in omnibus his. Sed secundum illud Augustini in praecedenti distinctione, capitulo 'Nec ideo': "Sacramentum gratiae dat Deus etiam per malos,"<sup>39</sup> videtur quod possit dici quod tam bonus sacerdos quam malus clavem habet et sacramentum confert. Clavis enim respicit sacramentum. Sed Deus gratiam ipsam et remissionem peccatorum in solo et per solum bonum dat sacerdotem, et ideo solus bonus sacerdos eadem. In quo enim et per quem dat Deus, ille dat. Et forte eadem dimissione et non alia dimittit sacerdos et Deus.

Malo autem non communicat Deus suam operationem. Unde nec in malo nec per malum dimittit peccata proprie. Unde malus clavem habet, potestatem scilicet ligandi etc., non tamen peccata dimittit, nec gratiam confert. Illud enim sacramentum respicit, illud autem rem sacramenti. Et iste est modus Hugonis.<sup>40</sup>

Et summa huius responsionis est quod in quo et per quem facit Deus, et ille facit; et in quo et per quem non facit Deus, nec ille facit. Sed per se ipsum tantum vel per sanctos suos dat Deus gratiam et dimittit peccata, ergo etc.

Sed contra illud directe videtur auctoritas in quarta parte distinctionis quae dicit sic: "Ut gratiam traditio per ministerium ordinati transfundat" etc.<sup>41</sup> Sed multipliciter potest ad hoc dici: primo quod loquitur de benedictione quae potest esse gratia gratis data tantum, vel quod loquitur de bonis sacerdotibus. Vel si generaliter de omnibus, tunc distinguenda est haec praepositio 'per': effective scilicet vel occasionative; vel per ministerium mali dimittit Deus peccata, id est dum ille ministerium suum peragit. Unde quasi communicative accipitur hic haec praepositio 'per.' Cum autem Deus per sanctos suos dimittit Deus (!), accipitur 'per' effective, licet non principaliter et primo. Quod enim dat Deus in bono, hoc et ipse dat, ut praedictum est.

Vel adhuc aliter: per ministerium ordinati dat Deus gratiam, sicut dicit haec auctoritas; non tamen per ipsam personam, sicut dicit alia superior auctoritas.<sup>42</sup> Contrarietas videtur esse Augustini ad

<sup>39</sup> Vide notam 37, in § 16.

<sup>40</sup> Ubi supra, nota 35, in § 16.

<sup>41</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Liber Sententiarum*, IV, d. 19, c. 2 (ed. cit., p. 869); ista auctoritas sumpta est ex Ps.–Augustino seu Ambrosiastro, *Quaestiones ex Veteri Testamento*, q. 11 (PL 35, 2223).

<sup>42</sup> Auctoritas scilicet Augustini, citata supra in §§ 16 et 18, notis 37 et 39.



se ipsum in his,<sup>43</sup> nisi his modis vel aliter possint concordari (ff. 165rb–166ra).

*Censura: Calumniosum. Hoc est simpliciter erroneum quod Deus in solo et per solum bonum sacerdotem dat gratiam.*

### § 19

*Dist.*, 24, p. 2, q. 2: *Quid est character* (ff. 216va–219ra). – *Bonav.*, dist. 6, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 1 (IV, 136 ss.).

Ecce quantus labor et sine fuctu omnino ut videtur.<sup>44</sup> Totum enim istud adeo vere et proprie potest dici de Baptismo vel sacramento sicut de characterē. Est enim Baptismus signum fidei sive professionis eiusdem factae se ipso sacramento divinitus ad hoc instituto. In missa enim dicimus “et pro his qui dormierunt cum signo fidei” etc.<sup>45</sup>

Item, secundum hanc viam non essent nisi duo characteres, cum tamen communiter ponantur tres et in tribus sacramentis. Ego autem quaero quid sit character per distinctionem contra sacramentum, talem scilicet definitionem eius quae omnino sacramento non conveniat, si tamen hoc sit possibile. Quaero etiam auctoritatem alicuius *Sancti* ad hoc. Respondent ergo mihi ad hoc quod a *Dionysio* in *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, cap. 2, definitur character et sic: “Character est signum sanctum communionis [*cod.*: commotionis] fidei et sanctae ordinationis datum accedenti a hierarcha.”<sup>46</sup> Quibus ego: quod inspiciant bene utramque translationem et omnino nihil tale invenient; nec etiam nomen ‘character’ ibi nominatur. Et *Expositor* super illum locum nihil de hoc tangit. Non enim intendit *Dionysius* ibi describere characterem vel Baptismum, sed intendit in tota illa parte capituli assignare mysteria, hoc est quid significant ea quae aguntur cum convertitur quis et baptizatur.

Praeterea, tota ista ratio convenit Baptismo et characteri. Est autem iste locus secundi capituli unde hoc summunt *M<agistri>*, ubi textus talis: “Divinorum partis et sacrae ordinationis, quorum est symbolum” etc.<sup>47</sup> In alia translatione textus talis: “In Deo manentium adimpletionis et sanctae ordinationis, quorum est signum sanctum” etc.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Contrarietas est quidem Augustini, non tamen ad se ipsum sed ad Ps.–Augustinum seu Ambrosiastrum.

<sup>44</sup> Vide hic supra, § 4.

<sup>45</sup> In commemoratione defunctorum, in *Canone Missae*.

<sup>46</sup> Ut supra, § 4, notae 11 et 12.

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem, nota 14.

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem, nota 15.

Alii dicunt quod in *D a m a s c e n o* <sup>49</sup> invenitur quod character est sigillum, custodia et illuminatio. Et verum et quod haec verba sunt capitulo 83, sed de Baptismo dicta. Unde textus talis: "Nunc quidem per Baptisma 'primitias Sancti Spiritus' accipimus, et principium alterius vitae fit nobis regeneratio et sigillum" etc. Et nullo modo ibi nominatur hoc nomen 'character'. Quod licet ibidem [*cod.*: idem] nominaretur, non propter hoc tamen probatum esset quod quaero, cum haec omnia vere conveniant et ab istis auctoribus Baptismo attribuantur.

Quid ergo in his dicam, nisi quod nondum inveni apud *S a n c t o s* distinctionem <inter characterem> sacramentalem et ipsum sacramentum. Quod si invenero, gaudebo. Graecum nomen est character, quod significat proprie figurationem vel impressionem, sicut dicunt qui experti sunt in illa lingua. Haec autem duo proprie dicta non sunt nisi in corpore. Ergo in sacramentis non nisi transumptive vel tropice. Sic autem dici potest character et ipsum sacramentum et ipsa gratia. 'Spirituale signum' invenio in *A m b r o s i o*, libro I *De Spiritu Sancto*, cap. 6, cum dicit: "Sicut in Christo nascimur ita et spiritu signamur, ut imaginem eius et gloriam tenere possimus. Quod est utique spirituale signum." <sup>50</sup> Isti tamen ex iam inchoato alia quaesita volunt solvere.

Ad secundum enim dicunt quod tantum duplex est character. Licet enim in quolibet sacramento fiat alicuius professio quod pertinet ad fidem, tamen haec duo sunt maxima quae in Baptismo et Ordine profiteamur et minus credibilia sunt et ideo credenti magis meritoria. Unde et characterem meretur illorum professio. Aliorum autem <quae> magis sunt credibilia, non.

Sed illud, ut dixi, est contra communem opinionem quae ponit tres characteres. Et subtiliter quaerunt causam huius sufficientiae... (f. 217ra-va).

Nos cum baptizamur ipso facto dictas professiones facimus. Quare non similiter et Christus? Et quomodo erit character separabilis a Baptismo? Et similiter illud Apoc. 13: *Faciet omnes* [*cod.*: homines] *habere characterem*. Glossa <sup>51</sup> dicit quod character est ad distinguendum; et insuper, tamquam insigne nobilitatis, bonis est ad glo-

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, nota 16.

<sup>50</sup> Ambrosius, *De Spiritu Sancto*, I, c. 6, n. 79: "Sicut enim in Christo morimur, ut renascamur, ita etiam Spiritu signamur, ut splendorem atque imaginem eius et gratiam tenere possimus; quod est utique spirituale signaculum" (PL 16, 752 C).

<sup>51</sup> *Glossa Ordinaria*, in Apoc. 13, 16, haec habet: "In manu et in fronte ponent signa, ut omnes confiteantur suum esse Deum verbo et opere" (PL 114, 734 B). Verba a Rufo hic citata leguntur etiam in Alexandri de Hales, *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum*, IV, d. 6, n. 2 (ed. cit., XV, 106).

riam, malis ad poenam. Secundum hoc videtur quod Christus habuerit characterem. Sed aliter respondent quod pastoris non est habere characterem sed ovium et a pastore. Et non curo de his (ff. 218vb-219ra).

*Censura: calumniosum. Hic plenius conatur ad characterem destruendum in anima.*

*The Franciscan Institute  
St. Bonaventure University*

GEDEON GÁL, O.F.M.

## SAINT BONAVENTURE AND OUR NATURAL OBLIGATION TO CONFESS THE TRUTH

To evaluate St. Bonaventure's doctrine correctly, it is necessary to see him first and foremost as a theologian. He is a philosopher inasmuch as he proceeds by way of philosophy in taking certain theological positions. Consequently, to understand his philosophical positions, we must first see their theological setting, and then consider them on their own ground as properly philosophical developments. Such is the situation with regard to our natural obligation to tell the truth. St. Bonaventure sets down his principles on this problem within the context of the sacrament of penance, or confession, which binds the Christian to tell the truth about his sins.

Handling the necessity for confession, Bonaventure takes the position that the sacrament was instituted under natural law, which obligates all men to confess their sins vocally and with humility to God. Forbidding concealment of sins, natural law dictates that they be confessed mentally and orally, with sorrow and amendment, for the praise and glory of God. As an obligation of natural law, therefore, confession of sins is a work of the virtue of truth. Now, by mental confession, Bonaventure means recognition of sin and of offence. This sort of confession is dictated specifically by natural law according as it makes offence known to the human mind. Knowledge of offence against man, who is a rational creature, is dictated essentially by natural law. Knowledge of offence against God is dictated by natural law with the aid of Christian faith. When a man knows by faith, for example, that he has offended God by a lie, natural law dictates specifically that the man ought to seek with humility the mercy of God. It is a necessary dictate of natural law, then, regarding mental confession, that every man must in his heart always acknowledge his offences. Bonaventure sees natural law dictating vocal confession only in a general way. Vocal confession to God is dictated by way of expedience and in certain circumstances, for instance, when God commanded it from Adam and from Cain (Gn 3:9-13; 4:9-15). Vocal confession to another man is dictated by natural law



in a universal manner. If a man offends a friend, however, human nature and right reason dictate that the man confess his offence and be reconciled with his friend. Natural law dictates, moreover, that we must be reconciled to God by every means that He has decreed. Consequently, it is a general and universal dictate of natural law that faults must be revealed and the truth must be told to the arbiter, or confessor, that God has constituted between Himself and the sinner. Thus, as a Christian sacrament, confession has its origin from natural law and divine institution. Although truth does not dictate that hidden sins be told to another man, even so, when the natural virtue of truth is added to the divine institution, the virtue of obedience commands such a confession, whose act is directed and regulated by truth.<sup>1</sup>

Two distinct points can be drawn from Bonaventure's view of the need for confession: (1) the Christian sacrament is governed by natural law and by evangelic law, or the law of the Gospel; (2) working through the virtue of truth, natural law has many dictates and obligations regarding confession of offences. The Christian sacrament relies on natural law and evangelic law in three respects. The first looks to offences against God as they are made known by Christian faith. The second looks to reconciliation with God by atoning for such offences. Obligating the Christian to tell the truth about his sins, these two aspects of the sacrament demand mental confession to God and vocal confession to a man representing God. The third aspect has to do with the natural virtue of truth, which controls the act of Christian confession. Taken apart from Christian confession, natural law has three kinds of dictates or obligations. It dictates essentially what constitutes an offence against man, who is a rational

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<sup>1</sup> IV *Sent.*, q. 17, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 (IV, 435-37; IV, 416-19). The view of truth as a virtue is taken from Aristotle, *Ethica*, 2.7 (1108a20-23); 4.7 (1137a13-33). This article was read originally as a paper at the St. Bonaventure Section of the Ninth Conference on Medieval Studies, 8-10 May 1974, at The Medieval Institute, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo. References to St. Bonaventure's texts use the more standard abbreviations: the first numbers in parentheses refer to his *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882-1902); the second refer to his *Opera theologica selecta* (Quaracchi, 1934-64). The works of ancient and medieval authors are shown with the standard abbreviations: Aristotle's works have the numbers of the Bekker edition, *Aristotelis Opera* (Berlin, 1831-70); patristic and medieval writings have the volume and pagination of Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* (PG), or *Patrologia Latina* (PL). The books of Sacred Scripture are shown with their (now) common signs.

creature. Thereafter, in general, natural law obligates a man who has offended God or another man to confess vocally, particularly when it concerns a friend, with whom he ought to be reconciled according to the dictate of human nature and of right reason. Dictating specifically and necessarily, however, natural law obligates all men, according to the virtue of truth, to recognize and to acknowledge in mind and in heart their offences against God and against their neighbour. The question arising here is: how are these dictates and obligations of natural law made known to the human mind? Bonaventure's answer to the question is given in his consideration of the human conscience. Considering it initially, he takes conscience in the wide sense as the means by which we know, or are conscious, of the natural law. Taking conscience in the strict sense, he sees it as a habitus perfecting the practical intellect and dictating the rules or principles of moral action.<sup>2</sup>

Considering the nature of conscience, Bonaventure first sets down two opposing positions. The one looks on conscience as an innate habitus and is based on Scripture (Rm 2:14-15), St. Augustine and human reason. The other looks on conscience as an acquired habitus and relies on Aristotle along with Augustine and human reason. Bonaventure then reconciles the two positions and the views of Aristotle and Augustine on the common ground of human reason. Dismissing the Platonic notion of all habitual knowledge as innate, Bonaventure also rejects the opinions that habitual knowledge is innate with respect to principles and the agent intellect, but acquired with respect to conclusions and the possible intellect. Accepting Augustine's doctrine, Bonaventure maintains that we have no prior knowledge of principles, for they become known in the spiritual light of the soul. From this point of view, conscience is innate with respect to the natural *lumen* of the mind, i.e. its natural seat or power of judgment, so that the first moral truths are most evident of themselves in that innate *lumen*. These truths are the principles of natural law, e.g., God is to be obeyed, and never do to another what you would not have done to yourself. Moreover, accepting Aristotle's doctrine, Bonaventure holds that the agent intellect, depending on the senses, makes things known to the mind, and that the possible

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<sup>2</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, Resp. (II, 899; II, 933-34). Bonaventure is influenced here by St. John Damascene, *De fide orth.*, 4.22 (PG 94.119); and by Aristotle, *De anima*, 3.9 (432b21-433a8).

intellect becomes whatever the mind knows. From that point of view, conscience is acquired by way of the species which must be obtained through the senses, as experience shows, for no one would know *father* or *mother* without receiving their species or likenesses through the senses. Uniting the two points of view, Bonaventure teaches that the first moral principles are known innately only after species are received through the senses. Although the natural power of judgment, or innate *lumen*, of the mind is sufficient to know those principles from their own evidence and without any other persuasion, the mind cannot draw evident conclusions from them unless some additional persuasion comes from a new capacity for instruction about particular things that ought to be done. This capacity is the acquired part of conscience directing our judgments of particular moral actions. Consequently, conscience is both innate and acquired. It is innate with regard to the natural *lumen* of the intellect and the primary dictates of natural law. It is innate most of all concerning our obligations toward God: the dictate of natural law to love and to fear God is simply innate; knowledge of God is given naturally to us, as Augustine says, and we know both *love* and *fear* through their essence and not through our senses. Conscience is acquired with regard to additional knowledge to be obtained through the senses: no one has innate species of his parents or of his neighbours. Aristotle's view of all human knowledge arising from the senses is to be taken only with respect to those things that have to be known by abstract species. We know good and evil innately by our natural power of judgment, as Augustine teaches, for truth is implanted naturally in the heart of man.<sup>3</sup>

Bonaventure puts in the will the natural habitus of synderesis. This moves a man to will rightly, as conscience moves him to judge rightly. Thus, corresponding to the innate part of conscience, which moves the intellect toward moral truth, synderesis is a natural instinct moving the will toward moral good. Synderesis is a natural principle stimulating the will instinctively and continually to do good and to repel evil. The movement of the will toward the good is

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., q. 2 (II, 901-04; II, 935-39). St. Augustine, *De lib. arb.*, 3.20.56 (PL 32.1298); *Retract.*, 1.8.2 (PL 32.594); *De Trin.*, 12.15.24 (PL 42.1011); *De Gen. ad litt.*, 7.11.16 (PL 34.361); *De civ. Dei*, 11.27.2 (PL 41.341). Aristotle, *De anima*, 3.4-8 (429a10-432a13); *Anal. prior.*, 2.21 (67a20-25); *Anal. post.*, 1.1 (71a25-71b8), 1.3 (72b18-33), 1.18 (81a37-38), 2.19 (99b20-100a14); *Ethica*, 2.1 (1103a14-25); *De sen. et sens.*, 6 (445b17-20).

initiated by conscience, which stirs the will by means of synderesis. Conscience and synderesis, therefore, have a common relation to natural law. As a habitus, natural law embraces conscience and synderesis, because it is the means of instructing man rightly in moral truth and of ordering him rightly toward moral good. Properly considered, however, natural law is a collection of precepts and the object of both conscience and synderesis, the one dictating the good and the other inclining the will toward the good. Consequently, synderesis is properly the natural ability of the will to desire and to tend toward the good as it is dictated by conscience and made known by natural law.<sup>4</sup>

In Bonaventure's view, then, the primary dictates of natural law, or the first moral truths, are known innately and self-evidently by the habitus of conscience. This habitus moves the will toward the good by the natural instinct of synderesis, which inclines the will to observe the innate dictates of natural law. To apply those dictates to particular actions, conscience must acquire a new capacity for instruction to be received through the senses. Hence, judging particular moral truths rightly according to the dictates of natural law, conscience directs the will to act rightly by seeking particular goods according to the natural instinct of synderesis. These judgments and actions look properly to natural law as a collection of precepts regarding God and our neighbour. With regard to our neighbour, the precepts are found by the Christian in the law of the Gospel. The teaching of Christ: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you" (Lk 6:31), is a restatement of the old law: "...never do to another what you would not have done to yourself" (Tb 4:16). Bonaventure often refers to the latter text as containing a primary dictate of natural law; Christ adds to the dictate: "this is the meaning of the Law and the Prophets" (Mt 7:12). For Bonaventure, then, the whole of the Law and the Prophets, and the whole wisdom of philosophy, as Augustine notes, is summed up in love of God and of neighbour.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Brevil.*, p. 2, c. 11 "Et quoniam... ad bonum." (V, 229; V, 55, n. 6); II *Sent.*, d. 39, div. text. (II, 897b; II, 932); a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (II, 900; II, 935); a. 2, q. 1, Resp., ad 1, 3-4 (II, 909-11; II, 944-46). For a more complete account of conscience and synderesis, which involve free choice, see my article "St. Bonaventure's Fundamental Conception of Natural Law," *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974* (Grottaferata [Roma], 1973-74), vol. 3, 571-98.

<sup>5</sup> *Comm. Lc.*, c. 12, v. 12, n. 20 (VII, 316); cf. *De s. Dominico*, "Prima est... in terra." (IX, 565); St. Augustine, *Epist.*, 137.5.17 (PL 33.524).



Taken apart from Christian faith, conscience acquires its particular instruction in natural law from the precepts or ten commandments of the old law. They are a particularization of the innate or general dictates of the natural law. Explaining this, Bonaventure maintains that the commandments obligate all men, at all times, and under all circumstances. Considered in themselves, the commandments are dictates of right reason, which prescribes things that are good of themselves, such as worshipping God and honouring parents, and prohibits things that are evil of themselves, e.g., lying and homicide. Prior to original sin, man was bound explicitly or specifically by the first three commandments, which ordered him to God, and implicitly or in general by the other seven, which ordered him to his neighbour. Following original sin, the implicit obligations of natural law remained, for nature always dictated that a man should do to other men as he would have them do to him, and that he ought not to treat them as he would not have them treat himself. The necessity to enlarge upon these two precepts arose after the many disorders following original sin. This is why the commandments were set forth explicitly in the written law of the Old Testament. The obligation of the commandments, therefore, is rooted innately in the natural law, but is unfolded and made distinct in particular ways by the written law.<sup>6</sup>

All the commandments come originally from the eternal light of God. The natural law, looking to justice, is implanted in the human mind by His eternal light. Now, according to Bonaventure, there is a twofold justice ordering our relations to God as the uncreated being and to our neighbour as a created being. Since the purpose of all law is justice, law is the rule of justice. Consequently, the precepts of natural law ordering our relations to God and to other men constitute specific ends of justice: honouring God (1st–3rd commandments), beneficence to parents (4th commandment), and not harming our neighbour (5th–10th commandments).<sup>7</sup>

The commandment forbidding the taking of God's name in vain is based on our natural obligation in justice toward God and toward our neighbour not to commit perjury or to swear a false oath. The obligation binds us to confess the truth in the name of the divine truth and without any falsehood, so that nothing false will be believed

■ III *Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 3 (III, 818–21; III, 824–27).

<sup>7</sup> *Decem. praec.*, coll. 2, nn. 2–4 (V, 511); coll. 1, nn. 21–24 (V, 510); coll. 3, n. 15 (V, 517); coll. 7, n. 2 (V, 529).

of the divine truth, nor will it be invoked to confirm anything which is false. We are bound, then, not to swear a false oath by the name of God. Such an oath is an offence against the supreme truth and, as a false testimony, also against our neighbour to whom it does an injury. Thus, including a falsehood, perjury contains a lie against God, a lie that also injures our neighbour. This is why perjury is forbidden by the second and by the eighth commandment.<sup>8</sup>

Although perjury generally involves a disordered oath, it is not essential to every perjury that it entail a lie. This view of Bonaventure comes from his understanding of perjury as more extensive than swearing a false oath. A man who swears to commit murder, for instance, commits perjury because of his disordered oath; but he does not tell a lie, for he intends to commit homicide. Likewise, a man invoking God to witness the truth is guilty of perjury when he swears what is false, though he believes it to be true; but he is not guilty of a lie, since he intends to say what he believes is true. This sort of oath is a rash oath, according to Augustine, and it involves perjury, according to Bonaventure, but does not necessarily entail a lie. Perjury involves a complete lie when there is falsehood both in the intention of the man swearing and in his words. This is the sort of lie that is not essential to perjury. There is an incomplete lie when a falsehood exists only in the intention or only in the words of the man committing perjury. One of these incomplete lies is included in every perjury, especially when it asserts something as true, even from a false belief of an erroneous conscience. Perjury also contains a lie when a man, violating his conscience, swears as certain what he knows to be in doubt.<sup>9</sup>

Bonaventure considers any perjury to be a graver fault than a lie and, taken theologically, always sinful. Taken philosophically, both perjury and lying are opposed to the virtue of moral truth. Perjury is wholly evil not only because it includes a lie, but also because it is an affront to the divine truth. Perjury is always evil because it introduces disorder between a man and his neighbour, and also between the man and God. Moreover, any man committing perjury for the sake of a neighbour brings the divine truth into

<sup>8</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 37, dub. 2, Resp. "...mandato secundae." (III, 831; III, 840); dub. 8, Resp. "Ad illud..." (III, 836; III, 846).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., d. 39, a. 1, q. 1 (III, 861-63; III, 870-72): cf. dub. 1, Resp. "...tres comites." (III, 881; III, 892); *Decem praec.*, cöll. 3, nn. 15-27 (V, 517-19). St. Augustine, *Sermo* 180, 2 (PL 38.973).

contempt by giving false testimony in the name of God. Nor does ignorance excuse a man in such an oath: he ought to know with certitude what he should not affirm under oath unless he is certain that what he says is true.<sup>10</sup> Bonaventure does not think, however, that every perjury is a grave fault or a serious sin. A man can commit perjury jokingly, or to profit one person without harming any other. A man committing perjury jokingly, for instance, does not deliberate about the excellence of the divine truth, though he spurns it by his lack of reverence in invoking God negligently and without due honour. It is also possible for a man to take an oath without sufficient deliberation, or beyond a due necessity; oaths of this kind involving perjury are not grave faults, because they do not bring the divine truth into contempt. When a man commits perjury deliberately and solemnly, for example, by swearing on the Bible, he is guilty of a very grave fault or enormous sin, thus rendering himself infamous. If a man commits perjury deliberately but not solemnly, he does not necessarily incur a grave fault by saying what is false, unless he also swears the falsehood with full deliberation.<sup>11</sup>

The commandment forbidding false testimony, or lying, is a negative precept on our natural obligation in justice to be truthful to and about our neighbour. The law forbids lies because every lie is evil and harms our neighbour. Bonaventure, following Augustine, distinguishes three kinds of lies. The first and most harmful is the pernicious lie, which has an intention of lying and of doing harm. This sort of lie profits no man and harms every man when it is contrary to Christian faith or Sacred Scripture, or when it imputes a crime falsely to some man. A pernicious lie can profit one person, however, though it injures another, if it is told in the cause of someone else. The second and less harmful is the jocose lie, which does not will any harm, but intends only to take pleasure in lying, or to please the listener. Such a lie sometimes does injury, but never profits anyone. The third and least harmful is the courtly or dutiful lie (*mendacium officiosum*), which injures no one, but intends to profit someone. A dutiful lie is told in defence of some temporal thing, e.g., the chastity or the life of the human body. The difference between the three kinds of lies is determined by their particular intention and not by their falsity of speech. A pernicious lie always has the

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., q. 2 (III, 863-65; III, 872-74).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., q. 3 (III, 865-66; III, 874-76).

intention of deceit. A jocose and a dutiful lie have only falsity of speech: neither one intends to deceive; but they do intend to say what is false, and so they are falsehoods because of their false intentions. Bonaventure, still following Augustine, holds that God cannot make a lie not to be a sin or, philosophically, a fault because of the nobility of truth. A lie is a false use of speech with the intention of deceit, so that God cannot depart from the truth, because He is truth itself. It is especially necessary that a man be honest and truthful in his speech, as Seneca remarks: "He who loses honesty, has nothing more to lose."<sup>12</sup>

The law dictates, therefore, and the (8th) commandment prescribes that no one is to be false in his speech, especially if it harms a neighbour, for such a lie also harms the liar himself. A spoken word is directed to someone else, so that a man speaking a false word to another man also injures himself by his own deceit, even though no harm may be done by taking something away from the other man.<sup>13</sup> Thus, in Bonaventure's view, relying on Augustine, a lie is essentially a false use of speech with the intention to deceive. Just as darkness is essentially the privation of light, so also a lie is essentially the privation of truth. A lie is so incompatible with truth that every lie has attached inseparably to it something false. Bonaventure demonstrates this from the twofold relation of speech to the intention of the speaker and to the thing signified by his words. Speech is said to be true or false from its relation to the thing. A speaker is said to be true or false from the relation of his speech to his intention. Speech is false and a lie when a man's words are not adequated to the things that they signify. A speaker is false and a liar when his intention is not adequated to the words that he uses. This twofold falsity is expressed in the definition of a lie as a false signification of speech with the intention of deceiving. Both elements are necessary for a complete lie: the false signification of speech is the material element; the intention of deceiving is the formal element. For the act of lying, however, that falsity suffices which consists in the discord between a man's words and his intention. It is not only

<sup>12</sup> *Decem praec.*, coll. 7, nn. 3-5 (V, 529-30); *III Sent.*, d. 38, un. 5 (III, 850-52; III, 860-62), un. 6, ad 5 (III, 853; III, 864). St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.*, 5.7.7 (PL 36.85-86); *Con. mend.*, 12.26 (PL 40.537), 15.31 (PL 40.540); *De mend.*, 14.25 (PL 40.505), 21.42 (PL 40.516); *Quaest. in Levit.*, q. 68 (PL 34.707). For the reference to Seneca see: St. Bonaventure, *Op. omn.*, V, 530, note 1.

<sup>13</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 37, dub. 8, Resp. "...primo obicitur." (III, 836; III, 846).



the man that knowingly says false things who is a liar, but also the man that says something is true which he knows is false. When we say that someone lies, we mean less than when we say that he tells a lie, because the intention of deceiving is sufficient to say that he is lying, but it is not sufficient to say also that he is telling a lie. Lying concerns the relation of speech to the intention of the speaker, whereas a lie includes also the relation of his speech to the thing that it signifies. It does not follow necessarily, therefore, that a man tells a lie because he lies, unless a lie is taken in a wide sense to mean the act of telling a lie. Taken strictly, however, a lie includes the intention of deceiving and the saying of something false. Since these two aspects are common and general to every lie, they extend to pernicious, jocose and dutiful lies. To say what is false is to deceive in this sense, that what is said can lead a man to accept a falsehood, and so to be deceived by something which is false.<sup>14</sup>

There is, then, a difference between lying and saying something false. Lying has to do with the use of speech to express what is known to the mind. A man can be lying even if his speech expresses what is really true. Lying always involves an abuse of speech and a crookedness in the man whose mind and tongue are so out of harmony that, as Augustine says, no good circumstances can make good his act of lying. Saying something false has to do only with a discord between speech and the thing that it signifies. False saying is not necessarily a lie, Bonaventure remarks, as concealing the truth is neither a lie nor an act of deceit. A man can be deceived and, therefore, believe that what he says is true, as St. Paul was deceived when he spoke of going on a journey to Spain (Rm 15:24), a journey that he did not make. It is a lie, nevertheless, as Augustine points out, not only to say knowingly what is false, but also to assert as true what is in doubt, because then the tongue is not in harmony with the heart.<sup>15</sup>

Bonaventure, relying again on Augustine, maintains that a lie is essentially a sin or, philosophically, a fault because it is evil, a privation of truth, a thing of deceit, and an abuse of the nature of

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., d. 38, un. 1 (III, 839-41; III, 847-50); dub. 3, Resp. (III, 856; III, 867-68).

<sup>15</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 21, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, Resp. "...Romanos 15, 24.", ad 4 (IV, 563-64; IV, 553-54): cf. d. 12, p. 1, dub. 1, Resp. (IV, 286; IV, 270-71). St. Augustine, *De Trin.*, 15.11.20 (PL 42.1071-73).

speech.<sup>16</sup> A lie is so essentially wrong that no human agreement, no end, and no dispensation, whether human or divine, can make it right. In holding this position, Bonaventure distinguishes an evil act from a malicious intention both with respect to God and with respect to our neighbour. An evil act with respect to God is essentially evil, e.g., to blaspheme God, and so it can in no way be made good. An evil act with respect to our neighbour, such as theft, is not essentially evil, and this act can be made good by a right intention coming from a divine dispensation. An act flowing from a malicious intention, however, whether regarding God or our neighbour, is simply evil and can never be right because of the privation of a due end. To make this sort of act good is to make it both good and evil at the same time. Now a lie is an evil of that sort, because it includes a false statement and an intention to deceive. A false statement, though it is an evil, can be made good if it flows from ignorance. But an intention to deceive is essentially evil and cannot ever be made good, even by a good end or a divine dispensation. It is a malicious or a crooked intention, then, that makes a lie to be always a fault. As an abuse of speech, nevertheless, a lie is also a fault. The purpose of speech is to allow a man to signify what is in his mind, so that truth can be established between him and another man. When this proper end of speech is abused, the fault of a lie is always incurred.<sup>17</sup>

Because it is easier for us to talk than to be silent, Bonaventure says, a lie in itself is not necessarily a serious sin or a grave fault, even with reference to the virtue of truth. This virtue looks more to our willingness to tell the truth than to our continual enunciation of what is true. Though the pronouncing of a lie is repugnant to the act of saying what is true, even so, it is not opposed to the truth by which a man shuns the pernicious lie, which is a grave fault. A pernicious lie is contrary to the virtue of justice and, therefore, to the dictate of conscience. A jocose and a dutiful lie take a man away from justice, and so they take him away from his conscience rather than turn him against it. Conscience dictates, on the one hand, that something is true and, on the other, that something is to be said

<sup>16</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 38, un. 2, fa. 1-6 (III, 842; III, 850, fa. a-f); St. Augustine, *De mend.*, 8.11 (PL 40.496-97), 21.42 (PL 40.516).

<sup>17</sup> Loc. cit., Resp. "Etideo...", ad 4 (III, 843-45; III, 851-53); St. Augustine, *De mend.*, 14.25 (PL 40.505).

or that its opposite is not to be said. Although a man who says knowingly what is false acts directly against his conscience in dictating what is true, he does not act contrary to his conscience in dictating what he ought not to say, because this dictate directs the action of his will, while the other dictate regulates the judgment of his intellect.<sup>18</sup>

In Bonaventure's view, relying once again on Augustine, any lie whatsoever told by a perfect man is always a grave fault. By the perfect man, Bonaventure means theologically the holy man, who can lose eternal life even for a dutiful lie. Bonaventure also means philosophically the ruler of a State: he is to be believed in everything that he says, so that, if he lies in any way, he would not be believed, and thus he loses that faith or trust by which men and States are governed.<sup>19</sup> Relying on human reason, then, Bonaventure teaches that men holding public office have a special obligation not to lie because of the danger of scandal and the dictate of their conscience. As conservators of truth, they are bound not to lie by reason of their public trust. When such men are found out in a lie, no one will again believe them or accept anything that they say, and so they give an occasion of scandal to others. Men in public office ought to have a conscience that moves them not to say knowingly, for any reason, what is false. When they do say knowingly what is false, they commit a grave fault, or sin, both by going against their conscience and by actively scandalizing others. Men in public office, therefore, are bound to avoid every lie no matter how small it may be, lest they bring the truth into contempt. According to Bonaventure, this is what St. Augustine taught, who was especially a lover of truth, and every man who loves truth, Bonaventure adds, hates a lie with all his heart.<sup>20</sup>

The special obligation to be truthful extends to teachers, particularly of philosophy and theology. In this respect, Bonaventure compares truth and falsity to the knowledge of good and evil in the tree of Eden (Gn 2:17). Castigating the Averroists as false teachers, he maintains that those who love Scripture also love philosophy, which they use to strengthen the truth of faith. But philosophy is

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., un. 3, Resp., ad 4-5 (III, 846-47; III, 855-56).

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., un. 4, arg. 2 & 4 (III, 847-48; III, 857, fa. b & d); St. Augustine, *De mend.*, 6 (PL 40.494-95).

<sup>20</sup> Loc. cit., Resp. "Et propterea..." (III, 849; III, 859).

a tree of the knowledge of good and evil because the philosophers have mixed falsehood with the truth. Any man emulating them and propagating their errors is not a lover of Scripture. Bonaventure warns those studying philosophy to flee from everything which is contrary to the teaching of Christ. Any teacher, moreover, teaching falsehoods to his students opens to them a pit of error, and such a teacher is bound to make restitution. Every teacher, then, has an obligation to know the truth that he professes to teach, or at least to consult someone who is learned in and has the truth of his science.<sup>21</sup>

Bonaventure considers truth in many ways, but he takes it fundamentally as in the thing, which is said to be true, and in the human intellect, which knows the thing to be true.<sup>22</sup> Speaking formally of the nature of truth, he says that it is related to the subject or thing which it informs, to the principle which it represents, and to the intellect that it moves or excites. In relation to the thing, truth is the indivision or unity of act and potency. In relation to its principle, truth is a representation or imitation of the first and supreme unity, which is God. In relation to the intellect, truth is the ground of discernment and expression. Truth can be distinguished in each of these three ways from impurity and falsity. With regard to impurity, truth is found only in the Creator, in whom alone there is unity without diversity, imitation and similarity without dissimilarity, and expression of light without obscurity. With regard to falsity, which is a privation of unity, imitation and expression, truth is found in the creature because it has unity, imitation and expression. Truth is found in the creature, however, with a certain degree of falsity, i.e. with a mixture of diversity, dissimilarity and obscurity. Created truth, then, has a certain emptiness because it is founded on the mutable being of the creature.<sup>23</sup>

The truth of the divine unity is the immutable being or essence of God; but the imitation of divine truth is the Divine Word, who is truth itself and the perfect expression, representation and similarity of the Father. Defining truth, Bonaventure calls it the adequation of an intellect and a thing understood. This adequation is of the divine intellect as the cause of the thing which is understood. The adequation

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<sup>21</sup> 3 *Adv.* 2, "Quid dicemus... propter curiositatem." (IX, 62-63); cf. III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4 (III, 482; III, 472-73).

<sup>22</sup> I *Sent.*, d. 3, dub. 4 (I, 79-80; I, 57-58).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, Resp. (I, 151; I, 116-17); *Comm. Eccl.*, Prooem., n. 14, q. 2, Resp. "...est mutabilitati." (VI, 7).



is true when the thing fulfills the conditions of the different predicaments, i.e. the ten categories of Aristotle. Hence, created things are really true when their being conforms to the being that they have in the eternal art of God, or as He expresses them to Himself. But no creature in itself is adequated perfectly to the divine intellect, and so Augustine says that every creature is a lie, or has falsity, because it is an imperfect imitation of the divine unity. For Bonaventure, then, no thing which is adequated to the divine intellect is its own adequation, so that the divine truth is necessarily the truth of every creature. Having a certain degree of falsity, therefore, a creature is not its own truth and, though it has real truth, this cannot become known to the human intellect apart from the uncreated truth. Every created truth known by the human intellect is a likeness imitating the divine truth, which is the cause and exemplar of the truth found in things. In short, every true thing, inasmuch as it is true, comes from the first truth, which cannot lie, and thus no lie is true, but is something false.<sup>24</sup>

The significance of Bonaventure's view of truth, as it concerns us here, is that created truth is an imitation, expression and representation of the divine truth. Because a creature depends on God for its being, the truth of a creature in itself has a certain degree of falsity, thus making it possible for the human intellect to be deceived by a false adequation to a thing that it knows. Since the truth which is really in the creature, however, is a likeness imitating and expressing its perfect truth in God, the human intellect imitates the divine intellect and is truly adequated to it whenever the human mind knows the truth of a thing. This truth is known by the mind when it is truly adequated to the thing as it itself is adequated to the divine intellect. When a man lies, he increases the falsity not only of the thing that he knows, but also of his own intellect, which should be an imitation of the divine intellect. As a consequence, failing to imitate and to represent the Creator, such a man does violence to his rational nature, which is created expressly as a likeness of the divine nature. The rational creature alone is expressly assimilated, or made like, to God as His image, and the ground of this image is that the rational

<sup>24</sup> *Hexaëm.*, coll. 3, n. 8 (V, 344); *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, arg. 3, ad arg. 3 (I, 150-51; I, 116-17 fm. c, ad fm c); *Sc. Chr.*, q. 2, Resp. "Ad intelligentiam...", ad 9 (V, 8-10); *III Sent.*, d. 38, un. 1, fm. 4 (III, 839; III, 848, fm d). St. Augustine, *De vera relig.*, 36.66 (PL 34.151).

creature be an express likeness of the Creator.<sup>25</sup> Now every image involves imitation and expression of something else, so that the created image of God in man is an express imitation of the divine essence. Hence, as a rational creature, man is a conformed likeness of God and an express imitation or natural image of the Creator.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, for Bonaventure, our natural obligation to confess the truth is founded on the law of a rational nature created expressly as an image or an imitation of God. Each man is bound to be like God in regard to truth and to the words representing and expressing it to other men. Each man is also bound by the same law of his rational nature not to lie, but to shun all falsehood. Looking upon the nature of man in this way, Bonaventure affirms that there is in the human soul an innate hatred of what is false, a hatred apparent from the fact, as Augustine shows, of no man wanting to be deceived. This hatred arises from an innate love in the soul for what is true, a love evident from the fact, as Augustine also shows, of no man hating anything unless he loves its opposite. There is in the human soul especially, Bonaventure adds, a love of the divine truth, for the soul is created to know and to love the truth which is God.<sup>27</sup>

Since everything that God does and says is true, He cannot be the cause of a lie, which is a privation of truth; nor can He say anything that is false, which is a defect of truth, as malice is a defect or privation of goodness. God causes human speech, but not a lie falsifying it, just as He causes human actions, but not the evil vitiating them. In other words, the natural and essential goodness of a human action is not destroyed by the privation of its moral and accidental goodness. Likewise, the essential truth of human speech is not destroyed by the privation of its accidental truth. The essential truth is that which is represented by the spoken words: they always signify the thing for which they were instituted. The accidental truth is that which represents a thing as it is, or the adequation of speech and the thing that it signifies. A statement is true or false, as Aristotle

<sup>25</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, fm. 5 (III, 37; III, 32, fm. e); d. 32, un. 2, ad 2 (III, 701; III, 701): cf. *I Sent.*, d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, fm. 3 (I, 541; I, 430, fm. c).

<sup>26</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, con. 4, Resp. (I, 540; I, 429-30, con. d); d. 27, p. 2, dub. 2 (I, 491; I, 391): cf. d. 26, dub. 6 (I, 463; I, 388). For Bonaventure's formal treatment of man, or the human person, as a natural image of God see: *III Sent.*, d. 16 (III, 393-408; III, 404-20).

<sup>27</sup> *M. Trin.*, q. 1, a. 1, fm. 9 (V, 46). St. Augustine, *Confess.*, 10.23.33 (PL 32.793-94); *De civ. Dei*, 14.7.2 (PL 41.410-11).

indicates, according as the spoken words represent or do not represent a thing as it is, or as it is represented by the words themselves. Just as injustice is a privation of rectitude, so also falsity is a defect of adequation; but neither the injustice of an action nor the falsity of a statement is to be attributed to God, who cannot be the cause of evil.<sup>28</sup>

Whenever a man lies, therefore, or says anything false, he alone is the cause of his evil intention or the falsity of his words. Because he does not imitate God, in whose image he is made, such a man departs from God, and so vitiates the divine image in which the law of his nature is grounded. When a man confesses the truth, however, he is following the law of his rational nature and the guidance of the divine image by imitating God, who is the first cause of all truth. It is in accordance with this understanding of the law of human nature that we can now set down certain guidelines from St. Bonaventure on our natural obligation to tell the truth and, consequently, not to lie or to give false testimony.

As a being with a rational nature, man is created expressly as a likeness and image of God, with an innate capacity to imitate God by a unity in truth and goodness. Man achieves this unity by fulfilling the dictates of natural law, which is rooted in his nature as an image of God. The law of human nature inclines man rightly toward moral truth by his conscience and orders him rightly toward moral goodness by his natural instinct of synderesis. Because truth is implanted naturally in the human mind, man knows innately by his conscience the first moral truths, or the primary dictates of natural law, and he observes them instinctively by his natural stimulus of synderesis. All men, then, are bound instinctively to follow the dictates of natural law, which are known innately, to be just and truthful with respect to God and neighbour. We are bound in the same way to acknowledge and to confess interiorly our offences against God and our neighbour, especially a friend, and to seek due reconciliation with those whom we have offended. Consequently, guided by the virtue of truth, we know innately by our conscience from the natural law what we are bound instinctively by synderesis to do or not to do in truth and in goodness before God and men. To act thus in a specific or particular

<sup>28</sup> II *Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2, q. 3, sc. 1-4, Resp. "...attribuendus est." (II, 874; II, 907-08, sc. a-d); cf. d. 1, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2 (II, 40; II, 32); I *Sent.*, d. 36, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4 (I, 629; I, 501). Aristotle, *Categoriae*, 5 (4b3-12).

way, however, we must acquire a knowledge of natural law as a collection of precepts, such as the ten commandments, which are an explicit statement of our obligations in truth and in justice toward God and our neighbour. These obligations, summed up in love, require us to do good and not to do evil. In particular, we are bound to manifest a reverence for the supreme truth and a love for the supreme good by confessing the truth in the name of God and by not taking His name in vain, or swearing a false oath. When a man commits perjury, he violates the natural law and offends God not only by invoking His name to confirm what is false, but also by failing to confess the truth, thus going against his conscience and his rational nature, and so doing an injustice to God, whom he ought to imitate. The evil of perjury, violating the virtues of truth and justice, also injures our neighbour by false testimony, whether it be deliberate, from an erroneous conscience, or an assertion as true of what is in doubt. We are bound by natural law, therefore, to be certain that what we affirm under oath is certainly true.

Natural law binds us also in justice on every other occasion to tell the truth to and about our neighbour. The law binds us never to tell a lie, which is essentially evil, always wrong, and harmful to our neighbour. Taken essentially, a complete lie is a false use of speech with an intention to deceive. The evil of such a lie, as a privation of truth, consists in an inadequation of the speaker's intention and his speech along with an inadequation of his words and the things that they ought to signify. Either of these two inadequations alone constitutes an incomplete lie, especially the intention to deceive, but not the sole intention or act of concealing the truth, nor a false statement made from an honest belief that it is true. The pernicious lie, which is opposed directly to the virtues of truth and justice, is the most harmful because, violating the dictate of conscience, it has the intention of lying and of doing harm, particularly when it imputes a crime falsely to an innocent man. Since every lie is an abuse of the nature of speech, which is intended to communicate truth, no lie can be right or be made good for any reason, except ignorance, not even by God, who is truth itself and cannot deny what is true. As rational beings, therefore, we are bound by natural law never to lie, but always to be honest and truthful in our speech by imitating God, who is the cause of truth and cannot be the cause of a lie. This obligation binds in a special way men who hold a public office or who profess to teach the truth. Representing God by reason of their office or profession,



public officials and teachers are conservators of truth and receivers of the highest trust. They should be true to their conscience and avoid even the least lie lest they harm the common good by scandal and destroy their sacred trust by bringing the truth into contempt. Teachers in particular are bound to know the truth that they profess to teach and, if they teach what is false, must make restitution to their students. Both teachers and public officials are obliged to be lovers of truth and to hate every lie with all their heart.

In sum, the fundamental ground of our natural obligation to confess the truth and not to lie is our innate love of the divine truth. We have been created to know and to love this truth, which is expressed, represented and imitated by every other truth. Each created thing is true according as it is adequated to the supreme truth in the divine intellect. The human intellect is true according as it is adequated to the supreme truth by the mediation of the truth of the things that it knows. A man is true in his speech when his words truly express and represent the adequation of his intellect to the divine intellect. When a man has and manifests a true adequation to the source of all truth, he truly imitates God in mind and in speech, thus fulfilling the law directing the thoughts and actions of each man as a natural image and likeness of God.

*Pontifical Institute  
of Mediaeval Studies  
Toronto, Ontario*

JOHN F. QUINN, C.S.B.

## SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BURLEY-OCKHAM DISPUTE

The dispute between Walter Burley and William of Ockham over supposition and signification has been discussed often in the literature.<sup>1</sup> For the most part, the philosophical — as distinguished from the textual — side of this discussion has centered on those aspects of the dispute which are based on the metaphysical disagreements between the two men. From this point of view, the main question in the debate is "For what does a common term stand when it stands in simple supposition?" Burley, the realist,<sup>2</sup> maintained that such a term stands for what it signifies, namely, a common nature outside the mind.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Ockham the conceptualist could not

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Philotheus Boehner, *Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 - c. 1400* (Manchester: University Press, 1952), pp. 40, 48; and William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 265-271. On the chronology of the Burley-Ockham dispute, with references to further literature and an edition of one of the relevant texts, see Stephen F. Brown, "Walter Burleigh's Treatise *De Suppositionibus* and Its Influence on William of Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*, 32 (1972), 15-64.

<sup>2</sup> On Burley's realism, see Herman Shapiro, "A Note on Walter Burley's Exaggerated Realism," *Franciscan Studies*, 20 (1960), 205-214; and his "More on the 'Exaggeration' of Burley's Realism," *Manuscripta*, 6 (1962), 94-98.

<sup>3</sup> See Walter Burleigh, *De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior, with a Revised Edition of the Tractatus Brevior*, Philotheus Boehner, ed. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), tract. long., tr. I, pars 1, c. 1, p. 3 lines 24 f.: "Suppositio vero simplex est, quando terminus communis vel singulare aggregatum supponit pro eo quod significat." (Henceforth, references to *De Puritate* will be to the *Tractatus Longior*, tract 1, pars 1.) The parallel passage in *De Suppositionibus* is par. 2.3 of Brown's edition. That a common term stands for a common nature is argued, *De Puritate*, c. 3, p. 8 lines 1-7: "Item, hoc nomen 'homo' significat aliquid primo, et non significat primo Sortem nec Platonem; quia sic audiens hanc vocem et sciens, quid per hanc vocem significaretur, determinate et distincte intelligeret Sortem, quod est falsum; ergo hoc nomen 'homo' non significat primo aliquid singulare; ergo significat primo commune; et illud commune est species; ergo illud, quod primo significatur hoc nomine 'homo' est species." In the lines immediately following this text (*ibid.*, lines 8-29), Burley says that it makes no difference to the argument whether the common species

accept such a position; in his ontology there were simply no common natures outside the mind. For him, therefore, a common term in simple supposition stands for the universal concept *in* the mind.<sup>4</sup>

This much of the dispute then is based on the metaphysical disagreement over whether there exist common natures outside the mind. It is this metaphysical side of the dispute that is usually brought out in recent discussions.

But there is quite another question too at issue between Burley and Ockham, one the answer to which is restricted but not totally fixed by their respective metaphysical views. It is: "Disregarding the question what we are to posit at the one end of the relation of simple supposition, which kind of supposition is it in which a term stands for what it signifies?" For Burley it is simple supposition, for Ockham personal. As will be seen, this issue has epistemological implications. It is this side of the dispute that I want to explore here.

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be a thing outside the soul or the concept in the soul. But in the next argument (*ibid.*, lines 30-34) it is clear that Burley thinks the concept is ruled out on other grounds: "Item, haec est vera, secundum quod subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem: 'Homo est substantia secunda'. Si tamen subiectum supponeret pro intentione in anima, esset falsa, quia intentio in anima est accidens, et accidens nec est substantia prima nec secunda."

<sup>4</sup> William Ockham, *Summa Logicae* I, Philotheus Boehner, ed., (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1957), c. 64, lines 27-38: "Suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative. Verbi gratia sic dicendo: 'Homo est species,' iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro intentione animae, quia illa intentio est species, et tamen iste terminus 'homo' non significat proprie loquendo illam intentionem, sed illa vox et illa intentio animae sunt tantum signa subordinata in significando idem, secundum modum alibi expositum. Ex hoc patet falsitas opinionis communiter dicentium, quod suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato; quia suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae proprie non est significatum termini, quia terminus talis significat veras res et non intentiones animae." On Ockham's supposition theory in general, see John J. Swiniarski, "A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of Some Contemporary Criticisms," *Franciscan Studies*, 30 (1970), 181-217. On the relation of Ockham's metaphysics to his philosophy of language, see also Teodoro de Andr s, *El nominalismo de Guillermo de Ockham como filosof a del lenguaje* ("Bibliotheca Hisp nica de Filosof a"; Madrid: Editorial gredos, S.A., 1969). The new critical edition of Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, by Gedeon G l and Stephen F. Brown, (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1974), was not yet available to me at the time of writing.

## I

The theory of supposition is, at least to a large extent, a *semantic* theory. It is a theory of the relation between terms and their referents.<sup>5</sup> Signification, insofar as it enters into this theory, is a semantic relation. But it would be a mistake to view signification solely in semantic terms. For a mediaeval, signification was primarily an *epistemological* relation. The early development of the notion of signification has been traced in some detail by De Rijk.<sup>6</sup> Although the details are not needed for the present paper, some elementary points will clear the way for further discussion in sections II and III, below.

Aristotle and Augustine, among others, contributed to the view of signification as an epistemological relation. In *De Interpretatione*, 3 (16b19–22), while discussing verbs, Aristotle observes that, like nouns, they too signify, “for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer’s mind, and fixes his attention” (Oxford translation). In Boethius’ Latin version, the whole passage reads: “Ipsa quidem secundum se dicta nomina sunt et significant aliquid. Constituit enim qui dicit intellectum et qui audit quiescit.”<sup>7</sup> To signify, then, is

<sup>5</sup> Burley, to be sure, gives a syntactic description (*De Puritate*, c. 1, p. 1 lines 25–27): “Suppositio communiter accepta est proprietas termini ad aliud terminum in propositione comparati.” The parallel passage in *De Suppositionibus* occurs in par. 2.01: “Et ideo dicendum quod suppositio est proprietas extremi secundum quod unum extremum ordinatur ad aliud in propositione....” See the discussion of this text in Brown, op. cit., pp. 19–21. I suspect this description is the basis for E. A. Moody’s rather confusing remarks about supposition’s being a syntactic relation of term to term, rather than a semantic relation of term to thing. See his *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1952), p. 22. Moody is not entirely self-consistent, however. See *ibid.*, p. 11. Moody’s remarks in these places are responsible for a certain confusion in the literature over what kind of a relation supposition is. One result of this confusion is the view that the mediaevals had a “syntactic” view of truth. See, e.g., Alfonso Maierù, “Il problema della verità nelle opere di Guglielmo Heytesbury,” *Studi Medievali*, serie terza, 7 (1966), 40–74, especially p. 46. On the other hand, at *De Puritate*, c. 1, p. 2, lines 12 f., Burley gives a general definition of supposition that makes it clear that he thinks of it as a semantic relation: “Suppositio generaliter dicta est acceptio termini pro aliquo, scilicet pro re vel pro voce vel pro conceptu.”

<sup>6</sup> L. M. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*, vol. II (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967), especially Part I, chs. 4–5.

<sup>7</sup> Boethius, *In Peri Hermeneias II*, Carolus Meisner, ed., (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880), I, c. 3, p. 71, lines 4–7.



"constituere intellectum" — to establish an understanding. The term is often glossed this way in the Middle Ages.<sup>8</sup> To take just two examples: (1) Abelard, in his *Glosses on Porphyry*, writes: "universals seem to derive no meaning [*i.e.*, *signification*] from things, particularly since they constitute no understanding of any thing"<sup>9</sup> ("nullo de rebus significationem contrahere videntur universalia, praesertim cum nullum de re aliqua constituent intellectum");<sup>10</sup> (2) John Buridan, in the opening chapter of his *Sophismata*, writes: "Signifying is described as that which establishes the understanding of a thing. So a word is said to signify that, the understanding of which it establishes for us"<sup>11</sup> ("Significare describitur quod est intellectum rei constituere. Ideo vox dicitur illud significare cujus intellectum nobis constituit.")<sup>12</sup>

A second source for the mediaeval view of signification as an epistemological relation is Augustine, especially the *De Doctrina Christiana*. There he defines a sign as follows:<sup>13</sup> "A sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes on the senses" ("Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire.")<sup>14</sup> With the exception of the additional proviso about

<sup>8</sup> For the early period, see De Rijk, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Richard McKeon, tr., in his *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 235. The insertion is mine.

<sup>10</sup> Bernard Geyer, ed., *Logica 'Ingredientibus': Die Glossen zu Porphyrius*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Bd. 21, Ht. 1, p. 18, lines 16 f.

<sup>11</sup> John Buridan, *Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, Theodore Kermit Scott, tr., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 67.

<sup>12</sup> John Buridan, *Sophismata Buridani*, ([Paris]: Jean Lambert for Denis Roce, [after 1500?]), no folio numbers (Copinger 1378). Copy at the Lilly Library, Indiana University.

<sup>13</sup> Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, D. W. Robertson, Jr., tr. ("The Library of Liberal Arts"; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 34.

<sup>14</sup> Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, Joseph Martin, ed., ("Corpus Christianorum Series Latina," v. 32; Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1962), II, c. 1, lines 5-7. In addition, Augustine's distinction between "thing" and "sign," in *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 2, was quoted in Peter Lombard's influential *Sentences*, I, d. 1. Although neither Augustine's quoted text nor Lombard's discussion makes the explicit point that signification is an epistemological relation, the passage was often read this way. Thus, e.g., in Aquinas' *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 1, divisio textus (R. P. Mandonnet, ed., Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929, p. 30), we read: "Primo ponit divisionem eorum de quibus agendum est, in res et signa, quae ad cognitionem rerum ducunt." (My emphasis.)

sense impressions, this definition conforms with the Aristotelian one. A sign signifies (is a sign of) what it makes us think of or understand. Thus signification is primarily an epistemological, not a semantical, relation. To construe the 'significatio' of a term as, for instance, its Fregean "sense" only obscures this mediaeval usage.

Both Burley and Ockham make use of this epistemological notion of signification. Ockham distinguishes a broad and a narrow sense of 'signify':<sup>15</sup>

...you should know that 'sign' is taken in two ways. In one way for all that which when apprehended makes something else come into cognition, although it does not make the mind come into a first cognition of it (as is shown elsewhere), but into an actual cognition of it after a habitual one. And in this way a spoken word signifies naturally, just as every effect signifies at least its cause, and just as also the barrel-hoop over the door signifies wine in the tavern. But I am not speaking about signs in such a general way here. In another way 'sign' is taken for that which makes something come into cognition, and is apt to stand for that thing, or be added to such, in a sentence... And taking the word 'sign' in this way, a spoken word is a natural sign of nothing.

Burley, on the other hand, does not explicitly discuss signification in the readily available texts. But it is clear from one of his objections to Ockham that he too thinks of signification as an epistemological relation:<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Ockham, *op. cit.* I, 1, lines 53-65: "...est sciendum, quod 'signum' dupliciter accipitur: Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud in cognitionem facit venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualement eiusdem. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam, sicut etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Sed tam generaliter non loquor hic de signo. Aliter accipitur 'signum' pro illo, quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione... Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est signum naturale." The translation is mine. On Ockham's theory of signification, see Philotheus Boehner, "Ockham's Theory of Signification," *Franciscan Studies*, 6 (1946), 143-170, reprinted in his *Collected Articles on Ockham*, Eligius M. Buytaert, ed. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1958), pp. 201-232. A more recent account may be found in Swiniarski, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-187.

<sup>16</sup> Burley, *De Puritate*, c. 3, p. 8, lines 1-5. For the Latin, see above, n. 3. This and the following translation are my own.

Again, this name 'man' signifies something first, and it does not first signify Socrates, nor Plato. For if that were so, someone who hears this word and who knows what is signified by this word would determinately and distinctly understand Socrates, which is false. Therefore, this name 'man' does not first signify any singular.

Again:<sup>17</sup>

But the man who imposed signification on this name 'man' did not know me nor John who is now present, and thus this name 'man' does not signify me nor John now present.

For Ockham, the term 'man' does not signify any nature common to all men, but rather individual men—either all individual men now existing or all past, present, future and merely possible men.<sup>18</sup> Burley objects that he who hears the word 'man' need not thereby be made to understand this particular man, for instance, Socrates. Moreover, the man who originally imposed signification on the term did not know and was not thinking of particular men who are existing only now.<sup>19</sup> The force of these objections depends on taking signification as the epistemological relation described above: terms signify what they make us think of or understand.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., lines 15–17: "Sed ille qui imposuit hoc nomen 'homo' ad significandum non cognovit me nec Joannem nunc praesentem; ergo hoc nomen 'homo' non significat me vel Joannem nunc praesentem."

<sup>18</sup> This is in accordance with the first two senses, respectively, of 'to signify' listed in *Summa Logicae* I, 33: "'Significare' multipliciter accipitur apud logicos. Nam uno modo dicitur signum aliquid significare, quando supponit vel natum est supponere pro illo, ita scilicet, quod de pronomine demonstrante illud per hoc verbum 'est', illud nomen praedicatur. Et sic 'album' significat Sortem; haec enim est vera: 'Iste est albus,' demonstrando Sortem. Sic etiam 'rationale' significat hominem; haec enim est vera: 'Iste est rationalis,' demonstrando hominem. Et sic de multis aliis concretis. Aliter accipitur 'significare', quando illud signum in aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro vel del praesenti vel in aliqua propositione vera de modo potest pro illo supponere. Et sic 'album' non tantum significat illud, quod nunc est album, sed illud quod potest esse album; nam in ista propositione: 'Album potest currere,' accipiendo subiectum pro eo, quod potest esse, subiectum supponit pro his, quae possunt esse alba." (lines 1–15). Note that these descriptions are given, via supposition, in purely semantic terms.

<sup>19</sup> This objection applies only to 'to signify' taken in the second of the two senses described above.

## II

Hence for the antagonists in our dispute, the question which kind of supposition a term has when it stands for what it signifies reduces to the question which kind of supposition a term has when it stands for what it makes us think of or understand. For Burley, it is simple supposition, where a term stands for a common nature.<sup>20</sup> For Ockham, of course, there are no common natures; in simple supposition a term stands for a concept. This much of the dispute between the two men can be accounted for by their opposing metaphysical views. But Ockham goes further than this. He insists that it is in personal and not simple supposition that a term stands for what it signifies.

This is an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one. Ockham's conceptualism would not have been compromised in the slightest if he had said that it is in simple supposition that terms stand for what they signify. The disagreement would then have been only that for Ockham terms signify concepts, whereas for Burley they signify common natures. But Ockham does not do this. He insists that terms do not signify the concepts to which they are subordinated, but rather the individuals falling under those concepts.<sup>21</sup>

It would not have been at all novel for Ockham to have said that terms signify concepts. Indeed, Aristotle says (*De Interpretatione* I, 16a3f.): "Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience" (Oxford translation).<sup>22</sup> Boethius interprets this as a signification relation, and takes the "mental experiences" to be concepts (*intellectus*).<sup>23</sup> The

<sup>20</sup> See above, n. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Ockham, op. cit., I, 1, lines 25-29: "Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significant ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem, quae per conceptus mentis significantur." See also Ockham, *In Peri Hermeneias*, c. 1, in Philotheus Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," *Traditio*, 4 (1946), 307-335 at p. 320: "Dicit tamen Philosophus, quod vox est nota passionis animae propter quendam ordinem eorum in significando, quia primo passio significat res, et secundo vox significat non passionem animae, sed easdem res, quas significat passio."

<sup>22</sup> Boethius' Latin translation (op. cit., p. 25, lines 6 f.) is "Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae."

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 29 lines 13-16: "Quare recta Aristotelis sententia est: quaecumque in verbis nominibusque versantur, ea neque sensus neque imaginationes, sed



basic view here is that the role of language is to express thought. When one hears another's words, he knows what the other is thinking. In this way, then, a term serves to make us think of the speaker's concept. That is, terms signify the speaker's concepts to the hearer.<sup>24</sup>

This same rationale is expressed by Augustine (*De Doctrina Christiana*, II, 2):<sup>25</sup>

Conventional signs are those which living creatures show to one another for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able, the motion of their spirits or something which they have sensed or understood. Nor is there any other reason for signifying, or for giving signs, except for bringing forth and transferring to another mind the action of the mind in the person who makes the sign.

Aquinas too upholds this position:<sup>26</sup>

Now if man were by nature a solitary animal the passions of the soul by which he was conformed to things so as to have knowledge of them would be sufficient for him; but since he is by nature a political and social animal it was necessary that his conceptions be made known to others. This he does through vocal sound. Therefore there had to be significant vocal sounds in order that men might live together. Whence those who speak different languages find it difficult to live together in social unity.

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solum significare intellectuum qualitatem." For a discussion, see De Rijk, op. cit., Part I, pp. 177-182.

<sup>24</sup> The plausibility of this view depends on the speaker's being distinct from the hearer. There is little if any reason to think that when a speaker hears his own words, he is made to think of his own concepts. Nor, for that matter, is there any good reason to think that a speaker's words need make *him* think of anything at all. One might hold that words express thoughts, but then the thoughts are prior to their expression, and are not caused by the utterances of the words.

<sup>25</sup> Robertson translation, pp. 34 f. ("Data vero signa sunt, quae sibi quaeque uiuentia inuicem dant ad demonstrandos, quantum possunt, motus animi sui uel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet. Nec ulla causa est nobis significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depromendum et traiciendum in alterius animum id, quo animo gerit, qui signum dat." Martin, ed., lines 1-6.)

<sup>26</sup> In *Peri Hermeneias* I, c. 1, lect. II, from Jean T. Oesterle, tr., *Aristotle: On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962), p. 24. ("Et si quidem homo esset naturaliter animal solitarium, sufficerent sibi animae passiones, quibus ipsis rebus conformaretur, ut earum notitiam in se haberet; sed quia homo est animal naturaliter *politicum* et *socialis*, necesse fuit quod conceptiones unius hominis innotescerent aliis, quod

On the other hand, by maintaining that terms do not signify the concepts to which they are subordinated (which they express) but rather extramental realities, Ockham commits himself to a somewhat different perspective on the role of language. It is thought of not so much as a tool for conveying one's thoughts to another, but as a tool for learning about extramental realities. In short, the *social* role of language is eclipsed by Ockham's view.<sup>27</sup> Burley held a similar position.<sup>28</sup>

### III

But while the social aspect of language is left relatively unemphasized by both Ockham and Burley, their close interweaving of the theory of signification with the theory of supposition served to underscore another side of language. Supposition theory, I have said, is a semantic theory of reference — a theory about the relation between language and what we are talking about by means of language. On the other hand, signification is primarily an epistemological relation.

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fit per vocem; et ideo necesse fuit esse voces significativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem conviverent. Unde illi, qui sunt diversarum linguarum, non possunt bene convivere ad invicem." Leonine edition, p. 11.)

<sup>27</sup> This is not to suggest, of course, that Ockham ever *denied* this social role of language. The matter is rather one of emphasis.

<sup>28</sup> *Burlei super Artem Veterem Porphirii et Aristotelis* (Venice: Otinus (de Luna) Papiensis, 11 May 1497), no folio numbers. (Goff B-1313). Copy at the Lilly Library, Indiana University. The passage is in Burley's commentary on *De Interpretatione* 1, 163f.: "Secundo est intellegendum quod nomen et verbum significare passiones animae dupliciter potest intellegi. Uno modo quod nomen et verbum significant passiones animae tanquam illa quae imponuntur primo ad significandum. Alio modo potest intellegi quod significant passiones animae tanquam illa mediantibus quibus imponuntur ad significandum. Primo modo non est necessarium nomen et verbum significare passiones animae...." Two arguments are given for this. Then: "Secundo modo dico quod nomina et verba significant passiones animae.... Et dico illud loquendo de nominibus primae intentionis, quod illa non imponuntur primo ad significandum passiones animae. Bene tamen est possibile quod aliquod nomen significet passionem animae, ut nomina secundae intentionis, etiam huiusmodi voces 'passio animae' 'similitudo rei in anima' et sic de similibus. Boethius tamen dicit hic quod vox non significat primo rem extra sed aliquid in anima et ex consequenti significat rem extra. Sed credo quod non sic intellegitur quod vox non primo imponitur. Si vero primo significat aliquid in anima non est necesse quod significet illud tanquam illud cui imponitur primo sed tanquam illud quod primo movet intellectum ad imponendum nomen rei intellectae."

By weaving these two theories so closely together, Burley and Ockham gave in effect not just an account of reference (the semantic side), and not just an account of knowledge (the epistemological side), but also an account of *how we can know and learn things through language*. The dispute between Burley and Ockham, then, is not just a dispute between realism and conceptualism, but also a dispute over how — in what way — language can be enlisted to do epistemological duty.

For Burley, it is the semantic relation of simple supposition that was given an epistemological role. It is only in simple supposition that a term stands for what it signifies. Hence it is only in cases of simple supposition that we are talking about what we understand by the terms.

But, pushed to its conclusion, this view seems to mean that it is only in the context of simple supposition that we know what we are talking about. It is only in cases of simple supposition that we can learn anything through language — that is, only cases of sentences such as ‘Man is a species,’ ‘Animal is a genus.’<sup>29</sup> And this to the *exclusion* of such sentences as ‘This cat is on the mat,’ which does not teach us anything about this particular cat, since the term ‘cat’ does not signify particular cats but rather the common nature.

Such a doctrine reflects the Aristotelian–Arab epistemology that grew up in thirteenth-century Scholasticism, and according to which “*understanding* is of universals,” that is, of common natures, “but *sensation* is of particulars.”<sup>30</sup> In such a doctrine — Thomism, for instance — the apparent fact that we do have knowledge about individuals was a difficult point.<sup>31</sup>

Burley’s account of the relation between signification and supposition, then, reflects well this view of knowledge. Now, as yet we know very little about Burley’s epistemology, but there are some grounds nevertheless for believing that in fact he did *not* hold such a doctrine, that he allowed for intellectual knowledge of singulars.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Difficulties might perhaps — but not necessarily — arise over the predicates of these sentences, which seem to be in personal supposition, and thus not to stand for what we understand by them. The details of Burley’s doctrine in this area need further study.

<sup>30</sup> “Intellectus est universalium, sensus autem particularium.” For a valuable discussion of the issues surrounding this dictum, see Sebastian J. Day, *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1947).

<sup>31</sup> See *ibid.*, especially Part I.

<sup>32</sup> See Herman Shapiro, “A Note on Walter Burley’s Exaggerated Realism,”

If this should turn out to be so, it will be hard to reconcile with his views on supposition and signification.

For Ockham, on the other hand, we do have a direct knowledge of individuals — indeed, in his view there is nothing else to be known. And this fact is reflected in his account of the relation between signification and supposition. Since there are no common natures for Ockham, terms in simple supposition stand for the concepts to which they are subordinated. Thus, if, as for Burley, terms stood in *simple* supposition for what they signify, we would be back with the social view of language as a tool to convey one's thoughts to another. On the other hand, the use of words in language clearly makes us understand and think of more than utterances and inscriptions; that is the difference between knowing the language and merely hearing it. Hence, it is not *material* supposition in which terms stand for what they signify. There remains only *personal* supposition. Thus for Ockham it is the semantic relation of personal supposition that is given an epistemological role.

This has the effect of expanding the power of language to serve as a vehicle of knowledge. While for both Burley and Ockham, only certain items can be the referent of a term in material or simple supposition, in Ockham's view anything whatever can be the referent of some term in personal supposition. Thus, just as Ockham in a sense extends our power of knowing by allowing us an intellectual knowledge of singular things, so too he extends the power of language to serve as a vehicle for knowledge of anything in his ontology.

*Indiana University*  
*Bloomington, Indiana*

PAUL VINCENT SPADE

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*Franciscan Studies*, 20 (1960), especially pp. 212–214. Shapiro's point is perhaps confirmed by the *De Potentiis Animae*, pars. 135–136. See M. Jean Kitchel, "The 'De Potentiis Animae' of Walter Burley," *Mediaeval Studies*, 33 (1971), 85–113 at p. 111: "Istud tamen videtur falsum quia, per Philosophum, sensus est singularium et intellectus, universalium. Intellectus autem non intelligit singulare, et sic non omne ens est intelligibile ab intellectu. Ad istud dicendum quod sensus cognoscet singulare appropriate, et ibi est appropriatio a parte sensus, quia sensus cognoscit singulare et nihil nisi singulare. Sed intellectus cognoscit universale appropriate, et ibi est appropriatio a parte universalis. Intellectus enim sic cognoscit universale, quod universale non cognoscitur nisi ab intellectu. Unde quod dicitur quod sensus est singularium et intellectus universalium. Hoc debet intelligi appropriate modo quo dictum est."



## OCKHAM AND HIS CRITICS ON: INTUITIVE COGNITION

It is sometimes thought that concern with epistemological questions marks the philosophic pastime of only modern and contemporary philosophers. That medieval thinkers did not ask themselves the so-called "critical" epistemological question of Kant is certainly true enough; but it would be quite rash to conclude that, therefore, they were not interested in many important and non-peripheral questions centering on the acquisition of empirical knowledge. One such question is how to obtain from perceptual experience propositions which are premises for empirical knowledge, and, as Bertrand Russell has remarked in his typical pellucid manner, this question "is difficult and complicated, but fundamental for any empirical theory of knowledge."<sup>1</sup>

In general, one can trace two distinct traditions within medieval philosophic literature on this question. One tradition — represented most competently, perhaps, by Thomas Aquinas — explains the process of getting from the sensible particular to the universal object of knowledge as a process of abstraction.<sup>2</sup> The mind assimilates the sensible particular to itself through a process of "image making." The images are less specific and more general than the particular object itself, although, in their initial stages, the images are, indeed, sensible. At some point in the abstractive process the mind can actually abstract from all sensible features of the image and produce a purely "intelligible image." The intelligible species becomes, of course, the universal thought or meaning which is that object by means of which the material particular is known.

The second tradition asserts that this process of abstraction is

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<sup>1</sup> *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1940) p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas' views on abstraction can be gathered from several sources: *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 26, 54, 65; II, 91. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 85. *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*, A. I. Our statement of the view is necessarily sketchy, since we are not primarily concerned with the theory of abstraction.

really unnecessary, and we do not need to hypothesize the existence of sensible or intelligible species as intermediaries between the mind that knows and the object known. This second theory asserts that we can have direct knowledge of the material particular and can form universal concepts without the postulation of any sensible or intelligible species. The act of direct apprehension of the material particular is called by the proponents of this view, "intuitive cognition."<sup>3</sup> William of Ockham is probably the best known representative of the theory of intuitive cognition and its relationship to the propositions of empirical science.<sup>4</sup>

I would like, in the remainder of this paper, to review the central points of Ockham's theory and then attempt a response to two recent critics of Ockham's notion of intuitive cognition. Although I do not pretend to be able to improve upon the accounts of Ockham's doctrine of intuitive cognition as given by Boehner<sup>5</sup> and Day,<sup>6</sup> I think there are several interpretational ambiguities, arising, doubtless, out of Ockham's sometimes rather sparse account, which have, in some measure, been responsible for the apparent success of his critics. It will suffice for my purpose to concentrate upon removing some of these ambiguities. It is hoped that, in doing this, my account will remain faithful to Ockham's intentions, if not always to his actual words.

Ockham presents a rather concise definition of "intuitive cognition": "Intuitiva est illa (cognitio) mediante qua cognoscitur res esse, quando est, et non esse, quando non est."<sup>7</sup> We must elaborate the

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<sup>3</sup> We ought not to be put off by this use of the term "intuitiva," for in its original sense, the term has a clear *perceptual* reference (from "intueri," to gaze at, pay attention to). Ockham's use of the term is, thus, etymologically more accurate than contemporary connotations surrounding the notion of "intuition." Also, it might be noted, Ockham's use of the term is sanctioned by Kant's similar use of this term.

<sup>4</sup> Although Ockham is probably the best known representative of the theory of intuitive cognition, the theory is discussed, at great length by several of his predecessors and contemporaries. For example, Duns Scotus: *Opus Oxoniense*, IV, dist. 45, q. 3. See also: Petrus Aureolus, *Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum* (Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M. Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.) Vol. I, Prologue, q. 1.

<sup>5</sup> P. Boehner, "The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents According to Ockham," *Traditio*, 1 (1943), and, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," *Traditio* 4 (1946).

<sup>6</sup> S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1957).

<sup>7</sup> *Reportatio*, Q. 15, E, as edited by Boehner (*Traditio*, 1, 1943), p. 248.

meaning of this definition in the light of what Ockham says elsewhere concerning intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition amounts to the evidential justification for making true existential judgments. That is to say, if someone were to challenge an existential knowledge claim, I would, naturally, appeal to intuitive cognition for the justification of my claim to know that something exists, or, alternatively, that something does not exist. Having said this, let us attempt to remove several ambiguities in Ockham's definition.

(1) If we understand "quando" in the sense of "si" (i.e. non-temporally, but merely logically) then it is clear that Ockham will allow that we can have an intuitive knowledge of things which exist, but which are not present to my immediate perception.<sup>8</sup> This, I think, is the correct interpretation; for it is quite obvious that we can have genuine knowledge of existential propositions which are in the past and future tenses, and which are about non-presently existing objects. Ockham says precisely this, it seems to me, in his conclusions to the sixth of his sixth set of quodlibetal questions, which asks: "Whether there can be intuitive knowledge of a non-existent object":

To the principal argument I say that it is a contradiction for sight to be and for that which is seen not to be in effect and for it not to be able to be; therefore, it is a contradiction that a chimaera be seen intuitively (the point here is that "Chimaera," for Ockham, is a *logical contradiction*, and, hence, *cannot* be seen). But it is not a contradiction that that which is seen be nothing in actuality outside the mind, so long as it can be in effect, or was at some time in the universe. It is thus in the question proposed. Whence God saw from eternity all makeable things, and yet none were from eternity.<sup>9</sup> (Parenthetical remark mine.)

Ockham sometimes refers to this intuitive cognition of non-presently existing objects as "imperfect."<sup>10</sup> The precise sense in which it ought to be imperfect is not at all clear, however. Perhaps

<sup>8</sup> Elsewhere, speaking of Aristotle's principle: "Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse," Ockham insists that the "quando" ought to be interpreted logically, for, if interpreted temporally, "it is simply false." (Cf. *Expositio super Primum Librum Periermenias*, c. 9m). Similarly, see: Petrus de Alliaco, *Quaestiones super Libros Sententiarum*, (Unveränders Nachdruck, Frankfurt, 1968) I, dist. 35, q. ii, G.

<sup>9</sup> Translated by Richard McKeon in *Selections from Medieval Philosophers* (Scribners, N.Y., 1958), II, 374-375.

<sup>10</sup> "Ex dictis apparet differentia inter cognitionem intuitivam perfectam:

it is imperfect in a kind of psychological sense, i.e. in the amount of certainty which we might be willing to ascribe to the belief accompanying the knowledge.<sup>11</sup> As far as logical justification is concerned, however, we are no less justified in saying that we know non-presently existing objects, so long as it is true that these objects have existed, or can, or will exist and that the basis for the resultant existential judgment is intuitive cognition. Logical justification of knowledge claims is quite independent of the psychological certainty accompanying those claims. This is a point of which Ockham seems keenly aware, and will be of the utmost consequence in assessing the weight of critiques of Ockham.

(2) The second unclarity in Ockham's definition concerns the question as to exactly what kind of entity intuitive cognition is. He says that it is "that cognition through the mediation of which a thing is known to exist, if it exists, and not to exist, if it does not exist." From this it appears that intuitive cognition is a mental apprehension (a disposition, perhaps, rather than an act) which is non-propositional in nature, i.e. its immediate objects are the terms of propositions (or objects of states of affairs), not the proposition itself. Intuitive cognition, then, is *in itself* not a judgment; but is the basis for an existential judgment.<sup>12</sup> It is what would amount to the possession of the evidence which would be partial justification for the truth of an empirical knowledge claim. Intuitive cognition

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quia prima non est nec esse potest naturaliter nisi obiectum existat; secunda potest esse, etsi obiectum destruaturs" (*Reportatio*, Boehner's edition, op. cit. p. 253). Fr. Boehner comments: "Whereas the perfect intuitive knowledge cannot be had without the existence of its object, when existence is affirmed; the imperfect one can be had without the actual, but not without any, existence of its object, where existence of the past or future is affirmed" (Ibid. p. 225).

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that this is probably *not* a distinguishing characteristic for Ockham, since, for him, "belief" and "knowledge" are two distinct dispositions. More on this later.

<sup>12</sup> "Et universaliter omnis notitia incomplexa termini vel terminorum seu rei vel rerum, virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci aliqua veritas contingens, maxime de praesenti, est notitia intuitiva." *Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, Edited by Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967) Vol. I, Prol. q. 1, pp. 31-32. It ought to be noted here that Ockham does distinguish between sensible and intelligible intuitive cognition, but, as he himself seems to intimate, this distinction is more theoretical than practical. Since intuitive cognition is a kind of 'paying attention to,' it is both somewhat perceptual and intellectual. (See: *Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum*, op. cit., Prol. q. 1, pp. 25 ff.).



could, then, at least theoretically, be distinguished from its object. Using some jargon from another age, we might say that intuitive cognition is like an *a priori* form of the mind; and, although in doing epistemology we can distinguish this form of the mind from its natural content, in the actual process of acquiring empirical knowledge, this distinction breaks down. So, to summarise, intuitive cognition is a simple (i.e. not further analyzable) apprehension which has as its natural and proper object presently existing particulars. Intuitive cognition can, on the theoretical level, be distinguished from its object; and, hence, it involves no *logical contradiction* to say that one can have intuitive cognition in the absence of any object for that cognition. In the normal activity of the acquisition of empirical knowledge however, intuitive cognition requires the existence of objects — and, in the case of perfect intuitive cognition, the *present* existence of objects.

(3) Ockham states that intuitive cognition is the basis for true existential judgments — negative as well as affirmative. *Prima facie*, it sounds queer that one should appeal to intuitive cognition as evidence for the truth of a negative existential judgment; but a few remarks should clarify Ockham's meaning here. If an object does not exist within my perceptual field, and I correctly judge that it does not, then my judgment is true and, thus, based upon an intuitive cognition. The fact that the object judged not to exist is, *ex hypothesi*, not present to my intuitive cognition, ought to cause no peculiar difficulty in the light of what was said above. Furthermore, even in quite normal perceptual situations (I am here considering only *sensible* intuitive cognition), any number of physical objects *could* be present to my sight which are not present. In fact, I suspect that it might be a necessary condition of my "seeing" anything at all that *some* things are *not* present to my sight. There must be "gaps," as it were, within my perceptual field; my "noticing" these "gaps" could legitimately constitute an intuitive cognition which would properly issue in a true judgment of non-existence.<sup>13</sup> What is not

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted here that instances of illusions or hallucinations are not examples of possible cases of having an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object. Ockham insists that it is wholly improper to refer to illusions and hallucinations as "non-existent objects." (Cf. *In Libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. 27, q. 3, C-H.) Furthermore, an illusion or hallucination is only successful if it issues in a *false* existential judgment, and intuitive cognition can only issue in true existential judgments. Noticing a gap in my perceptual field might properly be

permitted by Ockham's definition is that I be able to make any *false* existential judgment on the basis of intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition can issue *only* in true existential judgments — i.e. intuitive cognition is a sufficient condition for making a true existential judgment. When an existential judgment turns out to be false, it is then based upon "abstractive cognition."<sup>14</sup>

The distinction which Ockham draws between intuitive and abstractive cognition is important, but not at all entirely lucid. He insists that these two cognitions are not distinct as to their objects; for, although abstractive cognition abstracts from the existence of an object, intuitive cognition can also occur in the absence of an object.<sup>15</sup> They cannot be distinguished introspectively as psychologically distinct dispositions, for, as far as we are able to tell, they are of the same kind.<sup>16</sup> The degree of certainty which may accompany these dispositions may be different, but Ockham says little about this. It seems that we may be just as certain about false existential judgments as we are about true ones, so certainty cannot be a criterion of distinction. The only distinction which Ockham seems to allow, then, is a purely formal one: intuitive cognition can be the basis only for *true* existential judgments, abstractive cognition is the basis for either false existential judgments, or of non-existential judgments. We will have cause to return to this distinction later, for it is the source of the criticisms of Ockham.

In order to fill out the picture of Ockham's theory, we must sketch, very briefly, the relationship between intuitive cognition and the propositions of scientific knowledge.<sup>17</sup> As already remarked, in-

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described as "intuitively cognizing a non-existent object," so long as the existential (negative) judgment arising from this cognition is true. I am not at all sure, of course, that this is what Ockham has in mind.

<sup>14</sup> For Ockham's account of the distinction between "intuitive cognition" and "abstractive cognition" see Boehner's edition of these sections of the *Reportatio*, op. cit., pages 248 through 249.

<sup>15</sup> Intuitive cognition cannot occur, in the natural course of events, in the *total non-existence* of an object; although it can occur in the non-*present* existence of an object — then it is imperfect, however. As noted above, however, it is *logically possible* to have an intuitive cognition in the total absence of an object, i.e. it is no part of the theoretical *definition* of "intuitive cognition" that there must be an object for any particular intuitive cognition.

<sup>16</sup> *Quodlibeta*, V, 2, 5.

<sup>17</sup> For a more complete account of this relationship, see T. K. Scott, "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 7 (1969), 27-49.

tuitive cognition is the first and fundamental "activity" of directly apprehending — perceptually and intellectually — the terms of a proposition — or objects of states of affairs — which issues in true existential judgments. These existential judgments give rise to contingent statements of fact about the natural inherence of some particular property in a particular subject. Through a process of syllogistic inference, we can infer from a series of such true contingent statements, a general statement about the inherence of all properties of that kind in subjects of that kind. These general statements are, of course, the necessary statements of natural science. This is the bare skeleton which must, of course, be filled in with both psychology and logic. The role of intuitive cognition in this scheme is quite clear, however, and its importance cannot be gainsaid.

I would like now to examine two critiques of Ockham's notion of intuitive cognition which have appeared in recent literature. Both critiques attempt to establish essentially the same point, viz. that Ockham's theory as related to the acquisition of empirical knowledge is circular and has skeptical consequences. It will suffice for our purposes to attempt a response to one of these critiques, and then show how a similar response can be applied to the other critique as well.

The first criticism is given by Marilyn McCord Adams in a recent issue of *Traditio*.<sup>18</sup> The problem which Prof. Adams finds with Ockham's notion of intuitive cognition centers on the relationship between this formal disposition of the mind and its natural object. As noted above, in perfect intuitive cognition within the natural course of events, the presently existing object is related to the disposition of intuitive cognition as cause to effect.<sup>19</sup> The intuitive cognition of the presently existing object becomes the evidential basis for a true existential judgment. As noted above also, intuitive cognition can be the basis of a true judgment of non-existence, when, of course, the object judged not to exist truly does not exist within my perceptual field. The actual existence of an object is, therefore, not a necessary condition for having an intuitive cognition. A necessary condition of having an intuitive cognition is that such a cognition give rise to *true* existential judgments. So, although it involves no *logical contradiction* to assert that one can have an intuitive cognition

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<sup>18</sup> "Intuitive Cognition, Certainty, and Scepticism in William Ockham," *Traditio*, 26 (1970), 389-398.

<sup>19</sup> See Prof. Adams' account, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

of a non-existent object, it does involve a logical contradiction to assert that such a cognition could be the basis for a false judgment of existence. Having reviewed these points, the criticism of Prof. Adams can be clearly gathered from the following passage:

I think it can be shown, however, that where certain knowledge of the material world is concerned, Ockham defeats his purpose by defining "intuitive cognition" in this way. According to Ockham's definition, that any judgment caused by a cognition be true is a logically necessary condition for it to be intuitive. In particular, any cognition on which we base a judgment about the material world will count as intuitive, only if the judgment it causes is a true one. Since Ockham is not a phenomenalist, but thinks any real material thing is mind-independent, it will not be possible to determine by introspection alone whether or not a judgment about the material world is true. Instead, before one can be certain whether or not such a judgment is true, one must first establish whether or not some mind-independent (and therefore non-introspectable) state of affairs obtains. It follows on Ockham's definition that it will not be possible, after all, to determine whether or not any cognition of the material world is intuitive on the basis of introspection alone. Before one can be certain that any such cognition is intuitive, one must first determine whether or not some mind-independent state of affairs obtains. But, generally speaking, one can use one's certainty about *p* as a basis for one's certainty about *q*, only if one can be certain about *p*, without first being certain about *q*. Thus, it will not be possible, after all, to use one's certainty that a cognition of the material world is intuitive as a basis for one's certainty that some mind-independent state of affairs obtains. For the latter will be epistemologically prior to the former, and not vice versa.<sup>20</sup>

The error in Prof. Adams' objection to Ockham can be seen, I think, as a subtle confusion between two quite distinct epistemological questions: (1) What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for making a true empirical judgment? and (2) What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for being certain that one is making a true empirical judgment? The former question is essentially logical in nature, and it is the question to which Ockham is concerned to give a *partial* answer with his notion of intuitive cognition. The latter question is essentially psychological in nature, and it is unclear whether Ockham ever really addressed himself to this question;

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 393.



although he did make some remarks which clearly indicate that he was aware of the distinction between these two questions. Ockham admits, for example, that God could cause us to believe that a certain state of affairs which does not obtain, does obtain (or vice versa).<sup>21</sup> Thus, God could cause in us a psychological state of assurance that some proposition is true, which really is not true. If we should proceed to make a false existential judgment based on this belief, then it would follow that the cognition antecedent to this belief was abstractive and not intuitive. God cannot cause us to *know* that some proposition is true which is really not true, for this is logically impossible. So the distinction between a psychological state of belief and a state of knowledge — which may or may not be accompanied by belief — is based upon two factors: (a) whether the judgment issuing from these states is true or false, and (b) whether the judgment is mediated by intuitive or abstractive cognition. These two factors are inextricably intertwined; for, (a) is a necessary condition for (b). Now, the alleged problem arises because we are not able to distinguish intuitive and abstractive cognitions on the basis of introspection, i.e. psychologically. Also, they seem to involve the same 'objects.' They can only be distinguished, then, by the judgments which issue from them; but these judgments themselves are true or false only because they are based upon intuitive or abstractive cognition respectively. So we have gone full circle!

It seems to me that this problem is easily solved, however, by insisting that we need not be able to be certain that we have genuine knowledge concerning a particular state of affairs in order for us to have that knowledge. Similarly, we need not have to be certain that we have evidence (i.e. intuitive cognition) for the truth of p, in order to actually *have* that evidence and be justified in asserting the truth of p. Thus, we can be justified in making true empirical judgments and this justification rests on intuitive cognition, even though we are not able to be psychologically certain that we are actually having an intuitive cognition, as distinct from an abstractive cognition. That is to say, we can know p without it being simultaneously necessary that we know (are certain) that we know p.

Ockham's position, I take it, is that "knowing that p" is quite different from "being certain that p." The conditions of the former can be stated as independent of any psychological certainty about p.

<sup>21</sup> *Quodlibeta*, V, q. 5.

What Prof. Adams is asking Ockham to provide are the criteria not for my knowing *p*, but criteria for my being certain that *p*, or for my *knowing* that I know that *p* — where the italicized “knowing” here has the sense of “being certain.” Now, when Ockham allows that it is logically possible that God always make us to believe what is false, he seems to preclude the possibility of my ever being able to be certain that I really do know. If this latter is the point of Prof. Adams’ critique, I think it must be sustained. But, as the medievals would put it, this is nothing to the purpose (“*nihil est ad propositum*”)! For, it seems entirely possible that I should know *p*, without my ever being able to be certain that I know *p*. Ockham uses the hypothesis of a deceiving God to indicate this logical possibility. As is well known, however, for Ockham — as well as for the majority of scholastics — God’s omnipotence is bound only by the logically possible. So one could state Ockham’s position independently of his theologism as making the following claim: “It is logically possible that I know that *p*, without my being certain that I know that *p*.” In other words, my act of knowing *p* can, upon reflection be accompanied by doubt or uncertainty or any other psychological state; but this has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not I am justified in claiming to know *p*. Similarly, when *p* is a contingent truth, my knowledge of *p* is also contingent. My knowledge gains no more “assurance” by my being able to claim in addition, “and I *know* that I know that *p*.” As if I could, in this way, turn a contingent truth into a necessary truth. But this is all very muddled, for assurance, certainty, doubt, or belief have absolutely nothing to do with knowledge or truth.<sup>22</sup> Ockham precludes from the start that absurd *regressus ad infinitum* which results when we think that in order

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<sup>22</sup> This, I take it, is also the point of certain cryptic remarks of Wittgenstein recorded by Norman Malcolm in his *Memoir*: “The sceptical philosophers want to say that with experiential statements, ‘I know it’ is the same as ‘I believe it and it is true.’ They think that degree of *certainty* is degree of conviction. They interpret Moore’s ‘I know it with absolute certainty’ as an expression of extreme conviction. What is needed is to show them that the highest degree of certainty is nothing psychological but something logical: that there is a point at which there is neither any ‘making more certain’ nor any ‘turning out to be false’... Doubt, belief, certainty — like feelings, emotions, pain, etc. — have characteristic facial expressions. There is a *tone* of doubt, and a tone of conviction; but no tone of knowledge.” *Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir*, by Norman Malcolm (Oxford U. Press, 1972) pp. 91–92.

to know, we must know that we know, by making the question of "knowledge" independent of the question of "certainty."

One additional point must be made regarding Prof. Adams' critique. Prof. Adams believes that Ockham's preclusion of the possibility that we should ever be able to be certain about knowledge claims by his hypothesis of a deceiving God is a serious flaw in his epistemology. From what has been said, however, I think it is quite clear that the contrary is true, viz. that Ockham's hypothesis of a deceiving God indicates his awareness that knowledge is unassailed by deception. It is, after all, logically possible that I be deceived in all my claims to know; but, then, I wouldn't be any more certain of that either. In other words, if we were always being deceived in our beliefs that certain states of affairs obtained, we would not be able to tell, with *certainty*, that we were being deceived — just as we are not able to tell, with *certainty*, that we are *not* being deceived even now. So it is really of no consequence whether we know (are certain) that we know or not — the question is moot. The only significant epistemological question is: "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the contingent truth of empirical knowledge claims?" Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition proffers a partial answer to this question.<sup>23</sup>

Let us now examine briefly the second critique of Ockham. T. K. Scott, in a masterfully scholarly article on the relationship between intuitive cognition and empirical knowledge in Ockham, summarises his own criticism in the following short paragraph:

In brief, it seems to be suggested by his discussions that if all knowledge (in the strict sense) must be based on intuitive cognition, then even if we do sometimes know, we can never know that we know. He seems convinced that there must be instances of intuitive cognition, evident judgment, and necessary judgment,

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<sup>23</sup> It should be noted that there have been arguments attempting to show that it is *not* a logical possibility that we be deceived all the time (e.g. O. K. Bouwsma, "Des Cartes' Skepticism of the Senses," *Mind*, 54 [Oct. 1945], 216). These arguments are based upon the assumption that if we were always being deceived, then the expression "being deceived" would have no intelligible use, since it has meaning only in reference to its negation, "not being deceived." Hence, they conclude, there must be cases of *not-being-deceived*, if we can even talk intelligibly of *being deceived*. This assumption is fallacious, however; for all that is required in order to use intelligibly the expression "being deceived" is that we make a distinction between cases wherein we think we are being deceived

if a science is to be possible. But at the same time his discussion of the interrelations among them depicts them as internally related in such way that any attempt to determine what is and what is not an instance of any one of them involves a circularity that makes the determination impossible. Ockham is almost always concerned with the formal requirements for a demonstrative science, almost never concerned with a descriptive analysis of the nature of cognition. And the outcome of this seems to be that science can be what he thinks it must be only if we abandon hope of ever knowing whether or not we have a science.<sup>24</sup>

The circularity referred to by Scott is precisely parallel to the kind of circularity which Prof. Adams finds in Ockham's position. We ought to point out that there is a kind of circularity involved in any attempt to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. We could label this circularity "methodological," i.e. we are assuming the conditions which we are trying to state, in so far as our statement of the conditions is considered itself to be "knowledge." This methodological circularity is clearly not vicious.

There is a second kind of circularity which one encounters in a view of "knowledge" popular with many contemporary philosophers. This circularity is, I think, vicious. It can be easily seen by giving the following model of the necessary and sufficient conditions for "I know that p": (1) 'p' is true; (2) 'p' is believed to be true; and (3) 'p' is believed to be true with evidence.<sup>25</sup> The circularity enters in here with the third condition; for, how can one know that the evidence is truly evidence *for* p without assuming that one already knows p? This circularity cannot be imputed to Ockham's account, for Ockham does not make this a condition for knowledge. The point is not that Ockham's theory does not require that we have evidence for p, but, rather, that we need not believe that it is evidence for p.

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and those wherein we think we are not being deceived. And this would in no way guarantee that in the cases in which we think we are not being deceived, we are truly not being deceived. We could, therefore, always be deceived and still distinguish between "being deceived" and "not being deceived."

<sup>24</sup> "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 7 (1969), 46.

<sup>25</sup> This 'popular' view of "knowledge" has its roots in Plato's *Theaetetus*, and can also be found in recent literature, e.g. Roderick M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge* (Prentice Hall, 1966). Actually, one might argue that the circularity enters in here already with the second condition.



Or, even more strongly, Ockham seems to deny that we need believe *p* at all, in order to know *p*. Thus, for Ockham, we can readily admit that we do not know that the evidence is truly evidence *for p*. It does not follow from this admission, however, that one does not *have* evidence for *p*, in the sense that there exists the requisite evidence (intuitive cognition) which acts as partial condition for *p*'s being a piece of knowledge, as distinguished from mere groundless guessing, as it were.

Scott's remark that "Ockham is almost always concerned with the formal requirements for a demonstrative science, almost never with a descriptive analysis of the nature of cognition," is, I think, absolutely correct and also the clue to an appreciation of Ockham's unique contribution to an adequate theory of empirical knowledge. Scott seems to feel, however, that this concern evinces a lacuna in Ockham's account. It might, on the contrary, indicate Ockham's awareness of the distinction between logical questions and psychological questions, and his insight that the question of knowledge is logical in nature.

There may be other and more serious problems with the notion of intuitive cognition and its relationship to the true statements of empirical science, but the difficulties which Ockham's critics have asserted to follow from his account, either do not follow at all, or are not genuine difficulties.

This is clearly not the place to elaborate upon the merits or demerits of Ockham's theory of knowledge; but we might describe his contribution to epistemology, in a very general way, as a promising shift from a representationalist account of *species sensibilis et intelligibilis*, to a dispositional account of *habitus*. In this, Ockham is a precursor of Hume, and also anticipates some contemporary analyses of "knowledge."<sup>26</sup> The complete story of Ockham's contribution to epistemology, in the light of contemporary theories,

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<sup>26</sup> I am thinking here primarily of the American Pragmatists and, perhaps, the later Wittgenstein. It should be noted that very able accounts of Ockham's epistemology have appeared (e.g. E. Hochstetter, *Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre von Ockham* [Berlin, 1927]; and D. Webering, *Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham* [St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953]; and E. A. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham* [New York, 1953]). The very interesting question of Ockham's relationship to contemporary theories has hardly been touched upon, however.

remains yet to be told. Although the story would, doubtless, be a very complicated one; it could not be denied that it would also be a very interesting and rewarding story.

*West Chester State College*  
*West Chester, Pa.*

PAUL A. STREVELER

# SOME RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GERALD ODO'S AND JOHN BURIDAN'S COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE'S "ETHICS"

## I

I should like to begin this study by outlining the stages by which I stumbled upon its topic. Sharing the interest generated by my surprise, the reader may be fortified for laborious details to follow. So, presuming indulgence, here is a brief chronicle by way of introduction.

Some time ago, I examined a dissertation on the sexual ethics of Martin Le Maistre, a fifteenth-century figure in the tradition of John Buridan.<sup>1</sup> Poor Buridan was taken to task for his conclusions in that dissertation, and I made a note to look more closely into his treatment of the whole range of topics pertaining to the virtue of temperance. After all, the strength of Buridan is not so much the answers he comes to, but the questions he asks and the ingenuity and subtlety with which he analyzes the issues. And some of the problems pertaining to temperance, for instance, whether there is evil in natural desires, whether virginity is a moral virtue, whether insensibility is a vice, ought to be specially challenging to an Aristotelian moral philosopher who is at the same time an orthodox Catholic.<sup>2</sup> So I read through the Questions near the end of Book III of his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*, and was taken once again, not only with his cleverness, but also with his humanity and propen-

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<sup>1</sup> M. Valente, *The Sexual Ethics of Martin Le Maistre*, Columbia University, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> For the claim that despite his methodological nominalism, Buridan is a reasonably traditional Aristotelian naturalist, and what sense that thesis has, see my "Nominalism and the *Ethics*: Some Remarks about Buridan's *Commentary*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 4 (1966), 1-13. For the suggestion that Buridan's Aristotelianism was tempered by a considerable respect for Stoicism, see my "Buridan and Seneca," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 27 (1966), 23-40.

sity for the concrete.<sup>3</sup> To discover what might be distinctive in his treatment, I decided to consult some other commentary of the time.<sup>4</sup> Walter Burley had little of special interest to say. Then it occurred to me that the commentary by Gerald Odo might serve as an excellent foil. Buridan is usually considered an Ockhamist; Odo was an avowed opponent of William of Ockham, and indeed, had displaced Ockham's friend Michael of Cesena as Minister General of the Franciscan Order. Furthermore, I remembered a cursory sampling of Odo's commentary I once made, which suggested a strongly Augustinian orientation, with frequent references not only to St. Augustine, but also to Avicenna and Hugh of St. Victor — not exactly standard authorities for Buridan. What would Odo have to say about the virtuousness of virginity, the viciousness of insensibility, the sinfulness of natural desires, and related topics? <sup>5</sup>

I read Odo's Question 14 from Book IV, "*Utrum virginitas sit moralis virtus tanquam species temperantiae et castitatis*," which promised to parallel Buridan's Question 30 from Book III, "*Utrum virginitas sit virtus vel vitium?*" I experienced a certain uneasiness as I read, and then near the end, a sudden start. Odo was remarking on the two-fold character of 'oportere' — a term that has always

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<sup>3</sup> The commentary is titled *Quaestiones in Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum*. The text used for this study is the 1637 Oxford edition, which is more readily available and more easily read than earlier editions. This text has been extensively spot-checked against the 1513 Paris edition and *MS Bib. nat. lat. 16128*. I wish to thank the Bibliothèque Nationale for enabling me to obtain a microfilm of this manuscript. As for concrete situations, Buridan relates the virtuous status of virginity to the population situation, and at one point asks if a King of France should not have offspring if a tyrant would probably succeed him otherwise (276). Some of the arguments he considers are familiar in our own moral ferment. Question 29 of Book III asks "Whether there can be sin in natural desires?" Much of the discussion concerns natural law and marriage. What if John and Mary have a firm will to remain together, he asks — why do they require a further bond? What if a woman is rich and powerful and so does not need a man's support — why should she not have a child and raise it without giving up her liberty to the father by the bond of matrimony?

<sup>4</sup> The early fourteenth century was a great time for the study of the *Ethics*; Gauthier and Jolif note the "flot des commentaires." See R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, Louvain and Paris, 1958, Vol. I, 85\*.

<sup>5</sup> Odo's work is titled *Expositio in Aristotelis Ethicam*. The text used here is the Venice, 1500 edition. For manuscripts, see C. H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors G-I," *Traditio*, 24 (1968), 149-245, esp. 163-164. I wish to thank Professor Paul Kristeller for calling this reference to my attention.



given me trouble as a translator. Hadn't I seen a similar clarification in Buridan, and indeed noted it as a nice example of his persistent effort at conceptual clarity? Here is what I found in Buridan:

Sed dicendum quod *oportet* dupliciter accipitur: uno modo prout significat idem quod *esse necessarium*, et sic non *oportet* illos abstinere, nec per tale *oportere* determinantur actus virtutum. Alio modo capitur prout significat idem quod *opportunum esse seu consonum rationi*, et ita *oporteret* semper illos abstinere, quia semper esset *consonum rationi*, et per tale *oportere* determinantur actus virtutum. (277)

And in Odo:

Ad 12<sup>m</sup> dicendum quod oportere est duplex: unum necessitatis, aliud nobilitatis, secundum illud quod dicit Philosophus de prima philosophia: quod aliae artes et scientiae ad ipsam comparatae sunt necessariores quidem omnes, nobilior vero nulla, sic quod aliae scientiae maxime mechanicae fuerunt opportunaeratione necessitatis, prima philosophia vero ratione nobilitatis. Sic etiam dico quod virtutes civilis vitae sunt utique necessariores pro communitate hominum sed virtutes vitae contemplativae sunt nobiliores, de quibus est virginitas. Et sic oportet aliquos paucos contemplationibus deputatos habere eam, non opportunitate necessitatis sed nobilitatis. (68<sup>r</sup>)

So Buridan is not the only one pursuing conceptual clarity. The distinction seems not to be precisely the same, but the similarity is striking; I went back to the beginning of the question and began close comparison. Again the similarities were striking, but it took a bit of work to figure out that the order of passages was different. Buridan begins thus (numbering mine):

(1) Arguitur quod non sit virtus, quia virtus non est a natura sed a consuetudine; sed a natura est virginitas, quia a natura nascuntur virginitas viri et mulieris.

(2) Item, virtus non est illa quae magis convenit junioribus quam senioribus; nam ex quarto et quinto huius probavit Aristoteles verecundiam non esse virtutem, quia magis convenit aetati juvenili. Sed plures sunt virgines juvenes, quam senes; ideo etc.

(3) Item, virtus consistit in medio, virginitas autem non, sed in extremo, scilicet in abdicatione omnis venerei actus, non solum quando oportet et ubi sed ubique et semper.

(4) Item, *numquam contingit male uti virtute*, I. *Rhetoricae*; sed in aliquo casu esset malum uti virginitate, ut si primi parentes, scilicet Adam et Eva, usi fuissent ea.

(5) Item, virtus non corrumpitur ex operatione bona; sed virginitas corrumpitur ex operatione bona, igitur etc. Maior patet; quia corruptio boni non est bonum sed malum. Minor patet, quia non peccat virgo si nupserit, sed bene facit si quomodo oportet et cum quo et quando, et sic de aliis circumstantiis.

(6) Et confirmatur, quia cum virtus sit habitus, et per consequens de difficili mobilis, non videtur corrumpi per solam operationem, adhuc licitam et honestam; virginitas autem sic corrumpitur.

(7) Item, virtus perdita videtur posse regenerari quia *virtutes et vitia in potestate nostra sunt*, 3<sup>o</sup> huius; virginitas autem regenerari non potest.

(8) Item, virtus inclinatur ad operandum quod oportet, et quando et ubi oportet; sed non oportet abstinere semper, immo licitum est nubere; igitur virginitas quae inclinatur ad semper abstinere non est virtus.

(9) Item, nulla virtus inclinatur contra illum finem ad quem natura ordinavit rem, quia finis habet rationem optimi, specialiter finis quem statuit natura, quoniam natura semper facit de possibilibus quod melius est; *licet enim non cognoscat, tamen perfecte et ordinate operatur, tanquam directa ab infallibili cognoscente, scilicet Deo et intelligentiis*, secundum Commentatorem 12 *Metaphysicae*. Sed natura ordinavit membra genitalia et virtutem animae generativam ad actus venereos propter prolem habendam; ergo virginitas quae ad oppositum inclinatur non est virtus. (272)

Odo or his editor numbers his own points, and, omitting the second and third, the rest of the first ten offered against the thesis that virginity is a moral virtue go as follows:

Primo, quia omnis virtus moralis consistit in medio, non in extremo, ut supra libro 2<sup>o</sup>. Sed virginitas non consistit in medio sed in extremo abdicans a se actum venereum, non solum talem vel talem sed omnem, nec solum nunc vel tunc vel quocunque sed pro semper. Quare non videtur esse virtus moralis...

4<sup>o</sup>, quia omnis virtus moralis generatur consuetudine, non natura, ut supra libro secundo. Sed virginitas videtur inesse a natura non ex consuetudine. Quare etc.

5<sup>o</sup>, quia nulla virtus sicut non generatur ex una operatione sic non corrumpitur, ut ibidem. Sed virginitas corrumpitur ex unica fornicatione. Quare non est virtus.

6<sup>o</sup>, quia nulla virtus corrumpitur sine generatione vitii et peccati, quia corruptio unius est generatio alterius, scilicet contrarii, 2<sup>o</sup> *Metaphysicae*, et maxime quia corruptio boni est mala et prava; cuius enim corruptio bona est ipsum quoque malum, 2<sup>o</sup> *Topicarum*. Sed virginitas corrumpitur sine vitio et peccato, immo sine

malo, quia si nupserit virgo non peccavit, I *Ad Corinth.* 7. Quare virginitas non est virtus.

7<sup>o</sup>, quia omnis virtus si perdita fuerit, regenerari potest per magnam et longam frequentiam bonorum actuum, ut supra libro secundo et libro 3<sup>o</sup>. Sed virginitas non. Quare non est virtus.

8<sup>o</sup>, quia nullum in aliquo casu contingit male uti virtute, ut habetur primo *Rhetoricorum* Aristotelis. Sed aliquem aliquando contingit male uti virginitate, puta primum vel primos homines, quia peccassent si semper in virginitate vixissent. Et nunc etiam idem contingeret si omnes viri essent mortui praeter unum vel paucos, vel etiam si omnes viverent virginaliter et nullus generationi humanae vacaret. Quare virginitas non est virtus.

9<sup>o</sup>, quia omnis virtus saepius invenitur in viris quam in adolescentibus. Iuventus enim et adolescentia raro habent virtutes quibus natura providit de verecundia pro virtute, ut infra in fine quarti. Sed virginitas saepius invenitur in adolescentibus quam in viris; pro quolibet enim viro virgine inventus est unus adolescens virgo, quia ipsemet qui non potest esse virgo vir nisi virgo fuerit adolescens; sed nunc sic est e converso. Quare etc.

10<sup>o</sup>, quia nulla virtus inclinatur contra primaeva iura naturae, cum virtus sit habitus animi naturae modo rationi consentaneus, ut ait Tullius in *Rhetorica* sua. Sed virginitas inclinatur contra coniunctionem maris et feminae qui sunt de primaevo iure naturae, ut in principio *Decre.* c<sup>o</sup>: *Ius autem.* Item, contra illud: "Crescite et multiplicamini," *Genes.* primo capitulo. Quare non est virtus. (64<sup>r</sup>)

If the reader will make the following comparisons, he will, I hope, see that my initial uneasiness was eminently justified (for the moment, let 'B' be Buridan and 'O', Odo, each followed by paragraph numbers): B1-O4; B2-O9; B3-O1; B4-O8; B5-O6; B6-O5; B7-O7; B8-O1; B9-O10. One could dwell with interest on the small differences in these formulations, especially in the last, where Odo refers to Cicero and speaks of the "primaeva iura naturae" and Buridan refers to Averroes and appeals to the "finem, ad quem natura ordinavit rem." The formulations sometimes are not perfect match-ups, but there can be no doubt that one version is directly derived from the other.

Having made this discovery, I then remembered that somewhere I had seen a remark to the effect that certain verses in Buridan were reminiscent of verses in a Catechism of Odo. A little rummaging revealed that this remark was made by E. Faral: "Dans sa question 18 du livre VI, Buridan cite seize vers gnomiques, groupés par quatre, qui, au moins pour le genre, rappellent le Catéchisme de Guiral men-

tionné dans l'*Histoire Littéraire de la France* (t. XXXVI, p. 219 et suiv.). Il y aurait peut-être là le signe de certaines affinités." <sup>6</sup> Indeed, Buridan, from Question 18 of Book VI:

Dicunt ergo aliqui quod prudentiae sunt quatuor opera principalia. Primum est inventio mediorum ad finem statutum congruorum. Secundum est iudicium de honestate et congruentia mediorum inventorum. Tertium est praeceptum iudicatorum. Quartum est executio praeceptorum. Puto tamen quod hoc quartum non sit opus elicitum a prudentia, ut dixi prius, sed vel a voluntate, vel potentiis animae aut corporis et virtutibus earum. Si tamen ita esset ut dicunt, tunc essent (sic) sed illa quatuor opera quatuor partes principales prudentiae, scilicet inventiva, iudicativa, praeceptiva, et executiva, quarum iterum quaelibet habet plures partes sive plures exigit vires vel habilitates, ut illi dicunt, ad hoc ut possint perficere opus suum. Nam quandoque ad inveniendum medium vel non oportet consiliari vel modico tempore consiliandum est, ut dictum est prius, ne idoneitas attingendi finem transeat. Et tunc oportet uti eustochia sive solertia; aliquando tamen oportet consiliari et tunc habet locum eubulia, quae iterum plures requirit vires. Ad bene enim inveniendum medium valet multum praeteritorum recordatio, quae vocari solet memoria, deinde requiritur praesentium ad praeterita collatio vel etiam mediorum inventorum collatio, quae solet dici ratio. Sed forte quod haec ratio pertinet ad partem iudicativam adhuc etiam ad omnium istorum perfectionem requiritur docilitas, quae est habilitas ad bonam eruditionem: parum enim est quod unusquisque potest capere a se ipso, multum autem quod ab alio. Unde versus:

*Qui solers, docilis, memor est, qui vir rationis  
Rectum consilium perficit ille suum.*

E contra sunt quatuor defectus impediētes partem inventivam (sic), scilicet tarditas ingenii contra eustochiam, indocilitas contra docilitatem, oblivio contra memoriam, et inertia, sive ignavia ratiocinandi et conferendi contra rationem. Unde versus:

*Tardus, et indocilis, ignarus, et immemor extans  
Rectum consilium non facit ille suum. (549-550)*

And Odo, from Question 15 of Book VI (emphasis mine):

Est ergo sciendum secundo quod quatuor sunt opera prudentiae: Primum est consiliari quaerendo, ut supra, 6 lib., c. 6.

<sup>6</sup> E. Faral, *Jean Buridan, maître ès arts de l'université de Paris*, reprinted from the *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, T. XXVIII, 2e partie, Paris, 1950, p. 129, footnote 1. In view of the affinity I hope to demonstrate, I must apologize to Faral for doubting his prescience on p. 39 of my "Buridan and Seneca."



Secundum est iudicare de inventis per consilium, ut habetur hic, c. xi. Tertium est praeiudicato praecipere: prudentia enim est praeceptiva, ut habetur ibidem. Quartum est praecepta exsequenda agere, et ideo in eius diffinitione dicitur quod est habitus activus. Secundum hoc ergo posset dici quod virtus bene consiliativa, et virtus bene iudicativa, et bene praeceptiva, et virtus bene activa essent quatuor partes prudentiae modo quo dictum est.

Tertio sciendum quod quodlibet istorum quatuor operum requirit in homine bene operato quatuor habitus vel quatuor habitualitates per quos vel per quas redditur opus bonum. Bene enim consiliari requirit eustochiam, docilitatem, memoriam et rationem, quoniam consiliari est quiddam quaerere et consilium quaestio, ut super li. 3. c. 6.

Ad bene autem quaerere requiritur potestas inveniendi medium quae quidem habetur vel ex propria sagacitate quae generaliter sumpta idem est quod solertia, id est subtilitas et idoneitas inveniendi medium tempore imperspecto. Sumpta vero in agibilibus et moralibus dicitur eustochia quae idem est quod consiliaris solertia. Vel habetur ex aliena eruditione quae supponit docilitatem. Requiritur etiam retentio inventorum ex propria sagacitate vel ex aliena eruditione, et hoc facit memoria. Requiritur etiam inventorum et retentorum collectio, et hoc facit ratio. Haec igitur quatuor consequenter aptata reddunt bonum consilium. Unde versus. *Qui solers docilis memor est, qui vir rationis. Rectum consilium perficit ille suum.* Et per oppositum quatuor sunt peccata quibus vitiatur omne consilium, ut tarditas ingenii contra solertem eustochiam, indocilitas animi contra docilitatem, oblivio vel immemoria contra memoriam, inertia seu ignavia ratiocinandi et conferendi contra rationem. Unde versus: *Tardus et indocilis ignavus et immemor extans. Rectum consilium non facit ille suum.* (134<sup>r</sup>)

Again one finds small differences and large similarities, and the verses are the same (Buridan's *ignarus* should obviously be *ignavus*). The same pattern is repeated for the remaining verses, and for the passages which connect them. For what small interest they may have, the remaining verses are these:

Hinc intellectus, sensus, cautela malorum  
 Mens circumspecta, dant bona iudicia.  
 Mens hebes, insensata maneat, incauta periculis,  
 Incircumspecta, dant mala iudicia.  
 Certa, ac sua sive mens, constans, atque benigna  
 Utile praeceptum perficit ipsa suum.  
 Ambiguus, fatuus, inconstans atque malignus  
 Vanum praeceptum construit ipse suum,

Si curo, vigilo, si diligo, solliciterque,  
 Utiliter perago, quae peragenda volo.  
 Nec somnolenta, nec mens improvida felix,  
 Nec torpens animus, nec vagabunda manus. (Buridan, 550-551)

Buridan's opening "dicunt ergo aliqui" shows that it is he who takes this material from Odo, rather than Odo from Buridan, and this will be confirmed below.

These test samples certainly indicate that Buridan drew upon Odo, but in neither case does the dependence extend through the entire treatment. We do not seem to have here the amazing relation of almost total dependence which Heidingsfelder reported for Albert of Saxony upon Walter Burley.<sup>7</sup> But then, how extensive is Buridan's dependence upon Odo, and what character does it take? In the question on virginity Buridan seems simply to lift material without comment, but in the question on prudence, he does indicate that he is repeating what "aliqui dicunt." Systematic labor seemed in order. The results follow.

## II

Gerald Odo is known chiefly for his activities as Minister General of the Franciscan Order and as close associate of Pope John XXII.<sup>8</sup> He was a bachelor of arts perhaps by 1315 and lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris in 1326. He was elected Minister General in 1329. His commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* earned him the honorary sobriquet "Doctor moralis." Like the roughly contemporaneous commentary of Walter Burley it presents a text, expository lectures, and occasional discussions of problems in the classic form of the medieval *quaestio*.<sup>9</sup> Langlois remarks that with abbreviations expanded,

<sup>7</sup> G. Heidingsfelder, "Albert von Sachsen. Sein Lebensgang und sein Kommentar zur Nicomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 22 (1921), H. 3-4, esp. pp. 86 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Odo's career and writings are surveyed in G. Langlois, "Guiral Ot (Geraldus Odonis), Frère Mineur," in the *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, T. XXXVI (1927), 203-225. Since Buridan calls him "Gerardus," perhaps we should call him "Gerard." But Gordon Leff has called him "Gerald," and confusion might be avoided if we follow suit. See G. Leff, *Heresy in the Later Middle Ages*, Manchester and New York, 1967, p. 249.

<sup>9</sup> A peculiarity of Odo's treatment of the text is the placing of the break between Books III and IV. He does this at III, ch. 6 (1115a6), so that the discus-

the commentary would run to more than a thousand pages of the kind normal in our times.<sup>10</sup> We shall be concerned here only with the *Quaestiones* within this commentary. For the most part, these are of the normal medieval type. Occasionally they are extremely brief, and occasionally paragraphs which are mere pronouncements (dicendum) are treated editorially as questions (see, for instance, Book II, Questions 17 and 18). There are full sets of questions only for the first six books. Book VII has only two, Book VIII has none, Book IX has only eight, and Book X, one. The questions occur for the most part in small clusters scattered throughout the text, where Odo decides that a break in topic occurs. At these breaks, he will usually remark, "De evidentia praedictorum quaerenda sunt...", followed by a series of questions. As each is taken up, he will usually begin, "De primo (secundo, etc.) arguitur" followed by the version of the question he will refute. Thus there are three formulations of each question: one in the table of contents (which I have ignored), one in the cluster-heading, and one at the beginning of the actual treatment. Sometimes these are not quite the same, and sometimes one can tell which version Buridan used. For example, the "evidentia" formulation of Question 24 of Book IV by Odo is "Utrum sit melius honorare alterum quam honorari ab altero: vel econverso." The "arguitur" formulation is simpler: "quod melius sit honorari quam honorare." Buridan's Question 9 of Book IV reads, "Utrum melius sit honorari quam honorare?" One presumes that the commentary must have been written before 1329, when Odo undertook the busy life of ecclesiastical politics. As will be shown below, it is replete with theological and biblical references, which may indicate that it was composed during Odo's period as a theology master or maybe it points only to the piety one should expect of a Franciscan student of the arts. It may be worth adding that to Ockham, Odo was a notorious heretic.

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sions of courage and temperance fall into Book IV. Heidingsfelder reports that Albert of Saxony does the same, with the remark that the standard division is motivated only by the wish not to make Book III too short. It is more rational, Albert adds, to group the moral virtues that moderate passions together. Heidingsfelder also reports (p. 78) that only Odo and Albert of Saxony divide the books in this way. Walter Burley, the source of much of Albert's commentary, uses the standard division.

<sup>10</sup> Langlois, *op. cit.*, p. 217. Buridan's commentary runs to some 889 pages in the 1637 edition, where most but not all abbreviations are expanded.

Perhaps not so much needs to be said about John Buridan, since he has been the subject of much recent scholarly and even philosophical attention. He is usually considered to be the leading Parisian follower of William of Ockham.<sup>11</sup> His commentary on the *Ethics* seems to have been among the last of his works, but since he no doubt worked at it over many years of teaching the subject, precise chronology seems inappropriate. The commentary takes the form of questions alone and is very full. It had an enormous success, is found in many manuscripts from all over Europe, and was printed several times. I have argued that the moral philosophy presented in it is significantly different from that to be found in Ockham's *Sentences* and *Quodlibeta*, and this study may well reinforce that conclusion.<sup>12</sup>

The first point of comparison to be undertaken is the formulation of questions. Making a diligent effort to eschew arbitrariness, I have distinguished very closely similar formulations, to be called "match-ups," formulations similar but divergent, to be called "derivations," and unrelated formulations, which amount simply to different questions. In some match-ups, the formulations are identical, for example Odo's Question 4 of Book II, "Utrum ex unica operatione possit generari virtus" and Buridan's Question 7 of Book II, "Utrum ex unica operatione possit generari virtus?" In others, the wording is slightly different, but the sense is not, as in Odo's Question 2 of Book III, "Utrum violentia causet involuntarium" and Buridan's Question 7 of Book III, "Utrum omnes nostrae operationes violentae sunt involuntariae?" In some cases, Buridan has combined two or more of Odo's questions. Odo's Question 23 of Book I asks whether the use of virtue is required for happiness, and Questions 24, 25,

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<sup>11</sup> See E. Moody, "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt," *Franciscan Studies*, 7 (1947), 113-146, for a discussion of problems raised for this interpretation by the fact that Buridan, acting as Rector of the University of Paris, signed statutes in 1340 which seem in part to be directed against Ockhamism. In this connection it is interesting to note that, according to V. P. Zoubov, Nicholas of Autrecourt dedicated a work to Odo, and Nicholas Bonet derived many passages from Odo's treatise on the continuum. See V. P. Zoubov, "Walter Catton, Gerard Odon et Nicolas Bonet," *Physis*, 1 (1959), 261-278. I wish to thank the editors of these *Studies* for calling this to my attention.

<sup>12</sup> See "Nominalism and the *Ethics*" for differences between the moral philosophy of Ockham and that of Buridan, and "Buridan and Seneca," especially pp. 24-25, for a summary and bibliography concerning the influence of Buridan's commentary.



and 26 follow up on this theme: "Utrum delectatio"; "Utrum temporalis prosperitas"; "Utrum bona corporis dispositio." Buridan's Question 16 of Book I asks, "Utrum ad felicitatem requiratur usus virtutis, et delectatio, et bonorum exteriorum abundantia, et bona corporis dispositio?" In some cases, the decision whether to count a pair of formulations as a match-up or a derivation is difficult. Odo's Question 3 of Book I reads "Utrum haec scientia sola sit practica." Buridan's Question 2 of Book I reads "Utrum moralis scientia, quae de se virtutibus intromittit, sit practica vel speculativa?" I have taken this as a derivation, not a match-up. This problem suggests a further item of interest: some questions one might expect anyone to ask who comments on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, so that one would be unimpressed by finding the same question in two commentaries. Of course, we are concerned here not so much for the question, as for the formulation of it. But as a kind of interesting control on the experiment, as it were, I shall indicate match-up formulations from the commentary of Burley, in which the questions are called *dubia* instead of *quaestiones*.<sup>13</sup> Burley's treatment of the issues seems to show little similarity to that by Odo or Buridan, which gives his work a little extra value as a control. It is worth reflecting, I think, that just because a topic may seem to us mandatory for anyone commenting on the *Ethics*, for that very reason it may not have seemed a mandatory question for a fourteenth-century scholastic. After all, a *quaestio* had to formulate a genuine issue, one with arguments on both sides and opportunity for some kind of creative resolution. With this reflection in mind, one does find some of these standard issues common to Odo, Buridan, and Burley. Thus, Odo's Question 37 of Book IV is "Utrum mansuetudo sit virtus differens a clementia." Buridan's Question 14 of the same Book is "Utrum Mansuetudo sit virtus moralis?" And Burley's Question 11 of the same is "Utrum mansuetudo sit virtus distincta ab aliis virtutibus?" One also finds in common, issues which one might expect of a com-

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<sup>13</sup> The title of the commentary is *Expositio Gualteri Burlei super Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*. I use the Venice, 1500 edition, and wish to thank the University of Chicago Library for making it available for copying. I have been helped in consideration of Burley by the dissertation of G. Gomes, "Foundations of Ethics in Walter Burleigh's *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*," Columbia University, 1973. In this case I have used the question formulations in the table of contents, since the *dubia* are scattered and difficult to locate in the text. I have also numbered them for ease of reference.

mentator of this period, the issue, for instance, so insistently and protractedly discussed by Ockham in Question 12 of Book III of the *Sentences*, "Whether the virtues are connected?" This issue was made important for the medievals not so much by Aristotle as by the Stoics and Saint Augustine. Thus we find Odo's Question 17 of Book VI: "Utrum omnes virtutes morales sibi invicem et prudentiae inseparabiliter sint connexae." And Buridan's Book IV, Question 21: "Utrum virtutes morales sint necessario connexae ad invicem?" And Burley's Question 10 from the same Book: "Utrum virtutes morales sint connexae sic quod habens unam habeat omnes?" One also occasionally finds formulations of issues which seem surprisingly exotic to be found in all three commentaries, and thus, one presumes, to be common issues of the time. As an example, consider Odo's Question 16 of Book III: "De forma consilii, utrum scilicet consilium sit quaestio resolutoria?" Buridan's Question 15 of the same Book: "Utrum Consilium sit quaestio resolutoria?" Burley's Question 9 of the same: "Utrum omnis inquisitio consilii sit resolutoria?" A final preliminary matter: Because of the fact that full sets of questions are to be found only in the first six books in Odo's commentary, we shall consider only those books now. Later we shall discuss Book IX, which has a special place in the comparison.

So, then, in the first six books, Odo presents some 172 questions and Buridan, 142. Of that 142, some 71 are match-ups, of which 22 are echoed in Burley; 11 are derivations, of which 4 are echoed in Burley. In the following array, which I present for the sheer satisfaction of thoroughness rather than on the assumption that anyone would be fascinated enough to wish to pursue this comparison in detail, GO is Gerald Odo, JB is John Buridan, and WB is Walter Burley. Roman numerals number Books, Arabic numerals, questions. First, then, the match-ups:

I	II	III
GO7, JB5	GO1, JB2	GO2, JB7, WB2
GO8, JB6	GO2, JB1, WB1	GO5, JB9, WB5
GO10, JB7, WB10	GO3, JB8	GO16, JB15, WB9
GO12, JB8	GO4, JB7, WB3	GO IV2, JB20, WB17
GO13, JB9	GO5, JB5	GO IV3, JB22
GO15, JB11	GO7, JB10, WB7	GO IV5, JB19
GO19, JB X5	GO10, JB14	GO IV11, JB27, WB20

GO <sub>20</sub> , JB <sub>I3</sub>	GO <sub>23</sub> , JB <sub>I7</sub> , WB <sub>I6</sub>	GO IV <sub>I3</sub> , JB <sub>26</sub>
GO <sub>21</sub> , JB X <sub>5</sub>	GO <sub>26</sub> , JB <sub>I8</sub>	GO IV <sub>I4</sub> , JB <sub>30</sub>
GO <sub>24</sub> , 25, 26, JB <sub>I6</sub>	GO <sub>7</sub> , JB <sub>I2</sub>	
GO <sub>27</sub> , 28, 29, JB <sub>I7</sub>	GO <sub>9</sub> , JB <sub>I0</sub>	
GO <sub>30</sub> , JB <sub>I8</sub> , WB <sub>I7</sub>		
GO <sub>32</sub> , JB <sub>20</sub>		
GO <sub>34</sub> , JB VI <sub>3</sub>		
GO <sub>36</sub> , JB <sub>22</sub> , WB <sub>22</sub>		

IV

V

VI

GO <sub>I5</sub> , JB <sub>I</sub> , WB <sub>I</sub>	GO <sub>I</sub> , JB <sub>2</sub>	GO <sub>I</sub> , JB <sub>2</sub>
GO <sub>I7</sub> , JB <sub>3</sub>	GO <sub>6</sub> , JB <sub>9</sub>	GO <sub>2</sub> , JB <sub>4</sub> , WB <sub>I</sub>
GO <sub>20</sub> , JB <sub>6</sub>	GO <sub>7</sub> , JB <sub>I</sub>	GO <sub>7</sub> , JB <sub>6</sub>
GO <sub>21</sub> , JB <sub>7</sub>	GO <sub>I0</sub> , JB <sub>29</sub>	GO <sub>I0</sub> , JB <sub>I0</sub> , WB <sub>3</sub>
GO <sub>24</sub> , JB <sub>9</sub>	GO <sub>I3</sub> , JB <sub>I2</sub>	GO <sub>11</sub> , JB <sub>11</sub>
GO <sub>25</sub> , JB <sub>I0</sub>	GO <sub>I4</sub> , JB <sub>I3</sub>	GO <sub>I3</sub> , JB <sub>I2</sub>
GO <sub>29</sub> , JB <sub>11</sub> , WB <sub>6</sub>	GO <sub>I5</sub> , JB <sub>I8</sub>	GO <sub>I4</sub> , JB <sub>I4</sub> , WB <sub>6</sub>
GO <sub>33</sub> , JB <sub>I2</sub>	GO <sub>I6</sub> , JB <sub>20</sub>	GO <sub>I5</sub> , JB <sub>I8</sub> , WB <sub>7</sub>
GO <sub>34</sub> , JB <sub>I3</sub>	GO <sub>I7</sub> , JB <sub>21</sub>	GO <sub>I6</sub> , JB <sub>22</sub>
GO <sub>37</sub> , JB <sub>I4</sub> , WB <sub>11</sub>	GO <sub>I8a</sub> , JB <sub>23</sub>	GO <sub>I7</sub> , JB <sub>21</sub> , WB <sub>I0</sub>
GO <sub>39</sub> , JB <sub>I6</sub>	GO <sub>20</sub> , JB <sub>24</sub>	
GO <sub>40</sub> , JB <sub>I8</sub>	GO <sub>21</sub> , JB <sub>27</sub>	
GO <sub>43</sub> , JB <sub>I9</sub> , WB <sub>I3</sub>	GO <sub>22</sub> , JB <sub>26</sub> , WB <sub>5</sub>	

And here are the derivations, which one may or may not consider significant additions:

I

II

III

GO <sub>3</sub> , JB <sub>2</sub>	GO <sub>6</sub> , JB <sub>9</sub> , WB <sub>6</sub>	GO IV <sub>9</sub> , JB <sub>I8</sub> , WB <sub>I9</sub>
GO <sub>5</sub> , JB <sub>4</sub> , WB <sub>2</sub>	GO <sub>I0</sub> , JB <sub>I3</sub>	GO IV <sub>I0</sub> , JB <sub>23</sub>
GO <sub>23</sub> , JB <sub>I0</sub>	GO <sub>I4</sub> , JB <sub>I4</sub>	

IV

V

VI

GO <sub>45</sub> , JB <sub>20</sub>	GO <sub>3</sub> , JB <sub>4</sub> , WB <sub>2</sub>	GO <sub>5</sub> , JB <sub>3</sub>
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Mere formulation of questions may seem of little importance, especially in an intellectual situation leading to standardization. It

is worth pointing out that though there are some twenty-six cases in which Burley's formulations match or approach those of Odo and Buridan, there are many more in which they do not — which tells against the assumption of widespread standardization. The fact that in the first six books more than half of Buridan's formulations match or approach those of Odo is important, I conclude — it suggests very strongly that Buridan had Odo's commentary before him as he worked at his own, and turned to it for guidance in deciding what topics to take up.

Our preliminary chronicle has shown, of course, that he turned to it for more than that. In the most frequent type of use, Buridan takes one or more of the initial arguments from Odo. Again, sometimes the formulations are almost perfect match-ups, and sometimes Buridan alters the wording but not the sense, elaborating or condensing or commenting as he goes. Consider, for example, the opening of that odd question as to the form of counsel, Question 16 of Book III in Odo:

Et tertio arguitur quod consilium non sit quaestio resolutoria. Primo, quia omnis quaestio quaerit: vel si est, vel quid est, vel quia est, vel propter quid est. II *Posteriorum*. Sed consilium nulum istorum quaerit; sed quaerit aliquid: quaerit quomodo potest acquiri propositus finis. Quare non est quaestio. 2<sup>o</sup>, quia nulla quaestio est recta vel obliqua, vera vel falsa, quia oratio interrogativa nec verum vel falsum significat. I *Perihermenias*. Sed consilium est rectum vel obliquum, ut in libro 6<sup>o</sup>, parte *Eubulia*. Quare non est quaestio. (48<sup>v</sup>)

Compare it with the opening of Question 15 of Book III in Buridan:

Arguitur quod non sit quaestio: quia nec in consilio quaerimus si est, nec quid est, neque quia est, nec propter quid. Sed consiliamur quomodo, et per quae media finem statutum possumus attingere. Ergo cum *omnis quaestio sit altera praedictorum*, II *Posteriorum*, sequitur quod consilium non est quaestio.

Item, quaestio nec est recta nec obliqua; sed rectitudo vel obliquitas in eius determinatione consistit. Consilium autem est aliquando rectum, aliquando obliquum. Ergo ipsum non est quaestio, sed magis in quaestionis determinatione consistit. Minor autem patet 6<sup>o</sup> hujus, capitulo de *Eubulia*. (213–214)

Buridan tightens the prose a little, furnishes a quotation, and adds that directness and obliqueness belong to the determination of a question rather than the question itself (rather than refer us to the



*De Interpretatione*). Following is a list of questions in which Buridan takes such initial arguments from Odo, ranging from one small point somewhat recast, to several, almost word-for-word, with perhaps a small point or two in the body of the treatment or in the rebuttals at the end — in other words, here is a list of questions with what might be called minor but definite borrowings from Odo:

- Book I: Questions 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16, 18, 22.  
 Book II: Questions 2, 5, 8, 10, 15, 17.  
 Book III: Questions 7, 10, 13, 14, 27.  
 Book IV: Questions 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20.  
 Book V: Questions 9, 14, 20, 21, 26, 27.  
 Book VI: Questions 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 14, 21.  
 Book IX: Questions 1, 2.

In a more impressive use, however, Buridan turns to Odo not only for occasional initial arguments and final rebuttals, but also for considerations in the main body, and in a not inconsiderable number of cases, for extensive passages. It is difficult to be precise about this distinction, but I would say that the following are questions in which more than just a few arguments are taken over, accompanied by the questions from Odo containing the original material utilized:

- Book I: JB5-GO6, 7; JB9-GO13; JB17-GO27, 28; JB20-GO32.  
 Book II: JB1-GO2; JB7-GO4; JB18-GO26.  
 Book III: JB12-GO7; JB15-GO16; JB18-GO IV9; JB19-GO IV5; JB22-GO IV3; JB26-GO IV13.  
 Book IV: JB8-GO23; JB11-GO27, 30; JB16-GO39; JB18-GO40.  
 Book V: JB2-GO1; JB4-GO5, 8.  
 Book VI: JB10-GO10; JB22-GO16.

And finally, the extent of borrowing or utilization is great enough in the following cases to be worth singling out for special attention (the title of Buridan's question is given):

- Book III: JB30-GO IV14. "Utrum Virginitas sit virtus vel vitium?"  
 Book IV: JB6-GO20. "Utrum usura sit per se prava etiamsi non esset prohibita?"  
           JB9-GO24. "Utrum melius sit honorari quam honorare?"  
           JB10-GO25. "Utrum secundum magnanimitatem honores sint magis appetendi an contemnendi?"  
 Book V: JB1-GO7. "Utrum iustitia sit moderativa passionum?"  
           JB12-GO13. "Utrum operatio iusta sit medium inter iniustum facere et iniustum pati?"

JB13-GO14. "Utrum iustitia sit medium duarum malitiarum extremarum?"

JB18-GO15. "Utrum ius politicum sit aliud a iure dominativo, paterno, vel uxorio?"

JB23-GO18a. "Utrum aliquis patitur iniustum volens?"

JB24-GO20. "Utrum iudex corruptus, ferens iniustam sententiam pro parte corruptente, gravius delinquat quam pars corrumpens?" (This question has special interest as one of the few in which Buridan and Odo take opposite sides, so that the arguments borrowed are not found in corresponding parts of the question.)

Book VI: JB4-GO2. "Utrum scientificum, quo anima speculatur necessaria, et ratiocinativum, quo ipsa ratiocinatur circa contingentia, sint diversae potentiae, seu diversae partes animae?"

JB18-GO15 "Utrum eubulia synesis et gnome sint virtutes ab invicem et a prudentia distinctae?" (This question has the verses mentioned above.)

JB22-GO16. "Utrum sapientia sit virtus melior quam prudentia?"

Book IX: JB3-GO1, 5, 6. "Utrum oporteat magis subvenire patri quam alicui alteri?" (This question has special significance, in that Buridan refers to Odo by name. It will be discussed below.)

As an example of the kind of relationship to be found in this last grouping, let us consider, almost at random, Buridan's Question 18 of Book V and Odo's Question 15 of the same Book, paragraph by paragraph.

#### *Buridan*

Et arguitur quod non: quia omne ius naturale est ius politicum, cum ius naturale sit species iuris politici, ut patet in littera. Sed ius dominativum, paternum, et uxorium est ius naturale, ut patet I *Politicae*; ergo etc.

Item, dicit Aristoteles: *iustum politicum esse quibus est lex ad ipsos*. Sed leges plures dantur dominorum ad servos, patrum ad filios, et viri ad uxores, et e contra. Ergo etc.

#### *Odo*

Et arguitur quod non.

Primo, quia omne ius naturale est ius politicum, cum sit species eius. ut infra, capitulo primo. Sed ius paternum, dominativum, et uxorium est ius naturale, ut probatur I *Politicae*. Quare istud triplex ius est politicum ius.

Secundo, quia inter illos est ius politicum inter quos est lex et actio legitima, ut habetur hic per Philosophum. Sed haec sunt inter virum et uxorem, ut .ff. de servo corrupto .l. suum. Item, inter patrem et filium ut .ff. de iudiciis .l. lis. Item, inter servum et do-

minum ut .e. inter .l. vix. Quare inter virum et uxorem et inter patrem et filium et inter dominum et servum erit ius politicum, et per consequens haec iura, scilicet uxorium paternum et dominativum erunt iura politica.

Item, principatus despoticus, principatus regalis et principatus politicus videntur includere iustum politicum inter principantem et subiectum. Sed I *Politicae* declaratum est quod dominus principatur servo despotice, et pater filio regaliter, et vir uxori politice. Ergo etc.

Tertio, quia principatus politicus et principatus regalis et principatus despoticus videntur includere ius politicum inter principantem et subditum. Sed vir principatur uxori politice, pater autem filio regaliter, dominus autem servis despotice, ut probatur I *Politicae*. Quare in his tribus hominum ordinibus erit ius politicum. Jus autem primi ordinis est ius uxorium et maritale. Secundi vero ius paternum. Tertii autem ius dominativum. Quare haec tria iura erunt politica.

Oppositum dicit Philosophus. Notandum quod ius politicum est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter cives. Sunt autem cives qui sub eodem principatu commorantes sunt in vivendo, acquirendo, et possidendo, liberi, et aequales. Et non dico *aequales* sic quod quantum unus acquirit vel possidet tantum alter. Et sic sunt liberi et aequales quod licet unicuique aequaliter tamen sibi acquirere quantum potest, et acquisita possidere, et uti eis sicut placet, absque tamen communitatis et concivium laesione. Ius autem dominativum est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter dominum et servum. Ius vero paternum est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter parentem et prolem. Sed ius uxorium est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter virum et uxorem.

Sed oppositum probat Philosophus. Pro solutione quaestionis praenotandum est de isto quadruplici iure quid est unumquodque. Est ergo sciendum quod ius politicum est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter cives liberos et aequales sub eodem principatu degentes. Jus autem uxorium est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter maritum et uxorem. Jus autem paternum est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter parentem et prolem. Ius autem dominativum est ius servandi debitum ordinem inter dominum et servum.

Dicendum est ergo, quod iustum politicum est multipliciter distinctum ab alio triplici iusto. Primo, quidem quantum ad eius materiam vel obiectum, quoniam iustum politicum est inter partes civitatis, et inter cives, ut dictum est, ideo etiam dicitur *politicum*, id est civile. Alia autem iusta sunt inter partes domus, quia, sicut dicitur I *Politicae*, primae et minimae partes domus sunt dominus et servus, maritus et uxor, pater et filius. Modo civitas et domus specie differunt non solum magnitudine et parvitate, ut probatur I *Politicae*. Ergo illa tria iusta non sunt iusta politica, sed vocantur proprie iusta oeconomica.

Item, ius politicum est inter personas divisas in proprietate et usu bonorum. Aliud autem triplex iustum est inter personas coniunctas in utroque istorum: servus enim est tanquam possessio domini, filius autem sicut pars, uxor autem partis, est viro coniuncta.

Item, iustum politicum est inter personas aequales quantum ad principari et subici, quia neutri civium naturaliter principantur, vel subiciuntur.

Aliud autem triplex iustum est inter personas naturaliter inaequales. Paterfamilias enim naturaliter principatur servis, uxori, et liberis; prout ostenditur I *Politicae*. Secundo autem iustum politicum differt ab alio triplici iusto quantum ad formam et modum, quoniam iustum politicum est aequalitas eorum simpliciter

His ergo praemissis dicendum quod ius politicum differt ab alio iure tripliciter, scilicet in materia quidem, quoniam ius politicum ordinat principaliter partes civitatis. Aliud autem triplex ius ordinat partes domus. Civitas autem et domus specie differunt non solum magnitudine et parvitate, ut probatur I *Politicae*. Et ideo illud ius quia civitatem ordinat dicitur politicum. Istud autem triplex ius quia domum ordinat dicitur economicum.

Item, ius politicum ordinat personas divisas in proprietate ac usu bonorum. Aliud autem triplex ius ordinat personas non divisas in utroque istorum nisi forsitan uxor habeat aliqua bona paraphernalia in quibus est divisa simpliciter a viro secundum iura moderna.

Item, ius politicum ordinat personas aequales penes principari et subici, quia nullus principatur aut subicitur alteri.

Aliud autem triplex ius ordinat personas naturaliter inaequales, ut probatur I *Politicae*, quia paterfamilias principatur et uxori et proli et servis, ut allegatum est in proponendo. In forma vero differt, quoniam ius politicum est formaliter aequalitas civium in aequalitate artificum et officiorum, agricolarum et bellatorum,



inter quos ipsum est, in hoc ut quilibet habeat quod suum est.

Aliud autem triplex iustum est inaequalitas simpliciter eorum inter quos est, aequata tamen secundum debitam proportionalitatem. Iustum enim est quod pater praebeat filio nutrimentum et doctrinam; et e contra filius patri reddat honorem et reverentiam. Et sicut servus acquirit domino et procurat ita e converso oportet quod dominus servum custodiat, et defendat. Et, ut dicit Albertus, sicut vir uxori praebeat foecunditatem, ita uxor viro rependat generationem; vel, ut alii dicunt, quod sicut vir honorem impedit uxori, sic scilicet quod ex honore viri mulier honoratur, ita mulier reddat viro debitum famulatum.

Tertio vero differunt quantum ad finem vel effectum, quoniam iustum dominativum, paternum et uxorium ordinantur principaliter ad sustentationem et conservationem humanae vitae. Iustum autem politicum ordinatur ad per se sufficientiam vitae, sicut satis patet I *Politicae*. Et Tullius idem declarat in principio suae *Rhetoricae*. (434-435)

divitiarum et honorum, ad proportionalitatem congruam civitati producens.

Aliud autem triplex est inaequalitas naturaliter requisita inter virum et uxorem, quia vir naturaliter habet bonum deliberativum, femina vero habet invalidum, ut habetur I *Politicae*, et inter parentem et prolem, et inter dominum et servum. In effectu vero differunt, quia illud triplex ius ordinatur secundum se ad istum effectum qui est conservatio humanae ac naturalis vitae. Ius vero politicum ad effectum qui est per se sufficientia vitae, quia quamvis una domus posset aliquid sustentare naturalem vitam, non tamen sufficientem vitam qualis decet homines ratione vigentes, ut habetur I *Politicae* et in principio *Rhetoricae* Tullii. (108<sup>v</sup>)

There are some further parallel passages in this pair of questions, but this should be enough to show the kind of dependence I have called extensive. Buridan eliminates what I take to be the legal references of Odo's second paragraph, and the references to "modern laws" regarding husband and wife. It is interesting that he substitutes remarks about what is due between father and son for Odo's remark about women's poor deliberation. It does seem an unkind

gesture on the part of Buridan to make explicit reference to Albert in the midst of such unacknowledged borrowing from Gerald.

Not all of his borrowing is silent in this way, however, and it may be worthwhile to review the patterns of reference or identification of material derived from Odo. Most cases are prefaced with standard noncommittal references: *arguitur*, *videtur*, *dicendum est*, *deinde*, *item*, *sciendum est*, *sed respondetur*, *patet*, and these are so frequent it is hardly worth documenting them. In another pattern, Buridan indicates his debt without further comment, saying *dicunt* (490), *dicunt quidam* (353), *dicunt aliqui* (199, 306, 549), *aliqui... probant* (274), *alii... asserunt* (316), *respondent aliqui* (415), *quidam... arguunt* (566), *arguunt illi* (567), *probare viduntur... illi arguunt sic* (491). One wonders why so many references in the plural; surely this is a matter of intellectual courtesy, and need not indicate an actual plurality of those who hold the views presented. But in some cases, Buridan does seem to want to indicate not only plurality but even the commonness of the view. Thus he prefaces one passage from Odo so: "Tres solent poni conclusiones" (85), and others thus: "communiter dicitur" (414), "communiter respondetur" (417). But lest we conclude that Buridan merely considered Odo's commentary a convenient place to find customary positions, we should take note of a few places in which he indicates particular respect. On p. 17 he says, "dicunt quidam quatuor conclusiones bene subtiliter," a formula which is echoed on page 416: "ipsi arguunt bene subtiliter." On page 327 the Odo material is introduced thus: "Aliqui tamen magni Doctores hoc non concedunt: sed dicunt..." And on page 451, he pays Odo the same compliment that he elsewhere pays his revered Seneca: "Quidam doctor satis pulchre (sicut mihi videtur) determinat istam questionem subter hac sententia..."<sup>14</sup>

All of which brings us to the puzzle, or even perhaps, the mystery, of Book IX. In Question 2, after so much silent borrowing and anonymous reference, Buridan finally identifies a passage from Odo with the phrase "Respondet Gerardus bene" (794). In Question 3, there are more such identifications: "Gerardus respondet," "nec media Gerardi oppositum concludunt" (802), "Gerardus movet talem quaestionem," "Gerardus tamen dicit" (804), and "bene concederem quae nunc a Gerardo recitata fuerunt" (805). Does this sudden identification by

<sup>14</sup> See footnote 13, p. 29 of "Buridan and Seneca" for laudatory references to Seneca. The typical reference reads, "Hoc pulchre dicit Seneca" (669).

name indicate that Odo had died by the time these passages were written? If so, this might provide a clue for the dating of this portion of Buridan's commentary, for we are told that Odo died of the plague in 1349.<sup>15</sup> Of course, this explicit reference to Odo by name makes it certain that in all this similarity and parallelism we have been tracing, it is Buridan who is taking from Odo, rather than the other way around.

One reference may take us into considerations which, after a final statistical frenzy, will lead us away from these external matters of borrowings and references into at least a brief comparison of the actual thought of our two figures. In Question 18 of Book I, Buridan takes a passage from Odo's Question 30 of Book I, in which Odo attributes to theologians the distinction between earned happiness (*felicitas meritoria*) and rewarding happiness (*felicitas praemiatoria*). Buridan echoes Odo's attribution to theologians, thus suggesting that he looks upon Odo as a source for theological materials (65).<sup>16</sup> In this connection, it is of interest that at the end of Question 8 of Book IV, Odo sets aside his discussion of martyrdom and courage by saying "*Hoc autem magis pertinet ad theologos. Quare relinquo*" (60<sup>v</sup>). But a compilation of the non-Aristotelian references in the commentary shows heavy theological orientation. The Biblical references are as follows: Sacred Scriptures (without further specification), 2; Daniel, 1; Deuteronomy, 4; Ecclesiastes, 7; Esdras, 1; Exodus,

<sup>15</sup> Langlois, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

<sup>16</sup> This distinction is at the heart of Odo's discussion in his Question 31 of Book I, which Gauthier and Jolif single out for comment in remarking that in it Odo "*venge Aristote de l'hostilité de ses confrères en prouvent, dans une question spécialement consacrée à cet effet, que la morale d'Aristote est en plein accord avec la morale chrétienne.*" *Op. cit.*, p. 85\*. The question is, "*Utrum intentio Aristotelis de positione felicitatis concordet vel repugnet veritati et fidei christiane?*" One may wonder whether it deserves Gauthier's dramatic characterization. The leading arguments against Aristotle are that he claims that offspring, beauty, and temporal goods are necessary for happiness, that happiness comes from men rather than God, and that the dead do not live and are not happy. The deciding argument has a Thomistic ring: truth is not repugnant to truth; the Faith is true, and the position of the Philosopher is true since it is demonstrated through true reasons. All is resolveable once we realize that Aristotle is not talking about the kind of happiness envisaged in the Faith — indeed, he did not know of it. These external goods are not even part of the being of earned happiness; they are only its ornaments. Aristotle did not deny that happiness comes from god as well as man, and the happiness of the dead is not earned, but rewarding. This is all a bit too convenient to be very impressive.

3; Genesis, 2; Job, 1; Kings, 3; Numbers, 1; Psalms, 2; Tobias, 1; Wisdom, 1; Evangelists (without further specification), 3; John, 4; Luke, 3; Matthew, 5; Paul, 19; Revelations, 2. The other references include several classical personages as well as many Fathers and medieval writers of theological significance: Agathon, 1; Al Ghazali, 2; Ambrose, 2; Andronicus, 1; Augustine, 27; Averroes, 2; Avicenna, 3; Bede, 2; Bernard, 1; Boethius, 14; Cato, 1; Cicero, 23; Damascene, 4; *Decretals*, 6; Dionysius, 4; Empedocles, 1; Eustratius, 17; Gregory, 3; Homer, 6; Hugh of St. Victor, 7; Isidore, 6; Jerome, 3; Justinian Institutes, 1; Macrobius, 5; Plato, 1; Seneca, 4; Vergil, 1. The comparable Buridan references follow (one should keep in mind that Odo's references are drawn only from that portion of his commentary devoted to questions, which is considerably smaller than Buridan's commentary, entirely devoted to questions): Aegidius (Romanus), 1; Albertus (Magnus), 29; Alexander (of Aphrodisias), 1; Augustine, 3; Averroes, 113; Avicenna, 1; Boethius, 14; Cato, 1; Christ, 3; Cicero, 103; *De causis*, 5; *Decretals*, 1; Empedocles, 3; Eudoxus, 3; Eustratius, 66; Gerardus, 6; Lincolnensis (Grosseteste), 7; Macrobius, 1; Mohammed, 1; Parisian Articles, 12; Paul, 1; Plato, 5; Porphyry, 1; Proclus, 1; Seneca, 186; Solomon, 3; Thomas (Aquinas), 15.<sup>17</sup> Both Odo and Buridan (and Burley) rely as one might expect on Eustratius. Buridan, as one might expect for a master of arts with no theological degree, eschews the Bible. And where Buridan relies heavily on Cicero and Seneca, Odo's favorites are Augustine and Paul. Most of Buridan's references to Averroes concern metaphysical topics — and it is clear that Odo places very little trust in the Commentator.

It is interesting to note the absence of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas from Odo's references, especially in view of their prominence in Buridan and, in the case of Albert, in Burley. Perhaps as a Franciscan writing in a time of intellectual polarization between

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<sup>17</sup> See "Buridan and Seneca," p. 28, for the original compilation of these references. Gomes has carried out a parallel compilation for Burley's commentary, which may be interesting to compare with the others: Albertus Magnus, 18; Aquinas, 1; Averroes, 5; Avicenna, 2; Boethius, 2; Cicero, 4; Ennius, 1; Epicurus, 1; Eudoxus, 6; Euripides, 2; Eustratius, 265; Grosseteste, 105; Heracleitus, 2; Macrobius, 2; Plato, 2; Pythagoras, 1; Seneca, 8; Socrates, 5; Sophocles, 1; Vergil, 1; "Christian Religion," 1. Burley's English tradition comes out clearly in the 105 references to Grosseteste, most of which pertain to ethical matters. Buridan's references to Grosseteste pertain to logical and not ethical matters. It is surprising that there are so few references to Cicero and Seneca in the Burley list.



the orders, Odo could hardly be expected to make much of the two great Dominicans. Buridan's place in this situation is curious. As a secular, he had no obligation of loyalty to an Order, and we need feel no surprise at his use of Albert and his discussions of Thomas, especially considering the importance of Albert for the study of the *Ethics*. We have already seen him making a rather gratuitous reference to Albert in the midst of unacknowledged borrowing from Odo. In Question 4 of Book VI, which is concerned with the difference between the scientific and discursive powers, we find this:

Arguitur quod non, sicut sanctus Thomas arguit, quoniam in III *De anima* distinxit Aristoteles intellectum in duo, scilicet agentem, cuius est omnia facere, et possibilem, qui est possibilis omnia fieri. Uterque igitur ipsorum ad omnia se habet. Esset igitur contra rationem utriusque intellectus, si alia pars animae esset quae intelligit necessaria et alia quae intelligit contingentia. (487)

Which passage is at least reminiscent of the following text from Odo's Question 2 of the same book:

Tertio, quia intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere et possibilis quo est omnia fieri, ut habetur III *De anima*. Quare contra rationem intellectus possibilis et agentis esset si alia pars animae cognosceret necessaria et alia cognosceret contingentia. (120<sup>v</sup>)

No doubt the argument is a commonplace, and no doubt Saint Thomas uses it, but Buridan's formulation is suspiciously close to Odo's, especially in the context of some four other adjacent parallel passages. Buridan goes on to discuss Thomas's views at some length, and then discusses Odo's, identifying them as what "quidam dicunt." Where Odo says that the powers are distinct naturally, Buridan reformulates, so that the position is that they are distinct quidditatively — and that it is Odo's position that is so reformulated, we can be sure from the lengthy matching passage which follows. What is puzzling here is why Buridan would take the position that powers of the soul are distinct, not really, but quidditatively, from Odo rather than from the more formidable figure of Duns Scotus.<sup>18</sup> On occasion, Buridan

<sup>18</sup> Odo does hold the general position that the powers of the soul are quidditatively distinct from the soul and each other in Question 34 of Book I, which will be discussed below.

silently accepts Odo's account even over that of Albert. In Question 19 of Book III, which asks whether courage is a cardinal virtue, he cites Albert's criterion for being a cardinal virtue:

Item, secundum Albertum, virtutes ex eo dicuntur cardinales, quia in eis, veluti in cardinibus, tota volvitur humana conversatio... (225)

At the end, however, that criterion is rejected:

Ad aliam dicitur quod non dicitur cardinalis quia circa eam versatur humana conversatio quocunque modo, sed quia super eas humana bonitas sustentatur modo dicto,... (229)

Odo's Question 5 of Book IV asks the same question, and uses the following criterion for being a cardinal virtue:

De primo sciendum... est... quod ratio virtutis cardinalis seu principalis consistit in hoc quod ipsis quatuor habitis, et nulla alia, homo est simpliciter bonus homo in esse morali. Secundum quod philosophi locuti sunt de bonitate humana... Et cardinales quia super eas tanquam super cardines sustentatur et volvitur humana bonitas. (60<sup>v</sup>)

Perhaps the most interesting question involving Buridan, Odo and the great Dominicans is Buridan's Question 1 of Book V, "Utrum iustitia sit moderativa passionum?" The parallel question in Odo is 7 of Book V. We begin with the usual silent borrowing—first, Buridan, then Odo:

Arguitur quod non, quia communiter continuatur iste liber ad praecedentes secundum differentiam iustitiae ad alias virtutes, scilicet quod in praecedentibus determinavit Philosophus de virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones; in isto autem quinto de iustitiae quae est circa operationes. (363)

Arguitur quod iustitia non moderet aliquam passionem. Primo, quia communiter continuatur iste quintus liber ad praecedentes secundum differentiam iustitiae ad alias virtutes, dicendo quod in praecedentibus determinavit Philosophus de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa passiones; hic autem in quinto determinat de virtute iustitiae quae est circa operationes. Quare secundum hoc iustitia nec moderat passiones nec etiam circa passiones. (98<sup>r</sup>)

Despite the claim in this argument that this is the common version of the connection between Book V and the previous ones, Buridan tells us at the end of the question that in fact this is the version of Saint Thomas, and furthermore it is to be denied, as leading to error.<sup>19</sup> After the initial arguments, and parallel declarations of Aristotle's opposition, Odo describes a relevant position thus:

Hic dicitur quod iustitia et iniustitia differunt in hoc a virtutibus et vitiis, de quibus actum est in IV libro, quod virtutes et vitia de quibus dictum est ibi sunt circa passiones, quia scilicet in eis principaliter consideratur qualiter homo interius afficiatur circa passiones. Sed quid exterius operatur non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, inquantum scilicet operationes exterioris ex interioribus passionibus proveniunt. (98<sup>r</sup>)

Buridan describes what is clearly the same position, but identifies it as that of Saint Thomas and his followers:

Beatus Thomas, et sequaces eius in hoc, iustitiam ab aliis virtutibus inter caeteras differentias his duabus dicunt differre: primo, quia iustitia est circa operationes principaliter, et non circa passiones nisi ex consequenti, prout homo per passiones iuvatur vel impeditur circa operationem; aliae autem virtutes sunt circa passiones principaliter, et non circa operationes nisi ex consequenti, scilicet in quantum operationes exteriores ex interioribus passionibus proveniunt. Secundo, quia iustitia est in voluntate; aliae autem virtutes sunt in appetitu sensitivo. (363–364)

Odo makes no explicit mention of the second thesis, that justice is in the will while other virtues are in the sensitive appetite, and since Buridan makes that a major bone of contention, much of Buridan's treatment diverges from that of Odo. But he does agree with Odo in that part of his treatment pertaining to the first thesis, that justice chiefly is concerned for actions and only secondarily for passions. In comparing the following two passages, the reader might ask what is the subject of the verb "nituntur" near the beginning of the Buridan passage, which follows immediately after that just quoted. First Buridan, and then Odo:

Hanc autem sententiam non immerito reprobare nituntur, probantes primo conclusionem istam, quod omnes morales virtu-

<sup>19</sup> "Tunc ad rationes principales: Ad primam dicendum est quod illa continuatio est Beati Thomae, et neganda est tanquam faciens errare" (368).

tes prius ordine habent moderari passiones quam regulare operationes. Quod probant primo sic: ad unam virtutem cuius operi sunt innatae passiones obviare spectat primo vincere passiones, quam opus possit virtuose, id est, delectabiliter et firme exerceri; sed operi iustitiae plurimae rebellant passiones, ut amor, odium, affectio lucri; ergo, etc. Verbi gratia, posita est in homine pugna concupiscentiae et rationalis electionis: ex una enim parte secundum iussum rationis eligit non accipere pecuniam alienam et reddere iam acceptam; ex alia vero parte propter indigentiam concupiscit accipere pecuniam alienam et non reddere iam acceptam. Quomodo iste non poterit delectabiliter et prompte prosequi opus electum nisi prius devicta concupiscentia: nullus enim dubitat quin propter passiones multi iniusti fiant. (364)

Prima vero declaro primo, quia moderari passionem est vincere passionem; regulare vero operationem est reddere bonam operationem. Sed iustitia et omnis moralis virtus prius vincit passionem quam reddat bonam operationem. Quod statim patet circa iustitiam: posita enim pugna et repugnantia inter electionem iustitiae et passionem adversante iustitiae, homo pugnam in se sustinens ex una parte eligit non accipere pecuniam alienam et reddere iam acceptam, ex alia vero parte concupiscit accipere pecuniam alienam et non reddere iam acceptam. Nunc autem impossibile est huic homini simul sequi electionem et concupiscentiam, quoniam ad contradictoria tendunt. Quare sicut non posset sequi concupiscentiam procedendo ad opus concupitum, non prius victa electione, sic non potest sequi electionem procedendo ad opus electum, non prius victa passione. Quare prius necessario vincet passionem quam bonam reddat operationem. (98<sup>r</sup>)

If one did not realize that Buridan is here following Odo, one might wonder at Thomas and his followers striving to reject their own position. Seeing the relationship to Odo, one understands the situation, and thus Odo's rejection of Thomas on this point, and Buridan's agreement with Odo, against Thomas — an unconfessed agreement, however.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Odo felt quite strongly about this question. Behind Buridan's remark that Thomas's "continuation" leads to error there stands Odo's indignation at the view that deeds of virtue are only intended as proceeding from passions. Those who think this are dreaming, he says. (This seems stronger than the usual medieval way of describing an opponent's mistakes as "imaginationes.") He adds that this view leads to all kinds of errors in moral philosophy: "Si enim ad specialia bona virtutum descendamus quis interius poterit concipere quod opera virtutum non intenduntur nisi in quantum a passionibus proveniunt ut isti somniant. Hic enim statim occurrunt errores plurimi in morali philosophia" (98<sup>v</sup>).



So, then, Buridan derives a significant number of formulations of questions, initial arguments, main considerations, and even extensive passages from Odo. He shows respect for certain of Odo's treatments, in Book IX by name, and even on occasion sides with Odo against Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. One may wonder why he does all this. The most obvious and direct answer would be that he and Odo share a fundamental philosophical orientation, that he draws from Odo simply because he agrees with him. If that surmise should fail, we would be left perplexed. To test the surmise, we should now carry our comparison into their respective positions on fundamental matters.<sup>21</sup>

### III

Before entering into more significant matters, it may be of some interest to note that we find in Odo's commentary not only Ockham's Razor, but also, in a slightly different version, Buridan's Ass — or, as we now know it to be, Buridan's Dog.<sup>22</sup> The Razor occurs at least three times — in Question 34 of Book I: "Quia plura non sunt ponenda ubi sufficiunt pauciora" (24<sup>r</sup>); in Question 4 of Book V: "quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora" (95<sup>r</sup>); and, in a formulation reminiscent of Ockham, in Question 5 of Book VI, "quia pluralitas non est ponenda ubi non apparet necessitas" (123<sup>r</sup>). The

<sup>21</sup> A reader of Langlois's study of Odo might be discouraged at the prospect of close attention to his writings. Langlois presents a fragment of Odo's *De Figuris Bibliorum* and humorously adds, "Mais nous n'avons pas, en vérité, le courage de continuer." Op. cit., p. 216. As for the verses mentioned above, those closest to the ones found in the commentary come from a fragment probably by Odo, of which Langlois remarks, "Espérons que ce Manuel jusqu'à présent inconnu, et où il n'y a rien d'intéressant, ne trouvera jamais d'éditeur." Ibid., p. 222. However, we have Buridan's praise (subtiliter, bene, pulchre) to hearten us.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, the article "Buridan, Jean," by L. Minio-Paluello in the 1970 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. The ass is nowhere to be found in Buridan's writings, but the dog is, in his exposition of the *De Caelo*. For a more extended treatment, see the article, "Buridan, Jean" by N. Rescher in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. An earlier study by Rescher traces the history of the example. See "Choice without Preference: A study of the Logic and of the History of the Problem of 'Buridan's Ass,'" *Kant-Studien*, 21 (1959/1960), 142-175. As one might expect, the line of thought goes back at least to Aristotle, *De Caelo*, 295b30-35, where the protagonist is neither ass nor dog, but a man.

Dog first appears as an afterthought in an analysis of natural appetite in Question 1 of Book II:

6<sup>o</sup>, sciendum quod appetitus vel inclinatio aptitudinalis potest naturaliter sisti. Quod apparet dupliciter: Primo, siquidem quia ferro posito inter duos adamantes aequales et aequae distantes tractum aequaliter ab utroque ad neutrum movebitur. Simili modo appetitus sensitivus sine intellectivo acceptus positus inter duo concupiscibilia aequalia, et aequae distantia aequaliter imaginata et aequae moventia, tractus ab utroque a neutro movebitur. Secundo, posito quod aliquis lapis haberet virtutem ferri repulsivam, sicut adamas attractivam, et iungeretur adamanti: si ambo essent aequales in virtute et aequae respicerent ferrum, tunc nec adamas traheret nec ille alius lapis repelleret. Simili modo canis videns cibum porrigi, tractus amore cibi non recedet, sed tractus timore baculi non accedet. (26<sup>r</sup>)

The poor dog, similarly paralyzed between stick and bone, is found in Question 9 of Book II as well (31<sup>r</sup>).<sup>23</sup> Of course, both the Razor and the Dog, that is the rule of parsimony and the example of paralysis through equal and opposite causal influence, are found in other medieval writings.

We shall have to be rigorously selective in this comparison of content. Since Buridan's fame was made as a nominalist, it is appropriate to begin by turning to two of those questions in which the Razor appears in Odo's work, for they hinge upon the shibboleth topic of types of distinctions, especially those involved in relations. Question 34 of Odo's Book I asks whether the powers of the soul are really distinct among themselves and from the soul. Partly on the strength of the Razor, Odo argues that the powers are really the same as the soul. They are distinguished, however, but 'quidditatively' rather than really. The central argument is that a power is quidditatively a respect, or respective. The subject of the soul is not. So the powers of the soul are quidditatively distinct from the soul.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> In view of his traditional association with the example, it is interesting that neither ass nor dog appears in Buridan's Question 2 of Book II, which corresponds to Odo's Question 1 of Book II. Buridan has no question corresponding to Odo's 9 of Book II.

<sup>24</sup> "Secundum probo sic: quod est quidditative respectivum non est idem quidditative cum non quidditative respectivo; sed potentia est quidditative respectiva et substantia animae non; igitur non est eadem quidditative cum illa" (24<sup>r</sup>).

The further proof that a power is relational depends on the claim that "Every form whose formal act is not toward itself, but goes over into another objectively, positing that other in being correlatively to its foundation without which it cannot be known, is quidditatively relative or respective."<sup>25</sup> The theme of this question is echoed in Question 2 of Book VI, concerning the 'natural' distinction between the scientific and discursive (*ratiocinativa*) powers. Odo says that these two parts of the soul are not distinguished "as two realities," as he argued near the end of Book I, but rather naturally, as natural aptitudes.<sup>26</sup> The arguments specifying the precise distinction between the scientific and the discursive parts are subtle, but we are less interested in that than in the more general notion of a distinction not between two "realities," but two natural aptitudes or, following the suggested assimilation to the end of Book I, two quiddities. As we have seen, Buridan follows the suggestion. In Question 4 of Book VI, whose correspondence with Odo's Question 2 has already been indicated, he remarks that some say that the discursive and scientific are parts really distinct in the intellectual soul, "not indeed really, as they say, but quidditatively."<sup>27</sup> After an extended repetition of Odo's arguments, Buridan begins his refutation by commenting on the general distinction into which Odo fits them. He does not think the matter should be put that way, for 'thing' is just as much a transcendental term as is 'being,' and items intrinsically distinct are different beings and different things. Others posit quidditative or formal distinctions, he adds, distinctions which are not real but are in the intrinsic nature of a thing, but this is using a fiction to avoid difficulties. He shows his colors by invoking the Razor twice over, as though to cleanse his mind.<sup>28</sup> We may note the obvious, that the Razor is invoked by all parties, and that by itself it cuts very little

<sup>25</sup> "Omnis forma cuius actus formalis non est ad se sed transit in alterum obiective, ponens illud alterum in esse correlative ad suum fundamentum sine quo non potest intelligi, est quidditative relativa vel respectiva" (Ibid.).

<sup>26</sup> "Dicendum cum philosopho quod predictae particulae naturaliter distinguuntur: non quidem realiter tanquam duae realitates, ut probavi supra libro primo circa finem, sed naturaliter tanquam duae aptitudines naturales..." (120<sup>v</sup>).

<sup>27</sup> "Quidam tamen, iuxta opinionem narratam in alia quaestione, dicunt quod ratiocinativum et scientificum sunt potentiae realiter distinctae in anima intellectiva, non quidem realiter, ut dicunt, sed quidditative" (490).

<sup>28</sup> "Puto tamen quod non sit ita dicendum, quoniam sicut ens est nomen transcendens, ita res, ut puto. Ideo quaecunque, non extrinseca denominatione sed intrinsece, sunt distincta, puto illa diversa entia et res diversas.

— everyone admits that entities ought not be posited where not necessary; the question is whether this or that consideration amounts to such a necessity.<sup>29</sup> As to the general question concerning the distinction of powers of the soul, and the argument that a power is quidditatively respective, Buridan considers these in Question 3 of Book VI, where he offers what he calls a brief treatment, since the topic is more speculative than moral. How can a power be predicated of an absolute term, when absolute and respective are not the same, and an affirmative proposition is only verified because of identity? The whole difficulty comes from logic, from not understanding the difference between signification, supposition, and appellation, or connotation.<sup>30</sup> Buridan's conclusion is that (for the cases considered by Odo) there are no powers of the soul which are things distinct from the soul or each other outside of concepts, and the distinction which Odo calls quidditative is only conceptual.<sup>31</sup> On these crucial issues, then, Buridan hardly finds Odo's views congenial; indeed, the dif-

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Quidam autem alii ponunt distinctiones in intrinseca natura rei quidditativas vel formales, et non reales.

Puto quod fictio sit nominum ad fugam aliarum difficultatum: nulla enim necessitas mihi videtur cogens ad ponendum tales distinctiones; ergo non sunt ponendae, nam natura non facit per plura quod potest facere per pauciora" (491).

<sup>29</sup> Thus in Question 5 of Book VI, Odo simply replies to the invocation of the Razor that "hic pluralitas ponitur per philosophum ex evidenti necessitate" (123<sup>f</sup>). He does the same in Question 4 of Book V: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua tali virtuti posita ceterae non sunt frustra..." (95<sup>v</sup>).

<sup>30</sup> "Principium vel potentia praedicatur vere et affirmative de terminis absolutis... Sed quomodo hoc esse potest, cum absolutum et respectivum non sunt idem? Nam affirmativa propositio non verificatur nisi propter identitatem et negativa propter non identitatem. Dicendum est (ut puto) quod tota difficultas ex Logica est; nam ad veritatem propositionis affirmativae non requiritur quod termini, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum sint idem, neque secundum vocem neque secundum conceptum... Item, etiam non requiritur quod termini significant idem quantum ad significatum principale et formale... sed solum requiritur quod termini supponant pro eisdem..." (481). The further discussion explores the distinctions between supposition, signification, and appellation, which for Buridan is equivalent to connotation. These topics now have a sizeable modern literature. For convenient treatments, see E. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic*, Amsterdam, 1953, and T. Scott, trans., *John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, New York, 1966.

<sup>31</sup> "Dico igitur... quod... nullae sunt potentiae animae quae sint res ab anima aut ab invicem distinctae praeter conceptus, quoniam frustra ponentur, sicut prius arguebatur" (484). "Quod non est ita nisi loquamur de diversitate conceptuali..." Question 4, (491).



ference between the two figures is quite reminiscent of that between Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.

Sometimes one must suspect what Buridan must have thought from what he does not say, rather than from what he does. As material through which a comparison on metaphysical topics might be made, Odo's Question 16 of Book I promises an excellent opportunity. The title is "*Utrum sit aliquid bonum per essentiam.*" The point of departure is Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Theory of Ideas. The topics covered in this question include being or good through participation, as well as through essence, how being or good through essence is ideal being, the claim that there is some being and good through essence, that it is unique, and that it is formally or virtually every being or good.<sup>32</sup> "*Esse per essentiam,*" "*esse formale*" and "*ens ideale*" are all explained at length, and the question ends by emphasizing the concordance of Plato and Aristotle against misunderstanding produced by the poor exposition of some Platonists. Well, one wonders, what will the "leader of the Parisian nominalists" make of all that? Of course, he will have nothing to do with any "*esse per essentiam*" — in Question 6 of Book VI, for example, he insists that *esse* and *essentia* are not distinguished outside the soul, and further, that the term *essentia* is only the abstract form of the concrete term *esse*.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, despite his rejection of exotic forms of being, Buridan's own positive conception of the human good depends on the concept of participation. How will he interpret participation with such narrow ontological resources, as it were? One turns eagerly, then, to his counterpart discussion of Platonism in Question 12 of Book I, "*Utrum felicitas consistat in aliquo bono separato?*" The silence is deafening. Buridan distinguishes three ways a separated good can be "imagined" — as quidditative predication, as formal exemplar, and as end for the sake of which things are and act. The first two smack of Plato and the third is accepted by Aristotle. He mentions a distinction between subjective and objective, and then

<sup>32</sup> "Pro solutione quaestionis huius sunt declaranda .6. articuli. Primo, quid est esse, ens vel bonum per participationem. 2°, quid per essentiam. 3°, qualiter ens vel bonum per essentiam sit ens ideale. 4°, quid est aliquid, ens et bonum per essentiam. 5°, quod est unicum et non plura. 6°, quod illud est formaliter vel virtualiter omne ens vel omne bonum" (111<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>33</sup> "Ista opinio non placet mihi. Primo, quia non puto quod esse et essentia rei distinguantur in ipsa re praeter animam... Quinto, quia videtur mihi quod hoc nomen *essentia* non est nisi abstractum huius concreti *esse*..." (498).

develops the important distinction between attaining an end formally and immediately, and attaining it through a certain participated likeness of it.<sup>34</sup> There is no explicit contact with Odo's treatment, and we are left with disappointed expectation — which may in itself be significant.

The situation is not much better for basic epistemological comparison, except that the imbalance goes the other way. Buridan has several elaborate treatments of epistemological issues; indeed, the first question he takes up is whether there is a science concerning virtues. Odo seems to presuppose a positive answer to that; he first asks whether the subject of moral science is human good or operation. Here and there one finds small indications that topics of general epistemology and even of moral epistemology are cut-and-dried for him.<sup>35</sup> At one point he utilizes a conception of truth as adequation,

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<sup>34</sup> "Sciendum est secundo, quod tale bonum separatum potest tripliciter imaginari esse; uno modo, quod sit commune secundum praedicationem quidditativam ad omnia bona particularia, ita quod sit quidditas omnium bonorum particularium, et hoc quandoque videntur sonare verba Platonis. Secundo modo, quod si non sit quidditas omnium bonorum particularium, est tamen formale exemplar omnium bonorum particularium et eiusdem rationis cum eis, differens solum ab eis quia exsistit sine materia, et alia sunt in materia. Ad quod omnes artes, quodcunque bonum intendentes, aspicientes, possunt melius adipisci bonum intentum, et hunc etiam modum videntur aliquando sapere verba Platonis. Tertio modo, quod illud bonum separatum sit omnium aliorum finale bonum, gratia cuius caetera sunt et operantur, quod est coeli et totius naturae primus princeps; quod non est quidditative praedicabile de aliis, nec eiusdem rationis sed alterius, et maxime distantis a quidditatibus et rationibus aliorum bonorum, sed tamen includens (in se simplicissime vivens) omnia alia bona virtualiter et excellenter; et hoc est Deus gloriosus. Duos autem primos modos non concedit Aristoteles, et tertium approbat et demonstrat" (43). This is followed by the subjective/objective distinction. Near the end is the appeal to participation: "Nam sicut entia ordinata sunt ad commune quoddam bonum, et illud intendunt et appetunt, sed non omnia ipsum formaliter adipiscuntur et immediate, sed solum illa quae sunt aliorum suprema et illi bono summo propinqua, caetera vero sufficienter attingunt bonum sibi debitum sed adipiscuntur sibi quoddam proprium per quod in quantum ipsum est quaedam participata similitudo primi boni, ipsa refertur ad illud primum et commune bonum" (44). One wonders, remembering the Third Man, what kind of 'participation' this is, between two beings not of the same characteristic (rationis).

<sup>35</sup> Thus in Question 33 of Book I, Odo sets forth a kind of glossary or catalogue of human powers, including the practical intellect, synderesis, and conscience. These are then defined later in the question: "Intellectus vero practicus ut cognitivus agibilium potest sumi dupliciter: vel ut cognitivus principiorum quibus ratio regit appetitus, puta istorum duorum: malum est fugiendum, et bonum

which differs from Buridan's conception of truth as identity of supposition.<sup>36</sup> There are two match-ups in Book VI which appear promising. The first again is reminiscent of Plato, for it asks whether everything knowable is eternal. Odo's version is Question 7, Buridan's is Question 6. Odo takes as the key to the question the argument to eternity from necessity. He distinguishes necessity of the future, of the past, and of the present, and then necessity pertaining to propositions from that pertaining to existent things.<sup>37</sup> His treatment is crisp and brief, requiring little more than a single column. Buridan's treatment is full, extending some six pages. There is only one slight contact with Odo. Buridan distinguishes between the knowable as demonstrable conclusion and as things signified, reviews and refutes a position based on the distinction between being and essence, and one based on realism for universals. He reduces to errors in logic a controversy as to whether scientific propositions are hypothetical or categorical, and invokes what he takes to be the old doctrine

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faciendum. Ex quibus semper dicit in animo: declina a malo et fac bonum, et sic dicitur synderesis. Vel potest sumi ut cognitivus conclusionum ex his dependentium et sic dicitur conscientia" (23<sup>r</sup>). Question 19 of Book II looks promising from the title: "Utrum (virtus moralis sit) certior (intellectuali)?" This "certainty," however, is illustrated by the sureness with which a heavy body finds the center, as compared with the bumbling mathematicians with their constructions. It is "indeclinability" — hardly a straightforwardly epistemological sense of the term.

<sup>36</sup> See Question 17 of Book II, in which Odo says, "veritas enim est conformitas enunciationis ad illud de quo enunciatur. Falsitas autem est difformitas opposita" (34<sup>r</sup>). Buridan's contrasting conception can be found in footnote 30, above.

<sup>37</sup> "Pro solutione quaestionis: quia Philosophus arguit aeternitatem scibilis ex necessitate scibilis, praemitto duas distinctiones de ipsa necessitate. Prima quidem est quod necessitas aliter de futuro dicitur, aliter de praeterito, et aliter de praesenti. Quia necessitas de futuro est inevitabilitas eventus futuri... de praeterito tamen dicitur irrevocabilitas rei iam factae... Necessitas vero de praesenti dicitur immutabilitas et sic dicitur necessarium quod impossibile est aliter se habere... Necessitas autem praeteriti vel futuri non arguit, immo tollit, aeternitatem, quia talis necessitas includit principium vel finem... Tertio dicendum est quod necessitas immutabilitatis potest sumi dupliciter: uno modo ut dicit modum unionis cuiuscunque praedicati generaliter sumpti cum subiecto, et hoc necessitatis modo dicuntur propositiones necessariae in materia necessaria... Alio modo potest sumi ut dicit modum unionis naturalis existentiae cum re existente. Et hoc modo res dicitur necesse esse quae universaliter est immutabilis ex natura sua... Necessitas ergo sumpta primo modo non facit aeternitatem proprie dictam, quia aeternitas est interminabilis duratio sine principio et sine fine... Necessitas tamen secundo modo sumpta infert aeternitatem proprie sumptam" (124<sup>r</sup>).

of natural supposition.<sup>38</sup> Buridan's treatment, then, is not directly comparable with Odo's and is certainly not testimony to any special philosophical congeniality. Much the same holds true for another promising question which asks whether intellect is a virtue, Question II in both commentaries. In both cases, the discussions are lengthy and philosophically interesting. Since Buridan takes several initial arguments from Odo, one has hopes for straightforward points of comparison. Odo reviews the Aristotelian cognitive powers and then takes up questions concerning immediacy, self-evidence, and necessity in propositions. Buridan moves from indemonstrable propositions into a full-scale review of the problem of induction, drawing heavily on Averroes, and Buridan's own opinion surveys among the old women (*vetulis*) who crop up so often in his lighter moments. What similarities there are between the two treatments are noncontroversial and unenlightening as to deeper philosophical orientations.

One could pursue such a search for a very long time, and on some other occasion it might be fascinating and even philosophically rewarding to conduct a detailed and systematic comparison of these commentaries. I should like to adduce here only two final matters. For the first, I should simply like to set before the reader two passages, similar in style, but not in implication. Odo begins his Question 12 of Book II thus:

De secunda dicendum quod operis virtuosi tres sunt regulae: Prima est lex naturae, 2<sup>a</sup> debitum humanae naturae, 3<sup>a</sup> est dictamen rationis humanae. Lex enim naturae praecepit facere facienda et prohibet non facienda. Et haec enim est lex divina et primaeva rerum ratio quae singulis rebus modum et ordinem et finem imponit. Debitum autem humanae naturae est obligatio qua tenetur obedire legi naturae. Dictamen vero rationis humanae est ostensio praecepti ex parte legis naturae et debiti ex parte naturae nostrae. (33<sup>v</sup>)

In Question 1 of Book VI, Buridan pauses to offer a similar review:

Propter quod apparet quod primum directivum operum humanorum debet esse rerum natura, a qua principia practica habent ortum. Ideo dicitur, VII *Politicae*, quod nihil bonum est eorum quae praeter naturam sunt.

<sup>38</sup> The question is too long to cite here, running from p. 497 through p. 502. It is a model synopsis of Buridan's nominalism, both substantive and metho-



Secundum directivum est ipsa practica principia.

Tertium directivum est ratiocinatio, per quam ex dictis principiis conclusiones practicae deducuntur...

Quartum directivum est conclusiones practicae per huiusmodi rationicationem inventae et conclusae.

Quintum directivum sunt virtutes morales per assuetudinem inclinantes appetitum ad exsequendum id quod ratione decretum est et ad exspectandum semper in suis motibus et operationibus iudicium rationis; sic enim naturae consonant omnes nostrae operationes. (474-475)

Odo's elaboration of his passage emphasizes the themes of debt and obligation, themes which have little importance in Buridan. On this score, Odo seems closer to Ockham, or to one phase of Ockham, than does Buridan. The last pair of questions I wish to consider is Odo's Question 16 of Book VI, and Buridan's Question 22 of the same, both of which ask whether wisdom is better than prudence. The treatments are both too lengthy for convenient summary. Buridan takes almost two pages out of six from Odo; but Odo's position is that prudence is better than wisdom, and Buridan holds the reverse. Buridan faithfully and fully rehearses Odo's position in order to refute it, citing the Commentator in support of the decisive argument.<sup>39</sup> Needless to say, Averroes plays no part in Odo's case.

Even from such a brief and selective comparison as this has

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dological. The bulk of the question can be found translated in A. Hyman and J. Walsh, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Indianapolis, 1973, pp. 705-710.

<sup>39</sup> We should not depart from this question without taking note of this passage. It gives, I think, the heart of Buridan's substantive ethical doctrine:

"Similiter etiam operatio intelligentiae, qua ipsa contemplatur essentiam divinam, est nobilior quam illa qua ipsa cognoscit et agit alia; propter quod etiam videtur quod operatio nostri intellectus qua ipsa Deum contemplatur, quae est operatio sapientiae, sit nobilior quam illa qua cognoscit et operatur ea quae subsunt sibi, quae est operatio artis vel prudentiae. Quod etiam ex hoc apparet, quia cum Deus sit finis omnium aliorum, et *nihil sit bonum nisi propter causas finales*, ut dicit Commentator, II *Metaphysicae*, manifestum est nihil habet aliquid boni et perfecti, nisi in quantum participat aliquam Dei similitudinem. Intellectus autem noster magis efficitur similis ipsi Deo per ipsius contemplationem quam per eorum quae sibi subsunt notitiam et operationem, cum Deus principaliter et prima intentione contemplatur se ipsum, et intentione secundaria cognoscat et agat alia, sicut bene declarat Commentator, II *Coeli*, commento decimo septimo et decimo tertio" (569). For Buridan's methodological ethical doctrine, see especially Question 4 of Book X, and the discussion on pp. 10-12 of "Nominalism and the Ethics."

been we are justified in concluding, I believe, that Buridan did not turn to the commentary of Odo because of any deep or extensive philosophical affinity.

#### IV

Why did he do it, then? Perhaps we should distinguish between borrowing so much from anyone, and borrowing from this particular source. So far as borrowing *per se* is concerned, very likely Buridan wasn't aware of doing anything out of the ordinary. We should consider here the curious situation in which not only, apparently, did Albert of Saxony (usually considered Buridan's own student) borrow extensively from Walter Burley, but Burley himself has been shown by Gomes to have borrowed extensively, and silently, from Thomas Aquinas.<sup>40</sup> Faral notes that Buridan's *Summulae* "procèdent très directement" from the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain, and, what is more important, were recognized as such as a matter of course at the time.<sup>41</sup> But then, why take so much from Odo, of all people? Professor Paul Kristeller has suggested that Odo's commentary may have been something of a standard work, which the sobriquet "Doctor moralis" tends to support. As Buridan took the standard work of Peter of Spain for his point of departure in logic, so he took the standard work of Gerald Odo in ethics. There are also considerations of a different kind advanced by Faral; one doesn't know quite what to make of them, but they seem to be relevant. Pope John XXII held the view that until the resurrection of the body, the saints in heaven do not enjoy the full beatific vision; they contemplate instead only the humanity of Christ.<sup>42</sup> He encouraged discussion of this apparently unorthodox doctrine, and in 1333, Odo apparently tried to persuade masters at the University of Paris to accept it. There was considerable flurry, the doctrine was condemned, and the Pope rejected it on his deathbed.<sup>43</sup> Now, Faral points out that this doctrine appears in Book X of Buridan's commentary, and cites two passages

<sup>40</sup> See chapter II of Gomes, *op. cit.*, where the dependence is illustrated and related to the Albert of Saxony situation.

<sup>41</sup> Faral, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>42</sup> For a lucid account of this doctrine and its fate, see the article by D. Douie, "John XXII, Pope" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

<sup>43</sup> See Langlois, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.

from Question 4 in which a version of the doctrine is presented. Since the doctrine was condemned by Pope Benedict XII in 1336, Faral suggests this date as a *terminus ad quem* for these passages. He also suggests that Buridan may have been persuaded by Odo, and that this may testify to personal relations between them.<sup>44</sup> John XXII awarded benefices to Buridan in 1329 and 1330, well before the episode in question, and no doubt as a matter of course for a distinguished master. If Buridan was close to Odo, and, perhaps through him, sympathetic enough to John XXII to maintain a doctrine which was highly controversial, then perhaps we do not need to wonder at Buridan's endorsing the statute of 1340 which ratified a previous statute against "dogmatizing" the doctrines of Ockham, a special opponent of this Pope.

I have elsewhere suggested that in that same Question 4 of Book X, Buridan tries to place logical limits on the argument from divine omnipotence which was so widely and devastatingly employed at the time.<sup>45</sup> The heart of Buridan's position is that the term "happiness" connotes "everything required for the efficient operation of that act of speculation, and also what is naturally consequent or annexed to it."<sup>46</sup> Interestingly enough, he applies the same argument to the problem of beatitude, claiming that we should not say a man is blessed before his resurrection, because he then lacks a condition connoted by blessedness.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps he did not require much persuasion to accept a theological view so consistent with his own moral and methodological approach. There is an epilogue to this matter which brings us full circle. In the second passage cited by Faral, the context is the requirement of a full life for complete happiness. What, then,

<sup>44</sup> Faral, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

<sup>45</sup> See "Nominalism and the *Ethics*," pp. 10-12.

<sup>46</sup> "Si igitur dicamus quod illud optimum sit actus speculationis circa divinam essentiam, nos dicemus quod ille actus erit humana felicitas, ita quod hoc nomen *felicitas* supponit praecise pro illo actu, sed tamen non absolute a connotationibus, immo connotat sive appellat omnia praerequisita ad expeditum exercitium illius actus speculationis, et naturaliter consequentia vel annexa" (869).

<sup>47</sup> "Et sic expediendo breviter de beatitudine in patria, quia illa transcendit metas hujus considerationis, nos non diceremus hominem propriissime esse beatum ante eius resurrectionem, quia deficit ei beatitudo seu eius optima dispositio, quae est de integritate beatitudinis hominis vel connotata per beatitudinem hominis, cum proprie dictus homo sit compositus ex anima et corpore" (872). This is the first of the passages pointed out by Faral.

of the martyrs who died in their youth? Well, they are not happy *simpliciter*, but only according to the superior part; they will be totally happy at the resurrection. And, Buridan adds, this topic was resolved in Question 9 of Book I.<sup>48</sup> That question asks whether happiness consists in pleasures or any good of the body, and in it Buridan draws from Odo's Question 13 of the same book, which asks whether happiness exists in goods of the body.<sup>49</sup> It is not merely preliminary arguments that he borrows, but the central contention, and he does not give credit to Odo, but prefaces his borrowing with "I say."<sup>50</sup>

There we must leave this curious relationship between the controversial Franciscan and the legendary master of arts. One thing at least is, as Buridan might say, clear and distinct.<sup>51</sup> There can be no question of total philosophical polarization along lines of realism and nominalism, or the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna* for Buridan.

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<sup>48</sup> "Nonne martyres amore Dei mortem passi vicesimo aut tricesimo suae aetatis anno fuerunt homines felices? Diceretur quod non felices homines simpliciter, sed felices secundum partem superiorem, et etiam feliciores quam si non passi fuissent, pro salute partis superioris, ad quam salus inferioris, in casu impossibilitatis, nullam habet comparationem, ut dictum est, et in resurrectione fient felices homines totaliter. Et de hoc dictum est in nona quaestione quae soluta est in primo libro" (875).

<sup>49</sup> Buridan: "Utrum felicitas consistat in voluptatibus seu in aliquo bono corporis?" Odo: "Utrum (felicitas) exsistat in bonis corporis."

<sup>50</sup> Buridan: "His visis, dico primo generaliter quod in nullo bonorum corporalium consistit felicitas humana, propter quatuor: Primum est quod felicitas non est communis hominibus et brutis; secundum est quod felicitas non est communis bonis et malis; tertium est quod felicitas non praebet occasionem ad peccandum; quartum est quod felicitas non est ordinabilis ad maius bonum, cum ipsa supponatur esse maximum bonum" (28). Odo: "Dicendum quod quatuor conditiones generales sunt inseparabiles a corporalibus bonis quae repugnant totaliter felicitatibus bonis. Felicitas enim non est communis hominibus et iumentis cum nullum iumentum sit felicitabile. 2°, non est communis hominibus malis et bonis, cum omnis felix sit summe bonus, nullus tamen malus est bonus. 3°, felicitas non est ordinabilis ad maius bonum; ipsa namque supponitur quid sit bonum maximum. 4°, non praestat viam vel occasionem ad peccatum vel ad malum cum ipsa includat firmitatem et consumptionem in bono" (8v). Buridan has reversed the third and fourth points.

<sup>51</sup> "Constat autem quod virtus sensualis ex naturali complexione perfecta est ad clare et distincte sentiendum" (872). What would Descartes make of that? I offer this passage to Professor Edward Mahoney, who has compiled a collection of medieval uses of this famous philosophical phrase.



Not only is his moral philosophy quite different from that of William of Ockham, but he also borrows happily from a man of significantly different philosophical orientation, and a man at that who is a leading political opponent of Ockham.

*Columbia University*  
*New York*

JAMES J. WALSH



# Initia Operum Franciscalium

† REV. G. E. MOHAN, O.F.M.

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## EDITORS' PREFACE

Gaudens E. Mohan, O.F.M. († 1969) was professor of paleography at The Franciscan Institute and of Latin and Greek at St. Bonaventure University from 1941 to 1964. In order to assist the late Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., and other associates of The Franciscan Institute in their research and editorial work, he explored the manuscript catalogues, books, and articles at his disposal, filling a large filing cabinet (50,000 to 60,000 cards) with incipits of logical, philosophical, theological, and spiritual works by authors of the thirteenth to the fifteenth century.

In 1952, Fr. Gaudens published "Incipits of Logical Writings of the XIIIth-XVth Centuries" (*Franciscan Studies*, 12 [1952], 349-489). The publication was so much appreciated by mediaevalists that issues and offprints became exhausted in a very short time. During the following years he composed a 1,000-page incipit collection of logical and philosophical writings (commentaries, tracts, questions) which, after some editorial work, we intend to publish as a volume in the Text Series of Franciscan Institute Publications.

Here we initiate the publication of a third collection, namely the incipits of philosophical, theological, spiritual, and scientific works by Franciscan authors of the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Fr. Gaudens redacted it during the last years of his life, confined by a stroke to his room, using only his filing cabinet and typing with one hand. He finished the preface two weeks before he died, the 8th of October, 1969. He was very much aware that this work is far from complete or perfect, but if mediaevalists find it as useful as do the members of The Franciscan Institute and visiting scholars, it well merits publication.

THE EDITORS



## PREFACE

"O utilitas catalogorum, etiam saepe errantium, in quibus operum notantur rationabiliter saltem initia et fines."

F.-M. Henquinet, *Antonianum*, 13 (1938), 335.

This compilation was started some twenty years ago, in 1946 to be exact. It began with an attempt to discover unknown MSS of the works of William of Ockham, in which the Franciscan Institute here at St. Bonaventure University was primarily interested. The author had not advanced very far when he realized that many Franciscan items were not found in the various catalogues but were included in isolated articles which did not reach the general public. This compilation is the result. What A. G. Little had attempted for English collections of MSS in his *Initia* of the XIII-XVth centuries, the author tries to expand to include MSS in the United States and continental Europe as well.

Close inspection indicates that not all names mentioned and included are Franciscan in origin; for instance, Alexander de Villa Dei is definitely *not* a Franciscan. Robert, king of Sicily, is included among the Franciscans only because he desired it so; in fact, there is a tradition that he was buried in Franciscan dress. Nicolaus de Byard (Briodi) may have been a member of the Order of Friars Minor. His inclusion in this collection is based on the evidence of only one MS ascription found in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. In the case of Joannes Anglicus, one MS at St. Isidore's College in Rome, Italy, calls him 'frater,' but no other indication of the community he represents is mentioned. There are well over 1000 items of questionable authorship, some definitely Franciscan, some not, but others better equipped will have to determine true authorship.

Every Franciscan from the time of, and including, St. Francis himself to Adam Sasboth and Gasper Sasgerus at the close of the fifteenth century, is represented, but not all Franciscan writings are had. For example, Bernardinus Senensis and Joannes Capistranus

can be found here, but not in toto. Many references presented themselves too late to be added. In fact, there are at least six catalogues of major importance yet to be consulted. The reader will observe many items not included which might have been.

In large measure, the spelling of names follows the pattern set by the *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*. However, the vowels, *I* and *V* have been consonantized for easier reading; for example, Iob becomes Job, Ioannes becomes Joannes.

There remains a debt of gratitude to be paid to the various curators of MSS at the British Museum, the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, the Vatican Library and St. Isidore's College in Rome, Holy Name College in Washington, all of whom have shown the author the greatest of courtesy which St. Francis himself would have admired. To all of them, sincere thanks.

GAUDENS E. MOHAN, O.F.M.



## ABBREVIATIONS

AFH	<i>Archivum Franciscanum Historicum</i> , Quaracchi, 1908-
Anal Franc	<i>Analecta Franciscana</i> , Quaracchi, 1885-
Anton	<i>Antonianum</i> , Rome, 1926
Arch Frat Praed	<i>Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum</i> , Rome, 1921-
Arch Iber Amer	<i>Archivo Ibero-Americano</i> , Madrid, 1914-
Bale	Bale, J., <i>Illustrium Maioris Brittaniae Scriptorum... Summarium...</i> , Wesel, 1549
Bibl Franc Ascet	Bibliotheca Franciscana Ascetica Medii Aevi, Quaracchi 1904-
Bibl Franc Schol	Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, Quaracchi 1904-
Bibl Thom	Bibliothèque Thomiste. Glorieux, P., <i>La Littérature Quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320</i> , Vols. 5 (1925), 21 (1935), Paris
B-Oe	Bignami-Odier, J., <i>Etudes sur Jean de Roquetaillade</i> , Paris, 1952
Brit Soc Fr St	British Society of Franciscan Studies I-XIX, Aberdeen, 1908-37
BSF	Bibliotheca di Studi Francescani, Florence, 1948-
CF	<i>Collectanea Franciscana</i> , Assisi, 1931
Dict Theol Cath	<i>Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique</i> , Paris, 1909-
Estudis Franc	<i>Estudis Franciscans (Estudios Franciscanos)</i> , Barcelona, 1914-
Etudes Franc	<i>Etudes Franciscaines</i> , Paris, 1899-
Etudes Phil Med	<i>Etudes de philosophie médiévale</i> , Paris, 1922-
Franc Stud	<i>Franciscan Studies</i> , St. Bonaventure (New York), 1941-
France Franc	<i>La France Franciscaine</i> , Lille and Paris, 1912-
Fz St	<i>Franziskanische Studien</i> , Munster, 1914-
Gm	Glorieux, P., <i>Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle</i> , Paris, 1933

Gottlieb	Gottlieb, T., <i>Mittelalterliche Bibliotheks-kataloge Österreichs</i> , Vienna, 1915
GW	<i>Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke</i> , Leipzig, 1925
HBRP	Ehrle, F., <i>Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum tum Bonifatianae tum Avenionensis</i> , Rome, 1890
Hist France Litt	<i>Histoire littéraire de la France</i> , Paris, 1865
Hn	Hauréau, B., <i>Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale</i> , I-VI, Paris, 1890-95
HRL	<i>L'Histoire religieuse et littéraire du Moyen Age</i> . Paris, 1902
James	James, M.R., <i>The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover</i> , Cambridge, 1903
Ks	<i>Kirchengeschichtliche Studien P. Michael Bihl OFM als Ehrengabe dargeboten</i> , Kolmar, 1941
Leland	Leland, J., <i>Commentarii de Scriptoribus Britanniae</i> , 1709 Leland, J., <i>De Rebus Britannicis Collectanea</i> , 1770
Lg	Little, A. G., <i>The Grey Friars in Oxford</i> , Oxford, 1892
Li	Little, A. G., <i>Initia Operum Latinorum...</i> , Manchester, 1904
L-Po	Little, A. G. - Pelster, F., <i>Oxford Theology and Theologians, 1282-1302</i> , Oxford, 1934
Lrb	Little, A. G., <i>Roger Bacon Essays...</i> , Oxford, 1914
Mencherini	Mencherini, S., <i>Codice diplomatico della Verna e delle Stimate di S. Francesco d'Assisi</i> , Florence, 1924
Mg	Moorman, John R. H., <i>The Grey Friars in Cambridge</i> , Cambridge, 1952
Pits	Pits, J., <i>Relationum Historicarum...</i> , Paris, 1619
Rev Hist Franc	<i>Revue d'Histoire Franciscaine</i> , Paris, 1924
Roth	Roth, B., O.F.M., <i>Franz von Mayronis...</i> , Franziskanische Forschungen, 3, Werl in Westfalen, 1936
RTAM	<i>Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale</i> , Louvain, 1929
Rw	Russell, J. C., <i>Dictionary of Writers of Thirteenth Century England</i> , London, 1936

SBAW	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. hist. Abteilung</i>
Sikes	Sikes, J. G., <i>Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Politica</i> , Manchester, 1940-
Srb	Stegmüller, F., <i>Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi</i> , Madrid, 1950
Src	Stegmüller, D., <i>Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias P. Lombardi</i> , Würzburg, 1947
Ss	Sbaralea, I. H., <i>Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci</i> , Rome, 1908-36
Studi Franc	<i>Studi Francescani</i> , Florence, 1914-
T-K	Thorndyke, L. - Kibre, P., <i>A Catalogue of Incipits of Medieval Writings in Latin</i> , Cambridge (Mass.), 1937.
Traditio	<i>Traditio</i> , New York 1943-
Wadding	Wadding, L., <i>Scriptores Ordinis Minorum</i> , Rome, 1906





**INITIA OPERUM FRANCISCALIIUM (XIII-XV S.)**

**A - C**



## A

- A, A, A significat gemitum et lamentum...  
Franciscus de Abbatibus (?), Distinctiones Astensis  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 255
- A, A, A significat gemitum et metum...  
Astesanus ab Asta (?), Distinctiones  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 105
- A, ab, abs praepositiones sunt...  
Gualterus de Landu, Summa vocabulorum  
*Bibl.*: Li 1
- A. Alma dicitur virgo abscondita...  
Guillelmus Norton, Tabula in Nic. de Lyra  
*Bibl.*: Li 1
- A censura veritatis aeternae lex inviolabilis cunctorum mentibus...  
Petrus Joannis Olivi, Responsio ad dicta  
*Bibl.*: Srb 6729 — Src 676, 3
- A conversionis meae primordiis...  
See 'In conversionis meae primordiis...'
- A cunabulis meae conversionis...  
Petrus Chambon, Epistolae Fratribus  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 335
- A Domino factum est istud...  
Bartholomaeus Albisius de Pisis, Quadragesimale  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 5 (1912), cxx-cxxi — Ss I, 116
- A et ab dicitur habitudinem causae materialis et formalis...  
Tabula ex operibus Francisci de Mayronis: Cesena Malatest. Pl. XX dext., 1. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 2 (1887), 169 — Roth 126
- A littera in omnibus gentibus, ideo prior litterarum est...  
Quidam OFM (?), Elementarium doctrinae erudimentum: Valencia Cath. 82, f. 1. (14c)
- A littera in omnibus linguis...  
Guillelmus Brito, Glossarium: Oxford Bodleian Douce 239. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Li 14
- A littera sicut dicit Isidorus in primo libro Etymologiarum...  
Guillelmus Brito, De vocabulis Bibliae: Metz 293. (15c) ["Abbas niger"]
- A Moab et Abimelech cum natus ibi moritur... Post Job Psalmorum codex...  
Joannes Vasco (OFM?), Biblia metricata  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5037
- A nominato magistro Frater Bonaventura...  
See 'Innominato magistro...'
- A nonnullis optantibus Fratrum Minorum Regulam ad litteram et sine glossa...  
Ad defensionem Ordinis Fratrum Minorum  
*Bibl.*: edit. Monumenta Ord. Minorum, Salamanca 1511
- A plerisque et multis in locis...  
Albertus a Sartiano, De poenitentia  
*Bibl.*: Li 22 — Wadding 8
- A. Ponimus...  
Raimundus Lull, Ars inveniendi veritatem  
*Bibl.*: Li 22 — Ss III, 12 — Wadding 198
- A primo parente hominum...  
Albertus (Stadiensis?), Chronica usque ad 1256  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 8

A summo caelo egressio eius... Filius Dei in Incarnatione sua...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 37v-38. (13c)

A summo caelo egressio eius... Sicut supra dictum est Filius Dei...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 38v-39. (13c)

A solis ortu usque ad occasum...

Guillelmus (Melitona?) Ardenborch?, Sermo: Canterbury Cath. D. 7, f. 59vb — Paris BN 2851-2, f. 57-58v

*Bibl.*: CF (Bibl. Franciscana) 11 (1959-60), 320

A vel ab dicitur...

Franciscus de Mayronis (?), Glosarium philosophicum

*Bibl.*: Roth 125

A veritate quidam auditum avertent...

Joannes (Thomas?) Guallensis, Expositio Fabularum Ovidii: Saint Omer 662. (16c) — Worcester Cath. F. 89, f. 130 ("Redevallus")

*Bibl.*: Gm 322 v = P. de Beruire — Pits 430 = Thomas Walleys OP

Aaron...

Quidam OFM (?) Tabula: Cesena Malatest. Pl. XX dext., 2. 417 ff. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 2 (1887), 168

Aaron, abbas, abbatissa, Abel et Cain...

Joannes de Erfordia, Tabula originalium: Bruges 550, f. 11-34ov. (15c) — *olim* Milan Saint-Eustorge a.d 1494

*Bibl.*: Arch Frat Praed 25 (1955), 25

Aaron, Habacuc, Abdias...

Jo. Aegidius de Zamora, L. illustrium personarum: Madrid Nac. 2763 (I-212). (18c)

Aaron. Quid (quod) iubet Aaron in aures demi ab auribus uxorum...

Joannes de Erfordia, Tabula originalium: Klosterneuberg 137. 511 ff. (15c) — Paris Maz. 287; 288 — Vienna Schottenstift 284 — Toledo Cath. 22-2, f. 11. (13c) — *Investigate* Vienna NB 4345.

(15c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 7 (1932), 436; 20, 422 — Fz St 1 (1914), 272 — Arch Iber Amer 2 (1915), 100 — Li L — Srb 4460

Ab altitudine diei timebo, ego vero in te sperabo... Iam instat sacratissimo tempus quo quilibet praeparare...

Bernardinus de Senis, Sermo: Modena S. Cataldo 1, f. 124-126. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 625 — Li 1

Ab aquilone pandetur malum...

Guillelmus Melitona, Ad Hebraeos *Bibl.*: Srb 2958

Ab arbore fici discite... In Evangelio hodierno Matth. 24... egregii doctores ac Domini cursores...

Joannes de Capistrano, Sermo

*Bibl.*: AFH 11 (1918), 117: text

Ab arte demonstrativa trahit hoc opus exordium...

Raimundus Lull, L. propositio-num secundum artem demonstrativam: Alcobaça CCCLXXXV/203, f. 115-130v. (15c) — St. Bonaventure (New York) Franc. Institute, f. 85r-118r. (15c) — Venice S. Marco X, 189 (L.VI,CC), f. 161-178. (13c) *Bibl.*: Li 1 — Gm 335 aa — Ss 3, 12-13

Ab exordio nascentis Ecclesiae Christianae orthodoxi patres...

Joannes Pecham, Constitutiones Lambeth

*Bibl.*: James, 469; 484 — Li 2 — Pits 381 — Wadding 147 — Tractio 11 (1955), 263

Ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio...

Haec possunt esse B. Job in persona B. Nicolai...



Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo

*Bibl.*: BFS 11 (1935), cxl

Ab infantia mea crevit mecum miseratione... Ista verba scripta sunt in Job et convenienter...

Guillelmus de Mara, Sermo: Oxford Bodleian Ashmole 757, f. 138b — Paris BN 10968, f. 5 (*anon.*)

*Bibl.*: RTAM 16 (1949), 51

Ab initio et ante saecula creata sum...

Quia vero nulla creatura ante saecula fuit...

Franciscus de Mayronis, De esse essentiae (Formalitates): Berlin Staatsb. 975 (Theol. Qu. 32), f. 157v — Bologna Coll. di Spagna 47, f. 349r-357v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 17 (1942), 115 — Roth 186

Ab Oriente portae tres: prima porta innocentia, secunda simplicitas, tertia rectitudo...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus I: Milan Ambros. J. 5 Inf., f. 114r. (13c) (*anon.*) — Padua Univ. 1258

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 114 — CF 10 (1940), 68 — Ss I, 283 — Src 1216

Abbas, abbatis. Media producta; prior monasteriorum...

(Quidam OFM?), Vocabularium latinum: Falconara (Ancona) Conv. OFM 15, f. 11-111v — Rome Angel. 972, f. 1-135. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 48 (1955), 134

Abbas debet esse presbyter...

Angelus de Clavasio, Summa angelica: *olim* Vienna Dom. Q 16

*Bibl.*: Gottlieb 391

Abbas. Est autem (et) abbas is qui ex legitima electione vel canonica institutione praeficitur aliquibus...

Joannes de Erfordia, Tabula utriusque iuris (Recensio IV): Oxford Oriel 72, f. 11-414v — Rheims Munic. 761 (G. 501)

*Bibl.*: Anton 20 (1945) 422 — Li 1

Abbas. Litterae impetratae contra abbates super causis quae ad conventum pertinent, valent...

Joannes de Erfordia, Tabula iuris: Cues Hosp. 267. (13c) Angers 330 (321). 13c — Leipzig Univ. 885. (14c) — Munich Univ. 291. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 2 (1927), 183 ss; 20, 419 ss — Fz St 1 (1914), 286, 288

Abbas tres ordines minores...

Baptista, Summa: *olim* (1513) Vienna Dom. Q 15

*Bibl.*: Gottlieb 391

See 'Rosella haec casuum...'

Abbas. Ubi res conventus...

Joannes de Saxonia, Summa iuris: Vienna NB 2148. 372 ff. (14c) [*incomplete*] — Perugia Com. 679, f. 1-138; 153-174 [*anon.*]

Abbas. Utrum religiosus debeat dimittere curam sibi commissam...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Abbrevisatio Quodlibet Henr. de Gandavo

*Bibl.*: AFH 23 (1930), 50 — Gm 345 m

Abbas. Utrum religiosus institutus in cura plus debeat oboedire episcopo in remanendo in cura quam abati...

Bertramus de Ahlen, Quodlibet Henr. de Gandavo (Excerpta): Vat. lat. 12995, f. 21-86v. (14c) — Oxford Balliol 58, f. 1-186. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 40 (1947), 20-21

Abel... De innocentia eius... Quod Abel non solum placens sacrificio...

Ricardus de Insula, Tabula s. Moralia Gregorii

*Bibl.*: Srb 7272, 1

Abel est nomen significans luctum...

Gualterus de Bruges, Tabula nominum s. Scripturam: *olim* Turin Naz. CDIX (i.V.39). 202 ff. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Li 2 — Wadding 101-2

Abel. Quaeritur super illo dicto Matth.  
23, ut veniat super vos omnis san-  
guis iustus qui effusus est...

Guillelmus de Nottingham, Quae-  
stiones s. Evangelia

*Bibl.*: Srb 3003 — Ss I, 344

Abel. Quid significat oblatio Cain et  
Abel et mors Abel... Abominatio.  
Abominationis tres sunt signa...

Gualterus de Bruges, Tabula  
s. Originali

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 120 —  
Gm 315 e — Srb 2350

Abicere. Est abiectio hominis, i. e.,  
qua homo abicit et haec est ali-  
quando culpabilis...

(Thomas de Papia), Distinctiones  
(A-E): Florence Laur. S. Crucis  
Pl. XXVIII sin., 2

*Bibl.*: AFH 16 (1923), 8

Abicere. Est enim abiectio multiplex...

Mauritius Hibernicus, Distinctio-  
nes: Assisi Com. 401. 377 ff. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Srb 5567, 1 — Ss II, 241

Abiciamus ergo opera tenebrarum...

Bonaventura (?), Sermones: Ce-  
sena Malatest. Pl. XXIX sin.,  
6. (13c)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 2 (1887), 169

Abiciamus ergo opera tenebrarum...

See 'Secundum Philosophi sen-  
tentiam...'

Abiciamus opera tenebrarum... In  
adventu magni regis et principis...

Guillelmus de Lanicea, Diaeta sa-  
lutis: Klosterneuberg 373 A, f.  
190-194. (14-15c) [*Appendix*] —  
Vat. lat. 10060, f. 20v — London  
BM Royal 7 C. i, f. 33, 74; 7 D.  
xxii; 8 D. ii; Harley 103; 2379 —  
Graz Univ. 647, f. 71r-76v —  
Oxford Magdalen 200 — Breslau  
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273r; I. F. 115, f. 151r-160r —  
Tortosa Capit. 33. (14c) — Oxford  
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Dublin Trinity D. 4. 28 (442).  
(15c) — Burgo de Osma Cath.

113. 118 ff. — Escorial h. III. 24,  
f. 3. (15c) — Barcelona de la  
Corona Ripoll. 79. 185 ff. (14-  
15c); 202, f. 100-171. (14c); 223,  
f. 1-94. (15c) — Paris BN 14877,  
f. 155. (14c) — Brussels 2499-  
510 (1118), f. 193v-218v. (14c)  
[*Excerpta*]; 19526 (1619), f. 1-42.  
(1470); 2310-23 (2089), f. 154-  
255. (15c); 14745-50 (2235), f. 49-  
59. (15c) — Mechlin Grand Sem.  
29 — Bruges 304, f. 1r — Ro-  
senthal Cat. 83, no. 48. (15c);  
49. (15c) — *Investigate* Oxford  
Balliol 349, f. 81v-90v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 1 (1926), 470 —  
AFH 24 (1931), 14; 32, 14 —  
CF 7 (1937), 227-244; 13, 40

Abiciamus opera tenebrarum... Scrip-  
tum est ad Hebraeos iv: Adeamus  
cum fiducia ad thronum...

(Gilbertus de Tornaco), Sermo-  
nes Dominicales: Vat. Borgh. 76.  
210 ff. (13-14c); Vat. lat. 812.  
(13-14c); 11524, f. 1r-109v —  
Troyes 823. (13c) — Bruges 282,  
f. 161r-253r. (14c) Bordeaux 288  
— *Investigate*: London BM Royal  
3 A. xiii, f. 15. (c. 1500)

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 546 —  
Ss II, 18 — Jacobus de Rodo

Abiciamus opera tenebrarum... Ve-  
nientibus enim obviam Salvatori  
tria sunt necessaria...

Gualterus de Aquitania (?), Col-  
lationes Epistolarum

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 340

Abicit mundus pauperes et honorat  
divites. Nota. Augustinus...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Abyssus  
mundi: Assisi Com. 575, f. 41-81.  
(15c) — Oxford Bodleian 41, f. 42.  
(14c) [*anon.*]; Bodleian Hamilton  
21, f. 48v. (15c) [SC 24451] —  
Melk OSB C. 3 Cat. 125 — Troyes  
827. (15c); 1272. (14c) — Vat. lat.  
10057, f. 421. (15c) — Utrecht  
Univ. 349, f. 1-49. (15c) — Vienna

- NB 3609. f. 1-104. (15c); 3686, f. 231a, 246b, 252a-254a. (15c); 4253, f. 57a-88a. (15c); 4462, f. 361-392b. (15c); 4872, f. 1a-87b — New York Gordon Libr. 47, f. 411-491 — *olim* (1513) Vienna Dom. N 30  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 aa — Gottlieb 379 — Ss II, 86, s. n. Joannes Gualensis
- Abiectio est bona tripliciter...  
 See 'Excellentissimo Dimino R. Dei gratia...'
- Abiectio... Circa abiectioem nota qualiter in Scriptura sumitur...  
 Mauritius Hibernicus, *Distinctioes*: Rome Angel. 960. (13c)  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5566 — Ss II, 241
- Abiit in agrum et colligit spicas...  
 Ruth paupercula non habens messem... Abstinencia. Bonum est in cibo...  
 Joannes Gualensis — Thomas Hibernicus, *Manipulus florum*: Douai 458. (15c) — Graz. Univ. 445, f. 11-221v — Valencia Cath. 266. 307 ff. (14c) — Assisi Com. 244. 169 ff. (14c) — Madrid Nac. 234. 132 ff. (14c) — Saint-Omer 671. (14c) — Tortosa Capit. Denifle 75. (14c) — Paris BN 2615. 194 ff. (14c) — Arras 580. (14c); 771. (15c) — New Haven Yale Marston 244, f. 12-265. (15c) — Vich Museo Episcopal 52. 218 ff. (14c) — Escorial f. II. 18, f. 189-205. (14c) — Troyes 1261. 280 ff. (14c); 1785 — Charleville 10; 38 — Oxford Merton 129; St. Johns' 190, f. 179. (13c) — Valencia Cath. 189. 307 ff. (14c) — London BM Royal 7 C. iii. (14c); 10 D. x; Additional 24129 Lincoln 98. (14c) — Cambridge Caius 402. (1306) — Paris Maz. 1032 — Basel B. IV. 9. (1324)  
*Bibl.*: Arch Frat Praed 25 (1955), 25, no. 28 — Delisle, *Le Cabinet...*, II 176 — Anton 6 (1931), 308 — RTAM 24 (1957), 122 — Estudios Franc 45 (1933), 347 — Srb 8128, 1 — Gm 322 x — CF 1 (1931), 562; 13, 50 — Ss II, 85; III, 137 — Li 219
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 Joannes Gualensis, *Indices duorum operum*  
*Bibl.*: Pits 344 — Wadding 142
- Ablativus absolutus potest...  
 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Tabula s. totum Scotum*: Vat. lat. 4650, f. 1-119  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 115; 424
- Abnegare. Qualiter abnegare debemus nos et nostra, pulchre docet Gregorius...  
 Christianus de Hiddestorf (?), *Termini theologiales*  
*Bibl.*: Anton 14 (1939), 69-70
- Abominatio. Castaneae abominatioem astringunt...  
 Guillelmus Holme, *De simplicibus medicinis*: Oxford Bodleian 795. (1435)
- Abortum procurantes quando sunt homicidae... Abstinere a malis quid est...  
 Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, *Concordantiae sententiarum*  
*Bibl.*: BFS 11 (1935), cvi — Src 527 — Gm 318 f — AFH 27 (1934), 550; 47, 145
- Abraham castitatem coniugalem habuit in actu...  
 Nicolaus Succi de Assisi, *Tabula s. Sent. Thomae Aq.*: Assisi Com. 552  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 149 — Ss II, 289
- Abraham pater meus exultavit... Super quo quaeritur quam diem Christi vidit...  
 Guillelmus Nottingham, *Quaestiones s. Evangelia*: Cambridge Pembroke 239, f. 112. (15c) — Oxford Bodleian 583, f. 133. (15c) [SC 2214]

Abraham pater noster... Solent naturaliter filii de parentum nobilitate, probitate...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo: Assisi Com. 461, f. 129v-134r

*Bibl.*: AFH 9 (1916), 227-236 — BFS 11 (1935), cxi: text

Abraham Quaeritur super illo (primo) dicto Christi...

(Guillelmus Nottingham?), S. Evangeliorum difficultates: Lincoln 78 — Oxford Balliol 75

*Bibl.*: Li 3 — Lg 185

Abrenuntiatio terrenorum. Vocabulum 1. Joannes Cass. in collatione Abbatis Moysi...

Joannes Edaeus, Tabula de vocabulis communibus

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 68; 378 = Phil. de Alemania

Abscondita produxit in lucem. Haec verba scripta sunt Job 28... Cupientes — Hic liber primaria sui divisione...

Ricardus de Mediavilla, Sent. I-IV

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 554; 47, 160 — Gm 324 a — Src 722

Absconditur malum a diabolo sub delectatione sicut pedica sub folio...

Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Distinctiones: Paris BN 2925, f. 197-264, 265-267v. (13c) — Bruges 515, f. 63r-181v. (14c) — Padua S. Antonio XXII, 507 — Laon 150. (13c) — Oxford Bodleian 563, f. 1. (14c) — *olim* Milan Saint-Eustorge. (1494)

*Bibl.*: Pits 588 — AFH 16 (1923), 19 — Srb 5693; 5694 — Ss II, 270 — Arch Frat Praed 25 (1955) 44, 67

Absit istam rem facere... Quia ergo Virgo Maria est gloria Christianorum... (Franciscus de Mayronis?), De conceptu originali: Assisi Com. 560 — Bologna Arch. A. 1292, f. 108. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Studi Franc 53 (1956), 3 — Roth 219

Absit istam rem facere... Quia vero S. Genetrix est gloria Christianorum bene figuratur per istam sanctam...

Bernardinus de Senis, De conceptione Virginis: Vat. Ross. 40, f. 42v-47r. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 248

Absit istam rem facere... Quod ergo Sanctissima Dei Genetrix est gloria Christianorum...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 266, f. 90v-95v. (15c); 372, f. 1-12. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Li 4 — Studi Franc 51 (1954), 231-2

Absit nobis gloriari / Nisi cruce salutari...

Hymnus de Stigmatibus s. Francisci: Paris BN 10503

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 501-2

Absolutio a culpa. Utrum quilibet sacerdos possit quemlibet absolvere...

Bonaventura de Cineribus, Quaestio

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 111

Absolutio criminis sive peccati...

Adam Wodeham, De foro poenitentiario Fratrum

*Bibl.*: Li 4 — Pits 482 — Wadding 7

Absolutum potest manere absque respectu...

Jacobus Textor de Justinopoli, Tabula s. Conflatum Fr. de Mayronis: Assisi Com. 295, f. 9-38. [anon.]

*Bibl.*: Src 234 — AFH 47 (1954), 115-6

Absolutum. Utrum suppositum illud... Thomas Straversham, In lecturam Guill. de Ware

*Bibl.*: Pits 455 — Wadding 218

Absolvere aliquem ab aliquo delicto non debet quis nisi sit immunis ab isto peccato... Abortum procurantes...



- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Tabula Sent.: Breslau I. F. 169, f. 290r-309  
*Bibl.*: BFS 11 (1935), cvi — AFH 47 (1954), 145 — Src 526  
 See 'Abortum procurantes...'
- Absorbeat, quaeso, Domine, mentem meam...  
 Ps. Franciscus Assisiensis, Oratio  
*Bibl.*: CF 1 (1931), 440
- Abstinentum est a carnalibus deliciis... Legitur libro De donis...  
 Joannes Lathbury, Alphabetum morale: London BM Royal 11 A. xiii. 242 ff. (15c) — Cambridge Peterhouse 96 — Oxford Exeter 26. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Leland, Collectanea III, 21 — Pits 582 — Ss II, 95 — Lg 236 — Li 4 — Wadding 144 — Srb 4758
- Abstinentia (Absolutio) a culpa. Utrum quilibet sacerdos possit quemlibet absolvere...  
 Bonaventura a Cineribus, Tabula operum S. Bonaventurae: Munich Clm 8005, f. 135-157; 22110 — Seville Columbina 130, f. 35. (15c) — Siena Com. F. V. 19, f. 11-136v. (14c) — Todi S. Fortunatus 14. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia I, lxix-lxx — AFH 47 (1954), 111
- Abstinentia bonum est in cibo...  
 Joannes Gualensis — Thomas Hibernicus, Manipulus florum: Namur 90, f. 11 (15c) [*Excerpta*]  
*Bibl.*: Li 4 — Leland, Comm. de Script. Brit. II, 307  
 See 'Abi in agrum... Ruth pauperula...'
- Abstinentia. Carnotensis libro quinto...  
 Thomas Straversham, Tabula doctorum  
*Bibl.*: Li 4 — Pits 455 — Wadding 218
- (Abstinentia)... Duplex est abstinentia, detestabilis et commendabilis...  
 Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Directorium pauperum  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5695 — Traditio 11 (1955), 296  
 See 'Duplex est abstinentia...'
- Abstinentia est...  
 Auctoritates extractae de Manipulo florum: Assisi Com. 447, f. 203-232. (14-15c)
- Abstinentia est meriti augmentativa...  
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*Bibl.*: Srb 6940
- Abstinentia multipliciter sumitur...  
 Marcus Ulmensis, Dictionarium S. Scripturae  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5453 — Wadding 167
- Abstinentia. Non omni cibo voluit Deus hominem uti in Paradiso...  
 Bindus de Senis, Abbreviationes S. Scripturae: *Investigate* Vienna NB 4570, f. 1a  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 146
- Abstinentia triplex...  
 Ps. Bertrandus de Turre, De re morali  
*Bibl.*: Gm 349 m [= Jo. de Hoveden]
- (Abstinentia)... Uxori Manue concepturae filium...  
 Ps. Bonaventura, Biblia pauperum: Wurzburg UB It. q. 334  
*Bibl.*: Srb 1790
- Abstinentia valet ad multa... Ebrietas multa mala facit...  
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*Bibl.*: Srb 6939
- Abstinentiae triplex est species. Prima ciborum et potuum moderatio...  
 (Joannes Edaeus?), Opusculum: Oxford Bodleian Douce 107, f. 74 [SC 21681]

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- Jacobus Asculanus, Tabula s. Scotum
- Bibl.*: Ss II, 3
- Abstractio est duplex, L. III, q. II.
- Abstractivam...
- (Kilianus Stetzing), Tabula s. Metaphysicam Ant. Andreae: Stuttgart Bibl. Region. H. B. X. 10, f. 116r-120v. (15c)
- Bibl.*: Studie Testi 122 (1946), 448
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- Jacobus Asculanus, Tabuli Scoti
- Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 562; 47, 131 — Gm 348 d
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- Bonaventura a Cineribus, Tabula Sent. Bonaventurae: Milan Brera AF. X. 7 — Siena F. V. 19
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- Hubertinus de Casale, Narratio de vita S. Francisci
- Bibl.*: Li 5
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- Conradus Holzinger de Saxonia (?), Sermones
- Bibl.*: CF 13 (1943), 56
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- Petrus de Turre, Opusculum: Oxford Bodleian Can Misc 268
- Bibl.*: Li 5
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- Raimundus Lull, Disputatio
- Bibl.*: Gm 335 fr — Li 5
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- Ps. Bonaventura, De gradibus virtutum
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- Acceperunt ramos... Clamavit ad me... In verbo ultimo proposito...
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- Accepi librum de manu angeli... In verbo expressit Evangelista...
- Joannes Rupella, Introitus ad s. doctrinam
- Bibl.*: AFH 26 (1933), 539 — Gm 302 h — Srb 4888
- Accesserunt ad eum Pharisei... In verbis istis arguitur iniquitas...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo
- Bibl.*: BFS 11 (1935), cxl
- Accesserunt discipuli ad Jesum... Duo principaliter ponuntur...
- Joannes Rupella, Sermo: Florence Laur. Pl. VIII dext., 6
- Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 540
- Accessit Jesus et tetigit loculum...
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- Bibl.*: Li 5 — Wadding 106 — Traditio 11 (1955), 267
- Accidia. Nota accidiosus est sicut canis famelicus cuius omnia sensus esuriunt...
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- Bibl.*: Srb 4522

- Accidiosus sive piger est subtilis...  
(Gilbertus), *Distinctiones*  
*Bibl.*: *Traditio* 11 (1955), 267
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Miracula S. Ludovici Tolosanae  
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Gilbertus (de Tornaco), *Sermones*: Klosterneuberg 308, f. 295v-297. (15c)
- Accipe nigrum nigrius nigro...  
Raimundus Lull, *Compendium quintae essentiae*  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 mm — Li 5
- Accipe tartarum utriusque vini...  
Raimundus Lull, *Experimenta*  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 kx — Li 5
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*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 119-120 — Src 266
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*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 52
- Actum maiorem vocamus...  
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*Bibl.*: Gm 335 gn — Li 51
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Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, *Pharetra Fidei: olim* (1513) Vienna Dom. I. 13  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 ak — Gottlieb 354
- Ad acquirendum sensum non cognitum per antiquos...  
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*Bibl.*: Gm 335 bf — Li 5
- Ad acquirendum Terram Sanctam tria maxime requiruntur, sapientia, potestas, caritas...  
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*Bibl.*: Gm 335 eh — Li 5 — Ss III, 27
- Ad aliquam notitiam generalem de divinis habendam, aliquid breve tradam pro modulo intelligentiae meae...  
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Ps. Bonaventura, *De virtute humilitatis*  
*Bibl.*: Gm 305 d — Li 5 — S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia VIII, cii  
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- leat statutum factum per syndicum...
- Joannes de Capistrano, Quod non valet statutum Univ. Maranae  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 186
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*Bibl.*: Li 5 — Ss III, 54 — Wadding 202
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- Petrus Joannis Olivi, Postilla ad Romanos  
*Bibl.*: Gm 327 n — Srb 6716 — Ss II, 343
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- (Quidam OFM?), Vita S. Coletae: Brussels 3164 (4837-44), f. 49v-108. (15c)
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- Compend. Quadrigae spir. Nicolai de Auximo: Venice S. Marco VII. 35 [L. IIII, CIIII], f. 1-17. (15c)
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- (Quidam OFM?), De dictis 4 ancillarum S. Elizabeth  
*Bibl.*: Li 7 — AFH 2 (1909), 247; 3, 475; 6, 61
- Ad Dei gloriam et honorem... Cum igitur Fra. Stephanus praedictus...
- Passio Stephani de Hungaria, OFM  
*Bibl.*: Li 7
- Ad denuntianda S. Elizabeth digna praeconia... B. autem Elizabeth regis orta natalibus...
- Vita et miracula S. Elizabeth  
*Bibl.*: AFH 2 (1909), 250 = text
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- Petrus de Trabibus, Sent.: *olim* Turin Naz. LXIX. d. V. 12. 115 ff. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 157 — Src 696 — Ss II. 371 — Wadding 194
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- (Quidam OFM?), De reversione animae ad Deum: Siena Com. U. V. 5, f. 8r-v. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1936), 232
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*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 407 = extract

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Antonius de Padua, III Regum  
*Bibl.*: Srb 1393

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*Bibl.*: Wadding 203 — Pits 589

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*Bibl.*: Li 12 — Gm 335 bm — Ss III, 32

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*Bibl.*: Gm 327 ac = Post. in Matthaeum, c. 10

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*Bibl.*: Gm 344 at

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*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11, (1935), cxi

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Antonius de Padua, II Paralipomenon

*Bibl.*: Srb 1395

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*Bibl.*: AFH 6 (1913), 623-5 = text

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*Bibl.*: Gm 335 kq

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Passio Joannis et Petri OFM

*Bibl.*: Li 14

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*Bibl.*: Srb 7156, 2 — Li 14 — Gm 335 fp — Ss III, 40

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 Ss III, 40
- An tantum sit una...  
 See 'Utrum sit una tantum pru-  
 dentia directiva...'
- An Verbum infinitum maneat...  
 Joannes Duns Scotus, Perihier-  
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 210  
*Bibl.*: Li 22
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 perfectionis fuerit ab omni contagio  
 infectionis purgata...  
 Petrus Joannis Olivi, Quaestio  
 (III Sent.): Padua Univ. 1540,  
 f. 262d  
*Bibl.*: AFH 26 (1933), 562; 28, 171
- Angeli eorum semper vident...  
 Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Sermones  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 n
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- Patris... Circa materiam de angelis plures scil. octo contemplationes...  
Franciscus de Mayronis, De angelis  
*Bibl.*: Roth 248
- Angelis suis mandavit de se... Verbum propositum assumptum de Psalmo ad laudem...  
Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
- Angelus Domini exercitum est...  
Ps. Bonaventura, Sermo de S. Francisco  
*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia IX, 597-8
- Angelus: purus natura...  
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Thomas Straversham, Contra Thomam  
*Bibl.*: Pits 455 — Wadding 218
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Alexander de Hales, De mysteriori Ecclesiae  
*Bibl.*: Li 16 — Pits 316 — Wadding 10
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Ps. Bernardinus de Feltre, Oratio  
*Bibl.*: CF 9 (1939), 278 — Arch Iber Amer 6 (1919), 396-7 = P. Joannes XXII
- Anima Dei insignita imagine Salvatoris pio cruore redempta...  
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*Bibl.*: Li 17 — S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia IX, 28
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De exercitatione mentali abbrev. ex dialogo Bonaventurae: Vat. Regin. 261  
*Bibl.*: Anton 1 (1926), 470 = Petrus de Alliaco
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Ps. Bonaventura, De amore Dei et Christi: Vat. Regin. 444, f. 103-105v
- Anima mea liquefacta est...  
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*Bibl.*: Gm 131c = Nic. de Tornaco
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Petrus de Aquila, De anima: Perugia Com. 654, f. 1-79. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 184 — Li 17 — Misc Franc 61 (1961), 284-5; 300-301
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Guillelmus Ockham, Centiloquium  
*Bibl.*: Li 17 — Src 296 — Wadding 106  
See 'Humana nobilis natura eo, potius...'
- Anima Pauli fuit mirifice illustrata...  
Tabula in Francisci de Mayronis commentarios: Vat. lat. 900, f. 124-129v. (1417)
- Animadverti saepenumero...  
Nicolaus Eyfeler Confluentinus, Ars praedicatoria  
*Bibl.*: CF 7 (1937), 275
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Joannes Parchim, Sermo: Göttingen Univ. Theol. 156 h, f. 101r-112v. (1471)  
*Bibl.*: Anton 11 (1936), 435
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Galfredus Lynge, Chronicon  
*Bibl.*: Li 18 — Pits 556



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inceptit Ordo B. Francisci...

(Quidam OFM?), Chronica: Vat.  
Chigi E. VII. 221, f. 56r

Anno Domini 1213 B. Franciscus...

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(15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 119-120

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mus a prima conversione B. patris  
nostri Francisci...

(Quidam OFM), Chronica

*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 1 (1885),  
227-300 = text

Anno Domini 1219 a prima conver-  
sione B. Francisci anno 13...

Legenda 5 martyrum de Maroccio

*Bibl.*: HRL IV, xxxv

Anno Domini 1224 tempore domini  
Honorii Papae, scil. eodem anno  
quo confirmata est ab eo...

Thomas de Eccleston, De adventu  
OFM in Anglia

*Bibl.* Little, *Fra.*: *Thomae*...,  
Manchester 1951 — Monumenta  
Franc, Rolls Series IV, 493 —  
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nos... Haymo et Fra. Rodulphus  
nuntii D. Papae...

Disputatio Latinorum et Graeco-  
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350ra. (1388)

*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 118; 12,  
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Anno Domini 1269 circa Quadrage-  
simam...

Thomas Eccleston (?), Impugna-  
tio OFM Oxon.

*Bibl.*: Li 19

Anno Domini 1282 V Nonas Octo-  
bris, ego Fra. Philippus Minister  
Tusciae...

Instrumentum de Stigmatibus S.  
Francisci

*Bibl.*: Li 19 — P. Herman, *Via  
Seraphica*, Chicago 1959, 162

Anno Domini 1297 in Brinonia...

De obitu S. Ludovici Tolos.

*Bibl.*: Li 19

Anno Domini 1308 die 22 Februarii

Fra. Jacobus sacerdos...

Jacobus capellanus: *olim* Ms Phil-  
lipps 12290, f. 179r. (15c). —  
*Investigate* Rome Angel. 985,  
f. 67-71. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Brit Soc Fr St 5, 112

Anno Domini 1327, viz. iiii die mensis  
Maii Raimundus Boti...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Pro ca-  
nonizatione Elzearii de Sabrano

*Bibl.*: Li 19

Anno Domini 1331 in crastina octavae  
Epiphaniae...

De morte et miraculis Odorici de  
Portu Naonis

*Bibl.*: Li 19

Anno Domini 1369 xviii die Maii  
obiit Neapoli...

Vita Philippi ab Aqueriis

*Bibl.*: Li 19

Anno igitur a Salvatore nostro nato  
1417 cum applicuissem in Achon...

Guillelmus Gualteri de Zirixsee,  
Descriptio II Terrae Sanctae:  
Wolfenbüttel Aug. 18. 2. 4, f. 43r-  
66v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Fz St 6 (1919), 262

Anno Incarnationis Domini 1235,  
mensis Aprilis tertio decimo in-  
trante...

Sixtus Brixienensis, Opusculum

*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 509

Anno secundo Darii regis, cum...

Guillelmus Lisseius, In Zacha-  
riam

*Bibl.*: Pits 445 — Wadding 105

Anno secundo Darii... In isto prologo  
tanguntur quaedam communiter de  
Aggaeo...

Guillelmus de Melitona, Zacha-  
rias

*Bibl.*: Srb 2952

Anno siquidem dominicae Incarna-  
tionis...

- Thomas de Celano, Vita S. Francisci  
*Bibl.*: Li 21
- Anno tertio... Hieronymus: Daniel apud Hebraeos litteris quidem Hebraicis, sed sermone Chaldaico...  
 Pontius Carbonelli, In Daniele  
*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 32
- Anno tertio... Per istum regem de quo dicitur capitulo sequenti...  
 Nicolaus de Lyra, Danielis moralizatio  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5954 — Gm 345 k = — Postilla
- Anno tertio... Post Apocalypsis expositionem propter conformitatem...  
 Pontius Carbonelli, Daniel  
*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 32a
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*Bibl.*: Ss I, 63
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 Alexander de Hales, Ad Romanos  
*Bibl.*: Li 21 — Pits 316 — Wadding 10
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 Alexander de Alexandria, Postilla ad Romanos: Assisii Com. 70. 90 ff. (14c) — Vat. lat. 931. 56 ff. (14c) — Siena Com. F. II. 8  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 13 — Srb 1112 — Gm 340 i — AFH 27 (1934), 561
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 Raimundus Bancal, De coniunctionibus mediis lunae: Madrid Nac. 9288 (Bb-116), f. 99r-v. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 19 (1959), 327
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 Franciscus Gothus, Compendium Biblicum  
*Bibl.*: Srb 2308 — Wadding 2308
- Ante obsidatum custodia cuiusdam militis fuerat...  
 (Quidam OFM?), Vita S. Ludovici episcopi: Modena S. Cataldi 1, f. 119rb-122ra. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 624
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 Joannes de Rupella, In Translationem S. Francisci: Florence Laur. Pl. 8 dext., 6, after f. 317d  
*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 540
- Antecedebant me ista sapientia... (Quidam OFM?), De S. Antonio: Toledo Cath. 5-30, f. 62r-63r. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 1 (1914), 376
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 Elias de Cortona, De morte S. Francisci  
*Bibl.*: Li 21
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 Raimundus Lull, Apostrophe de articulis Fidei  
*Bibl.*: Srb 7156, 3 — Ss III, 29
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 Raimundus Lull, De syllogismo contradictionis: Rome Naz. Vitt. Emanuele 24, f. 66ra-75vb. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 ff — Li 21 — Estudis Franc 46 (1934), 259-260
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 Joannes Gualensis, Breviloquium de virtutibus cardinalibus: Falconara (Ancona) Bibl. OFM 13, f. 1r-34v  
*Bibl.*: AFH 48 (1955), 131
- Antoni, compar inclute / Nostri quondam itineris...  
 Julianus de Spira, Graduale: Salerno Cath. s. n., f. ccxx. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 164 = text
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Jacobus de Marchia, Antiphoniae  
de B. Antonio a Stroncone: As-  
sisi S. Damiano

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 42 (1942), 160

Antonii beatissimi de OFM Christi,  
conversatione caelicam describen-  
tes, primo tangemus...

Vita S. Antonii: Madrid Nac.  
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*Bibl.*: Studi Franc 4 (29) (1932),  
600

Antonius cum esset viginti annorum  
et audiret...

Vita S. Antonii: Pommersfelden  
Schlosb. 40/2919, f. 87-90v. (140)

*Bibl.*: RTAM 6 (1934), 380

Antonius Gratiadei venetus ex. Ord.  
Minorum in sacra theologia... Cum  
tanta sit grammaticae utilitas...

Antonius Gratiadei, Grammatica:  
London BM Addit. 14776, f. 1r-  
48v

Antonius in civitate Ulixbona natus,  
soli Deo servire cupiens, ab ipsa  
pueritia se Deo...

Legenda de S. Antonio: Florence  
Laur. S. Croce Pl. 35 sin., 9. (140)

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 67 — Studi Franc 4  
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Aperi pectus omne...

Joannellus Melphitensis, De ter-  
minis confundentibus

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 25

Aperiam in Psalterio propositionem  
meam...

Henricus Costesy (Cossey), Ex-  
pos. in Psalterium

*Bibl.*: Li 22 — Lg 234 — Pits  
432 — Wadding 112 — Srb  
3153 — AFH 46 (1953), 108

Aperiam in Psalterio propositionem  
meam... Spiritus S. etsi in omnibus  
prophetis sit locutus...

Joannes Bloemendal de Colonia,  
In Psalterium

*Bibl.*: Srb 4241

Aperiat terra... In verbo proposito  
describitur materia...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935),  
cxli

Aperta sunt prata et apparuere her-  
bae virentes... A vel ab dicit ha-  
bitudinem causae materialis vel for-  
malis...

(Quidam OFM), Spiraculum Fran-  
cisci de Mayronis

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 55

Aperta sunt prata et apparuere her-  
bae virentes... Rex pacificus Salo-  
mon...

Franciscus de Mayronis, etc.,  
Spiraculum: Oxford Bodleian  
Can. Misc. 389 [anon.]

*Bibl.*: Roth 125 — AFH 47  
(1954), 115 — Src 231 — Misc  
Franc 2 (1887), 168

Aperti sunt caeli et visiones Dei...

Et factum est hic consequenter...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla s. Eze-  
chielem: Madrid Nac. 259 (A-19),  
f. 68a-139va. (150)

*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 19 (1959),  
295 — Gm 345 f

Aperti sunt caeli et visiones Dei...

In verbo proposito ab Ezechiele...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla s. Eze-  
chielem: Klosterneuberg 175, f.  
202-270; 177, f. 1-40. (150)

*Bibl.*: Bale 130r — Srb 5877 —  
AFH 5 (1912), 105

Apertis thesauris suis... In hoc verbo  
quattuor notantur. Modus offerendi  
ibi...

Joannes de Rupella, Sermo

*Bibl.*: Hn VI, 75

Apertis thesauris suis... Triplex est  
thesaurus, viz. cordis, oris, operis...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo:  
Klosterneuberg 450, f. 56v-57v.  
(130)

Aperuit os eius... Dominus est sicut  
nutrix quae pascit puerum quae os  
eius aperit...

Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Hn II, 95

Apocalypsis Graece, Latine dicitur revelatio...

Alexander de Hales (?), In Apocalypsim

*Bibl.*: Li 22

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi...

(Quidam OFM?), Comm. in Apocalypsim: Vienna NB 4211, f. 133a-233a. (15c)

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... Beatus qui legit verba libri huius aliis intelligibiliter elucidando...

Bernardinus de Senis, Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Li 22 — Srb 1714

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... Dividitur enim... in prooemium et tractatum...

Henricus de Costesy (?), Apocalypsis: Oxford Bodleian Laud. Misc. 85

*Bibl.*: Li 22

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... In libro Apocalypsis Joannes intendit unam conclusionem...

Pontius Carbonelli, Divisio Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 73a

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... Legimus apud Eusebium...

Joannes Gualensis, Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Srb 4519

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... Legimus in ecclesiasticis historiis B. Joannem Evangelistam Christi Apostolum...

Guillelmus de Melitona (Phil. de Ghisulfis?), Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 343; II, 381

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... Liber iste dividitur in prooemium et tractatum...

Henricus de Costesy (Cossey), Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Srb 3161 — Lg 234

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi... Sicut dictum...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Apocalypsis moralizatio: Liège Univ. 192, f. 115ra-128vb. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 k — AFH 5 (1912), 107 — Srb 5924 —

Apocalypsis Jesu Christi quam dedit illi Deus palam facere... Ad hoc autem ut intelligas...

Landulphus Caracciolus, Sermones Quadragesimales

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 164

Apocalypsis Joannis Apostoli Jesu Christi... Conversus vidi septem candelabra...

Pontius Carbonelli, Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 73

Apocalypsis Joannis librique Danielis explanationibus... Osculetur — Glossa dicit...

Pontius Carbonelli, S. Canticorum

*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 24-5 (1925-6), 192 — Srb 6985, 24a

Apocalypsis Joannis tot habet... His enim paucis verbis... Apocalypsis — Haec, inquit B. Joannes...

Petrus de Candia (?), Apocalypsis

*Bibl.*: Srb 6444

Apostolus Paulus, I ad Corinthios inquit... Rex pacificus, sacerdos Dei altissimus, Christus...

Henricus de Werl, De eminentia potestatis Apostolicae: Vienna NB 4701, f. 60a-90b. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 45 (1952), 120

Apparuit Christus sub duodecim proprietatibus...

Petrus Joannis Olivi, Perfectio: Siena Com. U. V. 6, f. 92v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1936), 524

Apparuit gratia Dei Salvatoris nostri diebus istis novissimis in suo Francisco omnibus vere humilibus...

Bonaventura, Legenda maior S. Francisci: Capestrano Bibl. OFM X, f. 1a-37a. (14c?) — Valencia Cath. 121 — Liège Univ. 57, f. 265vb-304ra. (14c) — Troyes 401 — London BM Royal 8 G. vi, f. 160. (15c) — Bologna



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*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 4 (1917), 278-9 — Li 22 — Fz St 39 (1957), 23 — HRL IV, xxxiii — Anal Franc 10 (1926-41), 555-652 = text — AFH 4 (1911), 359; 6, 243; 7, 33-4; 12, 324 — Misc Franc 3 (1888), 75; 5, 9 — Anton 19 (1944), 241 — S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia VIII, lxxxvi; 504-564 = text — Sabatier, *Speculum perfectionis*, Paris 1898, cxcvii
- Apparuit gratia Dei Salvatoris nostri... in servo Francisco quem Pater misericordiam...  
 Bonaventura, Legenda minor S. Francisci: Bologna Arch. A. 76, f. 79. (1502) — Florence Ricc. 231, f. 124. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 10 (1926-41), 653, 678 — Gm 305 p — Li 22 — Ss I, 169; 179 — AFH 1 (1908), 124; 31, 458 S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia VIII, xiii; 565-579 = text
- Apparuit gratia Dei... In civitate Senarum...  
 Officium S. Bernardini de Senis: Florence Ricc. 231, f. 79r-81v. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 120 — Li 22
- Apparuit S. Elizabeth angelus Domini...  
 Sermo ad Elizabeth de Thuringia  
*Bibl.*: Li 22
- Appellamus esse Dei...  
 Raimundus Lull, L. de est Dei  
*Bibl.*: Li 22
- Appositio est...  
 (Quidam OFM?), Derivationes sec. Britonem: olim Milan Saint-Eustorge  
*Bibl.*: Arch Frat Praed 25 (1955), 35, 202
- Apposui cor meum ut intelligerem distinctionem (!) quae versatur in terra... Haec verba scripta sunt...  
 Petrus Thomae, De modis distinctionum: Vat. lat. 2190, f. 72v-113, 159r. (14c)
- Apposui cor meum ut intelligerem distinctiones quae versantur in omnibus scientiis...  
 Nicolaus Lackmann, De distinctionibus et modis intrinsecis  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 61 (1961), 249 — RTAM 2 (1930), 65-70 = Petrus Thomae
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 Petrus Thomae, Formalitates: Cracow Jagiellon. 2130 (BB VI 3), f. 68r-127v. (1466) — Escorial l. II. 11, f. 1-44. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Studi e Testi 122 (1946), 436; 444-5
- Apprehendet messium tritura... Ista verba pertinent ad Christum secundum praesens tempus...  
 Gregorius, Sermo: Paris BN Nouv. Acq. 338, f. 159r. (13c)  
*Bibl.*: Etudes Phil Med 14 (1930), 356-360 = text; 15, 14 — Hn VI, 220
- Appropinquant igitur tempore quo, spiritum redderet caelo...  
 Officium Translationis S. Ludovici Tolosani: Washington Holy Name Coll. 19, f. 26r-33v. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 7 (1951), xlvi; 259 = text
- Apud Tuanam civitatem Cappadociae metropolim scribitur aquam quandam...  
 Raimundus Lull, De mirabilibus rebus: Florence Ricc. 932, f. 11. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 3 (1910), 555-6
- Apud vallem Spoletanam, civitate Assisi, natale B. Francisci...  
 Brevis vita S. Francisci  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 4 (1906), xxvi

Aqua nostra philosophica (physica)...

Ps. Raimundus Lull, Conclusio

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 kr — Li 23

Aquila grandis magnarum alarum  
longo membrorum ductu... In qui-  
bus verbis tria mysteria de B. Joane-  
ne...

Quidam OFM, Sermo: Aquila  
Arch. Status S. 135 — Padua  
Univ. 2065, f. 95c-99d. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 33 (1940), 420 —  
S. Bernardini Opera Omnia I, xxx

Aquila grandis... Remanserunt in  
praecedenti praedicatione...

Quidam OFM, Sermo: Aquila  
Arch. Status S. 135, after f. 192b.  
(15c)

*Bibl.*: S. Bernardini Opera Omnia  
I, xxx

Aquila velut regina inter aves...

Bartholomaeus Anglicus, De pro-  
prietatibus rerum: London BM  
Royal 12 E. iii. 229 ff. (14c)  
[= L. 12-14, 16-18]

Arbor ista dividitur in septem partes...

Raimundus Lull, Arbor scien-  
tiae: *Investigate* Florence Naz.  
II, X, 11. (15c)

Arbor mala fructus malos facit, dicit  
Dominus...

Ps. Bonaventura, Speculum con-  
scientiae: Madrid Nac. 106 (B-  
72), f. 139ra-154ra. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933),  
343 — Ss I, 178 — Gm 305 dm;  
316 bf — Li 23 — BSF I, xxvi —  
S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia  
VIII, xcix; 623-645 = text

Arca Domini ferebatur super aquas...  
Sicut arca Noe ad hoc fuit dispo-  
sita...

Robertus de Bardis de Florentia  
(OFM?), Sermo: Florence Ricc.  
406, f. 22ra. (14c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 2 (1909), 321

Argentum eodem modo componitur  
quo et aurum, quamvis non aequè  
depuratum et minus digestum...

Recepta Rogerii Bacon: Florence  
Ricc. 119, f. 39vb. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 116 —  
Ss III, 70

Arguendus est non temere proximus  
et quando hoc contingit... Evan-  
gelistae quattuor sunt...

Registrum in expos. Nic. de Lyra  
s. Evangelia

*Bibl.*: Srb 5900, 1

Arguitur principaliter contra...

Reginaldus Langham, Contra  
Edmundum Buriensem

*Bibl.*: Pits 589 — Wadding 203

Aristoteles in III Metaphysicae osten-  
dens dubitationes...

Joannes Duns Scotus, Quaestio:  
Toulouse 739, f. 187v. (14c)

Arma militiae nostrae non sunt car-  
nalia...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Passus  
s. Universalia; Praedicamenta:  
Upsala Univ. C. 627, f. 166r-  
210r. (1464) — Bologna Arch.  
A. 96. (1441)

*Bibl.*: Li 24 — Anton 20 (1945),  
451 — Ss I, 284 — Roth 173

Arphaxat itaque rex... Liber Judith  
describit virtutem, modum et ef-  
ficaciam...

Pontius Carbonelli, Judith

*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 17

Arphaxat itaque rex... Per istum qui  
multas gentes superaverat...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in  
Judith: Klosterneuberg 373 B,  
f. 128v-131v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Srb 5946

Arphaxat itaque rex... Post historias  
Susannae...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Judith

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 f — Srb 5849 —  
Bale 130r

Arphaxat itaque rex... Post librum  
Baruch qui fuit scriptus Captivita-  
tis tempore...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Judith: Oxford  
Bodleian 251

*Bibl.*: Li 24 — Srb 5948

Arripe illam et exaltabit te... Beatus vir qui diligit nomen tuum, Maria Virgo...

Ps. Bonaventura, Psalterium: Madrid Nac. 9533, f. 13v-156r. (14-15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 305 dk; 316 bd — Ss I, 178 — S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia I, xvii; VI, 501 — Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 381

Ars alchimiae duo principaliter considerat...

Rogerus Bacon, Breviloquium, alchimiae

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 68

Ars confirmat et augmentat utilitates...

Ps. Raimundus Lull, Ars memorativa

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 iq — Ss III, 41

Ars generalis dividitur in duas partes, scil. in theoricam et practicam. Theorica est cognitio...

Raimundus Lull, Ars generalis

*Bibl.*: Li 24 — Ss III, 10 — Wadding 197

Ars generalis. Hic est titulus operis et dividitur in tres partes secundum tres distinctiones...

Raimundus Lull (?), S. artificium Artis generalis

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 in — Ss III, 41

Ars infusa sic in suo titulo...

Raimundus Lull, Ars infusa ad habendam cognitionem Dei

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 15

Ars ista hac intentione compilata est ut medicus sub compendiosa speculatione scientiam medicinae...

Raimundus Lull, De arte medicina: Vat. Urbin. 1394, f. 1. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Li 24 — Gm 335 al

Ars ista in tres partes dividitur...

Raimundus Lull (?), Ars grammaticae

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 16

Ars ista modum sequitur et doctrinam artis inventivae...

Raimundus Lull, Ars expositiva

*Bibl.*: Li 24 — Wadding 198

Ars praesens descendit ab arte demonstrativa...

Raimundus Lull, Ars inventiva veritatis: *Investigate* Alcobaça CCCLXXXV/203, f. 131. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 as — Ss III, 12 — Li 24

Ars principaliter duo continet...

Rogerus Bacon, De alchimia: Florence Ricc. 847, f. 34r. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 3 (1910), 553 — Ss III, 68

Ars sive scientia...

Raimundus Lull, Ars scientiae generalis

*Bibl.*: Li 24 — Wadding 198

Articulus pertractandus sit...

Joannes Hilton, De paupertate Fratrum Minorum

*Bibl.*: Li 25 — Lg 243 — Pits 515

Articulus pro finali cessatione...

Guillelmus Butler, De indulgentiis Pontificiis

*Bibl.*: Li 25 — Lg 255 — Pits 589 — Wadding 103

Ascendam in palmam et apprehendam fructus eius...

Raimundus Rigaldi, Sermones festivi

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 555 — Gm 325 b — Ss III, 41 — Wadding 202 — Li 25

Ascendam super altitudinem nubium...

Salvator generis humani Dominus noster Jesus Christus...

(Quidam OFM), Sermo: Padua Univ. 2065, f. 104v-106b. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 33 (1940), 420

Ascendens Jesus in naviculam... Bernardus in quodam sermone...

Guillelmus de Tornaco, Sermo: Venice S. Marco Cl. Vi, 36, f. 220v-222v

*Bibl.*: AFH 26 (1933), 210

Ascendens Jesus in naviculam... In istis verbis Salvator noster ponitur nobis in exemplum...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli

Ascendens Moyses in monte Dei...

(Quidam OFM), Sermo: Brussels II. 962 (223), f. 189v

Ascendens Moyses in montem... In verbo isto tria nobis considerata occurrunt. Primum est quomodo Moyses...

(Quidam OFM), Sermo: Paris BN Nouv. Acq. 338, f. 195v. (13c)  
*Bibl.*: Hn VI, 257 — Etud Phil Med 15 (1931), 15

Ascendente Jesu in naviculam, secuti sunt eum discipuli...

Berthodus Ratisponensis, Sermones

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 144

Ascendit Deus in iubilo... Cum enim Dominus noster Jesus Christus de caelorum sublimitate...

Bernardinus de Senis, Sermo: Vat. Chigh C. VI, 163, col. 133. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 28 (1935), 258

Ascendit Dominus super nubem levem... Prothema: Haec enim dies boni nuntii est...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli

Ascendit Elias per turbinem... Inter alios sanctos N. Testamenti...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli

Ascendit leo de cubili suo et praedogentium levavit se... Iam vos mundi estis propter sermonem...

Bartholomaeus de Bononia, Sermo: Kremsmunster 83, f. 163va-165rb — Worcester Cath. 5, f. 72ra-74va. (14c) — Vat. Ottobon. 505, f. 57ra. (13c)  
*Bibl.*: Arch Frat Praed 27 (1957),

137 — Anton 7 (1932), 207 — Studi e Testi 122 (1946), 417-8

Ascendit Simon Petrus et traxit rete...

Pisces quos Dominus capi vult...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Ascet II, xii — Bibl Franc Schol 3 (1952), 33

Ascendit super Cherubim... In verbo proposito describitur ascensio sive assumptio...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo: *Investigate* Cambridge Corpus Christi 63, f. 125b. (13-14c)  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli

Ascendit super omnes caelos ut adimplerentur... Ex doctrina Philosophi habemus quod omnis plenitudo...

Thomas Brito, De festivitibus Sanctorum

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 120

Ascensiones in corde... Ista verba scripta sunt in Psalmo et expono quasi de persona Christi...

Ricardus de Mediavilla, Sermo: Erlangen Univ. 280, f. 67v. (13-14c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 16 (1941), 49 — Ss III, 47, — Gm 324 b

Aspexi terram et ecce vacua erat... Haec verba scribuntur Jer. 4 et bene competunt Salomoni...

Guillelmus de Melitona, Ecclesiastes

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 543

See 'Memini me... Iste prologus primo dividitur...'

Aspiciebam, et ecce, arbor posita erat in medio terrae...

Ps. Bonaventura, De arbore caritatis

*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia IX, 29

Aspicientes in auctorem Fidei... In signum huius numeri 21 fecit Moy-ses serpentem aeneum...

Thomas Eboracensis, Sermo: Cambridge Trinity 373, f. 201



- Bibl.*: AFH 19 (1926), 840; 882  
— Rw 173 — Franc Stud 24  
(1964), 205–222 = text
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- Thomas Papiensis (?), Vita S. Antonii de Padua
- Bibl.*: Li 25 — Ss III, 124 — HRL IV, xxxv — Sabatier, *Speculum perfectionis*, Paris 1898, clxx — Anton 6 (1931), 232–5; 20, 456 — AFH 6 (1913), 243; 21, 480 — Anal Franc 7 (1951), lix — CF 1 (1931), 117; 3, 318; 8, 289; 11, 129 — Misc Franc 32 (1932), 120; 249; 34, 123
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- Antonius de Padua, Sermones Quadragesimales
- Bibl.*: Ss I, 83
- Assumpsit Jesus duodecim discipulos...
- Henricus a Montejardino Genuensis, Quadragesimale
- Bibl.*: Ss I, 359 — Wadding 113
- Assumpsit Jesus duodecim discipulos suos... Sapientis medici potius evitare volentis...
- Jacobus de Alexandria, Postilla Quadragesimalis
- Bibl.*: Ss II, 2
- Assumpsit Jesus Petrum et Jacobum et Joannem... Ait Philosophus in primo De regimine principum...
- Quidam OFM, Sermo: Padua Univ. 2065, f. 53a–56a. (15c)
- Bibl.*: AFH 33 (1940), 418
- Assumpsit Jesus Petrum... Ex vera utique confessione non tantum humana gens...
- Bernardinus de Senis, Sermo: Liège Grand Sem. 6 M. 27, f. 87v–98v. (15c)
- Bibl.*: AFH 7 (1914), 739
- Assumpsit Jesus Petrum... In verbo proposito describitur status contemplationis...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo
- Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
- Assumpsit me de aquis multis. A manu potenti debet trahi... De main souverain doit estre tire...
- Seguinus, Sermones de Sanctis: Troyes 759. (14c) [*Lat.–French*]
- Assumpsit me de aquis multis. A potenti manu debet attrahi...
- Antonius de Hispania, Sermones festivi
- Bibl.*: Ss I, 72
- Assumpsit me spiritus... In his verbis describitur et manifestatur translatio...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo
- Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
- Assumpsit mihi duas virgas... Resplenduit facies eius sicut sol...
- Marianus Florentinus, Fasciculus chronicorum: OFM
- Bibl.*: AFH 4 (1911), 560–561 — Ss II, 216
- Assumptus est in caelum... In quo verbo primo declaratur Christi ascensio...
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- Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo
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- Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1936), 218
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At noviter...

See 'Ut noviter...'

Attendamus omnes clerici magnum peccatum et ignorantiam...

Franciscus Assisiensis, De reverentia Corporis Domini

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Ascet I, 22-3 — Lemmens, *Extractiones de Legenda antiqua*, Quaracchi 1902, 66 — HRL IV, xxxiv — Sabatier, *Speculum perfectionis*, Paris 1898, clxvi, clxvii — Brit Soc Fr St 17 (1931), 38, 49, 59, 66, 69 — AFH 6 (1913), 12; 7, 125; 20, 99 — ed. Boehmer, Tübingen 1930, 41-3

Attendamus, omnes Fratres...

Franciscus Assisiensis, De admonitione Fratrum: Rome S. Isidoro 1/73, f. 7r. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Documenta antiqua Franc III, 62

Attendamus quantum debes habere reverentiam...

Considerationes Fra. Rogerii de Provincia

*Bibl.*: LI 26 — Lemmens, *Extractiones de Legenda antiqua*, Quaracchi 1902, 64

Attende quod natura dedit homini unicum os...

Ps. Bonaventura, De silentio

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 179 — Gm 305 bo

Attendite a falsis prophetis...

Communitatis responsio ad Spirituales

*Bibl.*: AFH 42 (1949), 216

Attendite popule meus... In Psalmo 77 scribitur...

Franciscus de Mayronis, De primo principio

*Bibl.*: Li 26

Attendite popule meus legem meam...

Franciscus de Mayronis, I Sent.

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 283

Attendite popule meus legem meam...

Quia vero primum principium complexum habet...

Franciscus de Mayronis, De primo principio: Oxford Balliol 70, f. 117-126v. (15c) — Vat. lat. 4385, f. 55-88v

*Bibl.*: Roth 202-3

Attributum. An attributa distingui...

Thomas Straversham, In Robt. Cowton

*Bibl.*: Wadding 218

Auctores quidem multi tractant de hac scientia...

Rogerus Bacon, De perspectiva

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 62

Auctoritate Beati Augustini dicitur in domo Dei esse...

Alexander de Villa Dei (OFM?),

Massa computi: Utrecht Univ. 722, f. 1-20. (14c)

Auctoritates S. Scripturae quae videntur facere quod B. Virgo fuerit in originali concepta...

Joannes de Capistrano, Quaestio

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 191-2

Audi, Deus, creaturam / Tuis factam manibus...

Joannes Pecham, Deploratio humanae miseriae

*Bibl.*: AFH 14 (1921), 355 —

Fz St 4 (1917), 364-5 — Gm 316 ap

Audi, Domine, et vide et inclina...

Joannes Pecham, Speculum animae

*Bibl.*: Pits 380 — Li 27 — Wad-

ding 147 — BSF I, xxiv, xxvi

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Marquardus de Lindavia, Sermones

*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 2 (1887), 219

— Fz St 21 (1934), 331

Audi, filia, et vide... Refert Solinus in commentariis...

Quidam OFM, Sermo: Oxford Bodleian 26, f. 192. (14c)

Audi, Israel, praecepta Domini... In his verbis propositis Spiritus S. circa divina praecepta tria agit...

Nicolaus de Lyra (?), Expos. 10

- praeceptorum: S. Gall 773 (763?)  
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 Petrus Joannis Olivi, Postilla s. Genesim  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 50
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 Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, In Canticum Moysis  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345
- Audite caeli... Haec est pars executiva in qua secundum litterale sensum intendit...  
 Thomas Docking (?), Glossa in Isaias 1, 2  
*Bibl.*: Srb 8097, 1
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 In verbo proposito traditur et describitur ordo visitationis...  
 Matthaeus ab Aquasparta  
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- Audite, Domini filii...  
 Franciscus Assisiensis, Litterae ad Capitulum Generale  
*Bibl.*: Lemmens, *Extractiones de Legenda antiqua*, Quaracchi 1902, 54
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*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
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 Joannes Pecham (?), De laude diei Dominicae  
*Bibl.*: Gm 316 az
- Audite somnium meum quod vidi...  
 Ps. Franciscus de Mayronis, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 55 (1955), 487 — Studi Franc 51 (1954), 234; 53, 22 — Roth 218
- Audite tibi fecit nova... In verbo isto duo nobis considerata occurrunt. Primo, quomodo Annuntiationis...  
 Quidam OFM, Sermo: Paris BN Nouv. Acq. 338, f. 170r. (13c)  
*Bibl.*: Hn VI, 256 — Etud Phil Med 15 (1931), 15
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 Arnoldus Galliard, Sermo: Oxford Merton 237, f. 35
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 Michael Mediolanensis de Carcano, Quadragesimale: Pavia Univ. 401, p. 221  
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*Bibl.*: Ss I, 178 — Li 27 — Gm 305 bt — S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia VIII, cviii
- Ave, Domina sancta, regina sanctissima, Dei Genetrix Maria quae es Virgo perpetua...  
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*Bibl.*: Fz St 36 (1954), 87; 89 — Brit Soc Fr St 17 (1931), 10 — Sabatier, *Speculum perfectionis*, Paris 1898, clxxxii — Bibl Franc Ascet I, 123; 197-8
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- Bibl.*: Gm 305 bu — Ss I, 179
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- Bibl.*: Ss III, 158
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- Julianus de Spira, Prosa de S. Francisco
- Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 178
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- Franciscus Assisiensis, Salutatio virtutum
- Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Ascet I, 20-21 — Fz St 36 (1954), 87-99 — Brit Soc Fr St 17 (1931), passim — Sabatier, *Speculum perfectionis*, Paris 1898, clxxxii — CF 1 (1931), 439
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- Bibl.*: Lg 211-2 — Li 28 — Rw 141 = f. 2-138
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## B

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B. Bonitas. C. Magnitudo...

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ad omnes scientias  
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Christo susciperet...

De S. Clara: Namur 110, f. 11.  
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rum...

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intelligere...

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Jacobus de Mozanica, Lectiones  
s. Psalmum

*Bibl.*: Wadding 125

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praemittitur pro titulo...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Expos. Psalmi:  
Monte-Cassino 207 Pl. K, p. 73.  
(14-15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 f — Src 5862

Beati mortui qui in Domino moriun-  
tur...

Marquardus de Lindavia, Sermo:  
*Investigate* Assisi Com. 554, f. 96.  
13c) — Cava dei Terreni Naz.  
della Badia 17, f. 149-150v. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 2 (1887), 218 —  
Fz St 21 (1934), 330

Beati mortui... Hodie, fratres carissi-  
mi, est confratria omnium fidelium...

Nicolaus de Aquavilla, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 117

Beati oculi qui vident...

Marquardus de Lindavia, De  
quinque sensibus  
*Bibl.*: Fz St 21 (1934), 331

See 'Quaerebant eum inter co-  
gnatos...'

Beati pauperes... Hic ponitur ipsius  
legis explanatio...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 n

Beati pauperes spiritu...

Jacobus de Tuderto (?), De bea-  
titudinibus: Escorial d. IV. 16,  
f. 60. (15c) — Siena Com. U. V.  
5, f. 19v

*Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1936), 233-4

- Beati pauperes spiritu... Nihil est in patria desiderabilius sicut quidam dixit...
- Quidam OFM, Sermo: Padua Univ. 2065, f. 198a-199a. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 33 (1940), 424
- Beati qui habitant in domo tua. Domine... Hodierna die S. Mater Ecclesia...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
- Beati qui persecutionem patiuntur... In verbis istis tria sunt consideranda. Primum est quae faciunt hominem...
- Nicolaus de Aquavilla, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 120
- Beati quod non viderunt et crediderunt... Quod corpus suum sit in innumerabilibus locis et altaribus...
- Robertus de Licio (?), Sermones: Würzburg Bibl. OFM I, 50, f. 2r  
*Bibl.*: RTAM 4 (1932), 181
- Beati sunt servi illi... Vulgariter dicitur 'que seur atent qui par atent'...
- Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Hn II, 96
- Beatissime Pater, accepto hodie...
- Robertus rex Siciliae, Epistola ad Benedictum XII: Rome Angel. 151 (B/ 6. 4), f. 251a. (14c)
- Beatissime Pater, ad vestrum pedum oscula Beatorum. Cum in cunctis vitae meae calamitatibus...
- Jacobus de Marchia, Epistola ad Papam  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 2 (1887), 395
- Beatissime Pater. Pridem Domino Joanne Papa XXII praecessore vivente... Circa opinionem...
- Robertus rex Siciliae, Libellus de visione animarum: Rome Angel. 151 (B. 6. 4), f. 256-387b. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 58
- Beatissimi patris Francisci amorem et dilectionem...
- De indulgentia S. Mariae de Angelis sec. Barth. de Pisis: Modena S. Cataldi 1, f. 107-119a. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 624
- Beatissimus Deus sempiternus...
- Ps. Raimundus Lull, Epistola ad Eleonoram  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 ng — Li 29
- Beatus Augustinus in Epistola ad Marcellianum...
- Joannes de Capistrano, De Christi paupertate  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 24 (1924), 144
- Beatus Augustinus in Epistola ad Marcellinum. Proponit sibi auctor concordiam inter Decretales Nicolai... (Quidam OFM?), Contra Fraticellos: Capestrano Bibl. OFM 18, f. 179r-191r. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 6 (1913), 746
- Beatus Bernardinus in oppido Fossa, ab Aquila Aprutii urbe quattuor fere lapidibus distante...
- Antonius Amicius (OFM?), Funerale Bernardini Aquilani: Venice S. Marco Z. L. lxxxix, f. 352  
*Bibl.*: Lemmens, B. Bernardini Aquilani Chronica, Rome 1902, xii-xix
- Beatus Bernardus...
- Petrus Aureoli, Explanatio Epistolae S. Bernardi  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 325
- Beatus Conradus audivit a Fra. Leone... quod nihil...
- Verba Conradi de Offida: Rome S. Isidoro 1/25, f. 48v. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Li 30 — Documenta antiqua Franc III, 55
- Beatus dives qui inventus est sine macula... In Isaia dicitur: Ab Oriente adducam semen tuum...
- Odo Rigaldi, Sermo: Paris BN 16502, f. 157r-159r  
*Bibl.*: Anton 27 (1952), 114 — RTAM 6 (1934), 187
- Beatus Franciscus...

- Quomodo F. petivit a Christo indulgentiam: Assisi Com. 417, f. 105-108. (14-15c)
- Beatus Franciscus de civitate Assisii ortus, a puerilibus annis nutritus... Thomas de Celano, Vita S. Francisci Assis.: Bologna Univ. 2134, f. 117. (14-15c) — Assisi Com. 338, f. 52. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 10 (1926-41), 118-126 — AFH 20 (1927), 73; 26, 343 — Li 30
- Beatus Franciscus de patria Tuscia, civitate Assisii natus...  
 Legenda S. Francisci: Toulouse 478, f. 24. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 10 (1926-41), 533-5 — Anton 35 (1960), 341 — Li 30 — AFH 1 (1908), 259-261 — edition: Quaracchi 1936
- Beatus Franciscus die quadam...  
 De vita S. Francisci: Worcester Cath. F. 75, f. 128. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Etudes Franc 20 (1908), 83
- Beatus Franciscus fecit duas (!) Regulas...  
 Actus S. Francisci: olim Phillipps 12290, f. 104-137v  
*Bibl.*: Brit Soc Fr St 5, 22-108
- Beatus Franciscus fecit tres Regulas, scil. illam confirmavit sibi P. Innocentius sine bulla...  
 Speculum perfectionis status OFM: Magdeburg XII. 2. 154. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Li 30 — Fz St 36 (1954), 92 — Misc Franc 43 (1943), 178 — Sabatier, *Speculum perfectionis*..., Paris 1898, cxcviii — *Documenta antiqua Franciscana*, Quaracchi 1902, 54-70 — Brit Soc Fr St 8 (1918), 32
- Beatus Franciscus post lasciviam juvenilem et negotia saecularia gravi langore attritus...  
 Legenda brevior Ord. Praedicatorum  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 10 (1926-41), 537 ss — edition Quaracchi 1936
- Beatus Franciscus pro maxima nobilitate...  
 Speculum perfectionis  
*Bibl.*: Li 30
- Beatus homo quem tu erudieris...  
 Franciscus de Mayronis, De decem praeceptis  
*Bibl.*: CF 13 (1943), 46\*
- Beatus homo quem tu erudieris... Neminem censi sapientem fateor...  
 Bonaventura, De perfectione vitae ad Sorores: Freiburg (Swiss) Bibl. OFM Conv. 23 J. 60, f. 172v-191. (14-15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 10 (1917), 69; 29, 530 — Ss I, 178 — Gm 305 ae — Wadding 48
- Beatus homo quem tu erudieris... Volenti studere in aliqua scientia quatuor sunt...  
 Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 145 — Srb 5498 — Gm 318 i — Bibl Franc Schol 1 (1903), 22-36 = text; 11, lxx
- Beatus igitur et evangelicus vir Franciscus patrem habuit...  
 Legenda trium Sociorum S. Franc.  
*Bibl.*: Li 30
- Beatus igitur iste scil. ac fortissimus Dei athleta...  
 Joannes de Tagliacotio (OFM?), De obitu Joannis de Capistrano...  
*Bibl.*: Li 30
- Beatus iste... Miles quidam de Corneto Turellus...  
 Miracula Benevenuti de Eugubio  
*Bibl.*: Li 30
- Beatus Ludovicus de Ordine Minorum, episcopus Tolosanus, ex hoc saeculo migravit...  
 Paulus Puteolanus (OFM?), Vita S. Ludovici: Vat. lat. 1960, f. 262 b-d  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 7 (1951), 400-403



Beatus Ludovicus quondam rex Francorum... In die sepulturae regis...

Vita S. Ludovici: London BM Royal 14 C. i, f. 7. (14c) — Namur 73, f. 123rb-126va. (15c) — Toulouse 82, f. 112b. (14c) — Liège Grand Sem. 6 L. 21, f. 46r-48r. (15c) — Troyes 401 — Valencia Cath. 249, f. ccxlvii. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 6 (1913), 554; 7, 527 — Arch Iber Amer 33 (1936), 213

Beatus quem tu...

Bonaventura (?), Ad quandam monialem: Vienna NB 3648, f. 56b-58b. (15c)

Beatus qui custodit...

Joannes Guallensis, S. Isaiam: Venice S. Marco 494, f. 39-50  
*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 553 — Srb 4513

Beatus qui custodit verba prophetiae...

Quidam OFM, Miscellanea sacrae eruditionis: Bologna Arch. A. 29. (15c)

Beatus qui intelligit super egenum...

Ad evidentiam ergo istius quaestionis qua quaeritur utrum asserere...

Robertus de Leicester, S. Psalmum: Cambridge Univ. Addit. 3571, f. 248ra-257va

*Bibl.*: AFH 46 (1953), 463 — CF 30 (1960), 176-207 = text

Beatus qui intelligit super egenum...

Praecedit actus meritorius ut succedat fructus consolatorius...

Ricardus de Conington, De paupertate OFM

*Bibl.*: AFH 23 (1930), 57 ss; 29, 398; 42, 214 — Gm 324 k — Lg 164 — Ss III, 44

Beatus qui legit et audit... Ad commendationem doctrinae quae traditur in hoc libro...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Postilla s. Apocalypsim

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), lxx — Gm 318 e — Srb 5518

Beatus qui legit verba libri huius aliis intelligibiliter elucidando...

Quidam OFM, Comm. in Apocalypsim

*Bibl.*: CF 8 (1938), 447

Beatus venter qui te portavit... Sicut Maria in ventre sic nos in mente Christum portemus...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 159v-160. (13c)

Beatus vir...

Ps. Antonius de Padua, Sermones in Psalmos: Paris BN 14804

*Bibl.*: AFH 25 (1932), 164 — Gm 113 b — Studi Franc 4 (29) (1932), 516 — Bulletin de Theol. anc. et med. 2 (1933-36), 74 = — Joannes d'Abbeville

Beatus vir...

Odo de Castro Radulphi, Postilla s. Psalterium: Assisi Com. 323. (13c) — *Investigate* Assisi Com. 25, f. 1; 33, f. 1

*Bibl.*: AFH 26 (1933), 542

Beatus vir... A via recta recedendo.

In consilio impiorum. Pravis eorum machinationibus consentiendo...

Antonius de Padua, In Psalmos

*Bibl.*: Anton 6 (1931), 329 — Srb 1402

Beatus vir... Chrysostomus Homelia 36 super Matthaeum...

Joannes Guallensis, S. Psalmos: Cambridge Pembroke 262, f. 1. (14-15c)

Beatus vir... Collecta: Effice nos, Domine, tamquam fructuosissimum lignum...

Robertus Boyselii, Psalmi

*Bibl.*: Srb 7370

Beatus vir... Evangelico viro triplex imponitur...

Hubertinus de Casali (?), Responsio

*Bibl.*: AFH 23 (1930), 61; 42, 213 = text

Beatus vir... Homo quamdiu per contemplationem...

Ps. Bonaventura, In Psalterium: Paris BN 441, f. 6v-118v. (13c) — Oxford New Coll. 36

*Bibl.*: Li 31 = Michael Melden-  
sis — S. Bonaventurae Opera  
Omnia (ed. Vaticana 1588), I,  
90-162, 293-308

Beatus vir... Huic Psalmo non prae-  
mittitur titulus. Primo quia est  
titulus aliorum Psalmorum...

Radulphus Brito (?), Psalmi I-  
IV

*Bibl.*: Srb 7000

Beatus vir... Mente concipio laudes  
conscribere sacrae Virgini...

Joannes Pecham (?), Psalterium  
Mariae: Madrid Nac. 276, f. 2r-  
95v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933),  
348 — AFH 3 (1910), 334 —  
Gm 316 bd

Beatus vir... Quamvis B. Augustinus  
dicat David fuisse actorem...

Nicolaus de Lyra (?), Psalmi  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5854

Beatus vir... Quamvis Salvator suffi-  
cientissime et ordinatissime...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935),  
cxli

Beatus vir... Sciendum quod intentio  
Psalmorum est facere...

Ps. Odo Rigaldi, Postillae in  
Psalterium: Oxford Balliol 37 —  
*Investigate* Troyes 1369. (12-13c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 26 (1933), 542 —  
Gm 303 d — Ss I, 324; II, 296

Beatus vir... Sicut dixi plenius in expo-  
sitione litterali...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Psalmorum  
moralizatio: Klosterneuberg 373  
B, f. 159, 218v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 k — Srb 6949

Beatus vir... Solus Dominus noster  
Jesus Christus mediator Dei et ho-  
minum non abiit...

(Quidam OFM?), Postilla s. Psal-  
mos: Vat. Ottobon. 185, f. 196r-  
215v. (13c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 103

Beatus vir... Ubi advertendum quod  
ubi doctores habent notitiam...

Robertus Boyselii, Expos. Psal-  
morum: Graz Univ. 249, f. 134r-  
159v. (1358) — *olim* Vienna  
Dom. G 40

*Bibl.*: Gottlieb 342

Beatus vir cuius est nomen Domini...  
Cum, sicut vult B. Dionysius...

Bonaventura, In Ecclesiasten:  
*Investigate* Oxford Bodleian Jones  
19, f. 5. (c. 1300) [SC 8926]

*Bibl.*: Gm 305 g — S. Bonaven-  
turae Opera Omnia I, xiii; VI,  
3-99 — Srb 1773

Beatus vir qui in sapientia morabitur  
et qui in iustitia...

Joannes de Capistrano, Sermones:  
Cologne Staatsb. G. B. Qu 34,  
f. 178v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: CF 21 (1951), 90

Beatus vir qui inventus est... In Isaia  
dicitur: In Oriente...

Odo Rigaldi (?), Sermo: Paris  
BN 16502, f. 157r

Beatus vir qui suffert... In verbis istis  
quae recitantur ad commendatio-  
nem et gloriam...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935),  
cxli

Benedicat nos Dominus Deus... Di-  
citur: Quant fol voit cuir il demande  
coroies...

Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Ser-  
mo: Paris BN Nouv. Acq. 373,  
f. 107

*Bibl.*: Hn VI, 262

Benedicat tibi Dominus et custodiat  
te...

Franciscus Assisiensis, Verba  
Fra. Leoni

*Bibl.*: Brit Soc Fr St 17 (1931),  
11 — Fz St 36 (1954), 87

- Benedicite omnia... Hic consequenter...
- Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, In canticum Trium Puerorum  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 p
- Benedicta Dei providentia... Beati pacifici quoniam filii Dei...  
See 'Religiosae dominae et in Christo carissimae...'
- Benedicta tu inter mulieres... Post angelicam annuntiationem et Filii Dei...  
Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol, 11 (1935), cxli
- Benedictio est alicuius superioris cum prece devota...  
Joannes de Erfordia, Tabula utriusque iuris: Oxford Oriel 53. (13c) [*fragment*]  
*Bibl.*: Fz St 1 (1914), 289  
See 'Quoniam ut dicitur...'
- Benedictus qui venit... Carissimi, istud Evangelium quod hodie lectum est et legitur etiam in Ramis Palmarum...  
Guillelmus de Melitona, Sermones  
*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 545
- Benedictus qui venit... Postquam exposita sunt cantica V. Testamenti...  
Joannes Bloemendal de Colonia, Cantica N. Testamenti  
*Bibl.*: Srb 4243
- Benedictus qui venit... Quanto affectu patres nostri diem istum exspectaverunt...  
Antonius de Bitonto, Sermones: Munich Clm 18247  
*Bibl.*: FS 13 (1953), 197
- Benedictus qui venit... Verba haec exponuntur de adventu Christi...  
Gilbertus de Tornaco, Sermones  
*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 546 —  
— Ss I, 326
- Beneficentiae et communionis nolite oblivisci...
- Eustachius, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Gm 313 p
- Benignitas et humanitas Salvatnris nostri Dei apparuit...  
Vita S. Antonii de Padua  
*Bibl.*: Anton 6 (1931), 243-4, 20, 456, — CF 11 (1941), 130 —  
Misc Franc 30 (1930), 156
- Bernardinus confessor natione Tuscus ex nobili...  
Vita S. Bernardini de Senis  
*Bibl.*: Li 32
- Bernardo suo de Oriciellaris Fra. Bartholomaeus de Colle... Collegi, ut postulasti a me, quod divinis eloquiis...  
Bartholomaeus a Colle, De confessione: Florence Ricc. 1637, f. 50r-68v. (16c)
- Bernardus in quodam sermone...  
See 'Ascendens Jesus in naviculam...'
- Bernardus in quodam sermone...  
Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Praerogativae Mariae  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 bb — Ss II, 278
- Blanquerna alterius anachoritae petitionibus acquiescens...  
Raimundus Lull, De amico et amato  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 g
- Blanquerna igitur insistebat...  
Raimundus Lull, De amico et amato: olim Sorbonne A. h  
*Bibl.*: L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet...*, III, 114
- Bonam inspirationem...  
Guillelmus Nottingham, In Epistolas Pauli  
*Bibl.*: Li 32 — Pits 433 — Wadding 106
- Bonaventura, Doctor devotus, septimus Generalis Minister post B. Franciscum, volens Fratres suos docere...  
Bertramus de Ahlen, De investigatione Creatoris  
*Bibl.*: AFH 40 (1947), 12
- Boni et optimi viri...

- Robertus rex Siciliae, Sermo: Rome Angel, 151 (B.6.4), f. 304a. (14c)
- Bonitas est ens ratione cuius bonum agit bonum...
- Raimundus Lull (?), Ars respondendi: Vat. lat. 946, f. 92v. (1338-55) [Ars inventiva veritatis: *excerpta*]
- Bonorum honorabilium... Capitulum primum libri De anima declarat nobilitatem scientiae...
- Jacobus de Alexandria, De anima [*epitome*]: Vat. lat. 901, after f. 99r. (14c); 3060
- Bonorum honorabilium... Circa primum declarat...
- Jacobus de Alexandria, De anima: Madrid Nac. 3059, f. 135r-160v. (15c)
- Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 361
- Bonorum honorabilium... Hic incipit liber De anima...
- Nicolaus de Orbellis, De anima: Rome Angel. 127, f. 101-114. (15c)
- Bonorum honorabilium... Iste liber De anima dividitur in duas partes, scil. in partem prooemiale...
- Alexander de Alexandria, De anima
- Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 559
- See 'Interrogasti me... Ubi non est scientia...'
- Bonorum honorabilium... Liber iste cuius expositioni intendimus dividitur...
- Alexander de Alexandria, De anima
- Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 559 — Li 33
- Bonorum honorabilium... Quaeritur an de anima possit esse scientia...
- Henricus de Werl, De anima: Oxford Magdalen 63, f. 58
- Bonorum honorabilium... Quaeritur utrum potentiae cognoscantur per actus...
- Alexander de Hales (?), Quaestiones de anima: Cambridge Peterhouse 239, f. 1-40b (schema II)
- Bonum erat ei...
- Petrus Joannis Olivi, S. Matthaeum: Siena Com. U. V. 5. f. 55r-v. (15c) [*excerpt*]
- Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1936), 236
- Bonum est viro cum portaverit iugam Domini... Verbum est Jeremiae prophetae...
- Alexander de Hales, Sermo: Paris BN 16502, f. 116r
- Bibl.*: RTAM 6 (1934), 175
- Bonus homo de bono thesauro... In his verbis praedicator instruitur et B. Clemens congrue commendatur...
- Odo de Brueriis, Sermo: Paris BN 15005, f. 143
- Bibl.*: Hn IV, 210
- Bonus homo de bono thesauro... Verbum propositum non inconvenienter potest...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo
- Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
- Bonus pastor animam suam... Gloriosus pontifex Thomas et veri pontifici...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo
- Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli
- Bonus pastor animam suam... Inspiratio omnipotentis Dei gratiam... Hic duo tanguntur praedicatori...
- Quidam OFM, Sermo: Paris BN 14947, f. 45; 15005, f. 160
- Bibl.*: Hn IV, 249
- Bonus pastor animam suam... Inter alios sensus auditus est magis disciplinabilis...
- Guillelmus de Falgar, Sermo
- Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 550 — Gm 321 g
- Breve breviarium abbreviatum sufficit... De compositione metallorum. Incipiamus ergo compositionem...



Rogerus Bacon. Breviloquium alchimiae: Oxford Bodleian 607, f. 63. (15c); e Musaeo 155, p. 513. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Li 33 — Ss III, 68

Brevis in volatilibus apis... A tribus commendatur...

Joannes Rupella, Sermo: Florence Laur. Pl. 8 dext., 6

*Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1934), 540

## C

Caecus quidam sedebat... Quattuor ex causis contingit caecitas culpa in anima...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 116v-117. (13c)

Caeli enarrant...

Joannes Gavinetus, Opusculum

*Bibl.*: Wadding 140

Caeli gyrum circuivi sola...

See 'Gyrum caeli...'

Caeli rore fecundatus / Sacer ordo caelo datus...

Sequentia de S. Ludovico: Assisi Com. 330, f. 12. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 186-7

Caelorum candor splenduit... Deus, qui mira Crucis mysteria...

Suffragium S. Francisci: Washington Holy Name Coll. 21, f. 1v. (15c)

Caelum et terra transibunt...

Guillelmus de Barlo (?), Sermo

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 547-8 — Gm 314 a

Caelum mihi sedes est, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum...

Franciscus de Fabriano, De dignitate praelati: olim Fabriano

*Bibl.*: AFH 52 (1959), 156

Caespitat in phaleris hippos (?)...

Alexander de Hales (?), Dictionarium

*Bibl.*: Li 35 — Pits 316 — Wadding 10

Candida plebs fidelium / Cordis extolle iubilis / Festum quo visitatur...

Petrus de Candia, Officium Visitationis Mariae: Madrid Nac. 873 (C-167). 353 ff. (14-15c) — Florence Laur. S. Croce Pl. XXV sin., 9. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 10 — AFH 23 (1930), 172 — Arch Iber Amer 19 (1959), 318

Candor est lucis aeternae... Dei eminentiam, sapientiam et omnipotentiam, de quibus tribus agitur...

Guillelmus de Rubione, Sent.: ed. Paris 1518

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 125

Candor est lucis aeternae... Sicut lex sensibilis tamquam pulcherrima creaturarum corporalium...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Sermo: Munich Clm 8715, f. 77a. (14-15c) — Bologna Arch A. 1292, f. 78v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Roth 219 — Studi Franc 51 (1954), 232-3; 53, 6

Candor lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula...

Vita S. Agnetis de Praga

*Bibl.*: Brit Soc Fr St 7 (1915) = = text

Canon arabice latine norma...

Joannes de Porta, 30mm. Avicennae: Paris BN 6925

*Bibl.*: CF (Bibliographia Franc) 10 (1955-8), 32\*

Cantabo dilecto... Inter signa laetitiae...

Joannes Guallensis (?), In Cant. Canticorum

*Bibl.*: Li 34

Cantabo dilecto... Inter signa laetitiae et amoris potissimum...

Guillelmus de Melitona, In Cant. Canticorum

*Bibl.*: Srb 2937

Cantate Domino... Semper Dominus

ducit ad finem bonum id quod incipit...

Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Sermo: Paris BN 12419, f. 113

*Bibl.*: Hn II, 90

Cantemus Domino... Per hoc designatur...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, In Cant. Moysis

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 p — Srb 5864

Capite vobis vulpes...

Bonaventura (?), Sermo: Namur 117, f. 8v-10r. (15c)

Capitulum primum: Adam, Seth... In hoc primo libro usque ad decimum capitulum mihi non occurrit...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Paralipomenon moralizatio: Liège Univ. 215, f. 40vb; 45vb-52rb. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 738

Capitulum primum: Arphaxat itaque... Per istum qui multas gentes superaverat...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Moralizatio in Judith: Liège Univ. 215, f. 94va-98ra. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 738

Capitulum primum: Arphaxat itaque... Post historias Susannae...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Judith: Liège Univ. 216, f. 112vb-131ra. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 102

• Capitulum primum: De abstinence. Utantur divites consuetudine...

Joannes Guallensis (?), Manipulus florum (extractio)

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 85

Capitulum primum: Et factum est... Allegorice per Josue Christus significatur...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Moralizatio in Ezechielem: Liège Univ. 95, f. 177ra-181ra. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 108

Capitulum primum: Et factum est... In ista prima visione Ezechielis secundum sensum litteralem...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Moralizatio in Ezechielem: Liège Univ. 215, f. 68ra-84va. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 738

Capitulum primum: Et factum est... Post historiam libri Judith quantum...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Machabaeorum

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 107

Capitulum primum. Hic incipit Epistola Pauli ad Titum et dividitur in tres partes...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Titum

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 744-5

Capitulum primum: In anno primi Cyri... Cyrus iste figuram gessit nostri Salvatoris...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Moralizatio in 1. Esdrae: Liège Univ. 215, f. 52va-57ra; 57ra-63rb. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 738

Capitulum primum: In diebus... Illum ordinem quem tenui S. Scripturam exponendo litteraliter...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Moralizatio in Ruth: Liège Univ. 215, f. 63rb-67va

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 738

Capitulum primum: In diebus... Postquam descriptus est...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Esther: Liège Univ. 216, f. 133ra-144ra. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 103

Capitulum primum: In diebus... Secundum Hebraeos iste fuit...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Moralizatio in Ruth: Liège Univ. 95, f. 185vb-186va. (15c)

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 108

Capitulum primum: Paulus Apostolus... Haec Epistola Pauli ad Galatas in tres partes dividitur...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Galatas

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 743; 745

Capitulum primum: Paulus Apostolus... Hic incipit Epistola ad Colossenses et dividitur in tres partes...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Colossenses

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 745

Capitulum primum: Paulus Apostolus... Hic incipit Epistola ad Ephesios quae dividitur in tres partes...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in Ephesios

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 743; 745

Capitulum primum: Paulus Apostolus... Hic incipit Epistola ad Timotheum prima quae dividitur in duas...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in I ad Timotheum

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 744; 745

Capitulum primum: Paulus Apostolus... Hic incipit Epistola ad Timotheum quae dividitur in tres partes...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in II ad Timotheum

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 744; 745

Capitulum primum: Paulus et Silvanus... Incipit Epistola prima ad Thessalonicenses quae primo dividitur...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in ad Thessalonicenses

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 743; 745

Capitulum primum: Paulus et Timotheus... Hic continenter incipit Epistola Pauli ad Philippenses quae dividitur...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Postilla in ad Philippenses

*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912), 743; 745

Capitulum primum: Vir erat... Philosophus I Ethicorum, tetragono comparat...

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*Bibl.*: AFH 5 (1912) 739

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*Bibl.*: *Documenta antiqua Franciscana*, Quaracchi 1901

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Ps. Raimundus Lull, De secreto scientiae Jo. Evangelistae

*Bibl.*: Srb 7156, 7 — Li 34 — Gm 335 md

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Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxli

Carissimi, sicut dicit Doctor de Lyra...

Michael de Hungaria (OP? OFM?), Sermones: London BM Royal 8 A, iv, f. 71. (15c)

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Bonaventura, Epistolae

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 169

Carissimo meo Fra. Antonio Fra. Franciscus... Placet mihi quod sacram theologiam Fratribus legas...

Franciscus Assisiensis (?), Epist. ad S. Antonium Patav.

*Bibl.*: H. Boehmer, Tübingen 1930, 48 = text

Carissimus Frater noster Paulus secundum datam sibi... Magister Sententiarum...

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*Bibl.*: Srb 2469; 2470 — Ss I, 324
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*Bibl.*: Roth 234
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 (Quidam OFM?), Expos. 10 praeceptorum: Florence Ricc. 470, f. 2r-9r. (15c)  
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*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 27 (1927), 69 ss
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 ut videmus...  
 Franciscus de Padua, Breviloquium de epidemia: Florence Ricc. 723 (N. II. 9), f. 47r-68v. (1456)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 3 (1910), 337 — Ss I, 269
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*Bibl.*: AFH 23 (1930), 179-180 = text
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*Bibl.*: Ss I, 75
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*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 250
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vare promittimus et ipsam serva-  
mus...

De praeceptis Regulae OFM

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Henricus Pisanus, Sequentia

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 359

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gulariter insignitis...

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carissimi; dicit enim B. Augusti-  
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*Bibl.*: Ss II, 140 (= Jo. de Wer-  
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sionem tria introduxit B. Petrus...

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*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935),  
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latum...

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sione Domini

*Bibl.*: Li 35 — Ss I, 178 — S. Bo-  
naventurae Opera Omnia VIII,  
152

See 'Domine, labia mea aperies...  
Christum captum...'

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lus ad Hebraeos dicit illa verba de  
Domine Jesu...

Ps. Bonaventura, Expositio Mis-  
sae

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bonorum... In Evangelio hodierno  
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Ricardus Porland, Sermones

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Hugo de Hertipol, Sermo: Worcester Cath. Q. 46, f. 159v-162r

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*Bibl.*: AFH 7 (1914), 531

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Franciscus de Mayronis, De articulis Fidei: Vat. lat. 4307, f. 30r-35r

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Ps. Bonaventura, De confessione  
*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia IX, 30

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*Bibl.*: Anton 25 (1950), 154-5  
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(Quidam OFM?), De correctione fraterna: Siena Com. U. V. 5, f. 26v-28r. (15c)

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Joannes Rodington, Quaestiones ordinariae

*Bibl.*: Pits 462 — Wadding 151

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Guillelmus Ockham, Notabilia Praedicatorum: Vat. Borgh. 151, f. 8r. (14c)

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Franciscus de Mayronis, De dilectione amicorum et inimicorum: Copenhagen kgl. 3392, f. 189-198

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Joannes Duns Scotus, Additiones secundae II Sent.

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*Bibl.*: Roth 211 — Studi e Testi 122 (1946), 447

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Rogerus de Marston, Disputatio: Assisi Com. 158 — Florence Laur. Conv. Soppr. 123. (13-14c)

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*Bibl.*: Ss II, 61

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Guillelmus de Alnwick, Quaestiones theologicae: Assisi Com. 166. 66 ff. (14c) — Vat. lat. 1012, f. 1r-39r. (14c)

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Gonsalvus Hispanus, Contra errores P. Jo. Olivi

*Bibl.*: AFH 42 (1949), 215 — Bibl Franc Schol 9 (1935), xlvii

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Petrus Joannis Olivi, Postilla s. Lamentationes

*Bibl.*: AFH 28 (1935), 166 — Gm 327 j — Ss II, 343 — Srb 6695

Circa formalitates Doctoris subtilis Scoti quaeritur utrum illa quae distinguuntur formaliter...

Antonius Sirectus, Formalitates moderniores: ed. Bologna after 1484

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Joannes Rodington, Sent.

*Bibl.*: Pits 462 — Wadding 151

Circa hanc tertiam distinctionem ubi Magister agit de qualitatibus carnis B. Virginis...

Henricus de Werl, III Sent.: Karlsruhe Landesb. Reichenau 34, f. 233-268

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 128

Circa has distiones...

Joannes de Marchia (de Ripa?), Quaestiones Sent.

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 35 (1935), 41

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Alexander de Villa Dei (OFM?), Massa compoti: Paris BN 4720 B, f. 1

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vitae et Regulae...  
Ubertinus de Casali, Rotulus  
*Bibl.*: Li 37
- Circa influentiam...  
Rogerus Bacon, De multiplicacione specierum  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 207
- Circa istam quaestionem qua quaeritur  
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extra animam fuerunt duae opiniones...
- Petrus Joannis Olivi (?), Quaestio:  
Vat. Borgh. 322, f. 195v-198r. (13-14c)
- Circa istum Prologum quaero primo de  
materia conceptuum. Et circa hoc  
quaero quattuor quaestiones...  
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*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 420
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*Bibl.*: Fz St 39 (1957), 26
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si homo non peccasset Filius Dei  
incarnatus fuisset...  
Robertus Cowton, III-IV Sent.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 29 (1936), 412
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Petrus Joannis Olivi, Lamentationes  
*Bibl.*: AFH 28 (1935), 164  
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Jeremiae...'
- Circa librum Elenchorum primo videndum  
an notitia syllogismorum  
sophisticorum sit vera scientia...  
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*Bibl.*: RTAM 2 (1930), 163
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*Bibl.*: AFH 41 (1948), 252
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veritates...  
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contemplari nos faciat...  
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Vitalis a Furno, De usu paupere  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 161 — AFH 10  
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Circa materiam de usu paupere est  
sciendum quod paupertas...

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Franciscus de Mayronis, De vir-  
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gesimale: *olim* Vienna Dom. M 67  
*Bibl.*: Gottlieb 374 — Wadding  
184

Circa praedicta dubitatur de princi-  
pio individuationis. Quid est illud  
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sionem: utrum solo Deo sit fruen-  
dum...

Franciscus Rubei de Marchia,  
Principia (?) Sent. I-II  
*Bibl.*: Src 238

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Sententiarum quaeritur utrum crea-  
tio sit possibilis...

(Quidam OFM?), II Sent.: Flo-

rence Naz. Conv. Sopp. D. 6. 359  
*Bibl.*: Studi Franc 8 (1922), 316  
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Sententiarum quaeritur utrum Sa-  
cramenta sint recipienda...

Franciscus de Mayronis (?), IV  
Sent.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 115 —  
Src 224

Circa primam partem Prologi ad mo-  
dum Lombardi magistri primo quae-  
ro istam quaestionem...

Joannes Duns Scotus (?), Col-  
lationes: Oxford Magdalen 194.  
(14c), f. 61-80 [Parisienses]; 80-  
96 [Oxonieneses]  
*Bibl.*: Src 1207 — AFH 47  
(1954), 412

Circa primam quaestionem Meta-  
physicae Antonii Andreae quae  
multas in se continet difficultates...

Joannes Foxalls (OFM?) Quae-  
siones: Rome S. Isidoro 1/14,  
f. 61r

Circa primum articulum sic est pro-  
cedendum. Primo dicendum est  
circa maximum talium divisionum...

Rogerus Rosetus, De maximo et  
minimo: Venice S. Marco Cl. XI,  
14, f. 55-66. (1391); XI, 20,  
f. 121-138. (15c)

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utrum creatio sit de materia vel de  
Deo...

Franciscus de Marchia, IV Sent.:  
*olim* Turin Naz. CXLIV. e. IV. 6.  
93 ff. (14c)

Circa primum notandum quod diver-  
simode describitur philosophia...

Joannes Guallensis, Floriloquium:  
Cracow Jagiell. 693. AA VII 27,  
p. 419-520. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Li 39

Circa primum principium complexum  
negando quaeritur utrum de quo-  
libet affirmare vel negare et de  
nullo...

- Franciscus de Mayronis, I Sent., D. 1-37: Padua Univ. 1258 — Rome Angel. 953, f. 1-25a. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 415
- Circa primum IV libri quaero utrum aliqua virtus sacramentalis possit cooperari instrumentaliter...  
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*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 351
- Circa I Sententiarum primo quaeritur de sacra doctrina quantum ad causas singulares...  
 Ricardus de Mediavilla, I Sent. *Bibl.*: Ss III, 46
- Circa I Sententiarum primo quaeritur utrum summe simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius cognitionis...  
 Guillelmus de Brena, Sent.: Prague Univ. 1568. VII. F. 14.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 122 — Src 1287
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*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 19 (1959), 309 = Guil. de Rubione
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 Joannes de Ripa, III Sent.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 140
- Circa principium huius primi libri in quo loquitur Magister de scientia theologiae sunt quattuor inquirenda...  
 Franciscus de Mayronis, Sent. I, Qq. 1-32  
*Bibl.*: Src 220
- Circa principium II libri quaero primo utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo...  
 Franciscus Rubeus de Marchia, Quaestiones II Sent.  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 258
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*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 141; 415
- Circa principium Sententiarum quaeritur utrum primum principium complexum possit formari in theologia...  
 Franciscus de Mayronis, I Sent. *Bibl.*: Roth 105
- Circa prologum in prima quaestione arguitur quod nulla sit veritas nota...  
 Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Animadversione in I Sent. Assisi Com. 132, f. 298r  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 144
- Circa prologum in quo agitur primo de necessitate theologiae caelitus nobis revelatae sciendum...  
 Nicolaus de Orbellis, Compendium I-III Sent.: Bologna Univ. 1114 (600)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 48-9
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 Joannes Duns Scotus, Opus Parisiense  
*Bibl.*: Gm 344 0 — Src 425
- Circa prologum libri Sententiarum quaeritur primo utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam...  
 Antonius Andreae, I-IV Sent.: Oxford Merton 87, f. 147-258  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 101-2
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*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 47 (1947), 493
- Circa prologum I libri Sententiarum quaero istam quaestionem utrum facultas theologiae sit...

Henricus de Werl, I Sent.

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 127 —  
Src 343

Circa prologum I libri Sententiarum  
quaero primo utrum sit possibile  
intellectui viatoris habere notitiam...

Guillelmus Ockham, Sent.

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 124 —  
Src 294 — France Franc 23  
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Circa prologum I Sententiarum primo  
quaeritur utrum homini pro statu  
isto sit necessarium aliquam doctri-  
nam...

Antonius Andreae, Sent.: Rome  
Angel. 1173 — Tours 359, f. 1-  
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*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 169 —  
Wadding 24 — Src 840 = Theo-  
baldus de N.

Circa prologum I Sententiarum quaero  
istam quaestionem utrum in aliqua  
intellectuali essentia generari...

Franciscus Toti de Perusio, Sent.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 31 (1938), 185; 47,  
116 — Src 236

Circa prologum quaeritur primo de  
cognitione abstractiva...

Abbreviationes Petri Aureoli:  
Clermont 109

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 152 —  
Src 662 — Gm 351 m

Circa prologum Sententiarum primo  
quaeritur utrum cum summa sim-  
plicitate subiecti theologiae...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Confla-  
tus Sent.

*Bibl.*: Src 219

Circa prologum utrum homini pro  
statu isto sit necessaria aliqua  
doctrina...

Joannes Duns Scotus, I Sent.:  
Valencia Cath. 83, f. 3r. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 33 (1936),  
177-8

Circa prooemium libri Sententiarum  
quaero primo utrum primum prin-  
cipium complexum possit formari...

Franciscus de Mayronis, I Sent.:

Valencia Cath. 265, f. 1r-170v  
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Circa prooemium I libri Magistri  
Sententiarum quaero primo...

Franciscus de Mayronis, Sent.

*Bibl.*: Roth 105

Circa prooemium I libri Sententia-  
rum primo quaero utrum primum  
principium complexum possit for-  
mari...

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cipium complexum possit formari  
in theologia...

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103 [*excerpt*]

*Bibl.*: Srb 228

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nota quod Christus descendit in  
carnem...

Michael Gallus (?), De 42 man-  
siones filiorum Israel

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 256

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Joannes Michaelis, Tractatus:  
Vat. Borgh. 54, f. 89v. (14c) —  
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*Bibl.*: AFH 46 (1953), 343-4 —  
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Circa quaestionem de unitate for-  
marum probatur quod est tantum  
una forma substantialis...

Ricardus de Mediavilla, Quae-  
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81b. (14c) — Florence Laur.  
Pl. XVII sin., 7, f. 99v [Guill.  
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*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 7 (1932),  
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Circa quaestionem de univocatione

- respectu Dei et creaturarum est sciendum quod quidam ponentes...  
 Petrus Sutton, Quaestio: Vat. Ottobon. 215, f. 170a-172a  
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 Petrus Joannis Olivi (?), Quaestio: Vat. Borgh. 88, f. 5v-7r. (13-14c)  
 Circa IV librum quaeritur utrum in Sacramentis sit aliqua virtus supernaturalis sine eis formaliter inhaerens...  
 Franciscus Rubeus de Marchia, Quaestiones Sent.  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 258  
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 (Quidam OFM?), Exempla virtutum et vitiorum: Siena Com. G. VI. 24, f. 83a-115b. (15c)  
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 Nicolaus de Lyra, S. Psalmo 'Beati immaculati': Monte-Casino 207 (text. 207, 540, int. 944) Pl. K, p. 95. (14-15c)  
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 Raimundus Lull, Lectura s. Ar.  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 13 — Wadding 198
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 Ps. Guillelmus de Vorillon, Quodlibeta  
*Bibl.*: Fz St 8 (1921), 59  
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*Bibl.*: AFH 25 (1932), 268  
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 Franciscus de Mayronis, De articulis Fidei: Munich Clm 8434, f. 155b-157c  
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 Circa secundam particulam istius sermonis restat insistere circa signa originis...  
 Franciscus de Mayronis, Replikationes: Vat. Borgh. 39, f. 299-304r, 323r-328r, 340v-341v. (14c)  
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(Petrus Aureoli), Distinctio XXXIII: Oxford Balliol 63, f. 54v-56v. (14c)

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Matthias Doering, De Regula OFM: Naples Naz. VII. A. 34, f. 60r-63v. (15c)

Circa III librum quaeritur utrum si homo non peccasset Filius Dei incarnatus fuisset...

Joannes de Berwick, III Sent.: Assisi Com. 158

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 134 — Src 408

Circa III librum quaero utrum Verbum divinum absque contradictione potuerit assumere individuum generis...

Franciscus Rubeus de Marchia, Principium III Sent.: Madrid Nac. 504, f. 19r — Vat. lat. 869

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Antonius a S. Leone (? OFM?), Lectura Scoti: Vat. Urbin. 534, f. 2. (15c)

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Franciscus de Mayronis, De oboedientia: Bologna Arch. A. 1292, f. 99v. (15c) [*incomplete*]

Circa tria principaliter versabatur dispositio. Primum circa Deum creatorem, secundum circa Christum...

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*Bibl.*: AFH 26 (1923), 481

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Petrus Joannis Olivi, De contractibus: Siena Com. U. V. f. 295r (15c) — *Investigate* Oxford Bodleian 52, f. 61. (c. 1420-30)  
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Circa Virginis Matris praeconia...

Utrum Mater Domini fuerit concepta in peccato originali...

Franciscus de Mayronis, De Immac. Conceptione Mariae  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 287 — Roth 220

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See 'Circuivi mare et aridam...'

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 Hymnus de S. Clara: Assisi Com. 338, f. 84. (13-14c)  
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*Bibl.*: Li 40
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 Vita Odorici de Portu Naonis  
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- Bonaventura de Iseo, Compostella: Florence Ricc. 119, f. 142va-166ra. (15c) — Assisi Com. 292. 75 ff. (15c) — Bologna Arch A. 1417. 126 ff. (15c)
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- Bibl.*: Misc Franc 36 (1936), 485 = text
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- Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 176-8
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- Joannes de Capistrano, Excommunicationes
- Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 177-8
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- Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 117-118. (13c)
- Confidimus in Domino Jesu Christo quia qui coepit in nobis opus bonum... Circa quod tria in quo sit...
- Joannes de Capistrano, Sermones: Capistrano XXIX, f. 1r
- Bibl.*: Misc Franc 27 (1927), 57
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*Bibl.*: Gm 345 p  
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 Alexander (de Hales?), Glossae: Würzburg Univ. 163  
*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 536  
 Confiteor tibi, Pater... Perfectio integri hominis attenditur quoad triplicem comparisonem...  
 Alexander de Hales (?), Sermo  
*Bibl.*: AFH 58 (1965), 551  
 Confortamini, carissimi, et gaudete in Domino, nec quia pauci estis...  
 Ps. Franciscus Assisiensis, Collationes monasticae  
*Bibl.*: Francisci Assis. Opera, Lyons 1653, 42  
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*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia IX, 29  
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 Nicolaus de Lyra, II Paralipomenon moralizatio  
*Bibl.*: Srb 5942 — Gm 345 k  
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 Nicolaus de Lyra, II Paralipomenon Postilla: Liège Univ. 75, f. 226rb-252ra. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 4 (1911), 593 — Srb 5842 — Gm 345 f  
 Confortatus est... Secundus liber Paralipomenon agit de regno ex paterna successione...  
 Pontius Carbonelli, II Paralipomenon  
*Bibl.*: Srb 6985, 13  
 Congregate illi sanctos... Volens petere orationes alicuius religionis, quia difficile est de magno conventu...  
 Nicolaus de Byard (OFM?), Sermo: Paris BN 12419, f. 106  
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 Congregentur aquae sub caelo... Quia propter labilitatem...  
 Philippus de Monte Calerio, Postilla s. Evangelia: London BM Royal 10 C. vii. (15c) — *olim* Arezzo Bibl.) FM  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 3 (1888), 75  
 See 'Maria Magdalena... Nos videmus...'  
 Conquestus mecum es...

Guillelmus de Savona, Harenga  
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Clm 5238. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Lg 266

Conscientia est habitus ipsius intel-  
lectus...

Raimundus Lull, De gradibus  
conscientiae

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 24

Consequenter de numero aliquantu-  
lum similiter prout ad principale  
intentum sufficienter explicemus...

Ps. Rogerus Bacon, De musica:  
Milan Ambros. R 47 Sup., f. 43.  
(13c)

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 69

Consequenter dicendum est de rore  
quod habet aliud eum pluvia et  
pruina...

Raimundus Lull (?), Meteorolo-  
gica: Toulouse 220. (14c) [*frag-  
ment*]

Consequenter quaeritur circa IV Sen-  
tentiarum...

Quidam OFM, Disputatio: Oxford  
Bodleian Hamilton 17, f. 176b.  
(15c) (SC 24447)

Consequenter quaeritur de modo  
S. Scripturae et quaeritur utrum  
modus in S. Scriptura sit artifi-  
cialis...

Alexander de Hales (?), De modo  
S. Scripturae: Vat. lat. 782, after  
f. 185v-186v. (13c)

Consequenter quia in aliquibus prae-  
missis capitulis sive titulis nonnulla  
reperiuntur...

Astesanus de Asta, Tabula: Va-  
lencia Cath. 222, f. 339r-348v —  
Klosterneuberg 134, f. 349-367v.  
(15c); 198, f. 126-142v. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 33 (1936),  
207 — CF 13 (1943), 43

Conservat...

Bartholomaeus Albisius de Pisis,  
Quadragesimale

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 116 — Anal Franc  
5 (1912), cxx

Considerandum autem quod alia...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Sermo

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 n

Considerandum est de canonibus poe-  
nitentialibus. Ad quorum intelli-  
gentiam praenotandum est...

Astesanus de Asta, Canones poe-  
nitentiales: ed. Venice 1479/80

Considerandum est pro IV quaestione  
I Distinctionis I libri Scoti...

(Quidam OFM?), De duplici prin-  
cipio: Rome Angel. 563, f. 35-39.  
(1465)

Considerandum est quod Scriptura  
divina potest dividi in octo princi-  
pales...

Petrus Aureoli, Divisio S. Scri-  
pturae: Oxford New Coll. 15

*Bibl.*: Srb 6415, 1 — Gm 351 h  
— Li 44

Considerans non parvam utilitatem  
me posse facere volentibus intelli-  
gere doctrinam...

Joannes de Anglia (OFM?), I  
Sent. Scoti: Padua Univ. 1560,  
f. 50-70

*Bibl.*: Src 400

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Raimundus Lull, Compendium  
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f. 5. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Franc Stud 12 (1952), 382

Consideravi tribulationes...

Joannes de Rupescissa, L. lucis:  
Manchester Ryland's 65

*Bibl.*: AFH 20 (1927), 306

Consilium est de faciendis arduis et  
perfectis...

Joannes de Rupella, Summa de  
consiliis: Escorial ç. IV. 2, f. 21v.  
(14c)

Consilium postulatur quid incumbit  
patri erga filium quem in adulte-  
rio... Ad quod breviter responde-  
tur...

Joannes de Capistrano, Consilium

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 188

- Consolationes et dona Dei in anima operantur in anima sicut cibus in corpore...  
 Quidam OFM, Dicta: Florence Ricc. 2959, f. 121r-122r. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 9 (1916), 438
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 Henricus de Balma (OFM?), Soliloquium animae  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 354 — AFH 50 (1957), 284
- Conspargere cinere, luctum unigeniti fac tibi... Cinere in capite mentis conspergimur dum incinerationis...  
 Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 128-129. (13c)
- Conspiciens in circuitu librorum magnitudinem studentium taedium in animo constituentem...  
 Sanctes de Salvis, Compendium logicae  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 84. Compare Franc Std 12 (1952), 382 = Paulus Venetus
- Constitues eos principes... Contingit aliquando aliquos de statu paupertatis sublimiter exaltatos...  
 Quidam OFM, Sermo: Paris BN 14947, f. 240; 15005, f. 124  
*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 245
- Constituimus te hodie summum sacerdotem...  
 Bartholomaeus de Bononia, Sermo: Troyes 951, f. 66  
*Bibl.*: RTAM 16 (1949), 54 — Gm 319 c — AFH 27 (1934), 550
- Consuluit quidam clericus non excessivae quamvis (forsitan) mediocris litteraturae...  
 Joannes Bremer, S. officio praedicationis  
*Bibl.*: CF 22 (1952), 180 ss — Studi Franc 16 (41) (1944), 43 ss
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 Joannes Guallensis, Sermo: Cambridge Trinity B. 15. 38, f. 204v-210  
*Bibl.*: CF (Bibliographia Franc) 10 (1955-8), 241\*
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 In his verbis quae ad litteram de iusto afflicto...  
 Guillelmus de Melitona, Job  
*Bibl.*: Srb 2932 — Gm 304 f — AFH 27 (1934), 544
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 Collectio Fratrum (OFM?): Paris BN 15958, f. 273; 18193, after f. 158  
*Bibl.*: Hn VI, 75
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 Raimundus Lull, De gradibus conscientiae  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 br
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 Ps. Bonaventura, De gradibus contemplationis: Madrid Nac. 9536, f. 80vb-85vb. (14c) — London BM Royal 8 F. xiv, f. 138b. (13c) — Paris BN 15363, f. 206 — Malines Sem. 24, f. 66r-68v. (15-16c) — *olim* Turin Naz. DCLXIV. d. I. 31, f. 122. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 325 — Gm 116 g; 305 da — Wadding 48 — Ss I, 166 s.n. Humbertus Romanus — Rev Neoscol Phil 36 (1934), 180 ss — CF 8 (1938), 119 Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 282 — S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia VIII, cxiv
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 Quidam OFM, Collecta miraculorum: Upsala C. 181, f. 105r-139r. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Anton 20 (1945), 457



Contingit mihi, meritissime Antistes...  
Postquam ad tuae celsitudinis...  
Nostrae deitatis...

Georgius Benignus, Contemplationes vexilli Fidei: Vienna NB 4797, f. 2a-4ob. (16c)

Contingit quod sedens in choro Fratrum Praedicatorum Avenione...

Ps. Raimundus Lull, De conceptione Virginali

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 7; 35 — Gm 335 kb

Contingit quod vitare volens errorem aliquando dilabatur in errata...

Guillelmus Ockham, De potestate Ecclesiae

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 345

Contra Fra. (Petrus) Joannis de Narbona OFM invehitur a quibusdam quod dixit nefandas haereses...

Ubertinus de Casali, Defensio P. Joannis Olivi: Florence Laur. S. Croce Pl. XXXI sin., 3. f. 160d-170a. (14c)

*Bibl.*: AFH II (1918), 261 — Ss III, 150

Contra illos inimicos S. Ecclesiae...

Augustinus Righini, Tractatus

*Bibl.*: Wadding 34

Contra peccatum simpliciter... Obstericante manu eius eductus...

Ps. Antonius de Padua, Concordantiae Bibliae: *Investigate* London BM Royal 4 E. v, f. 350. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Srb 1382 — Anton 6 (1931), 297

Contra primum articulum...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, De superstitionibus

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 be

Contra quaedam quae videntur excusare ab omni haeresi doctrinam Fra. Petri Joannis...

Bertrandus de Turre, Contra excusationem P. Joannis

*Bibl.*: Gm 349d — Ss I, 146 — AFH 27 (1934), 416

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*Bibl.*: CF 15 (1945), 21; 72-82 == text

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Gonsalvus Hispanus, Responsio ad Replicatio Ubertini

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 9 (1935), xlvii

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Ubertinus de Ilia, Transgressionibus Regulae, etc.

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 50; 152

Contra quosdam...

Communitatis Responsio ad Ubertini Replicationes

*Bibl.*: AFH 42 (1949), 214

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Raimundus Lull, Dictatum de Trinitate

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 ik

Contradictio in Deo non est...

Guillelmus Ockham, Dialectica nova

*Bibl.*: Li 46 — Wadding 107 — Pits 458

Convenit strenuis pugilibus...

Joannes de Capistrano, Contra Hissitas

*Bibl.*: Fz St (1930), 223

Convertantur peccatores in infernum per considerationem...

Nicolaus Lobalde, De poenis inferni: Milan Ambros. A. 93 Inf., f. 79c-91b. (13-14c) — *Investigate* Bologna A. 95, f. 132v

*Bibl.*: AFH 27 (1934), 552

Convertere, anima mea, in requiem meam...

Ps. Bonaventura, Laudatorium

*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia IX, 26

Convertere, anima mea, in requiem tuam... Et ecce occurrit mihi...

Helwicus, Denarius

- Bibl.*: AFH 4 (1911), 376 — Anton 1 (1926), 470
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- Hugo de Prato (OFM?), Sermo-  
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- Petrus Baedelli (OFM?), Quadra-  
gesimale  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 5 (1890), 182;  
184
- Convertimini ad me... Adiuvā nos,  
Deus, ad hanc conversionem...
- Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo:  
Klosterneuberg 450, f. 129v-  
130v. (13c)
- Convertimini ad me... His verbis post  
horrenda...
- Adam Sasbouth, Homiliae duae  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 6
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dum est quod hodie dimissum est...
- Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo:  
Klosterneuberg 450, f. 130v-  
131. (13c)
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quae conversionem impediunt...
- Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo:  
Klosterneuberg 450, f. 129r-v.  
(13c)
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tempus versatur circa conversio-  
nem peccatorum...
- Jacobus de Marchia, Sermones:  
Rome Angel. 187, f. 3a-5c. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 46 (1953), 305 =  
= Quidam Augustinus
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catoris...
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*Bibl.*: S. Bernardini Opera Omnia  
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vestro...
- Henricus a Monte Jardino Ge-  
nuensis, Quadragesimale (II)  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 113 — Ss I, 359
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solyms ne discederent... Consuevit  
aliquis, consolari parentes...
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- Secundum aliam litteram...
- Joannes de Capistrano, De con-  
tritione  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 175
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294a. (14c)
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Dominis Nicolao episcopo Hosti-  
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*Bibl.*: Srb 6734 = Petrus de Bo-  
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cisci celebrantur...
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sisi Com. 148, f. 86. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 503
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necessaria...
- Bertholdus de Ratisbona, Rusti-  
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et de sequentibus...
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thios Postilla  
*Bibl.*: Srb 6717 — Gm 327 0 —  
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- Daniel Agricola, Corona mystica  
BV Mariae  
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*Bibl.*: AFH 28 (1935), 426
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 (Quidam OFM?), Corona BV Mariae: Madrid Nac. 17674, f. 11-18v. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 397
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*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxlii
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 Hugo (Andreas?) de Novo Castro, II Sent.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 129
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 Simon de Lens, II Sent.: Todi 120  
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*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 111
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- Credo in unum Deum...  
 (Quidam OFM?), Expos. Symboli: Brussels 5138-41 (1108), f. 57v-98v. (13c)
- Credo videre bona Domini in terra viventium... De gloria igitur Paradisi locuturi...  
 Silvester de Denis, Sermo: Naples Naz. VII. E. 31, f. 11r-12v. (15c)
- Credo vos, Patres clarissimi...  
 Albertus e Sartiano, De Eucharistia  
*Bibl.*: Li 48 — Wadding 8
- Crescente religione Christiana, Dei Filius, via veritatis et vitae, qui revelat secreta...  
 (Quidam OFM?), Sermo: Venice S. Marco XXI, 116 (Z. L. CCCLVI), f. 343-347. (13c)
- Crescit in templum sanctum in Domino... Grande hoc festum et laetitia in militanti Ecclesia fit...  
 Quidam OFM, Sermo: Padua Univ. 2065, f. 132r-135v. (15c)
- Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram... Quamvis Deus hoc dixit ad filios hominum...  
 Quidam OFM, Tractatus  
*Bibl.*: Fz St 23 (1936), 113 = text
- Cruci Christi mons Alvernae / Recenset mysteria...  
 Gerardus Odonis, Hymnus de Stigmatibus S. Francisci: Rome Naz. Vitt. Eman. 743, f. 92. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 192-3 = text
- Crucifixo affixus quia Crucifixum dilexisti. Te crucifixum cum illo opus est quia Eius es...  
 Jacobus de Marchia, Epistola ad Jo. de Capistrano  
*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 95-7 = text



Crucis arma fulgentia / Vidit Franciscus dormiens...

Gerardus Odonis, Hymnus de Stigmatibus S. Francisci:

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 38 (1938), 193 — Ss I, 177 — AFH I (1908), 433; 440

Crucis Christi mons Alvernae...

Hymnus Stigmatum S. Francisci: Florence Ricc. 232, f. 290. (15c); 284, after f. 466r. (15c) — Venice S. Marco I, 57 (L. I. LXI)

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 177 — AFH I (1908), 433; 430

See 'Cruci Christi mons Alvernae...'

Crucis vox hunc alloquitur...

Gerardus Odonis, Officium de Stigmatibus S. Francisci

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 324-5

Crucis Christi in altum...

Antonius, Conclusio de signo Crucis: Mons de la ville 34/356 (227), f. 122r. (15-16c)

Cui comparabo te et cui... Consuetudo est in praedicationibus rogare Virginem Mariam...

Franciscus de Mayronis (?), Sermo: Bologna Coll. di Spagna 54, f. 2r-20r. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 17 (1942), 119

Cuidam diviti civi Lugdunensi cui nomen erat Valdensis...

David (de Augsburg?), De inquisitione haereticorum: Munich Clm 15312 — Stuttgart Theol. Quarto 125

*Bibl.*: AFH 18 (1925), 144; 146 — Gm 6 dw = Ps. Albertus Magnus

Cuidam Fratri conquerenti sibi quod Guardianus...

Aegidius Assisiensis, Gesta et dicta

*Bibl.*: Li 48

Cuidam ruralium...

Joannes Pecham, De iudiciis

*Bibl.*: Pits 381 — Wadding 147

Cuilibet volenti requirere concordantiae... A, A, A, Domine Deus...

Arlottus de Prato, Concordantiae Bibliorum: Assisi Com. 64, 400 ff. (14c) — Alcobaça VIII/439, f. 1. (14c) — Valencia Cath. 84. (13-14c); 90. 383 ff. (14c) —

Douai 61. (1424-8) — Arras 931. 285 ff. (14c) — Saint Omer 28. (13c); 52. (15c) — Escorial a

I. 12. (14c) — London BM Royal 4 E. v, f. 4. (14c) — Monte-

Cassino 61, p. 1. (14c); 62, p. 1. (13c) — Oxford New Coll. 69;

Bodleian 275. (c. 1400) — Venice S. Marco I, 143. 405 ff. (14c) —

*olim* Arezzo Frat. dei Laici — St. Martin, Dover, a.d. 1389

*Bibl.*: James, 437 — Ss I, 101-2 — Anton 6 (1931), 319-320 — Li

48 — Misc Franc 3 (1888), 75 — Arch Iber Amer 33 (1936), 178

Cuiuslibet latitudinis incepte...

Joannes de Casali (OFM?), Quaestio: Vienna NB 4217, f. 154a-172a, 231a-235b. (15c)

*Bibl.*: T-K 126

Culmine horis spreto...

Simon Simeonis, Itinerarium

*Bibl.*: Li 48

Cum a Deo Patre luminum a quo omne donum optimum et datum perfectum est et descenditur...

Paulus a Gualdo, L. historiarum: Assisi Com. 341. 137 ff. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 2 (1887), 21-2 = = cod. Assisi 841; 33, 216 ss.

See 'Incipit tractatus assumptus de sacris...'

Cum a iure...

Joannes Pecham, De filiis presbyterorum

*Bibl.*: Pits 381 — Wadding 147

Cum a reverendo Patre et domino Dom. Joanne S. Theodori Diacono Cardinali...

Andreas de Perusio, Contra edi-

- ctum Bavari: Venice S. Marco VIII. 129, f. 165-184. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 38
- Cum ad nos venisti, dilectissime fili ac princeps, in tali passu ac mortis articulo...
- Raimundus Lull, Testamentum: Toledo Cath. 96-39, f. 11-106. (16c) — Florence Ricc. 669, f. 99r-133r. (15c); 923, f. 268r-293v. (16c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 3 (1910), 335; 555 — *Estudis Franc* 46 (1934), 371
- Cum ad notitiam impressionem habendam...
- Rogerus Bacon (?), *Meteora*: Oxford Bodleian Digby 190, f. 38-43r. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 72
- Cum ad sanctam Fidem Catholicam possint reduci faciliter infideles...
- Raimundus Lull, *Ars theologiae et philosophiae*: Rome Naz. Vitt. Eman. Fond. minori 1832, f. 11-199v. (16c)  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 eo — *Estudis Franc* 46 (1934), 264
- Cum adversus amplissimae gloriae...
- Albertus e Sartiano  
*Bibl.*: Li 49
- Cum aggredi rerum physicarum determinare...
- See 'Quoniam aggredi determinare...'
- Cum aggredi sufficienter determinare...
- Raimundus Lull, *Physica nova*  
*Bibl.*: Li 49 — Ss III, 18  
 See 'Cum rerum physicarum principia...'
- Cum aliae sint Caesarum leges...
- Claudius Piquet, *Vita Clementis IV*  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 64
- Cum aliqui dicant...
- Raimundus Lull, *De probatione unitatis Dei*  
*Bibl.*: Li 49
- Cum aliqui dicant quod Christiana Fides...
- Raimundus Lull, *De articulis Fidei*  
*Bibl.*: Li 49 — Ss III, 28 — Srb 7156, 4 — Gm 335 cf
- Cum aliqui existant Christiani qui dicunt...
- Raimundus Lull, *De minori loco ad maiorem*  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 30-31
- Cum aliqui sint qui dicant...
- Raimundus Lull, *De minori loco ad maiorem*  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 30-31
- Cum almus Christi confessor B. Franciscus... Cum autem nostra sit intentio... De primo notandum...
- Joannes Guallensis, *De arte praedicandi*: Paris Arsenal 529 — Paris BN 3243  
*Bibl.*: Li 49 — Pits 343 — Wadding 142 — Lg 147 — Gm 322 — AFH 27 (1934), 552 — CF 5 (1935), 480; 9, 562
- Cum almus Christi confessor B. Franciscus a summo magistro Jesu Christi perfectissime edoctus...
- Joannes Guallensis (?), *De virtutibus et vitiis*  
*Bibl.*: *Traditio* 11 (1955), 280 — Lg 147
- Cum almus Christi confessor Franciscus...
- Michael de Cesena, *Epistola de paupertate et forma habitus*  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 252
- Cum animadverterem quamplurimos se miscere quaestionibus infinitis... Desiderii accepi epistolas...
- Joannes Aegidii Zamorensis, *De correctione Bibliae*  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 26
- Cum Apostolus Paulus...
- Albertus e Sartiano, *De insolentibus corripiendis*  
*Bibl.*: Li 49 — Wadding 8
- Cum apparet de voluntate testatoria

nulla debet fieri voluntatis quaestio...

Joannes de Capistrano, De voluntate testatoris exsequenda

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 189

Cum appropinquasset...

Bertrandus a Turre, Sermones: Assisi Com. 242. 220 ff. (14c)

Cum appropinquasset...

Odo (OFM?), Sermones: Vienna NB 2164, f. 46a-198b. (13c)

Cum appropinquasset...

Otto (de Bueriis?), Sermones: olim Bologna (a.d. 1421)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 5 (1890), 116

Cum appropinquasset... Christi fideles tempus quod hodie incipit durat usque ad Nativitatem...

Ps. Antonius de Padua, Sermones: Troyes 810. (15c)

Cum appropinquasset... Cum praesens Evangelium bis in anno legatur...

(Quidam OFM?), Sermones: Madrid Nac. 4200. 145 ff. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 395

Cum appropinquasset... In hoc Evangelio...

Guillelmus Nottingham, Sermones

*Bibl.*: Pits 433 — Wadding 106 — Ss I, 344 — Li 50

Cum appropinquasset... I hoc Evangelio ostenditur Domino quadruplex honoratio...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 191r-v. (13c)

Cum appropinquasset... Istud Evangelium scribitur Matthaео...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, Sermones  
*Bibl.*: Gm 345 n

Cum appropinquasset... Praesens Evangelium bis in anno legitur, scilicet in Adventu Domini...

Odonis (OFM?), Summa: Toulouse 61, f. 267-348. (12c!)

See 'Cum appropinquasset... Cum praesens...'

Cum appropinquasset... Tempus quod hodie incipitur durat...

Ps. Antonius de Padua, Postilla de Tempore: Vienna NB 3757, f. 49a-95b. (15c) [Antonius de Parma, OP]

See 'Cum appropinquasset... Christi fideles...'

Cum apud nos sint infinita particularia et eorum universalia finita sint...

Raimundus Lull, Ars inveniendi particularia

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 z — Li 50 — Ss III, 12

Cum ars artium sit regimen animarum... Et inter humana exercitia...

Bartholomaeus de Chaimis, Confessionale: Oxford Bodleian Can. Misc. 267 — Bologna Arch. A. 241. (15c) — ed. Milan 1480

*Bibl.*: Li 50 — Wadding 37

Cum ars maior (magna) praedicatio- nis quae sic intitulatur...

Raimundus Lull, Ars praedicabilis

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 gf — Li 50 — Ss III, 26

Cum autem B. Franciscus turbatus esset de statu et vita Fratrum anxio spiritu...

Responsio Dei ad S. Franciscum: London BM Harley 913, f. 43b

Cum autem ieiunas unge caput tuum...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo: Worcester Cath. F. 5, f. 52a-54c

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), clii

Cum autem nostra sit intentio, ut dictum est, aliqua authentica...

See 'Cum almus Christi confessor... Cum autem...'

Cum Averroes fuerit valde sensibilis...

Raimundus Lull, Contra errores Averrois: Rome Naz. Vitt. Eman. 244, f. 75vb-81vb. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 46 (1934),

- 260 — Li 50 — Gm 335 fi —  
Ss III, 40
- Cum B. Antonius unctione devote sus-  
ciperet Psalmos poenitentiales...  
Officium Translationis S. Antonii:  
Florence Ricc. 231, f. 48r-50v.  
(15c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 120
- Cum B. Franciscus de S. Jacobo re-  
diens...  
Chronicon XXIV Generalium  
*Bibl.*: Li 50
- Cum B. Franciscus esset in eodem  
monte...  
De S. Francisco  
*Bibl.*: Brit Soc Fr St 5, 13
- Cum beatissimae famulae Dei Eliza-  
beth longe lateque fama diffusa cla-  
resceret...  
Ordo canonizationis B. Eliza-  
beth: Charleville 115. (13c)
- Cum beatissimus Pater noster Fran-  
ciscus velut patriarcha Jacob se in  
gentem magnam crescere...  
Passio SS. Berardi, etc.  
*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 3 (1897), 579-  
616 = text — Li 50
- Cum Christiani dicant Deum agere  
bonum...  
Raimundus Lull, De bono et malo  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 hw
- Cum Christianos fideles...  
Raimundus Lull, De reprobatione  
errorum Averrois  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 199; 201 — Li 50
- Cum Christus fuerit unum supposi-  
tum...  
Raimundus Lull, Quaestiones  
Thom. Atrebatensis  
*Bibl.*: Gm 335 cc — Ss III, 32
- Cum circa utilia studere debeamus...  
Guillelmus Woodford (?), De vir-  
tutibus: Bologna Arch. A. 520,  
f. 284. (15c) — Oxford Bodleian  
Can. Misc. 519  
*Bibl.*: Li 50 — Ss II, 127 = Guill.  
Peraldus, OP — Traditio 11  
(1955), 280
- Cum clamarem ad Dominum...  
Petrus Sulphini, De hierarchia  
angelica (opus II)  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 193
- Cum collectionis huius quae potest  
dici summa collectionum...  
Joannes Guallensis, Communi-  
loquium: Worcester Cath. F. 114,  
f. 101-160b. (15c) — Valencia  
Cath. 44, f. 11. (14c); 135. 96 ff.  
(14c) — Assisi Com. 397, f. 1-  
310. (14c) — Vat. lat. 1018,  
f. 11. (15c) — Florence Naz. II,  
VI, 1, f. 191-256. (13c) — Alco-  
baça CCLXIX/272, f. 1. (14c)  
— Laon 356. (15c) — Rome  
Angel. 490, f. 56-185. (14c) —  
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592; 667 — Naples Brancacciana  
I. F. 7, f. 109r — Cambridge Pe-  
terhouse 237 — London BM Ro-  
yal 6 B. xi, f. 155. (14c) — Klos-  
terneuberg 320, f. 1-116v. (14c);  
328, f. 133-304. (15c) — Vat.  
Urb. 510, f. 25. (15c) — *olim*  
Turin Naz. DCCXCVIII. e. II.  
35. 193 ff. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Wadding 142 — Arch Iber  
Amer 36 (1933), 173-4 CF 13  
(1943), 50 — Ss II, 84  
See 'Cum doctor sive praedica-  
tor...'
- Cum confessor idoneus...  
Joannes Durandus, De septem  
peccatis mortalibus  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 68
- Cum contra paupertatem Evangeli-  
cam per seraphicum Christi confes-  
sorem Franciscum...  
Quidam OFM, De paupertate  
Franciscana  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 66
- Cum David dicat particeps...  
Michael Francisci, Determinatio  
quodlibetalis: Vienna NB 4727,  
f. 1a-16b. (15c)
- Cum de infrascriptis aquis...  
Elias de Cortona, Vade mecum:



Manchester Ryland's 65, f. 123r-125v

*Bibl.*: AFH 20 (1927), 306

Cum de ponderibus utilis sit distinctio...

Rogerus Bacon, De ponderibus

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 64

Cum de sanguine Christi, Beatissime Pater... Cupientes ut tenemur — Sicut Dei verbum...

Franciscus de Savona (de Ruvere), De sanguine Christi: Madrid Nac. 6294, f. 11-124v. (1480) — Vat. lat. 1051, f. 11. (15c); 1052. 76 ff. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 45 (1933), 375

See 'Cum nuper, Beatissime Pater...'

Cum de vita et moribus...

Vita S. Elizabeth: Vienna NB 3828, f. 233a-261b. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Li 50 = Theodorus de Appoldia

Cum debeamus apes imitari...

See 'Cum enim debeamus apes imitari...'

Cum Dei adiutorio intendo...

Nicolaus de Lyra, Disputatio contra Judaeos

*Bibl.*: Bale 130v — Li 51

Cum deposuisset Esther vestes regias...

(Quidam OFM?), Sermo: Udine Com. 7, f. 83-87. (1463)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 3 (1888), 74

Cum desiderans et iacens...

Raimundus Lull, De intentionibus

*Bibl.*: Li 51

Cum Deus creasset...

Raimundus Lull, De inveniendo Deo

*Bibl.*: Li 51

Cum Deus hominem creaverit ad se cognoscendum et amandum, et ad se multum cognoscendum et amandum...

Raimundus Lull, De cognitione Dei: Vat. Urb. 1506, f. 64. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Li 51

Cum Deus principaliter creaverit hominem...

Raimundus Lull, Pro conversione infidelium

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 31-2

Cum Deus sit in summo gradu amabilis...

Raimundus Lull, De voluntate: Rome Naz. Vitt. Eman. Fond. minori 1832, f. 666r-717v. (16c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 46 (1934), 266 — Gm 335 dc — Ss III, 14

Cum dicant aliqui se non posse intelligere naturaliter Deum esse infiniti vigoris, mundum esse novum...

Raimundus Lull, De modo naturali intelligendi

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 14

Cum dicant quidam Deum naturaliter esse infiniti vigoris...

Raimundus Lull, De modo naturali intelligendi: Rome Naz. Vitt. Eman. Fond. minori 1832, f. 200r-237v. (16c)

*Bibl.*: Estudis Franc 46 (1934), 264 — Gm 335 ex

Cum difficultas verbalis multum impedit animum a speculatione veritatis...

Franciscus de Mayronis, De usu terminorum: Vienna NB 4291, f. 1a-4b. (15c) — Leipzig Univ. 1525, f. 17a-26a. (15c) — Cracow Univ. 2130, f. 16b-18d. (15c) — Copenhagen Kgl. S. 620

*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 422 — Src 1342, 1 — Studi e Testi 122 (1946), 434 — Studi Franc 7 (32) (1935), 286 — RTAM 19 (1952), 336 — Li 51 — Roth 214

Cum dilexisset suos qui erant in mundo...

Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo: Klosterneuberg 450, f. 203r-v. (13c)

Cum doctor sive praedicator Evangelicus... Est autem res publica, ut dictum est...

Joannes Guallensis, Summa collectionum: Douai 451, f. 62. (15c) [*incomplete*] — Madrid Nac. 1470, f. 11a-201vb. (14c) — Vienna NB 4965. 260 ff. (15c) — Worcester Cath. Q. 27, f. 8-135b. (15c) — Graz Univ. 74, f. 11-109r; 1471-300r; 592; 667 — Escorial L. III. 7, f. 11. (15c) — Venice S. Marco VII, 24. 144 ff. (14c) — Oxford Balliol 274, f. 1-130. (1409)

*Bibl.*: Arch Iber Amer 36 (1933), 174 — Wadding 142 — Gm 322a — AFH 27 (1934), 551 — Ss II, 84; 391 — Lg 145 — Traditio 11 (1955), 281

See 'Cum collectionis huius quae potest...'

Cum dominus Cadii Tunisi...

Raimundus Lull, De Deo et suis qualitatibus

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 id — Ss III, 41

Cum dominus Martinus lector Minorum legeret seu exposuerat Misam, in prologo suo recitavit ista...

(Quidam OFM?), Expos. divini Officii: Vienna NB 350, f. 32rb-103ra. (14c)

*Bibl.*: Anton 18 (1943), 164

Cum Ecclesia utilia...

Guillelmus Woodford (?), De virtutibus: Assisi Com. 587, f. 112-261. (14c)

See 'Cum circa utilia studere debeamus...'

Cum ego Raimundus de Insula Maioricarum iam praeteritis temporibus pluries libros secretos...

Raimundus Lull, Epistola accurationis: Florence Ricc. 390 (N. III. 11), f. 451-48r; 942, f. 161-211. (16c) — Toledo Cath. 96-32, f. 841-v. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 kz — Li 51 —

AFH 2 (1909), 320; 3, 556 — Arch Iber Amer 7 (1920), 94; 13, 94 — Estudis Franc 46 (1934), 370

Cum ego Raimundus (Ilerdae existens dudum) rogatus affectuose... Domine Jesu Christe qui es vera salus...

Raimundus Lull, Ars operativa medica: Liège Univ. 354, f. 248ra-249vb. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 jx — Li 52 — AFH 5 (1912), 747

Cum ego Rogerus rogatus a pluribus sapientibus...

Rogerus Bacon, Tractatus trium verborum

*Bibl.*: Li 51 — Ss III, 68

Cum eiecta esset turba intravit Jesus... In his verbis quattuor considerande occurrit...

Bonaventura, Sermones

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 179

Cum elevasset Moyses manum... In isto verbo mystice intellecto secundum expositionem Sanctorum...

Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo

*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), cxlii

Cum enim circa res domesticas...

Joannes Guallensis, Floriloquium

*Bibl.*: Li 52 — Wadding 142 — Pits 343

Cum enim debeamus apes imitari...

Cum ex vita Gentilium... Circa primum notandum quod diversimode...

Joannes Guallensis, Floriloquium philosophorum: Cambridge Corpus Christi 307, f. 1. (14c) — Worcester Cath. Q. 72, f. 1-34 — Assisi Com. 397, f. 311-358 — Naples Brancacciana I. F. 7, f. 69r. (14c) — Florence Ricc. 1230 (M. II. 7). (14c)

*Bibl.*: Lg 145-6 — Pits 343 — Gm 332 c — AFH 3 (1910), 747; 27, 551 — Ss II, 84; 87 — Wadding 142

Cum enim ego Raimundus Ileride existens...

See 'Cum ego Raimundus...'

Cum enim fides sit...

Jacobus de Benevento, De articulis Fidei

*Bibl.*: CF 10 (1940), 294

Cum enim id quod iuste petitur istud denegari non possit...

Joannes de Utino, Compilatio librorum Bibliae

*Bibl.*: Srb 5025

Cum essem grandis...

Raimundus Lull (?), Desolatio

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 41

Cum essem in medio captivorum iuxta flumen Chobar... Conscendere cum Paulo volentibus...

Petrus Joannis Olivi, Ezechielis cap. I: Vat. lat. 918, after f. 74v. (14c) — Naples Naz. VII. F. 21, f. 11-111r

*Bibl.*: AFH 28 (1935), 165 — Ss I, 179 s. n. Bonaventura — Gm 305 cm; 327 a — Srb 6681

Cum esset sero factum, erat navis...

Antonius de Bitonto, Sermo: Verona Com. 779, f. 246a

*Bibl.*: Franc Stud 13 (1953), 195

Cum ex lege naturae pariter et scripturis...

See 'Reverendi magistri et domini, cum ex lege...'

Cum ex mandato Sedis Apostolicae...

Joannes de Plano Carpinis, De moribus Tartarorum

*Bibl.*: Li 53 — Wadding 149

Cum ex vita Gentilium...

See 'Cum enim debeamus apes imitari...'

Cum ex vita infidelium...

Joannes Guallensis, Compendiloquium de vitis philosophorum

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 84

Cum exemplo B. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos... Primum capitulum: quid sit respublica...

Joannes Guallensis, Summa col-

lectionum: Klosterneuberg 320, f. 1-116v. (14c)

See 'Cum doctor sive praedicator...'

Cum fortis armatus custodit atrium suum in pace sunt omnia quae possidet...

Joannes de Capistrano, De bello spirituali

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 25 (1925), 164-5

Cum Frater quidam domesticus Fra. Aegidio diceret...

Bartholomaeus de Pisis, Exempla De conformitatibus: Prague Metropol. B XC, f. 267v

*Bibl.*: Anal Franc 5 (1912), lxxviii

Cum haec sit maior ars praedicationis...

Raimundus Lull, Ars maior praedicationis

*Bibl.*: Srb 7155 — Li 53 — Gm 335 gd — Wadding 200

Cum homo sit creatus ad cognoscendum...

Raimundus Lull, "De milis pro-verbis"

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 cs

Cum humanus intellectus sit imperfectus...

Raimundus Lull, De intelligere Dei

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 hg

Cum humanus intellectus sit vilipensus ab hominibus...

Raimundus Lull, L. demonstrationum

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 p — Li 53 — Ss III, 14

Cum ieiunatis...

Antonius de Luca, Quadragesimale

*Bibl.*: Ss I, 83

Cum ieiunatis...

Antonius, De casibus: Perugia Com. Ant. fondo 565. (15c)

Cum ieiunatis...

Philippus de Montecalerio, Qua-

- dragesimale: *olim* Milan Saint-Eustorge a. d. 1494  
*Bibl.*: Arch Frat Praed 25 (1955), 31 — Ss II, 145
- Cum ieiunatis... Alpha et Omega, principium et finis...  
 Marcus de Monte, De figura vitae aeternae  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 210
- Cum ieiunatis... Apparet ex multiplici experimento...  
 Franciscus de Abbate, Quadragesimale: Graz Univ. 709, f. 11-146r  
*Bibl.*: CF 13 (1943), 58  
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rari. Primum est...  
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 Raimundus Lull, De 7 donis Spiritus S.  
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nostrae tabulae...

Raimundus Lull, *S. Tabulam generalem*

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 bd — Li 62 —  
Ss III, 13

Cum tota causa commotionis...

Raimundus Gaufredi, *Petitiones*

*Bibl.*: AFH 42 (1949), 215

Cum transieris per aquas... Haec pos-  
sunt esse verba Dei ad B. Clemen-  
tem...

Quidam OFM, *Sermo*: Paris BN  
14947, f. 19; 15005, f. 133

*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 248

Cum turba plurima convenirent...

Dictum est supra Dominica V post  
Epiphaniam...

Petrus Aureoli, *Sermones*: Assisi  
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*Bibl.*: Gm 351 j — AFH 27 (1934),  
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Cum universalium cognitio...

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*Bibl.*: Franc Stud 12 (1952),  
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Hugolinus de Donorio de Ferrara,  
*Sermones*: Assisi Com. 248. 132  
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Cum utilioribus intentio...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, *Triglossum*

*Bibl.*: Srb 5978 — Gm 345 y  
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Cum vani sint homines omnes... Licet  
in priori tractatulo...

Joannes Guallensis, *Breviloquium  
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louse 340. (14c) — London BM  
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322 d — AFH 27 (1934), 551-2

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Joannes Kanneman, *De libertate  
confessionum audiendi*: Wolfen-  
buettel Helmst. 550, f. 170v-  
172r. (1457)

*Bibl.*: Fz St 36 (1954), 304

Cum velimus tradere introductorium  
artis demonstrativae...

Raimundus Lull, *Introductorium  
artis demonstrativae*

*Bibl.*: Gm 335 v — Ss III, 11

Cum venerit... Hic primo quaeritur  
utrum divina natura potuerit uniri  
cum humana...

Joannes de Erfordia (?), *III Sent.*:  
Faenza Com. 25. (15c)

Cum venerit Filius hominis... In istis  
verbis describitur iudicis apparitio...

Bertrandus (de Turre?), *De iudi-  
cio extremo*: Breslau Stat-Univ.  
I. F. 135, f. 38v-39v

*Bibl.*: CF 13 (1943), 43

Cum venerit Paraclitus... In Evan-  
gelio hodierno circa radices omnium  
malorum dat nobis haec Dominus  
duo...

Odo de Brueriis, *Sermo*: Paris BN  
14947, f. 238; 15005, f. 123

*Bibl.*: Hn IV, 210

Cum venerit Paraclitus... Quia Domi-  
nus in die Ascensionis...

(Quidam OFM?), *Sermo*: Bolo-  
gna Arch. A. 62, after f. 123v.  
(15c)

Cum venerit quod perfectum est... In  
primitiva Ecclesia illi qui de Judai-  
smis...

Nicolaus de Lyra, *Postilla in Ad  
Hebraeos*: Namur Mus. Arch 31,  
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Univ. 33, f. 141rb-195va; 142,  
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*Bibl.*: Srb 5915 — Gm 345 f —  
AFH 5 (1912), 744-5; 6, 552

Cum venisset una vidua pauper misit  
duò minuta quod est quadrans...

- Ricardus Rufus de Cornubia,  
I-III Sent.: Oxford Balliol 62,  
f. 6-103. (13c)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 161 —  
Src 723
- Cum venit... Circa partem istam quae-  
runtur duo principaliter...
- Guillelmus de Mara, III Sent.:  
Florence Naz. F. 5. 728  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 124
- Cum venit... Hic primo quaeritur  
utrum divina natura potuerit uniri  
cum humana...
- S. III-IV Bonaventurae: Bologna  
Univ. 2907 (1575), f. 11-407r  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 110  
Compare 'Cum venerit... Hic  
primo quaeritur...'
- Cum venit plenitudo...
- III Sent. (Abbreviatio Bonaven-  
turae): Assisi Com. 285, f. 184
- Cum venit plenitudo... Distinctio I.  
Quaeritur utrum divina natura po-  
tuerit uniri cum humana...
- III Sent. (Abbreviatio Bonavent.)  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 105 —  
Src 125
- Cum venit plenitudo... Hic intendit  
Magister qualiter nos Deus Christo  
convivificavit...
- III Sent. (Abbreviatio Bonaven-  
turae)  
*Bibl.*: Src 126
- Cum venit plenitudo... In quibus ver-  
bis Doctor Gentium loquens sapien-  
tiam inter perfectos...
- Epitome III-IV Bonaventurae  
*Bibl.*: Src 127
- Cum venit plenitudo... Primo quae-  
ritur utrum divina natura potuerit  
uniri cum humana...
- III Sent. (Abbreviatio Bonaven-  
turae)  
*Bibl.*: Src 128 — AFH 47 (1954),  
105
- Cum venit plenitudo... Quia sicut di-  
cit Magister: Filii Dei missio est  
ipsa eius Incarnatio...
- Joannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio  
lecturae Paris.: Valencia Cath. 139  
*Bibl.*: Src 430
- Cum verbum sit medium...
- Raimundus Lull, Ars rhetoricae  
*Bibl.*: Li 62 — Ss III, 16 —  
Gm 335 cp
- Cum vero fama bonitatis...
- Miraculum S. Elizabeth Thuringiae  
*Bibl.*: Li 62
- Cum vestrae sanctissimae Paterni-  
tati...
- Raimundus Gaufredi, etc., Peti-  
tiones  
*Bibl.*: AFH 42 (1949), 215 —  
Bibl Franc Schol 9 (1935), xlvii =  
= Gonsalvus Hispanus — Ss III,  
161 s. n. Vitalis a Furno
- Cum videris nudum operi eum... Vide  
hodie oculis mentis Salvatorem pro  
te nudum in Cruce pendentem...
- Conradus de Saxonia, Sermo:  
Klosterneuberg 450, f. 218r-v.  
(13c)
- Cum videritis abominationem deso-  
lationis...
- Ps. Bonaventura, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: S. Bonaventurae Opera  
Omnia IX, 452, ftn. 7
- Cum videritis abominationem deso-  
lationis... In isto Evangelio in quo  
est consummatio et finis...
- Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Sermo  
*Bibl.*: Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935),  
cxlii
- Cum vitam B. Elizabeth eo modo quo  
apud nos habetur relegendo...
- Vita S. Elizabeth Thuringiae  
*Bibl.*: Li 62
- Cum zelus noster...
- Raimundus Lull (?), De proba-  
tione Fidei Catholicae  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 31
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- Utrum in divinis essentialia sint  
immediatiora...
- Joannes Duns Scotus, Quaestio-

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*Bibl.*: Gm 344 s — Bibl Thom 5 (1925), 218 ss
- Cupiens te et alios sapientia dignos excitare et disponere ad scientiam Perspectivae, scias actores multos...  
 Rogerus Bacon, *Perspectiva*: Florence Ricc. 885, f. 144r-198v. (14c)  
*Bibl.*: Pits 367 — Li 63 — AFH 3 (1910), 554 — Leland, *Comm. de Scriptt. Brit.* II, 258
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*Bibl.*: Gm 344 r — Src 421
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 Andreas de Novo Castro, *Sent.*: ed. Paris 1514  
*Bibl.*: Src 67 — AFH 47 (1954), 101
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*Sent.* secundum opinionem Petri Aureoli  
*Bibl.*: Src 662
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Circa Prooemium I libri Sententiarum quaeritur primo utrum primum principium...  
 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus I-IV Sent.*  
*Bibl.*: Ss I, 283-4 — Src 218 — AFH 47 (1954), 114
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Hic incipit liber qui dicitur Sententiarum, et dividitur iste liber...  
 Nicolaus Lakmann, *Sent.*: Vat. lat. 4289, f. 11-112r
- Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 148 423
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Hic liber primaria sui divisione dividitur in tres partes...  
 Jacobus de Trisancto, *Abbreviatio Ric. de Mediavilla*: Assisi Com. 148 — Florence Naz. Conv. Soppr. F. 3. 606  
*Bibl.*: Src 396 — AFH 19 (1926), 843; 47, 132 — Ss II, 21
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 Gualterus de Bruges, I *Sent.*: Cracow Univ. 1436, f. 1-174 — Todi 42  
*Bibl.*: AFH 45 (1954), 120
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*Bibl.*: Anton 19 (1944), 59
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*Bibl.*: Compare Src 309 = Hannibaldus de Hannibaldis, OP
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Huic operi Magister praemittit prologum, sicut et epilogum subnectit...  
 Joannes Pecham, *Prologus Sent.*: Zwettl 211, f. 11-rv  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 140, 427 — Src 1406
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Huic operi Magister praemittit prooemium...  
 I *Sent.* (*Abbreviatio Bonavent.*)  
*Bibl.*: Src 129
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Huic operi quod Sententiarum appellatur, auctor eius qui Petrus Lombardus...



- Antonius de Bitonto, I Sent.  
*Bibl.*: Src 73  
 See 'Cum plurima praeconiis et immensis laudibus...'
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... In isto Prologo possunt tangi quaestiones de veritate propter illum textum...  
 Petrus de Anglia (?), I Sent.: Ravenna Class. 472  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 150 — Bibl Franc Schol 11 (1935), lxxxviii
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Liber iste Sententiarum dividitur in tres partes principales...  
 Petrus ad Boves, Sent.  
*Bibl.*: Src 656 — AFH 47 (1954), 152
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Liber iste Sententiarum dividitur in tres partes principales...  
 Nicolaus Lakmann, Sent.: Breslau Univ. 1 Q. 54; 14 Q. 15  
*Bibl.*: Src 587 — AFH 47 (1954), 148
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Liber Sententiarum quem prae manibus... Veteris — Finito prooemio...  
 Christianus de Hiddestorp, Sent.: Goettingen Univ. Theol. 149, f. 228-352  
*Bibl.*: Src 163
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Magister Sententiarum in principio prologi sui, sicut doctor humilis...  
 Theobaldus de Narnia, Brevis sententia Sent.: Assisi Com. 191. 130 ff. (14c) — Rome Angel. 1174. 106 ff. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 115 — Src 1349 — AFH 47 (1954), 169
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Magister Sententiarum volens scribere — Veteris — Post prooemium...  
 Matthias Doering I, III-IV Sent.: Munich Clm 8997, f. 11-110; 170-219  
*Bibl.*: Src 532
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Per penuriam quae attenditur in rebus exterioribus et acquisitis...  
 Odo (Raimundus?) Rigaldi, Sent.: Troyes 1206 — Vat. Borgh. 374, f. 1r-147r  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 295 — Src 1317 — CF 13 (1943), 40\*
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Praemittit Magister huic totali libro prologum, qui dividitur...  
 Abbreviatio I Sent. Bonaventurae  
*Bibl.*: Src 130 — AFH 47 (1954), 105-6
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Quae-ritur de subiecto theologiae. Et quod sit Deus videtur...  
 Nicolaus de Anglia, Sent.  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 146 ss
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Super litteram...  
 Petrus de Anglia (?), I Sent.: Ravenna Class. 472  
*Bibl.*: Src 652 — Gm 318 ap 338\* d
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Totali libro praemittit Magister prologum in quo tangit causas...  
 Bonaventura, Quaestiones litterales: Paris BN 3185, f. 1-139  
*Bibl.*: Src 112
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Totali libro praemittit mihi prologum...  
 Ricardus Rufus, Sent.  
*Bibl.*: Ss III, 48
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Sed quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Opus agere praesumpsimus...  
 Abbreviatio Bonaventurae I, II, IV  
*Bibl.*: AFH 47 (1954), 106
- Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam...  
 Guillelmus de Missali, Tabula in Scoti Oxon.  
*Bibl.*: Src 291 — AFH 47 (1954), 124

Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Utrum  
praeter disciplinas philosophicas sit  
necessaria...

Ps. Petrus Aureoli, *Compendium  
Bonaventurae* I-IV

*Bibliae*: Src 663 — Gm 351 I —  
AFH 27 (1934), 563; 47, 153

Cupientes aliquid de penuria... Vide-  
licet quaeritur de hoc quod di-  
cit... Creationem — Ad intelligen-  
tiam...

*Abbreviatio Bonaventurae* I-II

*Bibl.*: Src 131

Cupientes te et alios...

Rogerus Bacon (*Opus maius*,  
P. VI)

*Bibl.*: Ss III, 66

Cupientes ut tenemur quaestiones  
de Christi sanguine...

Franciscus de Ruvere, *De san-  
guine Christi*: Vat. Urbin. 151,  
f. 6. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Li 63 — Wadding 211

Cupienti mihi, reverendissimi Eccle-  
siae principes ceterique colendissimi  
viri...

Franciscus de Florentia, *Oratio  
ad clerum Romanum*: Florence  
Naz. Landau-Finaly 152, f. 71r-  
73v

*Bibl.*: AFH 49 (1956), 91

Cur mihi nunc desunt optate in car-  
mina vires...

Joannes de Capistrano, *Episto-  
lae*: Capistrano Bibl. OFM X,  
f. 349a-350b. (15c)

*Bibl.*: Misc Franc 5 (1890), 10

Cur mundus militat sub vana gloria /  
Cuius prosperitas est transitoria...

Jacobus de Tuderto (?), *De con-  
temptu mundi*: Vienna NB 4459,  
f. 110a-b. (15c) — Venice S. Mar-  
co VII, 33 (L. III, XXVII), f. 71.  
— London BM Royal 8 B. vi,  
f. 29. (16c); 8. B. xvii, f. 6

*Bibl.*: Wadding 122 — Pits 284 =  
= Gualterus Mapes — Misc Franc  
38 (1938), 483-4 = text

Cura est onerosa atque sollicita custo-  
dia...

Ps. Nicolaus de Lyra, *De cura  
clericali*

*Bibl.*: Gm 345 bd

Currens post odorem virtutum B.  
Francisci, grex devotus eius habuit  
virum mirabilem...

De B. Aegidio Assisi.

*Bibl.*: AFH 1 (1908), 274-7 = text

Currite undique gentes et miramini...

Jacobus Mediolanensis (?), *Sti-  
mulus amoris*: Assisi Com. 438,  
f. 132-139. (13-14c) — Upsala  
Univ. C. 77, f. 147r-157r. (15c) —  
Stockholm Kongl. Bibl. A. 9,  
f. 138v-181v. (15c) — Bruges  
303, f. 82r-137v — Paris BN  
14923, f. 310. (13c) — Oxford  
Bodleian 475; Laud. Misc. 181 —  
Madrid Nac. 9536, f. 1ra-va.  
(14c) [*fragment*] — Karlsburg  
Cath. 310 — Klosterneuberg 251,  
f. 85-98. (14c) — Escorial d. IV.  
16, f. 80. (15c) — St. Bonaven-  
ture (N. York) 1, f. 2-25v. (15c)  
*Bibl.*: Ss II, 13, 14 — Bibl Franc  
Ascet IV, vii-vii — Ks 69, 71 —  
CF 7 (1937), 244; 8, 405-6; 13,  
49 — Anton 20 (1945), 445 —  
Wadding 47 — Li 63 — Estudis  
Franc 45 (1933), 382 — Hn III,  
308 — AFH 52 (1959), 142 —  
Faye-Bond, *Supplement...*, 409

Custodem ac patrem nostrae religionis.  
Quamquam nos omnes, clarissimi  
Patres...

*Exhortatio in Capitulo Penteco-  
stes*: Naples Naz. V. F. 18,  
f. 130v-135v

*Bibl.*: AFH 15 (1922), 389

Custodi nos, Domine, ut pupillam  
oculi. Pupilla humor est crystalli-  
nus vel glacialis...

Joannes Guallensis, *De oculo mo-  
rali*: Assisi Com. 442, f. 1-55.  
(14c)

*Bibl.*: Ss II, 86

## CORRESPONDENCE

I take this opportunity to apologize to my colleague Prof. James Marrow for having forgotten to acknowledge in my essay on the *Officium Passionis Domini* (FRANCISCAN STUDIES, Vol. 34, Annual XII, 1974, pp. 144-199) comments about the artistic quality of the miniatures which he was kind enough to provide for me in typescript form. The omission was unintentional and I deeply regret it.

SANDRO STICCA

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- Nyhus, Paul L. *The Franciscans in South Germany, 1400-1530: Reform and Revolution*. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 65, Part 8. 47 pp.; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The American Philosophical Society, 1975.



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